“Rural Development Enclaves”

Commuter Mining, Landowners, and Trafficked Women

In 2000, I was in school, in grade four, and they came to get me, and I got married. They came from Porgera. [And did you know him? Had you met him?] No, I didn't know him. His kin just came and got me. I didn't know what he was like, his living situation—I knew nothing about him. [So how did you come to marry him?] His kin just came and got me. They came to my family and described him to my parents and said to them, “Come get your bridewealth. It will be a lot.” [So you didn't know him at all. How did he know about you?] Some of my kin were living in Porgera. He is a landowner, and they were living on his land. And he told them that he wanted a wife from them. And so my kin told him about me and said they would go get me for him. . . . And all they said to me was, “Oh, he's a wealthy landowner in Porgera. You'll live free. You'll have money. Oh, you'll live so well. You won't have to work in the fields. You'll eat lots of food from stores. You won't have to take care of pigs. Here in the bush you have to take care of pigs, and look at your hands and feet, covered with scars and callouses. If you marry this man you'll be able to sit down and rest. You'll live on money.” It was all a con.

[Oh. So was it true what they had told you—that you would live on money and wouldn't have to plant sweet potato anymore?] No, it was all a con. There was a huge sweet potato field that I had to take care of all by myself. And another field that I used for growing extra produce that I sold. I worked really hard—I would get up early and go straight to the garden and work.

And my husband would sometimes follow me, sneak around in the ditches surrounding my gardens, and spy on me. He was jealous. He was always fucking around with other women, and this made him suspect that I might also be cheating. But I could always feel that someone was watching me, and a few times I caught him and I confronted him. I would yell out so anyone could hear, “Hey, why are you spying on me?! Are you my husband or are you some pervert criminal? Am I your wife or am I some young, unmarried girl that you are spying on?” So I shamed him for spying on me, and he would get angry that I’d caught him and was shaming him, and so a couple of times we fought in the field. The house too, we often fought at the house. [So you would hit him?]. Of course I did! I hit him. I whacked his legs with a spade. I cut his
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arm with a knife. I hit him in the balls. He had to go to the hospital plenty of times because of me. I would yell, “What—you think I don't have hands?! You have hands to hit me? Well, I have hands too!” That's what I would say to him. He was always sleeping around with other women, but I didn't do anything wrong, and he would come and hit me. So I hit him back—I cut him. I would say, “I might have lost a lot of weight and look small, but I can still hit you and cut you. I'm the one who works in the garden every day—I have a lot of strength to beat you.”

[You had lost weight?] Oh, my sister (here Pamela shifted into the song-like register Huli women use to indicate sorrowful lament), my body didn't use to look like this, ohhh. My husband was always going around with outside women, oh, ohhh. And my body changed completely, ohhh. I lost a lot of weight and I was sick all the time, oh, ohhh. (Shifting back to normal speech) And I wanted to go get a blood test at the hospital, but my husband said, “Why?” and he refused to go. And then I had a baby, and when it was four months old, it died. I took good care of it, but it died. So then I started to worry—this baby died, and I was sick all the time, and I developed lots of sores on my legs.

—PAMELA

I always asked the HIV-positive people I interviewed how they thought they had come to be infected, and resource extraction—gold, oil, and natural gas projects—was at the heart of the stories of eight of the thirty women. I return to Pamela later in this chapter, but here I want to highlight some significant themes in her narrative, because they point to the multiple pathways between resource extraction and HIV infection in Papua New Guinea. First is the figure of the “landowner”—or papa bilong graun (father/custodian of the land)—an identity category that has emerged from and become solidified by Papua New Guinea’s resource-extraction policies and practices, particularly the need for mining companies to have social entities, represented by specific persons, with whom to negotiate and to whom to provide benefits, such as royalties or compensation for the loss of land (Jorgensen 2001; Golub 2007a, 2007b, 2014; Jacka 2015). The landowner is a potent and multivalent symbol in the national imagination—landowners are envied, admired, and reviled. They are also economically and socially powerful people (almost always male) who can exert political influence, not only on their own communities, but also nationally or even internationally.

In Pamela’s narrative, I would draw particular attention to the way that less powerful migrant Huli men attempt to overcome their “mining marginalization” (Jacka 2001: 46) by using women as a kind of tribute, cultivating or cementing ties
to Porgeran landowners through marriage, a strategy that makes these women vulnerable to HIV. Pamela was her husband’s third wife, so also important to note is the way that mining wealth is converted by landowners into additional wives and extramarital sexual liaisons (i.e., “outside women”), which not only exacerbates HIV vulnerability, but also generates marital distrust and suspicion that can erupt into violence. Finally, I would note women’s determination, despite being structurally disadvantaged and vulnerable, to stand up for themselves both verbally and physically, a strongly socialized characteristic of Huli women (Wardlow 2006a).

In this chapter I analyze these resource-extraction sites—often referred to euphemistically in Papua New Guinea’s HIV/AIDS policy literature as “rural development enclaves”—as spaces that produce HIV vulnerability. Some of the factors at play—a predominantly male workforce, the circulation of large amounts of cash, and the in-migration of women hoping to find transactional sexual partners—are not surprising and have been discussed in the rich literature about mining, migration, and HIV, particularly in South Africa (Campbell 2000; Crush et al. 2005, 2010). However, I argue additionally that the particular constellation of laws and policies that guide mineral and petroleum extraction in Papua New Guinea—such as “commuter mining” and the figure of the landowner—create a sexual economy that differs somewhat from the models of mining and HIV risk that are now canonical in the social science literature.

“NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ENCLAVES”

One might wonder what a “rural development enclave” is in Papua New Guinea. In the multi-million dollar Asian Development Bank (ADB) “HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control in Rural Development Enclaves Project,” a rural development enclave is defined as “a particular area in a rural setting that has a significant private sector investment employing a relatively large number of people, has become a cash economy amongst a generally subsistence rural economy in the surrounding communities, and typically has become the major, or only, economic driver in the area” (ADB 2006a: 3). In other words, an enclave is defined geographically as a remote, rural site where a resource development project has created or massively intensified a cash economy and is, along with its affiliated subcontracting companies (e.g., trucking, janitorial, mess halls catering for employees), almost the only source of money in the area. Migration isn’t specified in the ADB definition, but implicit is that a rural enclave is like a centripetal mass, with large numbers of cash- and opportunity-poor people moving to it from outlying areas. Porgera’s population increased from approximately ten thousand in 1991, when the Porgera gold mine had just opened, to fifty thousand in 2010, almost all due to in-migration, Jerry Jacka estimates (2015: 185). Gender is also not explicitly
mentioned in the above definition, but there are no “rural development enclaves” in Papua New Guinea where women make up the majority of the workforce or the primary recipients of other enclave benefits. Thus, also implicit in this definition is that most of the suddenly available money is in the hands of men, and many of the people drawn to these centripetal sites are women who, unable to gain access to the very few formal opportunities available to them, enter into various kinds of relationships with men to acquire cash.

“Enclave economies” are usually described by scholars as having high levels of formal employment (at least in comparison with surrounding rural areas, where there may be almost no employment) and high levels of foreign investment capital. What distinguishes a “resource-development enclave” economy from other kinds of foreign investment, however, is that value, in the form of the natural resource, is exported out the country, as are many of the skilled and foreign employees’ wages. A defining feature of enclave economies is minimal integration with, or linkages to, the rest of the host country economy; thus, unlike other kinds of foreign investment, they may do little to sustain local industries or alleviate poverty (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007). Dependency theorists have therefore argued that enclave economies are damaging to underdeveloped countries, and while this view has been challenged, it is nevertheless the case that some mineral and petroleum companies have responded to such criticisms by trying to establish more linkages to local industries and businesses (Hansen 2014).

Another defining feature of enclave economies in Papua New Guinea is “commuter mining.” Usually called FIFO—for “Fly-In, Fly-Out,” because employees are typically transported in and out by plane or helicopter—commuter mining is a practice in which non-local employees (both foreign and Papua New Guinean) work very long shifts—typically twelve-hour days—every day for two to six weeks (the length varies enormously and depends on the company, the department, and the particular job), and are then transported for their breaks (also variable in length) back to their point of hire, which might be Cairns for Australian expatriate managerial employees, or cities like Mount Hagen or Port Moresby for non-local Papua New Guinean employees. FIFO has been a highly contested policy at some resource-extraction projects, not only in Papua New Guinea, but also in Australia, in part because it exacerbates the problem of minimal local economic linkages and business spinoffs (McGavin et al. 2001, Storey 2001, Filer and Imbun 2004, Connell 2005, McKenzie 2010). When Porgeran landowners were initially negotiating the Porgera Agreements—the documents signed by the national government, the Enga provincial government, and Porgera landowners that specify the benefits to be received by the community hosting the mine—they explicitly rejected the FIFO model. Instead they demanded the construction of a town in which employees would reside, and they imagined the establishment of an internationally and racially diverse mining community in which non-local staff would
settle with their families for the duration of their contracts (Bonnell 1999; Jacka 2001, 2015).

There were both pragmatic and ideological impulses behind this demand. On the practical side, there was the expectation that the creation of a residential town would immensely benefit local construction businesses, that expatriate residents would spend their salaries on local goods, and that wealthier expatriate residents could demand infrastructural amenities that might benefit everyone, such as recreational facilities. Jerry Jacka (2015) describes an artist's rendering of this envisioned town as having a performing arts theater and a golf course. On the more ideological side, accompanying these expected business spin-offs was a vision of racial equality and concord: rather than white expatriates disappearing back to their well-appointed “real lives” elsewhere and treating Porgera as a remote, unknowable, and undesirable hardship post, expatriate employees would become locals who were invested in the community. “What seems very clear, from the way that local people talk about their foreign guests or tenants, is that they want nothing more (and nothing less) than a condition of equality and mutual respect between themselves and the expatriates who come to excavate their land,” Colin Filer observes (2001: 15). The demand for a residential mining town is therefore not only about desired economic and infrastructural benefits. It is also an assertion about how expatriates (usually white) and Papua New Guinean citizens should live together, and it serves as an opening bid for trying to achieve this.

However, resource-extraction companies in Papua New Guinea generally resist demands that expatriate employees relocate, arguing that relocation will pose major recruiting and retention problems, since expatriate employees will avoid jobs that require their spouses and children to move to places that might put their safety in jeopardy and that do not have adequate educational, health, and recreational facilities. “Where social order remains volatile and opportunity costs of relocation are high, both employers and employees can be expected to seek to minimize physical and social contact with local communities,” McGavin et al. comment (2001: 119); their surveys of non-national employees at eight different mines in Papua New Guinea showed 100 percent approval for FIFO in all but two of the sites (122). The Papua New Guinea Chamber of Mining and Petroleum, which represents the interests of these industries, has therefore consistently and vigorously argued in favor of FIFO. Thus, even in Porgera, where a relatively powerful group of landowners rejected FIFO, both from the outset and in its later negotiations with the mining company, all expatriate and most national employees nevertheless remain on FIFO contracts, and the town as envisioned was never built. Perhaps not surprisingly, the FIFO model is often perceived by local communities as a racist and/or classist rejection of rural Papua New Guineans. Many Huli now sardonically refer to their elected representatives as “FIFO politicians”—
that is, as urban elites who live in Port Moresby and only rarely fly in by helicop-
ter to make a brief visit to their constituencies, much as FIFO expatriate mining
employees only reluctantly, and in exchange for great compensation, agree to work
at mine sites in Papua New Guinea.

The FIFO model creates enclaves with specific social and affective charac-
teristics. For example, in order to compensate for the expense of constantly fly-
ing workers in and out of the country, FIFO employees work “compressed work
schedules,” as the literature euphemistically puts it. That is, as noted above, they
work twelve-hour days for weeks at a time, leaving them exhausted and with little
time or energy to establish feelings of connection to, or even interest in, the places
where mines are located. When I stayed in Suyan, a residential compound of the
Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) gold-mining operation, employees were up by 4 a.m.
in order to have breakfast by 5, catch the shuttle to the mine site at 5:30, and begin
work by 6. When they got off work at 6 p.m., they were in the mess hall by 7 for
dinner, watched rugby on TV or used the gym for an hour, and were in bed by 9.
The men I spoke with—mostly Australians, but some Papua New Guineans—
knew next to nothing about Porgera and expressed no interest in learning about
it. Far from the racially integrated community envisioned by landowners, for most
non-local workers, Porgera is a place they have to go to in order to maintain their
lifestyle at home.

Moreover, resource enclaves and their residential compounds for FIFO
employees tend to be extremely securitized, with high razor-wire fencing, guarded
gates, strict rules about whether and when employees may leave, and, in Porgera,
a number of armed security forces on duty, including company security guards
(443 of them in 2010, according to a Human Rights Watch report); the local Porg-
era police; “mobile squads,” which are, as the name suggests, police units that are
moved from place to place to deal with situations deemed urgent security matters;
and Rapid Deployment Units, created in 1993 to protect national assets such as
mines. These various security forces have mixed and shifting reputations: mobile
squads, for example, are sometimes described as drunken, violent thugs. Intense
securitization, arguably made more necessary by the lack of integration between
the mine and the local community, contributes to HIV vulnerability. Police in
general, and mobile squads in particular, regularly move from one posting to
another, and they have a reputation for cultivating multiple sexual relationships
wherever they are posted. Their mobility and multiple sexual partnerships, as well
as the possibility that they coerce sex from female prisoners and from women who
attempt to report rapes and assaults (Mcleod and Macintyre 2010), suggest that
they are significant actors in Papua New Guinea’s HIV epidemic, and this is likely
intensified in places like Porgera, where there is a very large security contingent.

One woman I interviewed, Theresa, believed she had been infected with HIV
by her Porgeran policeman husband, though she had had many other sexual
partners after she left him, so the source of her infection is unclear. Theresa
journeyed to Porgera when her brother Jethro was marrying his third wife, a woman from a Porgeran landowner family:

We loaded lots and lots of bridewealth pigs into two trucks and drove them all the way to Porgera. And imagine!—I was a village girl. And when we were in Porgera we lived really well: we ate lots of store food and we rode everywhere in trucks. I saw people with lots of money—men with wads of kina shoved into their pockets. And I didn't want to go back—I wanted to stay. So when this policeman said he wanted to marry me, I said yes. [And were you his first wife?] No. He found women and left them, found them and left them. In fact, he already had a wife when I married him, but he didn't tell me this. He tricked me and said he wasn't married.

Probably for lack of additional housing, this policeman attempted to move Theresa in with his first wife, which did not go well:

I arrived, and his first wife stabbed me with a knife. And I stabbed her back, in the neck. [Did she die?] No (laughing). I injured her, but I didn't kill her. She stabbed me when my back was turned, but I turned around and grabbed her knife and poked her in the neck. It was good that I did that, because I really scared her. She was afraid that I would kill her, and so she ran away. Then the house was mine. I lived there for five years.

Most Huli women are taught and encouraged by their mothers, sisters, and other female kin to be physically assertive and to respond to physical aggression, especially from other women, with equal or escalated aggression (Wardlow 2006a). In this case, the first wife's attempt to intimidate Theresa backfired, and she ended up making a hasty retreat, leaving Theresa with dominion over the house. Ultimately, however, Teresa left:

When I lived with him, he would often leave and be gone for a while, and sleep with lots of other women, and he made me sick lots of times. [Do you mean sick with gonorrhea, that kind of illness?] Gonorrhea, other sicknesses, I don't know. I think he infected me with this virus.

Also contributing to the role that intensive securitization can play in creating an HIV risk milieu is the fraught relationship between local residents and security forces. PJV security personnel have shot illegal miners caught inside the mine site, for example, and local communities often retaliate when this happens, which can lead to a vicious cycle of escalating violence. Included in my interviews is a narrative by a Huli woman who said she and a friend had aided a local gang in assaulting two Porgera policemen and stealing their guns: they told the officers that they had missed the last bus home to their village and begged them for a ride, saying they were afraid to walk home after dark. They then lured them into a car-jacking. Moreover, it is now internationally known that PJV security personnel raped Porgeran women who had been caught trespassing and looking for gold on PJV’s waste rock dumps. According to the Human Rights Watch report about
these abuses, a factor that contributed to the guards’ violence was their fear of and anger about violent daily raids on the mine by groups of illegal miners (Human Rights Watch 2011). Thus, as an affective environment, one might characterize the PJV enclave as immersed in fear, anger, and distrust.

SITUATING TARI AMONG THE SURROUNDING ENCLAVES

The Tari area is not itself a “rural development enclave,” but it is located between three major resource-extraction sites, and residents thus can be considered a satellite population of all of them: an oil-drilling project operated by Oil Search Ltd., with a large base in Moro, Southern Highlands Province; the Porgera Joint Venture gold mine, just over the border in Enga Province, north of Hela; and, most recently, ExxonMobil’s PNG LNG, based in Hides, not far from Tari, which was in the construction phase during the final years of my research in 2010–13.

For the resource projects based in Hela Province, Huli receive some benefits, such as preferential hiring, and many Huli men are employed either by the companies themselves or by landowner companies contracted to do specific jobs, such as transport or janitorial services. In contrast, Huli do not receive direct benefits from the PJV gold mine, but many Huli have long-standing ties of ritual, trade, and intermarriage with Ipili people in Enga Province who do receive benefits, and it is these kinds of ties and claims—and not employment at the mine—that bring them to Porgera. Indeed, the few Huli men I knew who had attempted to get jobs with PJV said that they were expected to pay exorbitant bribes in order to be put forward by the hiring committee, controlled by Porgera landowners (see also Jacka 2001: 49). Thus, many Huli migrate to Porgera hoping for economic opportunities—searching for gold in the mine’s waste rock; engaging in artisanal mining; or simply becoming a kind of hanger-on, waiting for economic possibilities to emerge. Having sketched out some general characteristics of “resource development enclaves,” I turn to a discussion of how Moro and Porgera have shaped HIV risk for people residing in the Tari area, especially women.

Oil Search and Moro

The impact of Oil Search’s oil-extraction activities is not immediately felt in Tari, because there is no direct road between Tari and Moro, where Oil Search’s drilling operations are based. Oil Search’s employees therefore tend to travel to other towns, such as Mendi or Mt. Hagen, to spend their wages. However, even if Oil Search’s presence in Tari is not easily felt or seen through its employees’ consumption patterns, it has shaped Tari as an HIV risk milieu: three of the thirty women I interviewed who were on ART had been infected by husbands who worked at Moro, two as employees of Oil Search, and one for a landowner company contracted by Oil Search.
More than many other resource-extraction companies in Papua New Guinea, Oil Search has a reputation for a strong commitment to corporate social responsibility and to addressing health issues, not just for its employees, but also for the communities surrounding its projects. And, compared to ExxonMobil, for example, Oil Search has a far more savvy and astute sensibility regarding community relations, aware that spreading services and goodwill widely, even far beyond the official boundaries of its project sites, is worth the expense for the community support it garners. In the Tari area, for example, Oil Search employees will sometimes give rides to older women carrying heavy loads of sweet potatoes from their gardens (a practice that violates the rule against non-employees in their vehicles), and although they refuse to give in to the young men who sometimes block roads and demand payment to pass, they will nevertheless give those same young men cash on other occasions (that is, as gifts, not extortion) or hire them for community projects, such as cleaning up roadside trash.

Another indication of Oil Search’s commitment to social issues is that when it was determined that neither the Papua New Guinea Department of Health nor NGOs in the country had the technical capacity to manage grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Oil Search created the Oil Search Health Foundation and formally became the principal recipient for the country, in charge of disbursing funds to, and monitoring and evaluating the projects of the implementing sub-recipient organizations, such as Save the Children. Doubtless there was self-interest involved in this step (i.e., access to Global Fund money for health and development projects in the communities where Oil Search extracts resources); nevertheless, this proved to be an extremely challenging and onerous undertaking: I was told by one expatriate Oil Search Health Foundation employee that the monitoring and reporting requirements for the Global Fund were more elaborate, time-consuming, stressful, and unrealistic than those of any oil company or NGO he had ever worked for.

Another example of Oil Search’s commitment to corporate social responsibility has been its willingness to collaborate in HIV/AIDS research by the Papua New Guinea Institute of Medical Research (IMR) and the Papua New Guinea National Research Institute (NRI). Its cooperation in these endeavors means that there is a relatively large amount of data regarding employees’ behaviors and practices, more than is readily available for other mine sites. One piece of research by NRI (Buchanan et al. 2011), for example, investigated employees’ alcohol consumption, sexual behavior, condom use, and knowledge about HIV. It showed that the nature of Oil Search employment contracts—particularly the very long tours of duty entailed by the FIFO model—contributed to HIV vulnerability by shaping employees’ sexual behavior, both on-duty and off. Based on interviews with over four hundred employees, the research team found that “three main patterns for breaks were evident when workers were asked how many days they worked before
FIGURE 3. AIDS awareness billboard at Oil Search Ltd. site. Photo by Kenneth I. MacDonald.
they went on break: 39.0 percent took a break after four weeks (28 days) and close to half (48.2 percent) reported having breaks after six weeks (42 days)” (Buchanan et al. 2011: 43). Given long workdays, company guidelines prohibiting sexual relations between co-workers, and rules against leaving the residential compounds at night, it is not surprising that 82 percent of all employees said they did not have sex when on duty. Many of the employees lamented that the long tours of duty were damaging to their relationships at home and made them hunger for sex. In contrast, when off duty, the exchange of sex that happens outside the camp area was accepted by workers as normal. During time off, men spent time with people in the community, including in clubs where there is contact with women exchanging sex for money and other goods. There was also *dinau koap* (literally, debt sex), an arrangement where men would have sex with sex workers on credit and the women could come to the gates on pay days to be paid (Buchanan et al. 2011: 66).

Of those employees with FIFO arrangements, nearly half of the male employees who transited through large urban centers, particularly when coming off duty, had paid for sex when transiting (Buchanan et al. 2011: 46). Approximately 25 percent of the male employees had paid for sex in the past year. A third of these men reported inconsistent condom use, and 15.5 percent reported that they had not used a condom with any sexual partners during the previous three months (Buchanan et al. 2011: 71). It would appear, then, that the FIFO model of labor contributes to the production of a particular kind of sexual economy in which workers must largely abstain from sex during the four to six weeks that they are on duty, but then freely engage in a range of transactional sexual relationships when off duty, both in the nearby community and in the urban areas through which they transit.

As noted above, three of the women I interviewed had been infected with HIV by husbands employed at Moro. One of these women, Kori, had dropped out of school after grade 4 because her parents wouldn’t pay her school fees, and she spoke with resentment about the fact that they had been willing to pay for her two younger brothers, both of whom had made it through high school and beyond. Without an education, her means of making money became the same as most uneducated rural women in Papua New Guinea: selling betel nut by the side of the road. It was while doing this that she met her husband. He was driving a company vehicle, stopped to buy some betel nut, and flirted with her. He continued to do this for a few weeks, and each time they talked a little more. Although she felt too young to marry, she also felt lucky to have gained the attentions of a well-paid “company boy,” as Huli people sometimes call them, and so she agreed to marry him.

Although he initially always came home when his month-long shift ended, he began staying in the Moro area during his breaks when she became pregnant, and gradually he came home less and less. She heard gossip that he had other sexual partners, but she said nothing because he was a generous and reliable provider. It was when she heard that he had a relationship with a woman rumored to be HIV-positive that she insisted that they get tested: “And I told him, ‘If you’ve given it to
me, I want to die on my own clan land. If I die, I die, but I’m not staying with you.’ [What did he say?] What could he say? There was nothing to say. I told him I was leaving, and when we tested positive, I left.”

It would be incorrect, however, to think of all “company boy” wives as put in the path of HIV by their own desires to move beyond their less privileged backgrounds or the educational disadvantages they faced because they were girls. Another woman, Jody, whose father and two brothers worked at Moro, had completed high school and done one year of business college when she met the man who was to become her husband, also an employee at Moro. From her own observations and from talking to her brothers, she “knew what company boys were like” and how they behaved when on break—that is, she knew their reputation for having many sexual partners. But, she was in love, and so “I closed my eyes and married him (mi pasim ai na go marit).” In other words, she knew the possible risks, but chose to ignore them and hoped for the best. “Later I found out that he had slept around with a lot of women before we married and continued to do so after we were married. But, it was hard for me to leave him. When I learned he was fucking around (guap guap raun), I tried, but he came after me and brought me back.”

In 2006, her father, who had driven to Mendi Hospital to pick up supplies for the Moro health center, observed her husband in the area where HIV tests are done. HIV testing is available at Moro, so Jody’s father was made suspicious by the fact that her husband chose to be tested in Mendi. To his mind, this meant that her husband probably suspected he was HIV-positive and wanted to minimize the possibility of others finding out by getting tested elsewhere, a common strategy, especially for men, since they are more mobile than women. He informed Jody about what he had seen and advised her to leave her husband. Soon after, her husband left for Port Moresby without telling her, so she was unable to confront him about his HIV test. In 2007, when testing became widely available in Tari, she herself went for testing and was found to be positive. She did not begin treatment until 2008, when her symptoms of diarrhea, fevers, and weight loss were becoming severe. Her husband died in Port Moresby in 2008, and she believed that he never sought treatment, despite easy availability in the capital city, probably because of shame. Men’s failure to be tested, or their tendency to seek testing and treatment far too late, was a story I heard repeatedly.

That shame or fear thwarted HIV testing and treatment was not confined to men, of course. Jody’s own younger sister, whose husband worked for a resource-extraction company other than Oil Search, had died of AIDS-related illnesses in 2011. Despite knowing that Jody was HIV-positive and successfully on treatment, her sister could never bring herself to come to terms with her diagnosis:

Her husband would come and go to Port Moresby, but spent most of the time in Port Moresby. And she lost weight, but at first we just thought she missed him or was worried about him or was lonely. We didn’t think she was sick. But then she kept losing weight, a lot of weight. And so I told her, “Your husband lives far away
and we don’t know how he behaves when he’s not here. You should get a blood test.”

[So you suspected?] Yes. So I came with her to get a blood test, and she was positive.

[So when you knew you were both HIV-positive, did you live together and take ARVs together?] No, she was living in T—, and I was in H—. And she only started taking ARVs when she got very, very sick. The medicine didn’t work for her. I think she was already full of the virus when she started taking ARVs. And the virus must have infected her brain because she became very confused, and then she stopped making any sense at all (toktok bilong em go kranki olgeta).

She died in 2011. I miss her lot—she always took care of me when I was sick, she always listened to my worries, she was like my second mother. [Did her death make you afraid or worried, since you are also HIV-positive?] No, it just made me very sorrowful, because I have this illness, so I know what it is like, and I believe that if she had started taking this medicine earlier she would still be alive. I told her and told her to go to the hospital, but she gave up and wouldn’t go. [Why did she give up?]. She was supposed to go back after the blood test and get her results, but she wouldn’t go. I was the one who went and found out her results. They were willing to tell me because they knew I was HIV-positive and that I was her sister and could help her. They had told her to come back in two weeks for the results, but she refused. I think she just didn’t want to know, she was afraid, and so she delayed and delayed. And then it was too late.

Although we’ll never know what Jody’s sister was thinking or feeling, her case suggests the powerful role that the fear of death and stigma can play, even when a woman has strong family support and evidence within her own family of ART’s efficacy.

This case is also one of the nuclear family clusters of HIV that I discussed in the Introduction. These family clusters made me skeptical about the supposed low prevalence of HIV in Papua New Guinea, or at least made me suspect that some areas of the country, like Tari, have a prevalence far higher than the national average. Is it likely, I asked myself, that I would have found so many cases of HIV within nuclear families if prevalence was truly .9 percent? And yet this is a case in which a plausible explanation based on social dynamics might help to explain such family clusters without resorting to the conclusion that HIV prevalence must be high in the Tari area. Having been raised in a family where all the men worked for resource-extraction companies, and having become accustomed to a relatively higher standard of living, it is hardly surprising that both Jody and her sister chose to marry men who also worked in that industry. Born into a relatively wealthy rural class, they both strove to retain and consolidate that class through marriage. Though they knew that male employees were reputed to have many sexual partners, they did not know that their class-retention strategies were putting them at relatively greater risk of HIV infection.

**PJV and Porgera**

Porgera Joint Venture (PJV), one of the top-producing gold mines in the world, is located in Porgera, Enga Province, just over the border from Hela Province. The
Asian Development Bank proposal cited earlier notes that while average national HIV prevalence was estimated to be 2 percent in urban areas and 1 percent in rural areas, “Out of 920 persons tested at Porgera Hospital in 2004, 7.7 percent were infected with HIV” (ADB 2006b: 3). Notably, while HIV prevalence among PJV employees was approximately the same as national prevalence (2 percent), it was much higher—8 to 10 percent—in the rest of the Porgera community (Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire 2007). When I spoke to PJV medical staff in 2006, they expressed puzzlement and alarm at this large discrepancy. However, some of the specificities of Porgera as a mine site help to explain why HIV prevalence has been so much higher in the Porgera community than among PJV employees.

Much of the social science literature on mining and HIV vulnerability focuses on the mine worker—the usually male person who, while often sacrificing his well-being for his family, ends up infecting wives and girlfriends with STIs and HIV. Catherine Campbell’s research with black South African miners highlighted the exhausting work, the gnawing fear of death deep underground, and the long absences from home that provoked fatalism, loneliness, and the desire for comfort and the sensation of being viscerally alive, for example—feelings that the miners tried to manage through drinking and sex (1997). That mining labor is predominantly male, and mine culture often highly masculinist, also contribute to regular binge drinking and unprotected sex. The literature seeking to quantify the beneficial impact of family housing on HIV risk is scant (Gebrekristos et al. 2005), but in addition to these factors, some researchers blame mining companies’ failure to provide family housing for employees, which might help to curb the high levels of extramarital sex resulting from miners’ long absences from home.

The Porgera mine site is characterized by a number of these factors. The work force is mostly male (in 2010, 8 percent of PJV’s staff—196 out of 2,408—were women); alcohol is readily available (although its importation into and sale in Enga Province are prohibited); and many women have migrated to the area for sex work (PEAK 2011). There are, however, significant differences between South African mines and Porgera, and these differences demonstrate the importance of taking into account factors like national mining policies, the nature of employee contracts, and the housing of employees in analyzing HIV vulnerability at resource-extraction sites. For one thing, the housing of PJV employees would appear to be markedly unlike the situations described by Catherine Campbell (2003), Dinah Rajak (2011), and Donald Donham (2011), all of whom discuss mining employees coming and going freely from men-only residences, with some employees opting to live in the adjacent townships rather than in the mine’s hostels. In contrast, non-local PJV employees live in highly securitized compounds, and their movements tend to be only by vehicle and only to travel back and forth to the mine site for work, while local employees (i.e., Porgerans) commute from their villages or live with town-dwelling kin.
Occupational safety would seem to be another difference. PJV has an excellent occupational safety record, and underground mines in Papua New Guinea are not anywhere near as deep as those in South Africa. PJV miners are therefore not subjected to the claustrophobic and dread-inspiring caged mine shaft elevators described by Campbell’s (1997) and Donham’s (2011) informants. While some PJV miners work underground, the mines are shallow enough that they can be driven to their work sites. During my two brief visits to Porgera to discuss HIV prevention strategies with PJV managers, there was a large billboard as one entered the mine site that informed everyone how many “injury free days” had passed, and all the departments I visited began their day with a meeting in which the discussion of occupational safety seemed to be accorded almost as much time as the presentations on how much ore had been excavated and how much gold processed the previous day. In other words, mine safety ranked very high in importance. This is all to say that PJV miners probably do not experience the existential terror and fatalism Campbell describes as playing an important part in motivating South African miners’ sexual relationships.

On the contrary, it is likely that fear plays a part in deterring non-local employees from having sexual relationships with local women. Owing to ongoing tensions and episodic violent hostilities between the mine and the local community, between different landowning groups, and between landowner and non-landowner groups, PJV’S residential compounds are guarded by armed security personnel and surrounded by high fences topped with razor wire. The buses that transport employees from their fenced residential compounds to the mine and back have thick metal mesh on the windows because of past incidents when local residents threw stones at them. Jacka documents increasing violent conflict in the Porgera area, largely between those who receive benefits from the mine and those who do not, claiming that “for many of the young men in Porgera . . . warfare is the new economy” (2015: 224), with clans buying black-market M16 assault rifles and hiring out their young men as warriors to other clans. It is therefore likely that the strict security procedures, the fear of violence in Porgera, the PJV policy that forbids alcohol consumption, and the FIFO policy of extremely long hours, followed by mandatory breaks away from Porgera, all combine to prevent non-local employees from having sexual liaisons during their rostered twenty days on. Moreover, information about AIDS has been readily available to PJV employees since at least 2004, as have condoms: when I visited in 2004 and 2006, free condom dispensers were everywhere at the mine: the airport terminal, offices, break rooms, bathrooms, and so on.

Local employees, in contrast, may very well be engaging in a range of sexual relationships with multiple partners in Porgera. But, again unlike the black miners in South Africa, they are not migrants, they are not estranged from their families for months at a time, and many have wives and children to return to when their shifts are over. In sum, the way that PJV mining labor is organized
and disciplined, both spatially and temporally, means that the sexual economy in Porgera, and how miners are able to engage with it, differs significantly from that in South Africa described by Campbell and other scholars. And given the constraints on PJV employees’ mobility within Porgera, perhaps it should not be surprising that HIV rates among PJV employees are roughly the same as the national urban average.

The case with the rest of the Porgera community is another story, and the Porgeran landowner plays an important role in it.
Joshua Barker and his colleagues employed a novel way of analyzing the social fabric of modernity in Southeast Asia through the trope of “the figure,” which they described as “persons within a given social formation whom others recognize as symbolizing modern life” (2013: 1)—for example, a photo retoucher in Vietnam or a timber entrepreneur in Malaysia. Providing rich portraits of eighty such figures in nine countries, they note that “Just as the flaneur makes sense only against the backdrop of emerging mass commodification in nineteenth-century Paris, so too do the figures in this volume make sense only once they have been set against particular backgrounds” (4). They quote Ara Wilson (2004: 191), who asserts that “capitalist development comes with its own figures, personae that represent new modes of work and new styles of being,” persons who are “embodied symbols of the promise and problems of new economic realities.” In any analogous compendium of “figures of modernity” in Papua New Guinea, the landowner would surely be at the top of the list.

The landowner is the feature of Porgera that most differentiates it from the South African mines discussed by Campbell, Rajak, and other social scientists. And, as shown by Pamela’s story that began this chapter, the impact of landowners stretches beyond Porgera and into populations on its margins, such as Tari. The landowner is a person who can make demands and wrest things from government elites and multinational corporations in ways no one else can, and who embodies the promise of “development,” or perhaps even the possibility of bypassing “development” (in its implicit sense of only gradual improvement) in achieving swift and dramatic prosperity and power. The landowner also embodies the problems of Papua New Guinea’s economic dependency on mining. As Jacka notes,

> Expensive cars, new clothes, luxury food items, and partying trips to Mt. Hagen constitute the bulk of SML [special mining lease] landowners’ purchases. Porgera has also seen key players within the SML landowning clans becoming big men on a far larger scale than customary political economics allowed. Many of these men spend their days driving around the government station at Porgera in new model Toyota Land Cruisers with dark-tinted windows; nearly all are polygynists, some with as many as twelve wives. (2015: 210)

All land in Papua New Guinea not appropriated by the government prior to passage of the Land Act of 1962 is legally held by customary landowning groups, although subsoil resources are owned by the state. Since 97 percent of PNG’s territory had not been appropriated, one might assume that almost all Papua New Guinea citizens must be landowners; however, with the extractive industry accounting for approximately 70 percent of the country’s export earnings, the term “landowner” has come to refer only to those people—and typically only the men—whose land sits atop natural resources that a company plans to excavate. In order to develop a mine, a mining company must take out a “special mining lease” (SML) in which
it is the tenant, and the customary inhabitants thereby become landlords of sorts who have the right to compensation for the loss of their land. In other words, national law “requires the existence of a formally recognized group of ‘native landowners’” (Golub 2007: 39) who normally gain this legal recognition by forming Incorporated LandsGroups (ILGs).

Victoria Stead notes that it is through these ILGs that communities “become landowners in a way that is ‘legible’ (Scott 1998) to the sites and agents of the state and globalizing capital” (2017: 364, emphasis in original). In other words, ILGs provide corporations and government departments something to interact and negotiate with. However, she adds, “Doing so involves not simply a translation, but a transformation of the nature of connection to land” (2017: 364). Specifically, inhabitants’ connection to land becomes defined as a property relation. As Filer et al. explain this transformation, “Land is separated from human labour, local livelihoods and personal relationships, and made into a substance that can be mapped and surveyed, quantified and measured, divided and subdivided, without any necessary reference to its cultural and natural attributes” (Filer et al. 2017: 18). And, of course, for landowners, it becomes a substance that they relinquish and see transformed, or even destroyed, in exchange for money and other benefits. Filer et al. argue that if inhabitants willingly, or even enthusiastically, form ILGs in order to negotiate with resource companies, “it is not because they favour the accumulation of capital at their own expense, but because they believe (rightly or wrongly) that ‘developers’ will provide them with rental incomes, business opportunities, or even some of the public goods and services, from roads to scholarships, that cannot be obtained from their governments” (2017: 30).

Before mining leases are issued, a benefits-sharing agreement must be reached with landowners, and, in the case of the Porgera mine, this includes royalty checks every three months, monetary compensation for the loss of land and houses, preferential hiring at the mine, preference for contracts with the mine, and relocation housing. One study of PJV mining benefits from 1990 to 2009—which included royalties, wages, taxes, compensation payments, and contracts—found that the national government received K1.7 billion while Porgeran landowners received almost as much at K1.2 billion (Johnson 2010). In other words, many of the benefits from resource extraction are intensely localized, and one aspect of the “ideology of landownership” (Filer 2001: 9) is “the pervasive view at the popular, grassroots level that benefits from mining should be local rather than national” (Filer and Macintyre 2006: 219; emphasis added).

The policy of preferential benefits to landowners is deliberate: it is intended to secure the ongoing consent of landowners to the extraction of wealth from their land. However, the policy creates massive discrepancies between those who happen to reside on land that rests atop gold and their neighbors and kin who do not. As Victoria Stead notes, “Practices of land formalisation are exercises in boundary making, and this is a key way in which they function to exclude. Incorporated land
groups make landowners, in effect, by drawing boundaries around them. They provide a mechanism for determining who is and is not a recognised right-holder” (2107: 364–65). Consequently, as Jerry Jacka vividly describes it, “At the Porgera Station market, landowners drive up in their new Toyota Land Cruisers and saunter around the stalls in their latest fashions listening to their headphones or playing a hand-held video game. Meanwhile, their non-landowner kin sit beside a pile of vegetables for sale, barefoot and wearing second-hand clothing, hoping they will make enough money to at least pay for the PMV ride back to their own village” (2001: 50).

The stakes for being designated a landowner are obviously quite high. And, in many regions of Papua New Guinea, the identification of stable and pre-existing entities that might be termed clans or landowning groups has been a formidable task that has entailed some willful invention, or at least vigorous transformation, of indigenous sociality. For instance, all the ethnographers who have done research in Porgera assert that, as Alex Golub puts it, “Porgeran kinship is less a matter of corporate groups than of a large mesh of egocentric personal networks” (2007a: 83; see also Biersack 1995, Golub 2014, Jacka 2015). Much like the Huli, Porgerans assert that they descend from the ancestors of both their parents and can thus claim membership in eight clans (their FFF’s clan, their FFM’s clan, their MFF’s clan, their MFM’s clan, and so on). Membership depends on genealogical ties, but also upon activating and maintaining those ties through agricultural labor, commensality, visiting, and contributing to bridewealth, warfare, and homicide compensation payments. Few people can actually say they are members of eight clans, though many claim four or five. Moreover, Porgerans (and Huli) “do not consider it a virtue to identify strongly with only one clan” (Golub 2014: 124); rather, they seek multiple affiliations. And “clans”—although this should be considered an expedient term that has reifying effects which misrepresent Porgeran sociality—do not, in fact, act corporately: clan members do not pay bridewealth together or even necessarily make war together. As Jacka notes, and this would be true of the Huli as well, “Linguistically it may appear as though it is the activities of one clan that is engaging in these events, such as when people say that Tokoyela fought Undiki, or Tokoyela made a compensation to Pakoa. In reality one group of people from multiple clans is engaging with another, similar group” (Jacka 2015: 124). Rather than acting as corporate entities, then, individuals mobilize their “cognatic portfolios” (Golub 2014: 150) in times of need.

Eliciting, reifying, and delimiting bounded formal groups from this flexible array for the purposes of negotiating mining agreements and allocating mining benefits has been challenging at best and deadly at worst. In the Porgeran case, it was determined that seven Ipili “clans,” comprised of twenty-three “subclans,” were the official landowners within the PJV SML, and each subclan appointed a member to the Landowner Negotiating Committee. However, as Golub notes, “it was not so much that twenty-three subclans had representatives as that
twenty-three important people had ‘solidified’ . . . twenty-three subclans that they could represent” (2014: 97–98). Moreover, many of the Porgeran landowners belong to multiple subclans and thus receive multiple royalty checks, and landowners often try to marry strategically by taking wives from additional subclans in order to secure additional benefits.

Much of the anthropological work on Papua New Guinean landowners has, perhaps not surprisingly, focused on the landowner as an elicited and even invented category—that is, a category of person that has emerged in response to the requirement that resource-extraction companies and the state interact with them (Golub 2014, Ernst 1999, Jorgensen 2001, Gilberthorpe 2007). Less attention has been paid to the kind of personhood that landowners enact or embody. Landowner groups, perhaps especially Highlander landowner groups, are often vilified by mining company personnel (at least behind closed doors) for their negotiating tactics: they are said to hold projects hostage until demands are met, renege on agreements, attempt to extract more benefits after agreements have been finalized, demand financial compensation for injuries that seemingly have little to do with a project’s impact, and so on (Filer 1998, Golub 2007b). Indeed, one survey of mining and petroleum companies in Papua New Guinea identified landowners as the number one issue negatively affecting the resource-extraction industry (Imbun 2006). Moreover, particularly in the wake of ExxonMobil’s LNG project, which during its construction phase bestowed immense sums of money on Huli landowners, landowners have become associated with excessive, wasteful, arrogant, drunken, promiscuous, and sometimes bullying and boorish behavior, not only in their places of residence, but also in Port Moresby’s hotels and bars.4

People are often afraid of landowners. When non-local Papua New Guinean PJV employees drove me around the Porgera area, I observed that they always recognized and gave way to landowner vehicles when encountering them on one-lane roads and bridges, not wanting to risk the possibility that a landowner might feel disrespected and be motivated to retaliate in some way. And, although PJV employees were supposed to report even minor incidents of conflict with the local community (e.g., when a drunk person swore at them or threw a stone at a PJV vehicle), they did not always do so when landowners were involved.

It is important to note that there are wide discrepancies in wealth, not only between landowners and non-landowners, but between landowners. For example, the twenty-three Porgeran landowner subclans do not all receive the same amount in royalties because these depend on the amount of land a subclan owns within the SML; some subclans own a lot and some very little. So, as Jacka observes, “At one extreme are the SML ‘super big men’ with their multiple wives, business holdings, and new cars” (2015: 210); then there are the landowners whose subclans own very little land within the SML; and then there are the people who are landowners within “the project area”—that is, they do not belong to the twenty-three subclans who own land within the SML, and thus do not receive royalties, but they
do reside on land that is recognized as impacted by the mine, and so receive benefits such as preferential employment. In short, a landowner is not a landowner is not a landowner, though most officially designated landowners are wealthier and more powerful than non-landowners.

**PATRON-CLIENTISM AND TRAFFICKED WIVES**

Some of Porgeran landowners’ wealth is disseminated through the community, since there are strong cultural pressures to share (Biersack 2001, Jacka 2001). However, this sharing is often structured so as to form patron-client relations (Golub 2015: 147), so that landowners can gather around them less fortunate kith and kin who also serve as laborers and underlings and who owe their landowner patrons deference and allegiance. In return, landowners can bestow benefits such as money, use of land, attachment to artisanal and illegal mining operations, or even fictitious Ipili status for the purpose of gaining employment at the mine. Biersack, Jacka, and Golub all discuss the long-standing Ipili ethos of collecting people—related or not—on their land, and this practice has only intensified over the course of the mine’s life. So, for example, Jacka found from census data in 1999 (that is, almost ten years after the mine opened) that 13 percent of the men living in the three Ipili hamlets that he surveyed were men who had married into the group, and fully 33 percent had no kinship relation whatsoever to the landowners—that is, altogether 46 percent of male residents were outsiders. In sum, as Golub puts it, “Each Ipili household has become something of a rentier operation in miniature, with its own line of immigrant clients” (2015: 148). With long-standing ties to Ipili groups, Huli make up a significant portion of these immigrant clients, and, because of sociopolitical turmoil and the collapse of public services in the Tari area (discussed in the next chapter), it is likely that this proportion increased over the 2000s (PEAK 2011).

Golub and Jacka both observe that landowners tend to be polygynous and that they marry strategically. For example, a landowner may marry a Porgeran woman from one of the twenty-three subclans to which he cannot claim membership in order to gain benefits through an in-law status, but he may also make a point of marrying women from remote rural areas, including in Huli territory, in order to acquire agricultural laborers. As Huli women who have lived in Porgera witheringly (but enviously) report, none of the female vegetable sellers in the Porgera main market belong to landowning families. “Women from landowner families don’t do garden work,” I was repeatedly told. “They don’t even know how anymore. They just live off money.” Thus, landowners seek out rural-born wives who will do this labor. Furthermore, Huli immigrant clients may seek to solidify their relationships with landowners by offering them their rural female kin as possible wives. Rural Huli families do not generally understand the great variability in landowner wealth: when they hear the term “landowner,” the image they conjure up is of
the extremely wealthy man who owns Land Cruisers and an electrified relocation house. This increases their willingness to marry off their daughters to Porgeran landowners they have never met.

It is these sociopolitical dynamics that produce HIV vulnerabilities not only for people living in Porgera, but also for people, especially women, from satellite population areas, such as Tari. Like Pamela, whose story started this chapter, two other women I interviewed were also essentially given in tribute by their kin to Porgeran landowners, and, like Pamela, they were from very remote areas, and their parents were offered bridewealth in amounts that were extremely high compared to the norm in these rural areas. Their parents therefore assented, with bridegroom sight unseen, despite arranged marriages being untraditional and normally frowned upon (marriages are sometimes arranged, but most parents would insist on getting to know the groom before agreeing, and usually the bride-to-be's opinion is sought). In each case, much as Pamela asserts, “it was a con” in the sense that the young women were told they would live lives of ease and that the marriage would take them away from onerous agricultural labor, but they found, to their dismay, that they were expected to spend their days much as they had in their natal homes: planting, weeding, and harvesting great swathes of sweet potato fields. Indeed, they realized quickly that they had been chosen precisely because they were from remote rural areas and it was consequently assumed that they were habituated to arduous physical work and were more likely to be obedient. They described their landowner husbands as autocratic, sometimes very generous, often unfaithful, and sometimes violent.

All three were told that their husband's goodwill to their resident kin depended on them remaining in the marriage (see also Jacka 2015: 126). Since these kin were essentially clients of the patron landowner, and dependent on him for economic opportunities and their very ability to stay in Porgera, they were unwilling to help these women leave their abusive marriages. Both Pamela and Kelapi, whose narrative is below, did eventually flee their situations, but on their own and without assistance from kin.

In Pamela's case, neighbors to whom she had always been generous observed her increasing sickness, grew worried about her, and gave her enough money to get home by PMV. But as Pamela told it:

After a month went by he sent bus fare and I came back. [Why did you go back?!] He threatened my kin. He said if I didn't come back he would kill Tari men living in Porgera. And I was afraid that he would hurt my relatives or that he would kill other men from Tari and that it would cause trouble (a common euphemism for tribal fighting). So I went back.

But I was really sick—I had terrible diarrhea and ulcers inside my nose, and my nose swelled up. I was afraid I was dying, so I actually wanted to go back to Porgera so I could go to the hospital there, and they could find out what was wrong with me. (At that time Paiam Hospital in Porgera was reputed to have better services than most other hospitals in the region.) It was hard for me to travel. I had constant
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diarrhea, so how was I going to sit on a PMV for hours and hours? But I made it back to Porgera, and after a few days my husband said, “Okay, let’s go to the hospital and get a blood test.”

But when we got there he said that only I would get a blood test. And it took me a long time to figure out, but he didn’t ask for a blood test for himself because he’d already had one. In fact he’d known for a while, but never told me that he was HIV-positive. The nurses all knew him there—they knew he was positive. He tricked me. He knew all along that he had probably infected me and he was just pretending that he didn’t know. I was furious, so, so furious. “This is your fault,” I said. “This comes from you fucking lots of women.” This was in 2011. I started taking ART in Porgera at Paiam Hospital. In 2012, I came back to Tari, and I have not been back to Porgera since.

Kelapi’s story is similar to Pamela’s:

I traveled with an uncle to Porgera, and then I married a man in Porgera. [How did you meet him?] He lived next door—we lived on his land. [So you had talked to him and knew him?] No. I just stayed at home and I fried lamb flaps to sell. And one day he came to our house and he pulled me (a euphemism for rape) and forced me to go marry him. And I thought it would be ok—he looked like a good, healthy man. But I didn’t know he already had a wife, and she was sick, and so he had sent her back to her village. . . .

[So you mean his wife was sick with AIDS?] Yes, she had contracted HIV, and she gave it to him, and then he sent her back to her village. [And this man, your husband, did he know that he had this sickness when he came and pulled you?] Yes, I think he knew, or at least he suspected. He conspired with my uncle’s wife. They conspired that when I was home frying lamb flaps he would come rape me. . . . And he came to our house drunk. Everyone in Porgera was afraid of him because he was a landowner and also a well-known criminal. And he came charging in, and he sent the meat and the frying pan flying across the room. And then he took out K700 from his shoe, and he gave it to my uncle’s wife. And then he took me to his house. And when I tried to come home, she lied to everyone and said, “I’m not going to have some woman living in my house who fools around and lets men into the house when no one is home. Go live with him—you can’t live here.” . . .

And my uncle and his kin felt they couldn’t do anything because he was a Porgera landowner, and he allowed them to live on his land. And he threatened to knife them and evict them, so they were afraid and did nothing. [I see. It wasn’t their land and they were afraid?] Yes, and I was afraid he would hurt them, so I just went with him. And I thought that since he was a wealthy, powerful man my life would be okay. [I see. Did you try to run away?] Run away and do what? Go where? It wasn’t my land—where would I go? How would I get back to Tari? I had no money. And I worried that if I ran away or tried to hide or ask my kin for money, he would come after them, threaten them, knife them. I was afraid for them, so I just stayed. I was afraid he would hurt my family. And I was also afraid that if he hurt them they would blame me. He was a bad man—a criminal. So I stayed put. . . .

[How long did you live with him?] Two years and some months. I had a baby boy. He died when he was four months old. [Was it AIDS or something else?]
It was AIDS. Think about it—I married this man who had AIDS, and he must have infected me, and so the baby died. We took him to Paiam Hospital, but at that time people didn't talk about AIDS. There wasn't a Care Centre there yet, and the clinical staff didn't talk openly about AIDS. And there was no medicine. So even if you got a blood test they wouldn't tell you if you were positive or not. . . . But my baby was always sick—his mouth had lots of sores inside and he had diarrhea. He was big when he was born, but he lost weight fast, and then he died.

So I went back to the hospital on my own and got my blood tested. . . . When I came for the result, they handed me a piece of paper that said, “Reactive.” And I had no idea what this meant. And so I asked, “Reactive? What does reactive mean?” But they wouldn't tell me or explain it. . . . So I went back home and I gave K20 to a man who worked at the hospital in a different department, and I gave him the paper and asked him what “reactive” meant. He was afraid, and he said, “I’m afraid. I’m not supposed to say. I work in a different department, and if they found out that I told you they would take me to court.” All he would say was, “You need to eat well. You should eat lots of fruit, eat nutritious food.” But I had heard that they always tell people with AIDS to eat lots of fruit, and so I was sure that I had AIDS. And so I ran away from my husband and came home to Tari. . . . . [And was your husband showing any symptoms?] I don’t know. People have told me he is now on ART, but I don’t know. I did ask him, but all he would say is, “I’m a company man—I don’t have AIDS.” He was a landowner and, you know, the landowners are given jobs easily and don’t really have to do anything. And I asked him, but he got angry, and all he would say is, “I’m the kind of man who works for the company. I’m a company man! I’m a landowner! I don’t have AIDS!”

Here again we see that the patron-client relationships between Porgeran landowners and Huli immigrants are solidified through marriage so that the woman given (or, in this case, forcibly taken) as tribute becomes a kind of lynchpin: her flight could result in the expulsion of her kin or, if the threats of these landowner husbands are to be believed, in retaliatory violence against them. Also significant in this story is the apparent complicity of Kelapi’s uncle’s wife, who was paid for her help in arranging the sexual assault and forced marriage, and then made it impossible for Kelapi to return to her uncle’s home by ruining her reputation (i.e., telling others that she was “the kind of woman who lets men into the house when no one else is home”). This kind of collusion in sexual violence, done with the aim of forcing a young woman to act as the link to an influential patron, is rare to my knowledge; however, I have come across other cases, which similarly entailed not only cooperation, but orchestration, by an older woman who was trusted by the victim (Wardlow 2006b). While female solidarity is valued by Huli women, it is also easily fragmented by other interests and allegiances, and often takes a back seat to generational authority.

Also significant in Kelapi’s narrative is her husband’s consternation at his own (unadmitted) HIV-positive status. The few HIV-positive men I interviewed—indeed, especially the successful ones who had salaried jobs—often seemed shocked at their positive diagnoses, despite histories of unprotected sex with many
partners, and they exhibited this same sort of angry incredulous bluster. (“I’m a company man! I’m a landowner! I don’t have AIDS!”) In the case of Kelapi’s husband, his assertion may simply have been an attempt to maintain masculine dignity in the face of female accusation. But, I suspect that the element of disbelief is genuine, at least for some men. As many ethnographers of highlands Papua New Guinea have observed, a man’s socio-moral identity is often said to be exhibited “on the skin,” positing a direct relationship between one’s inner capacities and qualities and one’s external appearance (A. Strathern 1975, M. Strathern 1979, O’Hanlon 1989). In particular, social power and charisma are thought to express themselves through a powerful and vigorous body. For a man who has achieved the epitome of success—being a wealthy landowner, accumulating immigrant clients, having a salaried job with “the company”—being diagnosed with an illness associated with emaciation, loss of bodily continence, and social ostracism—might, in fact, have seemed impossible.

CONCLUSION

Most important in Pamela’s and Kelapi’s stories, and perhaps insufficiently emphasized in the existing literature about Papua New Guinea landowners, is the way that the relations between landowner patrons and immigrant clients can rest on a foundation of gender inequality, gendered moral duty, and gendered violence. Not all immigrants provide wives to their patron landowners, of course, but marriage is, for both Huli and Ipili, the best way to produce enduring relations into the next generation. Marriage ideally creates children who are “in between” the two families (Biersack 1995), thus linking them together and creating obligations between them. All of this depends, of course, on women agreeing to such marriages and staying in them, which, as we’ve seen, can be secured through violence and threats of violence. Both Pamela and Kelapi when considering escape weighed not only the possible violent consequences to themselves, but also the violence that their husbands might inflict on their kin, and how their kin might inflict violence on them for undermining the patron-client bond.

Indeed, in both Kelapi’s and Pamela’s cases, it was only the exceptionalism of AIDS as a dreaded disease that induced them to run away. A husband’s violence or extramarital escapades weren’t sufficient reason, but being infected with HIV by him was. At the time when Kelapi and Pamela were diagnosed, knowledge about the new availability of antiretrovirals was not widespread; thus, both women initially believed their husbands had given them a “death sentence,” as Pamela said. Thinking they would soon die, both women finally felt justified in returning home to their natal kin. Moreover, both women were furious about the deaths of their infants and the squandering of their reproductive labor. As Pamela bitterly retorted when I asked if her husband had demanded his bridewealth back after her escape, “Why would we return bridewealth? I gave him a child, but he threw it away on AIDS,” by which she meant that she had done her reproductive
duty as a wife (that is, fulfilled the obligations of the bridewealth payment), and it was ultimately her husband’s reckless sexual behavior that had killed their child. Anticipating that future marital sex would only result in the same heartbreaking, dismal end intensified both women’s determination to leave.8

This chapter also demonstrates that resource-extraction sites—or “rural development enclaves”—produce gendered HIV vulnerability in multiple ways. Of the eight HIV-positive women I interviewed whose infections were linked to resource-extraction sites, three were infected by landowner husbands, three by husbands who worked at Moro, and one most likely by her husband who worked as a policeman in Porgera. The eighth was the half-sister of a Porgeran landowner, whose husband courted her in order to gain access to her half-brother, who eventually got him a job as a security guard in Porgera, a case that demonstrates that landowners not only seek out wives from would-be clients, but also use their female kin to cultivate clients.

Finally, it is important to note that Papua New Guinea’s policies guiding resource extraction—for example, the FIFO model of using labor and the identification of landowner groups for mining benefits—shape the sexual economy in Porgera in ways that make the profile of HIV vulnerability there overlap with, but also differ from, the existing anthropological model of HIV risk at mine sites, which is based on data from the migrant labor–dependent, deep elevator-shaft mining of South Africa. The South African mining model has become somewhat canonical in medical anthropology, not only because of the innovative and compelling nature of Campbell’s and others’ work, but also because this work continues a long lineage of scholarly research on mining, migration, and disease in South Africa (e.g., Packard 1989, Marks 2006, Basu et al. 2009). Papua New Guinea’s mining geology, history, and policy environment has its own particularities, which create a somewhat different sexual economy and thus different gendered vulnerabilities to HIV.

Also important to Porgera’s HIV risk milieu is its pervasive violence between numerous and wide-ranging stakeholders (company security staff, landowners, non-landowners, etc.). Violence in Porgera is often represented as “traditional” by mining managers, and this ideological representation of violence around the mine as “tribal” and “customary” further entrenches the sometimes explicit construction of the mining company as civilized and the local populace as savage, which serves both to absolve the company of responsibility and to legitimate redoubling the protection of the mining enclave. Much as James Ferguson suggested in “Seeing Like An Oil Company” (2005), increased violence among Porgeran people has justified increased militarization of the mining area.

Women are often victims of this violent environment. International attention has focused on PJV security guards’ rape of Porgeran women (Human Rights Watch 2011); however, it has mostly escaped notice that women like Pamela and Kelapi are essentially victims of trafficking, duped or forced into marrying
Porgeran landowner husbands. It would be incorrect, I think, to see the incidents of rape by PJV security guards as discrete or anomalous phenomena to be bracketed off analytically from other kinds of gender violence that occur in the mining environment, such as forced or coerced marriages to landowner patrons. Rather, sexual violence on the part of security personnel and the tribute of women to landowners both stem from social stratification instantiated or intensified by the mine: male security guards, tasked with securing the extractive enclave, come to view local inhabitants as unruly threats who need to be disciplined and punished, including through sexual violence. And landowners, consolidating their position in the local hierarchy, come to see dependent migrants as subordinates who need to know their place, including through coerced and forced sex and marriage.

This is a male hierarchy consisting of male mine managers, male landowners, male mine workers, male security guards, and male migrant dependents. Women often serve as pawns in this masculine social field: they enable men to forge alliances with others, they are offered as tokens of male tribute, and sexual violence against them is a potent cautionary reminder to their kin of their vulnerability to men higher up in the hierarchy. That HIV prevalence is higher in such a social field is not surprising.