

## The Diplomatic Field in National Contexts

### *Deviations from the Master Narrative*

Comparative studies that address representations of mass violence within the diplomatic field are virtually nonexistent. That is regrettable as comparative analysis promises to shed light on the conditions under which diplomats acknowledge atrocities and, more specifically, distance themselves from the criminal justice narrative more or less decisively.

Political scientist Karen Smith (2010) is a rare exception as she has documented variation for European countries' responses to genocides. Smith, while agreeing with Power's (2002) charge of an overly cautious rhetoric in cases of genocide, identifies noteworthy differences between countries, in particular France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. To be sure, the diplomatic field shows commonalities across countries. Also, Western governments are linked by their countries' bilateral and multilateral ties and treaties. But diplomats nevertheless act under distinct national conditions, including their country's size (as well as weight and visibility in international politics), specific types of resources and expertise, and degree of activation of civil society, as well as the responsiveness of the nation's political institutions to civil society; the presence of expatriate groups, often associated with a country's colonial history; domestic carrier groups; and—especially relevant for responses to mass atrocities—country-specific collective memories of past human rights crimes. In addition to such cultural factors, countries also vary by economic and geopolitical concerns. The latter are especially pronounced, in the Darfur case, for countries such as China, with its

massive investments in Sudan, especially in the construction, agriculture and oil sectors.<sup>1</sup> Such immediate interests in Sudan are more limited in the countries under study here, providing for relatively little variation. In addition, all of the countries examined are Western-style democracies. The methodological advantage of this similarity is that it allows for the detection of otherwise hidden social, political, and cultural forces.<sup>2</sup>

In other words, the national context should matter, as it overlaps with the sectoral field of diplomacy. My earlier discussion of US and Irish particularities in representations of Darfur provided initial indications (chapters 3 and 5). In this chapter I revisit these and examine other countries to generate additional insights. Besides particular domestic conditions, countries also have varying ties to the international community, differing degrees of neutrality, memberships in various international organizations, and ratification of diverse treaties and conventions. The following analysis pays attention to these factors as well.

In what follows, I spell out differences between representations of the Darfur conflict in the countries under study and indicate conditions that potentially lead to such differences. I show that foreign policy makers in different countries deviate more or less from the ideal-typical or master narrative of diplomatic representations identified in chapter 6. A word of caution is warranted, though. As I highlight specific conditions in my discussion of these countries, I never suggest that we reduce the foreign policy of these countries to the features highlighted. That would neither be appropriate given my only limited survey of the national foreign policy fields nor justified in light of the varying narratives I encountered within countries, especially in light of the organizational position of interviewees within their foreign ministries. Nor do I suggest that conditions explored for one country are absent in others.

I first briefly remind the reader of insights gained in previous chapters regarding the representations of Darfur in Ireland and the United States. I then address Switzerland to illustrate a model of diplomatic representation that comes closest to the ideal type depicted above. I subsequently examine the United Kingdom and France as countries that stand out as former colonial powers of Sudan and its neighbor Chad, respectively, with all the historical consequences that colonialism implies. Austria then serves as an illustration for the Sudanese state's lobbying efforts that might have left traces in Austria's representation of Darfur. Finally, I discuss Germany to illustrate how the "cultural trauma of perpetrators" (Giesen 2004a) affects responses to current events, including Darfur.

THE UNITED STATES: MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL  
SOCIETY AND CRIMINALIZING DEVIATIONS  
FROM THE MASTER NARRATIVE

The massive mobilization of American civil society, addressed in chapter 3, took organizational shape in the Save Darfur campaign, an umbrella under which almost two hundred organizations assembled, religious and secular, conservative and liberal. Some of these organizations represented carrier groups—African Americans and Jews, as well as evangelical Christians, the latter a crucial constituent of the George W. Bush administration. This civil society movement advanced an interventionist and criminalizing position on the Darfur conflict. “Genocide” became its rallying cry, and the US Holocaust Memorial Museum played a central role in the mobilization. As our look at US media showed, news reports and editorials used the criminalizing frame and applied the term *genocide* significantly more often than media in other countries (see also Murphy 2007). This homology is not surprising given the competitive nature of the US media market.

It is also not surprising—given the porous nature of US political institutions, with primary elections and popular election of executive branch leaders—that the Bush administration applied the term *genocide* to the violence in Darfur more than any other government did. Diplomats of both the former Clinton and Bush administrations articulated support for this categorization and for the pursuit of criminal justice responses, both in conference discussions and in their writings (e.g., Williamson 2009a, 2009b). The American representation of Darfur thus leans further away from the diplomatic master narrative and toward a criminalizing and genocide discourse than do the representations of any other country under study.

Samantha Power’s diagnosis of American reluctance to refer to mass violence as genocide thus does and does not apply to the case of Darfur: “It is in the realm of domestic politics that the battle to stop genocide is lost. American political leaders interpret society-wide silence as an indicator of public indifference. They reason that they will incur no cost if the United States remains uninvolved but will face steep risks if they engage” (Power 2002:xviii). Power’s argument regarding the alignment of policy toward public opinion is confirmed for Darfur. But in the Darfur case it works in the other direction because—contra Power’s thesis—civil society became highly mobilized and produced a strong rhetorical response from the US government. It is also true, however,

that social movements can be easily satisfied by government rhetoric. Government actions such as the 2007 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act fell far behind the force of the verbal campaign.

#### IRELAND: MERCY, AID, AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Irish foreign policy is “aligned” (i.e., in line with that of international partners), as my interviewees in Dublin stressed. The country has indeed ratified all essential international conventions pertaining to human rights. Yet, as discussed in chapter 3, Irish foreign policy also has distinct characteristics that affect Irish representations of Darfur. It is strongly oriented toward humanitarian and development aid. It closely cooperates with aid NGOs, some of which are allied with the Irish Catholic Church. Trócaire (the name meaning “mercy”) is the most prominent. Ireland is thus closely tied to the humanitarian aid field and, like aid NGOs, depends on interactions with the Sudanese state. Representations of Darfur I encountered are consequently cautious, in line with the diplomatic master narrative. Also, our quantitative analysis of foreign ministry press releases shows the Irish foreign ministry’s strong preference for the humanitarian emergency frame and for humanitarian aid solutions. Positions of the Irish state are supported by civil society, as our statistics on media reporting indicate (chapter 5). Karen Smith’s analysis confirms this pattern. Her review of Irish DFA files showed little civil society input, for example, during Ireland’s political debates over the country’s accession to the Genocide Convention (K. Smith 2010:54).

There is good reason to believe that the Irish focus on aid programs is deeply rooted in the country’s collective memories of famine and extreme poverty. The resulting caution regarding criminal justice responses is further grounded in the cultural processing of the Northern Ireland conflict and partly institutionalized in a working group in the Department of Foreign Affairs. It seems as though foreign policy makers have developed an appreciation for the benefits of amnesty and a critical stance toward penal discourses.

#### SWITZERLAND: NEUTRALITY, ARBITRATION, AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A DIPLOMATIC NARRATIVE

Like Ireland, Switzerland is aligned with the basic principles of its partners in the international community. It has ratified central human rights conventions as well as the Rome Statute. Yet, as in Ireland, I encountered

a cautious rhetoric regarding Darfur. Interview statements cited above are well reflected in an essay by political scientist David Lanz (2009) of Swiss-Peace, a policy institute affiliated with the Swiss government. Presenting peace and justice as competing notions, Lanz spells out what he considers highly problematic consequences of the ICC decision to indict President al-Bashir: the eviction of thirteen INGOs from Sudan; the elimination of three Sudanese NGOs; sympathies al-Bashir won from actors in Africa and the Arab world who interpreted the ICC indictment as an expression of neocolonialism; difficulties for countries such as Switzerland that support the ICC but simultaneously maintain strong diplomatic ties with Khartoum; the risks to the North-South peace process; and challenges to a peace treaty for Darfur. Lanz speaks favorably of the option provided in Article 16 of the Rome Statute, by which the UNSC can suspend prosecutions.

Why do we encounter a representation of Darfur that is as cautious as its Irish counterpart? While Switzerland too has a well-developed program of developmental and humanitarian aid, the status of this program in national policy and the national consciousness is far less developed than in Ireland. Switzerland's caution is in fact rooted in a different condition. The following statement from one Swiss interviewee offers a promising lead:

There are several normative constraints and structural constraints for Swiss foreign policy. It's a small country in the middle of Europe and these are the obvious ones. But another characteristic of Swiss foreign policy is structural neutrality. I mean, it is a very, very, very strongly rooted identity of Switzerland as a neutral country—although neutrality arguably in a globalized world does not really make any sense, neither legally nor morally nor politically speaking. But still, if you do surveys, you have 90 to 95 percent of the Swiss public who say, “Yes. We are neutral. We were always neutral. We will always be neutral and our foreign policy should be neutral. . . . So there is very little that Switzerland can do in terms of an activist foreign policy. If you look at Scandinavian countries, all the different projects that they were able to take on, there is very little of that that Switzerland can do. Notably, participation in any military involvement in foreign countries is an absolute no-go area. But at the same time, you have political elites . . . who are aware of the fact that the world is connected and that there is a need for small states like Switzerland. And they, they want to be more active. So they have to find more activities that fit within the structural characteristics of Swiss foreign policy, that don't contradict them, that don't produce backlash in terms of domestic politics. Right? And so one of these things is mediation. It's perfectly in line with Switzerland's identity as a neutral country. . . . And it is also something that is fashionable in terms of world politics. It generates a certain prestigious sort of reputation.

Indeed, Switzerland did actively engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with the Sudan. Swiss foreign policy experts Simon Mason and David Lanz (2009) provide numerous examples: Josef Bucher, Switzerland's representative in Libya and Kenya during much of the 1990s and special envoy for conflict solutions (2001–2005), built strong ties with representatives of the government of Sudan and of the SPLM; after 2000 the Department of Foreign Affairs supported a project entitled “Councils of Traditional Leaders” for leaders in southern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains; Swiss diplomats participated in negotiations that resulted in a 2000 armistice in the same region; Swiss mediation experts participated in the negotiations that led to the CPA; and Switzerland contributed to monitoring missions following the CPA. These examples already represent an impressive record for a small country (see also Baechler 2011).

Research on Swiss foreign policy reveals motivations that, in the absence of immediate interests, drive such engagement. Indeed, statements from interviews with twenty-five policy makers are in line with the above interview excerpt. Respondents highlighted the Swiss government's desire to contribute to the advancement of peace and the support for suffering populations; to strengthen international legitimacy and Switzerland's reputation as a small country with a strong value orientation; to advance collaboration with international partners beyond the realms of economics and finance; and, domestically, to strengthen the population's image of their country as globally engaged on behalf of human rights, justice, and peace (Mason and Lanz 2009:65–66).

In short, both Ireland and Switzerland are small countries that operate in fields in which the government of Sudan plays a prominent role. The desire to advance humanitarian aid in the Irish case and to advance diplomacy in the Swiss case suggests similar caution vis-à-vis the Sudanese government, a caution that entails distance from dramatizing, criminal justice narratives. I found this caution reflected in representations of the mass violence in Darfur in both countries. Where the United States greatly deviates from the diplomatic master narrative, policy makers in Ireland and Switzerland adhere to it rather closely.

#### AUSTRIA: FRIEND OF THE ARAB WORLD—AND SUDANESE LOBBYING

Austria is a third small country where narratives about Darfur maintain cautious distance from the criminal justice discourse. To be sure,

Austrian interviewees from the field of diplomacy attested to their country's strong support for the ICC and their alignment with EU positions. One respondent, placed in the legal division of Vienna's foreign ministry and responsible for international criminal law as well as for Nazi-era compensation issues, stressed that Austria has special obligations toward the pursuit of human rights crimes, also in light of the country's involvement in the Nazi empire and the decades of delays in facing that legacy. Yet a prominent long-term Austrian diplomat raised, like one of his Swiss colleagues, the option of activating Article 16 of the Rome Statute and thereby temporarily suspending proceedings against President al-Bashir, albeit under specific conditions. Two Austrian interviewees who had met with al-Bashir also characterized him in ways that challenge the portrayal of the Sudanese president as the demonic leader of a mass-murderer regime.

What might be the root of such cautious distance from criminal justice narratives regarding Darfur—despite assurances of EU alignment? Austria's identity is tied neither to aid programs, as in the Irish case, nor to the surprising intensity of arbitration initiatives we encounter in Switzerland. Nevertheless, interviewees portrayed conditions in which Austrian foreign policy is made that likely contribute to the cautionary narrative.

First, the country is small and is no threatening heavyweight in foreign relations. Second, it emerged from the post-World War II conflicts as a Western democracy, but one with neutrality status. Third, it is perceived by countries in the Global South as relatively friendly toward Southern interests, a reputation considered a legacy of Bruno Kreisky, Austria's long-term socialist foreign minister (1959–1966) and chancellor (1970–1983). Fourth, diplomats present Austria as having historically positive ties to Middle Eastern countries, the Arab world generally, and Sudan specifically. Finally, while interviewees described its foreign policy as not well developed, one Austrian respondent characterized its foreign policy elite as focused on economic interests.

This constellation of features may help explain a recent concerted lobbying effort on behalf of the government of Sudan. In October 2007, a Sudanese consul to Vienna invited one of my Austrian interviewees to visit Sudan. After a series of negotiations, the Sudanese authorities extended their invitation to a group of Austrians consisting of a former defense minister, a high-ranking military officer of the Austrian Defense Academy, the heads of a conservative- and a liberal-oriented foreign policy think tank, a leading foreign correspondent for one of

the two most prominent Austrian newspapers, and the president of the Austrian-Sudanese Society, Paul Slatin.<sup>3</sup> As the interviewee reported:

That was an invitation from the Khartoum government, the entire government that is. We conducted conversations. . . . I myself have now been down there for the fourth time and we always had talks with representatives of the South and the North, including with Bashir. We were twice in Darfur, in Nyala, in El Fasher and, as I said, the last time just fourteen days ago. We repeatedly had, especially during the first three journeys we undertook, our own dates, where we met private individuals, business people, journalists, human rights activists, etc., whom we asked to meet in our hotels. Last time we also received a briefing from the UNAMID in El Fasher . . . and talked with Doctors Without Borders. . . . That has pretty much changed my view of the conflict, I'd have to say. (author's translation)

Building on this report, the respondent critiqued what he considered the dominant view of the conflict, which, he argues, was framed by the United States and American celebrities such as George Clooney, motivated by national interests, and adopted by Europeans. Another interviewee, a senior foreign policy maker now retired but still special envoy for Africa, voiced skepticism about the same visits: "All these activities were quite obviously rather much steered by the [Sudanese] government. They paid for it, the travel and also the stay there. They also organized all the interviews there" (author's translation). This interviewee, not part of the visiting group, pointed specifically to the Sudanese secret service's role in manipulating the tour. He contrasted the delegation's experience with his own independent travel to Sudan and his meetings not only with opposition figures but also with President al-Bashir. His own conclusions regarding al-Bashir nevertheless also contrast with those of the common criminal justice discourse:

We also talked about this affair [the ICC charges] . . . very politely, with friendly words, but still. He of course started with "Well, you have to understand how all of this started," and that he himself is a general and he knows he is the first who wants today that the violence ends. "It's of no benefit to anyone," and he favors peace, that he is the man who can really guarantee the peace. . . . Well, in part there is some truth to that. Everyone can see that those who really are responsible are hiding behind Bashir. . . . He understands only today that he was tricked in several respects. Not by us, but by his own people. . . . Of course I also talked to him about Chad a lot. I told him that we want him to finally make peace with Chad. He then told me that he is always ready to send a delegation. What I did not know, or nobody knew, was that this was already decided, and ten days later a Sudanese delegation visited Chad. (author's translation)

In short, Austria, a small country with a history of neutrality and relatively close ties to the Arab world, including Sudan, has been lobbied by the Sudanese government. Chances are that the information to which Austrian visitors to Sudan were exposed was to some degree vetted by the government. Noteworthy too is that the Sudanese efforts began in 2008, a full year before Austria took a seat on the UN Security Council for a two-year term. At least one other Austrian diplomat traveled independently and met with leading Sudanese actors, including President al-Bashir. He too returned with a skeptical view of the human rights campaign and criminal justice portrayal of the actions of Omar al-Bashir. I do not argue that these contacts necessarily affected Austrian foreign policy. Yet they likely influenced the representations of the Darfur conflict emanating from the Austrian foreign policy field.

FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: “AS IF [WE] WERE THE FORMER COLONIAL RULER”

“One thing that really struck me when I first joined the foreign office, especially working on a lot of different African conflicts, was the fact that it almost seemed to be divided up quite as simply as if you were the former colonial ruler. It is your lead. It is your responsibility. So France took on, you know, it leads on Côte d’Ivoire. We lead on Sudan. America leads on Liberia.”

The interviewee in the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) adds to this statement with regard to Sudan “that there is a certain feeling of responsibility . . . for how it was formed, the lines on the map, forcing the North and the South together perhaps.” She supplemented earlier statements by NGO interviewees who pointed to the special role of expatriate communities in advancing foreign policy motivations by highlighting the role of the “the press and foreign countries [that] say, ‘You created this mess; you drew the lines; you forced communities together that shouldn’t be together; . . . you need to help fix this.’”

This interviewee did not rescind, but rather modified, her statement in subsequent responses to questions about the special role of UK foreign policy toward the Darfur conflict. She pointed to British collaboration with others, for example, the leadership role of the “troika” of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Norway (“often seen as very impartial”) in the negotiations leading to the CPA (to settle the North-South conflict). Such collaboration was partly welcomed as the United

Kingdom did not want “to direct what happens, because that would be seen as being colonial again.” And yet the historical legacy of the colonial power “does require us to speak out first.” Contrasting the action on Sudan with the military intervention in Sierra Leone, she said, “It comes back to the sort of pure diplomacy.”

It is not possible, based on the interview data, to establish a causal link between such a “pure diplomacy” stance and UK diplomats’ representation of the Darfur conflict. But field theory again suggests that we expect a cautious narrative, distinct from the criminal justice account. Not surprisingly, it was this interviewee who had noticed cautious advice in diplomacy circles not to rock the boat because of Darfur when the North-South agreement was at stake. And while she did attribute responsibility for the Darfur violence to the government of Sudan, and while she agreed with the framing of the violence as “state crime,” she avoided naming specific individual actors. She would like to see justice delayed, and she rejected the notion of genocide.

The rejection of genocide rhetoric is in line with UK foreign policy makers’ official assessment (K. Smith 2010). Specifically for the Darfur case, this position was encouraged early in 2004 by Africa experts such as Suliman Baldo, James Morton, and—again—Alex de Waal before the UK House of Commons International Development Committee. Supported by columnists such as Jonathan Steele of the *Guardian*, it is reflected in numerous statements of leading policy makers. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, for example, stated in September 2004: “Some people call it genocide, some people call it ethnic cleansing, some people call it civil war, some people call it none of the above. Whatever it is, it’s a desperate situation which requires the attention of the world” (quoted in K. Smith 2010:228).

Karen Smith attributes some responsibility for such caution to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry, discussed above (chapter 1). That report had decided against the application of the genocide label, a decision that legitimized avoidance of the term and associated obligations. The “risk” of incurring obligations increased after September 2005, when the UN formulated the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. British hesitance, however, did not prevent the United Kingdom from joining forces with France, the only other permanent member of the UNSC that has ratified the Rome Statute, in taking a decisive stance in favor of referring the Darfur case to the ICC. Apart from this step toward prosecution, the United Kingdom limited itself to supporting humanitarian aid and diplomatic efforts in the Doha peace talks.

Just as the United Kingdom is the former colonial overlord of Sudan, so is France the former colonial power over neighboring Chad—and of numerous other West African and Sahel-zone countries. The interviewee in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that such history matters. He pointed to special expertise concentrated in the former colonial power, using the focus on Africa in his own university studies as an example. He stressed that 60 percent of French foreign aid flows to Africa. And he emphasized the role that the memory of colonialism plays, if not in the general population (an attempt to make the Darfur crisis central to the 2004 presidential election campaign did not succeed), then among the foreign policy elite. Associated with such memory is French foreign policy makers' belief in their special influence, "given the history we have in Africa, given the relations we have with Chad or just, you know, the neighboring countries." He portrayed France's position concerning the Darfur conflict as a reflection of "the risk of spillover on Chad"—supplementing concerns with the humanitarian crisis. Simultaneously the French interviewee sketched a shift toward a more "continental" vision on Africa and thus a direct interest in events in Sudan.

Despite his less pronounced diplomatic involvement in Sudan, my interviewee in the French MFA also displayed the habitus of a diplomat and provided the expected narrative of Darfur. While he subscribed to the state crime frame as appropriate for the interpretation of the Darfur conflict, and while he staunchly rejected the application of Article 16 of the Rome Statutes (i.e., suspension of ICC proceedings), his words were nevertheless guarded. His causal explanation of the conflict focused first on desertification, second on the center-periphery conflict, and third on the CPA and the encouragement Darfur rebels might have drawn from it (note that France did not play a central role in these negotiations). And, while he characterized Ahmed Harun, indicted by the ICC, as "one of the main tools used by the government," he responded to the question "Used by whom?" with an answer that avoided uttering the name of Harun's co-indictee Omar al-Bashir. He replied: "Well, that is the big question."

The French Foreign Ministry interviewee, finally, rejected the genocide label, in line with the official position taken consistently by French government ministers (K. Smith 2010:229). Yet, again, together with the United Kingdom, France is the only permanent member of the UNSC that has ratified the Rome Statute and promoted a referral of the Darfur case to the ICC. Earlier, the French government distinguished

itself when it lobbied strongly for a reference to Darfur in UNSC Resolution 1547 of June 11, 2004. Karen Smith (2010) reports: “According to one account, France’s position went from ‘we don’t want to do this’ to ‘we can’t let this go on,’ because it feared the conflict would spread to Chad” (214).

In short, the cases of the United Kingdom, former colonial power of Sudan, and of France, former colonial power of Sudan’s neighbor Chad, confirm the workings of the diplomatic field. Interview statements and official pronouncements are guarded. The name of the president of Sudan is rarely uttered as a co-responsible actor. Causal analysis attributes much of the violence to natural and political-structural conditions. Interviewees avoid applying the term *genocide*. But we also see that diplomacy and criminal justice are not mutually exclusive; their relationship does not constitute a zero-sum conflict. In fact, criminal justice interventions were based on diplomatic work. The UNSC referral to the ICC was strongly supported by both France and the United Kingdom. In fact, this referral may have the benefits, from a diplomatic perspective, that it defers the use of exclusionary language to the court and that deferral of further intervention by national governments is legitimized with the case in the court’s hands. Finally, the cases of two former colonial powers show again that a country’s history overlaps with the basic features of the diplomatic field. This intersectionality gives the field particular shape and colors the rhetoric and actions of its players.

#### GERMANY: CULTURAL TRAUMA OF PERPETRATORS—AND CONSEQUENCES

The memory of the Holocaust in Germany is deeply ingrained, especially among the political elite. Giesen (2004a) has written about the cultural trauma of perpetrators in discussing German memories of the Holocaust, and Savelsberg and King (2005, 2011) show how not only national memorial days and memorial sites but also legal codes and positions taken by law enforcers with regard to hate-motivated crimes refer frequently to the Judeocide committed by Nazi Germany. This places Germany, including its foreign policy, in a peculiar, albeit ambivalent, position when mass atrocities occur.

On the one hand, we might expect a particularly aggressive stance and a clear representation of mass violence as criminal, indeed genocidal. Several statements by German NGO workers cited above attest to

this sense of a pronounced German responsibility in cases of genocidal violence. The diplomats I interviewed similarly claimed a special sense of obligation. A respondent from the political division of the foreign ministry spoke about a general obligation deriving from the Holocaust. The interviewee from the foreign ministry's legal division spoke most emphatically to this German obligation, for the case of Darfur specifically and for international criminal law generally. He also argued that Germany's foreign policy practice is consistent with such rhetoric, citing as an example the fact that Germany is the second largest contributor to the ICC among the state parties to the Rome Statute. In line with this respondent's observations, comparative research finds not only that Germany uses a comparatively wide definition of genocide that includes episodes of ethnic cleansing (K. Smith 2010:22), but also that German courts pursued cases of Bosnian war crimes especially aggressively (135–36).

Specifically with regard to Darfur, Germany, a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council in 2002–2004, pushed early for the council to address the mass violence, even though France and the United Kingdom still hesitated (K. Smith 2010).<sup>4</sup> Government ministers used strong rhetoric, exceptional by European standards. In July 2004 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the minister for overseas development, called Darfur a “genocide in slow motion.” Christa Nickels, chair of the legislature's (*Bundestag's*) Human Rights Committee called the mass violence something that “equals genocide” and Peter Struck, Germany's minister of defense, argued in September 2004: “For me there is no doubt that we Germans also carry a responsibility for this continent [Africa]. We cannot simply look on when a part of the continent is experiencing genocide” (cited in K. Smith 2010:226). Similarly, opposition politicians such as Gerhart Baum of the libertarian Free Democratic Party, former UN special rapporteur for human rights in Sudan, referred to the massacres as genocide as early as April 2004, a position that enhanced the receptivity of German media to the Darfur theme, as we shall see in chapter 9.

On the other hand, complications inherent in the “cultural trauma of perpetrators” abound. As we have seen, German NGO respondents pointed to the strong representation of pacifists, especially in German sections of human rights organizations. They too base their pacifism on the memory of Nazi Germany, a position that confounds any consideration of military humanitarian intervention. Another NGO respondent spoke to the strong role that the churches still play in German society

and the engagement of many mainstream actors in religious humanitarian organizations. Their orientation too is fueled by the history of war and human suffering, yet their humanitarian mission conflicts with a human rights agenda and criminal justice responses to mass violence. This tension is in line with earlier observations from the humanitarian field (see chapters 4 and 5).

Throughout my research I encountered hesitations and complications, some of which are in fact associated with the cultural trauma of the perpetrator. One German Africa correspondent initially rejected the notion that his nationality affected his reporting about mass atrocities and genocide. He then reconsidered, confessing his reluctance to subsume the Holocaust and the violence in Darfur under the same category of genocide. Indeed, our newspaper analysis shows that German media apply the genocide label less frequently to the Darfur conflict than media in all other countries. While the difference is small for news reports (17% versus 19%), it is substantial in opinion pieces (24% versus 34%). The director of one of the major Holocaust memorial sites, a rabbi and son of an Auschwitz survivor, when asked why German memorial sites do not add an alert mission to their commemorative function, as the US Holocaust Memorial Museum does, answered (and I paraphrase): The Americans can do that. If we did this as Germans, we would be accused of relativizing the Holocaust. Journalists' apparent cognitive impediment to linking current mass atrocities to the Holocaust is thus supplemented by a normative hurdle expressed by the director of the Holocaust memorial site.

Finally, our analysis of German newspapers shows only rare uses of analogical bridging between the Holocaust and the Darfur violence. One German media piece in fact poses a bridging challenge. On May 10, 2005, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (p. 16) published a review of books by Romeo Dallaire and Robert Stockhammer, entitled *The Ranking of Atrocities*. Alex Rühle, the reviewer, refers to Stockhammer's quotation of works by respected historians: "Compared to the German death camps during the Holocaust, the daily killing rate in Rwanda was five times higher.' 'At that rate Hitler would have completed the Holocaust in less than nine months, not six years.' . . . The central paradox of such sentences, Stockhammer argues, is that 'here something is compared with that which is synonymous with the incomparable.'" In short, the trauma of perpetrators poses impediments against the use of the genocide label and against analogical bridging that interprets the violence in Darfur in the light of the Holocaust.

Cautionary notes from civil society are reflected in the diplomatic field, modifying the somewhat decisive rhetoric cited above. Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, of the Green Party, outspoken about the genocidal nature of violence in Kosovo just a few years earlier, was more guarded in the case of Darfur, which he referred to in September 2004 as "a humanitarian catastrophe with genocidal potential" (quoted in K. Smith 2010:225). Also Kerstin Müller, minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, used the terms "humanitarian crisis" and "ethnic expulsions" rather than *genocide*. Still, an interviewee in the Political Division of the Foreign Ministry referred to these two politicians as "rather fundamentalist" and strict observers of the "letter of the law." Social Democrat Walter Steinmeier, Fischer's successor as foreign minister, barely addressed the Darfur issue, partly because of his preoccupation with the situation in Afghanistan, according to an interviewee's assessment confirmed by K. Smith (2010:232).<sup>5</sup>

Caution at the leadership level of the Foreign Ministry is reflected in the words of the interviewee from the ministry's Political Division. He stressed that Germany's "general obligation" based on Holocaust history must not lead to "inflexibility" and "dogmatism." Yet his position seems marred by resignation. While generally advocating diplomatic means, this interviewee acknowledged challenges to diplomatic negotiations in the Darfur case, at least in the short run: "That, however, one can only do when the public dust of excitement has practically settled. Because this diplomatic solution necessitates negotiations with the criminal [*Verbrecher*], with the murderer—necessitates a, let's call it 'value free,' interest-guided approach to the problem, which one—when the images from CNN about the dead in the streets are still fresh—cannot do at all. That's impossible" (author's translation).

Further, hesitation about diplomatic engagement pales in comparison to the rejection of military options. Generally, not just in the Darfur case, the same interviewee rejected the notion of German military intervention, even when the risk of genocide looms or when genocide is already under way: "Germany does not have the foreign policy tools [*auswärtigen Machtmittel*] to intervene—like the Americans do—both militarily and with humanitarian means, . . . We can do logistics, at best, as a member, a useful member of international community operations, that is. But that Germany would take the lead [*eine Verantwortung führen würde*] and would be the 'driver' to prevent some genocide in some part of the world—no, no, that not, because we cannot do

that, because we do not even have the military means” (author’s translation).

In short, the German Foreign Ministry showed hesitation to intervene in the case of Darfur, and was most reluctant to do so by military means. But even diplomatic means are considered only with great caution. Finally, legal responses, as well, find mixed assessments in the German diplomatic field. In the words of my interviewee from the human rights department of the Legal Division, a strong proponent for ICC intervention:

As to my interlocutors in the *Auswärtige Amt* [Foreign Ministry], I think it is fair to say that there were constantly conflicting perceptions. And I do remember quite a number of quarrels I had with my colleagues in the political department. . . . And the reason is that we had two different approaches. Their approach was purely political. My approach was both political, but also legal and judicial. And that is extremely difficult to combine at times, because if you are only confined to making political assessments, then it is difficult to evaluate the work of a court, to accept a court, to accept any independent legal institution, and that is really something new in the international field, where people are trained to assess complex issues by political means only.

In conclusion, the German case shows how the cultural trauma of Holocaust perpetrators that afflicts German society and politics enhances at least rhetorical responses, in society and in the German diplomatic field, to cases of mass violence and genocide. But the cultural trauma also imposes constraints. The word *genocide* is applied with greater hesitation, and analogical bridging from the Shoah to contemporary mass atrocities is considered problematic.

I note, though, that the impediments appear more pronounced in deliberations about Darfur than in debates about other genocide cases and mass atrocities. In the Darfur case, the difference K. Smith finds between Germany’s typically more forceful rhetoric and the greater caution in the United Kingdom and France is substantially diminished. One potential explanation is the latter two countries’ colonial legacies in Sudan and Chad. In comparison to the United States, the responses of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany alike are substantially subdued. The much more ambivalent mobilization of civil society in Europe and the foreign policy sector’s lack of receptivity likely explain this difference. Then again, the diplomatic field is not homogenous. Actors in the Legal Division of Germany’s Foreign Ministry, especially

those trained as lawyers, strongly advocate for criminal justice interventions by the ICC—even if they simultaneously express commitment and voice caution regarding links between the Holocaust and Darfur. In the words of one interviewee:

I think it is justified to be very, very sensitive and very careful and very restrictive in making those comparisons. However, I mean, since we have that particular burden of history on our shoulders, I think it should be an incentive for us to inquire into cases of genocide. It does not always necessarily imply a comparison to the Holocaust. . . . Genocide is dramatic and horrible in itself. I think we have all reason to maintain that we as Germans have a particular responsibility to make sure that any holocaust [*sic*] or any genocide or any crime against humanity is not reproduced.

#### CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL CONTEXTS INTERSECTING WITH THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD, AND MODIFIED REPRESENTATIONS

Clearly, fields—or national divisions within fields—are affected by national contexts. Previous scholarship has found that human rights discourses, as well as legislation and implementation of laws, differ across countries even in light of global scripts (Boyle 2002). Halliday and Caruthers (2010) show that the adaptation of global scripts depends on a country's position in the international balance of power and on its cultural distance from the global center. This analysis of the diplomatic field shows, as did those of the justice and humanitarian fields, that structural and cultural variation within the world of Western countries also matters.

Several cultural and structural conditions affected the degree to which diplomats from different countries stuck to or deviated from the diplomatic master narrative. Strong mobilization of civil society in combination with a porous state contributes to dramatizing narratives even in the diplomatic field, as the case of the United States illustrates. Frequent and intense interaction with the Sudanese state, especially in the absence of strong civil society mobilization, results in a narrative that sticks closely to the diplomatic ideal type. Such interactions may be fostered by lobbying efforts on the part of Sudan, especially toward a country with long-standing ties with Sudan and the Arab world, as illustrated by the Austrian case. Close interactions may also stem from a country's special expertise, for example, in arbitration and the resulting involvement in diplomatic efforts. Such expertise in the case of

Switzerland is privileged by the country's neutrality status. Finally, special interactions can result from a country's dedication to humanitarian aid efforts, which may themselves be rooted in its collective memory of suffering, as the example of Ireland shows.

Also, a nation's status as a former colonial power matters. Specific regional expertise, the presence of expatriate groups, a sense of obligation—self-perceived or imposed by media and third countries—may contribute to intense diplomatic involvement, as was the case for the United Kingdom. Again, such involvement pushes the narrative on Darfur closer to the diplomatic ideal type. France, affiliated with its former colony Chad, also moved cautiously, but appeared more willing to deviate from the diplomatic master narrative than the United Kingdom.

Germany exemplifies the complex effects of the cultural trauma of the perpetrator of the Holocaust. German narratives display a clear sense of obligation in the face of mass violence. Yet the memory of the Shoah imposes constraints on use of the term *genocide* and the building of analogical bridges between the Holocaust and later mass atrocities. The German case also illustrates the variability of memorial normativity (Savelsberg 2016). Norms embedded in identical memories vary by carrier group. Whereas actors such as the foreign ministry interviewee from the human rights unit may find penal norms supported by the cultural trauma of the Shoah, religiously inspired groups may draw humanitarian lessons from the trauma of perpetrators that advance, much in line with findings in chapters 4 and 5, a cautious rhetoric about the offending country. The latter perspective seems to leave traces in foreign ministry press releases in which the humanitarian frame dominates.

Throughout, national carrier groups, their memories, and the normative implications of memories matter, from African Americans, Jews, and evangelical Christians in the United States to humanitarians in Ireland, foreign policy elites in France, and religion- and church-based middle classes in Germany. This finding suggests modifying Levy and Sznajder's (2010) argument about a shift from communicative memories, based on group-specific carriers, to cultural memories, reproduced through media and communicative institutions. National carriers still matter.

In short, the context of the diplomatic field produces a unique representation of Darfur, one that differs from and competes with representations generated in the humanitarian field and, especially, the justice field. Proponents of the "justice cascade" (Sikkink 2011) thus have to contend with the diplomatic field. At the same time, real narratives

deviate more or less from the ideal-typical diplomatic representation. The field of diplomacy intersects in complex patterns with diachronic experiences such as educational socialization and synchronic contexts such as organizational placement and national environment. Implications for communicating competing representations to the public sphere are at the center of the following chapters.