

Conclusions

Fields, the Global versus the National, and Representations of Mass Violence

In this book I have invited the reader on a journey through the competing representations of mass violence in distinct social fields and countries. Examining responses to the violence endured by the inhabitants of the Darfur region of Sudan during the first decade of the twenty-first century, I was especially interested to learn how the interventions of the UN Security Council and International Criminal Court, both part of the justice cascade, colored representations of mass violence. I also examined what distinct images of suffering and of responsible actors arose from the humanitarianism and diplomatic fields. I was, finally, concerned with the ways in which mass media in different countries communicated these competing perspectives to the public. I stress again that it is not assumed that news media will be receptive to the court's decisions or messages, much less that court events will prevail over those staged by competing institutions. Indeed, patterns of receptivity show considerable variability.

Answers to these questions matter for scholarship and for practice. In scholarly terms they provide insights into the generation of knowledge and representations at the intersection of fields, countries, professions, and biographies. They respond to crucial questions raised in branches of scholarship as varied as sociology (and its subfields of crime and law, culture and knowledge, political and mass communication), criminology and criminal justice, political science, and media studies, as well as globalization research, which cuts across disciplines.

Answers also matter for practice, as representations of mass violence, including genocide, affect—structure, inhibit, or propel—responses and interventions.¹ Finally, they are important in normative terms as the international community, in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, drafted in the immediate aftermath of the Shoah, began its campaign to intervene against the crime of crimes. Any intervention depends on overcoming denial (Cohen 2001), and appropriate interventions depend on appropriate definitions of the situation (Thomas 1928). What definition is appropriate, though, depends on the position of actors in the social structure, as we have seen throughout this book.

Zooming in on the mass violence in Darfur in the early twenty-first century, I provide answers to the above questions comparatively for eight Western countries, the United States and Canada for North America, and France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland for Europe. My analysis of 3,387 news reports and opinion pieces, constituting the Darfur media data set, and in-depth interviews with Africa correspondents of leading newspapers, NGO experts from Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders, and foreign ministry officials provides much of the evidence. I describe how representations of mass violence vary, at times substantially, across social fields. I demonstrate that judicial interventions color the representation of mass violence in all countries, and that they eventually do so more effectively than humanitarian and diplomatic responses. But I simultaneously document that the inclination to subscribe to the criminalizing frame and use the genocide label differs significantly from country to country. I offer explanations for these patterns, thereby contributing to our understanding of how the world, especially the Global North, acknowledges and frames violence in the Global South, specifically in Africa.

As this journey through the competing representations of the mass violence in Darfur and their communication to an international public draws to a close, I summarize central empirical insights. I conclude with a summary of theoretical contributions and insights for practice along the themes laid out in the introduction.

FINDINGS: PATTERNS OF REPRESENTING MASS VIOLENCE

This book's four parts raise a series of themes and questions: justice in lieu of impunity? Aid versus justice? Peace versus justice? And finally,

mediating competing representations. Insights gained from the analyses presented in the chapters speak to each of these themes.

From Impunity to Justice: The Justice Cascade, ICC, and the Human Rights Field

Analyzing responses to the Darfur conflict shows that reactions by the international community were propelled by the justice cascade—that is, the replacement of impunity by the pursuit of individual criminal accountability against perpetrators of grave human rights violations—and these reactions simultaneously constituted a part of the cascade. The broader patterns, powerfully described by political scientist Kathryn Sikkink (2011), were thus confirmed for Darfur. I also found confirmed that driving forces of the justice cascade are international organizations and human rights NGOs, often interconnected in transnational activist networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Simultaneously, the case of Darfur provided insights into strengths and limits of the justice cascade. A report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) and the ICC charges, reaching up to Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, powerfully depicted central political actors as criminal perpetrators. They squarely produced representations of the Darfur conflict within the crime frame. Yet the judicial account also illustrates the narrative constraints of criminal law (in addition to obvious enforcement constraints). While it is true that the ICID, part of the Darfur proceedings, was mindful of the social and political conditions of the conflict, it relegated such insights to a “background” section. The logic of criminal law attributes mass violence to a small number of individuals. Structural conditions and organizational contexts are underappreciated in the judicial field’s representation of mass violence. The court’s indictments focus yet further on a select number of individuals and their actions as conditions of the violence. This finding is consistent with previous research on judicial responses to mass violence, including the Mauthausen trial (Jardim 2012); the “Doctors’ Trial,” one of the subsequent Nuremberg trials (Marrus 2008); the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial (Pendas 2006); and war crimes trials against perpetrators of massacres in My Lai, Vietnam, and Haditha, Iraq (Savelsberg and King 2011).

The ICC of course does not act alone. A crucial condition of the justice cascade is the mobilization of human rights NGOs. I look closely at Amnesty International and its fight to end impunity in the case of Darfur. Interviews show that Amnesty’s narrative resembles and supports

the judicial field's. Here too the focus is on the goal of justice and on individual perpetrators, at the expense of larger structural patterns. Respondents insisted that justice, once achieved, would help actors reach other goals such as peace.

Respondents' relative unanimity in representing the violence as criminal supports the strength of the globalizing forces highlighted by the World Polity School (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; Boyle and Meyer 1998). This is expected for an international NGO that closely coordinates actions with other INGOs. It should be especially unsurprising in the case of Amnesty, with its strong International Secretariat in London and its relatively hierarchical organizational structure. Yet even in the case of Amnesty, national conditions also color narratives. Examples include the strong pacifist roots of NGO volunteers in a country such as Germany and pressure on Amnesty in the United States to cooperate with members of the massive civil society movement gathered under the umbrella of the Save Darfur campaign. In all countries, Amnesty workers are aware of their government's traditions, interests, and policy foci when they seek to influence government policies. Without such awareness they surely could not communicate effectively with public officials. They are also mindful of nation-specific carrier groups and their cultural sensitivities when they attempt to mobilize volunteers and the public and raise funds. Such mindfulness, a precondition for effective work at the national level, resulted—as we saw—in varying criminalizing representations of mass violence in Darfur. In addition, workers for international NGOs are themselves shaped by the national contexts in which they were socialized and educated.

But not only INGOs and TANs supported the justice cascade in the case of Darfur; national governments were also crucial actors, albeit to different degrees. I pay particular attention to the United States, its civil society, and government, as this country stood out in international comparison. It sought, more strongly than other members of the international community, to advance a criminalizing frame for Darfur and a definition of the violence as genocide. Crucial contributors were civil society groups, especially evangelical Christians, African Americans, and Jewish organizations, organized in the Save Darfur campaign. The George W. Bush administration followed suit, despite its opposition to the ICC, but under the pressure of civil society. Conditions for this transmission included the porousness of boundaries between civil society and the state in the United States (Bendix 1949 [1974]; Roth 1987; Savelsberg 1994). Articles in the *New York Times* and the

Wall Street Journal, especially opinion pieces, reflected and reinforced the consensus between civil society and the state. They highlighted the crime frame, labeled the violence as genocide, and used dramatic bridging metaphors to shed light on the violence of Darfur by referencing past genocides, including the Holocaust.

Nation-specific patterns are in line with recent literature on national contexts within which INGOs work (Stroup 2012), and with a long tradition of historicizing neo-Weberian scholarship (Bendix 1949 [1974]; Kalberg 1994, 2014; Savelsberg and King 2005). Some national sections of INGOs find stronger resonance in their respective country's governments than others, depending on the institutionalization of civil society–government relations. Nevertheless, this finding should not distract from the fact that national sections of human rights INGOs are characterized by a common denominator: the pursuit of human rights and some degree of consistency in their criminalizing narratives.

Justice or Humanitarianism? Aid NGOs and the Humanitarian Complex

Responses by the UNSC, human rights NGOs, and some countries, including the United States, thus advanced the justice cascade and the representation of mass violence in Darfur within a criminalizing frame. But to focus only on these actors would be misleading. Examining representations of Darfur in other fields reveals at times sharply competing definitions of the situation in the besieged region of Sudan. One potential competitor of the judicial field and its supporters is the humanitarian aid field, here explored with specific attention to one NGO, Doctors Without Borders (MSF). I show that humanitarian representations differ significantly from those of the human rights field. Humanitarian organizations highlight those aspects of suffering that can best be addressed by aid programs. Displacements and the conditions for IDPs and refugees in camps are privileged over the fate of others who lose their lives during massacres, in rape campaigns, and on death marches into the camps. Humanitarian narratives treat the government of Sudan cautiously. They emphasize long-term conditions such as the desertification of the Sahel zone and long-standing center-periphery conflicts, and soft-pedal government actions that are immediate precursors, and likely conditions, of the violence. The humanitarian catastrophe frame is privileged over the crime frame, and actors shy away from the genocide label. My analysis identifies the powerful position of the government of

Sudan vis-à-vis the humanitarian aid field as a crucial condition for this representation, in line with earlier examinations of the humanitarian field (de Waal 1997; Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni 2006).

My analysis of the humanitarian field also displays global-national tensions similar to those diagnosed for the human rights field. Yes, a global humanitarian representation can be identified, and here too international NGOs and aid organizations are major contributors, confirming arguments from globalization theory. Yet, as in the human rights field, cross-national variation in representations is pronounced. In the humanitarian field, too, activists have to speak effectively to reach government actors with specific policy preferences and volunteers and potential donors within civil society who are motivated by distinct collective memories and cultural sensitivities. Again, the validity of historicizing neo-Weberian arguments is demonstrated, and Stroup's observations (2012) on national boundaries within the international NGO movement find further support.

Cross-national patterns themselves are complicated by distinctions between members of diverse professions that inhabit the humanitarian field. Lawyers working in this field are less immune to the logic of the justice cascade than members of other professions such as physicians. Educational backgrounds and professional trajectories thus intersect with field and national context conditions and produce patterns of knowledge and habitus far less homogeneous than a focus on the field alone would suggest. Conflicts between human rights and humanitarian fields should thus not be conceived of as zero-sum. This conclusion is all the more important as conflict gives way at times to a division of labor, as when humanitarian organizations produce evidence of suffering and victimization that justice institutions may later use to assign criminal liability.

While the intersection between fields, national contexts, and professional backgrounds may lead to a weakening of the ideal-typical humanitarian narrative, other conditions move the humanitarian representation closer to the master narrative. I illustrate this hardening of the narrative for Ireland, a country with a strong humanitarian aid orientation and with a close network of state organizations, aid NGOs, and the Irish Catholic Church, all rooted in policy practices that mutually reinforce a humanitarian orientation and associated representation of Darfur. I refer to the structural basis of this constellation as a humanitarian complex. Interviews, supported by many conversations and observations of the cityscape of Dublin, with its numerous and

moving memorials to Irish suffering, reveal some of the cultural foundations of this humanitarian complex. This evidence suggests that collective memories of poverty and famine were crucial driving forces of NGO humanitarianism, aid- and development-focused foreign policy, and supportive public opinion.² In Ireland, the memory of famine and poverty is supplemented by additional memories that raise skepticism against humanitarianism's challenger, the human rights and associated judicial narratives. Irish interviewees interpreted the Northern Ireland conflict as supporting the notion of amnesties in the context of politically motivated violence. This memory in fact proved to be institutionalized in Dublin's Department of Foreign Affairs, where a working group drew lessons from the Northern Ireland conflict in developing foreign policy principles.

And, as in the case of MSF, the representation of mass violence in a humanitarian-complex situation such as Ireland's takes a particular shape. Here too aspects of suffering were highlighted that could be addressed by aid programs, and the responsibility of the government of Sudan was downplayed. The crime frame and the genocide label were used cautiously. This pattern, identified through interviews, is confirmed by media analysis. The causal mechanism was the same as for humanitarian NGOs, given the government of Sudan's role as gatekeeper for the delivery of aid.

Nevertheless, despite such national particularities and, again, as in the human rights field, globalization theory is not to be discarded. Irish government officials still considered their policies aligned with the rest of Europe and the United Nations. And Ireland is indeed among the many European countries that have ratified the Rome Statute, without which the ICC prosecution against President al-Bashir and others would not be possible. While such allegiance thus supports warnings against essentializing a country, its culture and institutions, positions, representations, cultural patterns, and policy practices are simultaneously well suited to illustrating and indeed confirming neo-Weberian concerns regarding national carrier groups and cultural sensitivities.

Peace or Justice? Diplomacy across Countries

In addition to representations from the humanitarian field, narratives of the mass violence in Darfur generated in the diplomatic field also differed sharply from judicial and human rights representations. Interviews revealed a diplomatic master narrative or ideal type of diplomatic

representation of mass violence. We saw that diplomacy focuses, even more than the humanitarian aid field, on long-term and structural causes of conflicts. It tends to avoid naming responsible actors, using the crime frame, or applying the genocide label. Information provided by interviewees suggests a similar causal mechanism. Again, the role of the Sudanese state is decisive. Humanitarian aid organizations depend on permits by lower-level government bureaucracies, where boundary-crossing professional solidarity may at times be at work. But in the diplomatic field dependency is yet more pronounced. Here actors depend on active participation by high-ranking politicians of the country in which mass violence unfolds. Clearly the bar is higher and the pressure to take account of the Sudanese state more intense.

Another distinction between the human rights and diplomatic fields is decisive. Unlike judicial actors and their allies, diplomats are less oriented toward procedure than toward substantive outcomes. They seek to advance their respective countries' material and ideal interests, which were tied—in the Darfur case—to the pursuit of peace and political stability in the region. Diplomats have internalized their field's institutional logic and its doxa, its matter-of-course assumptions about the world. The analysis relativizes arguments by Samantha Power (2002) for the United States and Karen Smith (2010) for Europe, according to which cautious language in the foreign policy field, even in the face of genocide, indicates the reluctance of rational actors to get involved, lest they incur potentially high political costs. I suggest that much of this hesitation must be attributed instead to the habitus of diplomats and its rootedness in the structural conditions of their field.

The diplomatic field thus generates a particular representation of Darfur, distinct from the humanitarian account and in stark contrast to the human rights narrative. Interviewees from foreign ministries generally applied great caution about using dramatizing labels, especially *genocide*, when they described the violence, and about attributing direct responsibility, especially criminal responsibility, to central actors in the Sudanese state. Even so, national contexts matter here even more than in the human rights and humanitarian fields, as my evidence suggests. This may be surprising at first, given that all countries under analysis are members of major international organizations and all but the United States have ratified the Rome Statute. It is also true that all interviewees from foreign ministries insist that their countries are aligned. Yet foreign policy and associated diplomatic work are primarily the domain of national governments, and my evidence suggests that the diplomatic

master narrative is pulled in different directions by the national contexts in which it is cultivated.

Strong mobilization of civil society in combination with porous state-society boundaries contributed to dramatizing narratives, including in the diplomatic field. My analysis shows this pattern especially for the United States. A government's intense interactions with the Sudanese state, in contrast, resulted in representations that stuck close to the diplomatic ideal type. Such interactions may have been fostered through various mechanisms. The Austrian case showed the effects of Sudan's lobbying efforts. Another factor may be a country's reputation for neutrality and associated expertise and involvement in mediation, a force visible in the case of Switzerland. Consider also effects of the close interaction with Sudanese officials in the humanitarian field on display in the case of Ireland. In addition, a country's status as a former colonial power—with the regional expertise, presence of expatriate groups, and normative commitment that this entails—plays into the way its policy makers and diplomats speak about and respond to mass violence occurring in a former colony. The United Kingdom served as an example, and France was particularly concerned with a potential destabilization of Chad, its former colony and immediate neighbor of not just Sudan but the Darfur region specifically. Finally, Germany exemplified the complex effects of the “cultural trauma of perpetrators” (Giesen 2004a) of the Holocaust. Throughout the German responses, national carrier groups and memorial normativities—those commitments implicated in and emerging from collective memories—affected responses to Darfur. While especially pronounced, the German case has one characteristic in common with other countries: communicative memories, embedded in specific carrier groups, matter. The weight of collective memory in the representation of mass violence and the fight for human rights thus confirms observations Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2010) make in their sociohistorical work on memory and human rights; however, my observations challenge their position regarding the declining weight of communicative memories tied to particular carrier groups.

Not to be misunderstood: as in the case of the human rights and humanitarian fields, I seek to essentialize neither field nor nation in the foreign policy and diplomatic realms. For nations, civil society organization, carrier groups, memories, aid programs, and ties to the Sudanese state are all variable. And here too fields overlap with their actors' diachronic experiences such as educational socialization and professional career trajectories, and with synchronic contexts such as

organizational settings. We saw that it matters, for example, if diplomats work in a legal department, especially a human rights unit, or in a political department of their foreign ministry. Also, despite the distinction between judicial and diplomatic representations of Darfur, resulting tensions do not constitute a zero-sum conflict. In some cases diplomats may even use the threat of criminal sanctions as a tool in diplomatic negotiations (Savelsberg and King 2011: ch. 3). In addition, diplomats are involved where international treaties are being promulgated, including the Rome Statute, on which the ICC is based and from which the prosecutions against President al-Bashir and others were launched (Scheffer 2012). Nevertheless, as abundant evidence in this book shows, diplomatic representations are highly distinct from human rights narratives, albeit variable across countries, and—like humanitarian narratives—they pose one potential challenge to the unfolding of the justice cascade.

This book's analysis thus shows that fields, national contexts, and actors' educational and professional trajectories intersect as they generate patterns of representation of mass violence. What applies to Darfur should also apply to other cases. We are thus one step closer to understanding the cacophony of voices that observers of world events encounter when they seek to make sense of distant suffering (Boltanski 1999).

Communicating Suffering to Civil Society: The Journalistic Field

The final question raised in this book addresses the communication of competing narratives to civil society. While NGOs involved in human rights and humanitarian activism seek to reach the public through their own campaigns, most members of civil society learn about instances of mass violence through news media. Also, foreign ministries and institutions of criminal justice depend on media to take seriously their press releases, their ceremonies marking the opening and closing of negotiations (diplomacy), and their hearings (court actions) when they seek to reach a broad public.

Based on interview data and supported by ideas from Bourdieuan sociology applied to the journalistic field, I show how Africa correspondents who reported on Darfur submitted to their field's rules of the game. Their habitus was shaped by their positions in the semiautonomous journalistic field, albeit mediated by the trajectories by which they reached their positions. All interviewees strongly identified with the journalistic profession, appreciated the work of writing, were highly

educated in a diverse range of fields (though most lacked an Africa-specific background), shared some dose of adventurism, were relatively independent from their editors (but variably so), and depended heavily on external sources of information, including IO and INGO reports; other news sources, especially guiding media (“*Leitmedien*”) such as BBC and CNN; and networks of colleagues in the field. I refer to the last-named sources as local cosmopolitan media networks, partially clustered by nationality. This mix of features entails some elements that strengthen journalistic autonomy (e.g., education and identification with journalistic work) and others that weaken it (e.g., dependency on IOs and INGOs as sources). It is in light of this relative autonomy that the relationship between journalism on the one hand and politics, diplomacy, human rights law, and humanitarianism on the other affects media reporting.

Interviews and analysis of the Darfur media data set indeed highlight the varying influences of distinct fields on media representations of mass violence. After initial neglect, a first—and massive—rise in reporting followed political initiatives, especially Kofi Annan’s analogical bridging before the UN General Assembly from the Rwandan genocide (on its tenth anniversary) to Darfur. Also, initiatives by domestic politicians, especially ones affiliated with international organizations, ignited media attention.

After the initial wave of media reporting was at risk of taking the typical nosedive (see Bourdieu 1998), steps by the UN to initiate judicial proceedings, followed by the ICC’s interventions, pulled Darfur back into the limelight of media attention. Several judicial interventions were followed by new peaks of reporting, drawing attention to killings and rapes and framing the violence as criminal. Analysis of the Darfur data set shows that the crime frame appeared more prominently in media reporting than any other frame, and its prominence intensified even when overall media attention to Darfur declined. In the case of Darfur, the justice cascade with its supporting forces—human rights NGOs, TANs, IOs, and the new, permanent International Criminal Court—thus significantly weakened the chances of abusers of human rights to go unnoticed or even to enter world history with a reputation as heroes (Giesen 2004b). Arguments about the discursive nature of court proceedings (Osiel 1997), their legitimacy by virtue of procedure (Luhmann 2004), and their ritual power (Durkheim [1912] 2001) may help explain the pronounced impact of court interventions on the intensity of media reporting and its coloring of the violence as crime.

The humanitarian field and its distinctive representations also turned out to be a crucial source of information for journalists, and the humanitarian emergency frame initially manifested prominently. Yet use of this frame declined quickly and dramatically. At least two reasons appear to account for this pattern. Most important, suffering in refugee camps that lasts for long periods loses newsworthiness. This feature of the media market was augmented by actions of the government of Sudan that increasingly barred humanitarian aid organizations from Darfur or made their continued presence contingent on “good behavior,” that is, on refraining from criticism and from any agenda of bearing witness. MSF sections were thus among the first organizations to be expelled from Sudan.

The diplomatic field affected media reporting more enduringly than the humanitarian field did, but less intensely than the judicial field. Like the latter it can produce dramatic moments. Its chances are even better the more its actions involve prominent political actors who themselves are considered newsworthy, enhancing the attractiveness of news from the field of diplomacy for mass media. But diplomatic negotiators usually do not have the same level of legitimacy as courts. Negotiations are not public, do not follow strict procedure, and lack a trial’s ritual force. Also, the outcomes of negotiation, even when an accord is reached, are more uncertain and lack the drama of an indictment against a head of state. In line with these considerations, the analysis reveals that the war or armed conflict frame, with its elective affinity to the diplomatic field, fared less noticeably and less enduringly than the crime frame in reporting about Darfur.

Finally, this analysis adds to insights from recent international comparative research on media reporting (Benson 2013). It shows that not only general structural and cultural features of the media’s home country affect reporting, including the relative strength of competing fields, but also national particularities of the media field itself.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND INSIGHTS FOR PRACTICE

The foregoing chapters present theoretical themes outlined in the introduction, and the empirical observations speak to those themes. These include concerns from the sociology of knowledge and collective representations, especially the role of legal rituals and procedures as well as carrier groups, their cultural sensitivities and memories; field theory,

with its focus on actors and the web of ties in which they are embedded, marred by power imbalances; and debates between globalization theorists versus scholars who highlight national forces even in a globalizing world. Simultaneously, empirical observations in this book speak to issues of practice and policy: the justice cascade and the forces that advance this cascade and its effects, as well as the strategies of different fields and how they relate to, support, or challenge other fields. Many messages appear throughout the review of empirical findings offered above. A brief summary of policy and theoretical themes in this final section of the book will nevertheless be helpful.

The justice cascade is at the center of massive debates, waged at once in scholarship and in practice. Increasing attribution of individual criminal liability in cases of grave human rights violations in domestic, foreign, and international courts is powerfully documented in the work of political scientist Kathryn Sikkink (2011; see also Neier 2012). The story of Darfur supports many of those arguments, even if the struggle to end impunity has not yet resulted in arrests and trials. The criminalization of human rights violations follows the story of past criminalizations of other behaviors, explored in a long tradition of constructivist criminology following the classical contributions of Turk (1969), Chambliss (1964), and Gusfield (1967). Yet, in contrast to these classics, the concern today is less with status group politics or the politics of class and race at the level of nation-states than with the diffusion of norms across national boundaries (Jenness 2004) and from global institutions down to nation-states. Also, recent literature on the justice cascade replaces conflict theory's critical stance toward criminalization (of the weak) by a supportive stance toward criminalization (of the powerful).

While questions remain regarding the endurance of the justice cascade as a short-term versus secular trend, the fiercest debates have focused on its consequences. In general, and in the Darfur case, critics argue that threatening sanctions motivates powerful perpetrators to resist a transfer to a more democratic and human rights-respecting regime (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003–2004; Pensky 2008). Sikkink (2011) instead argues, and she provides statistical evidence for her position, that the justice cascade will not harm, and may possibly improve, democracy and human rights records. In seeking to explain supporting correlations, she stresses the effectiveness of deterrence. Mindful of past punishments, potential perpetrators will shy away from committing human rights crimes. But the deterrence

mechanism does not—and it cannot—stand alone. It is accompanied by potential cultural effects that work through the capacity of criminal proceedings to represent violence as a form of criminal offending—and thus to contribute to a collective memory of violent repression as a form of human rights crime. In fact, deterrence presumes this cultural effect as it envisions actors who are conscious of acts committed and penalties paid in the past. Here too the story of Darfur provides evidence. UNSC and ICC interventions contributed to a depiction of leading actors of the Sudanese state, all the way up to its mighty president, Omar al-Bashir, as criminal perpetrators. Media communicated this image to a broad public across national boundaries. The justice cascade seems to have worked in an important way even though no arrests have been made (yet) and even if no trial is under way.

Linking ideas from field theory to debates about the justice cascade reveals reasons for both the cultural effectiveness and constraints associated with the cascade, the judicial field, and institutions such as the ICC. For all fields on which I focus—judicial, humanitarian, diplomatic, and journalistic—the crucial role of actors becomes apparent, in line with arguments by Bourdieu (1987, 1988, 1998) and his followers (Benson 1998, 2006; Hagan 2003; Hagan and Levi 2005), but also consistent with the conception of strategic action fields (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). Actors in these fields pursue specific goals such as justice, humanitarianism, and peace while they also seek to strengthen their own position within their respective field. Interviews with humanitarians, human rights workers, diplomats, and journalists alike provide abundant evidence. But actors are both enabled and constrained by their field's rules of the game. They become carriers of a habitus, a set of relatively fixed dispositions. They have little choice but to incorporate into their habitus their field's dominant institutional logic, a notion borrowed from Weber (1976) and elaborated by Luhmann (2004). They thus buy into the field's doxa, its matter-of-course assumptions about the world.

In criminal law this consistency between habitus and the surrounding field and the logic of its institutions means a focus on specific individual actors (as opposed to the social structures or broad cultural patterns that social scientists might stress) and on those rules of evidence compatible with the law's procedural requirements (not those rules deemed relevant by historians). It also implies application of a binary logic whereby clear distinctions between “guilty” and “not guilty” leave little room for the recognition of “shades of grey” (Levi 1988) and allow for

a “decoupling” (Giesen 2004a) of bystanders, more or less passive supporters of the violence, and others from the guilt determined against a few in criminal trials. While the field thus enables its actors to pursue specific goals, it constrains them and the representations to which they contribute. Important aspects of social reality are left out when it is constructed through the lens of a particular field, aspects that actors in other fields alert us to.

Further, the representation of mass violence by the global human rights field is not just complicated, for better or worse, by the contributions of surrounding fields to the social construction of the reality of mass violence (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The story of fields examined here is further complicated by their simultaneous operation at national and international levels (see also Dezalay and Garth 1997; Hagan 2003). Bourdieu’s study of academic life, but also much of his work on journalism, examines fields at the nation level, specifically for the case of France. This national focus produces two shortcomings. First, it buys into national conditions of fields without explicating their particularities. It runs the risk of exaggerating external validity, of overgeneralizing. Second, it misses complex interactions between global fields and national subfields, characterized by the structural, institutional, and cultural particularities of each country. Actors in national subfields are also confronted with (or are themselves members of) national carrier groups with specific historical experiences, collective memories, and cultural sensitivities. These scholarly insights likely have consequences for practice, even if it is a matter for further debate whether the application of national filters constitutes an advantage or a problem for the justice cascade or the pursuit of humanitarianism or peace. It is clear, though, that mobilization on behalf of any of these goals, including human rights, has to take nation-level forces into account.

Revelation of such intersectionality between global and national fields contributes insights into debates between globalization theorists and others who highlight national contexts. The World Polity School of John Meyer and his followers (e.g., Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; Boyle and Meyer 1998; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000), suggesting that fields in which multiple global actors are involved should produce global representations and scripts, finds significant confirmation in my research. Indeed, I identify common denominators in the human rights, humanitarian, and diplomatic narratives across national boundaries. Yet empirical patterns also suggest caution. Nation-specific factors, carrier groups, interests, institutions, and cultural sensitivities clearly affect

representations, in support of a different, historicizing brand of neo-Weberian scholarship (Bendix [1949] 1974; Gorski 2003; Roth 1987; Rueschemeyer 1973; Kalberg 1994, 2014; Savelsberg and King 2005, 2011). My findings confirm and elaborate on Halliday and Carruthers's conclusion (2010) that cultural distance from the global affects national adaptations of global models. Not just cultural distance matters, though, but also the substance of national cultures, their qualitative particularities. My findings do not stand alone. They are supported by recent work on the impact of national contexts on cross-national variation in responses to mass violence by Western governments (K. Smith 2010) and by INGO actors (Stroup 2012). Even work inspired by the World Polity School found nation-specific patterns in the implementation of human rights law (Boyle 2002). Still other scholars write about cosmopolitanism, especially in the realm of human rights (e.g., Levy and Sznajder 2010). They too take the nation level seriously, while insisting that international and global concerns are increasingly incorporated into national ideas, memories, and practices. My analysis sheds light on the relative weight of the global, the national, and the cosmopolitan and their interactions.

Interpenetration not only between the global and the national but also between national society and fields is further supplemented by systemic interpenetration between fields, for example, when diplomats use the threat of criminal sanctions in negotiations or when actors in the humanitarian field produce medical evidence that may later be used by criminal justice actors. A concrete example for the interpenetration of fields and national backgrounds is provided by the director of an operational center of a humanitarian aid agency in Europe. While working in the humanitarian field, he was trained as a lawyer (with affinities to the rights narrative) and his roots were in the United States (a strong supporter of judicial intervention against Sudan). His position in the organizational field, his educational background, and his national upbringing simultaneously contributed to his distinctive knowledge and habitus. Instead of harmonizing, biographical trajectory and field demands often produce contradictions that create room for improvisation. Recognizing such intersectionality across fields potentially provides actors with powerful tools for collaboration.

In short, complications (as well as opportunities) arise for the human rights field and its associated institutions, including the ICC, from their competition with other fields, from the global-national tension, and from complex interpenetrations with trajectories of professional socialization

and national upbringing. Added to this is a final challenge, the need to communicate representations of mass violence to a global public. Again, few members of Western societies have direct experience with mass violence in places such as Darfur, even if the cultural trauma of mass violence in their own regions persists. In contrast to other policy fields, they learn about those events primarily through media messages. Through them they become subject to distant suffering (Boltanski 1999) and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004). To the degree that policy decisions are informed by public perceptions of international issues—and scholarship shows that they are (see note 1)—media thus become an important social force. In line with historical and sociological literature on the processing of judicial narratives in media reports (Pendas 2006; Jardim 2012; Savelsberg and King 2011), my analysis documents compatibilities between the logic of the judicial field and the journalistic rules of the game. The need for dramatization and a focus on individual actors are among them. Criminalizing representations in the Darfur case thus more strongly and more enduringly affected media reporting across countries than representations from other fields.

To conclude, in the complex intersection of overlapping and conflicting fields there emerge consequential representations of mass violence. Building on a long tradition of ideas from the sociology of knowledge, rooted in the classical works of Emile Durkheim ([1912] 2001), Max Weber (1976), Karl Mannheim (1952), and leading to the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) and Pierre Bourdieu (1998), this volume further contributes to our understanding of how competing fields, at national and global levels, interact to produce collective representations of mass violence that news media communicate selectively. Collective representations then constitute a cultural repertoire (Swidler 1986) on which creators of collective memory of cruelty and suffering (Halbwachs 1992; Olick 1999; Osiel 1997; Savelsberg and King 2011) and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) eventually draw. Making sense of these patterns is a critical precondition for understanding, explaining, and predicting how civil societies and governments respond to mass violence. And such responses affect chances of breaking those “cycles of violence” (Minow 1998) that have tortured humanity throughout its history, with Darfur being one of the recent chapters of such suffering (Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2008). Nation building succeeded in dramatically reducing civil violence within modernizing societies (Elias 1978; Johnson and Monkkonen 1996; Cooney 1997; Eisner 2001). Will the building of global institutions, especially in the

justice field, lead to a similar degree of pacification worldwide? This book suggests that the building of global judicial institutions has the potential of contributing to global pacification at the international and national levels, especially if the builders tolerate, and learn to creatively manage, substantial conflicts between fields and nations; if they are mindful of the potential for division of labor and cooperation; if they are not bogged down by inevitable failures and frustrations; and if they prevail against massive resistance by those with an interest in the exercise of brute force.