

Conclusion

It has long been claimed that one source of conflict between science and society is the religious citizens who are inevitably in conflict with science. They are so, the narrative continues, because they are opposed to scientific claims, since religion has a different way of knowing facts about the world. The common conception is that religion ultimately determines truths about the natural world through supernatural revelation and science ultimately determines truth through observation and reason. This is what I have termed the systemic knowledge conflict between religion and science. Since all on-the-ground beliefs about nature are derived from high-level abstract ideas of how belief is generated, religion and science should not agree about any beliefs about the world. Therefore, if a citizen believes the conservative Protestant and nonscientific claim that the Earth is six thousand years old, then they cannot believe scientists' claims about the origins of global warming. In the first pages of this book I showed how this exact systemic knowledge conflict claim is common in the public sphere.

The reason this systemic knowledge conflict view is common, as I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, is that most academics, and especially those who focus on the "religion and science debate," assume it is so, and broadcast these views to the public. Scientists, theologians, historians, and particularly social scientists have all long made this assumption, with the origins of this view for social science reaching back to the birth of social science in the Enlightenment. One general reason academics assume that any relationship between religion and science will be based on systemic knowledge is that academics are rewarded for using hierarchical logically deductive systems of justification. The problem for contemporary public debate is then that these academic debaters do not acknowledge that their conclusions

about the relationship between religion and science may not apply to the general public, who use a different form of reason.

THE DOMINANCE OF THE SYSTEMIC KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE

A final example will show that the public is indeed being taught that the systemic knowledge conflict is in force for both elites and the public. This extrapolation from elites to the public is typically a sin of omission, not commission, primarily occurring by using the words “religion” or “Christianity” without a modifier. As the first sentence on the dust jacket of the influential edited volume *When Science and Christianity Meet* states, “Have science and Christianity been locked in mortal combat for the past 2000 years?”. Is “Christianity” in this case the members or the elites? By not specifying whether a text is talking about the elite or the public, and by not theorizing the link in general, the public is being taught that knowledge conflict is what the public also holds. We end up with Huffington Post articles using these assumptions and thus misinforming readers about the religious public.

Of course, the public does not read books like the aforementioned edited volume. I have no doubt that such writing trickles down through college education and other elite information venues. Empirically demonstrating that trickle-down would be extremely difficult, but I do not think that this claim is controversial. I will use as an exemplar a Google search that any high school student may make if interested in “religion and science.”² Such a search reveals what would be learned by an uninformed person, and they would learn that the public is in systemic knowledge conflict over science and religion.

In a Google search for “religion and science,” the first link seen is an advertisement for a documentary called *Closer to Truth?* that interviews academics about “humanity’s deepest questions.” Apparently these documentaries are shown on PBS, but this advertisement encourages you to watch an interview series titled *Are Science & Religion at War?* Our first indicator of the content is that these interviews are all with academics. This links to another series of interviews titled *Do Science & Religion Conflict?* Here we see content from atheists and science/religion synthesizers such as Daniel Dennett and Francis Collins. These are all participants in the elite struggles about systemic knowledge conflict, and there is no interviewee qualified to talk about what the public believes. One is left with the impression that members of religions believe this because these elites do.

The next link is seemingly a paid link from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Titled “The compatibility of science and religion,” it begins, “Science is not the only way of knowing and understanding. But science is a way of knowing that differs from other ways in its dependence on empirical evidence and testable explanations.”³ While it is not explicit from this page whether

religion is about knowledge, it is clear that science is only about knowledge. This page implies that any conflict in the public is similarly structured when it claims that “Today, many religious denominations accept” evolution. Given that denominations are filled with ordinary citizens, we see that the one issue discussed for these citizens is the knowledge claim about evolution. On this page, science and religion are in knowledge conflict, primarily over evolution, which seems to stand in for all “compatibilities,” and this same conflict is implied to be held by the public.

The third link is to the place where most people would probably start, which is Wikipedia. The entry is called “Relationship between religion and science,” essentially what the book you are presently reading is about. The first sentence says this relationship has long been studied, with the second saying that some people characterize the relationship as conflict, harmony, or of little interaction. The third sentence reveals the assumption of the entire extremely long page: “Science and religion generally pursue knowledge of the universe using different methodologies.” This is clearly systemic knowledge conflict, since methodologies for generating knowledge are near the top of both pyramids. Now that both science and religion have been defined as institutions dedicated to producing fact claims about the natural world, the page continues with innumerable details about these fact claims. The next sentences talk about how “Science acknowledges reason, empiricism, and evidence, while religions include revelation, faith, and sacredness.” We are introduced to Galileo, Dawkins, Weinberg, and Sagan. We read about non-overlapping magisteria. The public makes an appearance in a way that makes it clear that the religious public is also only concerned about fact claims: “Public acceptance of scientific facts may be influenced by religion; many in the United States reject the idea of evolution by natural selection, especially regarding human beings.”

Many of the scientist-theologian synthesizers are discussed, such as Polkinghorne, Barbour, and Arthur Peacocke. Various scientists and atheists are introduced to talk about knowledge claims, with Neil deGrasse Tyson saying that the two institutions rely upon “irreconcilable approaches to knowing,” and Victor Stenger saying that the conflict is based upon “approaches to knowing.” It runs through more scientists and talks about the dialogue movement populated by the theologian-scientists. The elite views from different religious traditions are discussed.

The public appears again in a discussion of American creationist movements, which are at least outwardly about fact-claims. Creation science, for example, “began in the 1960s as a fundamentalist Christian effort in the United States to prove biblical inerrancy and falsify the scientific evidence for evolution.” Since the only suggestion of the religious public’s view is fundamentalist views of evolution, the impression is given that the religious public is engaged in a fact conflict with science. Getting much closer to the public is a section on “Studies on Scientists’ Beliefs” that summarizes the research on the religiosity of scientists.

The final 550 out of over 10,000 words are about the “public perceptions of science.” It starts by saying that “While large majorities of Americans respect science

and scientists, they are not always willing to accept scientific findings that squarely contradict their religious beliefs.” Moreover, “specific factual disagreements are ‘not common today,’ though 40% to 50% of Americans do not accept the evolution of humans and other living things, with the ‘strongest opposition’ coming from evangelical Christians at 65% saying life did not evolve.” It continues by saying that “in the U.S., biological evolution is the only concrete example of conflict where a significant portion of the American public denies scientific consensus for religious reasons.” This *is* exemplary reporting of the propositional belief results summarized in Chapter 6, but certainly does not flag for the reader that this is a fundamentally different perspective than what has been discussed for the previous 9,500 words.

Most notably, this says nothing about moral conflict. Moral conflict is only gestured to with one sentence summarizing a study that I described in Chapter 7. The general conclusion from the Wikipedia page is that religion and science are about systemic knowledge. Elites are concerned with systemic knowledge conflict, but if you get to the last 5 percent of the entry, you will see that the public is only concerned with a few knowledge claims (propositional belief). The idea that the relationship between religion and science could be moral essentially does not exist.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACADEMIC RELIGION AND SCIENCE DEBATE

In the preceding pages I have shown, using data from a wide range of sources, that despite the assumptions of academics and participants in the public sphere, the religious members of the general public are not in systemic knowledge conflict with science. I show instead that some religious groups are in propositional conflict, which means that there are some distinct religiously-based claims that some religious people believe that science says are false. However, these knowledge claims are merely propositions—they are not linked to other facts about nature—and religious people in propositional belief conflict would believe the majority of scientific claims. In this version of conflict, if a conservative Protestant thinks the earth is six thousand years old, it does not mean they will reject scientific claims about global warming.

I have also built the case that for the public the strongest and most motivating type of conflict between religion and science is moral. This of course flies in the face of scientists’ image of themselves as engaged in morally neutral investigation of the world. But, existing research on the views of the public and on the nature of contemporary American religion and my own empirical examinations in Chapter 7 suggest that the most likely conflict is indeed over morality. For example, the much more likely driver of conflict for the contemporary religious public is the morality of embryonic stem cell research, not the age of the Earth.

What I have presented above suggests that for the good of a healthy debate in the public sphere, scholars should make it clear when they are talking about elites or the public—or even explicitly say that what they write may have little to do with how the contemporary public views religion and science. As I demonstrated with my case study of an internet search, an uninformed person will conclude that, for the public, religion and science are locked in a systemic knowledge relationship that sometimes results in conflict.

It will be useful for the academic fields involved with the religion and science debate to be aware of the contemporary public's views. We might think that this would be irrelevant for historians, because they only examine the past. However, history has a bias toward explaining the historical origins of what is relevant today. For example, I suspect that there would be much less historical analysis of Darwin and his interlocutors if Darwinism were no longer a live debate. If moral conflict is central today, it would be extremely interesting for historians to look more closely at the historic origins of this and other conflicts.

For sociologists, an extremely large issue, beyond the scope of this book, is to ask what the deep premises of the discipline should be if these premises are not based on systemic knowledge conflict. Closer to the ground, sociologists of religion and science should not presume that those they study are in systemic conflict, but they *should* continue to focus on instances of propositional belief conflict. That is, opposition to scientific claims about human origins remains an important sociological phenomena—it just does not stand in for a conflict over the nature of knowledge. A key question will be what predicts a person believing a religious claim about nature instead of a scientific claim, and I sketch out a number of hypotheses in the second half of Chapter 6. Moreover, as I will argue below, sociologists have a long tradition of addressing debates over morality, and these tools will be useful in examining contemporary religion and science.

Theology and philosophy are, in ideal form, not concerned with what the public thinks, because the public may just be wrong, and the point is to lead people to the correct answer. However, in general it would be useful for theologians and philosophers to be aware of the public's views before they try to change these views. At a minimum, they need to be aware of the misperceptions the public holds and how far they have to go to get to the correct answer. For example, it is useful for Catholic theologians to know that their most observant members are actually quite heterodox regarding evolution, believing in the conservative Protestant version. For theological traditions like Protestantism where the individual believer is also a source of truth, the collected views of the members of a tradition could provide theological input to the theologians. Theology and philosophy should continue to try to integrate systemic knowledge structures, because that is what their fields are about. It is important to emphasize to their readers that their systemic view of knowledge is probably not held by average religious practitioners, and to be very clear when claims are about nature and when they are about morality.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTISTS

Additional social science research on religion and science would be the most useful for scientists. Scientists are aware that society—whether the scientists like it or not—can determine what the scientists do by either creating explicit public policies or more subtly by influencing government funding. Many scientists think that there is a Republican war on science, which means that one political party and its supporters are limiting the resources that flow to science and ignoring the information it provides.⁴ Science is then inevitably political, and it would be extremely useful for scientists to have accurate information about the source of opposition they actually face. For example, if scientists continue to think that the Republican war on science is driven by conservative religious people—which is possibly true—they should know that it is unlikely driven by these religious people’s view of knowledge per se, but by morality. Scientists should acknowledge and deal with this moral difference to resolve this lack of support from the political system. That some Protestant fundamentalists do not believe scientists’ accounts of the age of the Earth really is not the problem, but pretending that it is is comforting for science, because it keeps the debate on the scientists’ turf of facts. But, this comfort comes at the price of ultimately hurting science.

What is worse for science in the U.S. is that what I am calling the systemic knowledge conflict narrative is likely hurting scientists in the eyes of the public. The public is being told that they must, in the weak systemic knowledge conflict version, believe all scientific claims, even if irrelevant to their lives. For example, to believe in science, they have to believe in an ancient Earth. In the strong version, science requires metaphysical naturalism and atheism—God cannot exist. I am certainly not the first to suggest that promoting the idea of knowledge conflict is bad for science. Typical is eminent primatologist Frans de Waal, who writes:

Most Americans feel that the Bible is either an inspired text not intended to be taken literally or a book of legends and moral precepts. This is great to know for those trying to get an evolutionary message across. The nonliteralist majority is (or should be) their target audience, since they are more likely to listen. Except, of course, if the discussion opener is a slap in the face. Unfortunately, all this talk about how science and religion are irreconcilable is not free of consequences. It tells religious people that, however open-minded and undogmatic they may be, worthy of science they are not. They will first need to jettison all beliefs held dear. I find the neo-atheist insistence on purity curiously religious. All that is lacking is some sort of baptism ceremony at which believers publicly repent before they join the “rational elite” of nonbelievers. Ironically, the last one to qualify would have been an Augustinian friar growing peas in a monastery garden.⁵

It is also likely that some of the moral agenda of some scientists hurt science. For example, consider attempts to have science set meaning for society. In Peter Harrison’s words, “In the twenty-first century, attempts to imbue science with

quasi-religious significance play little role in routine scientific activities, but are common in some influential popular presentations of science, particularly among those who seek to promote the image of an essential antagonism between science and religion.”⁶ While more research is needed, the survey analysis in Chapter 7 suggests that religious people have a particularly strong reaction against scientists’ trying to determining meaning and direction for society. I suspect that the vast majority of practicing scientists do not want this role for their profession, so why have they allowed it to be seen as a part of the scientific agenda?

The analysis in previous chapters leads me to conclude that scientists should admit their own moral stance and engage with the religious public in moral debate. Consider climate change again. Conservative Protestants, and all the other religious groups I examine, do not seem to have religious motivations to not believe scientists, but rather political motivations.

Climate scientists obviously have a moral position on climate change. Yes, it is a highly consensual moral position—that we want to limit the suffering of humans—but it is a moral position nonetheless. I would bet that most climate scientists are also concerned that the poor of the world will disproportionately suffer due to the actions of the wealthy who have created the problem in the first place. The current pope recently made a statement that accepted all of the science on global warming and then turned to morality—for example, that the people most negatively impacted by global warming will be the poorest.⁷ Mainline Protestants have long had similar views, and the National Association of Evangelicals takes a very similar stand.⁸ The climate science community and the largest religious traditions in the U.S. appear to be in moral agreement.

By explicitly turning to morality, scientists might be able to crack the real problem with climate change mitigation—the Republican party. Like it or not, most Americans probably view issues of intergenerational responsibility and the future of the species through a religious lens. Scientists could take components of the morality expressed by religious leaders, such as concern for the poor, and use this to facilitate the divorce of conservative Protestants from the Republican Party—at least on this issue. Groups like the Evangelical Environmental Network are working on exactly this project.⁹ But scientists will not be able to help facilitate this divorce if they imply that conservative Protestant religion somehow precludes believing scientific claims about global warming, or if scientists cannot be explicit about their own moral values.

Grabbing a different moral bull by the horns would also be useful to science. I can see why scientists and others are bothered by the propositional belief conflict that does exist. My research above suggests that the concern that not believing in Darwin means that people cannot become doctors is overblown. But, it is plausible that creationist activists are limiting the education of some children in the U.S. by stopping schools from effectively teaching scientific topics.

If scientists simply acknowledged that many people have moral concerns about science, they could mitigate some conflict without having to take a moral position themselves. For example, pretending that the debate about human origins is only about knowledge claims makes that debate go on and on, because the two “sides” are talking past each other. The courts have decided that science has greater authority, but that is not going to resolve any debate.

If scientists acknowledged that people have moral concerns about Darwin, they could at least join with the religious people to counter-program against these supposed moral impacts. For example, scientists could advocate detangling facts from morals. We can imagine science teachers talking about moral concerns with Darwinism, and teach that, for example, the survival of the fittest organism is not a moral model for human society. They could note that the role of random mutations in evolution does not mean that human morality is random. The moral lessons of Darwinism that concern religious critics could be counteracted in schools without compromising the idea that Darwinism is true or violating the separation of church and state. Some scientists already do this moral deprogramming. For example, in his response to the movie advocating Intelligent Design titled *Expelled*, Richard Dawkins wrote:

Natural selection is a good object lesson in how NOT to organize a society. As I have often said before, as a scientist I am a passionate Darwinian. But as a citizen and a human being, I want to construct a society which is about as un-Darwinian as we can make it. I approve of looking after the poor (very un-Darwinian). I approve of universal medical care (very un-Darwinian). It is one of the classic philosophical fallacies to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’¹⁰

Scientists might think that such an exercise is a silly waste of time, because that is not how they view religion and science. Even if scientists think the concern that scientific research teaches morality is fanciful, it would benefit them to acknowledge that others, rightly or wrongly, have these concerns. If Richard Dawkins can take the time to give these moral qualifiers, anybody can, given that Dawkins has been called the “high priest of the religion of scientism.”¹¹

A FUTURE DEBATE

Religious groups and scientists are going to be in conflict with each other in the public sphere as long as some religious groups oppose the moral goals of scientists. In these debates, scientists may come to disagree with their religious opponents, and vice versa. That is fine and a part of democracy, but people should disagree with each other for the right reasons. I hope that after reading this book we can conclude that the religious opponents of the scientists are not “anti-science” but rather opposed to the moral values promoted by scientists. Our public debates would be better if the participants were clear about this fact.

The final problem is where this moral deliberation between science and society, including the religious groups in society, would occur. We might think that the field of bioethics would be such a location, but as I have argued elsewhere, beginning in the mid-1980s mainstream bioethics evolved into a field that surreptitiously promoted the morality of scientists while claiming that this morality was that of the public.¹² What is worse is that with the advent of the George W. Bush administration, the final polarization of the field occurred, as it split into liberal and conservative factions or, in the terms of one of the liberals, between those who “celebrate the transformative power of science and those who fear it.”¹³ Religion became associated with conservative bioethics, and mainstream science participates in liberal bioethics, which still promotes the moral values of scientists. This is unfortunately not the venue of a conversation between religion and science about morality.

We are left with the public sphere—with the internet, opinion editorials, conferences, and TV shows. Before this can effectively occur we need to better understand the structural impediments to having a debate between religion and science in the public sphere. A recent study of religion and science debates in the public sphere by sociologist Michael Evans suggests a number of problems. At least in current media debates, when representatives of “science” and “religion” appear to discuss contentious issues, they do not engage in debate but just assert or advocate. Actual dialogue is a rare commodity.

The most severe problem for an actual debate between religion and science over morality is that the public thinks that “religion” means “religious right,” and the religious right is seen as violating the expectations of an appropriate debate in the public sphere. So, the liberal religious people who typically engage in debates with science are discredited along with the religious right. What is worse is that, for science, the dominant model of scientific credibility removes the credibility of science from any one scientist. Thus, science is more legitimate if it is faceless, without a representative, and the public then generally disapproves of scientists in public debates. How a debate without representatives could occur is unclear. Even worse for science is that people think that scientists are trying to cut off deliberation by deploying expert knowledge.¹⁴ Thus, we need more social science research on the nature of debates in the public sphere before a productive debate about morality between science and religion can occur.

CALL FOR MORE RESEARCH

As I have written in previous pages, the claims in this book are somewhat tentative because most of the existing data on the relationship between religion and science was designed while assuming the systemic knowledge conflict. I have tried to repurpose these data for my analyses. My point is to show enough disparate strands

of data to spur others to conduct more research in this area. For example, I proposed a number of explanations for the existence of propositional belief conflict in Chapter 6, all of which would require more social science research. Much of the existing data is about knowledge claims and can then be, to some extent, repurposed to examine propositional conflict. The most pressing need in this area is further studies of the moral relationship between religion and science for the public, in particular the area of moral conflict. Examination of the moral values taught by religion is a recognizable field in social science, so I will focus my suggestions on a more heterodox call for a similar investigation of science. I see three primary areas of inquiry.

The Moral Values of Science

Religion and science are both institutions that exist to replicate certain ideas and practices. Both have either explicit or implicit moral values that are taught to those embedded in these institutions—and these moral values may be behind more surface-level conflicts concerning beliefs about nature.

The first deeper institutional value of science that should be investigated to see if it actually exists among scientists—and if the public perceives it as well—is the aggressive attitude of science versus the more cautious approach of nonscientists. Science, at least in its cutting-edge forms, has a persistent “We know what is good for you, we know what is right, just get out of our way” attitude. As Wuthnow writes, in many people’s view: “Scientists are drunk on hubris, in it for the money or their own glory, and sadly incapable of any humility.” Wuthnow quotes C. P. Snow as writing that the scientific culture “is expansive, not restrictive, confident at the roots, the more confident after its bout of Oppenheimerian self-criticism, certain that history is on its side, impatient, intolerant.” Concerns remain that the “can-do attitude of science presumably overwhelms questions about deeper values.”¹⁵

This “can-do attitude”—this “impatient, intolerant” view on “progress”—is likely a major cultural and moral divide with the rest of the population, and another reason why the public thinks that scientists are promoting a morality different than the public’s morality. Scientists probably think that the public is far too cautious, and that if we had listened to public concerns about safety there would be no test tube babies or organ transplants, both of which occurred with only the dimmest understanding of what would happen. The public has a more cautious view, and this may be a trigger for public groups to engage in moral conflict with science.

A second institutional value to investigate is scientism, defined as “a matter of putting too high a value on natural science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture.”¹⁶ An extreme version of this idea is that the natural sciences are the only source of real knowledge. Poetry, literature, philosophy, and obviously religion would all be, at minimum, second-class ways of thinking, even for questions

that have nothing to do with the physical world, such as what our ethics should be. If scientists are explicitly or implicitly projecting this view and the public perceives it, I think this would again be another source of moral conflict with science.

A third and related potential source of moral conflict to investigate is the extent to which scientists look to science to set the goals for humanity. As noted previously, at various points in recent history prominent scientists and their allies have not wanted to be limited to investigate the world but have rather wanted to change it to be consistent with their own eschatological vision of human progress. For example, the eugenics movements of the twentieth century wanted to use science to improve the human species through selective breeding. In developing these movements, scientists often create idea systems that are structurally similar to religions. It would be good to see whether scientists approve of these attempts and if the public perceives scientists as trying to create a religion of science.

Fourth, and finally, research should try to enumerate the values forwarded by scientists on some public issue, like embryonic stem cell research, and compare these to the values forwarded by the public. For example, I think that medical research scientists explicitly learn only two values from their scientific training—the relief of suffering and the value of human understanding of the world. Individual scientists may have additional values, but they did not learn these from institutional science. Religious people share these values, but probably have a number of additional ones. If this is true, then moral conflict will occur, because religious citizens are using moral values that scientists do not recognize. More research is necessary to determine whether this is really true. In all four of these open questions, what requires examination is not only whether scientists hold these views but whether the public sees the scientists as holding these views and whether this changes their orientation toward scientists in the public sphere.

The Morally Expressive Nature of Science and Technology

A second major area that needs more social science research is in the area of the morally expressive nature of scientific discoveries. As bioethicist Erik Parens summarizes, “Technology is value-laden and it shapes us in ways that usually elude our attention.” For example, no pregnant woman has to take the test for Down syndrome, but the existence of such a test has a moral message, that people may want to avoid having a baby with Down syndrome. Social pressures then emerge for its use and then, in Parens’ words, “the fact that a technology exists can swiftly, if imperceptibly, turn into an ethical obligation to use it for a specific purpose.”¹⁷

In a recent study, I examined belief in an extreme version of a biological definition of a human, where humans are biological machines defined by their DNA. I showed that among the public this view is associated with being less concerned

about human rights violations such as buying organs from poor people, not stopping genocides, taking blood from prisoners against their will, and people committing suicide to save money for their families.¹⁸ This suggests that certain biological claims are expressive of a certain moral orientation toward people.

Again, the question is whether the knowledge and technology promoted by scientists really do teach the public a certain morality, as social scientists and humanists have long claimed.¹⁹ If so, this could be the source of a moral conflict between religion and science. Research is needed on a range of scientific claims and technologies to see whether they really do teach people a moral value, whether the public perceives this to be the case, and whether what is taught is at odds with what the public's values are.

Moral Conflict Over Specific Scientific Experiments and Technologies

The third type of moral conflict where much more research is needed is in public conflicts over specific scientific experiments and technologies, like embryonic stem cell research. It is extremely easy to show with public opinion data that the public is more opposed to embryonic research than are scientists. That is not the interesting question. The question is whether the religious public perceives "science" to be behind calls for embryonic stem cell research and whether any disagreement they have with science in this one area spills out into opposition to scientists' involvement with other issues. Moreover, how does the public perceive scientific advocates of these technologies? Are they perceived as medical researchers focused on the relief of suffering—or as one of the negative Frankenstein-type figures so popular in our culture? A similar and interesting question would be what the public hears when it hears about a new technology, such as "gene editing" of human embryos. Does it attribute the morally contentious technology to scientists? If so, what do they perceive the values of these scientists to be, and do they perceive them as being in opposition to their own?

It has long been said that religion and science are the two great ways of understanding the world, and this view has justified the enormous energy that has been spent on the relationship between these two great institutions. I would still say that religion and science are the two great ways of understanding the world, but by understanding I mean the relationships between humans in the world and the relationship between humans and nature. These relations are the stuff of morality, and we should turn our eyes to this new era of this ongoing relationship.

