

Introduction

Empires and Indigenous Peoples, Global Transformation and the Limits of International Society

PROLOGUE: THE WUSHE REBELLION AND INDIGENOUS RENAISSANCE IN TAIWAN

On October 27, 1930, terror visited the small community of Japanese settler-expatriates in the picturesque resort town of Wushe, an administrative center nestled on a plateau in the central mountains of Taiwan.¹ On that day, some 300 indigenes led by Mona Ludao raided government arsenals, ambushed isolated police units, and turned a school assembly into a bloodbath. All told, Mona's men killed 134 Japanese nationals by day's end, many of them butchered with long daggers and beheaded. Alerted by a distressed phone call from an escapee, the Japanese police apparatus, with backing from military units stationed in Taiwan, responded with genocidal fury. Aerial bombardment, infantry sweeps, and local mercenaries killed roughly 1,000 men, women, and children in the ensuing months. A cornered Mona Ludao removed to the countryside and then killed his family and hanged himself to avoid capture. Subsequently, the Japanese government relocated the remaining residents of Mona's village, Mehebu, forever wiping it off the map.²

Over the course of Japanese rule (1895–1945), the Taiwan Government-General forcibly relocated hundreds of other hamlets like Mehebu. The invasive and exploitative policies that provoked Mona and his confederates also eroded pre-colonial forms of social organization, authority, and ritual life among Taiwan's indigenes. As it severed bonds between indigenes and their lands, in addition to prohibiting or reforming folkways it deemed injurious to its civilizing mission, the government-general nonetheless laid the groundwork for the emergence of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples as a conscious and agentive historical formation. By arresting the diffusion of Chinese language and customs into Taiwan's interior,

restricting geographic mobility across the so-called “Savage Border,” dividing the colony into normally and specially administered zones, and sanctioning a battery of projects in top-down ethnogenesis, the government-general inscribed a nearly indelible “Indigenous Territory” on the political map of Taiwan over the five decades of its existence.

This book will argue that successive, overlapping instantiations of state power’s negative and positive modalities precipitated the formation of modern indigenous political identity in colonial Taiwan. This process paralleled other nationalist awakenings forged in the crucible of foreign occupation. As state functionaries smashed idols, compelled assimilation, and asserted the authority of a central government, their fellow nationals reified, commodified, and preserved the material, cultural, and territorial expressions of native distinction. These Janus-faced vectors of state building can be found wherever governments targeted citizenries, imperial subjects, or marginalized out-groups for inclusion into a new kind of national political space. Applying these axioms to the case of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples under Japanese colonial rule, *Outcasts of Empire* argues that the process Ronald Niezen dubs “indigenization” is a historical concomitant of competitive nation building in the age of high imperialism (1870s–1910s).

Rightly emphasizing the importance of transnational activist circuits, global NGOs, and the increased salience of international rights conventions, Niezen and others consider the decades following 1960 the incubation period for “international indigenism.”³ Laura R. Graham and H. Glenn Penny stress how indigeneity “emerged as a legal and juridical category during the Cold War era” in response to “growing concerns about environmental degradation during the twentieth century together with the emergence of human rights discourses. . . .”⁴ Writing about the Taiwan case study explored in this book, Wang Fu-chang asserts that indigenous political consciousness is a decidedly recent arrival, erupting in its current form in the 1980s.⁵

While recognizing the importance of the movements of the 1960s and beyond for indigenous cultural survival in the twenty-first century, this book argues that the early twentieth century is a better place to look for the systemic wellsprings of indigenism.⁶ Rather than viewing indigenism as a postwar development enabled by a more or less functioning international system, *Outcasts of Empire* suggests that nationality, internationalism, and indigenism were mutually constituted formations, rather than sequentially occurring phenomena.

The pages that follow examine the politics, economics, and cultural movements that informed the Japanese colonial state’s partitioning of Taiwan’s indigenous homelands into a special zone of administration known as the Aborigine Territory. The administrative bifurcation of Taiwan began as an expedient measure in the 1890s, reflecting the dependence of the Taiwan Government-General on Qing precedents and straitened colonial budgets. By the 1920s and 1930s, however, the peoples today known as Taiwan Indigenous Peoples⁷ were cast for good

beyond the bounds of the colonial state's disciplinary apparatus. The so-called *Takasagozoku* (Formosan Aborigines) were accorded a special status as imperial subjects because they were believed to lack the economic competence to thrive in the colony's "regularly administered territories."⁸ In a more positive sense, indigenes were invested with a cultural authenticity that marked them as avatars of prelapsarian Taiwan antedating Chinese immigration, based in part on high Japanese appraisals of Austronesian cultural production.⁹ From the 1930s onward, the distinctiveness of indigenes as non-Han Taiwanese was elaborated and promoted by the state, the tourism industry, and intellectuals, laying the groundwork for the successor Nationalist Party government of Taiwan (*Guomindang* or GMD) to rule the island as an ethnically bifurcated political field.¹⁰

The deterritorializing and reterritorializing operations that underwrote the emergence of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples during the period of Japanese colonial rule had locally distinctive contours.¹¹ But these interrelated processes were embedded in a global political economy dominated by a capitalist business cycle and international competition. In East Asia, the Japanese state refracted these transnational forces throughout its formal and informal empires. A parallel and instructive set of events in neighboring Korea illustrates this point.

In 1919, the Japanese state brutally suppressed a Korean uprising known as the March 1 Movement. That year, across the peninsula, around one million Koreans loudly protested the draconian administrations of governors general Terauchi Masatake and Hasegawa Yoshimichi (1910–1919) on the occasion of former king Gojong's funeral. As was the case with the Wushe uprising of 1930 in Taiwan, the magnitude and vehemence of the protests were taken as a negative verdict on Japanese rule. The savagery of Japan's suppression of the uprising, which may have taken 7,500 Korean lives, became a source of national embarrassment. The sense that colonial rule should rest on more than naked force, and the awareness that the world was watching, impelled the Japanese state to embark on reforms that emphasized co-optation, the active support of Korean elites, and abolition of the most violent and hated forms of colonial police tactics, such as summary punishment by flogging.¹²

During the 1920s, the Korean Government-General launched a series of policies known as "cultural rule" in response to the March 1 debacle. As part of a larger program to legitimate itself, Japan's official stance toward Korean literature, architecture, music, and other cultural forms took a preservationist turn that tempered enthusiasm for the fruits of Korean ethnic genius with a wariness of insubordination and a long-standing belief that Koreans were developmentally laggard. The softening of the government's posture and policies entailed neither the implementation of a culturally relativist agenda nor the abandonment of the core principles of racial denigration. Nonetheless, Saitō Makoto's "cultural rule" policy represented a sea change, and it set into motion a series of reforms that laid bare the contradictory demands made upon the interwar colonial state.

On the one hand, state power was ultimately maintained through the threat of force and justified by a theory of Japanese racial superiority. On the other, the colonial state sought to attain hegemony through the politics of inclusion, which brought in its train practices that were conducive to the production of modern Korean subjects.¹³ Henry Em summarizes the paradoxical long-term effects of colonial rule in terms that mirror events in Taiwan:

Thus, contrary to conventional [Korean] nationalist accounts that argue that Japanese colonial authorities pursued a consistent and systematic policy of eradicating Korean identity, we should see that the Japanese colonial state actually endeavored to produce Koreans as subjects—subjects in the sense of being under the authority of the Japanese emperor, and in the sense of having a *separate . . . subjectivity*. . . .

It was in this sense that Japanese colonialism was ‘constructive’ for both the colonizer and colonized. . . . Coercion, prohibition, and censorship, then were not the only (or even primary) forms through which colonial power was exercised. . . . there was a steady proliferation of discourses concerning Korean identity emanating from the Japanese colonial state itself—including studies of Korean history, geography, language, customs, religion, music, art—in almost immeasurable accumulated detail. . . . For the Japanese colonial state, the goal of exploiting Korea and using it for its strategic ends went hand in hand with the work of transforming peasants into Koreans, or ‘Chōsenjin.’¹⁴

Two parallels are in evidence here. First of all, well-coordinated attacks on Japanese state power (March 1 in Korea and Wushe in Taiwan), followed by clumsy and disproportionate responses (the open firing on civilians in Korea, the aerial bombardments in Taiwan), actuated regime change. In Taiwan, the heated debates surrounding the Wushe Rebellion pitted Japan’s opposition Seiyūkai (Friends of the Constitution) against Governor-General Ishizuka Eizō, who was allied with the ruling Minseitō (Popular Government Party). The Seiyūkai capitalized on the Taiwan Government-General’s incompetence to call for the resignation of Ishizuka, who actually stepped down along with his inner circle, a reshuffling reminiscent of Saitō Makoto’s ascension to the governor-generalship of Korea in 1919.¹⁵

Again echoing events in Korea, the cowed successor administration in Taiwan called for a renovation of “Aborigine Administration” and a shift from rule by naked force and intimidation to government by co-optation and delegation. Importantly, for our purposes, Taiwanese highlanders were thereafter governed as members of ethnic groups, whose cultural, political, and economic distinction from the rest of Taiwan was selectively preserved, with certain elements even celebrated by colonial administrators, metropolitan voters, and consumers in Taiwan and Japan alike.¹⁶ As was the case for Japanese cultural rule in 1920s Korea, the new era of aborigine administration proved compatible with the emergence of a discourse on ethnic integrity, one that overrode localisms. The artifacts and structures that coalesced during this period would then resurface in the postcolonial era in the form of indigenous ethnonationalism.¹⁷

In contrast to Korea, public expressions of indigenous patriotism were suppressed in Taiwan for over four decades after the Japanese Empire crumbled in 1945.¹⁸ The 1.5 million migrants to Taiwan in the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) exodus represented yet another wave of colonization for Taiwan's majority population.¹⁹ During a long stretch of one-party rule under martial law (1949–87), GMD-sanctioned history excluded discussions of indigenes as autochthons because it regarded Taiwanese history as a regional variant of mainland China's.²⁰

After martial law was lifted in 1987, politicians put distance between themselves and the GMD by supporting an indigenous cultural renaissance to signal the island's distinctiveness from the mainland.²¹ On a parallel track, the founding of the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines in 1984 ushered in a wave of organized indigenous activism.²² Thereafter, coordinated action between Han Taiwanese nationalists and Indigenous activists produced a number of political and cultural reforms aimed at promoting a measure of autonomy and correcting the most egregious forms of public denigration. As a result, the notions that non-Han peoples are the island's original inhabitants and that Taiwan's multiracial composition should be celebrated rather than overcome are mainstream political positions²³—much as they were in the 1930s, when Japan ruled the island.

Within this broader context of renaissance and revival, Puli-based freelance writer Deng Xiangyang's energetically researched oral and documentary histories articulate a local perspective on the Wushe uprising that posits indigenes as anti-colonial heroes and avatars of an authentic, pre-Chinese Taiwanese past. Deng's books draw on biographical and family histories and photographs culled from his local network of Sediq acquaintances.²⁴ Along with graphic artist Qiu Ruolong, who also has extensive contacts and family relations in the Sediq community, Deng coproduced a television drama and children's book about the Wushe Rebellion. Qiu and Deng have popularized the heroic suffering of the Sediq people, the harsh labor conditions and sexual harassment that contributed to the revolt, and the brutality of the Japanese counterattacks. All of these themes were subsequently dramatized in the blockbuster John Woo production *Seediq Bale* (2011), a feature-length film that recounts the story of the rebellion in romantic hues that recall *Last of the Mohicans* and *Dances with Wolves*.²⁵

As I watched and rewatched this film, I was struck by its fidelity to the Japanese inquest reports into the causes of the rebellion. The main characters, the key scenes, and the plot structure are immediately recognizable to anyone who has sifted through the documentation generated by the rebellion. Insofar as some Japanese characters are made out to be racist buffoons deserving of grisly deaths, this film can be considered anticolonial. At the same time, its deep engagement with a reservoir of colonial-era tropes, documents, and narrative structures highlights the entanglement of colonialism and postcolonial nationalism that marks


the Korean experience, shown here in a new context: the making of an indigenous people.

While there were similarities, as noted above, the complex process by which residents of Mehebu and Paaran (see map 1) became Sediq was different from the trajectory that saw natives of Seoul, Gyeongju, and Pyongyang transformed into Chōsenjin (people of Joseon, or Koreans). In the case of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, the translocal, subimperial, and putatively organic identities fostered under the government-general's variant of cultural rule were not *Taiwanese*, per se, but by turns Indigenous Formosan (*Takasagozoku*) or attached to particular ethnolinguistic groups (Amis, Bunun, Paiwan, Atayal, Tsou, Rukai, Saisiyat, and Yami) (see map 2).


For example, in 1930, Mona Ludao and his followers appeared in official documents, journalism, and commercial publications as “savages,” “barbarians,” or “Formosan Tribes” (*banjin*, *seibanjin*, *banzoku*).²⁶ In many respects, they were governed as such: policy before 1930 emphasized their backwardness, mainly by excluding them from the tax base due to purported economic incompetence. The translocal identifier *banjin* ascribed little importance to matters of ethnic identity and was, in fact, symptomatic of a pre-Wushe Rebellion approach to governance that paid scant attention to subject formation.²⁷

In the press, in government statistics, in police records, and in ethnological writing, indigenes were also identified as members of particular units called *sha* in Japanese (Mehebu and Paaran, for example). The *sha* were units of governance pegged to residential patterns, although they did not necessarily reflect local conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty. Rather, the category *sha* (in Chinese, *she*) was imposed by the Qing, long before the Japanese arrived, as a blanket term for any indigenous settlement or cluster of hamlets.²⁸ Like the *banjin* designator, affiliation with a *sha* did not confer ethnic or cultural status upon the governed.

Terminology anchored in derivatives of the terms *ban* and *sha* suggested continuity from Qing times and a relative disinterest in indigenous interiority. On the other hand, as early as 1898, Japanese ethnologists began to classify residents of Mona's hometown of Mehebu as Atayals. This neologism originated with Inō Kanori and signaled a different way of imagining Taiwan's non-Han population(s). The term *Atayal* first appeared in Japanese documents in 1896 to identify an ethnic group noted for facial tattooing, a common language that spanned several watersheds and valleys (and *sha*), and the production of brilliant red textiles.²⁹ The term *Atayal*, which connoted membership in a culture-bearing ethnos, rarely surfaced in policy-making circles during the first two decades of colonial rule. From early on, however, the term was inscribed in an academic counterdiscourse, as exemplified by a color-coded map. The map's novel subethnic components—territories for the Atayal, Bunun, Tsou, Amis, Paiwan, Puyuma, and Tsarisen peoples—overwrote Qing-period cartographic voids. This architectonic prefigured today's officially sanctioned view of Taiwanese multiculturalism (see figures 1 and 2).



MAP 1. The major indigenous ethnic groups of northern Taiwan, with the Atayal and Sediq settlements most frequently mentioned in this book. The Sediq territory reflects the demarcations of Japanese official surveys in the second decade of the twentieth century. Today, much of the territory labeled Sediq by the Japanese is now considered Truku territory.



MAP 2. An overview of the major indigenous ethnic groups of Taiwan, as portrayed in Japanese-period maps, ca. 1935. As this book argues, the shapes of these territories, their names, and their numbers have been historically contingent.




FIGURE 1. Japanese colonial-period ethnonyms for Taiwan Indigenous Peoples.

During the colonial period, the ethnic designator *Sediq* that marks Mona Ludao and his descendants was also slow to catch on, even after the Wushe uprising of 1930.³⁰ Nonetheless, the political and cultural salience of labels such as *Atayal*, under which the Sediq were subsumed at that time, increased in the 1930s. TGG-sponsored indigenous youth corps, a new locus of political power, were organized around these labels of identity and difference.³¹ In addition, museum collections, censuses, and language dictionaries inscribed these categories for reactivation decades later.³²

There are obvious differences in scale between modern Korean nationalism and Taiwan indigenous renaissance. The Korean Peninsula is populated by well over sixty-five million people, while the Sediq lands of contemporary Taiwan claim about ten thousand; Taiwan's sixteen recognized indigenous ethnic groups total roughly three hundred thousand souls. But for the purposes of this study, the more important issue is how these two former areas of the Japanese Empire have diverged, despite their common experiences as test cases for the efficacy of cultural rule, referred to above. Unlike Koreans who reside on the peninsula, Taiwan's indigenous peoples cannot claim a nation-state to express their shared heritage and territorial distinction in the hard currency of sovereignty. At the same time—and this separates them from ethnic minorities who cannot imagine themselves as indigenous—conditions are such for Taiwan Indigenous Peoples that territorial sovereignty in one form or another is a plausible, if not desirable, way forward.




FIGURE 2. Inō Kanori's ethnic map of Taiwan's indigenous territory, 1898. The colored zones represent indigenous ethnic groups. The white areas represent nonindigenous (Han) Taiwan. A broken line indicates the borderline between the two. This map was published in 1900 as part of a government report: Inō Kanori and Awano Dennojō, *Taiwan banjin jijō* (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokufu minseibu bunshōka, 1900), n.p.

THE DECLINE OF NATIVES AND THE EMERGENCE OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN WORLD HISTORY

American and Japanese successes in nation building during the 1870s and 1880s were not isolated events. After 1860, Germany and Italy also consolidated, and they, along with France, put into place new central governments. . . . A handful of nations put together the skills and aggressiveness to create concentrated industrial plants whose products and profits translated into military power. *The resulting new imperialism of the post-1860 years redrew the maps of Africa and Asia.*—Walter LaFeber³³

As there are no unoccupied territories—that is, territories that do not belong to [a] state . . . [T]he characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partitioning of the globe—final, not in the sense that repartition is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and inevitable—but in the sense that *the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has completed the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one “owner” to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an owner.*—V.I. Lenin³⁴

In their recent intervention into the field of international relations, political scientists Barry Buzan and George Lawson make a strong case for the nineteenth-century origins of the “full international system.”³⁵ They convincingly argue that a “global transformation” was occasioned by the confluence of shifts in the historically concatenated domains of production, state building, and ideology. Following historian Jürgen Osterhammel, Buzan and Lawson point out that today’s international system is not a creature of Europe’s landmark Treaties of Westphalia (1648) or Versailles (1919), but is rather a product of nation-state-sponsored industrial capitalism’s global impact as an integrative and disintegrative force.³⁶ Osterhammel also views the nineteenth century as a world-historical pivot, while decentering the story of global modernity with a conscious move away from unreflexive Eurocentrism. Osterhammel and Buzan and Lawson take inspiration from C. A. Bayly in their regard for ideation and social formations as more than the epiphenomena of high politics and industrial progress.³⁷ But for all of their breadth, erudition, and nuance, none of these magisterial syntheses of nineteenth-century global political economy and history has accounted for a persistent phenomenon that was part and parcel of the transformations they so ably map. I refer here to the emergence of indigenous peoples, which is the other side of the coin of the birth of the modern nation-state system.

As Lenin asserted a century ago (see epigraph to this section), a handful of nation-states managed to write their sovereignty over the earth’s surface during Osterhammel’s, Buzan and Lawson’s, and Bayly’s period of global transformation. This feat was accomplished by harnessing the power of capitalism to a novel form of intra- and interstate sovereignty. In the emergent international system, state sovereignty was imagined as distributed evenly within clearly defined and limited national borders. Unlike their early-modern dynastic-state predecessors, with

their relatively low state capacities and patchworks of graded, plural, and oscillating sovereignties, the new order was premised on the axiom that no space could belong simultaneously to multiple sovereigns. Perhaps even more radical was the axiom that no space on the globe could be excluded from the system.³⁸

Colorful early twentieth-century globes and Mercator projection maps visually encapsulated the new system's logic. Formerly unknown white spaces and great deserts of the world were filled in with various imperial colors. One color ended where another began. The shapes given to these territories were serially reproduced and became instantly recognizable logos. Thongchai Winichakul called these entities "geo-bodies."³⁹ Today, we understand that these globes and maps expressed wishful thinking. Surely, the United States had not extended its authority over thousands of Philippine Islands and their millions of inhabitants with the stroke of a pen in Paris in 1898.⁴⁰ So too with the French in Vietnam in 1862⁴¹ or the Japanese in Taiwan in 1895⁴² at the conclusion of similar paper agreements. Superficially, such treaties, accords, and protocols transferred sovereignty from dynastic states to nation-states. But the notion of "transfer" obscured a thorny problem: dynastic states conceptualized sovereignty in significantly different terms, so the sovereignty that was inherited by nation-states was necessarily incomplete, partial, and unsatisfactory by the standards of "international society"⁴³ as it was being reconfigured in the nineteenth century.

In the years and even decades following annexation, each imperial nation-state aspired to reconcile the contradictions of an international system premised on universal reach but composed of legally plural empire-states riddled with semi-autonomous enclaves. Through negotiation, warfare, and experiments in applied colonial science, empire-states attempted to create a world of contiguous imperial geobodies in the face of deficits of intelligence, rebelling populations, challenging terrain, and fiscal constraints. As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper put it, ". . . when territories were taken over, colonized people did not simply fall into whatever role striving industrialists could imagine for them. Empires still came up against the limits of their power at the far end of lines of command, where they had to mobilize conquered communities and find reliable intermediaries—all *at a cost that did not exceed the benefits.*"⁴⁴

Continuing in this vein, these historians point out that the far-flung European nineteenth-century empires, products and engines of a voracious industrial capitalism, were not *sui generis* entities. The great protagonists of high imperialism employed and built upon older imperial forms, albeit with more firepower and competitive edge. For them—and for Lauren Benton, another influential scholar of comparative imperialism—the ideal type of an international society exhausted by unitarily sovereign states was only that, an ideal. Giving it too much credence, as the telos of imperial history or as a dominant formation, belies an exclusive focus on the utterances of metropolitan visionaries and a disregard for how empires actually functioned.

This book shares the view of Burbank and Cooper and of Benton that empires are best understood as successors to other empires and that postcolonialism did not resolve itself into a world of sovereign nation-states based on former colonial boundaries. At the same time, it will argue that hallmarks of nineteenth-century imperialism—its symbiosis with industrial capitalism, a geostrategic setting of multipolar competition, and a susceptibility to liberal and anti-imperial inflections—produced a condition I will call indigenous modernity. Taking Burbank and Cooper’s emphasis on the cost constraints of imperial integration to heart, *Outcasts of Empire* will describe a kind of fiscal exhaustion, one that occurred during the slice of world-time described above, as the ground for the emergence of indigenous peoples, autonomous regions, and other forms of quasi sovereignty that mottle the ideally solid surfaces of the international system’s geobodies.⁴⁵

A particular type of virtuous circle or positive feedback loop lay at the back of state efforts to call forth disciplined populations, the forerunners of today’s national citizenries. In colonial Taiwan’s “normally administered” districts, the government-general recovered its investments on a “big bang” of outlays for population censuses, land surveys, and a buyout of the old regime’s elite because subsequent state revenues exceeded the costs of government. These monies were then plowed back into state building or reinvested in industry.⁴⁶ This virtuous circle of discipline begetting increased state budgets begetting governmentality was broken, however, in the militarily resistant, sparsely populated, topographically forbidding, and linguistically checkered highlands of Taiwan. In these “specially administered” territories, natives became indigenous peoples.

In our time, population recovery, courtroom victories, and cultural renaissance are integral to the story of indigenous peoples. The old tropes of dispossession, deracination, and endemic poverty remain relevant, but narratives of the “disappearing native” ring false in the twenty-first century. This book starts with the understanding that indigenous peoples did not become extinct. At its widest aperture, *Outcasts of Empire* asks how Bayly’s, Osterhammel’s, and Buzan and Lawson’s models of global transformation might look different if the emergence of indigenism is viewed as an integral component of the international system.

To accomplish this task, this study chronicles the making of an indigenous people at a spatial and temporal junction of the aforementioned great transformation. The case study is the emergence of the Atayal, Bunun, Saisiyat, Tsou, Amis, Paiwan, Rukai, and Puyuma peoples in Taiwan under late Qing and Japanese rule from the 1870s through the 1940s. By shifting the optic away from interstate competition and the development of a global division of labor between the First and Third Worlds,⁴⁷ and focusing instead on the production of bifurcated sovereignty within nationalized *and* colonized spaces, this study attempts to explain disjunctions and discontinuities internal to emergent national political formations. The intensification and extensification of global capitalism,⁴⁸ it will argue, instantiated the political geography of bifurcated sovereignty in Taiwan.

The narrative begins in the 1860s, with a discussion of shipwrecks and ransoms on Taiwan's Langqiao Peninsula. On the southern extremity of the Qing Empire, Langqiao's political topography presented numerous hurdles to the extension of the international system.⁴⁹ Through an analysis of the diplomatic, military, and institutional solutions implemented to solve these problems, I show how a vision of world order became globally normative (although it remained aspirational at best). Subsequent chapters analyze how the Japanese colonial state attempted to implement the new models of sovereignty throughout Taiwan from the 1890s through the 1940s.

At a more granular level, *Outcasts of Empire* focuses on the lives, actions, and aspirations of men such as Kondō Katsusaburō (a Japanese colonist) and women such as Iwan Robao (daughter of a Sediq headman), individuals who left faint but discernible traces in the documentary record. Jun Uchida's term "brokers of empire"⁵⁰ describes them well, as does Daniel Richter's sobriquet "cultural brokers."⁵¹ By either definition, these brokers thrived in the twilight era of the legally pluralistic dynastic empires—in our case, the Tokugawa, Qing, Joseon, and Shō dynasties in Japan, China, Korea, and the Ryūkyū Islands, respectively. *Outcasts of Empire* chronicles the shifting structural positions of the headmen, interpreters, trading-post operators, and trackers who dominated the political economy of the early-modern hinterlands as they were displaced or repurposed in the new international order.

As a narrative history that pays due attention to personalities who have yet to receive scholarly attention, the empirical heart of this study is pericentric.⁵² The reconstruction of the particulars of long-observed frontier history is necessary because it indicates that the nineteenth century's reterritorialization project was more costly and time-consuming than metrocentric histories would have it. At the same time, the macrohistorical frame cannot be ignored, because interstate competition propelled successive Japanese and Qing projects in state building on the edges of Taiwan's governed spaces. One cannot explain the lavish spending for these endeavors without putting them into a context of perceived national peril and the desire to create a world order that could accommodate much higher volumes and velocities of commerce, diplomatic communications, and migration.

I am not the first scholar to argue that indigeneity and the international system are related historical phenomena. However, the case that their co-creation dates back to the early twentieth century and that their entanglement commenced as part of the global movement to make the surface of the inhabited earth coextensive with national geobodies, has yet to be made. In making this claim, I argue that the historical process of indigenization was an integral component of the international system's emergence. The mechanisms uncovered by a study of their co-creation, I believe, provide an answer to one of modernity's big conundrums: why the dream (or nightmare) of a world exhausted by nationally governed territories is receding

farther and farther toward the horizon, despite the exponential increase in state capacities and communication technologies.

Behind such seemingly innocuous statements as “Ankara spoke with Moscow, to Washington’s chagrin” lies the conceit that there are people in Ankara, Moscow, and Washington who can speak for the populations containerized in Turkey, Russia, and the United States. These metonyms suggest that leaders have the power to restrain, encourage, and regulate their populations to the extent that agreements between them bind their populations, as well. Our ability to imagine that this system is operative, even as we are mindful of frictions and imperfections, presupposes a long history of state making that will be explored in the following pages. As we shall see, the project was animated by high ideals and mendacious ideologies, by altruism and greed. One can say that the UN charter presupposes such a world order, as did the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing war. At the same time, the Berlin Conference of 1885, the Taft-Katsura accord of 1905, and the League of Nations Covenant of 1920 invoked the same ethos to justify collusion among powerful states to deny sovereignty to colonized peoples.⁵³

This book contributes to the literature on global transformation by foregrounding the immense quantities of labor-power required to operationalize the ideal-typical political units that constituted the international system. For the women and men of Meiji Japan (1868–1912) who either went to Taiwan or participated in its colonization as citizens of the metropole, Taiwan’s former Qing frontier was a vast, complex, unregulated, and challenging hinterland. Its conquest and pacification was chronicled in minute detail, because each negotiation, punitive expedition, or survey appeared as a necessary step to consolidate a Japanese empire that must either “eat or be eaten.” And yet, for all of its intensity, momentum, and destructive fury, the project ran aground in the central mountains in the year 1915. The location and timing of the project’s abandonment, I will argue, tells us much about the patchy sovereignty that still characterizes the earth’s political geography.

STATES, SETTLERS, AND NATIVES

Historian C. A. Bayly has labeled native peoples “the losers” in the global transformation. Bayly’s formulation helpfully avoids the anachronistic and circular term “primitive” and provides clues for identifying global patterns in the configuration of modern political space. Bayly writes, “What can be said is that small cultural groups which *were not centrally involved in intensive peasant commodity production* came under unprecedented political, cultural, and demographic pressure where previously they had been able to bargain with residents of the settled domains or early representatives of European and American power. The ‘cultural terms of trade’ moved decisively in favor . . . of all settled societies producing a permanent agricultural surplus or industrial artifacts.”⁵⁴

In our analysis, we will designate Bayly's "settled societies" as *settlers*, defined as social formations involved in "intensive peasant commodity production." Following Eric Wolf, we stipulate that *settler* populations are distinguished from "lineages, clans, tribes, and chiefdoms"⁵⁵ by their relationships to states. *Settlers* surrender surplus wealth to a state via some form of routinized taxation, whereas Bayly's *native peoples* (hereafter abbreviated *natives*) inhabited what James Scott terms the ungoverned peripheries of a world not yet exhausted by national borders or the direct control of dynastic states.⁵⁶ As Bayly intimates, demographically preponderant settlers overwhelmed smaller, relatively mobile populations of natives by squatting and organizing self-defense in the course of the nineteenth-century global transformation. More importantly, however, settlers yielded a portion of their surplus to states, which converted agricultural productivity into organized military force, at a remove from direct native-settler encounters.

Natives, in contrast, lived under political systems that fissured, subdivided, and recombined within the limits imposed by the politics of redistribution and reciprocity, which could never attain the surplus-extracting capabilities of states.⁵⁷ States, not settlers, turned geographically indeterminate margins, borderlands, and frontiers into demarcated and permanently defended political boundary lines. The dynamic of this tripartite state-settler-native relationship, then, is a central plotline in the delineation of the spaces of centralized state sovereignty in world history.

As a third party, the state could either mobilize agricultural surplus to restrain land-hungry settlers or deploy it to advance settler interests vis-à-vis natives, depending on a host of variables. One should not understand this process as an uninterrupted, unidirectional march, as depicted in Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, with the state an assumed ally of the tax- or tribute-paying settler. As Richard White has noted, based on the North American example, the state's intervention on behalf of settlers was often determined by the relative value central administrators placed on alliances with native peoples.⁵⁸ Moreover, when multiple empires were in competition, natives could leverage imperial backing against settlers. But as John Shepherd has shown regarding the Qing frontier in Taiwan, state support for settlers was also determined by a crude cost-benefit analysis. If the military expenses required for an aggressive settlement policy were justified by the projected increase in land revenues, the state would back the settlers.⁵⁹

As White and other scholars have shown regarding the North American natives under British and U.S. colonial rule, it was when states abandoned native peoples in favor of taxpayers (actual or potential), in light of fiscal, geostrategic, or even electoral pressures, that nonstate spaces were likely to enter the realm of centrally administered territory. Broadly speaking, this dynamic of state expansion was reversible in the early modern period but became much less so with the advent of international relations undergirded by capitalist relations of production. As the increased volume and pace of global trade called forth greater regulation of

ungoverned territory by centralized administrations, states sided with settlers to turn the tide against the natives.

An observer at century's turn might well have agreed with Lenin that states, by then, had carved up the earth's occupied territory. Bayly estimates that "only" four to eight million people constituted the world population of natives circa 1900, a number seemingly too small to stop the march of progress. But if the large portion of the earth's surface occupied by natives on the eve of World War I is taken into account, Lenin's statement appears premature. The remaining spaces of native autonomy constituted formidable obstacles to state-building visionaries and the settlers who acted as shock troops for national territorial expansion. To be sure, during the global transformation, vast tracts of the most productive native land were incorporated under the authority of nation-states and dynasties through dispossession, slaughter, or epidemiological catastrophe. Nonetheless, large areas remained administered by or in the name of native peoples beyond the spaces of national sovereignty.

LEGAL CENTRALISM AND LEGAL PLURALISM

The Japanese state in Taiwan aimed to effect "the transformation of differentiated and layered political order into an homogenous space"⁶⁰ from the early 1900s through about 1915, at the height of a historical epoch when "territory rather than status and allegiance increasingly defined the jurisdiction of the state."⁶¹ Its predecessor state in Taiwan, the Qing, exemplified a contrasting regime of "weak" or multicentric "legal pluralism." Throughout the Qing Empire, heterogeneous communities and ranked status groups stood in differentiated legal relationships to the apical center of authority in Beijing. Implicit in the notion of multicentric legal pluralism is the possibility that sovereignty can be graded, and even diminished, at the margins of a polity. In contrast, nation-states ideally impose equal measures of sovereignty over the whole surface of their territories to facilitate defense, tax collection, conscription, economic development, and the mobility of labor, among other desiderata. At the least, expanding nineteenth-century empires attempted to shut down competing sources of authority and to bring plural systems under a hierarchical state-centered umbrella.

While the implementation of legal centralism was a costly affair, it was not a project abandoned lightly in the arena of competitive imperialism. At that time, border territories that appeared "ownerless," because they operated by nonstate logics, were subject to occupation by other states by the lights of Western international law. At the height of social Darwinism, Japanese leaders often felt compelled by geostrategic considerations to extend or consolidate territorial sovereignty in order to protect Japan's flanks, under time pressure and with finite resources. The end result of this conjuncture in Taiwan was its current bifurcated sovereignty.

Bifurcated sovereignty is a descendant of weak legal pluralism in roughly the same way that indigenous peoples are descendants of native peoples. In other

words, the processes described by revisionist historian of American foreign relations Walter LaFeber and influential theorist of empire V.I. Lenin as the final push toward state ownership of the earth's inhabited space was halted where native peoples could not be brought within imperialism's centrally administered territories. Today these peoples are known as indigenous, and their territories are administered under different sets of rules from the rest of the nation's spaces. That bifurcated sovereignty is here to stay, despite the overwhelming pressure for administrative and legal integration brought to bear by industrial capitalism and international competition, requires historical explanation.

Thongchai Winichakul has described modern, Mercator-projection map-logos as geobodies. The geobody has a fixed shape—its borders are no longer expanding (or oscillating)—and its boundaries are clearly delineated. These two features distinguish it from most dynastic realms of the prenational era. Thongchai's case, Thailand's geobody, was formed in the context of international competition and technology transfer that characterized the long nineteenth century. To preempt encroachment by aggressive Western powers, who considered the ability to cartographically represent the precise limits of sovereignty to be an index of sovereignty, the Siamese court sent officials to its unmapped and unbounded peripheries to establish the geographic outer limit of Siam's sovereignty, defined as the exclusive right to govern the polities and populations within its national territory. The maps created under this modernizing regime, adopting the cartographic sciences and conventions of international society, established clear limits to the Thai state's spatial reach, while forestalling British attempts to extend the boundaries of Indo-Burma at Thailand's expense.

The inscriptions of national and imperial boundary lines over the erstwhile middle grounds that separated dynastic states were more than defensive projects to consolidate sovereignty within a container. The construction of geobodies can also be read as a multistate solution to a chronic problem facing maritime empires during the second industrial revolution.⁶² The dynastic state's relatively laissez-faire approach to rule in distant borderlands was inimical to the orderly functioning of a world economy whose industrial plants and working masses were sustained by the timely shipment of oceangoing bulk commodities. This new epoch, wherein national populations became dependent upon long-distance trade for daily existence, I call the age of *high-velocity capitalism*.

High-velocity capitalism increased the number of disputes arising over shipwrecks in far-flung ports, while it swelled the vehemence with which states weighed in on such affairs. As the Qing and Tokugawa dynasts learned to their peril, foreign governments, representing the interests of the merchants and customers dependent upon oceanic trade, began to demand the right to negotiate with central authorities about incidents arising in the harbors and shores that shoguns and emperors had kept at arm's length since the mid-seventeenth century.

When authorities in Edo attempted to accommodate Washington's demands to facilitate the increased volume of oceanic economic activity in the 1850s, for example, they quickly ascertained that one central authority in Edo could not make the coastlines of Japan hospitable to foreign merchant marines by administrative fiat. The legacy of Edo's inability to command its borders from a central node of authority is well known: the Tokugawa government crumbled in a civil war that was ignited by confusion over how to deal with coastal traffic. Having learned how the fate of central government was now dependent upon the extension of sovereignty throughout the national geobody, the Meiji oligarchs made the eradication of legal pluralism and the instantiation of legal centralism key goals of the post-1868 Japanese state.

A mere five years later, the Meiji state joined the global war on legal pluralism by pressing the Qing court on its handling of the 1871 Okinawan shipwreck on Taiwan known as the Mudan village incident. In December 1871, Mudan villagers on the Langqiao Peninsula allegedly murdered fifty-four shipwrecked sailors from Miyakojima (Ryūkyū Islands). The fate of the castaways became a cause célèbre for ambitious Japanese politicians, who turned the islanders' misfortune into an opportunity for the young Meiji state to assert its territorial claims over the Ryūkyūs (later called Okinawa Prefecture). In April 1874, Japanese admiral Saigō Tsugumichi broke a string of diplomatic stalemates by descending on the Langqiao Peninsula at the rear of three attack groups to avenge the Ryūkyūans, recover their remains, and clear the coasts of wreckers.⁶³

Within a month, Japanese troops laid waste to the southern Taiwanese villages it held responsible for the murders. Negotiations among Japanese, Qing, and British officials in Beijing prevented armed confrontation between East Asia's major powers. Nonetheless, over five hundred Japanese troops perished from disease and exposure awaiting Tokyo's orders. Ultimately, the Japanese recognized Qing suzerainty throughout Taiwan and secured a face-saving indemnity, while the Qing pledged to ensure the safety of distressed sailors on Taiwan's coasts.

Recast as a chapter in the clash between high-velocity capitalism and legal pluralism, the Mudan incident's family resemblance to the American shipwrecks off the coast of Japan in the 1840s and 1850s becomes apparent.⁶⁴ The Langqiaoans' plunder of shipwrecks was analogous to the hostility of shogunal officials who refused succor to stranded whalers or even imprisoned them.⁶⁵ From the standpoint of heavily capitalized maritime commercial powers, stronger central authorities with shared commitments to safeguarding commerce were a prerequisite to opening up East Asian markets.

In the myriad "Mudan village incidents" that litter nineteenth-century annals, one obstacle to resolution was the uncertain, broken, and long chain of command that connected border areas to dynastic capitals. When consular officials relayed the protests of distressed travelers or merchants to the shogun, emperor, or king

about rough treatment on their peripheries, dynasts could hardly get to the root of the matter because their states functioned without the integrated, centralized, and ground-level bureaucracy that characterized nation-states.

Unlike the local hong merchants, interpreters, strongmen, and gentry who connected dynastic centers to their geographic peripheries, nation-state functionaries were dependent upon the center. Indeed, replacing intermediaries and brokers with centrally appointed officials was a venerable method of statecraft in East Asia long before the 1871 affair. During the Ming dynasty, the *tusi* system of inherited chieftainships was abolished in favor of staffing southwest China's frontier with appointed officials.⁶⁶ In the imperial Chinese case, the rule of avoidance, coupled with the centralized system of recruitment, appointment, and promotion, established an administrative grid united by common language, purpose, and chain of command. Institutionally speaking, the spatial extension of this grid represented the limits of the emperor's direct access to reliable information and the enforceability of his edicts.⁶⁷

However, under the Ming and Qing, centralized bureaucracy only reached down to the district level. An unpaid subbureaucracy of gentry, yamen runners, and local notables took over from there to manage the day-to-day functions of government. The problem of central command and control was only exacerbated in Central Asia, where a completely different system of state-to-society mechanisms was instituted under the banner of the Bureau of Border Affairs. As Pars Cassel points out in his study of Qing legal pluralism, under the imperial system, nonofficials were not permitted the "luxury" of claiming to be subjects of the emperor in the sense that they might have any ritual, legal, or moral claims upon his attention, or he on theirs.⁶⁸

From Beijing's perspective, then, the Mudan incident was "local" and "peripheral" because its Paiwanese perpetrators, and the Hakka Chinese who rescued the survivors, lived below and beyond the Qing's centralized administrative grid. One solution to the problem, attempted in the later 1870s and 1880s under the leadership of Shen Baozhen and Liu Mingchuan, was to put military pressure on Taiwanese border tribes in order to increase the size of the Qing tax base to pay for more expeditions to pacify and secure the interior.⁶⁹

Such punitive expeditions required rudimentary military intelligence or the help of local allies, neither of which was beyond the reach of the Qing. As William T. Rowe put it, "when it chose to, the [Qing] state could certainly marshal the resources to despotically terrorize its subjects." In the new order, however, such power was insufficient. Rowe continues: "on a day-to-day basis [the Qing] left many of the functions we might think of as governmental to private individuals and groups."⁷⁰ It was these private individuals and groups who were considered threats to a system that sought to make the world safe for the circulation of higher volumes and velocities of commerce.

DISCIPLINE, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND BIOPOLITICS

In the 1874 negotiations with the Zongli Yamen over the resolution of the Mudan incident, Ōkubo Toshimichi claimed that the Qing were not sovereign in Langqiao because the court, the entity that answered to national leaderships in London, Tokyo, and Washington, lacked the capacity to regulate the daily affairs of Langqiaoans.⁷¹ In Lenin's parlance, the Langqiao Peninsula was still among the ownerless territories of the world. For Ōkubo, who was being advised by French legal scholars and an American consul, establishing "ownership" or sovereignty over a governed territory meant educating and "improving" natives to prevent disruptive behavior, or punishing them for transgressions against merchants and outsiders in a timely manner. This type of sovereignty involved a level of territorial integration between borderland and capital unthinkable for the expansive, multiethnic, and legalistically plural Qing dynasty. As Meiji leaders themselves were to learn in the 1870s and 1880s, territorial integration on this scale, at this level of intensity, required new software and hardware for governance.

As Ōkubo was chastising Qing officialdom for its lassitude regarding southern Taiwan, the young Tokyo government that ruled in the name of Meiji was executing its own ideological offensives, administrative overhauls, and financial stratagems to avoid a repeat of the Tokugawa regime collapse (which was attributable to weak horizontal integration). This project entailed obvious centralizing measures such as replacing feudatory leaders with centrally appointed governors, raising a conscript army, funding and populating a public-school system, fielding a police force, and establishing a court system. These measures required tax increases, but getting citizens to pay such taxes, voluntarily and without recourse to revenue-squandering and economy-stultifying structures of oppression, presupposed the prior existence of these selfsame institutions.

To bootstrap itself out of this dilemma required nothing less than moving Japan from a society of *punishment* to one of *discipline*. This quantum leap entailed the instantiation of a *governmental* approach to statecraft. Here, I am borrowing from geographer Matthew Hannah's adaptation of Foucault's terminology to analyze the problem of state building in nineteenth-century North America. His model is apt because, as Yao Jen-to has observed, the government-general seems to have taken a page out of Hannah's playbook to govern Taiwan.

According to Foucault, the French dynastic state, for all its unchecked and terrifying power, was relatively weak. Beyond the palace precincts, he writes, a plethora of religious, clan-based, guild, and local leaders maintained the old regime's social order with recourse to bribery, corruption, and benign neglect. The problem with these "innumerable authorities," from the view of the insurgent bourgeoisie, was that they "cancelled each other out *and were incapable of covering the social body in its entirety.*"⁷²

It was the Chinese and Japanese social body's uncovered areas and multiple sources of authority that vexed the Euro-Americans who asserted a "natural right" to protect commercial intercourse throughout the world in the mid-nineteenth century. For Foucault, as was the case for treaty-port powers vis-à-vis the Qing and the Tokugawa, the unpredictability of royal power from above was of a piece with its weaknesses when directed outward. Under multicentered legal pluralism, to borrow Benton's terminology, "each of the different social strata had its margin of tolerated illegality: the non-application of the rule, the non-observance of the innumerable edicts or ordinances, were a condition of the political and economic functioning of society."⁷³ Here Foucault speaks of poaching, smuggling, pilfering, unregulated use of the commons, and other petty offences that did not concern the crown directly. In Qing-era Taiwan, as we shall see, ransoming, or paying "aborigine rent" to borderland toll-states, or redeeming severed heads from sham battles for bounties, were functional equivalents of these tolerated illegalities.

The political economy of high-velocity capitalism, in Foucault's exposition, demanded a new approach to law and sovereignty. The late eighteenth century's increase in "commercial and industrial ownership [and] the development of ports," along with "the appearance of great warehouses . . . [and] the organization of huge workshops,"⁷⁴ found the sporadic and uneven consistency of royal authority insufficient for the protection of widely dispersed, ubiquitous, and moveable property. Privately held and deployed assets were now too numerous and valuable to be rendered secure, everywhere and always, by the king's punitive brand of justice. For the treaty-port powers, the same principle held: how could the emperor's or shogun's occasional displays of sovereign/punitive power, or the compromised and negotiable justice of magistrates, village headmen, and yamen runners, be entrusted with the volumes of commerce that would pass through multinational customs houses?

For Foucault, the bourgeoisie's solution was to instantiate "a *systematic*, armed intolerance of illegality," which he termed "public power."⁷⁵ Public power is the aggregate effect of *discipline*, or what may be termed panopticism. This modality regulates the conduct of millions across vast distances because it conditions individuals as objects and authors of a dispersed, circulating form of behavior-modifying power as teachers and students, doctors and patients, jailers and jailed, parents and children, and so on. According to Foucault, again recapitulating the demands of treaty-port consuls in East Asia, it

. . . became necessary to get rid of the old economy of the power to punish, based on the principles of the confused and inadequate multiplicity of authorities, . . . punishments that were spectacular in their manifestations and haphazard in their application. *It became necessary to define a strategy and techniques of punishment in which an economy of continuity and permanence would replace that of expenditure and excess. In short, penal reform was born at the point of junction between the struggle against the super-power of the sovereign and that against the infra-power of acquired and tolerated illegalities.*⁷⁶

Here, the “struggle . . . against the infra-power of acquired and tolerated illegalities” called forth a public power that would educate, diagnose, cure, and police populations to pay taxes, work hard, serve in the military, and respect private property *willingly* if not *energetically*. As Caroline Ts’ai puts it, “disciplinary power works through the construction of routine. This power is ‘constitutive.’ As such, the Foucauldian approach . . . locates power in the ‘micro-physics’ of social life.”⁷⁷ Properly established, public power circulates continuously, everywhere and always. Its absence, as Ōkubo argued in his diatribes against the Zongli Yamen in 1874, signals a state’s incompatibility with modern political economy made manifest in the international system. For Foucault, *discipline* (government through reeducation and behavior modification), rather than *punishment* (the use of terror, edict, and brute force to obtain compliance), was a *sine qua non* for nation-states with capitalist economies.

Following Foucault, Hannah demonstrates how societies cross the watershed from punishment to discipline through a burst of state-directed energy, in the form of censuses, land registration, and bureaucratic staffing. These projects lay foundations for rule by *governmentality*. Discipline and governmentality are overlapping concepts. As Hannah puts it, discipline constitutes individuals as objects and authors of knowledge and power, but it does so with a specific goal in mind—the creation of docile workers and obedient citizens. Takashi Fujitani’s *Splendid Monarchy* provides a relevant example of discipline making in operation.

To unify a social body riven by horizontal and vertical cleavages, the Meiji oligarchs instantiated discipline by cultivating identification with the emperor, imperial history, and a new national culture. The enterprise aimed to flatten status distinctions and weld fissured territorial divisions.⁷⁸ First, the emperor was made visible across the realm by a series of lavish processions and tours, providing a common point of reference for a people only vaguely, if at all, acquainted with the image, person, or backstory of the state’s new symbolic, unifying center. However, these costly processions were insufficient. Their evanescence, novelty, and circumscribed routes could not in and of themselves cover an entire social body to produce “a modern citizenry with an interiorized sense of themselves as objects of an unremitting surveillance.”⁷⁹ But it was a start.

Statues of mythical and actual national heroes were installed across the landscape, while state-authored rituals and liturgies were publicized and enforced. Importantly, the imperial institution—including the imposing architecture of a national capital—was relocated to Tokyo as a node of panoptical power. Now the emperor would stay put, and the people would move. Meiji, instead of being the object of the public’s gaze, was now the author of an omnipresent discipline-making gaze. Meiji’s mass-produced portraits were made objects of daily rituals in public schools, allowing him to be seen looking down on his subjects, daily, to the far edges of Japanese sovereignty. The emperor’s paramouncy was augmented by mass military spectacles that drew tens of thousands near the

imperial palace, also presided over by the all-seeing emperor as the master of ceremonies.⁸⁰

To simplify, the Meiji oligarchs used the imperial person and associated pageantry to both represent a body politic to itself and interiorize loyalty and obedience to a symbolic center. This massive project consumed not only the costs of mobile pageantry but also expenses associated with Tokyo's urban renewal and the building of a conscript army. In microcosm, Emperor Sunjong and his retinue traversed the Korean Peninsula in 1909 on a similar errand, to forge identification with a subordinate national monarch. However, Sunjong reigned at the pleasure of a Japanese resident-general named Itō Hirobumi. Consequently, Sunjong's procession was met by protests and ended up working against the rump Yi dynasty.⁸¹ Its utter failure to replicate the effects of the earlier Meiji processions suggests that display and symbolism alone were insufficient in and of themselves to foment a sense of nation among a nascent citizenry. Moreover, Japan's 1909 exercise in imperial pageantry reveals that measures effective in the home country might not be exportable to the colonies.

While there would be no imperial processions in Taiwan,⁸² other more portable methods of bootstrapping social formations into the era of discipline were imported from Japan. The Meiji land tax reform (LTR) was implemented from July 1873 until the end of 1876, at about the same time that the imperial processions were setting out from Kyoto and Tokyo. Like the grand imperial tours, the LTR involved meticulous planning by Japan's top officials. At a cost of about forty million yen,⁸³ the central government assessed "85.44 million parcels of rice paddies and all other types of land, and issu[ed] 109.33 million certificates of land ownership" to Japanese citizens.⁸⁴

The purpose of the LTR was to simplify, standardize, and make more equitable (across prefectures) the patchwork system of Tokugawa land tenure and taxation. Under the old system, different domains were taxed at various rates, and taxes were paid in kind, based on a percentage of annual yield. For central planners *whose annual budgets required forecasts of income and expenses*, the unpredictability of the old system presented headaches. In addition, the differential tax rates caused discontent. Therefore, the two-and-half-year project sought to convince citizens that the new government was impartial. But more importantly for our purposes, the reformed system levied taxes based on assessed land value to make government receipts more predictable, to commoditize land (by issuing certificates), and to yoke peasants to market discipline by demanding cash payments.

In the short run, central-government receipts remained constant, and per capita tax rates declined in most years. Over the longer haul, Kōzō Yamamura argues, the reform strengthened the government while it enriched the populace, because efficiencies arising from a land market drove up aggregate productivity.⁸⁵ Less sanguine accounts do not deny the efficiency of the new system for administrators or its ability to generate national wealth. However, because tax rates were fixed and

redeemable only in cash, bad harvests, isolation from market centers, or low prices often sent smallholders without reserves into tenancy.⁸⁶

The LTR in Japan and the one implemented later in Taiwan exhibit a *governmental* approach to statecraft, rather than a *disciplinary* modality. Governmentality, rather than targeting individuals as objects of regulation, per se, targets the national political economy. As Hannah puts it, “Governmentality, like discipline, constructs (not merely “manipulates”) its objects, but unlike discipline, it constructs them as objects that should not be unduly manipulated. . . . As such, governmentality, too, is fundamentally structured around cycles of social control linking observation, normalizing judgment and regulation. But unlike its genealogical predecessors, governmentality . . . helps the governing authorities decide whether there are limits to its ability to enforce or achieve the norm . . . In short, governmentality at a national scale involves more respect for the integrity and autonomous dynamics of the social body.”⁸⁷

Seen in this light, the 1873–76 LTR was the quintessential governmental project. A nationwide cadastral survey of farmholdings and the validation of holdings with land certificates were undertaken to lay the foundations for a national political economy that could be managed, in some sense, by accountants and actuaries in Tokyo. Government yields were increased not by the principle of “squeezing the peasant like a sesame seed to get additional oil” but rather by monetizing agriculture, establishing a fixed tax rate, and creating the conditions for a national land market, thereby letting “the invisible hand” (and the enforcement of eviction notices) raise overall yields.⁸⁸

The Meiji state’s LTR was repeated a quarter century later in Taiwan. Minister of Civil Affairs Gotō Shinpei (1898–1906) oversaw Taiwan’s first national land survey and imperial Japan’s first population census. As with the home island, the land registration, assessment, and deeding project was a gargantuan enterprise. The cadastral survey itself produced 37,869 maps of villages. The project cost over 5,225,000 yen. Like its 1873 Japanese predecessor, Gotō’s LTR in Taiwan simplified and streamlined an early-modern system of land tenure and taxation. The old Qing system, with its multiple layers of usufruct and subsoil rights and various forms of payment, not only hid land from the tax collector but was difficult to administer from Taipei.⁸⁹

The related population census, another measure implemented to regularize government receipts, took three years to prepare. Enumeration day was October 1, 1905. It required “842 supervisory staff, 1,339 assistants, and 5,224 census takers.”⁹⁰ In terms of scale, level of detail, and cost, these two enterprises not only set Taiwan apart from less capital-intensive modern colonies—they also preceded the first national home-island census by fifteen years. From Yao Jen-to’s perspective, the TGG’s exorbitant spending and attention to detail distinguished the Taiwan Government-General from the British government in India, which staffed its census projects more lightly. Yao concludes that the Taiwan Government-General

did not take its military dominance as an invitation to remain ignorant about subject populations.

Rather, Japan entered the imperial arena in the 1890s, after statistics had finally become a basis for statecraft in Europe. Therefore, the advantages of followership allowed Gotō to put the Taiwan Government-General on a scientific footing from its inception. In Yao's account, however, the censuses and LTR were punitive, and not *governmental* in the sense Hannah uses the term. Yao rightly points out that accurate statistical data render an alien population visible, knowable, and to some extent manageable for outsiders by representing it in "combinable, mobile and stable" units (borrowing from Bruno Latour).⁹¹ On the other hand, Yao asserts that these expensive and scientific instruments were effective because they aided the government in hunting down rebels.⁹² He also equates "capitalism" with organized theft by noting that land registration made Taiwan's real estate available for confiscation by Japanese corporations after the hidden acreage was exposed in the cadastres.⁹³ In these two instances, systematic and comprehensive knowledge was weaponized for naked exploitation.

In contrast, Ka Chih-ming has analyzed this same land reform program as a *governmental* undertaking. For Ka, the purpose of Gotō's land reform was only in part to increase the government's tax yield by registering more land. It also served to cement a TGG class alliance with Taiwan's smallholders against absentee landlords who collected "small rents" and then forwarded "big rents" to the capital (after skimming). According to Ka—and this echoes the circumspection with which U.S. and Japanese land surveys proceeded in noncolonized spaces—cultivators cooperated with the cadastres in exchange for fee-simple titles to their land. Moreover, the Taiwan Government-General could reallocate these titles thanks to a large buy-off from absentee landlords—paid for by funds raised on the bond market in Japan.

From a fiscal perspective, Gotō's gambit worked. From 1905 onward, Taiwan no longer required subsidies from Tokyo and became exceptional in the annals of Japanese colonialism by becoming a boon, rather than a drain, on Japan's national economy.⁹⁴ Ka writes, "With order restored and revenues ensured through deficit financing, the administration implemented a number of measures to increase production and expand the market: a thorough land cadastral not only revealed tax evasion but greatly facilitated the subsequent reform that created a modern private land ownership system. The land survey and reform guaranteed private property rights, facilitated the effective use of land, and provided incentives to increase production for the market."⁹⁵

Anticipating Ka's analysis by many decades, the 1906 *Japan Yearbook* exclaimed that the "success of [Japanese] colonial policy in Formosa is conclusively demonstrated in the Revenue Column. . . . The item of 'Subsidies from Central Government' that was steadily diminishing finally disappeared . . ." ⁹⁶ W. G. Beasley, also noting the parallel between Japan's 1870s and 1880s reforms and Gotō's early

twentieth-century expenditures in Taiwan, concluded that the bundle of projects reviewed above had secured “financial stability which . . . made it possible to meet budget deficits by floating bonds, placed with a newly formed Bank of Taiwan.”⁹⁷

This quantitative yardstick for success—achieving black-ink balances on regularly scheduled budgets—represents the type of *governmental* rationality well articulated by Max Weber in his landmark study *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber’s linked concepts of quantification and continuous renewal resonate strongly with contemporary governmental projects in colonial Taiwan. Weber writes:

. . . capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever *renewed* profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise. For it must be so: in a wholly capitalistic order of society, an individual capitalistic enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction.

. . . The important fact is always that a *calculation of capital in terms of money* is made, whether by modern book-keeping methods or in any other way. . . . *Everything is done in terms of balances*: at the beginning of the enterprise an initial balance, before every individual decision a calculation to ascertain its probable profitability, and at the end of a final balance to ascertain how much profit has been made.⁹⁸

This passage, on the one hand, reflects the “eat or be eaten” worldview of a number of Meiji intellectuals and statesmen in the 1890s. For example, influential author, public intellectual, and publisher Tokutomi Sōhō, who came to see Japanese imperialism as a means of national survival at century’s turn,⁹⁹ would have assented to substituting “nation” for “enterprise” in Weber’s quotation: nations that do not compete successfully *are doomed to extinction*.

Weber’s formulation also encapsulates a core principle of governmentality in Taiwan under Japanese rule. Beginning with the LTR and the census, the Taiwan Government-General quantified human, environmental, and built assets in the colony, and more importantly, it set and recalibrated policy based on income and expenditure *projections*. As Hannah points out, a governmental state relies upon statistical record keeping and computation to manage its heterogeneous resources and budget for multiyear projects. In the competitive imperial setting, failure to balance the colonial budget portended scrutiny from the Diet, which held the purse strings of the military and supplementary budgets for the Taiwan Government-General. Therefore, Weber’s foregrounding of capitalism’s *continuously renewed* commitment to positive balances captures the spirit of capitalism as an ethos but also isolates a distinctive feature of statecraft in the postdynastic era. In this dispensation, national expressions of public power underwrote territorially aggrandizing war machines. National militaries, as income-starved institutional behemoths, not only competed against each other but also competed with domestic spending projects that sustained the public power presupposed by militarized states.

Weber's contemporary Takekoshi Yosaburō issued a book-length encomium to Gotō Shinpei and Japanese rule in Taiwan the same year that *The Protestant Ethic* first appeared. Takekoshi articulated the governmental ethos in his stout defense of the embattled government-general in Taiwan. In 1904 he wrote, "If the trade [between Taiwan and Japan] continues to grow as it has done during the last six of seven years, Japan will by about the year 1910 have received back an equivalent of all the subsidies [to the Taiwan Government-General], together with the interest upon them. From that time *Japan will have reached the goal of colonial enterprise*, and be able to look to her colony for substantial support."¹⁰⁰

Based on his own projections, the economic historian Takekoshi inserted a table that projected TGG annual income, expenditures, public loans (principal plus interest), and a positive overall balance for the years 1903 through 1922. Unsurprisingly, each year cost more than the previous one.¹⁰¹

In another example of Weberian rationality at work in colonial Taiwan, TGG councilor Mochiji Rokusaburō issued his famous "opinion paper on the Aborigine problem" (*Bansei mondai ni kansuru ikensho*) in December 1902. With an eye to the bottom line, Mochiji declared that the "savage-territory problem" (*banjin banchi mondai*) was, strictly speaking, a land management problem. As peoples who did not submit to the Qing, the "savages" (*banjin/seibanjin/genjin*) were not covered in the articles of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that formally ceded Taiwan to Japan. Moreover, Taiwan's *seiban* (savage) population lacked recognizable organs of government and therefore stood outside the rules of civilized warfare and diplomacy. As Mochiji put it, "sociologically speaking, they are indeed human beings (*jinrui*), but looked at from the viewpoint of international law, they resemble animals" (*dōbutsu no gotoki mono*).

Mochiji reasoned that, insofar as "savage territory" could be made to pay for the expenses of punitive expeditions and policing, they would be launched. But if expeditions were sent simply for the purpose of revenge or a display of dominance, Mochiji argued that they should not be undertaken.¹⁰² Accordingly, the military expeditions targeted the camphor-rich north and left the south mostly untouched. Mochiji here displayed a clear aversion to *punishment* (in Foucault's sense) and showed himself ever the rational bureaucrat.

Takekoshi added urgency to Mochiji's plan a year later with the plea that "time was running out" for a solution to the "problem of the savages." He wrote that the militarization of Japanese-Atayal relations "does not mean that we have no sympathy at all for the savages. It simply means that we have to think more about *our* 45,000,000 sons and daughters than about the 104,000 savages."¹⁰³ Takekoshi thereby embraced home-island Japanese as "sons and daughters" while banishing indigenes from the national family.

Thereafter, the Taiwan Government-General and the Tokyo government dribbled out funds to cobble together remnant Qing private armies and expand the police force in order to secure lucrative areas of camphor production. It took

the political clout of fourth governor-general Sakuma Samata (1906–15), a hero of the 1874 invasion of Taiwan, to pry the lid off the imperial treasury. Drawing upon connections to Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and father of the conscript army Yamagata Aritomo, and with the Meiji emperor’s blessing, Sakuma secured a whopping fifteen million yen, in 1909, for a five-year “big bang” spending program to solve the “aborigine question” once and for all.

While the scale, ambition, and cost of Sakuma’s “five-year plan to control the aborigines” was commensurate with the 1873–76 LTR in Japan and the 1898–1905 Gotō spending package in Taiwan, its rationale was not quite the same. In the vein of these early programs, the idea was to create conditions for future wealth accumulation with a large initial investment. But in this case, the human beings in the targeted area were not considered sources of labor power or entrepreneurial skill but were seen instead as obstacles (unless they could be mobilized to subdue other indigenes). There was no attempt here to instantiate the virtuous circle of governmentality. Therefore, Sakuma’s five-year plan, and the TGG policies regarding indigenes more generally, adopted a punitive and *biopolitically* inflected rationality of statecraft, to the exclusion of *disciplinary* concerns.

This was the crux of the matter: typically, in a nation-building context, discipline precedes or coincides with governmentality. However, in a colonial situation, wherein the “natives” (in Bayly’s sense of the term) are not reckoned as a potential source of labor but rather as impediments to resource extraction, discipline is—by the yardstick of governmental calculations—wasteful. Foucault’s notion of “biopolitics”¹⁰⁴ is operative here.

Sabine Frühstück’s account of the “modern health regime” in Meiji Japan illustrates the positivities of biopower. Her study analyzes state initiatives to “force a population to be healthy.” Several biopolitical projects, involving vital statistics, the regulation of sex, and government attention to nutrition, exercise, and inoculation, improved Japan’s racial stock so it could stand up to the West and compete in the international arena.¹⁰⁵ This ensemble of state interventions, many coterminous with the LTR of 1873–76, was aimed at building a healthy conscript army and industrial labor force.

However, like the LTR, the regime of hygiene aimed to improve national power, not individual health and wealth. As many farmers were dispossessed by land reform, the health of state-regulated military prostitutes was sacrificed for the general health of the body politic. Turned outward or against internal Others, then, a biopolitical regime marks out subpopulations as expendable in the name of the greater good. Fujitani and Achille Mbembe follow Foucault by insisting that arrogating the power to sustain life entails the assertion of a right to extinguish it. This duality has been referred to as “necropolitics.”¹⁰⁶

Patrick Wolfe’s analysis of the race politics in settler societies emphasizes this point. In North America, he writes, constituting the black race as a population and then nurturing its demographic resilience (partly through the legal fiction of the

“one-drop rule”) had a biopolitical logic: labor-pool management. On the other hand, the connected project of Indian removal (through both physical removal and the legal fiction that “mixed blood” Indians were, in fact, not indigenes) had a different economic logic: the land inhabited by indigenes was worth more, calculated in terms of cash value, if Indians could be removed.¹⁰⁷

Importantly, in this model, racism creates races—not the other way around. Extenuating circumstances may even impel biopolitical regimes to reverse race-based policies in the name of self-preservation. In Takashi Fujitani’s analysis of ethnic management during the Pacific War, the demands of mobilization pushed the Japanese and American regimes of the 1940s to transition from vulgarly to politely racist outlooks in the name of national security. As Japanese-Americans in the United States and Koreans in the Japanese Empire were identified as sources of labor and fighting power, each regime sought to inculcate that hallmark of discipline, the spirit of voluntarism, among formerly excluded populations. The shift to polite racism and the new emphasis on disciplinary measures such as compulsory assimilation programs aimed at the “conduct of conduct” announced a redefinition of marginalized communities in terms of cultural capacities or peculiarities, rather than as biologically defined Mendelian populations.¹⁰⁸

Leo Ching has made a related argument regarding Taiwan’s indigenes in the 1930s and 1940s. In Ching’s analysis, a combination of alarm over the Wushe Rebellion and wartime mobilization requirements pushed the Taiwan Government-General to imagine the former “savages” (*seibanjin*) as the Formosan Aborigines (*Takasagozoku*). This new politely racist rhetoric did not entail equal treatment or the end of exploitation, but it portended a shift in administrative rationality. Henceforth, the *Takasagozoku* would not be formally excluded with the vulgarly racist epithet *banjin*. They would instead be targets of disciplinary ministrations aimed at a particular kind of subject formation, one defined by a willingness to die for the emperor.¹⁰⁹ Huang Chih-huei’s study of the *Takasagozoku* volunteers who claimed to have exhibited even more “Japanese spirit” than their home-island officers in the Philippines campaigns of 1943 and 1944 stands as a testament to the efficacy of “imperial subjectification” among some indigenes in Taiwan.¹¹⁰

This book argues that “imperial subjectification” among indigenes can also be understood as an indigenization movement. While Ching’s chronology and analysis are persuasive as a two-stage model to chart the mechanisms and meanings of the shift from vulgar to polite racism in TGG policy, its emphasis on the ideational aspects of citizenship to the exclusion of its legal-economic bases leaves room for some debate.

The Taiwan Government-General’s assimilation campaigns were preceded by the multistage trading-post and guardline projects. During the Kodama and Sakuma eras (1898–1915), northern tribes were the expendables in the government-general’s biopolitical calculus. These punitive and often bloody campaigns encircled erstwhile borderland “natives” (in Bayly’s sense) with administered territories,

reconfiguring their homelands as an ethnic enclave.¹¹¹ While they were regarded as “savage,” and governed largely through the negative techniques of sovereign power, as objects of *biopolitical* management they were sequestered, “censused, mapped, and museumed.”¹¹²

As “specially administered” subjects, the Taiwan Government-General positioned indigenes as exterior to the more intensively disciplined and governmentalized territories governed by *baojia* (mutual-surveillance and tithing organizations) in “regularly administered” Taiwan.¹¹³ From 1898 through 1902, the government-general revived the old Qing-period system of mutual responsibility and tithing as an efficient mechanism for registering, policing, and mobilizing a Han labor pool. By 1920, the surface of “normally administered Taiwan” was covered with *baojia* districts.¹¹⁴ These had all been subject to land markets and taxation and were highly commoditized as integral parts of the imperial political economy. However, negatively defined indigenous territory, by 1920, was already “public land” and excluded from the *baojia* system. By the time the imperial subjectification campaigns of the 1930s were launched, access to the indigenous territory by outsiders had been suppressed by a permit system for three decades.

Against this backdrop, the imperial subjectification policies of the 1930s were implemented through a new generation of indigenous youth corps (*seinendan*). These corps leaders had attained adulthood under Japanese rule in an ethnic enclave. As the government-general mobilized these corps through drill, parade, song, schools, panindigenous gatherings, and finally military recruitment, it solidified the standing of the indigenous territory as a separate entity, or what I have termed a “second-order geobody.” Therefore, the “imperial subjectification” policies, even though they were conducted in the Japanese language, could only further isolate the indigenous territory from the social, political, and economic currents in Han Taiwan that were preparing the ground for postcolonial nationality.

During *kōminka* (imperial subjectification), indigenes became proficient in spoken Japanese. They hoisted Hinomaru (Japanese) flags and belted out imperial anthems with apparent gusto. Moreover, some abandoned “evil customs” such as in-home burials and face tattoos. Nonetheless, the notion that they were “becoming Japanese” overlooks an important aspect of modern citizenship: its material basis.

Unlike their neighbors, the specially administered peoples of Taiwan had never been citizens or subjects of agro-bureaucratic empires-cum-dynastic states. As “natives” practiced in the art of not being governed, most of Taiwan’s Austronesians were not accustomed to the routines of unremitting, coordinated, and surplus-generating agricultural and manufacturing toil that characterized the lot of their lowlander neighbors under Tokugawa, Qing, and Joseon rule. Looking backward, it would seem that the success of disciplinary projects such as imperial panopticism, the Taiwan Government-General’s graft of a Japanese police apparatus upon a Han Taiwanese *baojia* system, or the cultivation of national Korean and

Taiwanese bourgeoisies were all premised on *longue durée* processes begun before the great age of transformation.

Colonial rule in Han-dominated Taiwan took on a coloration of nation building in Japan, under a regime of governmentality/discipline,¹¹⁵ whereas the indigenous territory of Taiwan was ruled under a hybrid regime of punishment and biopolitics, at least until the 1930s. However, these regimes did not operate independently but were built together, one upon the back of the other. Initially, Japanese officials thought that highlanders could be mobilized on Japan's side against lowlanders in the colonial state's war against armed Han resistance. Looking back at these early years, commentators considered 1895–98 to have been a “honeymoon period” of Japanese-Indigenous relations. During this interval, brokers like Kondō the Barbarian flourished as trading-post operators, land speculators, and contract employees of the state. But the debt incurred by the Taiwan Government-General to set off the “big bang” of governmentality in the plains put pressure on the inland sea of Taiwan's camphor forests.

As Japanese officials were well aware, frontier violence, which began to spike in 1898, could have been reduced by simply backing the rights of indigenes vis-à-vis Japanese lumber companies and their employees. Indeed, such a policy had much to recommend itself while Japan sought allies in its war against Han guerillas. In fact, the biggest camphor merchants in Xinzhu Prefecture in the late Qing- and early Meiji-period camphor industry were Saisyat men, most notably Ri Aguai. Some indigenes were more than willing to sell camphor—the resource so ardently coveted by Japan's state builders and merchants—to outsiders for monetary gain.¹¹⁶ But the state could not exercise regulatory functions to control the volume or quality of camphor under “middle ground” or “contact zone” conditions. State planners wanted to standardize quality, regulate output, and project estimated profits from its monopoly bureau for annual budgetary purposes.¹¹⁷ However, unlike in the plains, where smallholders and some merchants, as well as scholars, could be co-opted to provide the means for igniting the motor of disciplinary rule, the Japanese found few property holders to make a parallel class alliance in the highlands. With this crucial element missing, the Japanese state pressed forward in its efforts to make the Aborigine Territory into a state space with a series of punitive expeditions and economic embargoes.

Sediq, Atayal, and Truku settlements surrendered their arms en masse and were at times relocated to valleys within reach of the police apparatus. After establishing this beachhead, the Japanese state embarked on a series of cartographic and infrastructural projects to make the indigenous territory legible to the state. But as Matsuoka Tadasu has demonstrated,¹¹⁸ the post-1915 Japanese state balked, in a sense, by not following up its military victories with policies of reterritorialization that would have rendered the non-Han spaces of upland Taiwan indistinct from the rest of the island colony. Legible, yes, but subject to modern discipline—not quite.

To restate the main argument: national and indigenous political formations are homologous, historically linked, and symbiotic. Modern state building in the age of high-velocity capitalism entailed heavy governmental outlays to create commensuritized sociopolitical formations for sustaining the timely circulation of information, goods, and people, all under the pressure of international competition. In the emergent international system, at least ideally, one national geobody's sovereignty ended where another began. The indigenous geobody was distinctive. As an administered territory defined by its exteriority to the full array of citizen-making projects associated with governmental and disciplinary tactics, the indigenous geobody was a "second-order geobody." It was discrete and bounded, and it took on the formal properties of a geobody. Instead of achieving national sovereignty, however, it remains a subunit of a first-order geobody, the arena of discipline- and citizen-making projects in the age of global transformation.

In Taiwan under Japanese rule, the virtuous circle of governmentality that is presupposed by legal centralism reached its geographic limit at the boundary of the Aborigine Territory. Therefore, Taiwan's second-order geobody can be considered the ethnogeographic expression of the Japanese regime's aspirations to master a territory just beyond its grasp. A first-order geobody describes a spatially configured unit of administration within which a mixture of Foucauldian discipline and Gramscian hegemony produces more or less self-actuating populations who surrender revenues to central authorities over and above the cost of funding myriad projects in governmentality. Such policies, programs, and installations underwrite the accumulation of capital, and its diversion to state coffers, at rates sufficient to balance accounts as calculated in annual government reports. Second-order geobodies are found at the extremities of empire, where various combinations of local resistance, rugged terrain, sparse population, and other factors rule out the creation of revenue-neutral regimes of governmentality. Although not brought within the fold of governmentality, the second-order geobodies were nonetheless constituted as objects of accounting, surveillance, and biopolitical ministration because the modern international system—unlike the interdynastic order it displaced—did not allow for ungoverned territories to exist "beyond the pale."

INDIGENOUS MODERNITY

In its 1905 census, the Taiwan Government-General attributed Malayan and Mongolian racial characteristics to populations that also fell respectively under "special" (savage) and "regular" (civilized) administration¹⁹ (see figure 3).

This innovation confirms Charles Hirschman's hypothesis that modern racial epistemology had a hand in hardening the once porous occupationally and confessionally defined sociopolitical boundaries that characterized the early-modern world. As was the case in colonial Malaysia, the racializing process in colonized Taiwan employed circular logic. In each colony, so-called Malays (indigenes) were

distinguished by their putative incapacity to participate in a modern, capitalist economic system, with all of its risks and benefits. Thus, Malays were placed under “special administration” and deprived of any chance to participate in a modern, capitalist economic system.¹²⁰ TGG officials asked: Did villagers have written deeds to their lands? Did they grow irrigated (surplus) rice? Could they honor contracts? If the answer was “no,” then they were Malays.

On the one hand, Japanese men on the spot defined race by recourse to stereotypes and institutions disconnected from the craniometry and anthropometry that stood at the foundations of scientific racism. Nonetheless, at the back of the Malay label was a large corpus of Japanese race science. This bundle of scientific ethnic maps, tables, photographs, and assessments of character mostly went ignored by policy makers in the early decades of Japanese rule. Yet it reemerged in the 1920s as the substrate for further elaboration, and it has been energetically revived in post-martial law Taiwan since the 1990s.

The classificatory work of three men in particular has drawn sustained attention from scholars of Japanese rule in Taiwan and of the history of anthropology in Japan's empire. They will play important roles in this study, as well. These three pioneering government ethnologists—Torii Ryūzō (1870–1953), Inō Kanori (1867–1925), and Mori Ushinosuke (1877–1926)—completed their most celebrated work during the first two decades of colonial rule, between 1895 and 1915. Methodologically, they arrayed various word lists, artifacts of material life, and elements of intangible culture into the tabular form that characterized fin-de-siècle anthropology's comparative method. Based on this data, they sorted Taiwan's diverse upland settlements into a nine-tribe schema. These tribes were represented as commensurate units juxtaposed like nation-states on a Mercator-projection map.

Reflecting their engagement with transnational currents in the young science of ethnology, these men were dissenters from the crudest forms of polygenetic racism that informed evolutionary anthropology. Rather, like Franz Boas and kindred spirits in England and Germany, these men advocated the worth and importance of nonliterate, small-scale societies as objects of study and subjects of history. To be sure, like Boas himself, they were self-assured in their superiority as members of industrial, urbanized societies. They neither aimed for nor achieved the Malinowskian ideal of empathy or access to the interior lives of members of the societies who were the objects of their taxonomic labors. As survey ethnologists, however, they were much more concerned about specificity, particularity, and the well-being of the peoples they studied than armchair ethnologists who did not concern themselves with face-to-face encounters. Reflecting their complicated relationship to the politics of conquest and ethnogenesis, their work was too fine-grained in some regards, and too abstract in others, to appear immediately useful to administrators in the early decades of colonial rule.¹²¹

However, on the heels of Governor-General Sakuma's campaign against the northern tribes, which ended in 1915, several trends conspired to put the latently

pluralist conception of Taiwan devised by Torii, Inō, and Mori on a permanent footing, one that lasts to this day.¹²² First, reflecting the post–World War I ethos of cultural appraisal (which was eclipsing racist denigration) that accompanied the Wilsonian moment, the new apostles of folklore and ethnic authenticity portrayed themselves as the stewards of territory inhabited by the non-Han Malaysians.¹²³ This operation figuratively swept the landscape of Chinese claims to prior occupation. Moreover, an ethnic tourism trade emerged in Taiwan’s highlands in the 1920s.¹²⁴ Its myriad graphic and material products were organized around the ethnic-pluralist model and institutionalized a view of indigenous Taiwan that rendered it a culture garden (see chapter 4).

To put these developments into global context, we recall that Bayly’s narrative of displacement, depopulation, and dispossession ends in 1914 on a cautious note: he did not write off the small-scale societies that Eric Wolf once termed the “peoples without history.” Bayly noted that indigenous resilience and creativity, the new human science of anthropology, a market for primitivist art in the metropole, and a growing revulsion to settler avarice in the mother countries had prevented the natives from becoming extinct. Turned on their heads, the forces Bayly regards as brakes on the extermination of natives can be reconceptualized as a seedbed for the creation of *indigenism*.

Anthropologist Ronald Niezen defines indigenism as the movement of First Nations and indigenous peoples to secure political rights, or even national self-determination, based on claims to primordial and prior ties to particular territories. Niezen has observed that indigenism has flourished with the *strengthening* of international society after World War II. He argues that the First Nations or indigenous peoples of the world, who number some “three hundred million people from four thousand distinct societies,”¹²⁵ are now a self-conscious, transnational force, whose current methods of rights articulation, preservation, and reclamation would have been scarcely imaginable in the prewar era. One of this book’s tasks is to reconcile the corrosive effects of nation building and capitalism on the natives during the global transformation that left the world with “four to eight million” people existing on the margins of expanding states circa 1900 and the rise of indigenous peoples as an integral component of international society in the current dispensation.

In this case study of Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, the period that separates Bayly’s narrative of decline and Niezen’s assertion of interstate system / First Nations symbiosis—1915 to 1945—brackets the years when central administrators in Taipei institutionalized and culturally invested the second-order geobodies that comprise Taiwan’s indigenous territory. Prasenjit Duara writes that during the interwar period, Wilsonian notions of ethnic self-determination, combined with strains of historical pessimism in the West, blunted the impulse to conquer new colonies outright or to expand state borders at the expense of natives. Duara argues that a new, globally circulating “symbolic regime of authenticity” based political legitimacy on primordial ties to territory instead of on the rights of the conqueror

to rule the conquered. Thus, “cultural rule” in Korea after 1919 and Japan’s insistence that Manchukuo be ruled as a *de jure* nation-state rather than as a colony were consonant with the Wilsonian outlook. In both cases, Japanese ideologues anchored claims to legitimacy in the language of a brand of stewardship that was exercised in the name of the authentic nation/nationals of each dependency.¹²⁶

In Taiwan, the discourse on sovereignty and authenticity dovetailed with an ethnic tourism trade that ennobled former “savage headhunters” as ethnic groups worthy of study, preservation, and even emulation. Indigenous artists, tourism industry workers, native informants, and politicians responded to those opportunities by producing the artifacts, icons, and performances that put flesh on the administrative-academic skeleton of territorially defined ethnic difference.¹²⁷ Under conditions of economic and physical isolation, coupled with cultural investment, the ungoverned peripheries of yore became the indigenous territories of today—now imagined as timeless, authentic, and buffered from the flow of world history.

Acknowledging that historical forces created indigenous peoples is not the same thing as claiming that indigenous claims for rights recovery in land, resources, or human rights rest on invented traditions and are thus hollow. As Arif Dirlik put it, “[a] critique of “cultural essentialism” that offers no articulated means to distinguish between the essentialism of indigenous ideology, and the essentialism of a Confucian revival or [political scientist Samuel] Huntington’s vision of war among civilizations, may be methodologically justifiable; but it is, to say the least, morally irresponsible and politically obscene. Indigenous claims to identity are very much tied in with a desperate concern for survival; not in a “metaphorical” but in a very material sense.”¹²⁸

The example of the Saisiyat group in northern Taiwan provides a counterweight to breezy notions that indigenous peoples themselves, as self-defined collectivities, were *invented* by colonialist discourse or urban metropolitan longings. While the notion that their homeland is circumscribed by a fixed boundary line populated by bearers of a unique cultural ensemble is indeed a colonial invention, Qing-period records indicate that Saisiyat peoples identified themselves as Saisiyat before Japanese colonization. Moreover, they have retained and defended a sense of corporate identity without recourse to projected or reified cultural markers as core elements of identity. At the same time, colonial-period photographs, artifacts, and documents, as material objects, have—to use Hu Chia-yu’s apt phrase—“enlivened” the past and served as touchstones for perseverance in the face of settler encroachment and institutionalized racism. Hu’s invocation of Marshall Sahlins reinforces Dirlik’s point and bears repeating: “The awareness of indigenous culture as a value to be lived and defended is not just a simple and nostalgic desire for the fetishized repositories of a pristine identity, but signifies the demand of them for their own space within the world cultural order, and recognizes their existence in the context of national or international threats.”¹²⁹

The goal of this book is to think through the processes and structures in world history that coproduced nation-states and indigenous peoples. It is less about the invention of tradition among indigenous peoples than it is about the incomplete consolidation of legal centralism characteristic of state building in the era of competitive imperialism and high-velocity capitalism. The world that was obliterated by the twin forces of capitalism and nationalism was not that of the natives but rather that of the in-between spaces of ambiguous sovereignty, the buffer zones at the margins or interstices of centrally administered, surplus-extracting dynastic and nation-states. In this niche, chiefs, interpreters, trading-post operators, trackers, headmen, and professional border crossers brokered the coexistence of political autonomy and economic interdependence during the *global transformation*.

As it turns out, the success or failure of projects to instantiate governmentality in Taiwan largely hinged upon whether or not a district or area had fallen under Qing administration. If this case study has broader applicability, the disciplined social fields considered normative in our models of international relations may, in fact, be products of *longue durée* processes that spanned successive empires. This finding suggests that today's international order is premised on sociological models that are relevant to a minority of the earth's population. Moreover, it suggests that bringing historically undisciplined populations within the ken of international society ("nation building") is probably beyond the means or will of any state that possesses the surplus wealth to pull it off. This is because such projects exhaust the patience of citizenries who must foot the bill, and because governments that ignore the centripetal pull of popular sentiment by definition lack the stability and resources to complete long-term projects for exporting discipline beyond their own borders.¹³⁰

ORGANIZATION OF THIS BOOK

This introduction has argued that the process Ronald Niezen dubs "indigenization" and the phenomenon James Clifford terms "Indigènitude" are historical concomitants of nation building during the era of high imperialism (1870–1914). Anthropologists and sociologists consider the decades following 1960 to be the incubation period for the global indigenism movement. Indigenism, in their view, rests upon an infrastructure of interstate coordination anchored in UN human-rights conventions, transregional NGO activity, and democratically sanctioned political protest. By looking for the origins of indigenism in the late nineteenth century, I have argued that seemingly disparate formations—a supra-state, nation-states, and stateless peoples—emerged as contemporaneous formations. The case study of Taiwan under Japanese rule suggests that nationality, internationalism, and indigenism were mutually constituted, rather than sequentially occurring phenomena.

Chapter 1 of this study begins with the murders of fifty-four shipwrecked Okinawans on Taiwan's Hengchun Peninsula. This cause célèbre put the opposing

logics of the dynastic and international systems on a collision course. Hengchun's mountain ranges were resistant to rule from a distance under the Qing, hindering the recovery of remains and the punishment of the alleged killers. The first part of chapter 1 explains how the lack of horizontal integration between the Hengchun Peninsula and the Qing Empire necessitated "wet diplomacy." This mode of interaction stressed particularistic, emotionally charged attachments requiring periodical renewal in the absence of administrators, courts, and policemen. To eradicate this obstacle to efficient resource management, which survived the transfer of sovereignty from the Qing to Japan in 1895, the colonial government built armed bunkers, relay stations, and guard posts along a scorched-earth trail known as the *aiyūsen* to enclose the Atayal settlements of northern Taiwan. From 1903 through 1915, government forces extended the barrier and then marched it inward. The Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, as a modern political-cultural formation, emerged from the ruins of these scorched-earth campaigns as a disarmed, geographically isolated, and dispossessed minority population.

Chapter 2 advances the argument that linguistic diversity occasioned institutional creativity and strategic frustration for colonialists in Taiwan. It examines state-led efforts to yoke an unruly Qing periphery to a centralized administration through its language and education policies. In Taiwan, administrators required methods to govern a patchwork of Chinese- and Austronesian-language-speaking populations. Commercial interdependency between the island's varied social formations spawned more organic solutions to the problem of cross-border communications, as well. Top-down, centrally installed measures, such as language training for colonizers or the colonized, were most amenable to administrative cohesion. However, formal language instruction was not scalable, due to cost constraints. Bottom-up arrangements, such as intersocietal adoption and marriage-centered alliance, were cost-effective but less answerable to central command. The Japanese state ultimately opted for intermarriages as a strategy—a holdover from Qing times. This policy came up short because it fostered identification with particular local power structures. It also allowed colonists to establish kin-ordered bases of authority independent of their bureaucratic chains of command. The political marriages, therefore, contradicted the more general colony-wide impulse to homogenize bureaucratic, legal, and economic space, and they led to intelligence failures and discontent among the ruled and even to the Wushe Rebellion of 1930.

The next chapter demonstrates how gifts performed multiple functions in the borderland economy of Qing-period and Japanese-ruled Taiwan. Travelers brought offerings to the mountainous hinterland to pay for services rendered or expectations of future assistance. In addition, the presentations of gifts were occasions for recording the emotional states of recipients and for gauging the dispositions of little-known peoples as either "greedy," "honest," or "uncorrupted." Gifts also fostered trade dependency among indigenes. As the Taiwan Government-General

intensified resource extraction from camphor forests in the 1900s, it regulated gift giving as an arm of policy, to reform indigenous mores or to reward and punish highlanders. One class of these gifts, those involving dyed red thread or cloth, took on additional meaning, as these materials were disassembled and reassembled into “traditional” Atayal textiles. These were either consumed locally or reexported to trading posts, anthropologists, curators, and tourists. In this last guise, Atayal red-dyed textiles became exhibits in discourses on authenticity, progress, and primitivism. By tracking the uses of textiles across these many domains, chapter 3 illustrates the productive, though problematic, interdependence of indigenes, settlers, and metropolitans in the production of colonial modernity and global indigenism.

Chapter 4 examines a battery of twentieth-century Japanese official, academic, and commercial publications about Taiwan indigenes. These artifacts deployed texts, pictures, and maps to manufacture a “large reservoir of cultural imaginaries”¹³¹ that have reemerged as reference points and resources for the indigenous renaissance in the twenty-first century. In what began as a quest to wrest resources, impose administrative order, and promote immigration to an erstwhile Qing borderland in the late 1890s and 1900s, Japan’s colonial administration, tourism industry, and scholarly apparatus, by the 1930s, had completed numerous projects in ethnic typification, geobody construction, and racialization to institutionalize indigeneity in Taiwan. This concluding chapter analyzes these three interrelated processes to demonstrate how the increased intensity of resource extraction in colonial Taiwan intersected with historical trends in reprographic technology and new forms of state making to ethnically pluralize the island’s non-Han populations as second-order geobodies.