

## Conclusion

“Tax the Waqfs” (*ḍarība ‘alā al-awqāf*). This was one of the slogans spray-painted in Beirut’s city center during one of the largest uprisings—if not the largest—in the history of the Lebanese nation. On 17 October 2019, demonstrations erupted in Beirut, protestors burning tires and expressing anger at yet another tax imposed on the general population in an attempt to reduce the budget deficit. Such a tax fell in line with the general fiscal strategy of the government; it avoided measures that would target the rich and members of the political class or the widespread shady deals that divert state funds into private pockets. Within days, the uprising had reached over 1.2 million people of the 5 million estimated inhabitants and the majority of the Lebanese territory. The chants, signs, and graffiti have led commentators (e.g., Majed and Salman 2019) to term this a class uprising, or more specifically, an uprising against the neoliberal model that has led to one of the highest rates of inequality in the world, exacerbated by the government’s fiscal policies (Salti and Chaaban 2010; Salti 2015; Assouad 2018).

Shared struggles with poverty and precarity had brought together a notably fragmented society, and the protest in its early days was remarkable in its “color”: the red, white, and green of the Lebanese flag.<sup>1</sup> Absent were the yellows, oranges, blues, and greens of the various parties. A major discourse of the protestors in the first month of the demonstrations was that of the unified Lebanese, who are now beyond “sectarianism.” “You are sectarianism and we are coexistence” (*antum*

1. I say “early days” because around the third day, Hizbullah encouraged its supporters to withdraw from the protests.

*al-tā'ifiyya wa nahnu al-'aysh al-mushtarak*)<sup>2</sup> read one banner, while another described the uprising as a “revolution against sectarianism.” Protestors addressed politicians by telling them that the Lebanese have woken up and will not be dragged into the sectarian logic that divides them against their (class) interest and reproduces the wealth of political and religious leaders. This discourse portrays the Lebanese before the revolution as identifying first and foremost with their sect, since sect was the main axis for access to resources and jobs, especially with public offices and civil servant positions apportioned via sectarian proportional representation in the consociational political model.

Amidst these very broad unifying statements framed in two of the most widespread idioms of critique in Lebanon, inequality and sectarianism, it might be puzzling to see such a specific call to tax a little known institution like the waqf. Yet, I suggest that this call echoes these concerns of the protestors, illustrating also many of the arguments that this book has put forward. As a plea for taxation, the graffiti first denounces the inequality produced by the fiscal privileges afforded to waqfs. But as a demand to tax *religious* nonprofits or property, it also points to the support of religion by the state, and can be read as a critique of the breach of (or an invitation to reconsider) the secular principle of separation of religion and state. Finally, it unravels popular conceptions of waqf as imbricated with and perpetuating sectarianism. Let me elaborate.

“Tax the Waqfs” echoes the many calls to “Tax the Rich” in the worldwide revolts against rising inequality. The graffiti can appear as a critique of the neoliberal model that leaves the provision of education, poverty relief, and other social services to “civil society” and “nonprofits” and as a call for a welfare state that provides these services to its citizens. By revoking tax exemptions, which also indirectly subsidize many of the services these religious institutions provide (like schooling), the state would be filling its coffers and itself providing these necessities. In Lebanon, such a call might be surprising given the lack of trust in “the state,” the corruption accusations charged at the government, the scandals of ministers approving unnecessary or unsound projects for a cut of the profits, and the appointment of employees in state agencies as a way to reward supporters. Yet, combined with the revolutionary demand of changing the whole political class (*kellon ya 'ne kellon*), one can read the call as part of an agenda for a welfare state.

However, the graffiti does specify: “Tax the *Waqfs*,” and it was sprayed on both the al-Amin Mosque, the largest congregational mosque in the city, built in the 2000s during the reconstruction of the city center and the adjacent Maronite

2. The expression *coexistence* comes from the Lebanese Constitution’s preamble, which declares, “There is no legitimacy to any authority contradicting the charter of coexistence.” The question of coexistence forms a major trope of political discourse in Lebanon, especially after the end of the war of 1975–1990, when the new national pact that ended the war was termed “*mithāq al-'aysh al-mushtarak*” (the pact of coexistence).

cathedral, the Saint-George, dating back to the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup> It targets the waqfs as part of “religion.” But it also leaves it open whether the waqfs should be taxed as religious property (like other private property), whose owner (“the religious community” or sect) should pay taxes; or whether waqfs should be taxed as moral persons (like nonprofits) that are not considered to provide a public good worthy of exemption (because religion is a private good); or finally whether waqfs stand here as religious institutions, like the DGIW or the Maronite Church, which are autonomous from the state. Despite that ambiguity, in all these readings, religious property or the provision of religious space and service appear as private (individual or group) endeavors that should not be assisted by the state (through exemptions)—suggesting perhaps that tax exemptions stand in the way of a secular government because they constitute state support of religion.

Yet, as this book has argued, the very definition of waqf as the religious property of a religious community and its cordoning off as part of the personal-status law of each community is itself part of the secular configuration in Lebanon (the architecture of state, law, and religious community). It is a reminder that, contrary to the ideal of separation common in popular discourse, secular states constantly interfere in defining and regulating religion. This is further confirmed in the tax exemptions afforded to religious organizations in states taken as secular, like France and the United States. There, depending on the place of religion in the state, they are at times framed as exceptions to the secular principle or an extension of it. In France, for example, churches that are recognized by the state as private religious associations benefit from tax exemptions, can receive assistance from municipal governments to build houses of worship, and are allowed to use public space for worship (Bowen 2008, 19).<sup>4</sup> According to a 1987 law, gifts made to religious associations receive tax exemptions, as these associations provide “a general public service” (Asad 2006, 506). In the United States, religious organizations are often considered charitable foundations, profiting from the general presumption of public benefit that accrues to trusts for religious purposes.<sup>5</sup> In US tax

3. For excellent studies of the politics of the construction of the mosque and its relation to the church, see Rustom (2011); Mermier (2015); Vloeberghs (2016).

4. I use France as an example since it is an important referent for Lebanon because of the French Mandate. Not all religious associations are given legal recognition by the French state: Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, were not recognized for a long time because they do not conform to the (Catholic) model of what counts as religion for the French republic (“a liturgy, performed inside a familiar sacred place once a week, with teachings intended to guide private life”) (Bowen 2008, 18–20).

5. For religious trusts to count as charitable foundations that are tax-exempt, they have to benefit the public. Thus, famously, a trust that benefited cloistered nuns was not considered charitable by British courts, because the public could not benefit from their prayers by attending mass, and prayers were not considered to be a tangible benefit. On that example, see Lundwall (1994, 1359–60). However, generally, the presumption is that religious organizations benefit the public, unless flagged otherwise, although in certain places like Australia religious organizations now have the burden to prove that they benefit the public (see Harding 2008).

law, for example, rental income of religious institutions, which is mostly how waqf income is generated, is not taxable.<sup>6</sup> In addition, for policy-makers and lawyers who take separation at face value, exemption from taxation creates more entanglement as exemption only requires the state to define religion, whereas taxation would require a much more involved valuation.

But the graffiti, in criticizing exemption as state support for religion, is not only an exhortation for the state not to support religion, but is also a plea to tax *religious* property or organizations. In the realm of taxation and economy, the call for the privatization of religion does not appear as a demand of separation of religious and public funds, but rather of flows of funds from religious institutions to state coffers through taxation. In the graffiti, there seems to be less concern with separating religion and state, and even a call for state interference in religion.

Besides its call for circulation of funds from religion to state, “Tax the Waqfs” can also be read in another sense—as a critique of political consociationalism because state provision of services would decrease the reliance of citizens on the services provided by the religious-political elites of the consociational regime. Taxing the waqfs would cut into the financial power of the religious institutions in charge of these waqfs, the assumption here being that these religious institutions are imbricated with the political class.

However, as we saw earlier in the book and above, these fiscal privileges are not inherently the product of political consociationalism. They are carryovers from the Ottoman state’s nineteenth-century reforms, which created the Waqf Ministry and seized much of the income of many waqfs. At the time, the tax exemption of these waqfs was an effect of their transformation into public assets, especially as their incomes were captured by the Ministry of Finance and used for various state expenses. The French Mandatory power moved the Waqf Ministry to the margins of the state, transforming it into a public authority named the Directorate General of Islamic Waqf (DGIW), which had its financial independence but was attached to the Prime Minister. The tax exemptions were carried over from the Waqf Ministry to the DGIW. However, now the incomes of the waqfs did not go into state coffers but to the DGIW and, by extension, to the “Muslim community.” Other state apparatuses and other religious communities, which did not receive the same exemptions, challenged these tax exemptions under the civil state time and again. In the 1950s and 1960s, they argued that the financial independence of religious communities from the state makes these waqf directorates not part of the state, and they should thus not benefit from the exemptions that accrue to “public” entities. However, in the 1990s, the argument against these Ottoman carry-over

6. One can contrast the American model of secularism with the French model of secularism as to the role of religion in the public sphere. The French model does not consider religion a public good and requires keeping religion outside the public sphere. Any state funding or tax exemptions granted to religious institutions are construed as exceptions to the absolute neutrality of the state (Asad 2006, 504–8).

exemptions based on the privatization of religious communities was dropped. Instead, using arguments about equality and justice among religious communities, similar exemptions were extended to the waqfs of all religious communities. Therefore, it was again the secular principle of equality that served as the reason for these tax exemptions, with the assumption that these waqfs were deserving of exemptions because they served the public or because religion is a public good.

#### REMAKING THE WAQF IN LEBANON AND BEYOND

Despite the fact that the tax exemptions of the waqf are not a result of political con-sociationalism, the graffiti's targeting of waqfs and their tax exemption as a symptom of sectarian ills confirms an argument of this book: that the waqfs in Lebanon have followed the state's architecture of religion, state, and law; they have been, in many ways, "sectarianized." In public discourse (like the graffiti) and in institutional settings, waqfs are today associated with the various "sects" (*tā'ifas*) defined in the constitution.<sup>7</sup> As we saw in the example of the Sunni Muslim community, they have come to stand, as a whole, for the community's patrimony that helps fund education and ritual and reproduce the community. Waqfs today are not simply individual Muslims' endeavors that serve the founders' worldly interests and bring them rewards in their afterlife, as they had been in late Ottoman Beirut. Since the birth of the French Mandatory Lebanese republic, the Muslim community came to be characterized as one "community" among others that make up the national body politic and that are defined by the civil state. Muslims were no longer simply represented by the Ottoman state as part of the umma that represents true religion and could include all humanity. Defined in law collectively as the religious property of the Muslim (Sunni) "sect," waqfs reproduce Muslims as a community and serve its "religious" benefit, which is now separate from the national interest and could even be opposed to it.

To understand how novel this conceptualization of waqfs as the property of the community (*tā'ifa*) is, one should recall that medieval and early modern Muslim jurists considered a waqf whose revenues were dedicated to "Muslims"

7. As I noted in chapter 2, footnote 61, one might think that because Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire were recognized as religious communities (*millet*) that had jurisdiction over some of the affairs of their communities, their waqfs were already thought of as the waqfs of their communities. Such an assumption follows a common argument in both scholarship on and public discourse in Lebanon that takes the sectarian regime in Lebanon as a legacy of the Ottoman *millet* system. However, as Abillama (2018, 151) notes, sectarianism, which he suggests is the Lebanese form of secularism, rests on entirely different assumptions about the state: it is based on legal recognition rather than being a privilege bestowed by the ruler, and it is based on the assumed equality of all communities. We can see the difference between waqf practices of Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire and current ones when we realize that Ottoman religious minorities founded waqfs in the shari'a court as individual endeavors that were not necessarily managed by the archbishops but were left to families and each parish (see Mohasseb Saliba 2008).

invalid.<sup>8</sup> Jurists asserted that such a waqf would benefit the rich (along with the poor) in perpetuity,<sup>9</sup> and thus foreclosed the necessary perpetual charitable end of the waqf, in the form of benefiting the poor alone. While jurists did speak of the “Muslims’ waqfs,” these were the aggregate of individual endeavors, rather than of the Muslim community, the *umma*. Furthermore, because many of these waqfs were rented on the real-estate market, and it was their income that served to support charitable causes, the religious affiliation of the tenant was not the main criterion for selection but rather the price offered. Waqf properties whose rents supported a mosque (like al-‘Umari) were routinely leased to non-Muslim tenants. Finally, many waqfs served the poor at large, of Beirut for example, without consideration of religion.

This sectarianization, this book has also argued, was a facet of the “secularization” of the waqf, which entails a refiguration of religion. There is first a secularization in the sense of an immanent frame because the private property regime instituted by the French Mandate did not recognize God as an owner of the waqf, as was dominant in the late Ḥanafī tradition. When God ceased to be the owner, the “owner” of each individual parcel became the waqf itself, now endowed with a legal personality. No more simply an object in property relations, the waqf also acquired a life of its own and could become a subject, owning lands and buildings. This transformation opened the door to novel uses of the waqf, like the waqf as nonprofit.

The subjection of waqfs to a different legal and property regime also secularized the waqf in another sense: the project and the constant question of the structural differentiation of the sphere of religion from other spheres, especially the economy. With new distinctions between real law and personal law (each under the legal sovereignty of different bodies), between civil state and religious community, between persons and things, between private and public, waqfs posed a problem of categorization: were they religion or economy? On the one hand, French Mandatory officials considered waqfs like mosques and shrines, and the parcels and buildings and lands that supported them, as religion following religious law, and thus sacred and inalienable. These waqfs thus became “religious” property. On the other hand, waqfs that benefited families came to be considered neither truly charitable nor religious and thus belonging to the real economy. Laws and regulations aimed to “liberate” these waqfs and bring them back to private property.

8. While this book took as its subject the transformation of the waqfs established by Sunnis into the waqfs of the Muslim Sunni community, I surmise that a similar process happened to the other communities like the Shi‘a, Maronite, Orthodox, and Druze.

9. As we saw in chapter 4, a waqf that benefited the rich for a limited period of time before reverting to the poor or another perpetual charitable purpose was valid. The problem arises when the rich are a perpetual recipient, blocking the ultimate charitable recipients.

These transformations of the waqf, its sectarianization and its secularization, may appear particular to Lebanon. However, this book has suggested that many of these changes are intrinsic to the modern state and its conceptualization of economy and progress and the private property regime. Many of these transformations stem from modern conceptions of charity, property, and economy and the private/public distinction essential to the operation of modern states. Most Muslim-majority countries implemented similar reforms that secularized waqfs. Reflecting and reproducing new sensibilities (e.g., that charity should be altruistic) and newly operative distinctions between the religious and the economic, each subject to a different regime of governance, most nation-states in the Middle East and North Africa have limited family waqfs to two generations, allowed their revocation, or abolished them.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the categorization of certain waqfs as religious property has had similar effects, related to modern conceptions of religion as worship: when making waqfs, most founders across the Muslim world privilege mosques and, to a lesser degree, educational facilities, without waqfing rent-yielding assets to sustain these charitable institutions (see, for example, Ridwan and Santi 2018, 55, for Indonesia). Waqf as a form of financing charity seems to have receded as a practice, almost forgotten outside embodied practitioners and objects.

These common understandings of charity, religion, and economy exist under different architectures of state, law, and religion, affecting the relation of waqf to religious community. The “sectarianization” of waqf—that is, its association with a religious sect—is therefore not universal to the Muslim world writ large. Whether these nations are Muslim-majority nations with minority religious groups or whether they are “multi-religious,” the notion of the equality of all recognized religious communities guaranteed by the constitution is shared. In Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, where there was a clear Muslim majority that the state represented, Muslim waqfs became part of the public domain of the state, administered by a waqf ministry.<sup>11</sup> In places where they are unmarked, where the Waqf Ministry effectively means the Islamic Waqf Ministry, claims about the waqf imbricate the state more broadly, rather than a religious community and its leaders.

10. Turkey abolished them in 1927, Syria in 1949, Libya in 1973, and the UAE in 1980. Egypt limited them in 1946, then abolished them in 1952.

11. In Iraq, this situation prevailed until the 2003 US invasion and the change in regime, when the national (unmarked Muslim) Waqf Ministry became two separate offices, one for Shi'a waqfs and the other for Sunni waqfs. This is closer to the Lebanese situation, and indeed Hasan (2019) describes it as the confessionalization of waqf. In Turkey, waqfs were abolished in 1926 and many of their properties (especially schools) were transferred to the Ministry of Education or reverted to private property (through tenants buying out the right of alienation or through auctions). In Egypt, waqfs were nationalized and redistributed in 1952 as part of the agrarian reforms and land distribution to peasants.

RETHINKING CHARITY, PROPERTY, AND THE  
MODERN STATE THROUGH THE WAQF

Beyond the particularities of waqf transformations in Lebanon, this book has traced intricacies of the waqf to understand the deeper contours of our modern present. The transformation of the Ottoman property regime into a private property regime with its attendant secularization has had profound implications beyond political economy, proving once again the insight that political-economic change involves changes in subjectivity, kinship, and community. The new regimes of debt that replaced forgiveness with foreclosure and that tied debt to particular objects rendered the creation of waqf suspicious. "Are indebted founders trying to avoid foreclosure?" asked Ottoman officials. An emphasis on the sincerity of founders and suspicion towards people and their "real intent" started to occupy judges, officials, and individuals. As such, the intent of founders became newly open to scrutiny, rather than being derived from their actions. A new grammar of intent arose that separated intent from action and emphasized the inner self as the locus of the true self that was accessible in the here and now rather than only to God. Philosophers like Charles Taylor (1992) have explored the rise of inwardness in connection with processes of self-reflection and self-exploration, which, he suggests, secularized the inward turn to find God within the self as Augustine had done. This book has highlighted the development and reproduction of this subjectivity in the crucible of property relations and lawsuits, and its importance for the reproduction of this new property regime and its associated debt regime.

The quest for truly charitable waqfs was pursued around a new articulation of the private/public distinction that associated family with the private and economy with the public. Starting with the French Mandate, waqfs that were deemed truly charitable were those that served "public benefit." Waqfs that benefited family were then cast by officials and even some scholars as "really" aiming to perpetuate the wealth of families and immobilize capital, rather than allowing it to freely circulate in the market.

Yet, waqfs in the late Ottoman period embodied an understanding of charity that prioritized an ethics of care of the family and that was structured not along a private/private distinction but rather along a perpetual/nonperpetual distinction. Thus, in Ottoman Beirut, waqfs that are today classified as charitable (public) institutions, like mosques, benefited beneficiaries along family lines. Such an ethic of care of the family even in charity decenters contemporary understandings of charity that overlay it with the public (as reflected in tax legislation, in Lebanon but also in places such as the United States and France, which exempt charities that are of public benefit).<sup>12</sup> It also reminds us that the notion of "giving to family in the

12. In British legislation, for example, trusts for education where beneficiaries are determined through personal connection such as kinship or employment in a particular company are not considered charitable. See Atiyah (1958, 148).

public” as a form of nepotism arises from a particular configuration of the private and the public, which was produced and reproduced through the remaking of institutions and practices that followed different logics.

Late Ottoman waqfs, as a form of charity that provided both services and the financial tools to support them in perpetuity, invite us to rethink the assumption that charity, before the dominance of the call for sustainability and long-term poverty-alleviation efforts, was directed to immediate relief in the here and now and was subject to the whims and fortunes of donors. Institutions like waqfs, whose legal validity required perpetuity, provided revenues to sustain endeavors like schools, bridges, soup kitchens, hospices, hospitals, or poor relief. Yet, the horizon of such endeavors was not yet conscripted by notions of progress, and thus delinked sustainability from progress. Indeed, these projects did not seek to eliminate poverty. The poor were the paramount beneficiary of charity because they were assumed to always be there.

Such assumptions behind charitable giving, which do not seek to solve the problem of poverty but just to alleviate it, present in both contemporary charitable giving and waqf, grate very much against ideals of social justice and the fight against inequality and poverty. The critiques are numerous. These practices of giving appear insufficient, a “Band-Aid,” because they do not address the root problem of poverty nor do they attempt to eradicate it. Charity, by focusing on individual giving and relief, diverts from the structural causes of need and poverty, thus disabling forms of resistance to such structural inequality and reproducing poverty and need. The contemporary waqf revival can also appear to undermine the view that citizens have rights and entitlements from their governments and to render citizens in need (of food, shelter, income, education) dependent on the goodwill of others. This goodwill is based on the compassion of donors, an affect that mobilizes racialized and gendered tropes of those deserving of charity and compassion.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, charity has been increasingly used as a biopolitical technology for disciplining poor and homeless people, as donations are often tied to specific requirements from recipients.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the delegation of the provision of services to individual benefactors is based on these benefactors’ priorities and visions rather than on the needs and desires of communities, and they are not accountable when their actions have unintended effects that harm the communities they aim to help.<sup>15</sup>

However, there are important lessons from these approaches to charity which otherwise grate against dominant understandings of social justice as equalizing wealth. In the waqf practices examined here, social justice was not equated with

13. See Ticktin (2006, 43) for the differentiation of migrants that fit the model of victims needing to be saved.

14. See, for example, O’Neill (2013) on the disciplining of child recipients of Christian charity in Guatemala; and Murphy (2009) for the disciplining of homeless people in San Francisco.

15. See McGoe’s excellent study (2015) of these issues in the work of the Gates Foundation.

economic equality but rather with mutual rights and duties, the duty of the rich to the poor and the right of the poor to the wealth of the rich. Sustaining family relations and having parents' blessing (*riqā*) were more valuable than wealth, because without them there was no possibility of redemption in the hereafter. Furthermore, as Amira Mittermaier incisively puts it in the context of contemporary Egypt, "Placing God in the foreground, and the suffering Other in the background, disrupts both the liberal conceit of compassion *and* the neoliberal imperative of self-help" (2019, 4). Such forms of charity refuse to locate justice in the future, in the linear time of development and social justice, and thus work for justice right now—even if the givers were not working towards better presents and futures but rather just for the sake of God and reward in the afterlife.

Many of these transformations of waqf conceptions and practices, I have intimated, arise with the consolidation of the modern state. Yet, the story I have told is not simply a story of a shift from the premodern to the modern, because—as the structure of the chapters, always articulated around different moments, suggests—the modern state is a project that takes different forms under different conditions. Although there are certainly particularities to that state, like the fact that it takes the progress of the newly created object, "the nation's economy," as its target, the way this project is implemented differs considerably at various conjunctures, articulations, and re-articulations of state-society relations. We saw the common threads of this project in the transmission of knowledge across various contexts, as with French colonial knowledge about the waqf and its management developed in French North Africa and with debates on the family waqf in Egypt. I also highlighted them above in the widespread transformation of waqfs into "religious" holdings and the delegitimization of family waqfs. Yet, even these transformations are ongoing rather than accomplished once and for all.

These transformations are also continuous because other lifeworlds, traditions, and grammars continue to exist in practitioners and objects, in memories and legal texts. Some of these remnants are fragments: it is not that a practitioner or a building is simply a reflection of an older grammar. There are usually different and contradictory layers. The same man who remembered the importance of waqf was calling for its agility. The same woman who criticized the transforming of all waqfs into "religion" was questioning the intent of new waqf founders and calling for greater scrutiny of them. The same waqf buildings that provided revenues and reflected the economic function of the waqf were also being outfitted with "properly" religious functions. The same Islamic legal texts dismissed in legal reforms were being used by scholars and the public to question the legal expropriation of waqfs.

The changes I trace in the grammar of concepts as well as the continuities in the older grammar became visible through the methodological trinity of archive/library/notebook. Indeed, without my encounter with waqf in the archive and the library, I would not have realized the novelty of many of the waqf practices in

Beirut today. These encounters helped me to historicize and depict the changes in understandings and practices of Islamic waqf over the last two hundred years. Through the library and the archive, I unearthed different ways of doing waqf, showing that the “sectarianization” of waqf was the product of historical conjunctures and opening space for re-appropriating this archive. Waqfs are part of our modern world and they have been partly remade in its image. This historicization of contemporary waqf also avoids presenting contemporary Islamic waqf practices as an essential “other” to Western practices of charity. At the same time, the notebook, by documenting the dynamism of the contemporary waqf practices and the lingering of older sensibilities, forecloses the temptation to see that earlier moment as the “true” waqf practice. Thus, this methodological trinity averts constructing contemporary waqf as outside time and place and highlights the contingency of every one of its iterations.

Indeed, a revival of waqf practices under a modern state and global capitalism is not simply a revival of older practices. It is a re-figuration of the tradition under these new conditions, conditions not conducive to older ways of doing and being, of supporting family as charity, of trusting in and leaving intent to God. And it is a revival that occurs under a legal regime very much designed to end many of these earlier waqf practices. This revival has produced new ways of doing Islamic waqfs, aligned with the modern public and private dichotomy and with the distinctions between religion and economy: waqf-NGOs, a plenitude of Islamic centers and mosques. Yet, as the unearthed continuities of older logics demonstrate, it is not simply a submission of this tradition to these new logics. Nevertheless, it is a revival that showcases the constant acts of interpreting and reinterpreting the tradition that keep it alive.