Palimpsests of Themselves is an intervention in current discussions about the fate of philosophy in postclassical Islamic intellectual history. Asad Q. Ahmed uses as a case study the most advanced logic textbook of Muslim South Asia, *The Ladder of the Sciences*, presenting in English its first full translation and extended commentary. He offers detailed assessments of the technical contributions of the work, explores the social and institutional settings of the vast commentarial response it elicited, and develops a theory of the philosophical commentary that is internal to the tradition. These approaches to the commentarial text complicate presuppositions upon which questions of Islam's intellectual decline are erected. As such, Ahmed offers a unique and powerful opportunity to understand the transmission of knowledge across the Islamic world.

“This is a transformative work of historical scholarship. With empathy and rigor, Asad Ahmed succeeds brilliantly in recreating the intricate logical theories and exegetical practices of South Asian Muslim logicians and commentators, who up to now have been entirely neglected in Islamic studies and in the history of philosophy.”

ROBERT WISNOVSKY, J. McGill Professor of Islamic Philosophy, McGill University

“A stunning piece of work. The historical detective work on the commentaries and their interconnections is truly extraordinary, as is the marriage of philological and philosophical skills that went into the translation and commentary.”

PETER ADAMSON, Professor of Philosophy, LMU Munich

“Both the amount of hitherto unstudied material excavated by Ahmed, and the care and sophistication with which he handles it, are remarkable and put scholarship on Indo-Muslim philosophy and logic on an entirely new footing.”

KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB, J. R. Jewett Professor of Arabic and of Islamic Intellectual History, Harvard University

ASAD Q. AHMED is Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

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4. *Avicenna’s Theory of Science: Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology*, by Riccardo Strobino

5. *Palimpsests of Themselves: Logic and Commentary in Postclassical Muslim South Asia*, by Asad Q. Ahmed
Palimpsests of Themselves
For Marjaan

تاروں کی فضا سے تکاں
تو بھی مقام آرزو ہے

—Muḥammad Iqbāl, Bāl-e Jibrīl
رب اشرح لي صدرني ويسير لي أمري وافحل عقدة من لسانى يفهمو قولي

Qur’ān, 20:25–28

"نبيان غيرْت كيا شرح آزر كرت "
وو نئوت آزامر من لحسو كرت

—Muṣṭafā Zaydi, “Zabān-e Ghayr”
adapted from Ḥaydar ‘Alī Ātish, “Yeh ārzū thi”
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 1

An Outline of the Project 1

A Brief Historical Introduction 4

PART I. A STUDY OF THE LADDER AND ITS COMMENTARIAL TRADITION

1. The Ladder of the Sciences and Its Commentaries 11

Muḥibballāh al-Bihārī 12

The Earliest Layer of First-Order Commentaries 13

Summary of Findings 20

First-Order Commentaries: Stage Two 22

Summary of Findings 24

Second-Order Commentaries 24

Ḥamdallāh 24

Qāḍī Mubārak 34

Summary of Findings 37

Mullā Ḥasan 38

Summary of Findings 41

Other First-Order Commentaries on the Sullam 43

Summary of Findings 45

Conclusions 45
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. The Ladder of the Sciences: Contents and Orientations</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Structure of the Sullam</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialectics</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Texts</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentarial Effort and Reception: An Example</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ladder’s Orientations</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II. A THEORY OF COMMENTARIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Anatomy of the Commentary: An Internal View</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Orally Inhabited Textuality: The Unity of Commentarial Voices</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition and Partisanship in Dialectical Verification</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Anatomy of the Commentary: A View from Above</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing the Tradition: Self-Reflections in the Commentarial Prolegomena</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Technical Conundrum: Curating Textual Orality via Hints</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing and Excavation: Authorship, Authority, and Originality</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Reflections: Dynamism</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART III. TRANSLATION AND STUDY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A Translation and Study of the Sullam</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ladder of the Sciences: Translation and Study</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proem</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Knowledge</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conception and Assent</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Purpose of Logic</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Inquiries</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Conceptualizations</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Absolutely Unknown</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signification and Semantics</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Simple and Compound Utterances</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Particulars and Universals</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Forms of Utterances</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal and Metaphorical Speech</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Synonyms
Statements and Propositions
Liar Paradox
Other Compound Utterances
On Universals and Particulars
  Section
On Contradictories of Universals
The Five Universals: Essential and Accidental
On the Nature of the Five Universals
On Logical, Natural, and Mental Universals
On Definitions
  Section
On Assents
  On Judgments: To What Do They Pertain?
  Parts of a Proposition
  Types of Propositions
  Conditional Propositions
  On the Subject Term
    Section
  On Quantification and Subject Terms
  On Predication
  On Divested Propositions
  On Modals
  On Conditionals
    Section
  On Contradiction
    Section
  On Conversion
    Section
  On Contradictory Conversion
    Section
Sylllogisms: Definitions
  Section
Types and Parts of Sylllogisms
Conditions of Sylllogisms
Modal Sylllogisms
Conditional Sylllogisms
Exceptive Sylllogisms
My reflections on the subject of this book began with the publication of Rob Wisnovsky's seminal article, “Nature and Scope,” and Jon McGinnis was the first colleague to hear some of my inchoate ideas. I am deeply grateful to both of them for helping me initiate this journey. Systematic work on this book began in 2009 in India, where I was able to study and collect copies of important manuscripts and lithographs over the course of several months. This effort was greatly facilitated by Mawlana Abu al-Hasan Farangi Mahalli, Mawlana Jamil Ahmad, and Mawlana Saeed Ahmad in Rampur, Patna, Lucknow, Tonk, Hyderabad, New Delhi, Kolkata, Aligarh, and Badaun. Similar manuscript and archival work in Karachi and Lahore benefited from the support of Hakim Mahmud Ahmad Barakati, Sabiha Qadri, and S. Nomanul Haq.

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Asma was the first with whom I shared my initial impressions of the commentarial machine. She was my partner in this book’s journey; she listened, advised, and loved. Through her brilliant work, she taught me how to think in other ways.
Sayyida Marjaan Naz-Sadia Al-Qadri was sent as a gift to adorn my life just as I began work on this book. For so many years, she would observe me hunched over the inscrutable, and would ask me regularly when the task would be completed. I have not heard that question for quite some time now, and I wonder if, along the way, she lost hope in my promises. I have completed it for you, my dearest Marjaan, and I dedicate it to you! jō mujh sē na hō sakā woh tū kar!
Introduction

AN outline of the project

This book is a study of the *Sullam al-ʿulūm* (*The Ladder of the Sciences*) of Muḥibballāh al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707), long considered to be the most advanced logic textbook in the Indian1 Nizāmī curriculum.2 It also engages the vast commentarial tradition that its composition elicited and offers a theory of commentaries. The culminating South Asian articulation of discourses on logic issuing after the close of the classical period (ca. 200/800–600/1200), the *Sullam* is uniquely positioned to give scholars of Arabic logic a vantage point from which to reflect on the postclassical (ca. 600/1200–1300/1900) career of the discipline: as we will witness below, it was the South Asian heir to a continuous tradition that passed sequentially from Avicenna to Marāgha to Shīrāz to North India. The *Sullam* also allows one to reflect on the development of logic in the local Indian environment: its commentarial tradition was either internally self-referential or it reverted to the prehistory of the hypotext; contemporary developments outside the Subcontinent are practically never cited by the *Sullam’s* hypertexts. In other words, although the *Sullam* was the product of a protracted transregional affair, its commentarial tradition was locally responsive.

This project was initiated more than a decade ago. In the intervening years, elements of its objectives were reformulated in response to the rapid growth of our knowledge about postclassical Islamic intellectual history; the work, therefore, was rewritten in various incarnations to accommodate such transformations. At the moment of its inception, the field was just beginning to test the longstanding conviction that, during the postclassical period, the rationalist disciplines in Islam succumbed decisively to the onslaught of the traditionalists and literalists, to the juristic obsessions of the madrasa, the repetitions of droning commentaries, the nondiscursive epistemologies of the Sufis, and so much else. By now, such
notions have been falsified so frequently that neither the hackneyed narrative nor a report on its demise requires a restatement. Yet, although we have been disabused of old assumptions and have realized that our paths were misleading, the vast postclassical territory remains largely unknown. In this regard, then, I believe my proposal from a decade ago is still valid: the new narrative of postclassical rationalist disciplines in Islam must be written with an eye to three matters—the technical details of texts; theories of textual traditions, extracted from, not grafted on, the texts; and the contextual frameworks for the production of the texts. These three angles of research allowed the project to retain its identity despite the various shapes it donned; and they are reflected in its three parts.

Part I has two chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the *Sullam* and its author; it then charts in detail the development of commentarial writing from its initial bursts through the contemporary period. The investigation lays out how the dense networks of scholars and locations facilitated the commentarial endeavor over the course of three hundred years. It also demonstrates how the practice of commentary was deeply entrenched in pedagogical systems and institutions and how its fortunes were determined by possibilities of patronage. The chapter is divided into several parts that correspond to communities, clusters, and periods of composition, and it is interlaced with summary conclusions on the basis of a mass of historical and prosopographical details.

Chapter 2 is devoted to a general study of the structure, contents, and orientations of the *Sullam*. It briefly compares the structure of the *Sullam* to earlier logic texts, explores the content, composition, and nature of its lemmata on the basis of representative cases, offers examples of the reception of its problemata in the commentarial space, and reflects on its general thrust. The details presented in this chapter also begin to offer a theoretical glimpse into the workings of the commentarial tradition as a genre of scholarly production. In its last section, the chapter also includes an extended analysis of the key concepts of *nafs al-amr* and *iʿtibār* as they appear in the commentarial tradition of the *Sullam*. These concepts were instrumental in tackling puzzles of propositional semantics.

Part II also comprises two chapters, both of which are concerned with developing a theory of commentaries. Chapter 3 investigates commentarial practices on the basis of archives from perhaps the last rationalist public debate in India. It allows us to witness how the live dialectical session oscillated between the oral and the textual, how authorial agency was diachronically sustained, how scholarly networks perpetuated topics of debate, how the master, as hypotext, compelled the student to speak/write as hypertext, how independent verification was traditionalist, and how the past and future of commentarial traditions stood in a recursive relationship.

These ideas are confirmed and extended in chapter 4 by appeal to certain lemmata of the *Sullam* and its commentaries. A key idea developed in this chapter is that the hypotext—whether the *matn* or the *sharḥ*—was deliberately elusive and
allusive, and that it called to its future hypertexts to actualize it. This it accomplished by way of a curated economy of implicit and explicit hints. The hypotext was thus the inner word of a broader discourse that was diachronically rendered visible by the hypertext. The commentary’s prime mode of being, therefore, was to be written, not to be read. Each text within the commentarial cycle occupied a liminal space, an actualization of its hypotexts—as their hypertext—and a guidance for its own writing out in its future hypertexts. As such, the practice of commenting was grounded in an authority vested in the past and a real authorial agency in the present. Therefore, it is properly analyzed neither in terms of traditional theories of intertextuality nor in those of the anxieties of influence.

Part III, chapter 5, is a translation of the Sullam, along with a detailed study. The purpose of this chapter is to explain and analyze the lemmata of the Sullam on the basis of its own commentarial tradition. It does not aim to historicize the claims and contributions of the Sullam in relation to the texts that preceded it. In other words, the study gazes in the direction of the Sullam’s reception, and, unless guided by the commentaries themselves, it does not track the influences that led to its formation. Such comparative approaches should be facilitated for historians of Arabic logic now that the initial task of understanding the text itself has been attempted.

A final methodological note about chapters 2 to 4 is in order. In developing an understanding of commentarial writing and functions over the years, I have remained committed to the idea that theories are specific to the sample and are not universal. Insofar as they are localized disruptions, they reveal the shaky grounds on which our generalizing tendencies are erected. By the same token, it has been my position that theories comprise propositions that lay bare the assumptions undergirding our broad and confident historical and critical judgments about the local. For the purposes of this book, therefore, I have taken it to be the prerogative of theory to investigate the very concepts of commentaries, authorship, originality, textuality, tradition, and so on—as delivered by the sample—before questions about the sources and reception or about dynamism and stagnancy can even be meaningfully posed.

I have also been keenly cognizant of the fact that most available and relevant theoretical frameworks are Eurocentric and that they reflect an interconnected intellectual history of European letters; their application to other textual traditions has often forced the inflection of the latter in artificial manners and, at times, has even been the source of textual violence. Given this position, I have been consistent and uncompromising in the methodology of first extracting theories of commentaries from the raw material of the texts I engaged. Such theories, therefore, are internal to the textual traditions in question. It is only in the late and mature phases of the investigation that I put my own developed theories in conversation with the existing theoretical material; for this reason, my engagement with the latter is largely embedded in the footnotes and it generally does not pervade
the main body of this book. However, as I found this approach to be beneficial
to the exercise, I do invite the reader to turn to these footnotes for theoretical com-
parison, reflection, refinement, and deconstruction.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

The study of Arabic logic has witnessed considerable growth in the past two
decades. The course of development has also been suitable, in that the earliest
investigations committed themselves to detailed technical studies, ultimately pav-
ing the way for broader narratives. Equally appropriate has been the initial focus on
the classical period (ca. 200/800–600/1200), followed by the more recent invest-
ment in the postclassical period (ca. 600/1200–1300/1900). These studies and nar-
ratives are easily accessible to readers, so I will not consider them in detail here.
Rather, the purpose of the remaining pages of this introduction is to write just
enough to situate the Sullam in its proper environment and to orient the reader.

The origins of the sustained study of logic in the Arabic tradition are dated
to the monumental translation activity that was ushered in by the ‘Abbāsids
(r. 132/750–656/1258). In the earliest phases, Arabic scholarship in the discipline
was mediated by Syriac works or by the second layer of Pahlavi. However, rather
swiftly—by the second half of the second/eighth century—direct attention to Aris-
totelian texts had overtaken this earlier trend. During the next century, the pace of
translation activity quickened, so that already before the end of that century’s first
half, the entire Organon of Aristotle was available in Arabic. The body of this work
was also studied carefully, so that epitomes and overviews were also produced
during this period. This activity intensified further in the second half of the third/
ninth in the circle of Ḥunayn b. Ishāq (d. 260/873) and his son, Ishāq b. Ḥunayn
(d. 289/910 or 911), where a number of translations were produced, often via the
mediatory of Syriac. The works of these scholars, however, were not Aristote-
lian; indeed their proclivity toward Galen was more pronounced.

Aristotelian logic, which became the main point of reference for the classi-
cal tradition of Arabic logic, was the heritage of the fourth/tenth century. This
was understood as a continuation of the commentarial practices of late antiquity,
revived after a historical hiatus, by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), whose main
effort was to harmonize Aristotelian doctrine against its own internal contradic-
tions. It was his work, mostly in the form of commentaries on the Aristotelian
logical corpus, in relation to which Arabic logic developed in the century after his
death. And this development—a critical reaction to Fārābīan Aristotelianism—
was accomplished by Avicenna (d. 428/1037) as the logic of the East. In the ensu-
ing centuries, Aristotelianism continued to flourish in North Africa and Iberia,
while elsewhere the progress of logic in the Arabic tradition became mostly a
response to Avicenna’s contributions and new syntheses that were not bound by
the task of producing harmony in the Aristotelian logical corpus. It was this latter
tradition—not the North African and Iberian one—that exercised influence through most of the Islamic world, including India.

Thus Avicenna came to loom large in the tradition of Arabic logic, almost entirely replacing Aristotle as a point of contact. But the reception was not passive—just as Avicennan logic was not the logic of Aristotle or even Fārābīan Aristotelianism, so logic after Avicenna was not Avicenna’s, but Avicennian. Its growth can be attributed to the dialectic with Avicenna’s positions, using Avicenna’s methods—not Aristotle’s—but its doctrine was not imitative or repetitive. Thus the immediately following period was one of reactions and reevaluations, especially to the areas where Avicenna had introduced innovations—to his modal logic, the propositional semantics under the descriptive reading of subject terms, and hypothetical syllogisms.

In the sixth/twelfth century, the most penetrating and independent analyses of Avicenna’s logic were offered by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209); after him, the most damaging disruptions to both Avicenna’s and al-Rāzī’s contributions came from the pen of Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 646/1248). It was the complex set of reactions to the works of both these scholars that culminated in the production of some of the most important logic books of the seventh/thirteenth century. A number of these were written by scholars who belonged to the same scholarly network: Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. between 660/1263 and 663/1265) (Īsāghūjī), Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276) (Shamsiyya), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) (Commentary on the Ishārāt of Avicenna), and Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283) (Maṭāliʿ al-anwār). Subsequently, it was in the institution of the madrasa—though not exclusively so—that their books were read and where most of the commentarial activity on them was sustained; in many cases, such focus on logic in the madrasa was informal, though substantial. Increasingly, the direct contact with Avicenna also dissipated owing to the proliferation of the complex commentarial traditions on these madrasa texts and the disputation culture encouraged in that setting. In the next phase, these texts themselves came to be read via gateway commentaries: for example, the Shamisiyya, the Maṭāliʿ, and al-Ṭūsī’s commentary on the Ishārāt were all studied along with the commentary and arbitration of the eighth/fourteenth century scholar, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365).

In the next phase of development in the eighth/fourteenth century, these textbooks-commentaries and the sustained tradition of dialectic around them resulted in the production of further textbooks and commentaries on logic. Prime among these were written by scholars who ultimately belonged in the aforementioned network—Sa’d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390) (Tahdhīb al-manṭiq) and al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) (Kubrā, Ṣughrā)—and whose influence was initially concentrated in Samarqand and Shirāz. And it is directly out of the ninth/fifteenth-century scholarship from the latter city that the tradition of logic in India ultimately sprang.
In India, the study of logic appears to have progressed in three phases. Until the ninth/fifteenth century, al-Tahtānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya was the most widely read text in the region. In the following stage, scholars descending from the line of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502–3) and Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 949/1542) popularized the study of the former’s commentary on the Tahdhīb; the latter text was also studied via the lens provided by the commentary by ʿAbdallāh al-Yazdī (d. 982/1574, 989/1581, 1015/1606, or 1050/1640—all dates have been recorded in the sources), who also belonged in the intellectual lineage of al-Dawānī. At around the same time, the Maṭāliʿ and its commentary by al-Tahtānī also began to be read in India. Thus, in the tenth/sixteenth century, the commentaries on the Shamsiyya, Maṭāliʿ, and Tahdhīb constituted the core of logical training in India. In the next phase, the eleventh-/seventeenth-century commentaries and glosses by a number of contemporary scholars, ultimately tracing their lineage back to Shirāz, began to have an impact. Among these, the commentaries written by Mīr Zāhid al-Harawī (d. 1101/1689) (commentary on the Risāla fī ʾt-taṣawwur wa-t-taṣdiq of al-Tahtānī and partial gloss on al-Jurjānī on parts of the umūr ʾāmma of the Mawāqif of al-Jījī) and by ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm al-Siyālkuṭī (d. 1067/1656 or 1657) (glosses on the Shamsiyya and Maṭāliʿ ) were quite significant. Strictly speaking, some of these texts were not in the discipline of logic, but the discussions they contained were relevant for resolving its aporiae. These were the texts and contexts in relation to which the composition, nature, and orientations of the Sullam must be understood. Its own pervasiveness in the subsequent period owed not a little to the rise of the so-called Niẓāmī curriculum of Farangī Maḥall, which prescribed a heavy dose of logic in the training of the scholar.

From the time of the Avicennian synthesis of the fifth/eleventh century to the appearance of the Sullam in the eleventh/seventeenth, the contents and foci of logic works had undergone considerable transformations. The logic textbooks of the seventh/thirteenth century, for example, devoted little space to several parts of the Organon, such as the Categories, Posterior Analytics, Rhetoric, Topics, Dialectics, and Poetics. As noted above, these textbooks concentrated more on certain specific innovations in Avicenna, such as modals and hypothetical syllogisms. Indeed, part of the motivation for this turn may well have come ultimately from the level of attention some of these topics received in Avicenna’s shorter works, such as the Najāt and the Ishārāt. For the authors of these textbooks that shaped the subsequent tradition, the purpose of logic was to arrive from known conceptions and assents to unknown conceptions and assents, generally leaving aside matters that pertained to metaphysics, utterances, and metalogical theory. Although these topics were generally relegated to just a few lines and pages within the textbooks, they did thrive independently in other Muslim disciplines, such as ādāb al-baḥth (methods of debate), ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān (the science of rhetoric, including semantics and elucidation), and uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory), where they emerged in the postclassical period in hybrid forms. For example, methods of debate involved
elements from the discipline of logic proper, legal theory, and from protojuristic and theological argumentation, and semantic and rhetoric absorbed both relevant parts of the *Organon* and the continuous tradition of poetic criticism. In many ways, the disciplines noted above could only have emerged as they did in the post-classical phase, when training in the madrasa facilitated such cross-pollination. 

Further innovations in the defining seventh-/thirteenth-century textbooks are also noteworthy: necessity and perpetuity propositions were distinguished from each other, so as to yield an extended system and nomenclature of modalities; general rules for the productivity of syllogisms were highlighted; implication rules among modalities of various strengths were articulated; rules of contradictory conversion were challenged; the fourth figure of the syllogism was accepted; and because the subject terms of propositions must pick out their substrates actually, various conversion rules, and in turn, certain modally mixed syllogisms were reassessed. These topics were all related to propositional semantics and syllogistics.

This trend began to change, starting with the aforementioned commentaries of the eighth/fourteenth century. One begins to observe, for example, that a number of these works paid greater attention to theological elements, semiotics, and semantics than their base texts. In many cases, these discussions were tied to more specific issues of logic and often served to bring attention to particular philosophical and logical points that interested the commentator. Further, although the commentaries did engage those aforementioned elements of Avicennian innovation that had elicited focused responses from the seventh-/thirteenth-century logic textbooks, their emphasis began to shift to other topics. Generally, the commentaries were more invested in the conception-assent division, the nature of knowledge, the circularity of proofs, the ontological status of universals, the semantics of the subject terms of propositions, and the nature of predication. Conversion and contradiction rules and the productivity and sterility of syllogisms were more briefly discussed and were often reduced to handy rules. Beyond the commentaries on the textbooks, specific issues and difficulties posed by the neglected parts were sometimes discussed in briefer treatises: one occasionally finds, for example, such shorter works devoted to modal propositions, syllogisms, and the fourth figure from no later than the late tenth/sixteenth century.

The aforementioned commentarial trends crystallized rather quickly, as can be evinced in the superglosses of al-Jurjānī on the *Shamsiyya* and *Maṭāliʿ*. The same is true for the partial later commentary by al-Dawānī on the *Tahdhīb* that was subjected to supercommentarial attention: normally, supercommentaries on this work in India, for example, did not proceed beyond the section on the five universals. Given the importance of these commentaries as gateways to their hypotexts, their subsequent commentarial traditions also generally restricted themselves to the topics that had attracted their attention.

Such developments, however, only point to shifting emphases within a living dialectical tradition; they did not dictate exclusivity. In India, for example,
al-Jurjānī’s commentaries on al-Tahtānī on the *Shamsiyya* and *Maṭāli* did not impose restrictions that could not be breached. In both cases, the Indian scholars also studied the entirety of al-Tahtānī directly. Al-Tahtānī on the *Shamsiyya* continues to be part of the curriculum in various madāris in contemporary South Asia, and commentaries on the entirety of the text, along with complete Urdu translations, have been published throughout the fourteenth/twentieth century. Similarly, although the commentary by al-Dawānī, along with its supercommentary by al-Harawī, on the *Tahdhib* was a rather important text in the Indian curriculum, it also included the complete commentary by ʿAbdallāh al-Yazdi. It is such complexities that explain the structure and the proportionality in the treatment of various subjects in the *Sullam* and the variations in its commentarial tradition. These matters will be discussed briefly in chapter 2 below.
PART I

A Study of the *Ladder* and Its Commentarial Tradition
The Ladder of the Sciences  
and Its Commentaries

This chapter introduces the Sullam al-ʿulūm and its commentarial tradition. In this context, commentary is understood as any hypertext, regardless of the extent of its completeness and of its designation as a sharḥ, ḥāshiya, taʿlīq, or majmūʿa.1 Commentaries on the Sullam were written almost entirely in Arabic until the first quarter of the twentieth century, when a number of Urdu commentaries also began to be published. Commentaries in Persian were limited to anonymous interlinear lexicographical interventions, but I do not take them into account in this investigation.

A product of the second half of the eleventh/seventeenth century (before 1109/1698), the Sullam al-ʿulūm received greater commentarial attention on the Indian soil than any other complete logic textbook.2 In the course of about two hundred years, for example, it garnered more than one hundred Indian commentaries and supercommentaries;3 and it also secured the position as the most advanced logic textbook taught in the celebrated Nizāmī curriculum. By virtue of certain disciplinary concerns and orientations of the Sullam, its commentarial tradition interacted seamlessly with other disciplines, such as legal theory, theology, and rhetoric, and it also inspired a number of independent treatises devoted to specific topics, such as the Liar Paradox (al-jidhr al-aṣamm), copular existence (al-wujūd al-rābiṭī), the paradox of the absolutely unknown (al-majhūl al-muflaq), the nature of knowledge (ʿilm), simple and compound generation (jaʾl basīṭ/murakkab), and the paradox of entailment (shubhat al-istilzām).4 All these issues had been discussed in earlier literature, but they were often mediated through the Sullam commentarial tradition in Muslim India.

The five sections of this chapter present a historical account of the development of the Sullam tradition. The primary aim here is to bring to light the details of the intellectual networks that were the sites of its production, so that one may understand how commentarial writing was determined by scholarly contacts and extratextual contexts. In the first section, I present an intellectual biography of the
author of the *Sullam*; in the second and third sections, I reconstruct the two phases of commentarial work on it. I then turn my attention, in the fourth section, to the second-order commentaries on three first-order commentaries that had quickly emerged as windows into the *Sullam*’s lemmata. Finally, in the fifth section, I discuss the remaining first-order commentaries written up to the contemporary period.

As the reader will observe below, commentarial production was intimately tied to certain scholarly networks, institutions of learning, geographical locations, systems of patronage, linguistic communities, and the fortunes of print culture. These factors explain the patterns of activity that will emerge below.

MUḤIBBALLĀH AL-BIHĀRĪ

The author of the *Sullam*, Muḥibballāh b. ʿAbd Shukūr al-Bihārī, was born and raised in Karā, a town among the dependencies of Muḥīb b. ʿAli Pūr in Bihar, India. He was a Ḥanafī jurist, who began to gain fame for his legal scholarship in the reign of Awrangzīb (r. 1069/1659–1119/1707). Under the latter’s patronage, al-Bihārī served as the qāḍī of Lucknow and Hyderabad; later, he was also appointed as a private tutor for the emperor’s grandson Rafī’ al-Qadr (d. 1124/1712). Toward the end of his life, al-Bihārī was appointed by Shāh ʿĀlam (r. 1118/1707–1123/1712) to the central ministry and given the title Fāḍil Khān.

Little more has been communicated in the sources about his life. We know that he was a student of Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692), the fountainhead of the Farangī Maḥalli tradition of scholars, and of his student Quṭb al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shamsābādī (d. 1121/1709). Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī was a student of Shaykh Dāniyāl al-Chawrasī and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī al-Lakhnwī (d. 1077/1666). And both these latter two were students of ʿAbd al-Ṣalām al-Dīwī (d. 1040/1630). This latter was also the teacher of ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm al-Siyālkūtī (d. 1067/1656 or 7). In other words, the teachers of al-Sihālawī counted al-Siyālkūtī, who is embedded in certain discussions of the *Sullam*, as their peer. Further, the lineage of al-Sihālawī ran via his teachers to the Dashtakī circle of scholars in ninth-/fifteenth- and tenth-/sixteenth-century Shīrāz. Both Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shamsābādī and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī were also the teachers of Amānallāh al-Banārasī (d. 1133/1721), who held the post of the minister of Lucknow during al-Bihārī’s appointment as qāḍī in the same city. It is during this period that these two scholars are known to have held debates on various scholarly matters. With respect to certain influences on the *Sullam*, it is worth noting that al-Banārasī had also composed a *Muḥākama* between Mīr Dāmād (d. 1040/1630) and Maḥmūd al-Jawnpūrī (d. 1072/1652) on the topic of perpetual creation (*ḥudūth dahrī*) that the latter scholar had severely criticized in his *Shams bāzīgha*. It is perhaps in such a context of debate that al-Bihārī had become familiar with Dāmād’s *Ufuq mubīn*, which forms an undercurrent of the *Sullam* with respect to certain solutions in logic, as we will observe below.

Al-Bihārī’s scholarly output seems to have been limited to legal theory, logic, and philosophy. Other than the *Sullam* and some short treatises on logic, he
also penned a highly influential textbook in legal theory, called the *Musallam al-thubūt*. Written in 1109/1698, the latter work is a detailed technical exposition of Ḥanafi *uṣūl*, set against the Shāfiʿī tradition, and containing also a heavy dose of *kalām* and logic as a framework for *uṣūlī* hermeneutics. Although the contraposition with the Shāfiʿī tradition was indeed a hallmark of postclassical Ḥanafi legal theory, as is evident in such works as the *Tanqīḥ of Ṣadr al-Shariʿa* and the *Manār* of al-Nasafi, al-Bihārī’s engagement with it is programmatic. This is not only mentioned explicitly by him in the *Musallam*; it is also manifest in his treatise “On Establishing that the Doctrine of the Ḥanafīs Is Further from the Method of Raʾy Than the Doctrine of the Shāfiʿī is, Contrary to What Is Commonly Believed.”

**THE EARLIEST LAYER OF FIRST-ORDER COMMENTARIES**

The earliest engagement with the *Sullam* was al-Bihārī’s self-commentary. The date of this work is not apparent, although it is certainly possible that it was composed simultaneously as a teaching companion and a clarification for the compressed hypotext itself. This phenomenon of the self-commentarial guide to the future commentary on the allusive hypotext is familiar from a number of cases, including those of Maḥmūd al-Jawnpūri’s *Shams bāzīgha* and Qāḍī Mubārak’s self-commentary on his commentary on the *Sullam*. It is also recognizable from other disciplines, such as legal theory. Indeed, here one may briefly cite al-Nasafi’s (d. 710/1310) self-commentary on his *Manār* as an instructive example of how the hypotextual work emerged and why a self-commentary on it was written. In the introduction to his *Kashf al-asrār*, al-Nasafi explains:

> When I witnessed the [scholars] to be inclined to . . . [al-Bazdawī’s] and . . . al-Sarakhsī’s legal theory . . . I abridged them [fa-ikhtasartuhumā] at the request of students. I mentioned all the principles and gestured toward the [underlying] proofs and the derivations [mūmiyan ilā d-dalāʾ il wa-l-furūʿ] and took into account the order of [the work of . . . al-Bazdawī]. [I adhered to all this] except with respect to that to which necessity called . . . Then, when some of those who used to frequent me reflected on its underlying sources and origins and delved into its knotty parts and its rules, they increased their visits to me, requesting from me that [I produce] a commentary that unveils [the solution to] its insolubles [kāshifan li-ʿuwaysātihi], clarifies its mysteries [muwaḍḍihān li-muʾ dilātīhi], and opens up that which was inaccessible [fāṭīhan li-mā ughliqa] in the legal theory of [al-Bazdawī], while encompassing the choice elements of what is mentioned in the *Muntakhab al-Mahṣūl* of . . . [al-Rāzī].

Neither the *Sullam* nor its self-commentary supplies the reader with a mission statement of this sort. As we will observe in the next chapter, however, the conclusions culled from the details of the commentarial tradition of the *Sullam* overlap rather nicely with al-Nasafi’s expository statements. For example, much like the hypotext of al-Nasafi, the *Sullam* appears to be a concise teaching text that embeds the tradition
that preceded it within its lemmata. Yet, it differs from the Manār in that it is not an epitome of the positions of clearly identified authors. Rather, in an internally consistent manner, the Sullam gathers together and commits itself to various authors and texts, producing a new, defensible synthesis. The patchwork of lemmata directly quoting or inspired by earlier works is generally arranged in the recognizable structure of premodern madrasa logic texts. This method also corresponds to al-Nasafi’s concern with maintaining the order of an underlying text. Much like al-Nasafi’s hypotext, the Sullam is laden with puzzles, obscure points, insolubles, hints, and gestures. Unlike the Kashf, however, the self-commentary of the Sullam was meant mostly to guide the future commentators toward a resolution of its difficulties. As we will observe below in the next chapter, it was not meant to resolve such difficulties fully.

Both the self-commentary and the Sullam must have gained wide and quick circulation. The earliest extant first-order commentaries on the Sullam were completed no later than 1707/1119, the year of the author’s death; and some were certainly started well before this time. All such commentaries quote al-Bihārī’s self-commentary, although the earliest two do so with limited attribution. The commentary of al-Sāʾinpūrī, which may well be the first extended commentary on the Sullam, is dedicated to Nawwāb Khudābandah Khān, who died in 1119/1707. This same work presents the first lemma of the hypotext with “The author, [al-Bihārī,] may God give comfort to his soul, said.” This indicates that the work was completed in the first half of 1119/1707, as both al-Bihārī and the nawwāb died in this year, the latter in the month of June. Since the last few years of the nawwāb’s life were spent in Delhi, where he was appointed as the grand steward of the imperial household, and since Sāʾinpūr is about one hundred miles from the capital, it is likely that the author resided somewhere in the vicinity and that the work was completed there. The commentator mentions in the introductory statements that the Sullam was already well-known at the time he composed the work.

At least seven other first-order commentaries on the Sullam were written around the same period. The first one of these, by Mullā Fīrūz b. Maḥabba, has the title al-Sirāj al-wahhāj and was dedicated to Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad Shāh Ālam Bādshāh. Given the title with which the dedicatee is referred and the invocation of the perpetuity of his reign, the work must have been composed during his rule between 1118/1707–1124/1712. Although some witnesses of Fīrūz’s commentary have survived and fragments are also included in the margins of some nineteenth-century lithographs of the Sullam, no further information about the author is available. The first-order commentary of Muḥammad ʿAli al-Mubārakī al-Jawnpūrī, called Miʿraj al-fuhūm, was composed after 1709/1121. This is gauged by an internal reference to the commentary of Mullā Nizām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1153/1740) on the Musallam al-thubūt of al-Bihārī that was completed in the same year; the author was eighteen years old at the time of the composition. Al-Mubārakī was born and raised in Dhaka, but received his further training in Delhi. The commentary of Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1167/1754), called the Suddat al-ʿulūm, was completed
in 1136/1723–4; the author also wrote a partial self-commentary on this work. In his introductory comments, the author mentions the existence of other commentaries on the *Sullam*, and explains that he began the work with the second section, on Assents (*Taṣdiqāt*). It is only after the completion of this section that he reverted to comment on the first section, the Conceptualizations (*Taṣawwurāt*). The author was the grandson of the fountainhead of the celebrated scholarly family of Farangī Maḥall, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī, and was born in 1103/1692. After Sihāla, he moved to Lucknow, where he studied with his uncle Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī.

None of the aforementioned commentaries from the first half of the twelfth/eighteenth century attracted supercommentaries, although, as we will observe below, they exercised influence on commentaries of the same order. The earliest first-order commentary from this period to generate supercommentaries was written by Qāḍī Mubārak b. Muḥammad Dāʾim al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749). The latter was trained by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713), a student of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī, by Ṣifatallāh al-Ḥusaynī al-Khayrābādī (d. ca. 1157/1744), a student of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī and of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shamsābādī, by the latter himself, and perhaps also by Mīr Zāhid al-Harawī (d. 1101/1689). As noted above, al-Sihālawī and al-Shamsābādī were both also teachers of al-Bihārī; in other words, Mubārak belonged to the next generation of a shared lineage. And like some of the commentators from this period, he arrived in Delhi after the completion of his studies to take up a teaching post. It is during the entire period, stretching from his course of studies to his setting roots in Delhi, that he composed the commentary. In a valuable passage, he writes,

I had begun to write [the first-order commentary] during the period of my studies. When I finished commenting on the connective syllogism, fate did not help me [complete] it until I emigrated . . . to Delhi to obtain a means of living. Completing it was not facilitated due to the contingencies of events . . . Then I was guided to the friendship of the Great Amir Nawwāb Sharīʿat Allāh Khān Bahādur and my heart found repose [in the city]. So I finished it . . . in the era of the reign of Muḥammad Shāh Rūshan Akhtar in the city of Delhi. [By this time,] one thousand one hundred and forty-three years had passed since the prophetic *hijra* . . . The beginning [of the first-order commentary] was in the period of the reign of Muḥammad Awrangzīb Ālamgīr . . .

Thus, Qāḍī Mubārak’s commentary on the *Sullam* had begun in 1118/1707 (the year of Awrangzīb’s death) at the latest and it lasted a quarter of a century. The year of its completion also witnessed the publication of his self-commentary, preserved in the margins of an autograph in the Rampur Raza library. Another autograph, along with marginal notes, was completed in Delhi in 1154/1741 for his son, Muḥammad Amir. Several other manuscripts also preserve the self-commentary in the margins. The latter was finally given the form of a collection by Mubārak’s student, ‘Abd al-Rasūl al-Sahāranpūrī, after the author’s death in 1162/1749. As I noted with reference to other cases above, this indicates that self-commenting was often coterminous with the writing of the hypotext and
that it was meant to be a key to unlocking the obscurities of the hypotext, which may itself have been a hypertext.\textsuperscript{36} The commentary of Mubārak is reported to have been adopted by scholars as part of the curriculum, a development that must have transpired relatively quickly: one observes, for example, that it was already being taught by ‘Abd al-ʿAlī Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (d. 1225/1810) to a descendant of Mubārak, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī.\textsuperscript{37}

The commentary on the *Sullam* to receive the greatest attention from second-order commentators was written by Ḥamdallāh b. Shukrallāh al-Sandilawī (d. 1160/1747). Born and raised in Sandīla, Ḥamdallāh was a notable Shīʿī scholar who studied under Mullā Nizām al-Dīn and his student and paternal cousin Kamāl al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1175/1761), whose role in the legacy of the *Sullam* will be discussed in more detail below. He also spent some time in Delhi as a teacher.\textsuperscript{38} He was also honored with the title of Faḍlallāh Khān by the Mughal emperor Ahmad Shāh Dihlawī\textsuperscript{39} and awarded many villages as private grants; this fortune afforded him the possibility of setting up a grand madrasa in Sandīla, which became the nascent site of the legacy of his commentary (see below).\textsuperscript{40} Ḥamdallāh’s commentary on the *Sullam* is limited to the section on Assents (*Taṣdīqāt*), although ‘Arshī reports a very small portion of a commentary on the Conceptualizations (*Taṣawwurāt*); I have not been able to check this manuscript and have, therefore, not been able to verify this claim.\textsuperscript{41}

Ḩamdallāh’s work is undated. However, internal and external evidence indicates that it must have been completed after 1142/1730, i.e. after the publication of Mubārak’s commentary. And it also cannot be doubted that it was written in conversation with the latter. For example, ‘Abd al-Ḥayy explains:

“The students of Mubārak would study their master’s commentary on the *Sullam*, the students of . . . Ḥamdallāh would study his commentary, and the students of . . . Baḥr al-ʿUlūm would teach his commentary to their students. When their respective students would encounter each other, they would mention the writings of their masters and criticize those of the others’ masters. Thus all the commentaries on the *Sullam* became the subject of scholarly discussions and investigations, and the students and teachers had to maintain an engagement with all these commentaries. The outcome was that control in the discipline of logic required knowledge of all these commentaries and glosses.”

The culture of scholarly encounters and discussions, and of living dialectics in the oral medium had a large part to play in the horizontal influence among commentaries. It is, therefore, entirely conceivable that, just as Mubārak was writing and teaching his commentary, along with the device of his self-commentary, it had begun to filter into the scholarly circles of Ḥamdallāh. This mode of transmission may certainly explain the influence of the former on the latter.

For this same period, two additional first-order commentaries are listed in the sources. One of these was written in 1151/1739 by Muhammad Ashraf al-Bardawānī (in Bengal), a pupil of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī, who was himself a student of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī. Shihāb al-Dīn was also the teacher of Mubārak, as noted
above, and of Muḥammad ʿAlī of Bengal and Lucknow; the latter was also a student of Mīr Zāhid al-Harawi. And Muḥammad ʿAlī, in turn, was also the teacher of Muḥammad Ashraf. Thus, a close-knit network of scholars engaged with the Sullam had emerged among scholars associated with Gūpāmaw.

Finally, a first-order commentary on some difficult parts of the Sullam, such as the Liar Paradox, was written by Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Dawlat b. Yaʿqūb al-Sihālawī al-Fatīhpūrī (d. 1175/1761). The author was a student of Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn and taught a number of commentators on the Sullam, such as Ḥamdallāh, Mullā Ḥasan, Muḥammad Wali, and ʿAbd al-ʿAlī Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (see below).

As Kamāl al-Dīn was an important figure in the growth of the Sullam’s commentarial tradition, some of his biographical details warrant attention. Indeed they bear testimony to the tight personal and professional ties that perpetuated the history of the text. He was related to the Farangī Maḥallī family via his patrilineal ancestor, Ḥāfiẓ al-Dīn, who was also the maternal ancestor of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī. The latter was also the teacher of Kamāl al-Dīn’s father, Muḥammad Dawlat, whom he had taken into his household as his son. After the murder of Quṭb al-Dīn in 1103/1692, Muhammad Dawlat moved from Sihāla to Fatīhpūr and then to Delhi, where he joined the group of scholars working on the famous Fatāwā Hindīyya. It is at this time that he also rose in the favor of Awrangzib, because of the latter’s respect for Muḥibballāh al-Ilāhābādī, who was the father of Muhammad Dawlat’s paternal grandmother. al-Ilāhābādī was also the maternal grandfather of the aforementioned Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī, who was also trained by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī. We recall that Shihāb al-Dīn was, in turn, the teacher of Mubārak and Muḥammad Ashraf, both of whom were mentioned above as first-order commentators of the Sullam.

Kamāl al-Dīn, therefore, was a representative figure whose genealogy and training included both the Sihālawī and Ilāhābādī lines; indeed both the latter traditions themselves reverted to ʿAbd al-Salām al-Lāhūrī. This same kind of confluence was also manifest in the work of the aforementioned Āmānallāh al-Banārāsī, the interlocutor of al-Bihārī, who had engaged the works of such scholars as al-Ilāhābādī, Dāmād, Maḥmūd al-Jawnpūrī, and al-Dawānī. From Kamāl al-Dīn, another scholarly line was established in Kirāna: he was the teacher of his paternal nephew, Qāḍī Nūr al-Ḥaqq al-Kirānawi (d. 1180/1767). This scholar, the author of a number of commentaries on books in the Dars-i Niẓāmī, initially had the patronage of the nāwāb Saʿdallāh Khān in Bareilly, where he taught in a madrasa. Then, after the death of his father, who had royal patronage, Nūr al-Ḥaqq assumed a judgeship in Kirāna; and following this appointment, he assumed a judgeship in Deoband. When he vacated this last post, it was taken up by his brother’s son-in-law, Ḥimāyatallah b. Faḍlallāh, a grandson of Mubārak. These intellectual and genealogical continuities are presented in trees 1 and 2 below. Lines with arrows represent master-disciple links; lines without arrows represent a father-son relationship; double-horizontal lines are marriage ties; dotted lines represent a tie via some unrecorded intermediaries; and boxes indicate commentarial writing on the Sullam.
**Figure 1.** Tree 1: Kirānawīs—38, 39, 40, 41.

**Key for Tree 1**

1. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1153/1740)
3. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
4. Quṭb al-Dīn b. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī
5. Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Sihālawī al-Fatihpurī (d. 1175/1761)
7. Muḥibballāh al-Ilāhābādī (d. 1058/1648)
8. Muḥammad Ḥusayn b. ‘Abd al-Salām
9. Daughter 1 of Muḥibballāh al-Ilāhābādī
10. Daughter 2 of Muḥibballāh al-Ilāhābādī
11. Farīd b. Sa’dallāh b. Aḥmad b. Ḥāfīz al-Dīn
12. Sa’dallāh b. Aḥmad b. Ḥāfīz al-Dīn
13. Ahmad b. Ḥāfīz al-Dīn
14. Ḥāfīz al-Dīn
15. ‘ʿAbd al-Ḥa ḫim
16. Muḥammad Dawlat al-Anṣārī al-Sihālawī
17. Muḥammad ’Āshiq b. ‘ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Kirānawī
18. Aḥmadallāh b. Shīfatallah al-Khayrābādī (d. 1167/1754)
19. Muḥammad Ya’qūb al-Anṣārī al-Sihālawī
20. Muḥammad Dawlat al-Anṣārī al-Sihālawī
**Figure 2.** Tree 2: From Shīrāz to Sihāla.

**Key for Tree 2**

1. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. ʿAbd Shukūr al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707)
3. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shamsābādī (d. 1121/1709)
4. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
5. Muḥibballāh b. ʿAbd Shukūr al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707)
6. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shamsābādī (d. 1121/1709)
7. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
8. Muḥibballāh al-Ilāhābādī (d. 1058/1648)
9. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Ḥakīm al-Siyālkūtī (d. 1067/1656 or 1657)
10. Ṣadr al-Dīn b. al-Qādir Dāwūd al-Ḥanafī al-Chishtī
11. Amānallāh al-Banārasī (d. 1133/1721)
Summary of Findings

The details above reveal some interesting patterns. The *Sullam* was clearly a product of the Farangi Maḥallī intellectual lineage that receded ultimately into the Shīrāzī circle of scholars. Therefore, it demonstrates an intimate familiarity with the contributions of scholars who constituted that tradition and with its specific prehistory. In addition, because of the networks of its author and the logic texts in vogue during his era, it evinces detailed knowledge of eleventh-/seventeenth-century debates on Indian soil regarding the contributions of such scholars as al-Sīyālkūtī and Mīr Dāmād. The locus of its production was Lucknow or Delhi, where its author had enjoyed enviable imperial patronage.

Other than the self-commentary of al-Bihārī, at least eight first-order commentaries on the *Sullam* were completed in about the first five decades of the twelfth/eighteenth century. Several of the authors were associated with Delhi and received imperial patronage. As we observed, some of these commentaries were already begun in the lifetime of the author; they are all either partly or completely extant. This deluge of commentarial activity and the reports from some of these commentators about the fame of the *Sullam* and the existence of yet other commentaries are testaments to the incredible pace of the work’s popularity.

The *Sullam* may well have been composed as a madrasa text whose meanings were meant to be unfolded in the process of future dialectical writing. For this reason, some of the commentarial activity connected with it may have been student exercises in the service of sharpening the wit and cultivating the student’s independent scholarly growth.\(^{51}\) This is true at least of Mubāarak, who states that he started writing his commentary in his student days, and of Mubārakī, who completed his composition at the age of eighteen. Within the space of the madrasa and the nascent period of the *Dars-i Niẓāmī* method of training, some of these commentaries on the *Sullam* were also written for the consumption of students, although, as we will observe below, they usually did not lose sight of the benefit of hypotextual brevity for the purposes of future commentarial growth.\(^ {52} \)

The details above indicate that the earliest commentaries on the *Sullam* were an exclusively North Indian affair, written by scholars largely associated with Delhi, Lucknow, Gūpāmaw, Sihāla, and Sandīla. Delhi is represented among the earliest sites of commentarial activity; thereafter, Lucknow and Gūpāmaw were the leading centers of production, with most other relevant cities located in close proximity. Again, this is not surprising, since the *Sullam* must have been taught in its early phases precisely in the region where it was composed. The earliest commentaries on the *Sullam*—such as those of Sāʾinpūrī and Fīrūz—were dedicated to imperial figures, and a number of commentators from this period, such as Mubāarak and Ḥamdallāh, had the support of the royal household. In this period, every commentator about whom we have sufficient biographical information was closely associated with the network of the Farangi Maḥallī family, and two commentators, Ḥamd ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Kamāl al-Dīn, were members of the family—the former directly and the latter via matrilineal ties. Thus, in terms of geography, patronage, and networks, the tradition of the *Sullam* demonstrated a remarkable continuity in its first few decades. The early commentarial efforts on the *Sullam* can be represented in the following tree (tree 3).\(^ {53} \)
**Figure 3.** Tree 3: The earliest commentaries on the *Sullam.*

**Key for Tree 3**

1. Quṭb al-Dīn Sīhālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī
3. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī (d. 1153/1740)
4. Muḥammad Asʿ ad
5. Muḥibballāh b. Ṭabd Shukūr al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707)
6. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Husaynī al-Shamsābādī (d. 1121/1709)
7. Mīr Zāhid Harawī (d. 1101/1689-90)
8. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
10. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ
12. Qāḍī Mubārak b. Muḥammad Dāʾ im b. Ṭabd al-Ḥayy al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
13. Mawlawī Ṭabdallāh Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Sāʾ īnpūrī (ca. 1119/1707)
15. Ahmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī (d. 1167/1754)
17. Ghułām Muṣṭafā b. Muhammad Asʿ ad
18. Muḥammad Wāli b. al-Qāḍī Ghułām Muṣṭafā (d. 1198/1784)
19. Ḥasan b. Ghułām Muṭṭafā (d. 1199/1784)
20. Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Sīhālawī al-Fātiḥpūrī (d. 1175/1761)
21. Muḥammad Aʿlam b. Muḥammad Shākir al-Sandilawī (d. 1198/1784)
22. Ḥamdallāh b. Shukrallāh b. Dāniyāl b. Pir Muḥammad al-Sandilawī (d. 1160/1747)
23. Ṭabd al-ʿAlī b. Niẓām al-Dīn Baḥr al-ʿUlām (d. 1225/1810)
25. Qāḍī Aḥmad ʿAlī b. Ṭath Muḥammad al-Ḥanafī al-Sandilawī (d. 1200/1786)
26. Muḥībballāh b. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq
27/101. Muḥībballāh b. Ṭahmīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Khayrābādī (d. 1157/1744)
28. Ṣifatallāh b. Madinatallāh al-Ḥusaynī al-Khayrābādī (d. 1157/1744)
FIRST ORDER COMMENTARIES: STAGE TWO

The first half of the twelfth/eighteenth century had witnessed the production of two gateway commentaries on the *Sullam*—namely, Mubârak and Ḥamdallâh. Geographically and genealogically, commentarial writing on the *Sullam* generally does not appear to have spread during this period once the initial hold of Delhi was loosened; on the contrary, the textual control of scholars associated with Lucknow and with the Farangi Maḥallîs had tightened. The next period saw similar trends and the production of an additional gateway commentary.

Perhaps the most significant node in the growth of the commentarial tradition of the *Sullam* during this period was the aforementioned Kamâl al-Dîn al-Sihâlawî. Of the seven identifiable first-order commentators from this second phase, three were directly his students, and two (perhaps three) were taught by his students. And among first-order commentaries to receive the greatest second-order commentarial attention, all but one (Mubârak, mentioned above) were written by Kamâl al-Dîn’s students. Let me take up the direct cases first, since their growth reveals other notable patterns.

During this second period, a first-order commentary was composed in 1155/1742 by Muḥammad Walî b. Ghulâm Muṣṭafâ (d.1198/1784), a great grandson of Quṭb al-Dîn al-Sihâlawî. Muḥammad Walî had been trained both by Kamâl al-Dîn and his father’s uncle Niẓâm al-Dîn al-Sihâlawî. He was raised and educated in Lucknow and, like his father, he was appointed a judge in Mallâwah; after he was removed from this appointment, he returned to Lucknow to resume teaching activities. The second commentary was written by his brother, Muḥammad Ḥasan b. Ghulâm Muṣṭafâ (d. 1199/1784), who was also trained by the same two scholars and taught in Lucknow for several years. It was in Lucknow or soon thereafter, in Rampur, that he must have composed the commentary on the *Sullam*, which is dated 1177/1763–64. This commentary, after those of Mubârak and Ḥamdallâh, garnered the most second-order commentarial attention in the *Sullam*’s history.

The third student of Kamâl al-Dîn to produce a major commentary on the *Sullam* was the celebrated ‘Abd al-’Ali b. Niẓâm al-Dîn Baḥr al-’Ulûm (d. 1225/1810). Like the two immediately preceding scholars, Baḥr al-’Ulûm was also trained by his father. He initially taught in Lucknow, leaving it for Shâhjahânpûr around 1167/1754 amid sectarian tensions developing in the former city. He spent twenty years teaching in the latter city, departing from it when the nawwâb Ḥâfîz al-Mulk was killed in 1188/1774. Thereafter, he spent about four to five years in Rampur at the behest of its ruler, who wished to establish a madrasa there. After spending some time in Buhâr, he received the invitation of the nawwâb of Carnatic Wâlâjah Muhammad ‘Ali Khân al-Gûpâmawî (d. 1210/1795) to Madras to head a madrasa in that city. Throughout this period, Baḥr al-’Ulûm enjoyed the patronage of a number of princely states and of the British East India Company.
In his self-commentary, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm writes that he had composed the commentary on the Sullam in his youth. By this, he most likely means to refer to his student and early teaching days in Lucknow. Thus, the commentary was in all likelihood composed before 1167/1754, perhaps no earlier than 1162/1749, when he was about twenty years old. As the commentary refers to his ʿUjāla nāfiʿa, a metaphysical work focusing on ontology; and as its major concern is frequently with precisely this subject in the context of the discipline of logic, it is possible that he imagined the former as setting the stage for the latter. But I will say more about this in the next chapter.59

Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s self-commentary was probably collected in the form of a book in Rampur, as the sources indicate that it is in this city that he attended to his earlier commentaries; one might thus date the received text to sometime between 1188/1774 and 1192 or 1193/1778 or 1779. However, the various parts of the text were written as drafts well before this time. This can be gauged by Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s reliance on the work in his Fawātiḥ al-raḥamūt, a commentary he completed in 1180/1767 on al-Bihārī’s legal theory work, the Musallam al-thubūt.60 Indeed, on the basis of self-commentarial practices with which we are familiar—the aforementioned cases of al-Nasafī and al-Jawnpūrī are examples of such practices—and the author’s own expressions, one might be able to surmise that the uncollected self-commentary had emerged even before this period, perhaps during the time that he was composing the first-order commentary. As we will note below, the self-commentary was often a guide to one’s own hypotext in the oral and/or written hypertextual space that was usually connected to the context of teaching in the madrasa. And often, its collection occurred at a later stage (see the observations on the collection of Mubārak’s self-commentary above). In this vein, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm explains in the opening passages of his self-commentary, “I had written (kuntu katabtu) these glosses in a dispersed fashion, on various folios, and I wished to collect them . . . it is asked of students that they not rely on the commentary except after going over these glosses.” Thus, the aim of collecting the self-commentary was to substitute a guiding text for himself, the master, so that the students might be able to work through the intricacies of his pithy and allusive hypotext.61

Three other first-order commentaries from this period are associated with the intellectual lineage of Kamāl al-Dīn. One of these was written by Qāḍī Aḥmad ʿAlī b. Faṭḥ Muḥammad al-Sandilawī (d. 1200/1786). He was a student and in-law of Ḥamdallah; we already encountered the latter scholar above as both the student of Kamāl al-Dīn and the first-order commentator of the Sullam to receive the most intense commentarial attention. Aḥmad ʿAlī was also the teacher of Ḥamdallah’s son Ḥaydar ʿAlī al-Sandilawī (on whom see below).62 Another first-order commentary, completed in 1200/1786, was written by Mūbin b. Muḥibb al-Sīhālawī (d. 1225/1810). Born and raised in Lucknow, Mūbin was a student of the aforementioned commentator on the Sullam, Mullā Ḥasan. His commentary, titled
Mirʾāt al-shurūḥ, is arguably the most lucid and extended exposition of the entire commentarial tradition associated with the Sullam. Finally, within the scholarly lineage of Kamāl al-Dīn there may also have been a first-order commentator on the Sullam by the name of Niẓām al-Dīn al-Kirānawī. Although no further information about this author is available, he most likely belonged in the family of the Kirānawī paternal cousins of Kamāl al-Dīn whom we encountered above.

The only other sufficiently identifiable scholar from this period to have written a first-order commentary on the Sullam was Muḥammad Ḥamdallāh Gūpāmawī al-Mallānawī (d. before 1199/1784). Born and raised in Gūpāmaw, he studied under the aforementioned Ṭab al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī, Muḥammad ʿIwaḍ al-Khayrābādī al-Gūpāmawī, and Ṣifatallāh al-Khayrābādī (d. 1157/1744). Thereafter, he moved to Mallānūh and taught there.

Summary of Findings
As I briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section, the second phase of the first-order commentarial tradition on the Sullam manifested the following patterns. A rather large number of identifiable commentators were students of Kamāl al-Dīn, who, owing to his genealogical and intellectual ties, appears to have been a central figure for facilitating the interaction of the various threads of the Sullam’s commentarial traditions. Kamāl al-Dīn was not only himself a commentator of the Sullam; he was also the teacher of two of the three commentators on the Sullam whose work received sustained second-order commentarial interest. These commentators were Ḥamdallāh and Ḥasan (Mubārak was the third); both were also students of Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī. Kamāl al-Dīn also taught the celebrated Bahr al-ʿUlūm and the teachers of some other important first-order commentators. Furthermore, a rather large percentage of the commentators of the Sullam from this period were also members of the Farangī Mahallī family, all of whom had prolonged associations with Lucknow. The remaining commentators were associated with two other distinct regions and dense networks that overlapped with the preceding one: Gūpāmaw, with the legacy of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (and his student Mubārak), and Sandila, which was dominated by the commentary of Ḥamdallāh, as we will observe below. These observations may be summarized in tree 4.

SECOND-ORDER COMMENTARIES

Ḥamdallāh
By the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, the commentaries on the Sullam that would subsequently receive commentarial attention had already been composed. These were the Sullam Qāḍī Mubārak, the Sullam Ḥamdallāh, and the Sullam Mullā Ḥasan. It is surprising that the Sullam Bahr al-ʿUlūm, which was written by one of the leading scholars and teachers of the twelfth/eighteenth century,
FIGURE 4. Tree 4: Second stage of first-order and gateway commentaries on the *Sullam*.

KEY FOR TREE 4

1. Qurṭb al-Dīn Sīhālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Qurṭb al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī
3. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī (d. 1153/1740)
4. Muḥammad Asʿad
8. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
15. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Qurṭb al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī (d. 1167/1754)
17. Ghulām Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad Asʿad
19. Muḥammad Wali b. al-Qāḍī Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1198/1784)
20. Ḥasan b. Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1199/1784)
23. ʿAbbās b. Shukrallāh b. Dāniyāl b. Pir Muḥammad al-Sandilawī (d. 1160/1747)
27/101. Muḥibballāh b. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq
28. Ṣifatallāb b. Madinatallāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Khayrābādī (d. 1157/1744)
38. Muḥammad Dawlat al-Anṣārī al-Sīhālawī
39. ʿAbbās al-Wāḥid al-Kirānawī
40. Muḥammad ʿAšiq b. ʿAbbās al-Wāḥid al-Kirānawī (d. 1138/1726)
41. Qāḍī Nūr al-Ḥaqq b. Qāḍī Muḥammad ʿAšiq al-Sīhālawī al-Kirānawī (d. 1180/1767)
52. Muḥammad Yāʾ qāb al-Anṣārī al-Sīhālawī
53. Muḥammad ʿIwād al-Khayrābādī al-Gūpāmawī
54. Niẓām al-Dīn al-Kirānawī
55. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ḥamḍallāb al-Sandilawī (d. 1225/1810)
86. Muḥammad ʿAẓīm b. Kifāyatallāb al-Fārūqī al-Gūpāmawī al-Mallānawī (d. before 1199/1784)
received practically no commentarial attention. This may be because, much like Mullā Mubīn’s commentary, it was introduced into the curriculum only at a later phase of its development, and interest in these books was not sustained in the context of scholarly training. Generally, it is not mentioned in the sources as a text that was taught in the madrasa—the colossal Nuzha, for example, refers to it only once—and it is cited infrequently in other commentaries. The 1309/1892 lithograph published by the Maṭbaʿ-yi Muṭabāʿī, however, does have marginal glosses on the work. The majority of these were written by Muḥammad Ilyās b. Muḥammad Ayyūb (d. 1364/1945). This scholar, whose intellectual genealogy was truncated from the complex of commentarial work that I will discuss below, was born near Peshawar in 1275/1858 and taught in Lucknow for some time. During this period, he also edited books for the aforementioned press. It is likely, therefore, that the commentarial activity was tied to the prospects of publishing the hypotext and was not the product of the madrasa context. The same lithograph also contains commentaries from two other scholars: Khalīl Aḥmad al-Isrāʾīlī al-Sanbhalī (d. 1340/1922) and Saʿīd Aḥmad al-Isrāʾīlī al-Sanbhalī. Although I have not been able to obtain any meaningful information about the latter, I suspect that he was the former’s brother. This is indicated by the onomastics and the fact that he was alive at the time the lithograph was prepared. Khalīl Aḥmad was taught at least partly in Aligarh by Fayḍ al-Ḥasan al-Sahāranpūrī (d. 1304/1887), a student of Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī (d. 1278/1861, see below). After completing his studies, he was appointed to teach in Aligarh, where a late second-order commentator on the Sullam, Muftī Luṭfāllāh (see below), also taught. Thus, the three identifiable commentators on the Sullam Bahr al-ʿUlūm were late scholars whose work was penned around the time of the production of the lithograph. The scholars are anomalous in that they are generally disconnected from commentarial networks, as well as the sites, contexts, and temporal range of commentarial production. It appears, therefore, that the assessment of the historical value of the Sullam Bahr al-ʿUlūm is mediated by the modern dissemination it received owing to the printing press. This statement, of course, is not a judgment on its intellectual contribution, which was quite significant.

The commentaries of Mubārak and Ḥasan defined the reception of the Sullam’s section on Conceptualizations (Taṣawwurāt), while that of Ḥamdallāh was a gateway to the section on Assents (Taṣdiqāt). Of the remaining aforementioned first-order commentaries, Mullā Mubīn deliberately cast a wide net, covering broadly and with remarkable expository capacity a range of topics discussed in both the commentarial tradition of the Sullam and the earlier, living dialectical space from which the hypotext had emerged. The contributions of all other commentaries of the twelfth/eighteenth century came to be articulated within the lemmata of these aforementioned commentaries. It is through them—especially Mubārak, Ḥamdallāh, and Ḥasan—that the subsequent tradition grappled with the Sullam.

Of the aforementioned, the hypertext to receive the greatest second-order commentarial attention was Ḥamdallāh. We may recall that Ḥamdallāh was a Shiʿī scholar and that, after completing his studies, he received handsome royal patronage
and established a madrasa in Sandīla; it was in this city that the commentarial effort on Ḥamdallāh began, most likely in the context of scholarly training. The authors of several commentaries on Ḥamdallāh are easily identifiable, and they display certain denominational and geographical patterns.

Excluding the self-commentary found in the margins of some early witnesses, the first commentary on Ḥamdallāh was composed by his student Bāballāh Jawnpūrī (fl. twelfth/eighteenth centuries). This work must have been completed before 1188/1774, as two witnesses, dated 1188/1774 and 1189/1775, include it in the margins; the second witness was copied by a scribe also associated with Sandīla. Bāballāh was also the teacher of a number of leading scholars and commentators on Ḥamdallāh. The first one of these was Ghulām Yahyā b. Najm al-Dīn, who studied with Bāballāh in Ḥamdallāh’s Madrasa-yi Manṣūriyya in Sandīla. After completing his studies, he taught for some time in Lahore and then in Delhi. He subsequently returned to Lucknow, where he passed away in 1180/1767. His commentary must have been completed before 1189/1775, as it is included in the margins of the aforementioned witness from Sandīla that was completed in the same year. This same witness includes marginal commentary by the third commentator, Muḥammad Qāʿim b. Shāh Mir Saʿid Ilāhābādī. There is no information available on this author’s training, although two of his students were associated with Ilāhābād and Lucknow. Thus, we are able to gauge that, very soon after its composition, Ḥamdallāh’s work received commentarial attention in Sandīla; some of the commentators were in his direct intellectual lineage, and they very likely commented on the work in the setting of the madrasa, either in the course of training or teaching. These same scholars were then also affiliated with teaching circles in Lucknow.

The historical trajectory of Ḥamdallāh’s commentary began to stretch beyond the Sandīla-Lucknow complex by the work of its fourth commentator, Muḥammad Aʿlam al-Sandilawī. Aʿlam (d. 1198/1784) was a younger peer of Ḥamdallāh in that he was trained by both Kamāl al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī and Niẓām al-Dīn. After completing his studies and following the pattern of a number of preceding scholars, he went to Delhi in search of royal patronage. Failing in this effort, he turned to Khayrābād, where he resided for a few years. He returned to Sandīla in the latter part of his life. Muḥammad Aʿlam is an interesting figure insofar as he stands as a node in the complex network through which the history of Ḥamdallāh’s commentary was mediated. For example, he was a teacher of his maternal nephew ‘Abd al-Wājid al-Khayrābādī (d. 1216/1802). The latter’s other teacher was Qāḍī Wahhāj al-Dīn, the son of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī, whose father, Shihāb al-Dīn, was one of the teachers of Mubārak. And the latter, we recall, was also taught by Ṣifatallāh al-Khayrābādī; his son Ahmaddallāh (d. 1167/1754) was also a teacher of the aforementioned ‘Abd al-Wājid. It was thus in a complex of the Gūpāmawī, Sandilawi, and Khayrābādī scholarly traditions of the Sullam that ‘Abd al-Wājid al-Khayrābādī was trained. In turn, he was a student of Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī (d. 1244/1828 or 29), whose family played an important role in the commentarial tradition of the Sullam, including that of Ḥamdallāh and Mubārak, as we will observe below.
Although the commentary by Ḥamdallāh had begun to spread rather quickly with the efforts of some of his students and peers to seek patronage in other cities, the commentarial attention on it generally remained a Shi‘ī and/or Sandīlawī affair during the next two generations. Two exceptions may quickly be noted: it appears that the two early commentaries, one by Ḥakīm Sharīf b. Akmal (d. 1222/1807) and another by Asadallāh al-Panjābī (1242/1827), were composed during the first century of the life of the Sullam. The former scholar was the renowned eponymous member of the Sharīfi family of physicians. Appointed as the court physician to Shāh ‘Ālam II (d. 1221/1806), he spent the greater part of his life in Delhi. The latter scholar was born and raised in Punjab and studied in Ilāhābād and may also have taught in Lucknow. Although these are exceptions for this period, they do revert the commentarial practice to the cities that were associated with some of the aforementioned scholars who commented on Ḥamdallāh.

But the stronger currents were as follows. The next commentary on Ḥamdallāh composed by his son, Ḥaydar ‘Alī (d. 1225/1810), who was trained by his father and two of the latter’s students, the aforementioned Qāḍī Aḥmad ‘Alī and the commentator Bāballāh, in Sandīla. In Sandīla, he taught Qāḍī Irtiḍā ‘Alī al-Gūpāmawī, Mirzā Ḥasan ‘Alī Lakhnawī, Ḥusayn Aḥmad Malīhābādī, and Dildār ‘Alī al-Naṣīrābādī. The last of these scholars, who was also trained by Bāballāh, was a celebrated figure of Shi‘ī intellectual and political history in India. The author of the next commentary on Ḥamdallāh, he is reported to have studied the text with Ḥaydar ‘Alī himself in Sandīla, following his early training in Ilāhābād. After spending some time in Iraq, he returned to Lucknow, where he received royal patronage and initiated an important program of Shi‘ī legal and theological revival in India. He died in 1235/1820. Dildār ‘Alī also taught his son Muḥammad (d. 1284/1868), who was born in Lucknow in 1199/1785. He enjoyed regional royal patronage, was given the title Sulṭān al-‘Ulamā’, and was appointed muftī in Lucknow. Both he and his brother Ḥusayn (d. 1273/1857) also commented on Ḥamdallāh.

During the period that Dildār ‘Alī was preparing his own commentary on Ḥamdallāh, the commentaries of certain other scholars associated with Lucknow and Rampur also began to appear. Most likely, the first of these was by ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Labkani, who studied under the Farangī Maḥallīs, Bahr al-‘Ulūm and Mullā Ḥasan, in Lucknow or Rampur. Thereafter, this trend pressed forward: biographical details of all but one commentator suggest that the Farangī Maḥallīs had emerged as the major mediators of the legacy of Ḥamdallāh, starting in the second quarter of the thirteenth/nineteenth century. The activity was most intense in Lucknow, especially in the circle of the students of Muftī Zuhūrāllāh al-Farangī al-Mahallī (d. 1256/1840). This latter scholar was the student of his paternal uncle Ḥasan b. Ghulām Muṣṭaftype, whom we encountered a number of times above as a major commentator of the Sullam and as a teacher of some of its other supercommentators.

At least four students of Zuhūrāllāh commented on Ḥamdallāh. One commentator, Turāb ‘Alī (d. 1281/1865), was born in Lucknow and studied there
also under Mufti Ismā’īl b. al-Wajih.96 Another commentator was Zuhūrallāh’s student, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm b. Aminallāh (d. 1285/1869), who was descended from the line of Muḥammad Ṣa‘īd Farangi Maḥallī. He was also trained in Lucknow by his father, his father’s paternal uncle, Muḥammad Asghar, and by his father’s paternal cousin, Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Asghar; all these scholars were Farangi Maḥallīs and some, as we will observe below, also wrote supercommentaries on the Sullam.97 Zuhūrallāh’s third student to write a commentary on Ḥamdallāh was Muftī Sa‘dollāh b. Nizām al-Dīn al-Rāmpūrī (d. 1294/1877). Born in 1219/1805 in Murādābād and recognized as a leading philologist, he traveled for his studies from Rampur to Najībābād to Delhi. In 1243/1828, at the age of twenty-four, he arrived in Lucknow to study under Mufti Ismā’īl b. al-Wajih and Zuhūrallāh.98 It is likely that he wrote his commentary on Ḥamdallāh during this period or soon thereafter, when he was appointed to teach at the Madrasa-yi Sulṭāniyya in Lucknow. The intensity of attention to the Sullam in the teaching circles of Zuhūrallāh can be gauged from the fact that Sa‘dollāh copied a number of manuscripts of commentaries on the Sullam, many of which are preserved in the Raza Rampur Library.99 Zuhūrallāh’s fourth student to write on Ḥamdallāh was Ja‘far ‘Alī al-Kasmandawī (d. 1284/1868), who also studied in Lucknow.100 Both he and the aforementioned Turāb ‘Alī enjoyed royal patronage: Turāb ‘Alī was honored with the title Rukn al-Dīn and Ja‘far ‘Alī was appointed over the ‘ushr (tithe) and kharāj (land tax) in Ghātampūr. Both scholars claimed descent from ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib; Ja‘far is explicitly mentioned as having descended from the line of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya. However, unlike the scholars of Sandīla who have been mentioned so far, neither scholar seems to have belonged to the Imāmī Shī‘ī denomination. The sources mention, for example, that each also studied ḥadīth with leading Sunnī scholars of the time and they do not suggest that they received similar training in a comparable Shi‘ī tradition.101

Yet the network with Sandīla and the Shi‘ī tradition was still maintained among these commentators of Ḥamdallāh. For example, Turāb ‘Alī was a teacher of two other commentators on Ḥamdallāh—Ḥaydar ‘Alī al-Riḍāwī (d. 1302/1885) and Kamāl al-Dīn al-Mūhānī (d. 1295/1878); both were Shi‘ī scholars associated with Lucknow.102 Turāb ‘Alī also trained Ja‘far ‘Alī b. Afdal (d. 1300/1883) and Anwar ‘Alī al-Lakhnawī (d. 1303/1886).103 The former of these was a Shi‘ī scholar who received his legal training from Dildār ‘Alī’s son Ḫusayn, who in turn was also trained by his brother, the aforementioned commentator on Ḥamdallāh, Muḥammad b. Dildār ‘Alī.104 J‘afar ‘Alī b. Afdal was a teacher of Tafaqḍul Ḫusayn, who in turn taught Bashīr al-Dīn b. Karim al-Dīn (d. 1296/1879); the latter scholar was also a commentator of Ḥamdallāh.105 Bashīr al-Dīn was also a student of Muḥammad Ḥasan b. Abī al-Ḥasan, under whom he studied the commentaries on the Sullam. This latter scholar’s teacher was Sharaf al-Dīn al-Rāmpūrī (d. 1268/1852),106 whose teacher, Ghulām Jīlānī b. Ḥamd Sharīf al-Rāmpūrī (d. 1234/1819), was a student of Baḥr al-‘Ulūm and Mullā Ḫasan.107 Ja‘far ‘Alī b. Afdal also taught the aforementioned Anwar ‘Alī.108
And Anwar ‘Ali, a physician and qāḍī in Lucknow and then Bhopal, was, in turn, the teacher of Ilāhī Bakhsh al-Ḥanafi al-Fayḍābādī (d. 1306/1889). This latter scholar was also a commentator on Ḥamdallāh and later, perhaps partly owing to his association with Anwar ‘Ali, was appointed in Bhopal as a tutor of Nawwāb Şiddīq Ḥasan Khān’s children. The patronage bore fruit in his further appointment as the overseer of the madāris in Bhopal.109

The aforementioned commentator on Ḥamdallāh, Jaʿfar ‘Ali al-Kasmandawī, taught at least one student from Sandīla by the name of Wārith ‘Alī b. Amīnallāh al-Ḥusaynī (d. 1247/1832).111 This same scholar was also the student of Sirāj al-Ḥaqq, another commentator on Ḥamdallāh, who belonged to the coterie of some important scholars of Lucknow of the thirteenth/nineteenth century. In the next generation, the Lucknow scholar ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm b. ‘Abd al-Rabb al-Faranjī Maḥallī (d. 1288/1872), the grandson of Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, also wrote a commentary on Ḥamdallāh.114 In addition to being taught by his father, ‘Abd al-Ḥakim was also the student of Nūr al-Ḥaqq al-Faranjī Maḥallī, the grandson of one of the earliest commentators of the Sullam—namely, the aforementioned Aḥmad Ṭuḥūrallāh being an example). Barakatallāh was trained by two descendants in the lineage of Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq. His commentary was one of the last engagements with Ḥamdallāh. The commentarial tradition on Ḥamdallāh had thus followed a traceable trajectory. It first thrived in Sandīla in the second half of the twelfth/eighteenth century among Shiʿī scholars, some of whom were students of Ḥamdallāh, and others who were trained by his students. In Sandīla, it was cultivated also by Aʿlam Sandilawi, a peer of Ḥamdallāh, whose role in the commentarial growth of the Sullam I will discuss presently. While the association with Shiʿī scholars was maintained, in the first half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, commentarial activity was most intense in Lucknow and among the scholars affiliated with Farangī Maḥallī. In all these cases, the networks of production were dense, and it is likely that most commentaries were generated in the context of studying and teaching in the madrasa.116

In the later part of the second half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, commentarial writings on Ḥamdallāh began to disperse to other regions, although the intellectual genealogies of the authors ultimately reverted to the same scholarly landscape. A few commentaries of these other regions are worthy of mention. The first of these was composed by ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī (d. 1316 or 1318/1899 or 1901), the grandson of Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī.117
lineage included the tradition of the Sullam from Sandila, Gūpāmaw, and Khayrābād. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī was trained by his father, Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, and he received patronage first in Rampur from Nawwāb Kalb ʿAli Khān, then from the princes of Hyderabad, and then again in Rampur from Nawwāb Mushtāq ʿAli Khān. He was known to turn to Khayrābād at various periods in his life, and he also enjoyed a period of patronage from the rulers of Tonk.

A number of scholars of the Khayrābādī tradition, including Barakāt Aḥmad, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s student, found patronage in Tonk, which had begun to emerge in the middle of the thirteenth/nineteenth century as an important center of maʿqūlī scholarship. A scholar associated with this city composed one of the last commentaries on Ḥamdallāh between 1309/1892–1322/1904. Begun in Lahore and dedicated to the prince Muḥammad ʿUbaydallāh Khān Firūz Jang (d. 1318/1900) of Tonk, the commentary by ʿAbdallāh b. Ṣābir al-Ṭūnḵī (d. 1339/1921) was composed at the behest of his students, very likely during his appointment at the Oriental College, Lahore. Al-Ṭūnḵī, who also held appointments in Delhi, Kolkata, and Lucknow, was trained by Muftī Luṭfallāh b. Asadallāh al-Kūʿilī (d. 1239/1921), who is reported in the sources as including Ḥamdallāh in his teaching cycle. His intellectual lineage passed through Ḥaydar ʿAlī al-Ṭūnḵī (d. 1273/1857), a student of Mullā Mubin Ghulām Jilānī, and of Rustam ʿAlī Rāmpūrī (d. 1240/1825); the last had been a student of Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. Another student of Muftī Luṭfallāh’s in Aligarh, Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Ḥanafī (d. 1322/1904), was also a commentator on Ḥamdallāh. He settled in Sahāranpūr.

Rampur, as a site of commentarial activity on Ḥamdallāh, was also represented by Faḍl-i Ḥaqq b. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Rāmpūrī (d. 1358/1939). Born in 1278/1862, al-Rāmpūrī received his initial training in his hometown, and then in Aligarh and Bareilly. His most advanced training was under the supervision of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, with whom he read some works of the classical authors. Faḍl-i Ḥaqq received several prestigious appointments at various colleges in Bhopal and Kolkata, but returned frequently to Rampur, where he eventually settled as the head of the Madrasa-yi ʿĀliya. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī’s student, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Kābulī (on whom see below), trained ʿAbd al-Wāṣi b. Yūsuf. Born in 1290/1873, he was one of the last commentators on Ḥamdallāh.

Thus, in its later phases, commentarial activity on Ḥamdallāh had begun to move beyond the tightly knit enclaves of the Sandila and Lucknow teaching circles to scholars associated proximately with such cities as Rampur, Lahore, Aligarh, and Tonk. This development was partly the function of patronage and the establishment of new madāris, the attendant dissipation of the networks of the earlier scholarly and teaching centers, and the emergence of new dense networks that counted more recent scholars as authoritative nodes. The developments presented in this section are summarized in tree 5 below.
Figure 5. Tree 5: Commentaries on Ḥamdallāh.

**Key for Tree 5**

1. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī
3. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1153/1740)
4. Muḥammad Asʿad
5. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī al-Shamsābādī (d. 1121/1709)
6. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
7. Quṭb al-Dīn b. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī
8. Qāḍī Muḥārak b. Muḥammad Dāʾīm b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1167/1754)
9. Ahmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1167/1754)
10. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Asʿad
11. Muḥammad Wali b. al-Qāḍī Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1198/1784)
12. Ḥasan b. Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1199/1784)
13. Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Sihālawī al-Fatīhpūrī (d. 1175/1761)
14. Muḥammad Aʿlam b. Muḥammad Shākir al-Sandīlawī (d. 1198/1784)
15. Ḥamdallāh b. Shukrallāh b. Dāniyāl b. Pir Muḥammad al-Sandīlawī (d. 1160/1747)
16. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Niẓām al-Dīn Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (d. 1225/1810)
17. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1167/1754)
18. Muḥammad Aḥmad b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1200/1786)
19. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ḥamdallāh al-Sandīlawī (d. 1225/1810)
20. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad al-Naṣīrī b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1225/1810)
21. Muḥammad b. Ḥaydar ʿAli (d. 1273/1857)
22. Shīfatallāh b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1157/1744)
23. Ḥamdallāh b. Shukrallāh b. Dāniyāl b. Pir Muḥammad al-Sandīlawī (d. 1160/1747)
25. Ṭāhir al-Hayy al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
27. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
28. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
29. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
30. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
31. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
32. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
33. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
34. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
35. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
36. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
37. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
38. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
39. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
40. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
41. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
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44. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
45. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
46. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
47. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
48. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
49. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
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51. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
52. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
53. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
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58. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
59. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
60. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ṭāhir al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
As noted above, Ḥamdallāh was not the earliest commentary written on the Sul-lam to receive second-order commentarial attention, although it may have been the quickest to elicit it. The curriculum and the scholarly enclave at Ḥamdallāh's Madrasa-yi Manṣūriyya in Sandila were clearly responsible for this swift growth. The earlier commentary of Ḥamdallāh's contemporary, Mubārak, also invited super-commentaries, although this activity appears to have begun in the second generation after Mubārak. This delay may be explained by the fact that, unlike Ḥamdallāh, the latter did not command a privately endowed madrasa that hosted a dense network of scholars. In the initial phase, commentaries on Mubārak were written mainly by scholars associated with Lucknow and Rampur, where the work was being taught by the Farangī Maḥallīs and Khayrābādīs. In both cases, the regional focus can be related back to two distinct networks of scholars, and, as with Ḥamdallāh, it is likely that the commentaries were penned in the context of scholarly training. For again, one often finds that, where a master produced a commentary, the disciple did so as well. Interestingly, a few commentaries on Mubārak were also written by scholars who were disconnected from any patterns of engagement. And some of these scholars, although unassociated with each other, were from Pashtun and Afghan backgrounds. Thus, part of the historical trajectory of this set of supercommentaries is somewhat haphazard as compared to that of commentaries on Ḥamdallāh.

One of the earliest commentaries on Mubārak appears to have been written by Nūr al-Islām b. Salāmallāh. Born and raised in Rampur, Nūr al-Islām studied under Mullā Ḥasan and Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, the Lakhnawī Farangī Maḥallī scholars and commentators on the Sullam, during their respective tenures in that city. Since the former died in 1199/1784, Nūr al-Islām must have been born no later than the mid-1170s/1760s. The sources do not give much information about him, although some students of his are mentioned in the biographical dictionaries. Almost all were trained by him in Rampur; and two also studied under Ḥaydar Tünkī, also in Rampur. Therefore, although this first commentary was written in Rampur, its author belonged directly to the intellectual lineage of the Lucknow scholars of Farangī Maḥallī.
The next commentator on Mubārak from Lucknow, Muftī Nūr Aḥmad al-Sahsawānī (d. 1280/1864), was also trained by Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. Born in 1190/1776 to a family of muftis, the commentator studied in Sahsawān, in Murūdābād, and in Lucknow. The next several commentators on Mubārak were deeply embedded within the Farangī Maḥallī tradition. Turāb ʿAlī, whom we encountered above as a commentator on Ḥamdallāh, Zuhūr ʿAli b. Ḥaydar (d. 1275/1859), and Muḥammad Yūsuf b. Aṣghar (d. 1286/1870) were all students of the aforementioned teacher of various commentators on Ḥamdallāh, Zuhūrallāh, who had himself written a commentary on Mubārak. Born in 1223/1808, Muḥammad Yūsuf b. Aṣghar, like his teacher, was a member of the Farangī Mahallī family, from the line of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the brother of the early commentator of the Sullam, Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq. In 1277/1861, Muḥammad Yūsuf was appointed a teacher at the Madrasa Ḥanafīyya Imāmiyya in Jawnpur, where he trained a number of students. None of them, however, is known to have written a commentary on Mubārak. His aforementioned student and paternal nephew, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, however, wrote a commentary on Ḥamdallāh (and Ḥasan, on which, see below). Like the last commentator, Zuhūr ʿAli was also descended from the Farangī Mahallīs—his grandfather was Mullā Mubīn, the celebrated commentator on the Sullam. Also from Lucknow, the commentator on Ḥamdallāh, ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm b. ʿAbd al-Rabb al-Farangī Maḥallī, wrote a commentary on Mubārak. Commentarial writing on Mubārak in Lucknow took place simultaneously with the work of scholars associated with Rampur. However, before I discuss them, it is worthwhile to point out that, starting from the earliest phase of commentarial activity on Mubārak in these two cities, a few unassociated Pashtun scholars had also begun to comment on the work. The first of these was most likely Jahd ʿAli b. MuḥABBat Khān al-Hazārawī, who was born in 1150/1738 and died in 1250/1834; unfortunately, we do not have any further information about him. The Pashtun scholar, Muḥammad Aḥsan b. Muḥammad Ṣādiq, who was also known as Ḥāfiẓ Darāz (d. 1263/1847), also composed a commentary on Mubārak. Again, we do not know much about this scholar other than that he was from Peshawar and taught a scholar by the name of Ghulām Nabi (d. 1306/1889) in the same city. A scholar by the name of Muzammil b. Fidāʾ Muḥammad (d. 1292/1875), known as Mullā Šarīkh, also wrote a commentary on Mubārak. The lithograph of the commentary states that he was a Yusufzai in terms of his genealogy—that is, from the region of modern-day northwestern Pakistan or eastern Afghanistan—and that he was a Šarīkhwī in terms of his home. Biographical notices indicate that his father had settled in Šarīkh after living in Mardān, which appears to have been an important center of learning during this period. The work is dedicated to Dūst Muḥammad Khān, a ruler of Afghanistan, who died in 1279/1863. The introductory comments mention the tribulations in the land; these may very well be a reference to the First Anglo-Afghan War. If this is the case, then the work was written sometime in the late 1830s and early 1840s. The lithograph of the
work, produced after 1847, also includes marginal commentary by the author’s son, Ḥabibballāh. Given that no further information is available about his teachers, this case also appears to be an interesting anomaly in the continuity of the Sullam tradition in general. That said, Muzammil b. Fidāʾ was a teacher of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Kābūlī, a commentator on Mubārak (on whom see below).

A commentary on Mubārak’s self-commentary was composed by another Pashtun scholar during this same period. The author, Saʾdallāh b. Ghulām Ḥaḍrat al-Qandahārī, is otherwise unknown. The lithograph of the work, which was published one year after its composition in 1299/1882, mentions the title of the work as al-Kāshīfāt. Since no further information is available, these cases appear to be intriguing anomalies in the continuity of the Sullam tradition in general. They do indicate that Mubārak had become popular among Pashtun scholars outside the scholarly ambit of Lucknow and Rampur, that this occurred relatively early in its commentarial history, and that the interest was sustained.

Commentaries on Mubārak were also written by later Pashtun scholars. Again, I mention them here, since their intellectual genealogies generally do not appear to map onto recognizable patterns. For example, a commentary on Mubārak was produced by Miyān ʿAbdollāh b. Miyān Abrār Shāh al-Pishāwārī (d. 1335/1917). Another commentary on Mubārak was written by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Subḥān al-Hazārāwī (d. 1316/1898), he was trained by Barakât Aḥmad, the student of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, and by Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Balyāwī, a notable scholar of the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband, who also wrote a commentary on the Sullam (see below). Another Pashtun scholar, Muḥammad Nadhīr Sawāṭī (d. 1391/1971), also wrote an extensive commentary on Mubārak that was published in 1395/1975.

The aforementioned Pashtun scholars are somewhat difficult to place in the networks of commentarial production on Mubārak. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that Pashtun scholars writing on the Sullam generally expended their energies on Mubārak and, to some extent on the Sullam itself, not on the two other gateway commentaries. As we will observe below, certainly the later investment in the work was tied to the curriculum at Deoband, where a number of these scholars studied.

We may now return to familiar territory. Along with Lucknow, the continuity of the commentarial tradition on Mubārak was afforded by scholars associated with Rampur, specifically among those who defined the Khayrābādī tradition. The latter was an offshoot of Farangi Maḥall, issuing from Aʿlām Sandīlawī; and through his student, ʿAbd al-Wājid al-Khayrābādī, it also incorporated the scholarly tradition of Gūpāmaw. The first two scholars from among the Khayrābādīs to write a commentary on Mubārak were Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī, the fountainhead of the tradition, and his son, Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī. The latter was born in 1212/1797 in Khayrābād and was trained mainly by his father, who had arrived in Delhi after 1218/1803. It is here that Faḍl-i Ḥaqq began his teaching and civil career, passing thereafter through Alwar, Sahāranpūr, and Tonk as a teacher
between 1246/1832 and 1256/1840 at the invitation of the rulers there. Around 1256/1840, he moved to Rampur at the behest of Nawwâb Muḥammad Saʿid Khān (d. 1271/1856), was appointed tutor of the royal household, and assumed other posts for ten years. Between Delhi and Rampur, Faḍl-i Ḥaqq trained a large number of students. A contemporary of Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, Tāj al-Dīn b. Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Madrāsī (b. 1214/1800), also commented on Mubārak. He was trained by Turāb ʿAli b. Nuṣratallāh al-ʿAbbāsī (d. 1242/1827), a scholar of Khayrābād and a student of the ʿAbd al-Wâjid al-Khayrābādī.

Among the Khayrābādīs, the next commentary on Mubārak was written by Faḍl-i Ḥaqq’s son, the commentator on Ḥamdallāh, ʿAbd al-Haqq al-Khayrābādī. Yet another commentary was composed by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Aʿẓam al-Kābulī (d. 1321/1903), a student of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī. Al-Kābulī received his early training in Kabul, where he was born. After studying with a certain Mullā Surayj, who is identified in the sources as a commentator on Mubārak, he went to Kolkata and Rampur to complete his studies.

At least three other commentaries on Mubārak were written after this period, none of which appear to belong either to the Lucknow or the Rampur network. The first was written by Ghulām Muḥammad b. Ghulām Rasūl al-Jawlākī al-Jihāyisī (d. 1325/1907). Born in 1282/1866 in Punjab, he undertook his initial studies under his father’s supervision and then went to Sahāranpūr to study at the Madrasat Maẓāhir al-ʿUlūm. The next two commentaries are modern. One of these was completed in 1398/1978 by Abū ʿUbayd Manẓūr Aḥmad Nuʿmānī (b. 1340/1922), who was trained in the rationalist disciplines at the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband, including by Ibrāhīm al-Balyāwī. The other commentary was written in 1424/2003 by Muḥammad ʿUbaydallāh al-Ayyūbī al-Qandahārī.

**Summary of Findings**

Some general observations are now in order. Much like Ḥamdallāh, the career of Mubārak was generally tied to specific scholarly circles, the first centered in Lucknow and perpetuated by the Farangī Maḥallīs and their students, and the second in Rampur among the Khayrābādīs. It is worth noting that, just as the writings on Mubārak were starting to dissipate among the first group, they were beginning to receive sustained attention among the second. This is most likely a function of the ascendancy of the princely state of Rampur as a site of royal patronage, just when Lucknow, its rival, was grappling with increasing financial and political pressures from the British East India Company and the rise of sectarian tensions. For example, three of the leading scholars of Farangī Maḥall and the most notable commentators and teachers of the *Sullām*, Bahr al-ʿUlūm, Mullā Ḥasan, and Zuhūrallāh, had all departed from Lucknow between the second half of the twelfth/eighteenth and the first quarter of the thirteenth/nineteenth centuries and had found patronage in Rampur. We might also recall that a similar shift on a more modest scale had taken place with reference to Ḥamdallāh, although interest in it continued to
be sustained in Lucknow; this makes some sense in view of the rise of Lucknow as a Shi‘i principality and the sectarian affiliation of Ḥamdallāh and his earliest commentators, such as Dildār ʿAlī. The production of commentaries on Mubārak in Rampur may be explained with reference to the movement of the aforementioned scholars, while its commentarial footing in Lucknow may well relate partly to the continuity with the Shi‘i tradition that extended back to Sandila. Indeed, as noted above, a number of Lakhnawi commentators on Ḥamdallāh were Shi‘a.

A couple observations should also be made regarding the Khayrābādī tradition of Mubārak in Rampur. First, the Khayrābādīs, much more than the Farangi Maḥallīs, were entrenched in Mubārak’s intellectual lineage: Mubārak was trained by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī and Ṣifatallāh al-Khayrābādī, both of whom were directly within the intellectual lineage of the Khayrābādīs, as noted above. This may suggest that, at some earlier stage, Mubārak was studied in their circles with the same intensity as Ḥamdallāh was studied in Sandila. Secondly, this possibility also explains the curricular choices and interpretive angles of the Khayrābādīs. As I will outline in the next chapter, the Sullam, in certain cases, and Mubārak, much more broadly, had infused the study of logic in South Asia with the apparatus of the Ufuq Mubin of Mīr Dāmād. And it was precisely among the Khayrābādīs, who included Mubārak and other Gūpāmawī scholars in their intellectual lineage, that the Ufuq was most intensely studied and critically assessed. Starting with Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī, the tradition included scholars who taught the Ufuq and also wrote the occasional commentary on it.153 As we will see below, the range of these commentaries pertained to precisely those issues that were of greatest interest to some aspects of the propositional semantics of the Sullam.154 Intriguingly, the scholars explicitly presented in the sources as having studied the Ufuq with the Khayrābādīs were Pashtun, and two, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Kābulī and al-Qādī Muḥammad Nūr al-Qandahārī, were mentioned above as commentators on Mubārak. Since there is no further information about such commentators, one wonders if there is a correlation in their interest in the latter and in the Ufuq. The details of this section are presented in tree 6.

**Mullā Ḥasan**

Like Ḥamdallāh and Mubārak, Mullā Ḥasan also wrote a self-commentary. Other than that, at least eleven supercommentaries were written on his work. The earliest commentary appears to have been written by Walīallāh b. Ḥabīballāh al-Farangi Maḥallī (d. 1270/1854), the paternal nephew of the celebrated commentator on the Sullam, Mullā Muḥib bin Muḥibballāh b. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq.155 Born in 1182/1769, Walīallāh was raised in Lucknow and trained under his paternal uncle, who, as noted above, was a student of Mullā Ḥasan himself. Walīallāh also wrote a commentary on Ḥasan’s Maʿārij al-ʿulūm, a logic work with a critical approach to the Sullam.156
**Figure 6.** Tree 6: Commentaries on Mubārak.

**Key for Tree 6**

1. Ḍuṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Ḍuṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī
3. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1153/1740)
4. Muḥammad Asʿad
5. Ḍuṭb al-Dīn al-Husaynī al-Shamsabādī (d. 1121/1709)
6. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī (d. ca. 1125/1713)
7. Ḍuṭb al-Dīn b. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Gūpāmawī
12. Qāḍī Mubārak b. Muḥammad Dāʾim b. ʿAbd al-Ḥāyy al-Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749)
15. ʿAbd al-Ḥāqq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Ḍuṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1167/1754)
17. Ghulām Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad Asʿad
19. Muḥammad Walī b. al-Qāḍī Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1198/1784)
20. Ḥasan b. Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1199/1784)
22. Muḥammad Aʿlam b. Muḥammad Shākir al-Sandilawī (d. 1198/1784)
28. Ṣifatallāh b. Mādinaṭallāh al-Ḥusaynī al-Khayrābādī (d. 1157/1744)
43. Aḥmadalallāh b. Ṣifatallāh al-Khayrābādī (d. 1167/1754)
60. Muḥammad Walī al-Farangī Maḥallī (d. 1256/1840)
61. Ṣifatallāh b. Mādinaṭallāh al-Ḥusaynī al-Khayrābādī (d. 1256/1840)
62. Ḥaydar ʿAli al-Tünkī (d. 1273/1857)
73. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī (d. 1316 or 1318/1899 or 1901)
74. Faḍl-i Ḥaqq b. Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī (d. 1278/1861)
75. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Aʿẓam al-Kābulī (d. 1321/1903)
83. ʿAbd al-Wājid al-Khayrābādī (d. 1216/1802)
The next set of commentaries, except two, were all products of scholars associated with Lucknow; and the two exceptions were the two last commentators on Ḥasan that I have been able to identify. Almost every commentator was trained directly or indirectly by a member of the Farangi Maḥalli family, and a number of them were members of the family itself. After Walīallāh, the next commentary was composed by the grandson of his teacher, Khādim Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar b. Mubīn al-Farangī Maḥalli (d. 1271/1855) of Lucknow. We have already encountered his brother, Ṭuhūr ʿAlī, as a commentator on Mubārak. Thus, the initial writings on Ḥasan came from a closely knit enclave of the family, which included the lineage of Ḥasan’s own student, Mubīn.

The next flurry of commentaries, also composed in the first half or the early parts of the second half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, were all written by students of the major commentarial node, Ṭuhūrallāh al-Farangī al-Maḥalli.
And all four of these Lakhnawī scholars had also written at least one other super-commentary, either on Ḥamdallāh or Mubārak or both, so that they have been mentioned above: Saʿdallāh Rāmpūrī, Turāb ʿAlī, Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Farangi Maḥallī, and ʿAbd al-Ḥalim al-Farangi Maḥallī.

In the second half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, two recognizable phenomena present themselves. First, just as in the case of Ḥamdallāh, the commentarial tradition had shifted to Lucknow from Sandīla, even as a tie with Shiʿī scholars was maintained, so in the case of Ḥasan, the tie with Shiʿī scholars was established even as that with Lucknow as a locus of activity was maintained. In this regard, as before, the role of Turāb ʿAlī appears to be significant. He trained two Shiʿī commentators on Ḥasan who had also commented on Ḥamdallāh—these were Kamāl al-Mūhānī (d. 1295/1878)158 and Ḥaydar ʿAlī al-Riḍawi (d. 1302/1885).159 The latter scholar was also trained by yet another Shiʿī commentator on Ḥasan—namely, Mīr ʿAbbās al-Shushtāri (d. 1306/1888), a student of Ḥusayn b. Dildār ʿAlī.160

**Summary of Findings**

The details may be summarized as follows. First, commentarial activity on Ḥasan appears to have begun only in the second generation after its composition. This delay is similar to the one faced by Mubārak and may perhaps be explained in view of the immediate entrenchment of supercommentarial activity on Ḥamdallāh. This was likely a trend against which both Mubārak and Ḥasan had to contend.

Secondly, like Ḥamdallāh, Ḥasan was a subject of commentary in Lucknow throughout the thirteenth/nineteenth century and always among scholars associated with Farangi Maḥall. Its sectarian growth, however, occurred in a reverse direction. For whereas Ḥamdallāh’s early career was mainly in Sandila among Shiʿī scholars, only to be perpetuated among the latter and Sunnī scholars in Lucknow, the engagement with Ḥasan in Lucknow was a Sunnī affair, passing onto the Shiʿī scholars of the city only in its second phase. In this regard, the roles of Zuhūrallāh and Turāb ʿAlī, and the intellectual lineage of Dildār ʿAlī appear to be rather significant. Keeping with these same patterns, one of the latest commentaries on Ḥasan was written by the commentator on Ḥamdallāh, Barakatallāh b. Ahmadallāh al-Farangi Maḥallī.

It is only in its final phases that commentarial activity on Ḥasan shifted away from Lucknow. The two latest commentaries of which I am aware were composed by Muḥammad Ḥasan b. Zuhūr Ḥasan al-Isrāʿīli al-Sanbhalī (d. 1305/1888), who lived between Sanbhal and Rampur, and Muftī Lutfallāh of Aligarh.161 I have not been able to get any more useful information about the former, but we may recall that the latter’s intellectual lineage can be traced back, via Mullā Mubīn, to Mullā Ḥasan himself. The observations above are summarized in tree 7.
**Figure 7.** Tree 7: Commentaries on Ḥasan.

**Key for Tree 7**

1. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī
3. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1153/1740)
4. Muḥammad As’ad
15. Ahmad ’Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Saʿīd b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1167/1754)
17. Ghulām Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad As’ad
19. Muḥammad Wali b. al-Qādi’ Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1198/1784)
20. Ḥasan b. Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1199/1784)
23. Ḥamdallāh b. Shukrallāh b. Dāniyāl b. Pīr Muḥammad al-Sandilawī (d. 1160/1747)
55. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ḥamdallāh al-Sandilawī (d. 1225/1810)
56. Dildār ʿAli al-Naṣīrābādi (d. 1235/1820)
59. Ḥusayn b. Dildār ʿAli (d. 1273/1857)
60. Muṭfī Zuhūrallāh b. Muḥammad Wali al-Farangī Maḥallī (d. 1256/1840)
61. Turāb ʿAli b. Shajā’a ʿAli (d. 1281/1865)
62. Ḥaydar ʿAli al-Tūnkī (d. 1273/1857)
69. ʿInāyat Ahmad b. Muḥammad Bakhsh (d. 1279/1863)
70. Muṭfī Luṭfallāh b. Asadallāh al-Kūʿīli (d. 1334/1916)
71. Ḥaydar ʿAli al-Rūḍawī (d. 1302/1885)
91. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Farangī Mahallī
d. 1334/1916
92. Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Farangī Mahallī
d. 1334/1916
93. Abū al-Riḥim b. Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
In this last section, I will mention a number of first-order commentaries on the Sullam that were not the subject of second-order commentarial attention. Some of the earliest examples, from the thirteenth/nineteenth century, reflect the patterns of production that were observed above. Thereafter, commentarial work generally tended to be tied to the fortunes of print culture and to the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband, eventually yielding to the Urdu language.

One of the earliest commentaries from the early thirteenth/nineteenth century was written by ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Nānūtawī. Born and raised in the province of Sindh, he received his higher training from Ghulām Ḥusayn Ilāhābādī. The latter was a student of Aḥlam Sandīlawī and, in turn, taught Dildār ʿAlī. Thus, Nānūtawī was the latter’s contemporary and can be said to fit within the earlier networks of commentarial work between Sandīla and Lucknow.162

The next few minor commentaries on the Sullam were also written by scholars associated with Lucknow and Rampur. These included Khalīl al-Raḥmān al-Muṣṭafābādī al-Rāmpūrī, who was trained by Sharaf al-Dīn al-Rāmpūrī and Mullā Ḥasan. After completing his studies, Khalīl al-Raḥmān arrived in Tonk, where he was appointed qāḍī and was known to engage Ḥaydar al-Tūnkī in debates.163 Sharaf al-Dīn, who was also trained by Ḥaydar al-Ḏahr al-ʿUlūm in Lucknow or Rampur, was also a first-order commentator on the Sullam.
Three additional commentators on the *Sullam* fit these patterns. Muḥammad Ḥanīf b. Abī al-Ḥanīf al-Dhamtūrī (d. 1276/1860) was trained in Delhi and Lucknow. In the latter city, his teachers were Nūr al-Ḥaqq al-Farangi Maḥālī and the latter’s father, Anwār al-Ḥaqq al-Farangi Maḥālī, students of Ḥasan and Bahr al-ʿUlūm respectively. The second commentator, ʿAbd al-Bāṣīṭ b. Rustam ‘Alī al-Qannawjī (d. 1223/1808), wrote on the *Sullam* up to the end of the section on conditionals. He is also reported to have been a teacher of Naʿīm al-Dīn al-Qannawjī, who commented on the *Tāṣdiqāt* section of the *Sullam*.

Notwithstanding two exceptions, the dense enclave for the production of first-order commentaries on the *Sullam* began to dissipate in the next period. Let me mention the two cases that form a continuity, before I turn to the other cases. The first one is Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Farangi Maḥālī (d. 1304/1887), a celebrated scholar of Lucknow who was trained by members of his family. The other commentator was the aforementioned commentator on Ḥasan and Ḥamdallāh, Barakatallāh b. Ḥamdallāh al-Farangi Maḥālī.

In the second half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, these networks of commentarial production began to unravel, and they gave way to different continuities. A good part of the explanation for the changes relates to the emergence of new institutions, methods, and curricula of scholarly training, and the attendant use of print culture. With the immediate exception of two cases—one, a Pashto commentary by Muzammil b. Fidāʾ (d. 1292/1875) and another by a certain Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Bahāʾ, whose work was composed around 1322/1904 for the printing press—a very large set of first-order commentaries on the *Sullam* were produced from this point on by scholars associated with the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband. This was as much an indication of the late thirteenth-/nineteenth-century decline of earlier networks, methods, and institutions of learning that had sustained the *Sullam* tradition as it was of the emergence of new systems that had arisen in their stead.

One of the earliest of these commentaries was written in the first quarter of the fourteenth/twentieth century by ʿUbaydallāh al-Pishāwarī (d. 1344/1924). Thereafter, between the end of the first quarter and the third quarter of the century, the following Deobandī scholars wrote commentaries on the *Sullam*: Muḥammad Ibrāhim al-Balyāwī (d. 1387/1967), who was a student of a student of Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, Muḥammad Ishāq al-Hazārawī (d. 1391/1971), Sayyid Anwār al-Ḥaqq al-Pishāwarī (d. 1388/1968), and Mawlānā Mumtāz al-Dīn. The last two of these commentaries were in Urdu and a number of them were produced for facilitating the training of students.

In the last quarter of the fourteenth/twentieth century and up until the current period, at least five commentaries on the *Sullam* were produced. Three were written by scholars of Deoband—Muftī ʿAṭāʾ al-Raḥmān Multānī (published 1422/2002), Muftī Saʿīd Ahmad Pālanpūrī (published 1433/2012), and Muftī Shakil Aḥmad Sitāpūrī. The remaining two commentaries were composed by
Mawlānā Sayyid Ḥamīd al-Raḥmān and Mawlānā Ṣiddīq Aḥmad Bāndawī. All these commentaries were written in Urdu.

**Summary of Findings**

We may summarize the results as follows. In the generation after the production of the three gateway first-order commentaries on the *Sullam* and up until the turn of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, most of the other first-order commentaries were produced either by the Farangī Maḥallīs or by their students. Every commentary—with the exception of one in Pashto—was written in Arabic. As was the case with commentaries on Mubārak, some of these commentaries were also written by Pashtun scholars whose intellectual genealogies are mostly truncated from the dense networks outlined above, although a couple of cases point to their participation in the Khayrābādī tradition.

By the late thirteenth/nineteenth century, a new set of patterns began to emerge. First, a rather significant number of first-order commentaries were written by scholars associated at some point with the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband. Interestingly, some of these scholars were also Pashtun. In this new kind of institutional setting, several of the commentaries were written for the purposes of seeing their production in print and often for facilitating ease of understanding the Arabic text. Although the Arabic *matn* almost always accompanied the text, the vast majority of commentaries composed in this period was in Urdu and did not display the same complex dialectical engagement that was the hallmark of the earlier tradition. In its last century, therefore, the tradition of the *Sullam* had generally shifted away from supercommentaries on the gateway hypotexts and became tied to a different curriculum belonging to a recent institution—the new madrasa that replaced the extended scholarly networks of production—whose fortunes were tied to print culture. As we observed, it is this print culture, too, which, by the function of its dissemination of texts, also sometimes elicited *readerly* commentaries. Put differently, in the last century, the commentarial tradition of the *Sullam* had come to serve the teaching of a set curriculum within a formalized institution; it was generally no longer a dialectical locus of attention. It is also for this reason that one no longer observes the commentary as unfolding discursively from one generation to another, from master to student, from the gestures of the hypotext to its fulfillment in the hypertexts that perpetuate the exercise. The commentaries discussed in this section are represented in tree 8.

**Conclusions**

Within the Subcontinent, the commentarial tradition of the *Sullam* was vast. This text was also unique in this respect: although by the thirteenth/nineteenth century it had become familiar to scholars outside India, only Indian scholars appear to have commented on it. The text of the *Sullam* was in all likelihood composed in
**Figure 8.** Tree 8: The rest of first-order commentaries.

**Key for Tree 8**

1. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1692)
2. Muḥammad Saʿid b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī
3. Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1153/1740)
4. Muḥammad Asʿad
5. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Saʿid b. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālawī (d. 1167/1754)
6. Ghulām Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad Asʿad
7. Muḥammad Wali b. al-Qāḍī Ghulām Muṣṭafā (d. 1198/1784)
8. ʿAbd al-ʿAlī b. Niẓām al-Dīn Bahṭ al-ʿUlūm (d. 1225/1810)
9. Ḥaydar ʿAli b. Ḥamdallāh al-Sandīlawī (d. 1225/1810)
10. Dildār ʿAli al-Naṣīrābādī (d. 1235/1820)
11. Muftī ʿAbd al-Wājid al-Khayrābādī (d. 1216/1802)
12. Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī (d. 1278/1861)
13. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Muḥammad Aʿẓam al-Kābulī (d. 1321/1903)
15. ʿAbd al-Wājid al-Khayrābādī (d. 1216/1802)
16. Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī (d. 1244/1828 or 29)
17. Anwār al-Ḥaqq al-Farangī Maḥallī
18. Nūr al-Ḥaqq al-Farangī Maḥallī
19. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad Saʿid al-Farangī Maḥallī
92. Ya’qūb b. ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Farangī Maḥallī
93. Abū al-Riḥim b. Ya’qūb b. ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz
96. ‘Abd al-Halīm b. Aminallāh b. Akbar (d. 1285/1869)
97. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Haqq b. Abdu al-Ḥalīm al-Farangī Maḥallī (d. 1304/1887)
101. Muḥibballāh b. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥāqq
102. ‘Alī b. Abī al-Riḥim b. Ya’qūb b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
103. Abū al-Riḥim b. Ya’qūb b. ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz
105. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥayy b. Abdu al-Ḥalīm al-Farangī Maḥallī (d. 1304/1887)
106. Abī al-Riḥim b. Ya’qūb b. ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz
108. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥayy b. Abdu al-Ḥalīm al-Farangī Maḥallī (d. 1304/1887)
111. Nūrallāh b. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥayy b. Abdu al-Ḥalīm al-Farangī Maḥallī (d. 1304/1887)

Lucknow or Delhi in the second half of the eleventh/seventeenth century and gained circulation at a very quick pace. Its earliest commentaries were also written either in Delhi or its vicinity by scholars who, like the author of the hypotext, enjoyed imperial patronage. Some of these earliest commentaries were begun within the lifetime of the author and at least one was completed in the year of his death.

With the shift in the fortunes of the network of Farangī Maḥallī scholars with whom the author had been associated and of Delhi, commentarial activity in the first phase shifted first to Lucknow, and then swiftly also to Gūpāmaw, and Sandīla; this occurred in the first and second quarters of the twelfth/eighteenth century.

In the next phase of first-order commentarial production, which may be dated to the second and third quarters of the twelfth/eighteenth century, a large number of students of Kamāl al-Dīn al-Sihālawī, who had scholarly and matrilineal ties to Farangī Maḥallī, emerged on the scene. It was during this period that two
of the gateway commentaries on the *Sullam* and some of those that were most intensely studied in the madrasa were composed by his students. A large number of commentators during this period belonged to the Farangi Maḥallī family and remained associated with Lucknow. Other commentators, associated with the same scholarly tradition, were located in Gūpamaw and Sandīla.

The vantage points into the tradition of the *Sullam* had thus been identified during this second phase with three gateway commentaries. Owing to the dialectical and oral-textual spaces that commentary inhabited, these three works had come to have a horizontal influence and had also absorbed the commentarial contributions of the first phase. All these works were also accompanied by self-commentaries that served as curatorial guides for commentarial disquisitions, especially with reference to those lemmata that were left deliberately allusive and elusive, so as to exercise the students and sharpen their acumen.¹⁸⁵

Of the three gateway commentaries, Ḥamdallāh received almost immediate commentarial attention. The first flurry of writings came from Sandīla and from Ḥamdallāh’s students at the Madrasa-yi Manṣūriyya, which had been supported by an imperial grant; the commentators were also Shīʿī. This trend began to shift partly during the first half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, when scholars from Lucknow who were closely associated with Farangi Maḥall—either as members of the family or as students—began to compose commentaries. During this period, however, the ties with Shīʿī scholars, some of whom also produced super-commentaries, were maintained. In the second half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, commentaries on Ḥamdallāh began first to be produced in Rampur and then, via ties to scholars in the latter city, in Tonk, Lahore, and Aligarh. These movements, as before, were tied to new centers of patronage; in the case of the latter two cities, they reflected the emergence of new institutions of learning, such as the Anglo-Oriental College (later, Aligarh Muslim College) and the Oriental College Lahore.

The commentary on Mubārak also reflected traceable patterns of production, along with some intriguing anomalies. Its earliest commentary was composed in the second generation after the author—that is, in the late twelfth/eighteenth century. During this time, both Lucknow and Rampur were the sites of commentarial production, the former firmly in the hands of the Farangi Maḥallī tradition and the latter among the Khayrābādis. The latter, as we noted above, were more directly part of Mubārak’s intellectual lineage. Starting in the first half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, commentaries on Mubārak were also produced by a number of Pashtun scholars; this was an activity that continued into the second half of the fourteenth/twentieth century in the context of the training at Deoband.

The commentary of Ḥasan was perhaps the most closely entrenched within the Farangi Maḥallī enclave of Lucknow. In keeping with the trends noted above, the work started in the first half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century; by the middle of this period, in a manner converse to the production of commentaries
on Ḥamdallāh, it had begun to absorb the effort of the Shiʿī scholars of Lucknow. Again, this makes sense in view of the political history of the region. In cases of second-order commentarial production, the Khayrābādis, Žuhūrallāh, Turāb ʿAli, and Dildār ʿAli served as important nodes and mediators.

Finally, other first-order commentaries on the Sullam had also begun to be written when second-order commentarial activity was taking shape. This work was almost entirely in the hands of the scholars associated with Farangī Maḥall and some Pashtun scholars whose intellectual genealogies are obscure. This trajectory continued until the late thirteenth/nineteenth century, when commentarial activity shifted largely to the Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband. During this period, the new institutional setting and curriculum also came to be tied to the vernacular Urdu, print culture, and the textualization of training, in place of the orality embedded within the commentarial tradition. Thus, most commentaries were produced in Urdu for mass distribution among students, and very few supercommentaries were penned. Remarkably, in the three hundred years since it was composed, the massive amount of commentarial work on the Sullam has remained almost exclusively a North Indian affair.
This chapter offers a general introduction to the structure and contents of the *Sul-
lam* and parts of its commentarial tradition. Although it is not my concern per se
to habilitate the *Sullam* tradition within a preceding history, I will resort to a com-
parative approach that will shed light on some aspects of its prehistory.

In the first section of this chapter, I will briefly comment on the structure of
the *Sullam* in relation to three textbooks on logic that held considerable sway in
India. This exercise will give us a sense of the continuities and transformations
to logic studies that the *Sullam* aspired to facilitate. In the second section, I will
offer a broad citation analysis of the text and determine to which authorities the
*Sullam* implicitly and explicitly refers. In general terms, the details presented in
this section will allow us to situate the specific contents of the lemmata within
the framework of the text. In the third section, I will analyze how the *Sullam* and
its commentarial tradition advanced their positions by crafting lemmata from a
combination of their personal expressions and embedded quotations from earlier
texts. The hypotext and hypertexts were diachronic modulations of a historically
continuous voice, such that, even within the space of disciplinary advancements,
the lemmata were patchworks of the old and the new. In the fourth section, I
will offer a representative example of the commentarial reception of a problema
discussed in the *Sullam*. As a logic textbook, the *Sullam* covered a broad set of
topics, ranging from semantic theory and semiotics to propositions and syllo-
gistics. Nevertheless, its investment in the discipline appears to be driven by an
identifiable set of concerns; its attempts at finding solutions to the latter point to
a general orientation and project of the text. This is the subject of the fifth section
of this chapter.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SULLAM

Before the publication of the *Sullam*, the three most widely read logic textbooks in India were the *Shamsiyya* of al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276),¹ the *Tahdhib* of al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390),² and the *Maṭālīʿ* of al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283).³ The first was read via the lens of al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365) and al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) on al-Taḥtānī;⁴ the second via that of ʿAbdallāh Yazdī,⁵ al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502–3), and al-Harawī (1101/1689) on al-Dawānī; and the third via that of al-Taḥtānī. It is on the commentaries of these three works that the Indian logicians wrote supercommentaries—often in the context of the madrasa.⁶

Other important textbooks included in the logic curriculum were the *Risāla fī t-taṣawwur wa-t-taqdiq* of al-Taḥtānī, read via the commentary of al-Harawī. Although this work is concerned primarily with the nature of knowledge and is not a complete logic textbook, it was included in the logic curriculum, because its subject matter overlaps with the opening sections of the aforementioned logic textbooks. It was also the logic text that received the greatest number of commentaries and supercommentaries—especially via the commentary of al-Harawī—after the *Sullam*.⁷ Another logic text was the *Mīzān al-manṭiq*, engaged through the intermediary of its commentary, the *Badīʿ al-mīzān* of ʿAbdallāh al-Tulanbī (922/1516–17).⁸ Shorter logic works included a commentary on al-Abharī’s (d. 660–663/1263–65)⁹ Īsāghūjī, attributed in India to al-Jurjānī, as well as the latter’s *Ṣughrā* and *Kabrā*.¹⁰ These works also attracted Indian supercommentaries. The sources and manuscript witnesses also suggest familiarity with the *Shifāʾ* of Avicenna,¹¹ but commentarial attention to the logic of this work is virtually nonexistent and its citation usually occurs via the intermediary of other texts.

As the logic textbooks that were most familiar to Indian scholars were the *Shamsiyya, Maṭālīʿ*, and *Tahdhib*, it should not be surprising, especially in the context of madrasa training, that the *Sullam*’s structure maps onto them rather well. Indeed, it is not only the arrangement of the *Sullam* but also the space expended on each topic that is proportionately identical to that of the three earlier textbooks.¹² For example, all four works devote extended discussions to sections on modals, conditionals, contradiction and conversion rules, modal syllogisms, and conditional syllogisms.¹³ There are, however, a few differences as well. In terms of structure, the discussion of the contradictories of universals is delayed in the *Shamsiyya* until after the logical, natural, and mental universals have been mentioned; on the other hand, the five universals are discussed at great length in the *Maṭālīʿ*—significantly more than in any of the other three textbooks—but only after the logical, natural, and mental universals. In contrast to the *Shamsiyya* and the *Maṭālīʿ*, the structure and topical foci of the *Tahdhib* map onto those of the *Sullam* precisely. And this makes eminent sense, as the *Tahdhib* was the most widely studied textbook on logic in the period immediately before the publication

¹ *Shamsiyya* of al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276).
² *Tahdhib* of al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390).
³ *Maṭālīʿ* of al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283).
⁴ al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365).
⁵ ʿAbdallāh Yazdī.
⁶ On the context of the madrasa.
⁷ *Sullam*.
⁸ *Mīzān al-manṭiq*.
⁹ al-Abharī’s (d. 660–663/1263–65) Īsāghūjī.
¹⁰ *Ṣughrā* and *Kabrā*.
¹¹ *Shifāʾ* of Avicenna.
¹² *Sullam*.
¹³ *Shamsiyya, Maṭālīʿ*, and *Tahdhib*. The *Sullam* maps onto all three of these textbooks.
of the *Sullam*. Its growth may be explained partly by the fact that its most famous commentary—by al-Dawānī—reverted back to the intellectual lineage of Shirāz that was shared by Farangī Maḥall and partly by the later legacy of al-Harāwī in India. Indeed, after the *Sullam*, the complete logic textbook to garner the most commentarial attention in India was the *Tahdhīb*, either via the vantage point of al-Dawānī or al-Harawī; manuscript evidence also bears witness to its wide circulation.\(^\text{14}\)

Now, what is rather intriguing about the *Sullam* is that, within the familiar terrain of these aforementioned textbooks, it encapsulated the earlier tradition in two distinct manners, so as to drive the hypertextual writing practices on itself. First, generally speaking, the *Sullam* embraced key dialectical histories—often from the commentaries on the logic texts the Indian tradition engaged—within its lemmata; and it implicitly indicated these histories by means of allusive gestures in the course of establishing its own stance. And second, it patched together verbatim quotations from other texts to produce its own lemmata and positions, forcing the hypertexts into textual archaeologies that became sites of further dialectics. In other words, brief and traditionally grounded as it was, the *Sullam* was deceptively heavy-laden, and its contribution as an original text was borne out as a patchwork of the past. The text was, therefore, a prompt that agitated the future hypertext. Examples from each of the two cases above might suffice as explanations.

### DIALECTICS

For the first case—namely, of allusive dialectical histories within the recognizable structure of the *Sullam*—one may turn to the section on propositions. Here al-Bihārī writes,

[The complete compound utterance is called] a statement and a proposition if a report about something actual is intended by it. And so it is necessarily described by truth and falsity.\(^\text{15}\)

The basic position al-Bihārī is promoting is a familiar one: a complete compound utterance, one with respect to which no further information is required for it to be meaningful, is a statement if it reports about what is actual and if, in view of the latter, it is susceptible to being true or false. This definition is also asserted by the *Tahdhīb*: “A proposition is a statement that is susceptible to truth and falsity.”\(^\text{16}\) The same position is expressed by the *Shamsiyya*: “A proposition is a statement about whose speaker it is suitable to say that he is truthful or a liar with respect to it.”\(^\text{17}\) Likewise, one finds the following in the *Maṭāli*’: “As for compound [utterance] . . . if it supplies to the listener a meaning [on hearing which] he may retain silence [because the meaning is complete] and if it is capable of being true or false, it is called a proposition and a sentence.”\(^\text{18}\)
Thus, an essential aspect of a proposition is its truth aptness. At this juncture, al-Bihārī introduces a conundrum that does not appear in any of these aforementioned predecessor texts. He states,

One [may] say that “This speech of mine is false” is not a statement because a report [that reports] about itself is nonsensical. The truth is that, [when this statement] is taken, along with all its parts, on the side of the subject term, then the relation [within the subject term] is considered in a compressed form [malḥūza ijmālan], so that [the relation] is that about which there is a report. And insofar [as the matter] pertains to generating [a statement] by means of [the relation,] the latter is considered in an expressed form [malḥūza tafsīlan]; so it is a report [about its own self]. So the difficulty is resolved in all its manifestations.¹⁹

This is of course a discussion of the famous Liar Paradox, and its aim is to resolve the difficulty that the assumption of its truth entails its falsity and vice versa. For if “This statement of mine is false,” is true, then it falls within the set of statements that are true; and this, in turn, means that it is indeed true that it is false. Alternatively, if the statement is false, it falls within the category of false statements; this entails that its assertion of being false is false, so that it is true. Al-Bihārī’s motivation for including this discussion at this juncture rests not on the hypotexts that are his models but on their commentarial history. In fact, as I will briefly outline below, his resolution is guided by one of them and targets another, serving as a prompt that thrusts his hypertexts into a dialectical space.²⁰

The argument that al-Bihārī offers above is predicated on the key distinction between a compressed (mujmal) and expressed (mufaṣṣal) proposition. In the former case, the whole proposition itself is taken as a subject of another proposition, so that its truth-value is determined with a view to whether the assertion of the relation between the propositional subject and predicate “false” accurately captures the state of affairs. Since it is being claimed that a given false statement is false, the proposition is true; it reports truthfully about that regarding which it is a report. In the latter case, the assertion of the predicate “false” generates the statement, “This statement is false.” In this case, the assertion produces the very statement about which it reports. As such, it is a report about its very self.

Put differently, the solution being offered may be summarized as follows. A compressed reading of the proposition takes \( p \) as the subject “\( p \) is false,” and the expressed reading takes \( p \) as \( p \) is false. In the former case, the relation, subject, and predicate are all parts of the subject “\( p \),” so that the report is about the relation compressed within the subject term “\( p \).” The report is asserting the predicate “false” of \( p \), and this is a truthful reporting of the state of affairs. In the latter case, “falsity” is being predicated of \( p \) and a statement, \( p \) itself, is generated by means of the relation between the two. However, in this case, the report is nothing other than the relation that it itself generated; hence, it is a report about its own self. The compressed consideration allows for the paradox to be avoided; the expressed form does not.²¹
One can easily determine why this discussion has found its way within a traditionally recognizable lemma on the claim that statements, by definition, are truth-apt. Surely, since the statement, “This statement is false,” is a report, it must be either true or false. Yet, as the argument makes plain, a statement of this sort results in a paradox where the truth-value oscillates perpetually. The Liar Paradox, therefore, constitutes a challenge to the standard claim that statements are truth-apt. In al-Bihārī’s solution, two elements are noteworthy. First, the solution appeals to the distinction between compressed and expressed considerations of statements; and second, it begins with an implicit rejection of the possibility that the statement in question is not a statement at all, since it is self-referential.

Let me take up the first matter. If we turn to the same section in al-Taḥtānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, we find an engaging discussion about the hypothesis’s assertion that a proposition is predicative—not conditional—if its two extremes resolve into simple utterances. For example, “Man is an animal” is predicative because, when the copula is removed, one is left with two simple utterances—“man” and “animal.” On the other hand, when the proposition, “If the sun rises, morning would exist” is resolved, the two extremes would be compound utterances—“The sun rises” and “The morning exists.” Al-Taḥtānī points out that this way of distinguishing the two types of statements is not sufficiently accurate. For example, one may have a predicative statement—“Every rational animal moves by putting one foot before the other”—that does not resolve into two simple utterances. Worse, one could even make statements about statements: “The contradictory of ‘Zayd is knowledgeable’ is ‘Zayd is not knowledgeable’” and “Morning exists” is entailed by “The sun rises” are examples. Both these latter statements resolve into two other compound statements; yet both are predicative. Thus, a key element in the definition of predicative statements—namely, that they resolve into simple utterances—is violated. Al-Taḥtānī offers the following response:

By a simple utterance is meant either that which is simple in actuality or in potentiality. The latter is that which may be expressed by means of a simple utterance. In the aforementioned propositions, although the extremes are not simple utterances in actuality, they may be expressed by means of simple utterances. The least of these would be for one to say, “This is that” and “This is this” . . . This is not the case with conditionals. For their extremes cannot be expressed by means of simple utterances. For in them, one cannot say, “This proposition is that proposition” . . . .

Al-Taḥtānī’s account thus veers toward the resolution of compound utterances into simple ones. In other words, “Morning exists” is entailed by “The sun rises” is a predicative proposition because its extremes are potentially, “This proposition” and “That proposition,” which can be expressed as “This proposition is entailed by that proposition.” Any proposition whose extremes may be expressed in this manner and may be brought in a relation is predicative. In this context, al-Taḥtānī’s commentator, al-Jurjānī, explains the notion of the potential resolution of compound utterances to simple ones in the following manner:
When [a relation in a proposition] is considered in a compressed form \([malhūţa ijmālan]\), [this proposition] is also predicative . . . When [the relation] is considered as expressed \([malhūţa tafsilān]\), the proposition is a conditional . . . Thus it is apparent that the extremes of the predicative [proposition] are either simple [utterances] in actuality or in potentiality . . . Likewise, that which consists of a predicative relation is among such [propositions] in whose place a simple [utterance] may be posited when [the predicative relation] is considered as compressed.

Therefore, the kernel of the argument is that two types of considerations may be advanced in relation to propositions—the relation between their extremes may be taken to be expressed or compressed. In the latter case, one may simply replace the predicative proposition with a simple utterance; as such, it would be the subject of a proposition and that about which something is reported. This argument is further elaborated by al-Siyālkūtī in his commentary on al-Jurjānī. I render it here, since this work was also an important point of contact with the \(Shamsiyya\) in the Indian milieu:

His statement, “[The relation between the subject and predicate] is considered as compressed” means that one does not intend to turn to the relation, but to the totality [of the proposition] insofar as the totality is also predicative, given that judgment [in a proposition] may be taken with respect to the unity [of the subject and the predicate]. His statement, “[The relation] is considered as expressed” means that one does intend to turn to the relation—this requires taking the two extremes into consideration as expressed—so that the judgment may not be taken with respect to the unity [of the subject and the predicate].

Although the point of issue in this context is not the Liar Paradox—rather, it is a definition of predicative and conditional propositions that would sufficiently distinguish one from the other—the solution offered here turns on the same distinction as one finds in al-Bihārī’s \(Sullam\). For we recall that, in the latter case, the same notions and expressions were deployed to overcome the conundrum: the Liar statement is not problematic if we take the statement, on the one hand, in a compressed form—that is to say, as that about which something is reported—and, on the other, in an expressed form, as that which reports. The two considerations accomplish two related tasks. First, that about which something is reported is under a different consideration than that which reports; they are not one and the same. And second, that which is false (the compressed) is under a different consideration than that which is true (the expressed). It is this latter that is either self-referential or what oscillates between truth and falsity.

We recall, however, that al-Bihārī also implicitly rejected another solution to the conundrum—namely, that the paradox is actually unproblematic since the Liar statement is self-referential, so that it is nonsensical. The distinctions between the compressed and expressed forms are meant to overcome this problem of self-reference. Here again, the history of al-Bihārī’s lemma stretches back into the commentarial tradition. In the same section in his commentary on the \(Tahdhīb\),
al-Dawânî explains that by the truth-aptness of propositions, al-Taftâzânî means that the intellect allows either truth or falsity to apply to propositions simply by virtue of what they mean, without regard to what is actual. In other words, propositions whose truth cannot be granted by the intellect and those whose falsity cannot be accepted are still propositions because their mere sense allows for this possibility, even if in fact this possibility does not actualize. This reduces to the position that the truth-aptness of propositions relates to the possibility of the presence or absence of a correspondence between that which the proposition reports and that about which it is a report. He then writes,

An equivalent scenario is that, when a sketcher embarks upon sketching a picture, such that it is a report [ḥikāya] about Zayd, one may level an objection against him that it lacks correspondence [with Zayd]. And if he undertakes the mere task of sketching without the claim that it is a sketch of a certain thing, then no error can befall him at all. For every sketch is a sketch with respect to its given self [fī ḥaddi dhātihi]. From this detail, perhaps you would understand that someone's statement, “This statement of mine is true,” which refers to this very speech, is not a statement at all, even though it has the form of a statement. This is so because a report requires a distinction between itself and that about which it is a report. And this is lacking in this case.28

Al-Dawânî further explains that, if the sketcher were to begin to draw a sketch, claiming that it is a sketch of the very sketch being drawn (ʿalā annahā ḥikāya ʿan nafsihā), then such a sketch would not be susceptible to error. It would only correspond with itself, thereby vitiating the mere possibility of a lack of correspondence by virtue of its very self. As such, since it lacks the mere possibility both of being true and false, it is not a report.29 The Sitz im Leben of al-Bihârî’s insertion of the Liar Paradox at this juncture, his cryptic rejection of the solution by appeal to self-reference, and the ultimate inspiration of his own solution are now apparent. The content and structural position of the lemma of the Sullam are practically identical to those of the Shamsiyya and the Tahdhib; its appeal to the Liar Paradox at this locus is meant to engage a challenge to the definition of propositions as truth-apt; its initial dismissal of the solution by appeal to self-reference—that the Liar statement is self-referential and, therefore, nonsensical and unproblematic—is an allusion to al-Dawânî’s discussion of self-reference in the same section; and his solution in view of the difference between the compressed and expressed considerations of proposition ultimately reverts to the commentaries on the Shamsiyya. Put differently, even as the lemmata of the Sullam fit within recognizable molds, they complicated traditional positions within the ambit of an apparently simple curricular hypotext that belied complexity; and they accomplished this task by means of brief, yet loaded, engagements with earlier commentarial concerns and disputes. For its own hypertexts, these lemmata served as sites and prompts for continued dialectic, often compelling the authors to engage in excavating the textual pre-history of the Sullam.
One may mention examples of the reception of this lemma and how, without being explicit, it guided the hypertexts. For example, in engaging the next statement of the Sullam—namely, that the Liar Paradox is like the statement, “Every praise belongs to God”—Mubīn writes,

Our statement, “Every praise” belongs in the totality of all praise [kullu hamdin min jumlati kulli hamdin]. This is so because it is also a praise. So it is an instance of itself. Thus, the report in it is the very thing about which there is a report. As such, it becomes like “This statement of mine is false” in that the report and that about which it is a report are one and the same. So, in [bringing this case forward,] the author indicated [ashāra ilā] the error of what the Verifier [al-Dawānī] said—namely, that there is no doubt in this [statement’s] being a truth apt-statement (khabar)—although there is no report in this case; otherwise, it would follow that there would be a report about its very self, which is nonsensical. Thus, there is no way out of this [conundrum] except by appeal to [a statement’s] being compressed and expressed. So this statement [of the Sullam] aids in [determining] that “This statement of mine is false” is a truth-apt statement. The difference between [the report and that about which it is a report] is by appeal to their being compressed and expressed.30

It is in a rather subtle manner that this section on propositions reveals itself as a dialectical space. By means of their textual archaeology, the commentators had come to realize that the target was al-Dawānī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb. They also came to understand that the latter had granted that “Every praise belongs to God” may be a statement, and that it was, nevertheless, self-referential and therefore also nonsensical.31 Thus, if al-Dawānī were to remain committed to his position on the latter statement, he had no choice but to accept the Sullam’s solution. For his own solution could be used to compromise a position that he was known to hold.32 Having laid out the details of this final turn of the argument against al-Dawānī, one that forces a concession by virtue of a position he would hold, Mubīn comes to his defense. He explains that if the praise expressed in, “Every praise belongs to God” includes the very praise itself, then it is indeed nonsensical. However, if it includes praises other than this very one, then it is a report. What is required, then, is a distinction between a report and that about which it is a report; and this is precisely what the Sullam’s distinction between the compressed and expressed reports was attempting to deliver.33

The archeology of the text also explains why al-Bihārī offered this specific solution. As we observed in the quotations above, one of al-Dawānī’s main concerns was with self-reference—a report and that about which it reports must be two distinct things;34 otherwise, the report would be nonsensical. Alternatively, as we observed in the analogy he offered, such an utterance is not a report, because its mere sense does not allow for the possibility both of its truth and falsity. And this is precisely what the Sullam’s solution tried to deliver by appeal to the distinction between compressed and expressed statements. The former are those about which something is reported, whereas the latter are the reports themselves.35 As
I have stated elsewhere, the lemma was a prompt for a dialectical engagement in the future hypertext, containing within itself determined and compact stances in relation to earlier commentarial traditions. But I will elaborate on this theory and its mechanics in the next two chapters.

The foregoing lemma—like many other similar ones—brought the hypertext back to a textual past. It did so by reviving a debate with an implicit rival, whose identity and text were unfolded by the hypertextual activity. In crafting its solution, the hypotext also ultimately and creatively relied on comparable lemmata in earlier madrasa texts. But the solution the hypotext offered also galvanized the field. A number of commentaries on this lemma of the Sullam analyzed its solution, and in so doing, they also began to introduce further distinctions in the debate, some on the basis of further textual excavations and others of their own effort. Let me give examples from two of the earliest commentaries on this lemma.

In his commentary, al-Sāʾīnūrī lays out three different ways in which “This speech” in “This speech of mine is false” may be understood. It may refer to the utterance itself or to its meaning or to its instance. In the first two cases, if it is false that “This speech of mine is false,” then “This speech of mine is true” would be true only if the two were reports. As they are not, the predicate of falsity is parsed as a denial of its status as an utterance; or to say that it is false is to deny that its meaning is true. The problem of the Liar, then, rests squarely on the third interpretation—namely, that the predicate “false” applies to the instances of “This speech.” In this case, what one is asserting is that the truth-apt statement, “This statement is false,” is false. The affirmation of falsity, therefore, must be false. As a result, the contradictory, “This statement is true,” must be true. However, since this truth is on the assumption of falsity, it results in the aforementioned paradox. Like al-Bihārī, al-Sāʾīnūrī now alerts the reader that what produces the paradox is not the compressed reading of the proposition but the expressed, where the predicate and its relation to the subject are affirmed. And he points out that the distinction between the compressed and expressed interpretations overcomes the difficulty that the report and that about which it is a report must be distinct. This is simply because it is the compressed report that is reported about and the expressed report that is actually the report.

The two related gains outlined above—namely, that the paradox is the result of two different readings of propositions and that the two different readings introduce the necessary distinctions between a report and that about which it is a report—are simply an elaboration of al-Bihārī’s lemma. But the author also explains the argument by means of the following parallel case mentioned in a number of other sources. Let us imagine that one states on Thursday that “My statement on Friday is true” and that, on Friday, he states that “My statement on Thursday was false”; and let us also grant that no other statements were issued on these two days. Thus, on the assumption of the truth of the statement on Friday, the statement on Thursday would be false; and its falsity, in turn, would mean that the statement on Friday was false. This means that on the assumption of the truth of the statement on Friday, its own falsity is asserted.
Al-Sāʾinpūrī points out that this conundrum may be overcome if we realize that the truth exists for the instance—the only instance—of the subject of the Friday statement, namely, “My statement on Thursday was false.” In this regard, what the statement really asserts is “‘My statement on Thursday was false’ is true” in the sense that its falsity corresponds to a given state of affairs. This state of affairs is the claim on Thursday that the statement on Friday is true. In other words, on Thursday, the speaker posited an instance for the subject tag “My statement on Friday” such that it would be qualified by the attribute of truth. And this statement on Friday, “My statement on Thursday was false” is true in the sense that it corresponds to the given and actual posit on Thursday. The thing about which the report exists, therefore, is the actual posit—an instance, given as such—and it is said to be true in the sense that it corresponds to the posit. This is precisely what the distinction between the compressed and expressed readings delivers. In this regard, al-Sāʾinpūrī alerts the reader to another important underlying aspect of the solution, namely, that it is operative under the ḥaqīqi, not the khāriji, parsing of the proposition. The former is such as to allow the mind to posit an instance determined by it with certain qualifications under a tag and for the predicate to apply to it—as such a given—with respect to what is actually the case. He writes, “If the instances of the possible were to exist and were described by this tag, then on the determination of their existence, they would be described by falsity.” Put differently, if the instances of “This statement on Friday” were determined mentally to exist as true on Thursday and were described by the tag “This statement on Friday” then, in view of this given state of affairs, these instances would be true by virtue of their correspondence with the given claim on Thursday.

Having introduced these distinctions in the discourse, al-Sāʾinpūrī now lays out a potential problem. Truth and falsity, he asserts, are attributes of a relation that reports something; so they must be posterior to such a relation. Therefore, if either of them is made a predicate, it must precede the relation. He claims, however, that this challenge is not effective in the case at hand. Although he does not elaborate on the reasons, it is obvious that the refutation would fall by the wayside, since the claims of truth or falsity in the given compressed forms of the report are simply mentally posited qualities, not attributes that relate to correspondence with the extramental; and the same claims in the expressed form are indeed posterior to the correspondence between the thing about which the report exists and the given state of affairs. As such, they are not predicates. Nevertheless, the criterion of posteriority is retained in view of two abiding challenges that continued to be reconsidered in other commentaries—the report must be posterior to that about which it is a report; and the report and that about which it is a report must be distinct from each other.

As we will observe below, the approach al-Sāʾinpūrī adopted in his elaboration of the Sullam’s solution—namely, that the subject of the proposition may be conceptualized in a certain sense and that truth and falsity may be determined in view of this given conceptualization with respect to the actual state of affairs—was one of its major leitmotifs. A fundamentally important aspect in deploying this
move was to recognize that a particular consideration could be taken, in virtue of its very self, as an actual state of affairs, such that propositional claims about it, with respect to itself, would also be true or false with respect to the actual. This is precisely the point made by al-Sā‘īnāpurī in his recognition that the proposition was unproblematic if parsed as *haqiqi*. This perspective was not granted by all the commentators, so that the solution offered above, along with its underlying machinery, fell on several deaf ears.

We may take another early commentator, Fīrūz, as a representative case. He begins his commentary on this lemma by pointing out that al-Dawānī had resolved the paradox by demonstrating that the sentence at hand is not a report, because there is no distinction between it and that about which it is a report. The gist of the matter, he explains, is that a report is the very sense of the proposition, and that about which it is a report is its verifying criterion. Thus, if the two were one and the same, there would be no possibility for a report, in virtue of its sense, to be either true or false. Since it is self-referential, it would only be true. Given this, the following elements must hold. (1) The criterion of verification—that about which there is a report—must also precede the report; it must exist independently of the report. (2) The relation between the subject and the predicate must be valid only in the report, not in that about which it is a report. And finally, (3) the distinction between the two must be with respect to their very selves (*bi-dh-dhāt*), not in virtue of some consideration (*bi-l-iʿtibār*). The crux of the challenge lay in the third condition, for if it is granted that a distinction on the basis of consideration is sufficiently satisfactory, then one may posit a report with certain mentally determined qualifications. Such an object would both precede the report about it and would also itself be considered a report.

Thus, elaborating on this lemma, Fīrūz writes,

[The lemma] may be rendered as follows. A proposition is of two types. It is compressed—the collection [of the parts of the proposition] insofar as they are compressed; here, the relation is not made a tie between the subject and the predicate. Or it is expressed—the collection [of the parts] insofar as they are expressed; here, the relation is made a tie between them. The first is independent with respect to its sense and the second is not independent with respect to it. Between the two of them there is a unity in virtue of themselves and a distinction in virtue of mental consideration—namely, the observation of the fact of being compressed and expressed. In the case at hand, that about which the judgment is passed is the collection, “This statement of mine is false,” with a view to the first type of consideration; as such, it is that about which there is a report. And the report is with a view to the second type of consideration. The mentally considered distinction between [that about which there is a report] and the report is sufficient. Al-Dawānī’s statement that “the distinction between the report and that about which it is a report is by virtue of themselves” is an oversight. However, do you not see that our statement, “Every praise belongs to God” is among the totality of all praise. Thus, if the distinction between the two of them had to be in virtue of their very selves, this statement would not be correct. Thus, it is now known that [the distinction in virtue of their very selves] is not necessary.^[41]
Firūz thus understands that a mental consideration does not produce an object, which, so posited and given, may be evaluated in virtue of its given self. Rather, the fact of consideration remains perspectival. Therefore, he understands al-Bihārī to be arguing that, since “Every praise belongs to God” is of the same self-referential nature, with no distinction between the report and that about which it is a report, and since such a report is not nonsensical, the distinction between the two in virtue of mental consideration must be sufficient. He concludes the discussion in the following manner:

The gist of what the Verifier al-Dawānī says in his solution to this paradox is that this speech is precluded from being a report . . . For one of two things must obtain for it to be so. Either a real distinction between the report and that about which it is a report must exist in this case or a distinction in virtue of mental consideration must be sufficient. Yet neither of these things is established by what he mentions. This is owing to the limits of his reflection.

The former possibility, as we noted, was not entertained by Firūz; he accepted the latter, but it was dismissed by others as they undercut al-Bihārī’s effort to force a concession in view of the statement, “Every praise belongs to God.” We recall that the latter statement was not granted as a parallel case by al-Sāʾinpūrī, who took the mental posit of the subject term in virtue of its very given self.

EMBEDDED TEXTS

In many other cases, the dialectic of the Sullam’s lemmata was also provoked by the verbatim incorporation of earlier texts. These lemmata constituted new forms of arguments out of a patchwork of expressions, some al-Bihārī’s and some belonging to his predecessors. The same mode of writing was also used by his commentators, including, as we observed above, in cases where a commentary was compounded of others. Here I offer one example of this pervasive phenomenon.

In the section on the subject terms of propositions, al-Bihārī writes,

[In the proposition “Every J is A”] by J we do not mean that whose reality is J. Nor [do we mean] that which is described by it. Rather, [we mean] something more general than these two [senses]. [We mean] those individual instances of which J is true. These individual instances may be real, such as the particular instances or species instances. Or they may be [instances] that are [a product of mental] consideration, such as animal-genus. For [the latter] is more specific than animal simpliciter. However, customary usage takes [only] the first type [noted above] as relevant.

The history of the growth of this lemma is rather tortuous, so that for the purposes of this section, I will only outline a simple path that is sufficient to undergird my general claims. To begin then: al-Bihārī is arguing for a bipartite interpretive division of the subject term of any proposition. When one states that every J is A, the J is not limited to being a term like “man” that picks out the reality of that which falls under it (John, William, etc.); nor is J limited to being a term like “white” that stands as a description of that which falls under it (swans, the Taj Mahal, etc.).
Rather, encompassing both these possibilities, it simply stands for that of which it is true. Now $J$ may be said truly of two types of substrates—the real and the considered. It is this division that became the grist of the commentarial mill that ultimately revealed the structural features of the Sullam’s lemma.

Take, for example, Mubārak, who writes:

Among particulars, that of which $J$ is true may be real $ḥaqīqīyya$. They are those [cases] whose specific [nature] $khuṣūṣīyya$ is owing neither to a kind of mere consideration of the intellect nor to the fact of its observation $mulāḥaża$, such as species and individuals $anwā’ wa-ashkhās$. And they [i.e., the particulars] may be owing to consideration $i’tibāriyya$. These are those whose specific [natures] are owing only to the consideration [of the intellect], such as the animal-genus. [This is so] since it is taken with respect to [a consideration of its] generality $min ḥaytu l-ʿumūm$, such that the mode of [consideration] $al-hayṭiya$ brings to the foreground the absoluteness [of the substrate] $bi-an yakūna al-hayṭiya bayānān bi-l-iṭlāq$. [The consideration of the mode] does not [serve] as an act of supplying a restriction of generality and absoluteness $lā taqyīdan bi-l-ʿumūm wa-l-iṭlāq$. So [animal-genus] is more specific $akḥass$ than animal insofar as it is animal.\footnote{45}

Thus, the only difference between the two types of substrates, as granted by Mubārak, is that the specific aspect or nature of the former (i.e., the $ḥaqīqī$) that stands in focus is not owing to the observation of the intellect. On the other hand, in the latter type of substrate, the specific aspect or nature is brought to the fore entirely owing to the consideration of the intellect. However, this latter consideration does not restrict the substrate; it merely brings into relief its absolute nature under the fact of its mental consideration. Put differently, when “animal” is considered with respect to the fact of its being a genus, then it is taken as a mentally considered $i’tibāri$ substrate. The consideration as a genus is not a qualification added onto “animal” that specifies it as a kind of limitation on a general type; it is merely a consideration of “animal” insofar as it is a genus. The upshot is that both substrates (animal and animal-genus) can be said to have some specific aspect or nature ($khuṣūṣīyya$), although, again, it is only in the case of the animal-genus that a certain aspect is highlighted and made relevant owing to mental consideration. In principle, both types may be suitable as propositional subjects.

In addition to the substance of the argument, certain terms are also important to bear in mind: Mubārak has appealed to the notions of $khuṣūṣīyya$, $taqyīd$, and $mulāḥaża$ as central to his commentarial exercise. These notions are introduced and deployed by his commentary with as little fanfare and exposition as the statements of the Sullam itself. This gives the reader the impression of a kind of completeness in both layers: brief as it is, the hypotext presents a statement that would elicit no protest of incompleteness from its reader; and it is only with the arrival of the hypertext that the former is opened up in a rather casual manner, such that, in relation to the latter, the former now begins to appear incomplete. From this
point on, the hypotext could no longer be read without the hypertext. In turn, features of Mubārak’s own lemma were subsumed in the voice of his contemporary, Ḥamdallāh. It is in this commentary that allusive textual retrojection began to take shape, giving speed to the rehabilitation of the lemma of the *Sullam* within its true discursive space. Ḥamdallāh writes:

Let it be known that that which is more specific with respect to reality, I mean, the opposite [*muqābil*] of that which is more specific with respect to consideration, divides into [1] an instance that may be restricted by that which is real [*al-ḥaqqi wa-l-ḥaq*] and [2] that which may be called an instance [determined by] consideration [*al-fard al-iʿtibārī*]. Thus, if a nature is taken along with a certain restriction [*idhā ukhidhat maʿa qaydin mā*], that which is [so] taken would be an instance [*fard*] of [that] nature. And if [a nature] is observed as related to a certain restriction [*idhā lūḥizat mudāfatān ʿilā qaydin mā*], such that the restriction is external [to the nature] and the act of restricting, insofar as it is an act of restricting, is included [in the consideration of the nature, the nature, so taken,] [*wu-t-qaqīd min haythu huwa taqīdī dākhilān*] would be a part [*hiṣṣa*] of [the nature]. So the part would be [a distinct] nature. The difference is owing to the kind of consideration [*al-faq bi-naḥwīn mina l-iʿtibār*]. However, this kind of consideration is distinct from the consideration *that is under examination* in the case of the specificity [that obtains] according to consideration [*lākinna hādha naḥwa l-nafsi sh-shay*. The real instances of universals that do not obtain positively except by means of the relation [of the mental consideration to the absolute]—such as existence, nonexistence, and the rest of the verbal concepts [*maʿānī maṣdarīyya*]—are their parts [*hiya ḥiṣṣuḥā*]. The upshot is that these [types] may also be called [instances of] consideration, as it is explained in the *Ufuq mubīn* [of Mīr Bāqir Dāmād]. Since the eminent al-Lāhūrī [al-Siyālkūtī] was not aware of this fine point and he [also] opined that the parts were [instances of] consideration, he excluded parts from [the category of] real instances.46

The *Sullam* had stressed that subject terms may pick out substrates that are unconditioned or conditioned by mental consideration. We were told, however, that, in customary usage, one does not interpret subject terms to pick out mentally considered substrates; this observation had effectively allowed for both types of subject terms to be susceptible to the same universal rules, the distinction between them falling squarely on common usage. This basic discussion in the *Sullam* was then filled out with additional philosophical apparatus by Mubārak, as we noted above.

In the immediately foregoing quotation, Ḥamdallāh builds on and redirects Mubārak’s interventions. As a starting point and in implicit agreement with the *Sullam* and Mubārak, he concedes a bipartite division: the substrate of a subject
term may be viewed with respect to reality or with respect to consideration; but the former type of substrate itself has two divisions. The first type has a real restriction. This would be, for example, “man” as a real instance of “animal,” without regard to any kind of mental consideration. The other type that is a subclass of the real universal subject term is mentally conditioned, such that the restriction is external and is brought in relation to the absolute, but the act of restriction, as such, is taken to be internal to its consideration. This type of substrate is a considered individual instance (fard i 'tibārī) of the subject term. In this latter case, each instance—say, existence-as-necessary, existence-as-contingent, existence-as-Zayd, and so on—is not an inclusive composite of the absolute and its restriction; rather, each substrate is taken as a part of the totality to which the subject term refers.

The difference between the two types of real substrates may become apparent with the following two cases. Man, for example, is a composite of the absolute—namely, animal—and the restriction—namely, rational. The restriction of rationality is internal to the consideration of man, whereas the fact of being so restricted is external to that consideration. By contrast, existence in an absolute sense may be considered by the intellect, but insofar as it is brought into a relation with a restriction that is not internal to the absolute. For example, one may consider existence as the existence of Zayd or as the existence of the contingent or as the existence of the Necessary. Although each of these existences is distinct from the others, the restrictions of Zayd, contingent, and Necessary are not taken to be internal to the consideration of the absolute. Rather, it is the act of restricting that is internal to the consideration. What allows both these types to be real substrates of the universal is the fact that they are grounded in mind-independent reality. This cannot be said of a substrate like animal-genus or risible-property, because the restriction and the act of restriction are both internal to the consideration of the absolute. Animal-genus, as a composite, exists only owing to the consideration of the restriction “genus” as internal to “animal,” and the fact of its being so restricted, as such, is also internal to its consideration—that is, taking “animal” insofar as it applies to many species. It is the fact of being taken as such that is common to this type of considered instance and the considered instance that is the hissa, the difference between the two lying squarely in the fact that the former has no mind-independent reality, whereas the latter does. Barakatallāh very nicely sums up the matter: “That which is taken with respect to a certain aspect, insofar as it is taken as such, is a considered thing (al-muḥayyath min ḥaythu huwa muḥayyath amrun i ‘tibāriyyun).”

We may now return to Ḥamdallāh, in whose typology two specific types are subsumed under the rubric of the real subject terms: the instance (fard) and the part (hissa). The former of these is also referred to as al-fard al-haqqī and the latter as al-fard al-i ‘tibārī. Figures 9 and 10 sketch the foregoing discussion and illustrate the difference between Mubārak and Ḥamdallāh.
Thus far, despite the noticeable and significant difference, Ḥamdallāh’s broader classification maps onto that of Mubārak’s (and, in turn, onto the Sullam’s): both allow for two broad rubrics to encompass (1) real and (2) considered substrates. However, Ḥamdallāh further divides ḥaqiqī substrates in a manner that establishes a sharp divide between the ḥaqiqī and iʿtibārī substrates of the “animal-genus” sort—that is, the category of the iʿtibārī substrate that does not obtain except owing to mental consideration. To reiterate, this latter iʿtibārī substrate is distinct from the type he considers in the foregoing passage in its not having subsistence except owing to the very fact of consideration. By contrast, the types of considered substrates discussed in the passage above do have such an existence, except that, insofar as they fall under subject terms, they are absolutes considered with a view to the act of restriction—not the restriction itself—as being internal to their consideration. Thus, in both cases, an object is examined with a view to the restrictions of certain types of consideration; this is what is common to both types of iʿtibārī substrates. However, in the iʿtibārī substrates that are also ḥaqiqī, the perspectival aspect of the examination does not render the object as mentally dependent for its positive and specific existence.

The technical details and diagrams above demonstrate the quick transformation in the substance of the lemma. We may now turn to two other significant
points. First, given the shared expressions of Mubarak and Ḥamdallah—taqyid, lūḥizat/mulāḥaza, akhaṣṣiyya/khuṣṣiyya—the link between the two horizontally related texts is obvious. The textual contact is direct, with the line of influence issuing from Mubarak, who either was the proximate determinant of Ḥamdallah’s lemma or led him to earlier texts in the Sullam’s prehistory that, in turn, helped shape it. Secondly, a hint is received by the commentary tradition that this prehistory may have something to do with Mīr Dāmād and al-Lāhūrī (al-Siyālkūtī). These observations may be summarized now in figure 11. As a quick point of reference, it shows that a certain prehistory lay constricted within the lemma of the Sullam, that the lemma saw fulfillment in its vertical and horizontal reception in the works of Mubarak and Ḥamdallah, and that, with the latter, the technical developments of the commentary had moved forward even as the gaze had begun to shift backward to an earlier dialectic.

Further transformations took place—in slow and subtle ways—over two centuries of commentarial activity; increasingly, refinements in the discussion of the fard and hisṣṣa occupied center stage.48 The presentation of such details would take us far afield from the primary purpose of this section—namely, the question of how and to what effect the Sullam and its commentarial tradition embedded earlier texts. I will, therefore, move forthwith to ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī’s commentary on Ḥamdallah, one of the final stages of the maturation of the discussion and also the site of the most profound textual excavation of the lemma. We recall from just above that, in the course of his commentary, Ḥamdallah had hinted that a dispute between Mīr Dāmād and al-Siyālkūtī underlies the lemma of al-Bihārī. At this precise juncture, then, one reads the following in al-Khayrābādī’s commentary:

[Regarding Ḥamdallah’s] statement, Also with the determination of taking the specification, etc. Know that the commentator of the Maṭāliʿ [i.e., al-Taḥtānī] stated, “By J we mean neither that whose reality is J nor that whose description is J. Rather, [we mean] something more encompassing than these two. And it is that of which J is true . . . ”49

The quotation from al-Taḥtānī should sound familiar, as it was taken up verbatim in al-Bihārī’s mission statement on the subject term. To put the textual patchwork into relief, I supply the Arabic below. Italics represent Ḥamdallah’s expressions; boldface represents al-Taḥtānī’s; and underlining represents the Sullam. Overlap in these categories means that the text is shared among the authors.

Qawluhū wa-ayda’n ʿalā taqdīr akhdhi t-takhsīṣ ilā ākhirih i’lam anna shāriḥ al-Maṭāliʿ qała la’ na’ bi-l-jīm mā ḥaqiqatuḥu jīm wa-lā mā huwa šifatuhu jīm/mawsūfūn bihi bal a’ ammu minhumā wa-huwa mā šadaqa yaṣduq ʿalayhi jīm.50

The commentarial lemma of al-Khayrābādī reverted to that part of Ḥamdallah’s text that had embraced al-Bihārī’s; and he revealed that this latter incorporated lemma itself incorporated a lemma from the commentary of al-Taḥtānī on the
Maṭāliʿ of al-Urmawi. Following this revelation, al-Khayrābādī’s commentary on Ḥamdallāh in fact became a seamless, exacting, and truly innovative engagement with a more extended quotation from al-Taḥtānī: and all this took place on the terrain of al-Khayrābādī’s hypotext—namely, Ḥamdallāh. The critical assessment of the subject matter also drew obvious inspirations from several of al-Siyālkūtī’s third-order commentarial distinctions found in his work on the Shamsiyya.

As the textual dive deepened, the contributions of al-Khayrābādī came to vary increasingly from the original matn of the Sullam, even as they continued to be dragged closer to the contexts of its composition. This original matn, as we now see in full view, was itself responding in tacit ways to debates found partly in the commentarial traditions of the Shamsiyya and the Maṭāliʿ and partly in the Ufuq of Dāmād; and it was staking a claim on the basis of a verbatim quotation from a much earlier text—namely, the commentary of al-Taḥtānī on the Maṭāliʿ. The appropriation and naturalization of the past—near and distant—needed no announcement in the lemma of the Sullam: there were sufficient diachronic hints to expose its structure. The commentary on the Maṭāliʿ, which the lemma of the Sullam clearly signals, is deeply invested in the question of how a subject term, under certain considerations, picks out a substrate and how the predicate applies to it in virtue of such considerations. It is precisely this discussion that was critically assessed by al-Siyālkūtī, who refers to considered instances (afrād i tibāriyya) as parts (kiṣaṣ) in his third-order commentary on the Shamsiyya and excludes them from among the relevant types. And I suspect that the reference in al-Siyālkūtī to the parts is what led the commentators of the Sullam to refer to Mir Dāmād, who discusses this matter at length. Put in succinct terms, the Sullam’s act of embedding a brief quotation from al-Taḥtānī indicated its dialectical stance with reference to an earlier commentarial tradition. Following some early hints, the commentarial tradition of the Sullam began to excavate it, and it was led to Mir Dāmād, in whose Ufuq a central feature of such commentarial work was most highly developed.
What followed from this point on should not be surprising. Having wrestled with the lemma that may now best be deconstructed and disambiguated as a patchwork of voices, al-Khayrābādī penetrated further into the issue of the distinction between universals that are specified with respect to reality and those that are specified with respect to consideration. So he tracked further the aforementioned explicit hints from Ḥamdallāh and earlier commentaries on his work, stating that Ḥamdallāh had crafted his own commentary on this lemma of the Sullam from parts of Mīr Dāmād’s Ufuq taken verbatim. He then quoted the latter text at length, revealing in detail, more than a century after Ḥamdallāh, how he had managed to compose his lemma. Thus, as a historical assessment, al-Khayrābādī’s own commentarial lemma became a commentary on the patchwork lemma of al-Taḥtānī/Dāmād/al-Bihārī/Ḥamdallāh. The details may be represented in figure 12.

We may summarize the results as follows. The lemma of the Sullam on one of the most significant issues in the history of Arabic logic seamlessly embedded a verbatim quotation from al-Taḥtānī’s commentary on the Maṭālīʿ of al-Urmawī without acknowledgement, while another part spelled out al-Bihārī’s position in his own words. The commentarial exercise on this organic patchwork led the tradition back to al-Taḥtānī—to his commentaries on the Maṭālīʿ and the Shamsiyya—in part via the third-order commentary by al-Siyālkūtī; this latter differed in its position from that of Dāmād. These observations make good sense in view of what we know of the curricular texts on logic in India at the time of the composition of the Sullam. With the onset of commentarial production, the tradition also began to inflect the lemma of the Sullam with passages from the Ufuq of Dāmād that supplied the robust grounds for an investigation of considered substrates of the subject term. And the more profoundly the commentarial exercise invested itself in cycles of textual archaeology, the more detailed and subtle were the logical distinctions it yielded.

There remains, however, one conundrum that still needs explanation—namely, that the commentaries on this lemma of the Sullam either implicitly embedded quotations from the Ufuq of Dāmād in their own lemmata or explicitly recognized the presence of the latter text in the discourse at hand. That the Ufuq should contribute to shaping the tradition of one of the most influential works of Indian logic requires reflection, since it was not a Dars text and since its author’s intellectual networks in India were relatively thin. One can only speculate that al-Siyālkūtī’s reduction of parts to considered instances and their excision by him from the class of real substrates was an impetus behind this orientation. As I noted above, the Ufuq devotes itself at length to the discussion of parts and of considered instances, and it may, therefore, have emerged as the most fertile ground for the discussion in this context. Another path to the Ufuq may well have been carved by al-Harawī in his commentary and self-commentary on the Risāla maʾmūla fi t-taṣawwur wa-t-taṣdiq of al-Taḥtānī and his second-order commentary on al-Ījī’s Mawāqif. These works were extremely popular in the South Asian madrasa tradition; they
discuss the ontology of parts in some detail. Similar contexts may well have led to the other contacts of the Sullam and its tradition with the Ufuq.

Much of the Sullam exhibits the features we have noted in the two foregoing sections: organized along the structures of a recognizable textbook, its lemmata implicitly participate in living dialectics and debates either by taking a stand for or against unannounced positions or by embedding unacknowledged quotations. This practice beckons the hypertexts to harken back to the fuller prehistory, to the import of its commitments and proofs, and to the significance of its own contributions. Explicit references to earlier authorities are practically nonexistent among the lemmata of the Sullam: Avicenna and al-Fārābī are referred to four and two times respectively; al-Dawānī and al-Jurjānī are mentioned a couple of times each and al-Sībawayhi and al-Sakkākī (via the Miftāḥ) once each. It is rather the commentaries that unveil the rich internal life of the hypotext. Al-Dāwānī is perhaps the most pervasive scholar in the backdrop of the Sullam; following him, there are several implicit references to al-Jurjānī and al-Taḥtānī (especially the latter’s commentary on the Maṭāliʿ); and Avicenna emerges as an ancient authority in some cases. Occasionally, the Sullam also implicitly converses with other scholars, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Ghazālī, al-Taftāzānī, Ibn Ḥabīb, Mahmūd al-Jawnpūrī, Mīr Dāmād, Mīrzā Jān al-Shīrāzī, al-Ījī, al-Siyālḵūṭī, and al-Khūnajī as its interlocutors. These identities are often revealed by quotations in the commentaries on the Sullam culled from al-Bihārī’s self-commentary or in the course of the commentaries’ exposition of the hypotext. Furthermore, in the course of developing its arguments, the Sullam considers various positions expressed not just in logic and philosophical texts but also in texts on rhetoric, lexicography, theology, and legal theories. And via the intermediary of the Sullam’s allusions to these texts, the hypertexts are led to a broader set of sources in the background of the hypotext’s arguments. Once led along such paths, the direction and point of reference that a particular commentary embraced are often determined by its own philosophical projects and proclivities.
COMMENTARIAL EFFORT AND RECEPTION: AN EXAMPLE

With regard to the last set of observations, a few words about Mubārak on the Sullam constitute an instructive example. Let me begin with a quotation from Mubārak’s commentator, Ḥāfiẓ Darāz, who puts the project and its reception in perspective. He writes,

The lemmata of the treatise called *The Ladder of the Sciences* are like the sun among the stars, and its commentary that the eminent Verifier . . . Mubārak wrote is unique in resolving and unveiling its difficulties. However, its expressions are difficult for the verifying scholars and its hints are obscure for the eminent investigators. This is so, because most of [the expressions] are taken from the *Ufuq Mubīn*. Indeed, he has trodden a novel path in his enduring commentary.63

Thus, although Mubārak’s commentary engaged the entire text of the Sullam, its various perspectives relied on the aforementioned work of Dāmād. As I have noted above, the latter scholar does loom at various loci beneath the surface of the Sullam’s arguments; it stands to reason, therefore, that one of the Sullam’s earliest commentaries should be attentive to this feature of its dialectics.64 On the other hand, the Ufuq is certainly not a preoccupation of the Sullam, so that this choice on Mubārak’s part is quite intriguing. Part of the explanation may rest on the fact that, within the context of its discourse on the entire set of concerns of a traditional logic textbook, the Sullam focuses consistently on puzzles that pertain to questions of ontology and epistemology, especially regarding the status of mental objects when these produce paradoxes for propositional semantics. For example, when the substrate of a subject term is an impossibility, accepted rules of affirmative predication and conversion are compromised, since the instance of the subject term must be existent; or, as we observed above with reference to the Liar Paradox, when the proposition is self-referential by virtue of the subject term, propositional truth-conditions appear not to satisfy basic assumptions. It is precisely in such cases that Dāmād’s contributions in the early parts of the Ufuq are most relevant for the Sullam and, in turn, that Mubārak’s extension of the former as a subtext is justified.

In practically every case, the thrust of the solution is inflected by Dāmād’s understanding that an instance of a universal may be a restriction (qayd) on the latter, and that such a restriction may be considered either by virtue of its mere nature (ṭabīʿa) or by virtue of its particularity (khusūṣiyya).65 For example, one is confronted with the following paradox in the Sullam.66 It is given that the Participant with God is impossible. Let us posit a compound notion that consists of two Participants with God. This compound of two Participants with God would also be a Participant with God, just as, for example, the collection of two drops of water is also water. So the compound of two Participants with God would be impossible. However, every compound is possible;67 indeed, its possibility is demonstrated
by the very fact that the compound was posited in this thought experiment. This means, contrary to what is posited, that the Participant with God is possible. The commentarial wrestling with this conundrum features Dāmād rather prominently. And the solution consists of recognizing that the possibility and impossibility issue from two distinct considerations. Therefore, they do not produce a paradox. It is argued that the compound Participant with God is indeed possible, but by virtue of the nature of the restriction of being compounded; it is impossible by virtue of the specificity of the restriction—namely, that it is the fact of two impossibles being compounded.\(^{58}\) In the vast majority of cases, it is some iteration of this distinction—one that turns on the broader issue of mental consideration—that compels Mubārak, in particular, and some other commentators, in general, to turn to Dāmād’s *Ufuq*.

The ultimate consequence of this approach for the second-order commentaries on Mubārak was that, over time, they came to attend increasingly to discussions of the semantics of simple utterances. These discussions themselves were predicated on resolving issues of ontology as a prerequisite for epistemology. For example, when a simple utterance signifies grades of the color black, is one committed to an ontology of modulation in essences or is the modulation a product of distinct considerations of certain restrictions on the universal? Does “existent” as a simple utterance refer to a substrate that is generated by means of simple production (*ja’l basīṭ*) or compound production (*ja’l murakkab*)? Can parts (*hiṣāṣ*) of existence be suitable substrates of subject terms under certain considerations of the restriction of the universal or are they mere mental concoctions? These are precisely the discussions—all of them tied to subtle analyses of the mental considerations of various restrictions on universals—that occupy Dāmād in the early parts of his *Ufuq*. Therefore, it also stands to reason that these were precisely the parts that attracted commentarial attention in India.

Yet a couple of notes of caution are advisable at this juncture. First, Mubārak’s reliance on Dāmād was neither exclusive nor uncritical. At several places, he categorically disagrees with the earlier scholar, and, at many others, he ignores him altogether.\(^{69}\) And just as he embeds Dāmād’s expressions within his own—not just from the *Ufuq* but also from the *Īmādāt*—so he also embraces those of other scholars without announcing them. For example, his introductory comments are a combination of this later work by Dāmād and the commentary of al-Taḥtānī on the *Maṭāli*.\(^{70}\) In other words, the lemmata of Mubārak, like those of the *Sullam*, are an organic new product comprising his own articulations and those of others; commentaries on Mubārak, therefore, also participate in textual archaeology, much like Mubārak himself does in relation to the *Sullam*.

Second, the reception of Dāmād’s *Ufuq* in India, which was likely precipitated by the *Sullam* and its early commentaries and by the Shams bāzigha of al-Jawnpūrī, was highly critical.\(^{71}\) In India, only four premodern commentaries were written on the *Ufuq*—one by the aforementioned Baḥr al-ʿUlūm of the Farangī Maḥall
family, and one each by Faḍl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī, his son, Faḍl-i Ḫaqq al-Khayrābādī, and his son, Ṭab al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī. As we saw above, all these scholars were commentators within the Sullam tradition, and the latter three were central to the Khayrābādī network that was most intricately immersed in the production of commentaries on Mubārak. Of these four commentaries, I have been able to consult two—that of Baḥr al-ʿUlūm and ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq—and both concentrate precisely on those early parts of the Ufuq where ontological questions related to the semantics of simple utterances are most relevant; and both are written in the spirit of refutation. The Sullam thus appears to be a key text that, in opening up the dialectical space of its lemmata to a consideration of Dāmād’s contributions, called forth to its own hypertexts to turn to the earlier philosopher. This task was most keenly taken up by Mubārak, whose own proclivities, guided by the Sullam and the latter’s textual past, set the stage for future second-order engagements. Many of these works assume a polite, although oppositional, stance toward Dāmād. Insofar as the study of Mubārak was most densely concentrated among the Khayrābādīs, so too was the study of the Ufuq; and these Khayrābādī scholars were equally critical in their assessments.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that about a hundred years after Mubārak’s commentary was completed, the questions of ontology and epistemology that occupied it had set its second-order commentators on a distinct path to questions of metaphysics. These questions were most aptly satisfied with reference to the early parts of the work, where issues of the possibility of defining and conceptualizing impossible and transcendent entities segue into discussions of the nature of divine knowledge. Similarly, the issue of the modulation in essences led naturally to discussions of time and the nature of creation. And the problem of subject terms, such as “existent,” led to a devoted focus on the theories of simple and compound production.

There were two consequences of these developments. First, most second-order commentaries on Mubārak that were written after the first quarter of the nineteenth century entirely ignored not only the section on Assents (taṣdīqāt), but also did not fare much farther than some of the earliest sections on Conceptualizations (taṣawwurāt), where the aforementioned topics are most highly developed. The most widely read commentary on Mubārak, for example, was composed by Faḍl-i Ḫaqq al-Khayrābādī. Covering about five hundred pages in the Indian lithograph (Delhi, 1317/1900), it reaches no further than the section on the four inquiries in the Sullam. His son Ṭab al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī’s commentary on Mubārak is a massive tome of about six hundred pages, published in lithograph by the same press in 1324/1906. It covers its hypotext only up until the section on modulated utterances. These works read less like traditional logic books and more like works in metaphysics.

The second consequence of the aforementioned developments was that the investigation of the affiliated metaphysical issues in the second-order commentaries on Mubārak led the authors to consider the contributions of scholars such as
al-Suhrawardī and Ibn al-ʿArabī in their evaluation of the substance of Mubārak’s claims. Such scholars had generally played a minor role in the earlier history of the Sullam’s commentarial tradition; in second-order commentaries on Mubārak they were more prominent figures. Part of the explanation for this kind of commentarial growth of course lies with the commentators’ own philosophical interests and commitments.73 Certainly, they repurposed their hypotextual lemmata in view of their own living dialectical concerns: the Khayrābādis, for example, had also written independent treatises on the doctrine of the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujūd), simple production, and the nature of divine knowledge.

THE LADDER’S ORIENTATIONS

The commentaries’ interest in the Sullam was guided by the dialectical spaces it had opened up within its traditionally organized lemmata. In an earlier publication, I referred to these lemmata as prompts, whose function was both to offer pithy responses to its discursive prehistory and to call forward to future hypertextual activity.74 In a later publication, I also pointed out that a determinant feature of the Sullam is that it tends to think of problems of logic—and of their solutions—in terms of mental conceptualizations and considerations, whether these be of subject terms, predicates, or propositions. The commentarial tradition took heed of this recurring aspect of the Sullam and was consistently motivated by its prompts to pursue this specific angle in the examination of various problemata. Thus, although it would be difficult to argue that the Sullam tradition is committed to a single and overarching project within the broad mandates of a traditional logic textbook, it can be shown to prefer a certain orientation in its recognition and handling of diverse issues. Let us briefly take up three representative cases from different parts of the Sullam to demonstrate this point.

In the section on conception and assent,75 al-Bihārī explains that belief in a predication relation between a subject and predicate falls within the category of assent; when there is belief without such a relation, one has a conception; and in the immediately preceding section, he also states that knowledge is conception. Furthermore, he asserts that conception and assent are two different species of apprehension; they are not one and the same thing. He then presents the following doubt. If we grant that knowledge and the thing that is known are one and the same thing, then, since one can conceptualize anything, a conception of assent would mean that the two are one and the same. In other words, if the object of that form of knowledge that is conception is assent itself, then, the two would not be distinct from each other. This goes contrary to al-Bihārī’s doctrine that the two are indeed distinct.

The solution al-Bihārī offers relies on distinctions that emerge when one becomes cognizant of the manner of one’s consideration of the object of knowledge. When one considers knowledge as a form that comes to inhere in the mind,
it is an object of knowledge; and insofar as one considers it to subsist in the mind, it is knowledge itself. The following analogy should unravel the argument. When a table is taken as a subsisting entity, its form is constitutive of it and is, therefore, not distinct from it; however, when one considers the form as something that comes to inhere in the wood, it is indeed something distinct. The resolution, therefore, rests on the recognition that the conundrum was generated because two different modes of mental consideration were conflated.

This conundrum and its solution presuppose two doctrines that are explicitly accepted by the Sullam: that it is things themselves—not their simulacra—that obtain in the mind and that the intellect can conceptualize anything. The former is justified on the basis of the observation that a simulacrum presupposes the existence of something it represents. However, the mind can certainly conceptualize things that have no mind-independent existence that is represented by the act of conceptualization. Thus, what is known to the mind is the very thing that it conceptualizes; this conceptualization can accommodate both extramental and mental entities; knowledge is this known object itself. The second doctrine issues from the observation that the mind may, in some fashion, pass judgments even on absurdities. Thus everything, including that which is impossible, may have a conceptualization in the mind. These two doctrines loom large in the evaluation of various puzzles in the Sullam, and they consistently compel the Sullam to regard the intellect’s consideration of its objects—in virtue of their given selves—as central to questions of epistemology.

Let us now turn to the second example that further demonstrates the effects of these convictions. The Sullam outlines the conundrum that, since it is things themselves that obtain in the mind, then, if multiple minds have a conception of a specific extramental Zayd, the latter would become a universal. The reason is that this one extramental Zayd would pick out each of the mental instances of Zayd as its substrates and would, therefore, also be predicated of each one. To put it differently, the extramental Zayd would be said of several instances and would, as such, satisfy the basic definition of a universal.

In offering a solution, al-Bihārī points out that the proper definition of a universal is that whose sense may apply to multiple extramental instances. Since the extramental Zayd is not such as to allow for multiple extramental instances to be picked out by it, he does not satisfy the posited definition. The definition proposed here, however, poses a potential problem: certain mentally supposed and mentally dependent objects, such as “nothing” and second intentions, cannot have extramental instances, although they are considered to be universals by philosophical consensus. Al-Bihārī explains that the definition would indeed allow one to include such objects among universals, because the mere consideration of their conceptualization does not involve a haecceity (ḥādhiyya); the latter has only a part to play in the consideration of such mental objects with respect to their specific natures. Put differently and as explained by the commentaries, insofar as “nothing” is considered
as the contradictory of “thing,” the intellect, under the restriction of such a consideration, does not preclude the possibility of its extramental multiplicity. On the other hand, “nothing,” considered as such and absolutely, may not have any instances at all. By contrast, the conception “Zayd” as described above always denotes this Zayd, the mental one that is no other than the singular extramental one. As such, its consideration, which cannot evade a haecceity, simply does not allow for the possibility of extramental multiplicity; it is always itself—that is, this very extramental Zayd.79

The two preceding examples put into sharp relief a standard orientation of the Sullam and its commentaries. When confronted by a challenge, the immediate recourse was to test whether it was generated owing to distinctions that coincided with restrictions under which concepts were considered by the intellect. All knowledge, as the Sullam proclaims in the opening sections, is conception. That which is known is the very thing itself that obtains in the mind, not its simulacrum; and knowledge is the thing known as it subsists in the intellect, in the same way as taste is the thing tasted insofar as it is the very content of the taste itself. These basic principles appear to motivate the Sullam and its commentaries to take the mode of mental consideration in relation to its object as the defining feature of knowledge. If knowing is conceptualization, then conceptualizations of the same object under specific restrictions would also be distinct. And it is precisely the acknowledgement of these distinctions in considerations that are marshaled in order to resolve the paradoxes presented by the Sullam.

In this regard, three adages that are explicitly mentioned in the commentarial tradition of the Sullam ought to be taken seriously: “Were it not for [various] considerations [of a thing], philosophy would be falsified”; and “If not for considerations, philosophy would be false”; and “The status [of things] differs with respect to the difference in [their various] considerations.”80 They should be interpreted to mean that attention to the precise nature of mental considerations would preserve philosophical doctrine and philosophy as an enterprise. Indeed the claims of philosophy, which correspond to mental considerations, are variegated precisely owing to the variations in such considerations. Paradoxes may be overcome, and philosophy may be maintained as a consistent set of propositions only in view of the fact that such considerations underlie philosophical truth: they are constitutive of the very objects of knowledge, given as such.

This brings me to a final puzzle that takes us to the very heart of the points discussed so far. In the section on the nature of the five universals, al-Bihārī distinguished among three different types of concomitants—the necessary concomitants of a quiddity simpliciter, of mental existents, and separable concomitants. Of necessary concomitants, he further states that they may be obvious to the observer, such that when that which is a concomitant and that of which it is a concomitant are conceptualized, the concomitance between them follows ineluctably.

It is at this juncture that a puzzle presents itself. If the conceptualization of the necessary concomitant (A) and that of which it is a necessary concomitant
(B) generates the conceptualization of the concomitance (1) between them, then this necessary concomitance (1) is itself a necessary concomitant (C) of the necessary concomitance (2) between the necessary concomitant (A) and that of which it is a necessary concomitant (B). This latter necessary concomitance (2) is itself a concomitant (D) of the necessary concomitance (3) between that which is a necessary concomitant (A) and that of which it is a necessary concomitant (B). And so on. Thus, since the conceptualization of the initial necessary concomitance is itself a necessary concomitant within a series of previously embedded relationships of necessary concomitance that proceed ad infinitum, such a conceptualization can never be realized. Al-Bihārī’s response is simple and expected: concomitance is a mentally considered meaning that is effected only in the mind insofar as it is secondarily abstracted from the fact of another mental consideration. In other words, it is not grounded in anything other than another mental consideration. Since mental considerations may be brought to a halt by choice, the infinite regress would cease when the mind no longer engages in the consideration.81

The paradox, therefore, was once again the result of mental consideration. The object of consideration—concomitance—was the very consideration itself, which was self-generative since it was grounded in yet another mental consideration with identical features. I shall not comment on the merits of this solution. Rather, what is relevant for the purposes of this investigation is to recognize that this example allows the Sullam tradition to reflect on the manner in which propositional claims—especially those of a higher order—are meaningful. If knowledge, as conceptualization, is its very object that itself is known, and if that which is conceptualized may be only a mental entity along with certain modes of distinct mental considerations, then how can a discipline whose subject matter is second intentions be concerned with that which is actual? For the subject of its propositional claims would always be a mentally considered entity that has no guaranteed mind-independent correspondence.

This concern was already implied in the foregoing example, where the Sul- lam grappled with the challenge that second intentions would be excluded from the class of universals, given the definition that grounds the latter ultimately in the possibility of extramental instances. In the current example, the difficulties are more severe, as they are spelled out by the commentators. Here is what Mubīn writes:

If [mental] considerations [iʿtibārāt] do not have an existence with respect to the very given [wujūd fī nafs al-amr], then it is not suitable to pass judgments about them with respect to the given. This is so because the truth of the affirmative proposition requires the existence of the subject. However, they do pass judgments about them. For they say, “Concomitance is a concomitant by virtue of itself” [al-luzūm lāzim bi-dh-dhāt], and “Necessity by virtue of itself rules out necessity by virtue of another,” and “Possibility is dependent on a cause,” and so on. Thus, it is known that
[mental] considerations also have existence and that they must obtain with respect to the very given \[\text{fa-} \text{ulima} \text{ anna} \text{ li-l-i} \text{ 'ibāriyyāt aydān} \text{ wujūdan} \text{ wa-l-} \text{budda} \text{ min} \text{ tahaqqquqāhā fī nafsi l-amr}.\] Thus, the basic consequence of the Sullam’s solution—namely, that since concomitance is a mental consideration, it can be neutralized simply by halting the consideration—led to a dilemma. If mental considerations have no claims to actuality, then assertions about them are also merely mental considerations because it is not proper to predicate something over a mental consideration outside the mental locus. This would be acceptable were it not the case that one does make such assertions, as the examples from Mubīn demonstrate. On the other hand, since such assertions are indeed made, mental considerations must also exist irrespective of their mental locus.

The solution offered by the Sullam is that the source of the mental considerations that are a product of mental abstractions exists with respect to the given. And this fact, in turn, preserves the consequent fact of their also being given (\textit{mansha} ‘u \textit{l-i} \textit{tibāriyyāt} \textit{mawjūd} fī nafsi l-amr \textit{wa-huwa l-} ḥāfiẓ \textit{li-nafsi} \textit{amriyyatihiā}). It is by virtue of the ultimate grounding in the given that one can make assertions about mental considerations outside the mental locus.

I have chosen to translate the expression “\textit{fī nafsi al-amr}” here and in part III below with the infelicitous “with respect to the given/the very given” because I wish to make room for the polysemy of the term: its multiple meanings relate to each other by participating in a single and essential aspect—namely, a thing or state’s being by virtue of its very posited self. It is true, as has been argued in recent literature, that the expression is used in various ways—to refer to the actual (\textit{al-wāqi‘}), the extramental (\textit{mā fi l-khārij}), the Active Intellect (\textit{al-} ‘\textit{aql al-kull}/\textit{al-} ‘\textit{aql al-fa} ‘\textit{‘al}), and so on. This variety is a consequence of the basic fact that the ontological scope of the very given is vague enough to allow contraction and expansion. Its most capacious ambit is found within the Sullam tradition. For we observe that it is also used to refer to mental considerations (\textit{i} ‘\textit{tibārāt}). Indeed, even the claim that the fact of being given can be preserved for the mental considerations provided they are grounded in that which is given does not lead al-Bihārī to reduce the given to the extramental. In his self-commentary, he writes that the source that confers the givenness to the mental consideration may obtain extramentally or, \textit{provided that one does not take into account the fact of the mind’s consideration} (\textit{ma‘a qaṭ‘i n-nażar ‘an i} ‘\textit{tibārī dh-dhihn}), that it may obtain either in the mind or extramentally. In other words, that which is given may indeed be a mental product; what renders a judgment as true or false about it \textit{fī nafs al-amr} is that the fact of the mind’s consideration of it in a particular manner is not made relevant to the judgment in that act of judgment. If the object or state of affairs is taken with respect to its very self as a given, then what the mind extracts from it or the judgment it passes of it is true \textit{fī nafs al-amr}. In this regard, Bahr al-’Ulūm’s statement cuts to the heart of the matter:
The meaning of the givenness of those things that are extracted [by the mind] is that their sources are such that—with respect to their very selves, without a consideration of anyone—the [mental] extraction of such things from them may properly obtain [fa-inna ma’na nafsi l-amriyya li-l-intizāʿ ʿiyyāt kawnu manāshīhā fi dhātihi min ghayri i’tibārī l-mu’tabir bi-ḥaythu yaṣīhhu intizāʿ u tilka l-intizāʿ ʿiyyāt minhā].

Thus, if the mentally extracted notion is such that the particular mental consideration of its source has a part to play in its generation, then it is not fi nafs al-amr; otherwise, it retains this feature. What is common to the various usages is that something is taken to be fi nafs al-amr if the fact of the mental consideration is itself neglected in its analysis—the object, even if it is a product of mental consideration, is taken as a given, with respect to its very given self (fi ḥaddi dhātihi), not by virtue of any consideration (lā bi ḥasabi l-i’tibār). This means that an assertion about any mental object, insofar as it is given as such, would be true with respect to its givenness, if the fact of the consideration is neglected in its analysis. The admittedly cumbersome translation “with respect to the given/the very given” has the virtue of being conceptually minimalist and, therefore, expansive enough to accommodate the actual, the concrete, the mind-independent, the Active Intellect, and the mere mental considerations of the intellect (without regard to the fact of mental consideration) as fi nafs al-amr.

It is in this sense of being grounded as the given that the expression is strictly polysemic.

The upshot of the foregoing is that the Sullam tradition is able to make sense of various statements about mentally concocted objects, such as “The Participant with the Creator” where the predicate “impossible” must be taken to be true not just in the mental locus but fi nafs al-amr. It also means that the ontological space of logic is potentially expanded to include purely mental objects and considerations, provided they are considered by virtue of themselves, as given. There is a further motivation on the part of the Sullam logicians to treat mental considerations in the manner discussed above: since the subject matter of logic is intelligibles insofar as they lead from the known to the unknown, the entire enterprise of logic will be relegated strictly to the mental locus if claims about these intelligibles cannot be taken to be true fi nafs al-amr. But I will briefly return to these points below.

In the immediate analysis, let me turn to two episodes in the Sullam tradition that can help flesh out my interpretation and lend it further support. In the section on conditional propositions, al-Bihārī contrasts the position of the logicians with that of the grammarians, explaining that, for the former, the judgment applies to the tie between the antecedent and the consequent and that, for the latter, it applies to the predicative apodosis, while the protasis is taken as a restriction under which the former’s predicate applies to its subject. This contrast sets the text off on an extended dialectic in which al-Jurjānī and al-Dawānī play prominent roles.

At issue is the status of conditional propositions whose consequent is manifestly false but that are nevertheless recognized to be true. Take, for example, the proposition, “If Zayd were a donkey, he would bray,” which is recognized
by al-Jurjānī to be absolutely true, although the consequent, “Zayd brays” is false. If the judgment in the conditional proposition applied to the consequent, then, since the consequent is false absolutely, it would also be false when it is restricted by the antecedent. This conclusion is based on the general rule that the negation of the absolute entails its negation when it is restricted by a qualification; for example, if man simpliciter is not stone, then he is not stone even when qualified in a certain way. Given this consequence and the fact that the conditional proposition is categorically true, the position of the logicians is accepted by al-Jurjānī to be the correct one—the judgment is simply an assertion of the tie between the antecedent and the consequent.

This conclusion is challenged by al-Dawānī, who points out that al-Jurjānī’s proof is based on the false equivalence between what is the case at all actual times (jamiʿ al-awqāt al-wāqiʿiyya) and what is the case simpliciter (muṭlaqan). The correct position is rather that Zayd’s braying is negated with respect to actuality, not with respect to all the mentally determined times (al-awqāt al-taqdiriyya). The absolute includes both actual and determined circumstances. Therefore, the consequent, as determined by the antecedent, is not actually false; in turn, the conditional proposition is not so either. This means that the interpretation of the grammarians can be defended. It ought to be noted that, in the course of this discussion, the Sullam treats that which is actual (al-wāqiʿ) as a synonym for that which is given (nafs al-amr). In representing al-Dawānī’s argument, for example, al-Bihārī writes, “That which is mentioned [by al-Jurjānī] about entailment is granted [as a principle], but we do not grant that the absolute [al-muṭlaq], in the case [at hand], is negated. For [the absolute] is taken in a sense that is more general than that which is with respect to the way things are given [aʿamm mimmā fi nafsi l-amr].”

Thus, two competing typologies have been set up. In the first case, that which is actual/given is equivalent to the absolute; the mentally determined cases are its restricted cases, such that if the former is negated, the latter is as well. In the second, the absolute is a larger category within which two distinct types fall—namely, the actual/given and the mentally determined. The second case does not leave any possibility for mentally-determined entities to be included in the class of what is fi nafs al-amr, whereas the former subsumes it as a subclass.

From this point on, the development in the commentarial space emerges as quite instructive. An important point of inflection, for example, is found in Mubin, who writes,

I say that the intention by “mentally determinative times” (al-awqāt al-taqdiriyya) in the discourse of the Verifier al-Dawānī is not [just] the circumstances/contexts that are considered in the antecedent of the conditional [proposition], so that it would be said that they are specific to conditionals. Rather [what he intends] are the times during which the consequent is mentally determined to come about [al-awqāt allatī quddira wuqūʿu t-tālī fiḥā]. These do not occur in the actual world [fi ʿalam
al-wāqi’]; rather, they are mentally determined to exist in the latter. And this sense also exists in the predicative [proposition]. Thus, the gist of the discourse of the Verifier al-Dawānī is that the falsity of the consequent and its nonexistence with respect to the given, owing to a consideration of the denial of the actual sources [of its obtaining,] do not entail that it [i.e., the consequent] should fail to obtain in it [i.e., with respect to the given] owing to a consideration of the mentally supposed sources [of its obtaining] [anna kadhiba t-tālī wa-‘adama wujūdihi fi nafs fī nafs l-amr bi-i ‘tibā’i intifā’i l-mawārida l-wāqi’ ‘iyya lā yalzimu minhu intifā’ uhu fi ‘i tibā’i l-mawārida l-fardiyya].

Two important points can be culled from the quotation above. First, the commentarial tradition of the Sullam recognizes that al-Dawānī’s critique of the grammarians on their own terms also allows one to evaluate predicative propositions in the same manner as the conditionals. The argument is simply that, since the judgment applies to the consequent on the mental determination of the restriction supplied by the antecedent, so, too, judgment in a predicative proposition (i.e., without an antecedent) can apply in view of the consideration of a mental determination. Second—and this is central to my earlier interpretation—even if a proposition is false with respect to the given owing to the fact that the sources whereby it obtains are not actual, it can still be true with respect to the given on the basis of the mentally determined existence of its sources. One can say, therefore, with respect to the given (fi nafs fī nafs al-amr), that Zayd brays on the mental determination of his existence as a donkey. Or, put differently, Zayd brays, with respect to the given, provided the mental determination of his being a donkey. Both these consequences follow in view of the first typology noted above—namely, that fi nafs al-amr is the absolute within which the actual and the mentally supposed are both subsumed.

Now, the first typology was that of al-Jurjānī, who challenged the position of the grammarians by noting that if the consequent is false with respect to the given, then it is false under all restrictive determinations. This is so, we recall, because the given is taken to be the equivalent of the absolute, such that, if the absolute is denied, so is that which is qualified. According to the reporting of Mubīn’s commentary on the Sullam, this same typology was embraced by al-Harawī, who squarely shifted his discussion of the issue to predicative propositions. What the latter convey in the affirmative, he argues, is the existence of a thing for another with respect to the way things are given, whether the proposition is restricted or absolute. The affirmative proposition does not convey such existence simpliciter. This can be proved by the observation that when something is affirmed of something with respect to the given, the mental determination that it is negated of it, with respect to the given, is false; and this is so because negation with respect to the restricted—that which is mentally determined—does not entail negation with respect to the absolute—that which is given. However, when an affirmation is denied with respect to the absolute—that which is given—the affirmation of that
which is restricted is also denied. It appears, therefore, that al-Harawi sided with al-Jurjānī and the logicians on this point.\textsuperscript{94}

At this point in the discussion, a challenge from al-Dawānī that was already noted in the 	extit{Sullam} is taken up. The response is quite helpful. The problem al-Dawānī points out is that, although it may be false with respect to actuality that “Zayd is standing,” it is still true, with respect to mental determination—namely, when I merely imagine him as standing—that “Zayd is standing.” In other words, if the typology accepted by al-Jurjānī (and al-Harawi) were correct, whereby the given is a broad and absolute category within which the restricted mental determinations of a thing are subsumed, then the falsity of the former statement would also entail the falsity of the latter.\textsuperscript{95} Yet this is clearly not the case, since everyone recognizes that it is true to say that “Zayd is standing” on the mental determination of his standing, even when Zayd is not standing. Here is what Mubīn offers, via al-Harawi, as a defense:

\begin{quote}
It is true that a proposition that is restricted by that which is a report about the given—such as “Zayd is standing in my mind”—because it [i.e., this proposition] is a report about a report about it [i.e., the given], it indicates the existence of a thing for a thing with respect to the given, by virtue of the report about the given \[na‘am al-qādiyya al-muqayyada bi-mā huwa ḥikāya ‘an nafsi l-amr ka-Zaydun qā‘imun fi żanni li-kawnihā ḥikāyatān ‘ammā huwa ḥikāyatun ‘anhā tadullu\]

\[‘alā thubūti sh-shay ‘li-sh-shay ‘fi nafsi l-amr bi-hasabi l-ḥikāya ‘anhā]\.
\end{quote}

The solution brings into sharp relief the orientation of the 	extit{Sullam} tradition that I have discussed in the foregoing pages: one can resolve wrinkles in propositional semantics by taking propositions themselves as conceptualized mental objects about which other propositions report. In such layered, second- and third-order propositions, predication can be true with respect to the given by virtue of the fact that, with respect to the given, a lower-order proposition is true with respect to a mentally determined item. The case that Mubīn (reporting on al-Harawi) is laying out may be clarified in the following fashion. Let us posit that I am thinking that two and two make five; although two and two do not make five with respect to the extramental state of affairs itself, it is true that two and two make five in my mind. Now this is what is given. Therefore, my proposition, “Two and two make five,” is true on the determination of my thinking that two and two make five. And since it is given that two and two make five in my mind, with respect to this determination, it is true, also as a given, that “two and two make five.” This would be the truth of the proposition—let us call it \(p\)—within the restricted space of my determination, as a given. Next, “Two and two make five” can be taken as a report about \(p\). And it is true that, given \(p\), with respect to the given, “two and two make five” truly reports about \(p\). Yet this report about \(p\) is true, as a given, insofar as \(p\) is true, as a given, about a given state of affairs—namely, my mental determination that two and two make five. The upshot is
that the truth of the restricted, with respect to the given, can also be reflected in
the truth of the unrestricted, with respect to the given, since the latter reports
about the former as given. To put it differently, even when two and two do not
make five, it is true, on this reading, that they make five; and this consequence
follows even when that which is given (nafs al-amr) is a category that subsumes
cases of mental determination.98

This same position is helpfully articulated by the Sullam and its commentaries
in a later discussion. In the section on predication, al-Bihārī discusses a conundrum
related to an essential principle used for resolving various logical impasses—
namely, that an absurdity entails an absurdity. The issue with this assertion is that
the absurd, insofar as it is absurd, obviously has no form either in the intellect
or extramentally. Yet true affirmations—including, for example, that it entails an
absurdity and that it has no form in the intellect—are indeed pronounced of it;
and they require explanation. Here the typology we just encountered is brought
forth to suitable effect: judgments about the absurd are valid insofar as they relate
to a universal notion conceptualized by the mind; and whatever is conceptual-
ized by the mind exists with respect to the given. In other words, although the
absurd itself does not have either a form in the intellect that corresponds to it nor
instances—so that a predicate may be affirmed of that of which it is true—it can
still be conceptualized as a universal, so that affirmations may be true of it as such.
For example, one may conceptualize an absurdity—say, the joining of two contra-
dictories—as a notion that may not exist as a form corresponding to something
mind-independent; or one may conceptualize the joining of two contradictories
as something similar to the joining of blackness and sweetness, which is in fact
possible.99 Since whatever is conceptualized exists as given, claims about the
absurd of the sort noted above, as such, are also true with respect to the given.
These points are expressed by the Sullam in the following terms:

The absurd, **insofar as it is absurd**, has no form in the intellect. It is nonexistent both
mentally and extramentally. Given this fact, it becomes clear that everything existent
in the mind—as mentally obtained—exists with respect to the way things are given
[kullu mawjūdin fī dh-dhihn haqīqatan mawjūdun fī nafsi l-amr].100 Thus no judg-
ment is passed of it [i.e., of the absurd], whether it be, for example, an affirmative
[judgment] that it is impossible or a negative [judgment] about its existence. [This
is the case] except with respect to something universal, when its conceptualization is
among things that are possible. Every object of judgment that has been determined
[in the mind] is a conceptualized nature.101 And everything that is conceptualized
exists. So the judgment about it [i.e., the conceptualized nature] that it is impossible
and similar [judgments] are not correct **insofar as it is what it is**. However, when
[this thing about which the judgment is passed] is considered with a view to all or
some of [its individual instances] that are the sources of its positive obtaining, then
the judgment of impossibility, for example, is correct. So, impossibility is affirmed
of the [conceptualized] nature; and it is true owing to the fact that the [existence
of the individual instances] that are the sources of its obtaining is denied.102
It appears, therefore, that the mind may conceptualize the absurd as a notion and, insofar as this notion is determined in the mind in some way—even if the notion is not able to capture the specificity of the nature under question—it obviously exists, given as such. In addition, al-Bihārī’s assertion at the beginning of the quotation and expositions in the commentaries make it plain that he understands mental existence—even mentally concocted existence, such as that of the absurd—to be a case of existence with respect to the given. Mubīn, for example, illuminates the Sul- lam’s assertion that everything that is conceptualized exists with the addition, “with respect to the given, because it is described by thingness and being a notion” (fī nafsī l-amr li-kawnīhi muttaṣafan bi-sh-shayʾ iyya wa-l-mafhūmiyya). Similarly, he explains that the judgment of impossibility is not correct for such a mentally determined entity because it exists with respect to the given insofar as it is a conceptualized existent (ath-thābit fī nafsi l-amr . . . min ḥaythu annahu mutaṣawwar thābit). Thus, the conceptualized absurdity exists with respect to the given so that, by virtue of what it is as given, it is not impossible, with respect to the given. The assertion of impossibility is actually a claim that denies that the absurd has instances.

That the existent in the mind is existent with respect to the given is another articulation of the typology we encountered above: the mind can conceptualize anything; the absurd, for example, can be conceptualized as that which is impossible, and two can be conceptualized as odd. And whatever the mind conceptualizes, by the mere virtue of this fact, exists with respect to the given. Put differently, absurdities may exist in the mind in view of certain considerations; these considerations can then be posited as the conceptualizations of absurdities as such; and, since all conceptualizations exist with respect to the given, so does the conceptualization of absurdities.

At this juncture, the commentaries fill out the details of these claims more explicitly. Let us return to the critical doctrine articulated by the Sullam: “Everything that is conceptualized exists.” The earliest extant extended commentary on the Sullam, by al-Sāʾinpūrī, has the following to say:

*Everything that is conceptualized exists* with respect to the given, although this may be after mental manipulation and invention [wa-in kāna baʿda t-taʾammul wa-l-ikhtirāʾ]. This is so, because that which is absurd does not exist [as a form] in the mind, as was already explained . . . It has already been apparent from the position of the Shaykh [Avicenna] that the existent in the mind—like the extramental existent—is fully subsumed under that which is existent with respect to the given. Their statement that the existent in the mind overlaps with the existent with respect to the given may be addressed in the following manner. The existent with respect to the given is of two types. One of them is that which does not exist by virtue of the part that someone’s consideration and invention plays. The second is that which exists after the consideration and invention of someone. The first is [called] the real given [al-nafs al-amrī al-ḥaqiqī], which is the opposite of the second, the considered given [al-nafs al-amrī al-iṭibārī]. The latter is the opposite of the absurd, meaning that it obtains, in reality, after consideration.
This explanation, much of which is culled from al-Bihārī’s self-commentary, makes plain that there are two broad categories in the typology adopted by the Sullam and most of its commentaries—that which is with respect to the given and that which is impossible insofar as it is impossible. The reader may now fully understand why I have chosen the infelicitous expression “with respect to the very given” to translate fi nafs al-amr. In the context of the Sullam, which is inspired ultimately by certain pronouncements of Avicenna, the latter expression does not refer to mind-independent realities. Indeed, the products of mere mental concoctions (ikhtirāʿ) and considerations (iʿtibār) insofar as they exist in the mind, once they so exist, can also be posited as the given. And as such, one may affirm or negate predicates of them, with respect to the given. As we noted above by means of various examples, anything, including the absurd, the nonexistent, second intentions, propositions, and so on, insofar as they can be conceptualized in a certain way, exist as such with respect to the given. After they have been conceptualized, they are taken as given posits about which claims may be made with respect to the given. This latter kind of givenness is termed considered givenness (al-nafs al-amr al-iʿtibārī), and it is this sense of nafs al-amr that is generally operative in the Sullam and its commentaries.

Some further clarification of these points is in order, especially because of certain expressions in the Sullam and the commentaries that may fail to convey the intention of the general tradition. We observed above that the Sullam claims both that the absurd has neither mental nor extramental existence and that everything can be conceptualized, so as to exist with respect to the given. These two positions may appear to be contradictory. The point that the Sullam is making is spelled out, for example, in Mubīn’s commentary. He writes that the absurd and other things that exist due to mental manipulation and invention have a mentally supposed existence (wujūd fardī), not a mental existence (wujūd dhihnī). “Thus,” he explains, “that which is absurd has no existence in the mind. For only that which is possible is in the mind, and this latter exists with respect to the given. So it is apparent that every existent in the mind exists with respect to the given.” The immediate sense of these claims seems to run contrary to the foregoing conclusions, as it appears that Mubīn is claiming that only those mental objects that are not mentally invented exist with respect to the given. Yet the point he is making can be made to cohere with earlier statements that were quoted above. What Mubīn is highlighting is that the absurd is something that does not exist in the mind; as such, it does not exist with respect to the given. By the same token, if something does exist in the mind—say, a particular conceptualization of the absurd—then it does exist with respect to the given.

At this precise juncture, an interpretive corrective from his teacher’s teacher is offered. The given/the actual (nafs al-amr/al-wāqiʿ), we are told, is understood in two ways: either it is the mode of the being of that about which something is reported, such that the report about it is correct (kawnu l-mahki ʿanhu
The ladder of the sciences: contents and orientation

bi-ḥaythu tasīḥṭu ʾanhu l-ḥikāya), or it is something’s being with respect to its very self, although this may be the case after mental abstraction (kawnu sh-shay’ fi nafsihi wa-law ba’dā intīzāʿi l-ʿaql). The former, therefore, presupposes the possibility of correspondence with a state of affairs; the latter simply requires the self-sameness of an entity. And since correspondence may not come about when false objects populate the mind, the first case is that sense of the given that only overlaps with that which is in the mind; on this reading, not everything in the mind is fi nafs al-amr. Thus, with respect to truth-conditions, that which is given only overlaps with that which is in the mind. By contrast, if that which is given is nothing more than the existence of a thing with respect to its self, then everything existent in the mind would also be contained within the given. Of course as noted above, one may always posit a mental object—even a false propositional claim—and, given as such, one may propose a second-order propositional claim about it that corresponds with it.

Returning, then, to the claim of the Sullam and the discussion in the preceding paragraph, we recall that the absurd as such does not exist in the mind; so it is not existent as a given. Yet whatever exists as conceptualized in the mind exists with respect to the given, and it may serve to capture that which itself cannot be conceptualized. Mubīn writes quite instructively about the universal that is conceptualized in one’s judgment about the absurd: “The conceptualization of this universal is such that the intellect supposes it as a tag and mirror for that absurdity, so that the judgment passes from the former to the latter.”

The preceding details make it clear that the space of conceptualizations in the Sullam is capacious, and that, in some manner, the mind may conceptualize anything, including propositions and its own manipulations and concoctions. When these items are subjects of propositional claims that correspond to some given criterion of truth, they are said to be true with respect to the given. And when they are taken with respect to themselves as existents—even when they are mentally concocted—they exist as given. Given the orientations of the Sullam, these two ways of interpreting fi nafs al-amr may be collapsed when the given criterion of truth is the mentally determined object itself, given as such.

A final quotation from al-Sāʾinpūrī should help us put much of the preceding in perspective. He writes, with reference to the mind’s consideration of the evenness of the number five (thubūt zawjīyyati l-khamsa fi dh-dhihn):

Everything that exists in the mind in accordance with the [mind’s] extraction—whether it corresponds or does not correspond [to something]—exists with respect to the given [thābit fi nafsi l-amr]. This is the case whether this given existence [al-thubūt al-nafs al-amr] is so owing to the part that mere mental concoction and manipulation play or not owing to it. The secret [to understanding this] is as follows. If a sketcher sketches a sketch without intending from this act that [the sketch] should correspond to something or that it should be a sketch of something—regardless of whether it corresponds to something or not—[this sketch] exists with respect to
itself [thābita fī nafsihā] after the sketcher has invented it [ba 'da ikhtirā i n-naqqāsh]. Thus, it makes no sense to say that this sketch corresponds or does not correspond to something, because neither correspondence nor its absence is intended by the act. However, if he sketches it with the intention that it is a sketch of something, and it turns out that [the sketch] fails to correspond to it—whether this failure is intentional or is owing to an error—it would be said that [the sketch] fails to correspond to it. The error, in this case, is not in the sketch itself insofar as it is something sketched [by the sketcher]. Rather, it is in the correspondence of the [sketch] with that of which it is a sketch. [Likewise,] the error is not in the fact of the imprinting of the form of the evenness of the number five in the mind after mental concoction and manipulation, because [this form] is imprinted in [the mind] afterward, as an actual imprinting [li-annahā munṭabi‘a fīhi ba ‘dahu inṭibā‘an wāqi‘iyyan]. Rather, the error is only in the report, in that it does not correspond to that about which it is a report. But this is not what was intended [by the act of the sketcher].

The gist of the matter, expressed by means of a truly apt analogy, is that any item can be made to exist as conceptualized by the mind. And this, in turn, means that it exists as a given (fī nafsi l-amr) in terms of its very given self (fī nafsihā). Thereafter, one may make certain propositional claims about this given. These would be true or false depending on whether the scope of the given is the thing itself as posited or is some broader given ontological space. For example, after mental concoction, it would be given that five is even, so that the claim that all multiples of five are even would be true with respect to the given (fī nafsi l-amr). On the other hand, this statement would be false if the scope of the given extends beyond the mental manipulation—say, to the extramental given—and it is taken to serve as the proposition’s verifying criterion.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this chapter was to present an overview of the structure, contents, and orientations of the Sullam and its commentarial tradition. Set in the form of a traditional logic textbook, with parts corresponding to the three most popular full-length works in the discipline in the Indian landscape, the Sullam's broader enterprise was dialectical. The lemmata took into account existing and recent debates in various texts—among various disciplines and authors—and often concentrated on puzzles, even as they committed themselves to specific philosophical and logical stances. These lemmata were almost always pithy prompts that both responded to a prehistory and, in their allusiveness, called out to future hypertextual activity. At some times, the impulse for the latter was initiated via the implicit participation of the Sullam's lemmata in the resolution of an issue and, at other times, by means of its act of embedding verbatim quotations from earlier works. Both these practices led the commentators to textual archaeology in the course of their own investigations; and often, in the pursuit of their own projects, they adopted the same genre-techniques as the Sullam—as a means to perpetuate the discursive space.
The examples of technical issues and arguments presented in this chapter are representative of the Sullam and its commentarial tradition. As we noted above, almost all the conundrums the hypotext highlights—ranging from the Liar Paradox to the judgments in conditional propositions to the subject terms of propositions—are related to the matter of mental considerations (iʿtibārāt). If there is a broad leitmotif and orientation of the tradition of the Sullam, it is that it presses in favor of the argument that everything—including propositions, second intentions, and absurdities—can be conceptualized and that, as such, everything that is can be posited as a given (fi nafs al-amr) without regard to a consideration of the fact of the mental manipulation that led to its production. In principle, there are at least three related consequences of this position: all mental considerations can be treated as propositional objects by virtue of themselves; propositional claims, with respect to the given, can be made about these given objects as such; and logic can cover a capacious ontological domain.\(^\text{114}\)

Yet these consequences were local reverberations in the broader system. They generally remained buried within the lemmata and independent treatises as logical and philosophical items meant to resolve difficulties; they do not appear to have led to paradigm shifts. There is an explanation for this fact that is often announced in the texts themselves. For in a number of cases, on the heels of extended investments in metalogical and second- and third-order considerations, the institution of the text tugs the discourse back to its origins with a sobering call: logic, one is reminded, is a tool of the sciences, and such discussions do not serve the purpose for which logic was invented.\(^\text{115}\) With such pronouncements, the text reverts to the traditional discourse, even as the finer distinctions continue to be debated within the many interstices of the commentary. The machinery of the latter is the subject of the next two chapters.
A Theory of Commentaries
Anatomy of the Commentary

An Internal View

For out of olde feldes, as men seyth,
Cometh al this newe corn from yer to yere,
And out of olde bokes, in good feyth,
Cometh al this newe science that men lere,
—Chaucer, Parlement of Foules

On July 17, 1916, a coterie of scholars assembled in the court of the nawwāb of Rampur to witness one of the last rationalist (maʿqūlī) debates in Muslim South Asia. According to the sixteen documents that constitute the archival witness of this event, the two opponents, Barakāt Aḥmad (d. 1347/1928) and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bihārī, had arrived in the city to debate the merits of certain positions taken up by the late Khayrābādī scholar, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Faḍl-i Ḥaqq, in his commentary on the commentary of al-Harawī on al-Taḥtānī’s al-Risāla fi t-taṣawwur wa-t-taṣdiq.1

Exactly one week later, a report was published by the editor of Rampur’s widely circulated newspaper, the Dabdaba-yi Sikandarī.2 It reveals that the origins of the Rampur Debate were rooted in the layered world of the commentary that oscillated between the written and the oral. We are informed that al-Bihārī had penned a second-order commentary on a medieval work on logic, devoting considerable space to challenging the commentarial interventions of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī. Parts of the longer commentary al-Bihārī had produced were then discussed by him in person with Muʿīn al-Dīn al-Ajmīrī (d. 1359/1940); subsequently, another shorter and more focused work pertaining to this session was published by al-Bihārī. Al-Ajmīrī conveyed the details of the encounter to his teacher, Barakāt Aḥmad, who was himself a student of al-Khayrābādī. And with Barakāt Aḥmad the written text reverted to the oral medium. This latter moment was the 1916 Rampur Debate, where the battle lines
on issues in logic also demarcated scholarly networks sustained by specific commentarial traditions.

Rampur had long been a city that bore profound loyalties to al-Khayrābādī, and this devotion, punctuated by a history of princely patronage, had seen some continuity with his intellectual heirs. Perhaps the most telling case was that of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Amīthwī, who is mentioned in the reports as having been present during the debate in the company of the many attending scholars. Al-Amīthwī was not only the teacher of the presiding nawwāb; he was also a student of al-Khayrābādī. Similarly, we are told that the nawwāb’s father’s first cousin, Ṣāḥibzāda Muḥammad ʿAlī Khān Bahādur (Chuttan Ṣāḥib), was the host of Barakāt Aḥmad, whom he had personally invited to Rampur. Like his guest, the prince had also studied under al-Khayrābādī and was troubled by the looming prospects of the publication of al-Bihārī’s longer critical commentary in his master’s city. By any measure, this was unfriendly terrain for al-Bihārī.

But there was more to this story. One report—partial though it is—highlights three significant points. First, al-Bihārī is presented as a younger and lesser-known authority who aimed to enhance his standing in the scholarly community by challenging a canonized authority under particularly insurmountable circumstances. Second, the report emphasizes that the commentarial exercise was a mere excuse to launch the critique. In other words, the commentarial effort involved a carefully deliberated circumscription of the base lemma as the site of living debate. And third, although this commentarial dialectic served individual ambition and scholarly agency at its most recent iteration, it was still fully animated by the past: the report mentions that al-Bihārī’s challenge to the late al-Khayrābādī was also meant to vindicate his own late master, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Lakhnawī, who had objected to the latter scholar’s positions in his own commentarial effort. In other words, al-Bihārī was both an instigator and a legatee.

This chapter traces the history of the Rampur Debate in order to offer theories of commentarial practice. The Rampur Debate archive supplies us with a rare glimpse into the internal mechanics and living contexts of commenting, serving as a complement to received and canonized texts. As such, theories of the commentary developed on its basis illuminate the work of the next chapter that relies on the texts of the Sullam tradition. This chapter has two parts. In the first, I will explore how the life of the commentary shifted cyclically between the oral and the textual and how the act of commenting—either as hypotext or hypertext—was both an imitative performance of authority and agentive self-actualization. Building on these observations, in the second part I will examine the process of philosophical verification. I will highlight how, in the commentarial context, it was paradoxically innovative precisely by virtue of the constraints of historical texts and partisan legacies.
AN ORALLY INHABITED TEXTUALITY: THE UNITY
OF COMMENTARIAL VOICES

The commentary was a mode of agentive performance in that the commentator both spoke in the voice of his predecessors and also spoke for them. This feature of the commentary explains various forms of its movement between orality and textuality, the past and the future, and the potential and the actual. Below we will observe that, just as al-Bihārī had reanimated the voice of his deceased teacher, so his own respondents and defenders donned the authorial persona of their own teachers. As such, the Rampur Debate was an imitative reenactment of the dialogic space of a previous generation—a commentarial extension of the past. Yet it was also the self-actualization of the past, realized by the authorship of newcomers—a base text (matn) in its own right; cyclically, the latter was itself the grist for future exercises. As we will witness below, just as the future commentary performed, rehabilitated, and authored the incomplete past—its hypotext—so the past also preemptively authorized it—its hypertext. As such, the commentarial machine was cyclical, oscillating between two loci: that in which the past was actualized and reenacted and that in which the text remained suspended in potentia in relation to its future. The movement was facilitated and sustained by an oral aspect that inhabited the textual space.

The tendency of a student/commentary to fulfill the promise of the teacher/base text and of the latter to call forth to the former is a defining feature of the commentarial genre. Yet this kind of mutual propulsion within the commentarial cycles is obscured from view once the text is straightjacketed into its static form that, with the loss of the contextual, dialogic space, becomes an object of late readership.

One report from the Rampur Debate archive explains, for example, that Barakāt Aḥmad had initially insisted that his student, al-Ajmīrī, engage the debate in his stead, stating that it would be all the same whether he or the latter took up the mantle; another report, “A Debate in the Princely State of Rampur” is a ventriloquation by al-Bihārī via his associate, Muḥammad Ṭāhā. Ṭāhā writes,

Mawlānā Barakāt or Chuttan Ṣāhib . . . are requested to give a swift response to this objection and to the objection related to [al-Khayrābādī’s] commentary on the Mirqāt. If they do so, this act will be worthy of praise. However, I am certain that they will not be able to offer a response . . . If there is a Khayrābādī who would like to step into the fray, then I invite him to respond according to the respectful etiquette of the great scholars.

A response was indeed published by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Bihārī, a student of Maqbul Ahmad, who was himself a student of Barakāt Aḥmad. A rebuttal of this latter work appeared almost immediately in Kolkata and was written by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bihārī’s student, Abū al-Fath Muḥammad. And in this fashion, the initial encounter at Rampur was fulfilled in the cycle of several written layers. So the story had begun with two pithy reports of the oral Rampur Debate that called
forth to the elaborately written commentarial formats. The subject matter of these works extended well beyond the topics discussed at the court, such that, within six months, detailed defenses of associated issues in al-Khayrābādī’s *Kalām-i balāghat nizām* and related critiques of al-Bihārī’s *al-Ṣahīfa* were also published. These engagements, in turn, led to two additional oral debates between al-Bihārī and two of Barakāt Aḥmad’s students, Muhammad Sharīf and Maqbūl Aḥmad, in Benares and Bankipore, respectively. And in the form of new texts, these latter witnessed a scholarly life similar to the Rampur Debate. In other words, orality quickened and *inhabited* textuality, and the brevity of past oral discourses led to future cross-generational fulfillments in the commentarial space.

It is revealing of commentarial writing that, of the sixteen archival documents, not a single one is attributed to the two original debaters at Rampur. Indeed, their direct arguments quickly disappear from view altogether, even as their voices are assumed by the student/commentator. In speaking for them, the student both spoke for himself and for the positions of scholars two generations removed—that is, the masters of his own master. A kind of living and orally directed textual archaeology lay at the core of the commentarial exercise: the debate was analogous to the base text (*matn*) that spoke through the future commentary, but with a devotion to its own anchored past; the reports, short treatises, and commentaries were all part of a dialectic that textualized the oral and that focused on sets of disputed problemata—the *masāʾ il*—that were introduced by the *matn*. The latter called out to the future commentary to fulfill it, while also compelling it to return to layers that were subsumed by it. The process continued cyclically, even as the more recent articulations of the cumulative history marched forward in new directions.

Therefore, from the perspective of the commentary as a *readerly* canon, it makes sense that it should appear to be sterile repetition; as a *writerly* medium, however, the commentary was tantamount to a process that sustained cycles of dynamic orality *through* the textual form. The intense bursts of activity propelled by the Rampur Debate allow us to capture commentarial lives eventually—as punctuated disruptions—and within the scope of their cyclical character. Since they are contained both temporally and in terms of their subject matter, they display quite vividly that the textual commentary actualized the oral and that the oral—an invested dialectical site of its own textual past—was a latent germ of the future text.

**TRADITION AND PARTISANSHIP IN DIALECTICAL VERIFICATION**

The commentary tradition oscillated between the oral and the textual, the past and the future, the pithy and the expansive, the potential and the actual, and the master and the student. These dichotomous features of the tradition naturally facilitated certain processes and expectations of philosophical argumentation and
verification. The conduct of the Rampur Debate and episodes in its history can be used to highlight these aspects of the tradition. The Dabdaba-yi Sikandari captures the Rampur Debate in the following fashion.

In the first iteration, according to the direction of . . . His Highness, Bihārī was designated to be the questioner [sāʾil] and Barakāt Aḥmad the respondent [mujīb]. The question was, “What is the difference between the expressions ‘all’ [tamām] and ‘totality’ [jamī’]?” The respondent gave a thorough answer. When Bihārī was about to raise an objection against the respected [Khayrābādī], His Highness said that the objections should have been raised if the books written by [Khayrābādī] were present. After this, the next argument—whether propositions are second intentions or not—was under way. Although this debate should have taken place with Muʿīn al-Dīn . . . Bihārī Ṣāḥib adamantly refused this, such that, in the end, this debate was also carried out with the [Barakāt] Ṣāḥib . . . When, by means of his powerful speech, [he] was able to prove that [propositions] are second intentions . . . Bihārī could say nothing more than that [he] had never heard this from anyone and that this is a new verification [yeh jadīd tahqīq hē]. Upon this [claim] the gloss of the respected [Khayrābādī], on Ḥamdallāh, wherein this position was proved on the basis of the expressions of the Ufuq mubīn, was presented . . . In the third iteration, [Barakāt Aḥmad] . . . was the questioner and [Bihārī] was simply asked for a definition of the continuity of substrates . . . Try as he would . . . Bihārī could not give its definition . . . His Highness declared that, truly, [Bihārī] was not able to offer a definition . . . and on explaining the matter himself, he forced the concession (ilzām) on . . . Bihārī.”20

This quotation is significant in that it lays bare the mechanism underlying the formation of the matn, which, in this instance, is the words of Barakāt Aḥmad and al-Bihārī. The context was an oral debate, conducted formally along the lines discussed in the ādāb al-baḥth literature: the questioner and respondent take turns in these roles as they engage specific problemata; and the event is concluded when the nāwāb forces a concession on al-Bihārī. The iterations of each side are concise and decisive, as they are meant to have an immediately forceful effect on the audience and the arbiter within a limited span of time. And it is these condensed oral arguments that became the hypotexts for the written commentarial exercises that followed.

In large numbers and strung together in an organic format, debated problemata of this sort eventually became the written hypotextual handbooks on which commentaries operated; indeed, fertile commentaries—those that beckoned super-commentaries—foreshadowed their future fulfillment in the same manner. The hypotextual lemmata of the handbook were thus tantamount to subdued heteroglossia that the anticipated commentarial hypertexts reified in a loosely unified style. These dialectical sites undergirded the possibility of the philosophical commentary as a genre.21

In all this, the case of the Rampur Debate is instructive because it unveils a structure of commentarial practice that is generally obscured by the commentary
on the page. Here it is visible in plain view that the starting point of the written matn was an oral debate. As we will observe below, similar traditions of living debates—oral or textual—underlay the production of other hypotexts. And the matn that emerged from these debates gestured to its dialectical turgidity in a way that was resolved only in the adoptive voice of the commentator. This was done much in the same way as the positions of the debaters of Rampur were fulfilled in the reports and commentaries of their students.

Furthermore, as we noticed in the case of the first and third problèmatas mentioned in the quotation above, the oral medium carried determinative weight, although it also betrayed its underlying textual grounds: the debaters were not allowed to appeal to the written text in its absence, although the latter was the source of the dialectic. In this regard, with the third problema, a proof text was only produced in response to a curious riposte of al-Bihārī—that his opponent was presenting a new verification (tahqīq) of the issue at hand. Such a case of verification was problematic. The underlying text was written by the late al-Khayrābādī and it had been argued, in a contracted oral format, by his student and stand-in debater, Barakāt Aḥmad. However, the proof text turned out to be not his master's commentary but a claim in this commentary grounded in the much earlier authorial voice of Mīr Dāmād.

There was, therefore, a certain paradoxical tension within the exercise: Barakāt Aḥmad enjoyed full agency in establishing his positions in the oral defense; it was he whom al-Bihārī aimed to defeat. Yet the victory of Barakāt Aḥmad was poignantly also a historical gain and a vindication of his master, whose written commentary lurked under the surface of this oral moment that would emerge as a new matn. Paradoxically again, Barakāt Aḥmad's independent verifications and demonstrations could not be new or unrecognizable. They had to be erected atop al-Khayrābādī's text and, via the latter, they had to be grounded in a still deeper textual foundation. As we will observe in several cases below, it is precisely in this fashion that the dynamic aspects of the most youthful commentaries were also the most profoundly archaic: there were historical commitments buried below the surface of their dense mutūn that also brimmed with the urgency of live debates. Thus, the commenting texts—whether critical or constructive—were prompted by their base texts to assume and actualize proximate and distant voices, even as they held fast to their own innovative authorial agency.

In the Rampur Debate, the words spoken with reference to an underlying textual layer crystalized as the matn that became the prompt for the ensuing textual deluge of commentaries. It is worth observing, however, that in defending the positions taken up by the Rampur debaters, the ensuing commentaries readily adopted a classical orientation. This mode of scholarly engagement was already apparent even in the aforementioned appeal to Mīr Dāmād's Ufuq. In that case, the pithy matn of the oral statement had forced a commentarial intervention that authorized the independent verification of the speaker by appeal to a much earlier
source text. This same process is also ubiquitous in the written corpus of the Rampur commentaries. As an example, one may cite ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz’s “Īfāda,” which also reveals a number of other important points.

[Al-Bihārī writes in ‘Munāzara’]²⁴ that a group of imitators [muqallidin] have written that the simulacrum is distinct [mubāyin] from that of which it is a simulacrum and that [a thing] is revealed [as an object of knowledge] only to the extent that there is a self-same unity [between that which reveals and the object that is revealed]. This [position betrays] a neglect of the relationship of imitation [muḥākāh] [between a simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum]. For self-same unity is only the most proximate type of specific quality that is suitable for revealing [the knowledge of an object]. A celebrated [scholar] maintains that [such] revealing occurs also in the case of knowledge by means of an aspect [of something] [al-ʿilm bi-l-wajh], although an aspect and that of which it is an aspect are different per se [mutaghāyirāni bi-dh-dhāt]. The explanation [in the one case] would be the [same as the] explanation [in the other]. Against this [response] is [my criticism] that distinction as a technical term [al-tabāyun al-istiḥlāḥ] is more specific than difference [tagḥāyur]. There is no distinction between an aspect and that of which it is an aspect. Thus the analogy [qiṣṣa] has no shared term. However, it is conceded by the eminent ones that there is an accidental unity [ittiḥād ʿarāḍī] between an aspect and that of which it is an aspect. In the case of knowledge by means of the aspect, the revelation [of an object of knowledge] occurs only per accidens. So the revelation occurs only to the extent that there is a unity [between the aspect and that of which it is an aspect]. So reflect on this! For the verification [of this issue] in this manner [fa-inna t-taqīqa ʿalā hādhihi t-tarīqa] is among the things specific to this work.²⁵

Let us first outline the argument before turning to its form. The views of three distinct contenders are presented—those of the imitators; those of al-Khayrābādī (the celebrated scholar); and those of al-Bihārī (in the words of Ṭāḥā). The imitators first posit the position (1) that a simulacrum in the mind may reveal that of which it is a simulacrum if there is a unity between them. Given this position, and since there is no such unity per se—the two are mutabāyin bi-dh-dhāt—the implicit conclusion is that a simulacrum in the mind may not reveal that of which it is a simulacrum. (~1) This conclusion is rejected on the grounds that there is a relationship of imitation between the two and that this type of relationship is sufficient for gaining knowledge of the object. (2 = ~1) al-Khayrābādī supports this argument by pointing out that an aspect of a thing proffers knowledge of that thing; it is implied that this is a position accepted by the imitators. Yet there is no unity per se between an aspect and that of which it is an aspect; the two are mutaghāyir. Since the relationship between a simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum is of the same sort, one cannot reject the simulacrum as capable of revealing knowledge of a thing, while accepting that an aspect may do so. (3 = ~2) al-Bihārī counters al-Khayrābādī by stating that distinction (tabāyun) and difference (tagḥāyur) are technically distinct. Given this, the analogy between a simulacrum and an aspect
is not valid. Furthermore, there is an accidental unity between an aspect and that
of which it is an aspect. Presumably, such a unity is lacking in the case of a simula-
crump and that of which it is a simulacrum.

The “Ifāḍa” is effectively a critical commentary on this textual lemma of
al-Bihārī, displaying some of the important features of the genre. Its first order
of business was to disentangle identities and arguments: the imitators, it explains,
are the majority of the Peripatetics (mashḥāʿūn), who hold the doctrine that a
form in the mind is identical to its object with respect to its quiddity (not with
respect to its individuation). Given this unity on the level of the quiddity, a thing
may be known, with respect to its quiddity, by means of a form that obtains in the
mind, but not by means of a simulacrum. The contravening position is specified
as that of the Illuminationists (ishrāqiyyūn), and it also grants that the mind may
know things other than those that obtain in it. However, it denies that there is a
unity of any sort between what obtains in the mind—a simulacrum—and that of
which it is a simulacrum. The two are distinct from each other both on the level
of quiddity and on the level of individuation. Thus insofar as something is known
at all, it must be due to a relation of mimesis. “This is an elaboration,” ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz writes in closing his first set of thoughts, “of the locus of their disagreement whence
the earlier [scholars] sought to prove the doctrines that they held.” In writing a
critical assessment of al-Bihārī’s stance, therefore, the author of the “Ifāḍa” had
to take up the passing reference to the imitators and expose the necessary funda-
mentals on which the later arguments were erected. This was a historical unfolding
/exposition (tahrīr). 26

It is noteworthy that neither al-Bihārī nor ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was directly concerned
with the conclusion. Rather, what was of interest was the dialectical play of the
argument to which the matn and the historical baggage had led. In the case at
hand, the argument of the imitators was not suitable because the proof they used
in support of their views could be used to the same effect by those they wished to
undermine—the aspect was no better as a ground of knowledge than the simula-
crump. al-Bihārī’s critique, in turn, pointed out that, in formal terms, to be distinct
(what is said of the simulacrum in relation to the referent) is not the same as to
be different (what is said of the aspect in relation to that of which it is an aspect);
and so the analogy al-Khayrābādī had established was not valid. Furthermore, he
claimed that there was an accidental unity between an aspect and that of which
it was an aspect; this unity was presumably lacking in the analogue. These twin
elements of the proofs, he averred, constituted a mode of verification that was a
distinct feature of his work. We will return to this important claim below.

In the next phase of the argument, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz shifts from the tahrīr of the
positions of the earlier scholars to those of al-Khayrābādī. As before, the defense
is only implied in the work of the latter author, so the argument of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
effectively appears to be a continuation and fulfillment of the hints of his predeces-
sor. He writes,
Al-Khayrābādī . . . countered [them] [naqidan] in that the revelation [of a thing] obtains in the case of knowledge by means of the aspect. However, the aspect and that of which it is an aspect are different per se [mutaghāyirānī bi-dh-dhāṭ]. The explanation [here] is the [same as the] explanation [there]. The gist of it is that the proof that you mentioned for [arguing] that the simulacrum does not reveal its referent—namely, that what is distinct [mubāyin] does not reveal something else that is distinct [from it]—is applicable, in the exact manner, in the case of knowledge by means of an aspect. The reason is that the aspect is also distinct from that of which it is an aspect. And so the claim [muddāʾā]—namely, that no revelation happens [in the first case]—fails . . . If they offer the explanation that . . . although the aspect is distinct and different from that of which it is an aspect, it does have a relation [ʿalāqa] with that of which it is an aspect—that is, [a relation of] accidental unity—well a relation also obtains between a simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum; between them there obtains a relation of imitation. [That there is an accidental unity between the aspect and that of which it is an aspect] is claimed by al-Bihārī in the Ṣaḥīfa; and he made the verification [of the issue] in this manner [at-taḥqīq ʿalā hādhā t-tariq] among the special characteristics [khusūsiyyāt] of his commentary, deeming the resolution [of his challenge] to be difficult.

There is no need to rehearse all the elements of al-Khayrābādī’s critique. What is new in this part of the commentary is the tahrīr of his expression, “The explanation [here] is the [same as the] explanation [there].” One learns that this cryptic statement is a response to the anticipated counterresponse by the Peripatetics that, although the aspect and that of which it is an aspect are distinct, they nonetheless have some relation to each other. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz writes,

Al-Khayrābādī imagined that perhaps, at a later point, some supporter of the Peripatetics might try to resist this refutation [naqḍ]. He might present the sterile explanation—as Bihārī has done in his objection—that there is a difference [between the two analogues]. In the one case, there is a pure distinction per se, with no kind of unity. By contrast, in the other case, although there is no unity per se, there certainly does obtain a unity per accidens. And so the ʿAllāma [al-Khayrābādī] himself overcame this [potential objection] . . . and he stated that the explanation [in that case] is the explanation [in this case] [fa-lʿudhr al-ʿudhr].

What is this explanation that applied in both cases and that allowed the ʿAllāma to overcome the projected critique? Nothing more than the hint—fa-lʿudhr al-ʿudhr—was offered in the text itself, so that the task of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz came to be, as it were, to divulge a secret that he shared with the author. Furthermore, in so doing, he donned the mask of al-Khayrābādī’s persona and directly addressed these critics—the anticipated and historical ones—in his living voice:

You never posited that the source of revelation and the basis of knowledge was unity simpliciter. Rather, you had claimed that the basis of knowledge and the source of revelation was only unity per se. You hold that the thing itself should obtain [in the mind] for knowledge and revelation to come about. So how can unity per accidens
help you now? And if you must now arbitrarily abandon your doctrinal position
[agar yahi tark-i madhhabi sūjhī hai]—that although there is no unity per se, at least
there is some relation—then remember that, in addition to being contrary to your
doctrinal stance, a relation simpliciter is found also between a simulacrum and that
of which it is a simulacrum. For even you do not deny that there is a relation of imitation
between a simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum. In this case, if unity
per se is dropped [as a condition], then both cases are the same.30

Two layers of attack are leveled against the critic. If he holds firm to his standard
epistemology, he cannot argue in favor of knowledge by means of an aspect. If, on
the other hand, he abandons his underlying doctrinal position, he must concede
a conclusion that he wishes to reject. In all this, for the purposes of a theory of the
text, it is important to recall that ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz is a commentator of a third layer
who resolves the textual hints of the commentator of the first layer by inhabiting
his persona (“You!” as al-Khayrābādī would have addressed his critic); and he is
brought to assume this role in his defense of an oral debate of the second layer.
As in the oral debate, so here, too, the development is diachronic and synchronic.
The latest author is paradoxically both constrained and free—the historical text
predicted, authorized, and compelled his arrival (the central argument, “fa-l-ʿudhr
al-ʿudhr,” required articulation) and he, in turn, authored and fulfilled the historical
text.31 Yet this role of the latest author does not emerge as though from a back-
ward gaze of an epigone; the germ of each layer was already sown in each of the
cumulative earlier layers; it was posited there deliberately and with the anticipation
of an unfolding at each moment of recasting. Indeed, even the criticism was pro-
jected in a similar fashion: “Observers!” writes ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, “You have now noted
that the doubt that al-Bihārī had attributed to himself, and about which he had
claimed that it is absolutely unsolvable, is precisely that to which the ʿAllāma
had himself hinted [ishāra] in his Kalām-i balāghat niẓām. And he had [hinted
at it] along with its response [—fa-l-ʿudhr al-ʿudhr]. So you [the objector] should
concede defeat.”32 The identities of the actors are diluted within the persona of
each latest agentive author.

In addition to uncovering the unusual framework of the commentarial texts,
the evidence presented above intimates that the pulse of the debate was still beat-
ing in each of its oral or written transmigrations. As mentioned above, the relevant
parts of the commentary of al-Khayrābādī on the base of al-Harawi’s commentary
had textualized a disagreement with ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawi; this confronta-
tion, itself a fulfillment of earlier developments, was reignited, rehearsed, and
reformed by their respective students in the oral debate of Rampur; this moment
then led to another set of textualizations of the oral in the form of reports; and
these, in turn, led to commentaries, such as those of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. In each
case, the earlier text looked forward, as a prompt, to the next layer and called
out to be realized by it. The master’s voice—oral or textual—reverberated through
the future student, the speaker/writer of his commentary. It is in this sense that
the commentator never quite read the base text of his master as an ordinary recipient but spoke/wrote that very text as the master himself. Hence, in each case, he occupied a liminal space—that of the student and the master—in relation to the historical past and the projected future.

The vibrancy of the commentarial cycles was also sustained by the thrust and parry hidden under the contracted form of each layer, a point that is made explicit by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz: “The ʿAllāma . . . has already contravened [naqḍ] their aforementioned proof by means of the rules of dialectics [uṣūl-i munāẓara].” These rules of dialectics were also at play in the oral debate at Rampur, where the nawwāb assumed the role of the arbiter (ḥākim), appointed the questioner (sāʿīl) and respondent (mujīb) in each cycle, and eventually forced the concession (ilzām) on one side. In the “Ifāḍa,” ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, as al-Khayrābādī, became the nāqiḍ, wrestling with several of the cumulative layers before and after the Rampur Debate; and he similarly forced his opponent to succumb (ifḥām). And so this form of play continued in future commentaries.

These texts were thus motive objects—substitutes for the strategically reticent master—that guided future writing. In compressing historical voices and in appropriating them as their own, they deliberately prompted future debate. In this manner, each latest incarnation of the textual organism thrived to the extent that it succeeded in regenerating itself through a voice both of its own and of another. When this process of writing ceased, the text became sterile. It was thus the paradox of the genre that textual repetition—so maligned by past scholarship as a symptom of scholarly decline—was in fact at the root of intellectual development and innovation.

Various elements of the “Ifāḍa” bring this cumulative dialogic tradition into sharp relief; and its arguments also uncover an important aspect of the meaning of verification (taḥqīq). For example, in turning to refute the aforementioned criticism that distinction in the technical sense (al-tabāyun al-iṣṭilāḥī) is more specific than difference (taghāyur), such that the analogy between a simulacrum and an aspect fails, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz writes:

Observers! Bihārī believes that the distinction that exists between the simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum is a distinction in the technical sense of the term. And then he presents it as more specific than the essential difference that [exists] between an aspect and that of which it is an aspect. It is not clear to me what he intends by the technical sense of distinction; nor do [I understand] why he declares this distinction to be more specific than essential difference . . . The real story is that, since even in the most basic books of the rationalist disciplines the expression “distinction” is used in relation to a simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum and [the expression] “difference” [is used] in relation to an aspect and that of which it is an aspect . . . well, his error may be attributed entirely to these expressions. It is these surface utterances that are the source of his objection . . . and it is on their basis that he presented his doubt against the ʿAllāma—namely, that the analogy between
[the two aforementioned pairs] fails . . . Well, what if this word “distinction,” which is the source of the error and of the objection, were to be dropped and, in its place, [the expression] “difference” were to be posited? . . . Now the problem is: how can I make simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum “different” in the same way as an aspect and that of which it is an aspect? For it is indeed very easy for me to present the statements of many great scholars as my proof texts [sanad]. Yet perhaps Bihārī has not heard them, especially [the statements] of the eminent Khayrābādī scholars. For as far as he is concerned, they are his opponents. However, perhaps ’Allāma Dawānī is not a Khayrābādī? If his statement is presented as a proof text and he conveys that the simulacrum and that of which it is a different [mutaghāyir], then perhaps it would be suitable [for the opponent] to concede [taslim].

Earlier, we witnessed al-Bihārī presenting his critique of al-Khayrābādī as an independent verification of the issue, declaring his doubt to be unresolvable. In that case, we observed ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz pointing out that the doubt had already been anticipated and that al-Khayrābādī had supplied a response in the expression fa-l-ʿudhr al-ʿudhr. The cryptic expression called to the future commentator to take up the challenge against the future critic. Thus, al-Bihārī's verification was not independent in the strictest sense, as it unfolded a challenge already foretold by his opponent. The challenge was subsumed in the transmitted text.

In the passage above, a similar development is noticeable: the ground for al-Bihārī's verification is a commonplace expression found in a number of books of the rationalist disciplines. Thus, a case of independent verification is generated by accepting, in the first instance, certain transmitted claims about distinction and difference. Now, this would not be an unusual manner of proceeding, as independent proofs may certainly be erected on an established consensus. Yet the matter here requires further consideration. In his response, ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz does not trouble himself with undoing the textually based starting point of his opponent by offering an independent counterproof. On the contrary, he cites proof texts in order to show that the grounds are faulty. Indeed, one should bear in mind that these citations do not offer arguments for the validity of the rebuttal; they are simply claims made by past authorities. And perhaps what is most striking is the expectation that the proof texts would not be accepted by al-Bihārī if they issued from an opposing faction. Put differently, the independent verification (taḥqīq) of al-Bihārī, like the defense against it, is fully grounded in transmitted texts (naqli) that require factionalist considerations. This is a representative case of the paradoxical imitation (taqlid) of one's masters within the ambit of an exercise in verification (taḥqīq). As we will see in the next chapter, commentarial networks facilitated this mode of scholarship.

Next, in order to press his point further, ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz, in the ensuing passages, offers other proof texts (sanad), making sure, in each case, that they were not produced by scholars who belonged to the opposing camp. Thus, he quotes Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī and ultimately, al-Bihārī's own teacher al-Lakhnawī, using the
following words: “Who knows? Perhaps even great scholars like [al-Dawānī and al-Dashtakī] made a mistake. Yet what would you say if al-Bihārī’s own teacher confirms this position of ours? . . . Perhaps then he would concede . . . and the analogy [that he declared sterile] would be productive.”36 Following this, a number of quotations are offered.

Let us return to the proof text from al-Dawānī that was extracted from his first gloss on al-Qūshjī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd. (As in other proof texts, so here the aim is to collapse distinction and difference into one notion.)

His statement that this [thing] that subsists in the mind, which is expressed as a psychological state [kayfiyya nafsāniyya]—if it were different [mughāyir] from that which is known, as the apparent sense of his discourse indicates—well, this [reduces] exactly to the doctrine of the simulacrum and the image.37

In other words, Dawānī recognizes no category that separates what is in the mind and what is known other than that of difference (taghāyur). ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz now points out that, despite his intense opposition to al-Dawānī regarding precisely the same issue, in his gloss, al-Dashtakī did not take recourse to the claim that distinction and difference are two notions. Given this historical fact, al-Bihārī’s verification fails. He writes,

Observe [Dawānī’s] contemporary, Ṣadr-i Shirāzī, who, despite his intense opposition and rebuttal of this statement . . . in his new gloss . . . he did not deploy [this distinction]. Otherwise, the easy response would have been that the simulacrum and that of which it is a simulacrum are distinct, but not different . . . In other words, this objection on the part of Ṣadr would have been onerous to the discourse of ḌAllāma Dawānī . . . For here as well it is the same story of distinction and difference . . . Alas, this idea that befell Bihārī could not have befallen the contemporary Ṣadr. For in his view, essential distinction and difference are one and the same thing.38

The dispute was thus already part of a set of earlier texts that were familiar to Indian scholars. Had the criticism of al-Bihārī been valid, so the argument goes, some version of it would have occurred at the suitable locus in the earlier tradition. Since there is no such proof text (sanad), the verification of the latter author, which must build on an established foundation of the transmitted textual base, cannot lift off the ground. Thus, we again have ambivalence in the notion of taḥqīq.

Next, in turning to the proof text of al-Bihārī’s teacher, the author of the “Ifāḍa” exposes an interesting logic behind his choice of the Dawānī-Dashtakī commentary cycles on the Tajrīd. He writes,

Mawlānā al-Lakhnawī . . . writes the following in his Miṣbāḥ . . . “We say regarding his statement that this thing that subsists in the mind is different [mughāyir] from that which is known that it does not reduce to the doctrine of the simulacrum and the image, as Dawānī falsely imagined. For the simulacrum and the image are different [mughāyir] from that which is known with respect to their quiddities.”39
The Miṣbāḥ was a gloss by al-Lakhnawī on Ghulām Yaḥyā’s Liwā’ al-hudā. This latter work was itself a gloss on al-Harawī’s commentary on al-Taḥtānī’s Risāla fi t-tasawwur wa-t-tasdiq. In other words, the proximate proof text was a commentary of one order lower than that of al-Bihārī and al-Khayrābādī on the same genealogical text. And this commentary, in turn, had taken up the task of engaging the same quotation from the Dawānī-Dashtāki commentarial cycles as ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz had invoked as his proof text (sanad) against al-Bihārī. Here, then, we have a typical moment that illustrates the syncretic disciplinarity—the Tajrīd was not a text on logic—and the synchrony of the commentarial tradition: a commentary of a lower order impacts those of an earlier one even as its commentarial task focuses on earlier commentaries on a text of a different discipline. It is within the logic of such textual constraints that the process of verification was valid.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s chronologically proximate proof text both betrays his misunderstanding of its substance and further confirms the idea of the commentary as the fulfillment of textual potentialities. In his work, al-Lakhnawī is arguing against al-Dawānī that the claim of difference between the mental object and the object of knowledge does not necessarily reduce to an adoption of the doctrine of the simulacrum and the image. For in the latter case, the difference between them and the object of knowledge is with respect to quiddity. In other words, the latter difference has a further restriction, making it more specific than the former. This interpretive step appears to be precisely what led al-Bihārī to posit that essential distinction (tabāyun dhātī) is something other than difference (taghāyur) and that, given this, the analogy that al-Khayrābādī had set up—one that is sharply reminiscent of al-Dawānī—had failed. The failure of this analogy was of course only implicit in the statement of al-Lakhnawī; it was articulated in its fullest form by his student, al-Bihārī. Yet here again, this rehearsal and actualization of the hints in the textual base is precisely what is referred to as taḥqīq. Given that these texts were widely available, the author surely did not imagine that he would escape charges of intellectual theft in his claims of verification. No such accusations were leveled against him; rather, verification appears to be the author’s ability to draw out and actualize the textual base in potentia. By the same token, the verification efforts were considered to be futile by his opponent precisely because, as the latter claimed, his textual acumen and range were limited.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Let me highlight the salient features of the foregoing analysis. The story of the Rampur Debate begins with the ambition of a rising scholar, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bihārī, to cultivate his stature. In this effort, he had raised objections against the commentary of a major figure of the previous generation, using his own
commentary on a much earlier text as the locus of the exercise. The targeted scholar, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, was a scholarly rival of al-Bihārī’s teacher, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawī. Thus, from the offset, the personal agency of the author was inexorably implicated in factionalist scholarship, with two layers of commentarial space serving as the medium of dispute.

After some iterations—oral and written—the issue was presented in a live session in the deeply partisan court of the nawwāb of Rampur. This oral debate was held between al-Bihārī and Barakāt Aḥmad, who was a student of the commentarial target. Following the debate, a written corpus was produced at a quick pace, excavating its dialectical commentarial roots. It indicates that, in any moment of commentarial writing, the most recent author circumscribed the lemma of the hypotext—the matn or the sharḥ—for his own professional and scholarly ends. As such, each new author retained his agency in relation to the past. This agency was liminal in that, on the one hand, it was authorized and compelled to be effected by the authority and sanction of the dialectical space of the hypotext and in that, on the other hand, it called to its own future hypertext to fulfill it. In other words, this agency did not militate against the past or the future—it subsumed the former as the germ of its actuality, and it prompted the latter to speak for it. The cumulative past was thus fulfilled in each iteration.

This notion of fulfilling the promise of the past author, by dint of his authority, is a central theoretical claim of this book. Whether the hypotext is the oral debate or the commentary or the handbook, the actualization of the incrementally billowing lemmatic space was the defining feature of the commentarial tradition. The hypotext in each instance was both a hypertext in relation to its base and a call to its own future actualization. It is in this fashion that the notions of authority and authorship were invested in each agent commentator. The commentary, then, is most suitably regarded as a writerly process motivated by the hypotext in potentia. Such a hypotext was tantamount to the living master, the guide who issued gestures and prompts to the student, the hypertext, in order to lead him to the past dialogic space and to sustain its voices by means of his own agency. It is in this manner that each scholar in this dialectical space was both a master and a student.

The agency of any author within this system of writerly culture was therefore complete in both temporal directions: he both actualized the past and prompted his own actualization in his future hypertextual incarnation. As an object of readership, the commentary was merely exegetical deadweight. And this is precisely where the paradox of dynamism resided. As we saw above, within the ambit of the commentarial tradition, independent verification (taḥqīq) was also grounded in past textual authority and, although its exercise legitimized claims to innovation, it too appears to have been the creative actualization of past potentialities. It is in this manner, then, that the voice of each recent authorial agent was both his
own and the tradition's; and it is for these reasons that the relation among such texts was not properly intertextual, for neither was the author dead nor was there a clear-cut circumscription of textual domains—or one of influence—there being neither parricide nor filicide. The genre of commentary was unified in the implicit and explicit dialectic that recognized the dual gesturing and actualizing agency of each historically cumulative authorial voice.
Complementing the foregoing analysis, this chapter theorizes the commentary on the basis of the texts of the Sullam tradition. The first section presents some key self-reflections of the commentators on their exercise, bringing into relief their understanding that the hypotext of any order was both a partial unfolding of past texts and a gesture inviting its own completion in future hypertexts. Here, the literary allusions and rhetorical elements of the commentators’ statements are quite instructive. In the second section, I focus on the instrument of textual allusion as a means to uncover the architectonics of the commentary. In following piecemeal the textual life of a technical conundrum presented in the Sullam, I demonstrate how the economy of gestures—in the hypotexts and hypertexts—sustained commentarial writing. In the final section of this chapter, I explore how the aforementioned features and frameworks of the commentary also curated textual excavations that, by forcing oscillations between the past, present, and future, ultimately complicated notions of authorship, authority, and originality. I conclude with some reflections on the vexed question of the dynamism of postclassical Muslim rationalist disciplines.

**WRITING THE TRADITION: SELF-REFLECTIONS IN THE COMMENTARIAL PROLEGOMENA**

Strictly speaking, base texts and commentaries were not true items of readership; they were meant to be written and spoken, *along with* earlier textual layers. As
I have indicated above, in making this claim, I do not mean to assert that the base texts and commentaries were not actually read; such a position would be trivially false. Nor am I proposing that we should approach commentarial cycles as palimpsests that impose textual erasure and layering. Commentarial practice was characterized instead by accumulation—in the diachronically contracting and expanding lemmata—within one continuous authorial discourse. The initiating moment of the discourse, the hypotext, was itself a laden allusion to living philosophical debates; as a prompt, it invited its own expression and realization in the hypertext. It is in this manner that base texts, commentaries, and supercommentaries were palimpsests of themselves.

This defining feature of commentarial practice and production—the allusive prompt to future self-actualization—was both implicit and explicit. With a first gesture, for example, the Sullam’s early pages disclose the wishes of the author that it should be “among mutūn like the sun among the stars.” The commentator, Mullā Mubīn, writes:

A matn is what is hard and difficult and in need of a commentary/opening [sharḥ]. This is a supplicatory statement. Its meaning is, “Lord, make this matn among the ordered mutūn, with respect to its fame, ‘like the sun among stars.’” For when the sun rises, the stars become dim and are not seen, even when they exist. So God granted his prayer and the scholars . . . wrote commentaries on it, so that it came to be widely circulated among the students of the madāris . . . and other mutūn came to be obscured.1

Thus, a matn called to its future commentaries. It was realized through them and its institutional circulation—the practice of reading it—was a function of the written attention that it received. It was often repeated in the bio-bibliographical literature that students in the South Asian Dars-i nizāmī method were expected to read only the most difficult parts of various technical texts, so that they may learn to resolve aporiae of any measure of obscurity in their written contributions.2 Yet there was an irony in these expectations: when any matn was fully actualized in its commentarial incarnation, it became sterile. For the commentary itself to remain vibrant and to call to new commentaries, it needed to give voice to the matn in a manner that did not say everything. Indeed, it is for this reason that the aforementioned commentary of Mubīn, perhaps the most accessible and comprehensive realization of the Sullam, was one of the least popular among students of the Dars, receiving little written attention and leaving behind only a faint vestige of manuscript witnesses. There was an oft-repeated pun, meant to warn students of the crushing lucidity of the text: Do not look at Mubīn, the text, because it is mubīn—that is, clear (Mubīnrā mabīn chūn mubīn!).3

That Mubīn was conscious of the distinct nature of his enterprise becomes apparent when his introductory claims are juxtaposed with those of other commentators. He writes,

The Sullam al-ʿulūm is among the most subtle [adaqq] and . . . precise of base texts [mutūn] written in [the field of] logic. It is utterly inaccessible [mughlaqan ghāyat
The greatest scholars devoted themselves to it and wrote commentaries on it that contain novel verifications [tahqiqat badi’al] and unusual penetrations [tadqiqat ‘ajiba]. And they did not turn to resolve [the Sullam’s] problemata, to reveal its objectives, to clarify its puzzles, and to explain its compressed [claims] [bayān mujimalihi]. So [the book] is still hidden under veils . . . In the past, one of my revered friends and sincere comrades had asked me to write a commentary that would overcome its insolubles and facilitate the way to arriving [at solutions] to its subtle problemata, so that it may be beneficial for students and eminent [scholars]. So, despite the limits of my wares and the deficiencies of my merchandise in this discipline . . . I ventured [the effort] . . . and I wrote a commentary with a clear expression [‘ibāra wādiha] and renderings [of the issues] that make plain [the hidden points] [taqrīrat kāshifa], such that it would facilitate for beginners, during their period of study, the acquisition of its aim and would prepare eminent [scholars] in seeking a way to opening up its difficult points. I avoided transmitting too many statements from the books of [other] men, fearing excess. And I dispensed with lamps by [availing myself] of daybreak. Thus, this commentary came to be without equal among commentaries in its [capacity] to reveal and explain [difficult points] . . . And since this commentary has the utmost clarity, I called it The Mirror of Commentaries. And this name is suitable for that which it names, because this commentary opens up other commentaries [kāshif li-shurūh siwāhu].

Doubtless, Mubīn’s report about the pressing requests is a recognizable topos; although interesting as a rhetorical strategy in its own right, it is not directly relevant to the topic. Instead, the following points ought to be highlighted. Mubīn considers the text of the Sullam to be subtle (adaqq) and inaccessible (mughlaq), so as to require commentarial investment. Yet the suitable commentarial exercise, he tells us, never materialized in the efforts of past scholars. Rather, these latter themselves introduced rare verifications (tahqiqat badi’al) and unusual penetrations (tadqiqat ‘ajiba) into the commentarial task, failing to unveil the hypotext. In fact, these commentarial layers themselves became the subject of Mubīn’s commentary, which drew its hypotext into the lucidity of daylight. Others, by contrast, had resorted to the light of a lamp that partly illuminates its objects, while casting new shadows. Their commentaries on the Sullam, therefore, were effectively new hypotexts calling out to be unveiled by Mubīn’s commentary.

Mubīn’s claims about the method and purpose of his commentary were neither an exaggeration nor rhetorically hollow. Indeed, the significance of his statement can be brought into sharp relief when it is juxtaposed with introductory sections of other commentaries. Let me present the remarks by Qāḍī Mubārak as an example.

The discipline [of logic] is the most lucid of disciplines in terms of demonstration . . . The treatise that the adept Verifier [al-muḥaqiq], the subtle investigator [al-muḍaqqiq], the Perfect Shaykh, Muḥibballah al-Bihārī composed, amongst its pages, is a heavenly book [ṣaḥifa malakūtiyya], from which the rivers of the real disciplines flow [tajrī minhā anhār] for those who are friends of rational [disciplines] . . . And I saw a large number of people seeking its solutions . . . And although I am unique [mutafarridan] . . . in [finding] solutions to its impenetrable [discourse]
Mubārak begins with the usual *topos* of being compelled to write the commentary owing to a request. Like the later commentator, Mubīn, he describes the hypotext as obscure and subtle; yet here the enormity of the challenge he faces is spelled out in rather interesting terms: the *Sullam* is an oracular text that guides its readers with rare hints and subtle points. As a heavenly book, it calls out to be unveiled (*kashf*) by the activity of the commentator, who must both emend it and render it meaningful to others. Indeed, the suggestion that the book is a grace for seekers of knowledge is inescapable—it is a source from which the rivers of true knowledge flow (*tajrī minhā anhār*). This is a direct quotation from the Qurʾān (4:122), which promises Elysian fields with subterranean flowing rivers (*jannāt tajrī min taḥtihā l-anhār*). The *Sullam* is, therefore, a heavenly reward that contains within it secret nourishment, the meanings of the real disciplines. It is the task of the commentator to render these esoteric meanings intelligible, much as an initiate would expose divine texts and signs.

Yet Mubārak does not consider his task to be mere exegesis. Commenting involves the introduction of that which is rare and unusual, inciting wonder and curiosity (*bādī’, ‘ajīb*), within the practice of unfolding another text. Mubārak’s commentary confirms Mubīn’s observations—his own book “includes subtle points . . . rare hints . . . and unusual allusions.” In other words, Mubārak’s commentary on the *Sullam* is precisely one of those hypotexts that Mubīn had set out to unveil (*kāshīf li-shūrūḥ*) in the context of commenting on the original hypotext. Mubārak, therefore, is not engaged in the two distinct tasks of opening up a first hypotext and setting up signposts. The two tasks are intimately intertwined, such that, in commenting on the *Sullam*, the later commentator, Mubīn, must also comment on the earlier commentaries that, like lamps, both illuminate and cast shadows of the self-same objects. As we observed above in the context of the Rampur Debate, the hypertext is potential in relation to its future commentary, even as it actualizes and becomes an incarnation of its own hypotext. The hierophant is also an oracle.

Having prepared his own commentary in a manner that required future commenting, Mubārak also had recourse to his personal pedagogical glosses. ‘Abd al-Rasūl al-Sahāranpūrī, who collected them, explains as follows:

> These are glosses . . . that remove obscurities, keys for insolubles . . . from the dawn of the suns of verification, the sun of the sky of penetration, belonging to his per-
fect eminence, the source of emanation . . . the third teacher—rather, the Eleventh Intellect—whose name is blessed [Mubārak] . . . may God give him to reside in the gardens of paradise . . . He had appended [these glosses] to his commentary on the Sullam al-ʿulûm, as a means of divulging the hidden secret[s] [ifshāʾ an . . . sirrahu l-maktūm] [of the commentary] to those who are limited [in their abilities]. I had requested of him, may God’s mercy be upon him, to gather it together, but he did not have a chance to collect [it] and put [it] together. So now, little by little, I gathered it, fearing that it would be lost.

Following these comments, al-Sahāranpūrī offers, in suitable order, the inventory of the interventions of the author on his own commentary. What is of interest here is al-Sahāranpūrī’s confirmation that the commentary itself, written by the apotheosized Mubārak, the Eleventh Intellect, contained secrets that needed to be divulged. Indeed, the expression “al-sirr al-maktūm” immediately brings to the reader’s mind the celebrated work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the “occult” that was written to unfold mysteries. These rhetorical strategies imply that the commentary of Mubārak contains knowledge that would be accessible to the adept, but that calls out to be opened up and actualized for others. His own appended notes provide some glimpses into the intentions of the text in some respects.

A TECHNICAL CONUNDRUM: CURATING TEXTUALIZED ORALITY VIA HINTS

That the introductory statements examined above were not merely rhetorical can be demonstrated rather easily by means of a close investigation of the modes of technical arguments within the body of the Sullam’s commentarial tradition. As noted above, the practice of commenting was sustained by ambiguity and allusions. Hypotexts, whether they were mutūn or shurūḥ, spoke with a clarity bounded by obscurity. As such, the hypotext was both a fulfillment of a past tradition—a hypertext in its own right—and a prompt for its own self-actualization and unraveling in some future hypertext.

This section details, on the basis of the extended analysis of a particular lemma of the Sullam, how commentarial allusions functioned as signposts for textual self-actualization. This will be accomplished by means of the extended analysis of a particular lemma of the Sullam. As I mentioned above, these lemmata, insofar as they were deliberate sites of measured hints and prompts, also generated a large set of features that constituted the vibrancy of commentarial practice. These included textual excavation and hypothetical debates, which, in turn, complicated notions of authorship, originality, and authority. In the next section, therefore, I will also turn to some of these connected elements of commentarial allusions.

A number of explicit expressions in the hypotext served as hints (ishārāt) that guided the hand of the future commentator. The following imperatives, obviously imitative of the Qurʾān, galvanized the commentarial field: fa-taʾammal,
fa-tadabbar, fa-tafakkar, and ifham. Although the expressions are polysemic, in a rather large number of cases they compelled the future hypertext to fill and fulfill the hypotext.

The Sullam uses the expression “fa-tadabbar” nine times, and I will adopt one of its occurrences as the starting point of my extended analysis below. In each case where the expression occurs, the commentators take it as a cue not just to reflect on the solution offered by the Sullam—the command is often parsed as “Ponder! [fa-taʾammal!]”—but also to remedy its failures against projected opponents. Indeed, in certain cases, the Sullam provides a solution to a problem that is either left deliberately incomplete or that represents a weak rendering of its own position. The expression at hand, then, serves as a call to the future commentators to take up the charge of defending the hypotext against the anticipated challenge, which, owing to the feigned shortcoming of the argument, would prevail if the text were abandoned by the future author.

In its technical aspects, the example I have chosen—predication—goes to the very core of the Sullam as an organic text; as such, it is also representative of the broader orientation of the work. We might recall that, although the Sullam is a complete logic work that maps rather neatly onto the structure of earlier handbooks, the unity of its discursive engine is generated by the conundrums tied to certain types of propositional claims. In simple terms, these latter concern predication over supposed objects that have neither mental nor extramental existence. Yet the claims appear to be valid, thus violating the basic principle of affirmation that the subject term must have existential import. Examples include statements, such as “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” and “That which is absolutely unknown has no judgment passed of it.” As I showed in chapter 2, solutions to these types of problems could only be offered on the posit of certain mental determinations and this, in turn, produced the further tension with the programmatic conviction that logic was a tool of the sciences and was meant to facilitate the discovery of mind-independent reality. Echoes of these issues will pervade the discussion below.

Toward the end of the section on quantification and subject terms, al-Bihārī mentions four interconnected investigations that pertain to universal affirmative propositions. The fourth of these, on predication, contains several subsections. I will take up the second of these subsections as my point of departure. In order to situate the nature of the commentarial exercise in what follows, I present the matn in full.

The absurd, insofar as it is absurd, has no form in the intellect. So it is nonexistent both mentally and extramentally. Given this, it is clear that the reality of everything existent in the mind exists with respect to the way things are given. Thus, no judgment is passed of it [i.e., of the absurd], whether it be, for example, an affirmative [judgment] that it is impossible or a negative [judgment] about its existence. [This is the case] except with respect to something universal, when its conceptualization is among things that are possible. Every object of judgment that has obtained [in the
mind] is a conceptualized nature. And everything that is conceptualized exists. So the judgment about it [i.e., the conceptualized nature] that it is impossible and similar [judgments] are not correct insofar as it is what it is. However, when [this thing about which the judgment is passed] is considered with a view to all or some of [its individual instances] that are the sources of its positive obtaining, then the judgment of impossibility, for example, is correct. So impossibility is affirmed of the [conceptualized] nature; and it is true because the [existence of the individual instances] that are the sources of its obtaining is denied. Thus, there is no issue with respect to propositions whose predicates oppose existence, such as “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” and “The joining of contradictories is absurd.”

The argument of the author may be explained in the following terms. A mental object, insofar as it is a mental object, has a form in the intellect; otherwise, it would not be a mental object. As such, then, it is not absurd, since the absurd has no form in the intellect; and, as a consequence, any mental object exists as a self-same given. Next, anything of which an affirmative or negative judgment is passed must have mental or extramental existence. Now, one runs into a conundrum once these principles are in place. One would concede, for example, that a proposition such as “The square circle is impossible” is true, even though there are no square circles either in mental or extramental existence. Al-Bihārī’s solution to this wrinkle in his system is to state that the proposition is not about square circles insofar as they are absurd. Rather, the proposition is parsed to mean that there are no underlying instances by virtue of which the square circle may come to have positive mental or extramental existence. But this is not the end of the issue, as he explains further:

As for those who said that the judgment applies in reality to the individual instances, well, among them is one who said that these are [actually] negative [propositions]. [Yet] there is no doubt that this is an arbitrary [solution]. And among them is one who said that, although these [propositions] are affirmative, they only require the conceptualization of the subject at the time of the judgment. [This is the same] as it is with negative [propositions], without any difference. [However,] it is obvious that this is something that clashes with an a priori [sense of what a proposition is]. And among them is one who said that the judgment applies to supposed individual instances that have been determined to exist. It is as if he states that everything that is conceptualized by means of the tag “Participant with the Creator” and the truth [of this tag] is supposed for it—[such a thing] is impossible with respect to the way things are given. [Yet] it is not hidden from you that this [position] entails that the existence of the description is more than the existence of that which is described. For the impossibility [said of the Partner with the Creator] obtains with respect to the way things are given, as opposed to the individual instances [which do not obtain in this way]. So reflect on this!14

Once he had laid out his own position in the briefest of terms, al-Bihārī turned to some competing views, each one of them meant to accommodate the conundrum produced by absurd subject terms. The common element among them is in fact
something he also shares—namely, that the judgment in a proposition relates to individual instances. However, the alternative authorities parse the proposition in distinct ways. The first one states that such problematic propositions are actually negative, a claim that the author considers to be arbitrary. The second authority aims to overcome the difficulty by asserting that, in such cases, the subject need only be conceptualized at the time of the judgment; however, al-Bihārī points out that this runs against our sense of what a proposition is. Finally, the third explanation offered is that the mind conceptualizes a nature and supposes it to apply to instances that it determines to exist. The predication applies to these instances, *via the tag of this nature*, with respect to the way things are given. Al-Bihārī rejects this solution by claiming that, in such a case, the predicate applies to its subject instances with respect to the way things are given, whereas the subject instances are merely supposed mentally. Following this refutation, he commands the reader to reflect with the expression, “*fa-tadabbar!*” No further explanation is offered by him.

The material difference in clarity between the first and second extended quotations is obvious. Whereas for the first quotation one can lay out, in specific steps, some of the critical analytical choices of the author, in the second, one gets the sense of being confronted with the fragment of each argument followed by an elusive and allusive refutation. This blind spot obscures from view a living dialectical space into which the closing expression, “*fa-tadabbar!*” now leads the commentator. And this latter expression is the starting point of our theoretical journey into the text.

The commentators inform us consistently that “*fa-tadabbar!*” contains a hint (*fīhi ishāra*). In pursuing it, they effectively supply a full arsenal of defense against the third alternative position that al-Bihārī wished to dismantle. Yet the task comprises more than a simple buttressing of al-Bihārī’s claim, in that the commentators point out that the latter’s argument is in fact flawed. The hint in the hypotext, therefore, is that it has supplied a poor argument that must be jettisoned in favor of a more robust one. Here is what Mubīn states in relation to this issue:

There is a hint in [*“fa-tadabbar”*]. [The hint] points to the fact that what is intended by the impossibility with respect to the way things are given is not that the impossibility exists in it [i.e., with respect to the way things are given]. For this would entail that the description would be [ontologically] greater than that which is described. Rather, what is intended [by such impossibility] is the positive obtaining of existence with respect to the way things are given [*taḥaqquq al-wujūd fi nafs al-amr*]. For impossibility is a denial. And denial obtains only when that which is denied does not exist. Thus, it does not follow [that the description] has a greater [ontological] status [than that which is described]. This is what is said in one/some of the commentaries. So reflect on this! [*fa-taʾammal fīhi!*] 15

According to Mubīn, therefore, the hypotext’s hint was meant to undo itself. Al-Bihārī’s explicit argument was that, if the predicate of impossibility applies with respect to the way things are given and if that to which it applies is a set of mentally determined instances of which a supposed tag is mentally posited to apply, then
the description of impossibility has an existence greater than the existence of the thing described. According to Mubīn, the hypotext is implicitly suggesting that this outcome would violate the principle that the thing described must be equal to or greater than the description in terms of existence. This argument is followed by the command “fa-tadabbar!” which, ironically, invites the commentator to the task of dismantling the refutation. Mubīn points out that the hint in the expression “fa-tadabbar!” is that impossibility is simply the denial that existence should obtain with respect to the way things are given; the predicate of impossibility is not meant to suggest that impossibility exists in that ontological space. Thus, the infelicitous consequence that constitutes the crux of the hypotext’s refutation—namely, that the description would be ontologically superior to the thing described—against the opposing position does not follow. The refutation was true on interpretive grounds that the Sullam grants, but grounds that Mubīn, as guided by the hint, dismisses. The hypotext, therefore, appears to be calling to its own redress.

Yet this counterrefutation to which Mubīn is led does not constitute a closure; indeed, it would be strange if it did, given that this would mean that the hypotext is consciously presenting an indefensible position and is not merely participating in the game that guarantees its future actualization. Thus, the dialectical process continues. In the next breath, as presented at the end of the last quotation, the counterrefutation in Mubīn’s commentary invites further redress with the expression, “Reflect on this!” (fa-taʾammal fihi!).” The command leads to a pithy statement in al-Bihārī’s self-commentary. It is reported by Mubīn as follows:

[The author] stated in his [self-] gloss that it is not hidden from the author that that to which the mind is led [mā yansāqu ilayhi dh-dhihn] by the statement, “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” is that the quiddity is impossible with respect to existence in an unqualified sense [muṭlaqan], not [that it is impossible with respect to existence] under this determination. So ponder [this!] [fa-taʾammal!]

Al-Bihārī’s position, therefore, appears to be that the predicate of impossibility should be parsed as an unconditioned denial of the possibility of the existence of the quiddity (namely, the Participant with the Creator), not just the quiddity insofar as it is taken to be true of supposed mental instances that are determined to exist and for which it is mentally supposed to serve as a tag. We are told in al-Bihārī’s words, as quoted by Mubīn, that this is because the mind is not led to the specific interpretation of the proposition that was offered by the third alternative above. This position is in concert with the rejection of the third position and, in Mubīn’s words, it is “a hint toward the author’s . . . foregoing response to the aporia [hādhā ishāra ilâ mà sabaqa mina l-muṣṣannif . . . fi jawābi l-ishkāl].”

Going forward, we will observe how the commentarial cycles disclose the nature of this further hint and the aporia and response to which it points. Before continuing, however, given that the labyrinth of hints and allusions has already led us down a dizzying path, both a summary and a few broader assessments are in order. The developments may be outlined as follows. The hypotext of
al-Bihārī posited the claim that the absurd as such cannot sustain predication and that a conceptualized nature as such, since it exists at least in the mind, can sustain predication. Thus, the meaning of a proposition such as “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” is that the quiddity cannot have any verifying instances, since of the impossible as such no judgment can be passed—it has no form in the mind.

He then sets off presenting and refuting opposing positions in the briefest fashion. Of these, the third position argues that in the proposition, “The Participant with the Creator is impossible,” the mind supposes instances that are determined to exist under the subject tag. The hypotext offers an argument against this third position—namely, that the reading would mean that the description would have greater ontological weight than the thing described. Yet on the heels of presenting this refutation, al-Bihārī himself hints at its weakness with the expression “fa-tadabbar!” He does not tell us anything more in the matn.

This hint then sets things in motion; the aforementioned expression is taken to be a call to offer a counterrefutation. This latter consists in pointing out that the principle, the violation of which constitutes al-Bihārī’s refutation, can only be granted on an interpretation of the proposition that is itself unsound. In effect, therefore, the refutation in the matn is invalid, since it must first grant a parsing that is unacceptable. The intriguing element in this discursive space between the hypotext and hypertext is that the former is both aware of its shortcomings and guides the latter to redress with its expression “fa-tadabbar!” Following the counterrefutation, one is commanded, “fa-taʾammal!”—an expression that is practically identical in its meaning and import to “fa-tadabbar!” This now leads the hypertext back to the mātin, although to the self-commentary, not the hypotext itself. Moving forward, then, a more suitable counterproof to the third position is offered by the hypertext as it quotes this self-commentary. Yet the explanation is utterly obscure: we are told that the mind is not led to the interpretation of the proposition that was offered by the third position—that is, the one with which this story began. And we are then informed that this explanation is itself a hint (ishāra) at what al-Bihārī had stated earlier in relation to the aporia.

The lemma where the hypotext confronts alternative interpretations thus comprises highly compact, obscure, and even self-defeating claims. The exchange between the hypotext and the two hypertexts—Mubin’s commentary and the self-commentary—partly unfolds these claims and partly introduces new ones that need further explanation. The interstices between the former and the latter are punctuated by commands to reflect, which are hints whereby each hypotext curates the broader discursive growth of the lemma in a cycle that oscillates between it and the future hypertext. The details may be represented graphically in the following manner.
The textual landscape evinces a curated motion that would be expected of an oral dialectical space. Interestingly, it is the hypotext that wrote itself in its hyper texts by means of the carefully determined economy of signposts. In other words, the living tradition retained its vibrancy insofar as it was written in and out of deliberately obscure and compressed passages, as guided by a bedrock of hints. The aim of the commentarial tradition, therefore—of the hypotexts and hyper texts—was to perpetuate the authorial voice by means of the types of prompts and hints mentioned in this case. The commands to reflect (fa-tadabbar! fa-taʾammal!) were devices in the service of this purpose, and they sometimes operated in a paradoxical fashion. Standing at the end of a brief and cryptic disquisition, they
could call out to the future commentary to dismantle the textual proof by means of a refutation that could also serve the function of sustaining the principal claim of the hypotext. In other words, just as the hypotext’s call to reflect propelled the hypertext to refute the former’s proof, so the latter also strengthened the former’s claims by redressing its weakness. Yet what is intriguing is that the shortcomings of the proof were already known to the author of the hypotext, who indeed provided further hints toward the corrective path in the self-commentary that was mobilized by the hypertext. It was the deliberate incompleteness and failure of the lemma that allowed it to grow and to actualize itself in the voice of future authors. Successful and successive commentaries engaged in the same play, although, as we will see below, the hypertext did not always speak the hypotext to the effect the latter wanted.

Self-actualization was a recurring feature of the commentary tradition. If one turns to the earlier commentarial engagements with the same lemma, one discovers that the general thrust was rather similar; the details in such cases also complicate notions of authorship, as we will observe below. The eighteenth-century commentator, Ḥamdallāh, for example, informs us that al-Dawānī was among the proponents of the third position, explaining al-Bihārī’s objection in the following words:21

The gist is that the judgment passed on supposed instances is imagined in two ways. The first is that it is judged regarding them that the predicate exists on the determination that [the supposed instances] obtain [‘alā taqdir tahāqqūqihā] and [the determination that] the tag [of the subject term] is true of them. This is the considered position of the lot of the later scholars about ḥaqīqī proposition[s]. The second [understanding] is that the predicate exists with respect to the way things are given in actuality [fī nafs al-amr bi-l-fiʿ]; this is as it is understood from the discourse of one of the [later scholars]. If the first position is intended, then it is not hidden that it goes contrary to that to which the mind is led [khilāf mā yansāqu ilayhi dh-dhihn] with respect to these propositions. This is so, because the meaning of our statement, “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” is that this quiddity is described by the description of impossibility in actuality, with respect to the way things are given, not that it is so on the basis of [some] determination . . . If the second position is intended, then it follows that the description obtains with respect to the way things are given and that the existence of the thing described is [merely] supposed. Thus, the existence of the description would be more than the existence of the thing described. And this undermines the foundation of the premise that states that the existence of a thing for a thing is derivative of and follows from the existence of the thing described.22

Both of Ḥamdallāh’s interpretations of the refutation were considered by his hyper-texts to contain hints. In the first case, the idea that the mind is not led to parse such propositions in the manner suggested is taken by the author of al-Intibāh, a commentary on Ḥamdallāh, to be an allusion to the self-commentary of al-Bihârî,
as was noted above. And one might recall that the relevant fragment of the self-commentary itself ended with a call to reflect (fa-taʾammal). Thus, led via this circuitous path—from Ḥamdallāh’s allusion to al-Bihārī’s self-commentary to the command therein to reflect—Ḥamdallāh’s commentator now takes up the charge.

We are told by this second-order commentator that the command to reflect is a hint (ishāra) back to what al-Bihārī had previously stated—namely, that the impossibility applies simpliciter, not on the basis of any qualification. Yet al-Bihārī’s position is undercut by an imagined defender of the counterrefutation, the familiar mujīb, whom the second-order commentator introduces at this juncture. Indeed, it was precisely such a challenger to his position whom al-Bihārī had envisioned in his command, “taʾammal!” in the self-commentary. The argument against al-Bihārī, as presented by al-Intibāh, is that the quiddity must be impossible on the mental determination of the existence of the instances, since al-Bihārī holds the position that judgment applies to instances; yet the Participant with the Creator has no instances that obtain. In other words, in order for al-Bihārī to be consistent in his parsing of propositions, he must accommodate instances. However, the only instances that avail themselves in the case at hand are mentally determined ones; hence, impossibility does not apply simpliciter. Responding now in al-Bihārī’s voice (fa-qāla), as a fulfillment of the command to reflect on this projected challenge, al-Intibāh explains that, although the judgment of impossibility applies to mentally determined instances, with respect to the way things are given, they are not impossible owing to the determination and supposition (wa-laysat muntaniʿa bi-ḥasabi t-taqdir wa-l-fard).

Ḥamdallāh’s second interpretation of the refutation is likewise taken to be a hint. A marginal note to his text elaborates,

Ḥamdallāh’s statement, “[the description] obtains with respect to the way things are given,” hints that what is intended in the [position] that the description is more [than the thing described] is that this notion is an erroneous concession for the sake of advancing the argument. This is so, because existence is not receptive of modulation in intensity and weakness and in increase and decrease.

Thus, although Ḥamdallāh’s second interpretation is practically identical to the literal sense of al-Bihārī’s matn, according to its hypertextual history, it actually hints at the opposite effect, since it is based on a hypothetical concession/error; and the future commentator is invited to unfold these details in following Ḥamdallāh’s gestures. This was precisely the kind of motion that the hypotext’s command “tadabbar!” was meant to initiate. For their part, the commentarial receptions of these hints displayed the same tactics in advancing the writerly dialog. In this manner, each layer advanced its hypotext and also maintained sufficient allusiveness to be actualized by its own hypertext. The details may now be summarized graphically in the following manner (the Arabic numbers reflect the order of the movement).
The ambiguity within the command to reflect also helped sustain a complex form of authorship. It encompassed the inner word of the hypertext that was spoken by the hypotext; in turn, future layers perpetuated the process. In many instances, this phenomenon produced partial and complete overlaps among individual authorial voices, often by means of textual excavations to which the hints compelled the latest authorial agent. However, as I have argued above, these features did not dissolve authorial independence and identity—each latest commentator embraced the cumulative commentarial tradition, as his own voice.

The lemma that we have been investigating can also serve as an excellent example for demonstrating these points. In perhaps the earliest first-order commentary written on the Sullam, al-Sāʾinpūrī explains that the established position is that
the existence of that which is described must be more intense than the existence of
the description, given that the latter follows on and is derivative of the existence
of the former. This is of course an elaboration and justification of the Sullam’s
refutation of the third position, and it was explicitly pointed out as a ground-
ing principle by Ḥamdallāh. Yet on the heels of this explanation, al-Sāʾinpūrī
insists that the author’s ensuing call for tadabbur must be taken seriously, as the
hypotext had made a subtle point that is deserving of reflection. And it is here
that without announcement and, in order to advance the command to reflect (and
redress), he absorbs the self-commentary of al-Bihārī, as presented above, into his
own text; he interpolates only three words into the verbatim repetition (bi-iʿtibār
mawārid muḥaqiqāqā):

It is not hidden from the author that what is led to the mind (mā yansāqu ilā
dh-dhihn) from our statement, “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” is,
for example, that this quiddity, with a consideration of the resources that cause it to
obtain, is impossible with respect to existence simpliciter, not that it is [impossible]
with respect to the [mental] determination. Reflect!27

We might recall that, in the commentary of Mubīn written several decades later,
this same quotation from the self-commentary on the Sullam was given a proper
authorial attribution. Generally, however, in its earliest appearances, the quotation
above was not disambiguated from the voice of other authors. The significance of
this phenomenon, which is rampant in the commentarial tradition, can be easy
to miss if standard perceptions of authorial identity remain operative. There are
indeed two ways in which such a casual insertion of the self-commentary within
the space of the first-order commentary may be interpreted. On the one hand,
one may understand al-Sāʾinpūrī to have quoted the self-commentary negligently
or plagiaristically or both—he both interpolates certain expressions within the
reported text and quotes it without acknowledgment. On the other hand, one may
take him to be engaged in a conscious and independent authorial effort whose
main purpose was to oversee the suitable growth and pruning of lemmata, which,
in the course of his effort, became his own. The latter appears to me to be the cor-
rect position, as we will see below.

Another early commentator, Mullā Fīrūz, explains that the expression,
fa-tadabbar, alludes to the fact that the hypotext’s foregoing explanation is not
considered agreeable (fihi ʾishāra ilā anna hādhā ghayr mustaḥsan). In this
interpretation, Mullā Fīrūz is in the company of al-Sāʾinpūrī and other later com-
mentators. He states,

From our statement, “The Participant with the Creator is impossible,” what is led to
the mind is only, for example, that this quiddity is impossible with respect to existence
simplicer, not that it is so in view of the mental determination [of the instances].
Reflect! [wa-inna mā yansāqu ilā dh-dhihn min qawlinā sharīk al-bāri muntaniʿun
The statement is of course practically identical to the one we just encountered above. Yet, as in that case, so here the apparently negligible difference is significant—the expression, “It is not hidden from the author,” which was maintained from the self-commentary in al-Sāʾinpūrī’s commentary, is missing. We have thus moved very quickly from an expression in the self-commentary—a cryptic statement that served as a guide to the hint in the expression, fa-tadabbar—to its absorption by al-Sāʾinpūrī as his own commentarial voice to its full embrace by Fīrūz’s lemma, without any reference to another author or authority. Indeed, we might recall that in Ḥamdallāh the self-commentary was entirely subsumed within the sentence structure: “If the first position is intended, then it is not hidden that it goes contrary to that to which the mind is led [khilāf mā yansāqu ilayhi dh-dhihn] with respect to these propositions.”

Thus, it is worth noting that where the earliest commentaries quote this fragment of the self-commentary, they generally do so without attribution, and that it is habituated within the voice of each subsequent commentator in an increasingly organic fashion. On the other hand, for most cases after Mubīn, commentators do supply the authorial attribution. As we will observe below, this is the general manner in which the lemma developed in the process of contraction and expansion—the earliest hypertexts (including the matn as the hypertext to its own living tradition) are pithy, and they are allusive in the embrace of lemmata from other texts as their own lemmatic voices; later hypertexts set about the task of disambiguating authorship, thereby clearing the path for textual excavations at the commentarial sites. I will supply a detailed example of such textual excavation below.

The pruning and growth of the lemma along the course of its commentarial passages is rather typical. Indeed, at times, both the hypotextual and hypertextual lemmata were shaped as interactive patchworks, all the while advancing subtle notions and distinctions into the discourse. The lemma at hand may be mined further as a serviceable example—the expression “bi-iʿtibār mawārid muḥaqqaqa” in al-Sāʾinpūrī appears in the immediately preceding lemma of al-Bihārī’s matn as “bi-iʿtibār jamīʿ mawārid taḥaqqiqihī.” In other words, the commentarial lemma of al-Sāʾinpūrī is generated by a combination of al-Bihārī’s matn and his self-commentary. And it was this self-commentary itself that, with the expression, taʾammal, had led the commentator back to the earlier passage in the matn to complete the argument. The textual history was produced by means of such prompts.

The reverse was also true, since parts of hypertextual lemmata often reemerged as hypotextual ones in diachronically evolving witnesses. Indeed, one need not look far for examples, as various proximate lemmata that appear as the hypotext in the commentators—Baḥr al-ʿUlūm and Mubīn, for example—are not identified
as such in other commentaries.\textsuperscript{31} In other words, the commentarial tradition as a whole was a historical collage where the authorship always belonged to the one wielding the pen. The hypotexts and hypertexts formed and transformed lemmata in a diachronic space that was accessible to and shaped synchronically by each latest author.

Collages may of course always be analyzed into their parts; indeed, late scholarship often engages in such archaeological endeavors. As we will see below, it is often with commentators of slightly more recent provenance that the various lemmatic fragments were resolved back to their original sources (indeed, the inchoate phase of the process is already familiar to us in Mubīn’s identification of the self-commentary as the origin of the remarks that appeared above as the voices of al-Sāʾīnūrī, Fīruz, and Ḥamdallāh). In cases of such resolution, the later commentators continued both to cultivate the lemmata in their own appropriative voices and to excavate the sediments from which they originally sprang. The result was an ever-deeper and broader engagement with the entire history of the lemmatic prompt with each new commentarial effort; as we will observe below, at times, the textual archaeologies generated commentaries within commentaries and, in turn, the formation of new authorial collages that called for yet other commentaries. At other times, such textual excavations with respect to one commentarial tradition compelled commentators to devote their energies to commenting independently on those texts that had been absorbed into their hypotext.

With these points before us, we may now return to explore further the lemma that has been the subject of the last few pages. In another early commentary on the \textit{Sullam}, Muḥammad al-Mubārakī explains that the third position refuted by al-Bihārī—namely, that the judgment applies to instances that are mentally supposed to exist—amounts to taking propositions to be nondefinitive. He writes, “Propositions like this are called nondefinitive [\textit{ghayr battī}]\textsuperscript{32} and these are those [propositions] in which one passes the judgment that the two extremes are unified in actuality on the determination that the nature of the subject tag [\textit{ʿunwān}] is applicable to the [underlying] instances [\textit{wa-hiyā ʿlāti yuḥkamu fihā bi-l-ittiḥād bayna taraf(ay)hā bi-l-fi ṭabīq ūlā taqdir inṭībāq ūtabi ati l- ʿunwān ʿalā l-afrād}].”\textsuperscript{33} To the best of my knowledge, this is the first instance in the commentaries on this lemma of the \textit{Sullam} where the third position is identified with the “nondefinitive” parsing. Al-Mubārakī further states that the following part of the lemma by way of the example offered—namely, that those who hold the third position interpret “The Participant with the Creator is impossible” to be so on the basis of such mental determinations—is al-Bihārī’s clarification (\textit{kamā fassarahu bi-qawlihi}) of the nondefinitive proposition. Put simply, then, the commentary supplies the third interpretive position with an explicit identity and asserts that the hypotext is itself offering an exegetical commentary. As we will see, this was the beginning of an unannounced textual excavation that came into sharp relief only in the efforts of later commentaries.
Al-Mubārakī does not tell us more about the living tradition to which the hypo-
text was implicitly responding, although he offers two more clues along the way. 
The first of these is found immediately preceding the part of the lemma where the 
Sullam offered its refutation of the third position. The commentator intimates that, 
since the nondefinitive proposition does not require the conceptualization of the 
thing about which the judgment is passed in reality, but only on the condition of 
the aforementioned mental determinations, the existence of the predicate for the 
subject does not necessitate existence of the latter in actuality either (fa-lā yaqtaḍī 
dhālika th-thubūt al-muthbat lahu bi-l-fiʿl). Rather, owing to the mental determi-
nations, that for which something exists may itself be mentally determined; and 
since that which exists for the latter is dependent on it (farʾ muthbat lahu), it may 
also be mentally determined.

The upshot is that the nondefinitive parsing of the proposition allows one to 
apply predicates to mentally determined instances, on the condition of the appli-
cation of the quiddity of the mentally supposed subject tag to those instances, on 
the same ontological plane. And this predication, on this condition, as well as the 
principle that that which exists for a thing is dependent on that for which it exists, 
is valid with respect to the way things are given (fi nafs al-amr). This is so, since 
that which is given is precisely the mentally determined ontological locus, not that 
which is given simpliciter (muṭlaqan).

“It is for this reason,” writes al-Mubārakī, “that this [proposition] is called non-
definitive. And so what [al-Bihārī] states as a refutation [of the third position] is 
rejected . . . [The reason] is that, if, by impossibility, he intends a simple nega-
tion of existence that is [merely] emphasized [by the assertion of impossibility], 
then, since the simple negation of existence does not obtain for the quiddity with 
respect to the way things are given simpliciter, then how can [the simple negation] 
that is emphasized [obtain]? And if he intends the negation of existence that is the 
predicate of the negative-predicate [proposition], then there is no doubt that, in 
this case, it also fails to obtain with respect to the way things are given simpliciter. 
Rather, [the negation and impossibility] obtain with respect to the way things are 
given on the [condition of] the mental determination [bal mutaḥaqqaq fi nafs l-amr 
ʾalā t-taqdīr].”34

In other words, impossibility applies, with respect to the way things are given, on 
the posit of the mental determinations; otherwise, it does not apply at all.35 
Therefore, for the proposition to have the validity that is clearly granted by all sides—for 
the Participant with the Creator is impossible in view of all parties—it must be 
parsed as nondefinitive; and this latter interpretation is a vindication of the third 
position against the Sullam’s claim. I will return to comment below on how this 
intervention of al-Mubārakī—especially with reference to the key principle that 
the ontological locus of the thing that exists is dependent on the ontological locus 
of that for which it exists—was a guiding clue for the later commentaries. As for
the nature of his philosophical contribution, I will address this matter only in the concluding remarks of this chapter.

The second implicit hint that drove commentarial choices and textual archaeology follows immediately after al-Bihārī’s postured refutation of the third position. We are told by al-Mubārakī that the expression “fa-tadābbar,” with which the commentarial itinerary began, points to (ishāra) the nondefinitive readings of the proposition. We witnessed just above precisely how this interpretation undermined the mātin’s own refutation and how, according to the commentator, the former’s lemma was in fact an explication of and concession to this underlying sense of the proposition. We are now informed by al-Mubārakī that an appeal to any primary notions of what the proposition means as a way to overcome the challenge of the nondefinitive reading is not admissible in debate (wa-dāʾwa l-bāḍīha lā yokfī fī maḥallī n-nizāʾ);36 this comment of course relates back to al-Bihārī’s idea that the parsing offered by the third position is not “that to which the mind is led,” and it constitutes a first reference to an underlying debate. Al-Mubārakī then offers the following, final, extended commentary on this lemma of the Sullam:

One must know that nondefinitive predicative [propositions]—although they may be equivalent to conditional [propositions]—do not reduce to them, as it is imagined. For the judgment in them about that which is taken up is on the basis of a certain determination—namely, that the determination is owing to the completion of the mental supposition of the subject. [This is] such that there was no nature that had obtained positively at all extramentally or mentally [before such supposition. The determination] was not such that there was a subject that had already been supposed, and then it was supposed with respect to itself, and then a judgment was passed on it with a view to the aforementioned determination. [In other words, it is not] that the subject [of the proposition] is the type that is temporally restricted or qualified [in some other way], such that the proposition would be conditional.37

It should be stressed that neither the expression al-battī (definitive) nor any of its derivatives in a technical sense appear anywhere in the Sullam. Nor, indeed, does the lemma of the Sullam justify the commentator’s slippage into the concern of disambiguating the predicative nondefinitive propositions from conditional propositions. The entire discursive thrust of al-Mubārakī—from the parsing of the third position squarely in terms of nondefinitive propositions, to the connection of the ensuing proof with the principle that what exists is a derivative of that for which it exists, to attributing al-Bihārī’s failed refutation to the nature of nondefinitive propositions, to the reference to a dispute at which the counterrefutation hints, to the extended discussion about the difference between the nondefinitive and conditional propositions—appears out of place. And this anomaly must have signaled something to the future commentators.

The indications in al-Mubārakī’s commentary bore fruit rather quickly. As I will detail below, the reference to the principle that what exists is a derivative
of/dependent on that for which it exists as a way to explain the efficacy of the non-definitive reading of the proposition led future commentators back to the opening lines of the *Sullam’s* investigations into predication. One must be reminded here again that this recursive movement was also guided by the hypotext: al-Mubārakī’s own critique of al-Bihārī’s refutation began with the latter’s self-undermining hint, “fa-tadabbar!” which, in turn, led to a different refutation in the self-commentary, followed by the command, “fa-taʾammal!” This latter objection was also rejected by al-Mubārakī, although he took seriously this closing command, along with the clue that it was meant to direct the commentator back to what the hypotext had already discussed.

As I pointed out, the key phrase in al-Mubārakī’s engagement with the lemma at hand was “fa-inna [al-muthbat] farʿu l-muthbat lahu” (That which exists for something is derivative of/depends on that for which it exists). This principle allowed him to claim that, on certain determinations of the existence of the subject, the predicate exists within the locus of those same determinations; and it does so with respect to the way things are given—that is, as posited on such mental determinations by virtue of their givenness. This vindicated the position that the hypotext had set out to undo. The principle al-Mubārakī invoked here was echoed in a challenge in an earlier lemma of the *Sullam*: thubūt shayʿin fi ḥarfin farʿu fi liyyat mā thabata lahu wa-mustalzim li-thubūtihi fi dhālika ḥarfin (The existence of a thing [for a thing] in a locus is derivative of/dependent on the actuality of that for which it exists and it entails its existence in that locus). Future commentaries, recognizing the crux of the matter, shifted the dialogic space of this lemma back to this earlier point of origin. And it is from this new locus, where the principle first makes its appearance, that the relevant issues began to unfold. Along the way, the significance of the various aforementioned and interconnected elements of the analysis that were introduced by al-Mubārakī—elements that were entirely sublimated in the hypotext—also began to come to light. Thus, following al-Mubārakī’s lead, Mullā Fīrūz, in engaging this earlier lemma, wrote the following:

It is commonly held [mashhūr] that the existence of a thing for a thing in a locus is derivative of the existence of that for which it exists [thubūt shayʿli-shayʿfi ḥarfin farʿthubūt al-muthbat lahu]. [This position] is refuted in two ways... the second [way] is by means of “existence”; otherwise, it would follow that a single thing would have infinite existences, some [arranged] over others.

In returning to this earlier lemma, then, we are sensitized to this fact: to cite the principle allowing for the efficacy of the nondefinitive reading would also be to commit to a commonly held position that is implicitly challenged by the hypotext in the course of articulating its own position. And it now appears that the initial refutation of the third position that was followed with the
command, *tadabbar*, was grounded in the counterfactual of granting this rejected principle. Indeed, we now understand that this is precisely what the commentaries had been calling the hypotext’s erroneous concession. For al-Mubārakī, the defense of the position against al-Bihārī amounted to embracing this concession and then to demonstrating how it in fact entailed the position al-Bihārī had rejected.

But what is the philosophical position that the hypotext’s lemma is replacing and how is the former refuted by an appeal to existence? The commonly held position is that the existence of that which is said of something is derivative of the existence of that of which it is said. The former, therefore, must exist in the same ontological locus as the latter. The problem with this position emerges when one is confronted with predicates such as “exists.” For in this case, to say that “the sun exists” is first to grant that the sun exists in an ontological locus and that existence comes to inhere in it in that locus. However, this would entail the existence of the sun in a locus prior to the inherence of existence in it in that very locus. And for that other existence to inhere in the sun in that locus, yet another existence would be required. The process would go on ad infinitum. Faced with this challenge, earlier authors had adopted different principles. Thus, channeling the self-commentary of al-Bihārī, Fīrūz writes:

Given this, ‘Allāma al-Dawānī denied [the principle] of derivation [*al-farʿ iyya*] and accepted [the principle] of entailment [*al-istilzām*]. The truth, as the author [al-Bihārī] indicates [kamā ashāra ilayhi al-muṣannif], is that derivation is with a view to the actuality and establishment [*taqarrur*] [of the thing] and entailment is with a view to existence [*thubūt*]. For existence, insofar as it is an attribute, is posterior to the existent thing. This is so because the [ontological] order of that which comes to inhere—whichever inhering [thing] it might be—is posterior to the [ontological] order of the substrate, although the posteriority is nontemporal; rather it is [a posteriority] by virtue of the thing [itself]. So reflect! [*fa-tadabbar!*] This is on the level of the dissolution [*ḥulūl*] [of a thing with another]. As for the level of predication [*ḥaml*], well, the existence of a thing for a thing, in an unqualified sense, is posterior to the existence of that for which it exists. So there is no difficulty in this, because the predicate is posterior to its source.

The self-commentary of al-Bihārī that is embedded within a number of early commentaries gave way to a first indication of the historical import behind the hypotextual lemma. As we know, the conundrum associated with predicates such as existence was grounded in the underlying principle that the existence of that which exists for something is derivative of the existence of that for which it exists. The solution offered by al-Dawānī, as understood by these commentators, was to deny altogether that such dependence existed. Rather, he modified the principle to claim that the existence of that which exists for something entails the existence of that for which it exists. In effect, then, al-Dawānī had tried to evade the
problem by parsing the problematic claim on the level of the proposition: insofar as predication takes place, the existence of that which is said of something is posterior to the existence of that of which it is said. And the fact of predication entails, therefore, the fact of the existence of that of which something is said. As we will observe below, this position is compatible with the nondefinitive reading that was discussed above.

The quotation above introduces us to yet another element of the debate—namely, that the ontological status of that which comes to inhere in a thing is posterior to the thing itself, even if this posteriority is nontemporal. This claim is an elaboration on the theme that the actuality and establishment of that of which something is said is prior to that which is said of it. A fuller exposition, along with additional clues, is found in the slightly earlier commentaries of al-Sāʾinpūrī and al-Mubārakī. I take up the former commentator’s remarks first.

An explanation [of the idea that dependence is with a view to actuality and entailment is with a view to existence] is [as follows]. When man comes to be, for example, he exists not by way of a compositional mode of being [al-ṣayrūra al-talīfiyya] that is required for its sense . . . but by way of a mode of being that is simple [al-ṣayrūra al-basīṭa] . . . that is, the substantiation and establishment of its very self [tajawhir dhātihi wa-taqarrurihi] . . . The intellect extracts being-existent from it [intaza’al-ʿaql anhu l-mawjūdiyya], because [being-existent] is the first of the accidentals that is extracted from the substantiated substrate that has been established. This is so, because, with regard to [being existent], one only reports about the very substrate that is actual, as something substantiated in the ontological locus of that existent thing. Thus, the level of being existent is a report about the level of actuality and establishment and the former is posterior to the latter.44

The commentator is pointing out in greater detail an argument that already appeared in the quotation from Fīrūz above. In its true ontological features, a substrate has a simple actuality, such that its basic sense is not composed of any parts. In other words, man, for example, is a simple substrate that is the verifying criterion of the sense of “man.” It does not comprise compositional parts that generate man as a composite and from which the sense of “man” is synthesized. This general principle of the simplicity of generation and being also applies to existence. An entity’s actuality is simple, such that when one states, for example, that “man exists,” one is simply engaging in a mental act of extraction from this simple entity. The actuality of the entity is its very existence. This position yields the final point in the quotation above—namely, that existence is to be understood properly in its propositional locus as a mental predicate and that, as such, it is posterior to the actuality of the substrate. Otherwise, it is not distinct from its actuality. Given this, we may conclude, the predication of existence with respect to a locus entails the existence of that of which it is said in that locus. However, since existence does not come to supervene over a quiddity secondarily, given
the doctrine of simple generation, it is derivative of the actuality of the latter, not of its existence.

The features of the debate underlying the hypotextual lemma with which this chapter has been concerned now stand in sharp relief. We recall that it was al-Mubārakī who had induced the reversion of the later lemma to the first subsection on the problemata associated with predication. And he had done so, following the thread of hints, by linking the principles of derivation and of entailment—principles discussed just above—with nondefinitive propositions. It has now emerged, via the commentarial voicing of al-Bihārī’s self-commentary, that, owing to certain insurmountable infelicities with predicates such as “existent,” al-Dawānī had rejected the original principle of derivation and had modified it to the principle of entailment. Insofar as this latter operated entirely on the level of a report, the new principle was also compatible with the nondefinitive readings of propositions. This was so, since the predication in the nondefinitive readings was valid on the determination of the givenness of the subject tag by a mental act and of the mental posit of its application to instances. In other words, such nondefinitive propositions were effective within the ontological plane of the proposition; and they were valid with respect to the given as such (fī nafs al-amr). The principle of entailment functioned similarly: it did not claim that the existence of that which is said of something is derivative of the existence of that of which it is said. Rather, the predication itself entailed the existence of that of which the predication holds in the same ontological plane.

Al-Bihārī’s alternative was to combine a modified rule of derivation—that what is said is derivative of the actuality, not existence, of that of which it is said—with al-Dawānī’s rule of entailment. This move, which was also motivated by the conundrum of predicates such as “existent,” was itself grounded in the principle of the simple generation of quiddities. Further, al-Bihārī’s commitment to the idea that logical and philosophical rules ought to apply universally to their cases also played a role in his choice. Regarding this matter, al-Mubārakī states the following:

When the mass [of scholars] realized [the aforementioned] exacting point [daqīqa], they sometimes made the universal rule [al-qāʿa ʾida al-kulliya] specific to [the principle of] derivation, and sometimes they shifted away from the latter to [the principle] of entailment. Sometimes, they denied that existence has existence mentally and extramently, saying instead that quiddity is one and the same as the sense of the existent and that [the latter] is a simple thing [amr basīṭ].

In other words, different types of predicates had forced earlier authors to oscillate between different principles of propositional semantics. Al-Bihārī’s choice, therefore, was also conditioned by his desire to develop a single rule that would accommodate all cases; this was a programmatic thrust that I have already highlighted in chapter 2. This rule was facilitated by appeal to an ontology of simple being and
simple generation. Indeed, al-Mubārakī had explained the opening lines of the hypotextual lemma—“the existence of a thing in a locus is derivative of the actuality of that for which it exists”—with the expression, “this is the level of simple generation [wa-huwa martabat al-jaʿl al-basīṭ].” The final piece of the puzzle was now in place.

As the living, mediating engine of the text, the hints and allusions along the waystations of a commentarial tradition allowed the lemmatic prompts to be actualized as full arguments and voices. As we have seen in the foregoing details, this process embraced a return of the text both to itself and to its prehistory. The dynamic movement of the text was a function of its cyclical reversions. It was the return to origins that, as a paradox, propelled the debate forward on its discursive path. The arguments, therefore, were often familiar and the commentarial voice was ostensibly a reproduction. At the same time, each commentary comprised a representation of the known in the novel voice and locus of the most recent lemmatic growth. And this growth, as we have observed, was curated by the hypotext itself.

Once any hypotext had caused a hypertext to speak it fully, an open engagement with the prehistory that the former sublimated became possible in further hypertexts. Thus, we begin to witness the types of analyses that Qāḍī Mubārak supplies in his commentary on the lemma under discussion:

The Illustrious among the verifiers [al-Dawānī] denied [the principle of derivation] and held fast to the [principle] of entailment . . . And based on [the doctrine of] simple generation [al-jaʿl al-basīṭ], the first teacher of Yemeni Wisdom [Mīr Dāmād] said that the affirmative tie/copula [al-rabṭ al-ījābī] [between the subject and predicate] simpliciter, insofar as it is a tie/copula, is derivative of the establishment and actuality of the subject and it entails its existence.\textsuperscript{46}

The hints found in the horizontal commentarial tradition had led Mubārak to the root of the controversy. In view of difficulties associated with certain kinds of predicates, al-Dawānī had embraced a distinct rule as a solution, and, dissatisfied with it—perhaps because it restricted truth conditions to the level of the proposition—Mīr Dāmād had posited yet another possibility by modifying the established rule of derivation from existence (thubūt) to actuality (fiʿliyya), and by combining it with al-Dawānī’s solution. Without identifying it, al-Bihārī had stepped into precisely this controversy and had decided to adopt Dāmād’s position, complete with the arsenal of its auxiliary principles, such as the doctrine of simple generation and the definitive reading of the proposition.

It was on this definitive (battī) reading of the proposition—which was grounded in the principle of simple generation (jaʿl basīṭ) and which, in turn, served as the scaffolding for Dāmād’s riposte to al-Dawānī—that al-Bihārī had offered his refutation of the third position. However, since this latter position itself only
recognized a nondefinitive semantics, the refutation was hollow. This is precisely what was meant to be indicated by the expression *fa-tadabbar*, which had set the commentarial machine in motion. Given that al-Bihārī's refutation was illusory, he had implicitly turned to the nondefinitive readings, offering as his refutation in the self-commentary nothing more than that “this is not that to which the mind is led.” The command in the self-commentary, *taʾammal*, eventually caused the commentarial reversion to an earlier lemma in al-Bihārī and to its rich historical background, as we saw above.

Al-Mubāraki’s seemingly out of place and extended discussion of the nondefinitive semantics of propositions that had galvanized the commentarial field was also taken up by Mubārak. However, he transferred this discussion to the earlier textual locus to which the hints in his predecessor’s work had guided him. Mubārak writes,

Next, in the predicative [proposition], if the judgment is that [the subject and predicate] are unified in actuality and definitely/simply, then it is called a definitive predicative [proposition]. If [the judgment] is on the determination [*ʿalā taqdīr*] that the [subject] tag applies to an instance—although [the instance] may be among those things that do not obtain positively except by means of the [mind’s] establishing of the quiddity and existence of the subject—then it is called a nondefinitive predicative [proposition]. With respect to its truth [conditions], this latter is parallel to the conditional [proposition], but it does not reduce to it, as it is falsely imagined. The definitive [proposition] only requires the establishment and existence of the subject in actuality [*bi-l-fiʿl*]. The nondefinitive [proposition] requires it in accordance with that [mental] determination, not in actuality. So remember [this!].

As we know from the foregoing discussion, the nondefinitive propositions simply allow for the mind to posit a quiddity and for the tag of this quiddity to apply to instances that may come to obtain positively only on the mental determination of the quiddity. Mubārak explains further in his self-commentary that it need not be the case with respect to these propositions either that, mind-independently, such instances should be possible or that it should be possible for the tag of the mentally established quiddity to apply to them. Rather, the quiddity may encompass impossible and possible instances. This is the first instance at which the purpose of the nondefinitive semantics is explicitly and directly tied to the question of absurd subject terms.

Finally—and this is a fundamentally important point—the predicate in such propositions would apply to the instances with a view to the aforementioned mental determination. Put differently, in the proposition, “The Participant with the Creator is impossible,” the predicate of impossibility applies with a view to the condition that the mind has determined the actuality of a certain quiddity (the Participant with the Creator) and the application of its tag to some posited instance. Mubārak contrasts these types of propositions with the explanation that
the definitive predicative proposition requires that the subject should be established and exist in actuality and that the nondefinitive requires it on the basis of mental determination.49

At this juncture, a rather interesting fact presents itself: Mubārak’s statements on the definitive and nondefinitive distinction that he brings to bear on the principle of derivation and entailment and that he also neatly ties together with the question of absurd subject terms are in fact verbatim quotations from Mīr Dāmād’s Ufuq. And, if we compare it with the quotation from al-Mubārakī on nondefinitive propositions, it becomes apparent that the latter was offering a looser quotation from the same source. In other words, both these commentaries on extended lemmata of the Sullam appropriated the voice of a scholar from the living prehistory of their matn for their commentarial purposes. In so doing, they were able to tie together disparate threads of the argument of their hypotext into a coherent whole via the intermediary of an earlier text.

From a broader perspective, we may say that al-Bihārī had penned his own lemmata as a way of staking his claim within the context of a living debate; and in consideration of the challenges posed by predicates such as “existent,” he had thought that Dāmād’s position offered the best solution. Once he had adopted the earlier scholar’s principle, along with its supporting auxiliaries, such as simple generation, the demand for consistency compelled him, at a later juncture, to reject the third position regarding absurd subject terms and their predicate “impossible.” For the adoption of the third position would have meant acquiescence to al-Dawānī’s solution to propositions with predicates such as “existent.”

Yet his refutation was based precisely on a concession to a principle he did not endorse; so he set up signposts for the future commentaries—including via his own self-commentary—to initiate the task of redress. Commentators, such as al-Mubārakī, following al-Bihārī’s hints, began to revert to that part of the Sullam with which the story had first emerged. Taking the cue from yet further hints and identifications in al-Bihārī’s self-commentary, they also recognized how the mātin’s claims were grounded in a broader system of commitments that participated in a prehistory. Then, without explicitly indicating their historical sources, these commentators absorbed these sources into their own lemmatic voices as commentaries on the hypotext, with sufficient clues for the next phase of commentaries to undertake a textual archaeology. It is at this stage of development that Mubārak’s commentary was being written; and for the first time in the tradition of the lemma, he mentioned Dāmād explicitly and brought forth a full quotation from his Ufuq as a way to explain the matn. This quotation, which became part of the commentarial tradition of the Sullam, was further refined by Mubārak in the dynamic space of his own self-commentary.

It is in this rather tortuous and circuitous fashion that the economy of hints and allusions functioned to propel the writing of the tradition—the lemma of
each hypotext prompted its hypertext to oscillate between the past that was its inner word and the future that both fulfilled and transformed it as a new hypertext. Such curating tasks of the hypotexts—whether these were base texts or commentaries—were substitutes for an oral dialectical space. Each hypotext was akin to a deft scholarly master who spoke just enough for each hypertext, the keen student, to fill in the speech. Yet in following the hints and speaking fully the master’s words, the student also diverged from the path, setting up along the way signposts that would curate the next phase of hypertexts, guiding the hand of the student. Each hypotext, whether a base text or a commentary, thus controlled future commentarial directions by bringing its writing back to its suitable loci and its living dialectical space. The cyclical return to these spaces enriched the import of the lemma and, in turn, compelled a dynamic movement forward.

With respect to the lemma at hand, various positions were in debate in a systematically and systematically connected manner. On these debates, the Sullam had taken up considered claims, defended against potential challenges, and led those commentators who voiced them via hints. Practically all the lemmata of the Sullam emerged out of a tradition of living dialectic, such that, even as it articulated its own stance on an issue, it often did so by arrogating the voices of past authorities to itself. The commentaries, insofar as they participated in the tradition in this manner, produced similar collages of voices.

On conundrums related to predication, the immediately relevant discursive space from which the lemmata of the Sullam emerged concerned the position of Dāmād, especially insofar as it was in dialogue with al-Dawānī. And although the reader would not know it in an encounter with the Sullam, the commentaries revealed with quickening pace that, on this issue, al-Bihārī had sided with Dāmād. When Mubārak came to participate in this dialectical space, he placed the germ of the debate, the Ufuq Mubīn, squarely within the suitable landscape of the Sullam. The commentarial space, therefore, served as a medium whereby the past became a hypertext to its own future incarnation within the compressed hypotext of the Sullam. For in principle, Dāmād’s very words also constituted a critical element in Mubārak’s commentary on the Sullam; this latter text had itself embraced a contracted Ufuq within its own lemmata and hinted at how it should be unfolded with reference to its proper textual history. Yet Mubārak did not announce that he was quoting the Ufuq; rather, the words of the Ufuq constituted his own authorial voice. Mubārak’s engagement with what was originally the text of the Ufuq within the space of his self-commentary was also an act of commenting on the prehistory of the Sullam within the confines of the tradition of the Sullam. This is a standard case of the diachronically unfolding tradition within the recurrent synchrony of the commentarial genre. The protracted analysis above may be represented graphically in figure 15 (again, the numbers indicate the order of the commentarial process).
The contributions of the commentarial genre were effected via the displacement and replacement of textual fragments into new lemmatic collages at suitable sites. As we observed above, the process was curated by the hypotexts at each phase. Within the curated space, the latest author’s agency lay in the act of producing a commentarial unit that combined existing textual fragments and arguments with his own interventions and in placing these units at receptive dialectical loci. With respect to the example studied above, one would note that the Ufuq deployed the definitive/nondefinitive dichotomy in order to overcome the conundrums associated with affirmative predication over impossible concepts (mafhūmāt mumtānīʿāt) in propositions such as “The joining of two contradictories..."
is impossible” and “The void is nonexistent.” Yet the discussion of predicates such as “existent,” the theory of simple generation, and the principle of derivation and entailment were part of earlier discussions in the Ufuq. It is in the commentarial tradition of the Sullam, which itself implicitly embedded the various threads of Damād’s contributions within its proximate lemmata on predication, that these disparate elements were systemically brought together, defended, and debated. In this fashion, the curated archaeology of the text continued to generate vibrant commentarial sites. Each new commentarial layer was the new cumulative hypotext on which the machinery of the next commentarial layer operated.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: DYNAMISM

This book has been concerned with theorizing philosophical commentaries in post-classical Islam. The question of philosophical dynamism can only be posed as a function of this primary concern, and it is in this fashion that I now briefly take it up.

Our investigation has demonstrated that each hypotextual layer—both the matn and the sharḥ—created dialectical sites, wherein it staked its claims. The details of the claims were often left deliberately obscure by the hypotextual lemmata, thus setting the stage for the hypertextual layer to fulfill and actualize it. In other words, from its very inception, the hypotext called forward to its hypertext as an instrument to its full manifestation. The process was carried forward by an economy of hints and allusions that guided the diachronic hypertexts, each synchronically embracing the full authority of authorship, to relevant lemmata within the hypotext. A watershed in the process was the full unveiling of the living dialectical space that the lemmata of the hypotext implicitly embedded. This discovery led to deeper textual archaeology, such that the commentary on any given lemma both became a site for commenting on the latter in the voice of the historical dialectics that it embraced and for commenting on the historical texts themselves.

Throughout this process, the commentarial machine continued to produce original texts out of a combination of textual fragments and hypertextual interventions. This was done in a fashion that both fit philosophical demands and that endowed the later author with a full agency, authority, and ownership over his articulations. This is a different mode of conceiving authorship, textuality, and orality—here even the canonical logic textbook has emerged as possessing a living orality; the orality writes itself as new texts; the author of each new text is the latest agent. And this makes perfect sense, as the first hypotext had itself emerged as a crystallization of a pressing dialectic and had sought to be fulfilled by the cyclical speech of its hypertexts. Each hypertext, insofar as it was a hypotext to another layer, functioned in the same manner. But did the cycles of return and representation proffer anything that may be called dynamic? And if so, is there some distinct category of dynamism that one must acknowledge?
The dynamism of the tradition emerges in fuller view after Mubārak, who had generally sensitized the commentarial tradition to the *Sitz im Leben* of the *Sullam*. With reference to the lemma at hand, for example, a greater awareness of its underlying historical development and the structural intricacies of the argument are amply displayed by the commentator Baḥr al-ʿUlūm:

It is a commonly held view that the existence of a thing for a thing is derivative of the existence of that for which the thing exists; indeed, they claim necessity [for this doctrine]. Then a refutation [naqḍ] was leveled against them by means of examples such as “Zayd is existent.” So the Verifier al-Dawānī reverted from this [position] and held fast to [the doctrine] of entailment. The author [of the *Sullam*] changed this rule [al-qāʿida], following the author of the *Ufuq mubin*, stating, “The existence of a thing for a thing in an ontological locus is derivative of the actuality of that for which it exists . . . and it entails its existence in that ontological locus.” When the author of the *Ufuq mubin* [had] sensed [the refutation of the common view] by examples such as “Every man is an animal” and “Zayd is possible,” he stated, “The nature of the affirmative copula requires derivation/dependence [al-farʿiyya] with a view to the establishment [taqarrur] of the subject and [it requires] entailment [with a view] to its existence, not with a consideration of the specificity of the two terms . . . .” He then stated, “As for one who does not believe in [the doctrine of] simple generation, well, it is more fitting that he be content with [the doctrine of] entailment [i.e., that the existence of that which is said of something entails the existence of that of which it is said].”

More than any author before him, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm cast the lemma back into its preexisting textual mold. At the center of the dialectic that the *Sullam’s matn* embraced as its own voice were the contributions of Dāmād to which the earlier commentaries had led this later author. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm fully fleshed out the dialectical space: we are informed, in a historical narrative, that al-Bihārī had changed a well-known rule in order to overcome conundrums that certain predicates posed, and that, in doing so, he had rejected the proposal of al-Dawānī in favor of that of Dāmād. We are also told explicitly that the former position is inconsistent with the doctrine of simple generation, whereas the latter is not. Then, regarding this rule that we have observed to govern predicates over impossible subject terms and regarding the doctrine of simple generation that undergirds it, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm goes on to offer some critical—yet allusive—remarks.

The doctrine of the *Ufuq* (and the *Sullam*) does not solve the issue: “The problem persists, as in the case where the predicate is existence and the concomitants of the quiddity.” This hint is only parsed in the self-commentary, where he explains that the doctrine of simple generation asserts that existence is not other than the establishment of a quiddity. As such, the verifying criterion (*miṣḍaq wa-mutābaq*) of existence is the very establishment and actuality of the quiddity. If this is so, then to affirm that a quiddity exists is nothing more than to assert the establishment of the quiddity. Yet if, according to the new rule, the predicate of existence is derivative of the establishment of the quiddity, then the establishment of the
quiddity is derivative of itself. And this is the same conundrum of infinite regress that one faced with the rule asserting that a thing is derivative of the existence of that of which it is asserted.

Baḥr al-ʿUlūm offers the further explanation that one may take a proposition such as “Zayd exists” either to be a report about a state of affairs that is actual or a report about the subsistence of a concept that is abstracted by the mind. In the former case, to say that Zayd exists is tantamount to admitting that the report is independent of any mental process; in the latter case, the report is about the fact of a concept that is extracted via a mental process. The latter type of report, we are told, is unproblematic with reference to the rule of derivation, since it in fact concedes a predicate by virtue of the fact of a derivation. Yet this kind of report remains on the level of mentally manipulated operations—much like the case with propositions with impossible subject terms—and is not subject to the refutation faced by the aforementioned commonly held rule. In such a case, the predicate is indeed derivative of the subject; for the latter must be actual in some sense for the mind to derive the predicate from it. The former type, on the other hand, is precisely the target of the counterexamples; but these apply equally in the case of the new rule, as was just explained. The upshot, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm indicates, is that the Ufuq’s contribution ought to be rejected, since it does not offer a completely satisfactory path out of the conundrum.52

Similarly, since the grounding principle on which al-Bihārī’s critique of the third position regarding propositions with impossible subject terms rested was dissolved, so was the critique itself. Instead, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm endorsed a solution that had received little attention in the sources—namely, that such problematic propositions may be reduced to negative ones; and this solution is attributed to al-Taḥtānī. As I have argued above, in a significant number of cases, the method of verification was discharged within the constraints of positions available in the prehistory of a text. At this juncture, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s dynamism lay in supplying independent arguments against the validity of one position and, in the interest of consistency and systematization, in favor of another.53

Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s commentary and self-commentary on the Sullam did not display the full critical arsenal at his disposal. The textual excavation to which the signposts of earlier commentaries had led compelled him also to pen a commentary on the Ufuq mubīn itself. The lemma of the Sullam effectively embraces the key parts of the first and especially the second section of this work.54 And it is precisely with a key discussion in the first section that Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s commentary begins: “As for the predication ‘existent,’ its verifying criterion is the very subject itself, not insofar as [the latter] is what it is, but with a consideration of the fact of the causal production associated with it.”55 Freed from the constraints of the lemma of the Sullam, which embraced an entire prehistory of the issue, the commentator expends considerable energies in showing how Dāmād’s commitment to the principle of simple generation poses problems for his modified principle
of derivation and entailment. This he accomplishes by picking key lemmata from almost four hundred pages of the *Ufuq* in the span of his commentary of about fifty pages.56

Following Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī, who wrote both a supercommentary on the former and on Mubārak, also penned a commentary on the *Ufuq*. His father, the equally celebrated Fadl-i Haqq al-Khayrābādī, had also produced a supercommentary on Mubārak on the *Sullam*, where he took cues from his hypotext at key moments to explore the positions of Dāmād, often in a severely critical fashion. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī devoted his entire commentary of almost three hundred and seventy pages to the first section and part of the second section of the *Ufuq*, covering about twenty pages of the *matn*. The extended critique of the commentator is devoted to existence, predication, and the principle of simple generation; in other words, this commentary may be approached as an extended criticism of the one-page lemma of the *Sullam* in its excavated locus. Like his predecessor, al-Khayrābādī marshaled various arguments to demonstrate how these different parts of Dāmād’s argument do not fit together; in other words, they were systemically problematic.

It is in this fashion that the dialectical space constituting the inner life of the *Sullam* was opened up piecemeal via the hints and prompts found within this very text and within its accumulating commentarial voices. Thus led from one signpost to another, the commentarial tradition exposed the textual past with increasingly pointed focus, until the dialectic was fully engaged. And the dynamism and agency of the tradition, especially as mediated by the commentary, lay in the acute efforts of redress, refutation, and defense that a synchronous systemization required. The commentarial machine, therefore, not only led to lemmatic growth with each authorial voice that incorporated a synchronous tradition and that also effectively generated commentaries within commentaries; it also prompted independent commentaries on texts implicitly embraced by the hypotextual voice. In a certain manner, the first two sections of the *Ufuq*, covering an argument in the course of some fifty pages, were represented and reenacted in the *Sullam*’s compressed voice and within the logic of its own philosophical program. Over time, the latter text and its commentarial hypertexts led each new authorial voice back to the fullness of the *matn*’s inner word. In the process, the textual bedrock on which the lemma of the *Sullam* lay was increasingly exposed, such that the commentarial tradition spoke the *Sullam* through the voice of its own hypotext; this latter, the *Ufuq*, was itself engaged in hypertextual activity in relation to its past. The accumulation of arguments in the interim and the interstices of the commentarial exercises also meant that the return to origins was a new dialectical and dynamic endeavor.

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Through the unknown, remembered gate
When the last of earth left to discover
  Is that which was the beginning;
At the source of the longest river
The voice of the hidden waterfall
And the children in the apple-tree
Not known, because not looked for
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
  Between two waves of the sea.

T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding”
PART III

Translation and Study
The task of the translator must be grounded in certain principles and commitments that ought to be articulated clearly at the outset. Translations can aim to convey the aesthetic quality and texture of a text or adopt a style that, disregarding such a quality, simply produces an affect in the target environment as it did in the original; they may be strictly literal or expository; they may be aimed at a specialized audience or a general one. Or they may be produced with regard to another set of objectives altogether. My position is that none of these considerations—let alone the specific choices they avail—is essentially tied to the task of the translator. The choices are determined by the aim; and the aim can be determined freely.¹

My methods of translation are consistent with my earlier practices. They are grounded in the idea that translation should not be conquest; rather than domesticating a text, it should facilitate entry into the original environment.² These methods are rather simple and are as follows. First, inasmuch as the sense of the text can be conveyed, I render it as literally as possible, with minimum interventions forced by the demands of the target idiom or exposition. Second, where the case requires my participation in the text, I enclose my own words in square brackets, such that, in principle, one would be able to reconstruct the Arabic if such brackets were removed. The potential reconstruction of the Arabic is not the aim per se. Rather, the translation practice displays to the reader the extent to which a single Arabic word or the concatenations of such words may be laden with expanded meaning and nuances; and it also makes transparent the extent to which I have read into the text. Third, with the exception of basic scholarly equivalents of the Arabic in English—such as syllogism for qiyās and first figure for al-shakl al-awwal—my translation reduces the Arabic to its simple parts. Sometimes, I prefer to render the Arabic literally even when handy specialist equivalents are available, because, to my ear, these latter take one to specific traditions in the history of philosophy:
for example, I translate ʿaks an-naqīḍ as contradictory conversion and not as
contraposition or conversa per contrapositionem. I recognize that this choice is partly
subjective and is a function of my formation. Fourth, I have tried to be consistent
in my translation choices, unless the context of the argument dictates alternatives.
And finally, I intend for the overall effect of the text to reflect its reception by
its premodern audience. This is a pithy, allusive, and dense text, and this is how
the translation generally reads. However—and this is an abiding commitment of
mine—a translation must, most importantly, deliver the sense of the text to the
reader, and it must do so in the manner adopted by the author. My minimalist
approach is geared toward satisfying the latter criterion. The former—namely, the
fuller sense and import—is served by the extended study of the text in the form
of my commentary in the endnotes to this chapter. With respect to the latter, too,
a specific rule was in effect: I did not endeavor to track the historical background
and development of a given position or argument of the Sullam unless my gaze
was so directed by the commentaries that I consulted. I was driven primarily by
the task of making sure that the reader understands what the Sullam is saying,
especially as understood by its hypertexts, leaving the task of its historical analysis
to the cases mentioned in the chapters above.

In preparing this translation, I have relied on the text found in the lithograph
of Muḥammad Barakatallāh’s Iṣʿād al-fuhūm (bibliographical information below).
This latter print was used as the textual base simply because it is readily available
and is pervasively used by various South Asian madāris. In other words, it is the
latest non-mamzūj text-cum-commentary of the Sullam to gain wide acceptance
in South Asia. This lithograph can easily be found online.3

A proper edition of the Sullam is certainly a desideratum, although, in view of
the observations about authorship above, I should note that such an exercise may
be misguided if it presupposes that texts and authors were fixed or were intended
to be so in the world of the commentary. A historical critical edition—that is,
one that systematically displays the contraction and dilation of the lemmata—as
discussed above (as opposed to one that solely intends to deliver the autograph),
would be far more valuable and a proper fulfillment of informed philology in such
a case.4

Finally, my explanatory notes rely heavily on the commentary of Mullā Mubīn,
Mir ʿāt al-shurūḥ, although I also turn to a number of other commentaries, where
suitable. As I mentioned above, it was Mubīn’s commentary that, owing to its
blinding lucidity, vitiated the practice, effort, participation, and sharpening of the
wit that was the purpose of the muṭālaʿa of a text such as the Sullam. For this rea-
son, students were advised to ignore it. As my capacities are much more modest
than those of the premodern students of the Sullam, I am glad to have overlooked
this proscription.
THE LADDER OF THE SCIENCES:
TRANSLATION AND STUDY

In the Name of God, the Kind and Merciful

Proem

1. Praised be God! How great are His works! He is neither defined nor conceptualized. He neither begets nor changes. He is above genus and modes. He made the universals and particulars. How wonderful an assent [to His existence] is belief in Him! How excellent is the victory that is to seek refuge in Him! May blessings and peace be upon the one sent with [His religion’s] proof, in which is the cure for every sick [soul], and upon his family and companions, who are the vanguards of religion and the proofs of right guidance and certainty.

Preface

2. Now we continue [onto the main subject]. This is a treatise on the discipline of the [correct] balance [in thought]. I have called it the Ladder of the Sciences. Lord, make it among base texts like a sun among stars!

On Knowledge

Introduction.

3. Knowledge is conception; and it is what is present for the one who apprehends. The truth is that it [i.e., knowledge] is among the most apparent of primary [apprehensions], like [the apprehension of] light and happiness. Granted, an examination of its reality is truly difficult.

Conception and Assent

4. If [knowledge] is a belief in a predication relation [between a subject and a predicate], it is an assent and judgment. Otherwise, it is a simple conception. These are necessarily two distinct species of apprehension. To be sure, there is nothing that prevents [the] conceptualization [of a thing]; for [conception] is related to everything.

Now, there is a well-known doubt [about the distinction between conception and assent]. It is that knowledge and that which is known are one and the same in virtue of their very selves. So, if we were to conceptualize assent, the two would be one. But you said that they were distinct in reality. The solution [to this conundrum], one that I am unique in [offering], is that knowledge, with respect to the issue of [its] self-sameness [with its object, is to be understood] in the sense of the form that is knowledge. For insofar as [this form] comes to obtain in the mind, it is an object of knowledge; and insofar as its subsistence in [the mind is concerned], it is knowledge.
Then after examination, it came to be known that this form [of knowledge that comes to obtain in the mind and is the thing known] becomes knowledge only because the apprehending state had mixed in a unified, linked manner with it [insofar as it] exists as imprinted [in the mind]. [This is] just like [when] the state of tasting [is mixed] with things tasted, so [that this state] becomes the form associated with tasting; [or it is like the relation of the state of] hearing to things heard; and it is thus [in the case of knowledge]. This state is divided, in reality, into conceptualization and assent. The distinction between these two is like that between sleep and wakefulness, both of which come to inhere in a single substrate. Yet the two are distinct with regard to their realities. So ponder this!

It is not the case that the whole of each of [conception and assent] is primary; otherwise you would be able to dispense with theoretical [investigation]. Nor [is the whole of each of the classes of conception and assent] theoretical; otherwise, [the derivation of each] would be circular and a thing would precede its own self within two steps [of the derivation]; indeed [it would precede itself] within an infinite [number] of steps. For circularity entails an infinite series, which is absurd. [The reason for its absurdity is proved by the following argument]. The doubled number is more than the original [of which it is a double]. And of every two numbers the added part of one that is greater occurs after all the units of that to which something is added have been run through. For one cannot imagine adding to the starting point [of that to which something is to be added], while the middle parts [preceding this starting point] are sequentially ordered. And so, if that to which something is added is infinite, the addition would attach to the infinite side; and this is absurd, [given] that the finitude of number entails the finitude of the thing counted. So ponder this!

Conception is not known via assent; likewise is the converse. [The former is the case] because that which informs [about something] is predicated [of that thing]. [The latter is the case, because] conception is indifferent to the relation [of two sides]. So, some of each one of [conception and assent] is primary and some theoretical. That which is simple cannot lead to the acquisition [of something else by the assembly of parts]; for acquisition requires the compositional ordering of things. And [this ordering] is [called] theoretical [investigation] and cogitation.

5. Here [we may mention] a doubt, which was addressed to Socrates, and it is that the sought conclusion is either known—so that the act of seeking is [nothing other than] making something obtain that has [already] obtained—or it is unknown—so how can one seek it [in the first place]? To this is responded that it is known in one aspect and unknown in another. [The challenger would then] say that the aspect in which it is known is known and the aspect in which it is unknown is unknown. The solution to this is that the aspect in which it is unknown is not absolutely unknown, so as to preclude the seeking. For the known aspect is [still]
its aspect. Do you not see that what is sought is the reality known with respect to some considerations? [So take] this!

Not every ordering [of things] is useful or natural. It is owing to this [fact] that you see the opinions [of people] contradict [each other]. So there must be some [body of] rules that confers immunity from error; and this is logic. Its subject matter is intelligibles insofar as they lead to conception and assent.22

On the Inquiries

6. That by which an inquiry is framed is called a question. The foundational questions are four: what, which, whether, and why. “What” is for seeking conceptualization by way of an explanation of the noun, so that it is called an explanatory (“what”); or [it is for seeking it] with respect to the reality [of a thing], so that it is called the real (“what”). “Which” is for seeking something that distinguishes [a thing from another] with respect to [its] essential or accidental [elements]. “Whether” is for seeking assent to the existence of a thing in itself; [in this case] it is called the simple (“whether”); or [it is for seeking assent] with respect to its attribute, so that it is called the compound (“whether”). [Finally,] “Why” is for seeking the proof for mere assent or [for seeking the proof] for something with respect to its very given self.23 As for what is sought of [the questions] “Who,” “How much,” “How,” “Where,” and “When,” well, these are either extensions of [the question] “Which” or they fall under the rubric of “Whether” [in the] compound [sense noted above].

ON CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

On the Absolutely Unknown

7. We present conception first because it occurs first by nature. For no judgment can be passed on that which is absolutely unknown.24 It is said that a judgment is [indeed being] passed [on the absolute unknown] in the [very claim];25 so [the original claim] is false. The solution [to this conundrum] is that [the absolutely unknown] is known per se and absolutely unknown per accidents.26 Thus the judgment and its negation are with respect to two [different] considerations. [An explanation of this] will come [later].27

Signification and Semantics

8. Communication only comes about by way of signification. [This latter] is [1] related to the intellect, which [presumes] an essential relation [between two things], or [2] conventionally posited and [exists] because someone made it so, or [3] natural and is generated by a nature. Each of [these three types of significations] is either an utterance or not. Now, since man is political by nature and is highly dependent on teaching and learning, and since [that signification which falls in the category of] the conventionally posited utterances is the most general and inclusive
of them, we should consider [such signification here]. It is clear that utterances are
posited for meanings insofar as they are what they are; [they are not posited] for
mental forms or extramental individuations, as it is said.28

The signification of an utterance for the totality of that for which it is posited,
insofar as [the utterance] is posited as such, is [called signification by] correspon-
dence. [Its signification] for a part of it is [called signification by] inclusion—and it
follows from it [i.e., correspondence,] in compound [meanings].29 [And its signifi-
cation] for what is extraneous [to the conventional posit is called signification by]
compound-implication.30 [This last] requires a verifying relation based on the intel-
lect or custom [that allows the transfer from the originally posited to the entailed sig-
nification].31 It is said that signification by compound-implication is excluded in the
sciences, because it is based on the intellect; but this last position is refuted by [appeal
to the case of signification] by inclusion.32 [Our position is] that what is implied by
signification by inclusion and compound-implication is [signification by] corre-
spondence, but not vice versa.33 And the mind is not always led to [consider] that
[the thing signified by correspondence] is not other than itself.34 As for [significa-
tion by] inclusion and [the idea that it also signifies by] compound-implication, well,
there is no [mutual] implication between the two [types].

On Simple and Compound Utterances

9. Being simple and compound are, in reality, attribute[s] of an utterance, because,
if a part of it signifies a part of its meaning, then it is a compound [utterance] and it
is called a statement and a composite. Otherwise, [it is called] a simple [utterance].
If [an utterance] is a mirror for [supplying] the knowledge of something other
[than itself], then it is a particle.35 The truth is that existential verbs are among
[such particles]. For “to be,” for example, has the sense that a thing is something
that is not yet mentioned.36 [The existential verbs] are called “verbs” because they
conjugate and signify time. Otherwise, if [an utterance] signifies time, by means of
its morphology, it is called a verb. Not everything [considered] a verb among the
Arabic [grammarians] is called a verb among the logicians. For example, [things]
like “I walk” and “You walk” are verbs for the former, but not verbs [for the latter].
This is so because [such verbs] can be true or false, as opposed to “He walks.”37 [If
it does not refer to time,] then it is a noun. Among properties specific [to a noun]
is that judgment may be passed on it. Now, their statements, “‘From’ [is a particle]
governing a genitive case,” and “‘He hit’ is a past simple verb,” do not refute [this
position], because this is a judgment about the sound itself, not its meaning;38 and
it is [the meaning] to which [the judgment] is specific. The same is also the case
for indefinite [nouns].

On Particulars and Universals

10. If the meaning [of the simple utterance that is a noun] is unified, then, given
the specification [of this utterance] for [this meaning] by the act of imposition, it
is a particular. Pronouns [such as “you”] and demonstrative nouns [such as “this”] are included among [particulars]. For the imposition for these two is general, but that for which they are posited is specific, according to verification. Without [the specification, the simple utterance] is a [universal] that applies equally [to various instances] if the individual instances are equal with respect to [the meaning’s] truthful application [to them]. Otherwise, it is a modulated [universal]. They limited the difference [of the individual instances participating under a universal] with respect to primariness, priority, intensity, and increase. [Yet] there is no modulation in quiddities or in accidentals, but in the description of individual instances [of the universal] by [the accidentals]. For there is neither any modulation in body nor in blackness, but in that which is black.

The meaning of one of two individual instances being more intense than another is that the intellect extracts [from the stronger case], with the help of the estimative [faculty], examples of the weaker [type]; and it resolves [the stronger case into the weaker]. Thus, the general understanding is led to [believe] that [the stronger] is composed [of the weaker]. So understand [this!]

Other Forms of Utterances

11. If the meanings [of a noun] are multiple, then if [the noun] is posited for each [meaning] at the original moment [of imposition], then [this is called] a homonym. The truth is that [this homonymy] exists even between two contraries, except that, [in this case,] there is no overlap in [the meanings] in reality. It is said that an arbitrarily invented [utterance for a meaning] falls under the homonym; and it is [also said] that it falls under [the class of utterances that are] transferred [from their original meaning]. Otherwise, [if the utterance is not posited for each meaning at an original moment of imposition, then,] if it becomes widespread with respect to the second [meaning that occurs for it at a later stage], then it is a transferred [utterance] that is either legislative or customary; and the [latter] is either specific or general. al-Sibawayhi states that proper nouns are all transmitted [utterances]. [This position is] in opposition to the vast majority.

Literal and Metaphorical Speech

12. [If the aforementioned options do not apply], then the [utterances] are either literal or figurative. [The latter] must have some connection [to the literal]. And if [this connection] is a simile, then there [comes about] a metaphor; otherwise, it is nonmetaphorical figurative [speech], which is limited to twenty-four types. [In these cases,] it is not necessary that one hear the particular [cases of usage from anyone], though hearing their general [underlying] types [of connections] is necessary. The telltale sign of a literal [utterance] is the immediacy [with which its meaning occurs to the mind] and its dispensing with any contextual clue.
And the telltale sign of figurative speech is its application for that which is impossible [in literal speech] and the usage of the utterance for [only] some of [the instances] of its meaning, such as [the usage] of dābba for the donkey. [In cases of doubt, taking an utterance as] transferred and figurative is more suitable than [taking it as] homonymous; and [taking it as] figurative is more suitable than [taking it as a] transferred [utterance]. In virtue of its very self, figurative [speech] is grounded in the noun. As for the verb, the rest of the derivatives, and the particle, well, it is found in them only derivatively.

Synonyms
13. The multiplicity of utterances with respect to one meaning is [called] synonymy. And [synonymy] exists in actual fact owing to the multiplicity of the manners [of communication] and [owing to] the liberties [of expressions needed] in stylized [speech]. [However,] it is not necessary for each [synonym to be able] to stand in place of another, though they both be from the [same] language. For the soundness of [each] composition is among the accidentals [specific to each synonym].

Statements and Propositions
14. Is there synonymy between a simple and a compound utterance? There is a dispute over this matter. If it is correct to maintain silence [on hearing] a compound [utterance], then it is a complete [compound utterance]. [The complete compound utterance is called] a statement and a proposition if a report about something actual is intended by it. And so it is necessarily described by truth and falsity.

Liar Paradox
15. One [may] say that “This speech of mine is false” is not a statement because a report [that reports] about itself is nonsensical. The truth is that [, when this statement] is taken, along with all its parts, on the side of the subject term, then the relation [within the subject term] is considered in a compressed form, so that [the relation] is that about which there is a report. And insofar [as the matter] pertains to generating [a statement] by means of [the relation,] the latter is considered in an expressed form; so it is a report [about its own self]. So the difficulty is resolved in all its manifestations. A corresponding [example] of this is our statement, “Every praise is for God.” For this [too] is a praise and belongs in the class of “every praise.” Thus the report is that about which something is reported. So ponder [this]! For this is an irrational root. If [this is not a report,] then it is a non-truth-bearing utterance, which includes commanding and forbidding, desiring, hoping, interrogating, and so on.
Other Compound Utterances

16. [If] it is not correct [to maintain the aforementioned silence], then it is a deficient [compound utterance] and includes restricted, mixed, and other [forms].

On Universals and Particulars

17. In terms of [its mere] conceptualization, if the intellect allows for the multiplicity of a sense, then it is a universal. [There are three types of universals:] impossible, such as the supposed universals, or not [impossible,] such as the necessary, and the possible. Otherwise, [the sense] is a particular. The sensing of a child in the early phases of life and of the old man with weak eyesight and the imagined form of a specific egg—all these are particulars because the intellect does not allow the multiplicity of any of them by way of their being collected [together under one rubric]. And that is what is intended [by universal] here.

There is a well-known doubt [about particulars] and it is that the extramental form of Zayd and the form that obtains from the former—conceptualized by a group in their minds—are true of each other. Now verification [has shown that the correct doctrine] is that it is things that by themselves come to obtain in the mind, not by means of their simulacra or by means of what is similar to them; so the [extramental] form has [become] multiple. And thence it becomes clear that the real [extramental] particular is a predicate. And [they claim] this is the truth.

One should not respond [to this doubt by saying] that one intends by [a universal] that [the form] is true of many and that it is a shadow for them, having been extracted from them. In the case at hand, it would follow that there are multiple shadows [for the one form,] not that there is [one] shadow of many things. What is needed [for the definition of a universal, however,] is the latter. [This response is not correct] because the mutual truth [of the extramental for the mental and of the mental for the extramental forms] entails both [that the extramental form] is extracted from and is a shadow of [the mental forms]. [This is so] because the two [types of forms] are one and the same.

Rather, the response [to this doubt] is that what is intended [by the universal] is the multiplicity of the sense with respect to what is extramental. The form of Zayd that obtains in the [multiple] minds cannot have multiplicity with respect to the extramental [world]. Rather, all these [mental forms] are ipseities of [the one and same extramental] Zayd.

As for supposed universals and secondary intelligibles, the intellect, in simply conceptualizing them, does not abstain from allowing their multiplicity in the extramental [world], because they do not include specific denotation. So it is said that supposed universals are universals in relation to existing realities. So [take] this!
Being universal and particular are attributes of the object of knowledge. It is [also] said that [they are] attributes of knowledge. The particular is neither something from which [knowledge of something else] can be acquired nor something [the knowledge of which] is acquired [from something else]. [Finally, the particular] may be said of whatever falls under another universal. [Such a particular] is specified as a relative [particular], just like the first [type that is specified as] the real [particular].

If two universals are both true entirely [of each other’s individual instances], then they are called equal. Otherwise, they are mutually differentiated. If [this differentiation] is with respect to all [individual instances], then the two [universals] are mutually distinct. If [the differentiation] is partial, then either it exists with respect to both [the universals], in which case they partially overlap [with each other], or they are [distinct] only with respect to one [universal]. So, each is more general and specific in an absolute fashion [in relation to the other].

On Contradictories of Universals

18. Know that the contradictory of each thing is its removal. So the two contradictories of two mutually equal [things] are mutually equal; otherwise, the two would differ with respect to their truth [over individual instances], so that the truth of one of two equal things would follow without that of the other. This is absurd.

Now there is a strong doubt [about this proof] and it is that the contradictory of [two things that have] the same truth-value [in relation to all instances] is the removal [of their mutual truth for these instances], not the truth of their [mutual] differentiation. Indeed the contradictory of two equal [things] may be something that has no individual instance with respect to the way a very thing is given, such as the contradictories of concepts that encompass [everything]. [In this case,] the first [i.e., the removal of the mutual truth of the two things] would be true, not the second [i.e., the truth of the mutual differentiation of the two things].

The statement [in refutation of this last argument]—that the truth of the negation [of a thing for a thing] does not require [this thing’s] existence, so that the removal of the mutual truth [of two equal things for all their instances] does entail their mutual differentiation—well, granting this is farfetched. This [argument] can only be granted if the [universal] concepts were existential, such as “thing” and “possible.” As for when they are negative [encompassing concepts], such as “the non-Participant with God” and “the nonjoining of two contradictories,” well, there is no way out of this. [To this critique] there is no response except by making the claim specific to those [things that are] not contradictories of these [types of encompassing] concepts. So [take] this!

[In cases where one thing] absolutely encompasses [another,] their contradictor[ies] stand in a converse [relationship]. For the passing away of the general entails the passing away of the particular; but the converse is not
There is a doubt that is raised [about this rule] in that “the nonjoining of two contradictories” is more general than “man,” though there is a mutual differentiation between their contradictories. Similarly, the general possible is more general than the special possible. So every nongeneral possible is a nonspecial possible; and every nonspecial possible is either necessary or impossible. [Yet] both of them are general possibles. So every nongeneral possible is a general possible. The answer is what has [just been said about] the specification [of cases by nonencompassing concepts].

There is a partial mutual differentiation between the two contradictories of [two] overlapping [things], as is [also] the case of [the contradictories of] two [things] that are mutually differentiated. This is a distinction with respect to a totality, because there is [some] mutual distinction between the two exact things. So, when one of these exact [things] is true, the contradictory of the exact other is true. This [mutual partial distinction] may come about within the ambit of a complete mutual distinction [between two things]. [This is the case of] nonstone and nonanimal and man and nonrational. Or [the mutual partial distinction] may come about within the ambit of an overlap [relation between two things]. [An example of this] is white and man and stone and animal. Regarding this [set of rules] there is a question and the answer is within the scope of what has already been mentioned [about the specification of cases by means of the exclusion of encompassing concepts].

The Five Universals: Essential and Accidental

19. The universal is either the exact reality of the individual instances or it is included in [the reality of these instances, such that] it is shared completely by the [reality of the instances] and another species; or it is not shared [in this total way]. These [universals] are called essentials, [a term] that may be used to refer to that which is internal [to a reality]. Alternatively, [the universal] may be external [to the reality of the instances], while being specific to a [single] reality. Or it may not [be specific in this way]. Both these latter [two] cases are called accidentals. The majority are of the [opinion] that, in reality, the accident is something other than the accidental and that [the accident] is [something] other than the substrate [wherein accidents inhere]. One of the eminent scholars stated that the nature of the accident, [when] unconditioned [by any modality of existence], is an accidental; [when] conditioned with something, it is the substrate; and [when] conditioned absolutely, it is an accident, which is distinguished from substance. For this reason, it is correct to say that the women are four and that the water is a cubit. Given this [unity among the three], he said that that which is derivative [i.e., the accidental] does not indicate either the relation [between the accident and the substrate] or the thing described, in a general or specific manner. Rather, its meaning pertains only to the extent
of the description. And this is the correct [view]. What Avicenna states aids him [in his doctrine, i.e.,] that the existence of accidents in themselves is their existence for their substrates.

**On the Nature of the Five Universals**

20. The universals are five. The first is genus and it is a universal that is said of many things that are different with respect to their realities. [It is said] in response to “What is it?” If it is a response about the quiddity and about all that is shared [by the various quiddities,] then it is a proximate [genus]; otherwise, it is the [genus that is more] distant.

There are investigations [about genus]. The first is that “What is it?” is a question about the totality of a quiddity that is specific [to singular entities, species, and so on]. If [the question] is limited to a single thing, then the species or the complete definition is given in response. [If the question is] about the totality of the shared quiddity, then, if the [various] things are brought together [and] if they have a shared reality, then species is given as a response; [however,] if [these things] have different [realities,] then genus [is given in response]. Given this, it is deduced that one quiddity cannot have the possibility of two genera on the same level.

The second [investigation] is that the existence of the genus is [exactly] the existence of the species both mentally and extramentally. For [the genus] is predicated of [the species] in both [modes of existence]. The source of this [doctrine] is that the genus has no positive existence before the species, though it does have a nontemporal priority [over it]. For example, if color occurs to us, we are not satisfied that a stable thing has obtained in actuality [in our mind]. Rather, something additional to the sense of color is sought, so that it may obtain in actuality. As for the nature of the species, well, the positive obtaining of its meaning is not sought; rather, the positive obtaining of an indication/pointing [is sought].

The third [investigation pertains to the issue of] the difference between genus and matter. For it is said of body, for example, that it is a genus of man; so it is predicated [of man]. And it is said that it is [man’s] matter; so it is impossible to predicate it of [man]. We say that when body is taken with the condition that nothing should be added to it, it is matter. And [when] it is taken with the condition that something is added to it, it is species. However, when it is taken unconditionally, however it may be—be it with a thousand constitutive meanings included in the totality of [what leads to] the positive obtaining of its meaning—then it is genus. [In the last case, body] is unknown and it is not known in what [exact] state it is. It is predicated of every composite of matter and form, be the [form] one or one thousand. And this [rule, i.e., that from one consideration, a nature is matter and, from another, it is genus] encompasses that whose essence is composite and that whose essence is simple. However, in the case of the composite, the positive obtaining of [its] meaning as genus is very difficult and complicated and, in the case of the simple, the extraction of [its meaning as] matter is difficult and hard.
For making something that is specifically individuated into something divested and specifically individuating something that is divested is a greatly [challenging] task.\textsuperscript{114} This is [also] the difference between specific difference and form. Given this, you will hear them say that genus is taken from matter and specific difference is taken from form.\textsuperscript{115}

The fourth [investigation is that] they say that the universal is a genus of the five [predicables].\textsuperscript{116} So it is both more general and more particular than the genus.\textsuperscript{117} The solution is that the universality of the genus is with respect to the consideration of the essence [of genus] and the being-genus of the universal is with respect to the consideration of the accident [that comes to relate to the universal].\textsuperscript{118} Consideration with respect to the essence is other than consideration with respect to the accident. The status [of things] differs with respect to the difference in [their various] considerations. Given this, the solution [to the following problem] becomes clear: that the universal is an individual instance of itself; so it is other than itself; [but] the negation of a thing of itself is absurd.\textsuperscript{119} Yes, it does follow [from the forgoing] that the reality of a thing is the very individual instance of itself and [also] something other than itself. However, when [this is an outcome] owing to two considerations, then it poses no difficulty. Given this, it is said that, were it not for [various] considerations [of a thing], philosophy would be falsified.

[The fifth investigation is that], if the universal were existent, then it would be individuated. So how could it be said of many things? Otherwise [i.e., if it were not existent], how could it be constitutive of existent particulars? The solution [to this problem] is that it is granted that every existent is the substrate of [an] individuation [that comes to inhere in it and whereby it is individuated]. And [its being the substrate of individuation] is the proof [both] of [the universal’s] being divided [into particulars] and of its being common [to particulars].\textsuperscript{120} That individuation should be internal to each existent is impossible.\textsuperscript{121}

The second [universal] is species and it is that which is said about shared realities in response to the question, “What is it?” Each reality, in relation to its parts, is a species.\textsuperscript{122} [Species] may be said of a quiddity of which and of another [quiddity] genus is said in response to the question, “What is it?” [However, this would be so] provided this response is not mediated [by anything]. The former [i.e., a universal in relation to its parts] is the real [species] and the latter is the relative [species].\textsuperscript{123}

Between the [real and relative] species there is [a relation] of partial overlap, [though] it is said that this is a complete encompassing [relation]. Like the genus, [species] is either simple or ordered.\textsuperscript{124} The most particular of all [the species] is the low [species] and the most general of all [the species] is the high [species].\textsuperscript{125} The [species] that is more particular and more general [in relation to some species] is the intermediary [species]. Since being a genus is in consideration of generality and being a species is in relation to particularity,\textsuperscript{126} the lowest species is called the species of the species and the highest genus is called the genus of the genera.
The third [universal] is specific difference. It is that which is said in response to “Which thing is it with respect to its substance?” That which has no genus, such as existence, has no specific difference. If [the specific difference] distinguishes [a thing] from that which shares [some reality] with it with respect to its proximate genus, it is called the proximate [specific difference]. If it distinguishes it with respect to its distant genus, it is called the distant [specific difference]. The specific difference has a relation to the species [insofar as it] constitutes it; so it is called constitutive; and every [specific difference] that is constitutive of the higher [species] is constitutive of the lower, though this is not the case conversely. The specific difference has a relation to the genus [insofar as it] divides it; so it is called the dividing [specific difference].; and every [specific difference] that divides the lower [genus] divides the higher, though the converse is not the case.

The philosophers say that the genus is an ambiguous thing that does not have a positive reality except owing to the specific difference. So the [latter] is a cause for it. [Given this,] no specific difference of the genus can be a genus of the specific difference. And one thing cannot have two proximate specific differences; a specific difference can only constitute a single species; a specific difference can only stand in relation to a single genus on a single [layer of the ordered] rank [of universals]; and the specific difference of substance is substance, as opposed to what the Illuminationists say.

Given [the foregoing,] there is a doubt from two perspectives. The first is what is mentioned in the Shifāʾ [of Avicenna] and it is that each specific difference is a [mental] sense among other [mental] senses. So it is either the most general of predicates or [it falls] under [such a predicate]. The first [possibility] is false. And so [a specific difference] is distinguished from other shared [predicates, such as property and common accident] by means of a specific difference. [But] then each specific difference will have a specific difference, so that this will [result as] an infinite regress. The solution [to this problem] is that we do not grant that each sense [in the mind] is distinguished [from others] by means of a specific difference. [To be distinguished in this way] would only be necessary if the general sense [under which the specific difference falls] were constitutive of it.

The second [doubt] is what has made itself apparent to me. It is that, just as a universal is true of one of its individual instances, so it is also true of many of them in the same way. So [man by itself, horse by itself, and] the collection of man and horse [are all] animal. [As a consequence, the collection] has two proximate specific differences. It cannot be said [as a solution to this problem] that [the premise grounding this problem] would entail “cause” to be [said] truthfully of the compound effect, because the latter is a collection of the material and formal causes. This [consequence] is impossible. [Such an objection to the doubt-producing premise cannot be accepted] because we do not accept that it is impossible [that “cause” should be predicated of the compound effect]. This is so because the [compound] effect is one and it is a cause [insofar as it is composed of] many
[things]. The multiple aspects of being an effect do not entail the multiplicity of the effect in reality.\textsuperscript{134}

[The following also] cannot be said [as a solution to the doubt]: that the collection of “two participants with the Creator” is “the participant with the Creator.” So, some “participant with the Creator” is a compound. Every compound is possible, though the “participant with the Creator” is impossible. [This objection would not hold] because we do not grant the possibility of every compound. For the fact that the collection needs [its parts] with the determination of [its] supposed existence does not affect the impossibility with respect to the way things are given.\textsuperscript{135} Don’t you see that [the possibility of “the Participant with the Creator”] entails an absurdity in virtue of its very self, so that it cannot be possible? So reflect on this!

The solution [to this second doubt] is that the existence of two [things] entails the existence of a third, which is the collection. And this [latter] is one. It cannot be said [as an objection] that, given this, an infinite number of things would obtain when two things obtain, because from the addition of the third, a fourth would obtain. And so on. [This objection does not have an effect] because we say that the fourth [thing] is something [produced] owing to a [mental] consideration. For it obtains when a single thing is [mentally] considered twice. Infinite regress in things that are [products of mental] considerations can come to an end when [such considerations] are brought to an end. So understand [this!]\textsuperscript{136}

The fourth [universal] is property. It is something external [i.e., nonessential, to a thing] and is said of [instances] that fall under a single reality that is a species or a genus. If it is generally [said] of all individual instances, it is [called] inclusive; otherwise, it is noninclusive.

The fifth [universal] is the common accident. It is something external [i.e., nonessential, to a thing] and is said of different realities.

If it is impossible to separate [property and common accident] from that in which they inhere, then they are necessary concomitants; otherwise, they are separable concomitants.\textsuperscript{137} The latter may pass away quickly or slowly or not pass away.\textsuperscript{138} Next, if it is impossible for the necessary concomitant to separate from the quiddity absolutely [i.e., mentally or extramentally] owing to a cause or a necessity, it is called the necessary concomitant of the quiddity. Or [it may fail to separate from the quiddity] with respect to either extramental or mental existence. This latter [i.e., that which fails to separate mentally] is called a secondary intelligible.\textsuperscript{139} [Returning to the claim above,] perpetuity must [in fact] issue from a causal entailment.\textsuperscript{140}

[Next, we must ask] whether existence in an absolute sense has any necessary part to play in [determining] the concomitants of an essence.\textsuperscript{141} The truth is that it does not. For necessity is not such that it should be caused after the existence of [its] cause is first necessitated, as [is the case with] the existence of the Necessary (may He be exalted), according to the doctrine of the theologians.\textsuperscript{142}
In addition, the necessary concomitant is either obvious, such that its conceptualization follows from the conceptualization of that of which it is a concomitant. It may be said that the obvious concomitant is such that from the conceptualization of [the concomitant and that of which it is a concomitant] the judgment of this concomitance follows. This latter [type of obvious concomitant] is more general than the former. Or [the concomitant] is nonobvious, as opposed [to the obvious]. The relation [of particularity and generality] would be the converse [in this case]. And both [the obvious and nonobvious concomitants] exist necessarily.

Given [the foregoing,] there is a doubt [that is raised]—namely, that the concomitance is [itself] something that is a concomitant; otherwise, the underlying principle of mutual concomitance [between the concomitant and that of which it is concomitant] would be nullified. And so the [many] concomitances would regress infinitely. Its solution is that concomitance is among the [mentally] considered and [secondarily] abstracted meanings that obtain only in the mind once the [mental] consideration [has been effected]. So [this regress] would come to an end once the [mental] consideration does so as well. Certainly, that from which it is taken and its source obtain [in reality], and [this source] preserves the independent givenness [of the thing]. The secondarily abstracted things may be finite or infinite, arranged or unarranged. So their statement that the infinite regress in [such cases] is not an absurd impossibility is true because the subject [—i.e., infinite regress—] is nonexistent. So reflect on this!

On Logical, Natural, and Mental Universals

21. The [mere] sense of the universal is called the logical universal and that in which this sense inheres is called the natural universal. The collection of the accidental and that in which it inheres is called an intellected universal. Thus are the five universals, [each one divided into the] logical, natural, and intellected. Next, the natural [universal] has three [mental] considerations. [The first is] with the condition that it is not conditioned [by any accidentals] and it is called the abstracted. [The second is] with the condition [of some attached accidentals] and it is called that which is mixed [with accidentals]. [The third is] unconditioned and it is called the absolute. [This last] is neither existent nor nonexistent insofar as it is what it is; nor are there any accidentals [in this grade]. Thus, with respect to this [third type] both something and its contradictory [can be] removed.

The natural [universal] is more general than the absolute [universal] owing to the consideration [that the latter is unconditioned]. So it does not follow that a thing is divided into itself and that which is other than it.

Know that the logical [universal] is among the secondary intelligibles. Given this, nobody holds that it exists extramentially. And given that, if the logical [universal] does not exist, the intellected [universal] would not exist, [so that] only
the natural [universal] is left [as existing extramentally]. There is a disagreement [about this latter position]. The doctrine of the verifiers—and among them is the Principal [Scholar, Avicenna]—is that it exists extramentally as the very existence of [its] individual instances. So the existence [of the two types—the natural universal and the individual instances—] is one [and the same] in itself [extramentally] and that which exists is two [only mentally]. [Existence] comes to inhere in the two, [i.e., the natural universal and its instances] insofar as these two are one [extramentally].153 [Then] anyone who holds that there is no specific individuation [for the natural universal] also holds that [the natural universal] is sensible generally, [i.e., whether accidentally or essentially].155 And this [latter position] is correct.156

A small group of philosophasters hold the position that the [extramental] existent is the simple ipseity and that the universals are mentally dependent and intellected extractions.157 I wish I knew [how this would make sense. For] if Zayd were, for example, simple in every way and he were considered insofar as he is what he is, without [reference to] anything shared or distinct—even [without reference to a shared] existence or nonexistence—how could one imagine mentally extracting mutually different forms from him? This [requirement of extracting multiple forms from Zayd] would inevitably force on them the doctrine that, on the level of its constitution and its positive existence, the real simple has two distinct forms that correspond to [the simple]. And this is the doctrine that two mutually exclusive things [can both be the case].158 This [difference regarding the extramental existence of the universal] pertains to the mixed and absolute [universals]. As for the abstracted [universal], nobody holds that it exists extramentally except for Plato. And this is the Platonic Form for which he is defamed. Does [the abstracted universal] exist in the mind? It is said that it does, and it is said that it does not. This is the correct position.159 For there is nothing that impedes conceptualizations.160

On Definitions

Section. 22. That which identifies a thing is what is predicated of it either [insofar as] it causes one to obtain its conceptualization or [insofar as] it elucidates it. The latter is [merely] verbal [elaboration], whereas the former is the real [identification]. For with respect to [the latter] a form that did not already obtain is caused to obtain.161 If [that which is being identified] is known to exist [extramentally,] then [the real identification] is with respect to reality. Otherwise, it is with respect to the name [only].162 That which identifies [a thing] must be better known [than that thing]. [Identification] cannot be correct when the two are equal with respect to being known; nor [can it be correct] when [that which identifies] is more obscure, although both [must] be equal with [with respect to truth].163 For [in this way] both would necessarily exclude and include [the same instances]. [Given this,] it is not correct that [the identification] be by means of that which is more general or
more particular. Identification by means of example is identification by means of a specific similarity. The truth is that identification may be allowed by means of that which is more general.

Identification is definition if that which distinguishes [a thing from another] is an essential; otherwise, it is a description. If it consists of the proximate genus, it is a complete [definition or description]. Otherwise, it is a deficient [definition or description]. The complete definition consists of the proximate genus and specific difference. It is that which leads to the true nature [of a thing]. It is considered better to place the genus first; and it is necessary to restrict the one with the other. [A complete definition] is not susceptible to increase and decrease. The simple is not [something that can be] defined, though one may define by means of it. The composite is defined, and one may or may not define by means of it. Providing a real definition is difficult. For the genus resembles a common accident and the specific difference [resembles] property; distinguishing [between these] is among the [most] inscrutable things.

Next, there are [some points of] investigation. The first is that even though the genus is ambiguous, insofar as it is intellected, the mind may create an individual existence for it in the mind. [The mind] then adds something additional to it, not in the sense that [this latter] is extraneous [and] comes to attach itself to it. Rather, [the mind] restricts [the genus] with [this addition], so that the former may have a positive existence and individuated specification and may include [the latter]. Thus, when [the genus] comes to have a positive existence, it does not become something else. For the positive existence does not change it; rather, it causes it to obtain. So, when you look into the definition, you find it to be composed of many meanings, each one like a scattered pearl, [each] distinct from the other, owing to a kind of [mental] consideration. For [in the definition composed of several meanings] there is multiplicity in actuality, so that one [part of the definition] is neither predicated of the another nor [is one part predicated] of the collection [of the parts]. With a view to this consideration, the meaning of the definition is not [the same as] the meaning of the intellected thing that is defined.

However, if the ambiguity of one of two [parts] is observed and the one is restricted by the other in a way that [the first part] includes [the second] within itself and [this ambiguous thing] is described, so as to cause a positive existence to obtain and to be constituted, [then the definition, with a view to such a consideration,] comes to be something other [than what was described above and] it leads to the unified form that the defined thing has; and it causes [the defined thing] to be acquired. An example is “rational animal” [which is given] as a definition of “man.” From it is understood one single thing that is exactly animal; and the latter is exactly rational. [And] just as the predicative connection conveys a unified form that the subject has with the predicate in extramental reality—except that, in that case, there exists a sentence-making composition, so that there is a judgment in it—likewise, in this case, there exists a restrictive composition that
conveys only the conceptualization of unity. The collection of the conceptualizations of the parts insofar as they are discrete (that is, the definition) leads to the single conceptualization of all the parts insofar as they are nondiscrete (that is, the thing defined).

Thus, one can defend against the doubt of al-Rāzī that identifying the quiddity is either by means of its very self or by means of all its parts, which [collection of parts] is its very self; so to identify is to make something obtain that has already obtained. Or [the identification of a quiddity] is by means of accidentals, but a reality cannot be known except by means of the knowledge of the true nature/core [of a thing]; and accidentals do not supply this [kind of knowledge]. Given this, all types [of identification] are null [for him] and he adopted the doctrine that all conceptualizations are primary.

The second [investigation] is [on the question whether] nominal identification belongs among topics [in the category of] conceptualizations. For it is [said in response to] “What is it?” and everything said in response to “What is it?” is a conceptualization. Don’t you see that when we say, “The simba exists,” and the addressee says, “What is a simba?” then we express it as lion. Thus there is no judgment [involved] in this case. Indeed, the clarification that an utterance is originally posited [for a certain meaning] in response to [the question,] “Is this utterance originally posited for a [certain] meaning?” is an investigation about words. [The response] is intended to be established by means of proof in the discipline of language and lexicography. So anyone who states that it falls within the category of assent does not distinguish between nominal identification and the linguistic investigation of utterances.

The third [investigation pertains to the point] that that which identifies is like a painter who paints a simulacrum on a tablet. So the act of identification is an act of producing a sheer picture in which there is no judgment. So nothing that can preclude [its existence] is directed against [the act of identification]. Indeed there are implicit judgments [in such cases], such as the claim that [an identification is] definitional or on the level of supplying a sense [for something] or that it is fully exclusive and inclusive of relevant instances, and so on. So one may preclude such judgments. However, [and despite these considerations,] there was a consensus of scholars that there is no identification that can be precluded [from existing]. Yet [this position] was like a divine law that was abrogated before one acted in accordance with it. Indeed [an identification can be] nullified, for example, when the principle of exclusion and inclusion is nullified. The challenging proofs that a person sets up against his opponent can only be imagined with respect to real definitions, since the reality of a thing is only one [as opposed to descriptions].

The fourth [investigation concerns the claim that] a simple utterance does not indicate discrete [parts] at all. Otherwise, unipartite propositions would obtain. Given this, they say that when a simple [utterance] is identified by means of a composite utterance in a nominal identification, the discrete [elements] obtained
from that composite are not intended.\textsuperscript{181} The Shaykh said that, among utterances, simple nouns and verbs correspond to simple intelligibles in which there are no discrete elements, composition, truth, or falsity. In fact [the simple utterance] does not even supply [any] meaning.\textsuperscript{182} Otherwise, this would lead to a circularity. [Such utterances] only bring [a meaning] into the presence [of the mind]. So [simple utterances] may supply identifications only nominally.\textsuperscript{183}

ON ASSENTS

On Judgments: To What Do They Pertain?

23. Judgment is compressed/nondiscrete and it is the disclosure, all at once, of the unity between two things. Or [judgment] is expressed/discrete and it is the logical [judgment] that invokes multiple expressed/discrete and individuated forms. The relation [among these forms] enters [into the consideration] of the object of judgment only in a dependent fashion, because [relation] is among the particle-meanings that are not considered independently. [A relation] is only a mirror for observing the state of the two extremes, [i.e., the subject and predicate, in relation to each other]. In reality, the judgment only pertains to what is the outcome of the compositional form--that is, the unity [of the subject and predicate].\textsuperscript{184} So reflect on this carefully!

Parts of a Proposition

24. Next, a proposition is only complete by means of three things. The third of these is a sentence-making relation that reports [that something holds for something].\textsuperscript{185} Given this, it becomes apparent that mere belief [in a proposition] is a simple concession [to the claim of that proposition]. Otherwise, the parts of a proposition would be four.\textsuperscript{186} The more recent [philosophers] claimed that doubt concerned the restrictive relation and that [this type of relation] is [also] a base for judgments.\textsuperscript{187} They called this [restrictive relation] the intermediate relation.\textsuperscript{188} As for judgment in the sense of the occurrence [of the predicate for the subject] and the nonoccurrence [of the predicate for the subject], well, only assent pertains to it. Their statement confuses me. Do they not understand that oscillation [in the case of doubt] does not occur in reality for as long as it does not relate to the occurrence and nonoccurrence [of the predicate for the subject]? So that which is apprehended in the two cases [of assent and doubt] is one\textsuperscript{189} and the difference in the apprehension is that [one] is an allowance [of something for something] and [the other] is an oscillation [of opinion]. So the statement of the ancients is the correct one.\textsuperscript{190}

Now there is a doubt [raised about this]. And it is that the three known things are the totality of the parts of the proposition [also] obtain in the case of doubt. However, [a proposition] does not obtain [in this case], according to the
well-known position.\textsuperscript{191} It is said as a solution [to this problem] that, in relation
to these [three] known things, the proposition is whole [and complete] per acci-
dens. So it does not follow that it should obtain, as in the case of “writer” for
“rational animal.”\textsuperscript{192} I say that, given this, it is necessary that something else be
considered after [the information-bearing relation] has occurred. And this [other
thing] is nothing other than the apprehension [that the relation has obtained].\textsuperscript{193}
And [apprehension] is something extraneous [to the occurrence of the relation]
by consensus. [However,] to take the obtaining [of the relation only] with the con-
dition of [the] generation [of assent to this relation] is to grant the soundness of
[the doctrine that] the essential is created [for the essence for which it is essential].
And this is absurd.\textsuperscript{194} [Moreover,] the communication [of a meaning] is prior to
the generation [of the assent to the relation between subject and predicate]. The
proposition does not wait so as to have a positive existence [once something else
has obtained] after [the communication of the meaning]. Thus the consideration
of the generation [of assent] to the occurrence [of the relation] is something that
has no bearing on the obtaining of the reality [of the proposition].

The truth is that our statement, “Zayd is standing,” is a proposition with respect
to each determination, [i.e., in the case of doubt or assent]. For it communicates
a meaning that carries the possibility of truth and falsity. In the case of doubt, the
oscillation exists only with respect to the correspondence of the report [with real-
ity], not with respect to the original [nature] of the report itself or the possibility of
[its truth or falsity]. Yes, propositions that are considered in the sciences are those
to which assent pertains, since no perfection [that is sought via the sciences] exists
in the case of doubt. Although this [foregoing discourse] is something that has not
reached your ear [before], it is in fact [the conclusion based on] verification.

\textit{Types of Propositions}

25. Next, given that the parts [of a proposition] are three, then it is suitable that
[these three] be signified by three expressions. So that which signifies the relation
is called the copula; sometimes, the language of the Arabs elides the copula, find-
ing the diacritics sufficient as entailing signifiers for it.\textsuperscript{195} [In this case,] it is called
a bipartite proposition. Sometimes, [the copula] is mentioned, so that it is called a
tripartite [proposition]. Although [the copula] that is mentioned is a particle,
sometimes it is in the guise of a noun, such as “it,” and is called a nontemporal
copula. \textit{Estin} in Greek and \textit{ast} in Persian are among [nontemporal copulas].\textsuperscript{196}
Sometimes, [the copula] is in the guise of a verb, such as “was,” and is called a
temporal copula.

If the affirmation or negation of a thing for a thing is judged in a proposition,
it is called an attributive [proposition]; otherwise, it is a conditional [proposi-
tion]. [The first part in the attributive proposition,] that about which something
is judged, is called the subject; and [the first part is called] the antecedent [in a
conditional proposition]. That which is judged [about it, the second part in the attributive proposition] is the predicate; and [the second part is called] the consequent [in a conditional proposition].

**Conditional Propositions**

26. Know that the doctrine of the logicians is that the judgment in a conditional [applies to the tie] between the antecedent and the consequent. The doctrine of the grammarians is that it [applies to] the apodosis and that the protasis is a restriction for the predicate in [the apodosis], in the [sense of] being a state or circumstance [in which the predicate obtains]. So it is in the *Miftāḥ* [of al-Sakkākī].

Al-Sayyid [al-Jurjānī] said that the first [position] is the correct [one], because the conditional may be true with certainty, though the consequent may be false in actual fact. [An example is] our statement, “If Zayd were a donkey, he would bray.” If, however, the [truth-bearing] sentence were the consequent, then the truth of [the conditional] could not be conceived, along with the falsity [of the consequent]. [This is due to] the necessity that the negation of the absolute entails the negation of the restricted.

ʿAllāma al-Dawānī states that the falsity of the consequent at all actual times does not entail its falsity at times that have been determined [by a mental restriction]. For the being-braying at all times at which the being-donkey of Zayd is determined [as a restriction] is affirmed for him, even though it is negated of him with respect to actual times. Don’t you see that [the proposition,] “Zayd is standing in my mind,” is not falsified with the negation of his standing in actual fact? That which is mentioned [by al-Jurjānī] about entailment is granted [as a principle], but we do not grant that the absolute, in the case [at hand], is negated. For [the absolute] is taken in a sense that is more general than that which is with respect to the way things are given. The most one need say is that this expression [i.e., “Zayd brays,”] is not posited so as to lead to this [kind of absolute] meaning [by means of signification by] correspondence. And there is no harm in this. [An explanation] like this [also] resolves the doubt concerning the “nonexistent corresponding equal.”

I say that they—and among them is the Verifier al-Dawānī—allowed that a thing may entail its contradictory and two contradictories. [This position] is based on [their granting] that an absurdity may entail an absurdity. They hold fast to this [principle as their base] in a number of cases, including in the answer to the indiscriminately applicable and well-known [following] paradox: the claim is affirmed; otherwise, its contradictory is affirmed; whenever its contradictory is affirmed, something is affirmed; so, whenever the claim is not affirmed, something is affirmed. This undergoes a contradictory conversion as our statement, “Whenever nothing is affirmed, the claim is affirmed.” This is absurd.
Having laid this groundwork, we say that, if the condition [i.e., “whenever nothing is affirmed”] were a restriction for the predicate in the apodosis [i.e., “the claim is affirmed”], then the joining of two contradictories would follow in the [case of that conditional] in which the antecedent entails the two [contradictories].\textsuperscript{208} For our statement, “Zayd is standing,” at the time when nothing is affirmed contradicts our statement, “Zayd is not standing,” at that self-same time. This is known a priori. As for the case when the judgment in the conditional [proposition] pertains to the connection between the two things, then [the joining of two contradictories] does not follow. For the contradictory of the connection [between two propositions] is its removal, not the existence of some other connection. So the doctrine of the logicians is the correct one.\textsuperscript{209}

\textit{On the Subject Term}

Section. \textbf{27.} If the subject is a particular, then the proposition is singular. If [the subject] is a universal, then \{1\} if a judgment is passed about it without the addition of any condition,\textsuperscript{210} it is ambiguous for the ancients; and \{2\} if a judgment is passed about it with the condition of [its] mental unity,\textsuperscript{211} then it is natural; and \{3\} if a judgment is passed in [the proposition] about the individual instances [of the subject], then \{A\} if the quantity of the individual instances is explained in it, it is quantified; and that whereby [the quantity is] explained is called a quantifier. The quantifier may be mentioned on the side of the predicate. In such a case, the proposition is called distorted.\textsuperscript{212} \{B\} If [the quantifier] is not explained, then [the proposition] is ambiguous for the later [logicians]. Given this, the [later logicians] state that [the ambiguous proposition] mutually entails the particular [proposition].\textsuperscript{213}

Know that the doctrine of the verifiers is that the judgment in a quantified [proposition] applies to the reality itself because it obtains in the mind in reality.\textsuperscript{214} The particulars [that fall under it] are known per accidens; so the judgment applies to them only in this way. Perhaps it would be opined that, if this is so, then an affirmation would require the existence of the reality [about which the judgment holds] in reality. For that about which something is affirmed is [the same as] that about which something is judged in reality. However, [it is obvious that the reality] may be nonexistent, indeed negative.\textsuperscript{215} The truth is that, even if the individual instances are known from an aspect,\textsuperscript{216} they are that about which the judgment is passed in reality. Do you not see that, in [the case of] general positing and the particular thing for which something is posited, that which is known from an aspect is [the same as] that for which something is posited in reality?\textsuperscript{217}

The response [to the aforementioned opinion] is that, what is communicated [in an] affirmative [proposition] simpliciter\textsuperscript{218} is the existence [of the predicate for a subject] simpliciter.\textsuperscript{219} So, every judgment that exists for individual instances exists [also] for [their] nature in some general way.\textsuperscript{220} As for the manner in which [this judgment applies—] whether it applies first and in itself to the nature or to
the individual instance—well that is a sense that is additional to the reality [of the sense of what an affirmation is]. So reflect on this!

**On Quantification and Subject Terms**

28. There are four quantifiers: the affirmative universal, whose quantifier is “all” and the definite particle [al-] that encompasses [all cases]; the affirmative particular, whose quantifier is “some” and “one”; the universal negative, whose quantifier is “nothing” and “not one” and the occurrence of an indefinite after the negation; and the particular negative, whose quantifier is “not all” and “not some” and “some are not.” Each language has quantifiers specific to it.

_Further Reflection._ [The logicians have a general] habit of expressing the subject term by \( J \) and the predicate by \( B \). The more common [thing to do] is to articulate [each of] these two as a compound noun, like the mysterious Qur’ānic letters. This [common habit] is suggested by the fact that they use the expressions “the jim” “the jim-ness” and “the bāʾ” and “the bāʾ-ness.” In sum, if they intend to express the universal affirmative, for example, such that the [logical] judgments [apply to all material cases], they abstract [the universal proposition] from [its specific] matters. [They do this,] so as to preclude the opinion that the [proposition] is limited [to specific subjects and predicates]. And they say, “Every jim is bāʾ.”

There are four things [in the universal affirmative proposition]. So let us verify their state in [the following] investigations.

The first is that “every” is in the sense of the universal, as in “Every man is a species.” [It is also] in the sense of a collected whole, as in “This house does not have enough room for the totality of men.” [Finally, it is also] in the sense of “every” with respect to each of the instances. The difference between these three senses is clear. It is the third sense that is used in syllogisms and in the sciences. [That proposition,] which consists of [this third type of “every,”] is quantified. As for the first [type], it is the natural [universal] and, [as for the second,] it is the singular or ambiguous [proposition]. And [that proposition,] which consists of “some” in the collected [sense], well, it is the ambiguous.

The second [investigation] is that by \( J \) we do not mean that whose reality is \( J \). Nor [do we mean] that which is described by it. Rather, [we mean] something more general than these two [senses]. [We mean] those individual instances of which \( J \) is true. These individual instances may be real, such as the particular instances or species instances. Or they may be [instances] that are [a product of mental] consideration, such as the animal genus. For [the latter] is more specific than animal simpliciter. However, customary usage takes [only] the first type [noted above] into consideration.

Next, al-Fārābī reckoned that the truth of the tag of the subject applies to its substrate possibly. [Given this,] a Byzantine would fall under “Every black.” When the Shaykh found this to be contrary to customary usage and language,
he reckoned that its truth applies [to the substrate] in actuality, either in extra-
mental existence or in mental supposition, in the sense that the intellect reckons
the description [of the substrate by the tag] such that [the substrate] exists in this
way [i.e., as picked out by the tag,] in actuality with respect to the way things are
given.\textsuperscript{229} It is all the same whether [the substrate] exists or does not exist. Thus
the substrate perpetually devoid of blackness does not fall under “every black,”
according to the Shaykh. Anyone who claims that it is [in fact] his opinion that it
falls under it has made an error, owing to his limited contemplation of one of his
expressions.\textsuperscript{230} Of course nonexistent substrates that are black in actuality after
they come to exist do fall under it.

On Predication

29. The third [investigation pertains to predication]. Predication is the unity of two
things that are distinct owing to a kind of intellection [and that are unified] with
a view to another kind of existence.\textsuperscript{231} “This unity is either per se or per accidents.\textsuperscript{232}
[By predication] is meant either that the subject is exactly the same as the predic-
ate; in this case, it is called a primary predication. And [primary predication] may
also be theoretical.\textsuperscript{233} Or [predication] is limited to the mere unity [of the subject
and predicate] in existence; [in this case,] it is called the customary and commonly
known predication. It is this [predication] that is considered to be apt in the sci-
ences.\textsuperscript{234} [Predication may also] be divided—with respect to whether the predi-
cate is essential or accidental—into predication per se or predication per accidents.
[And predication may also] be divided [into types] with respect to whether the relation
of the predicate and the subject is mediated by “in,” “being endowed with,”
or “having.” [This kind of predication] is [called] predication by derivation.\textsuperscript{235} Or
[predication may be] unmediated, [indicated by] the expression “of.”\textsuperscript{236} [This is]
predication by complete overlap.\textsuperscript{237} The more suitable thing is that the latter two
[types, i.e., predication by derivation and predication by complete overlap,] are
called predications homonymously.

Know that every sense is predicated of itself by means of a primary predi-
cation.\textsuperscript{238} Given this, you hear that the negation of a thing of itself is an absur-
dity. Now, there are some senses that are predicated of themselves by means of a
customary [and commonly known] predication, such as “sense” and “common
possible,” and so on.\textsuperscript{239} There are [also] some [senses] that are not predicated
of themselves in this latter fashion; rather, their contradictories are predi-
cated of them, such as “particular” and “nonsense.”\textsuperscript{240} Given this, in the case of contradic-
tion[s], one must take into account the unity of the kind of predication
[in question].\textsuperscript{241} [This condition of the unity of the kind of predication in question]
is over and above the well-known eight kinds of unities [that must be considered
in cases of contradiction].\textsuperscript{242}

At this point, a well-known doubt presents itself and it is that predication is
impossible because the sense of \(J\) is either exactly the same as the sense of \(B\) or
something else. Being exactly the same negates [the possibility] of difference. And being different negates [the possibility] of unity. The solution is that difference from one aspect does not negate [the possibility] of unity from another aspect. Indeed, it is necessary for the predicate to be taken unconditionally, so that two things [—the difference and unity of the subject and predicate—] may be conceptualized with respect to it.  

That which is considered in the customary predication is the truth of the sense of the predicate for the subject—whether it is essential [to the subject] or is a description that subsists in it, whether it is [a concept] abstracted from it without any relation [to anything extraneous to the subject] or [abstracted] owing to [such an extraneous] relation. Thus the affirmation of evenness for five does not make true our statement that five is even.

The fourth [investigation—also on predication—] has [subtle] parts. The first is that the existence of a thing for a thing that obtains in a context depends on the actuality of that for which it exists; and [the existence of the former] entails the existence of the latter in that very context. Among [the types] is what exists for something that has obtained mentally; [the proposition pertaining to it is called] a mental [proposition]. [Then] there is that [which exists for something that is] determined mentally; the proposition pertaining to it is called a mentally real [proposition]. There is [that which exists for] something that has obtained extramentally; and [the proposition pertaining to it is called] an extramental [proposition]. Or [it exists for something that is] determined extramentally; and [the proposition pertaining to it is called] an extramentally real [proposition].

As for negation, well, it does not require the existence of the subject. Indeed, it may be true [even] with the absence [of the subject]. Of course, the sense of the negative [proposition] does not obtain except owing to the existence [of the subject] in [the mind] only at the time of the judgment.

The second [subsection of the fourth investigation is as follows]. The absurd, insofar as it is absurd, has no form in the intellect. So it is nonexistent both mentally and extramentally. Given this fact, it becomes clear that everything existent in the mind—as mentally determined—exists with respect to the way things are given. Thus, no judgment is passed of it [i.e., of the absurd], whether it be, for example, an affirmative [judgment] that it is impossible or a negative [judgment] about its existence. [This is the case] except with respect to something universal, when its conceptualization is among things that are possible. Every object of judgment that has been determined [in the mind] is a conceptualized nature. And everything that is conceptualized exists. So, the judgment about it [i.e., the conceptualized nature] that it is impossible and similar [judgments] are not correct insofar as it is what it is. However, when [this thing about which the
judgment is passed] is considered with a view to all or some of [its individual
instances] that are the sources of its positive obtaining, then the judgment of impos-
sibility, for example, is correct. So impossibility is affirmed of the [conceptualized]
nature; and it is true owing to the fact that the [existence of the individual instances]
that are the sources of its obtaining is denied. Thus there is no issue with respect to
propositions whose predicates oppose existence, such as “The Participant with the
Creator is impossible” and “The joining of contradictories is absurd” and
“The absolutely unknown has no judgment passed of it” and “The absolutely non-
existent is the opposite of the absolutely existent.”

As for those who said that the judgment applies in reality to the individual
instances,\(^{255}\) well, among them is one\(^{256}\) who said that these are [actually] negative
[propositions].\(^ {257}\) [Yet] there is no doubt that this is an arbitrary [solution]. And
among them is one\(^ {258}\) who said that, even though these [propositions] are affirma-
tive, they only require the conceptualization of the subject at the time of the judg-
ment. [This is the same arbitrariness] as is the case with negative [propositions],
without any difference. [However,] it is obvious that this is something that clashes
with an a priori [sense of what a proposition is].\(^ {259}\) And among them is one who
said that the judgment applies to supposed individual instances that have been
determined to exist. It is as if he states that everything that is conceptualized by
means of the tag “Participant with the Creator” and the truth [of this tag] is sup-
posed for it—[such a thing] is impossible with respect to the way things are given.
[Yet] it is not hidden from you that this [position] entails that the existence of
the description is more than the existence of that which is described. For the
impossibility [predicated of the Participant with the Creator] obtains with respect
to the way things are given, as opposed to the individual instances [that do not
obtain in this way].\(^ {260}\) So reflect on this!

The third subsection [of the fourth investigation is as follows]. Describing [a
subject by a description] that is added [to the subject] requires that the two sides
[i.e., the subject and predicate] obtain positively in the [same] context in which
the describing occurs, as opposed to [describing a subject with a description]
that is extracted [from the subject]; the latter only requires the existence of that
which is described [i.e., the subject].\(^ {261}\) So [the act of] description in an absolute
sense does not require the existence of the description in [the same] context; as
for the existence [of the attribute] in an absolute sense, well, this is necessary.\(^ {262}\)
For it is impossible for that which does not exist in itself to exist for anything
[other than itself]. [The actual] act of describing [something by something] does
not obtain extramentally, lest it be [posited that] the description [must] obtain
[extramentally in all cases]. [This is so] because [the act of describing claims]
a relation and every relation obtains [only] insofar as the two things that are
related obtain. Rather, [the description] obtains in the mind, even though it
is the case that that which is described in an inclusive extramental description is
united with its attribute, [as exemplified] in [extramental] individual essences,
such as body and white, and that, in the extramental description by extraction, [this unity occurs] with a view to [extramental] individual instances, such as the sky and upness.263

The fourth subsection [of the fourth investigation is as follows]. The later [logicians] invented a proposition and called it a negative-predicate [proposition]. They distinguished it from a negative [proposition] in that, in the negative [proposition], the two extremes are conceptualized and a judgment of negation is passed, whereas, in the negative-predicate [proposition,] the negation reverts [from its original place] and is predicated of the subject.264 They judged that the truth of affirmation in [this proposition] does not require the existence [of the subject], just as in the case of a [traditional] negative [proposition]. Rather, it is the negative [proposition] that requires [the existence of the subject], just as in [the case of a traditional] affirmative [proposition]. Your natural inclination judges that the affirmative copula simpliciter265 requires the existence [of the subject].266 Given this [latter view], it is said that the truth is that [this new type of proposition] is a mental proposition; all conceptualized senses exist with respect to the way things are given, either as obtaining or as determined [to obtain].267 Thus, there is a mutual entailment with respect to truth between [the negative-predicate affirmative proposition] and the negative [proposition].268 Yet [this position] has its problems. So recall [them]!269 Now that you have verified [the nature of] the universal affirmative [proposition], [determine the nature of the] rest of the quantified [propositions] by analogy.

On Divested Propositions

30. Next, the particle of negation may be made part of an extreme. In this case, [the proposition] is called divested. [Such a proposition] is either divested with respect to the subject or divested with respect to the predicate or with respect to both extremes. Otherwise, it is a positive [proposition]. “Zayd is blind” is a divested [proposition] insofar as it is intellected, [but] a positive [proposition] insofar as it is uttered.270 The name “affirmative [proposition]” may be specified by the positive [proposition] and [the name] “negative [proposition]” [may be specified by] the simple [proposition].271 This latter, [i.e., the simple negative proposition,] is more general than the affirmative [proposition] that is divested with respect to its predicate and the copula in it comes after the utterance of the negative [particle], whether [the copula] is uttered or not.272 In the negative-predicate affirmative [proposition] there are two copulas and the negation [is posited] between the two.273

On Modals

31. With respect to the way things are given, every relation is either necessary or impossible or possible. These qualities are the matters [of the proposition]. The mode signifies them. That [proposition,] which includes [the mode,] is called
modalized. The [proposition of this sort is called a] simple quadripartite, if its reality is only an affirmation and only a negation; and [it is called a] compound [quadripartite], if it is composed of both [an affirmation and a negation]. In naming [the compound quadripartite proposition as affirmative or negative,] one has to take the first part into consideration; otherwise, [i.e., if the proposition does not have a mode, it is called] absolute and ambiguous with respect to modality. If the [mode] corresponds to the matter, the proposition is true; otherwise it is false. The verification of this [position] is that the matters [discussed in] philosophy are [the same as] the modes [in] logic. It is said that they are different; otherwise, the necessary concomitants of quiddities would be necessary in themselves. The answer [to this claim] is that there is a difference between the necessity of existence in itself and existence owing to another. The former is absurd and is not something that is entailed; the latter is entailed and is not absurd. This is according to the opinion of the ancients.

As for the opinion of the moderns, well, matter is an expression [that refers to] every quality that belongs to the relation, such as perpetuity, being within temporal limits, and so on. Given this, modalized [propositions] are infinite. So, if it is judged with respect to [a modalized proposition] in an absolute way that it is impossible for the relation [between the subject and predicate] to be severed, then it is an absolute necessity [proposition]; or [if it is judged that the relation is impossible to sever] for as long as the description [of the subject by its tag is true], then [it is a] common conditioned [proposition]; [if it is judged that the relation is impossible to sever] for a specific time, [then it is an] absolute temporalized [proposition]; [if it is judged that the relation is impossible to sever] for a nonspecific [period of time, then it is] an absolute spread [proposition]. [If the judgment is that] the severance [of the relation] is nonexistent in an absolute sense, then it is an absolute perpetual [proposition]; [if the severance is nonexistent] for as long as the description [of the subject by the tag is true], then it is a common conventional [proposition]. [If it is judged that the severance is nonexistent] in actuality, then [the proposition] is a common absolute. [If it is judged that the severance is not impossible,] then it is a common possible [proposition]. [If it is judged that] neither extreme, [i.e., that neither the affirmation nor the negation of the severance,] is impossible, then it is a special possible [proposition]. In the latter, there is no difference between an affirmation and a negation, except with respect to the utterance [of affirmation or negation].

[Some] have considered [it apt] to restrict the two common and the two absolute temporalized propositions with essential nonperpetuity, so that they are called the special conditioned, the special conventional, the temporal, and the spread [respectively]. [When] the common absolute is restricted by essential nonnecessity and non-perpetuity, it is called the nonnecessity existential and nonperpetual existential. The latter is the Alexandrian absolute [proposition].
The section on modalities ends with a conclusion in which there are several investigations. The first is as follows. The identification of the absolute necessity proposition has become widespread as that proposition in which the necessity of the affirmation or of the negation of the predicate for the subject is judged with the qualification “for as long as the substrate of the subject exists.” There is a doubt about this position from two perspectives. The first is that if the predicate were “existent,” the mutual exclusion of the necessity proposition and the special possible proposition would not be entailed. The response to this problem lies in the difference between necessity with respect to the time of existence and necessity owing to the condition of existence. [A further] critique is mentioned and it is that absolute necessity would be limited to eternal necessity, in which it is judged that the predicate holds of the subject by means of a necessity relation in pre- and post eternity. [So, absolute necessity] would not be more general [than perpetual necessity] because, when the existence of the subject is not necessary [at the time of its existence], nothing would be necessary for it at the time of its existence. [This challenge] is contravened by reference to the existence of essentials [for their essences]. For [this existence of the essential] is necessary for [the] essence perpetually, without the condition of the existence of the essence. Otherwise, the animality of man would be generated [for man by something external to the essence of man]. So understand this.

The second investigation is as follows. A negative proposition in which the negation holds for as long as the substrate of the subject has existence is not true without the existence of the substrate. So the negative necessity proposition is not more general than the affirmative divested necessity proposition. This entails that it is not true that, by necessity, nothing that is a griffin is a man. It is said in response that “for as long as” is a context for the existence of the predicate for the subject and the negation applies to [this affirmation insofar as it is so conditioned]. Thus the truth of the negative proposition is allowed [even] with the denial of the [existence of] the subject and of the predicate, either at all times or at some. [An example is] “Nothing that is a moon is eclipsed by necessity.” The objection to this solution is that it entails that possibility [and necessity] are not mutually exclusive. For every moon eclipses in actuality. So it is possibly true [that it eclipses]. In addition, their statement—that the negative necessity perpetual and absolute negative necessity are equal—would be falsified. For the negation of the more general is more particular than the negation of the more particular. In sum, innumerable errors, which are not hidden from one who reflects, would be entailed [from this proposed solution]. In the end, it could be responded that existence is more general than that [existence] that has obtained and that [existence] that is determined. [Yet] there are criticisms of this position.

The third investigation is as follows. The identification of the absolute perpetuity proposition is commonly held to be “that in which it is judged that a perpetuity of relation [holds between the predicate and the subject], for as long as the
substrate of the subject exists.” There is a doubt [about this] and it is that it entails that essential perpetuity is no different from the general absolute with respect to a proposition whose predicate is “existence.” So there is no contradiction between the two. It is said as a solution to this [problem] that the immediately apparent [sense] of the identification [of the perpetual proposition requires] that the predicate be something other than existence. So there is no essential perpetuity in this case. I say, “The Active Intellect is nonexistent in actuality” is false. So the truth of its contradictory is entailed—that is, an absolute perpetuity [proposition,] whose predicate is existence.

The [fourth investigation is as follows.] The common conditioned [proposition] is sometimes taken in the sense that there is a necessity of relation [between the subject and predicate] on the condition of the description [of the substrate] by the tag; and sometimes [it is taken] in the sense that there is a necessity [of such a relation] at all times at which the description [holds]. The difference is that, in the former, the description must have a role to [play] in the necessity, as opposed to the latter [case]. There is a [relationship] of overlap between these two [interpretations].

[The fifth investigation is as follows]. Some people adopted the position that the common possibility [proposition] is not a proposition in actuality, owing to the fact that it does not carry a judgment [that the predicate applies or fails to apply to the subject]. And so [if it is not a proposition,] it is not modalized [either]. This is an error. Do you not see that possibility is a quality of the relation and the basis of a relation is affirmation? Granted, [affirmations in possibility propositions] are of the weakest order. Given this, they say that necessity and impossibility signify the firmness of the copula and possibility [signifies] its weakness. Affirmation by way of possibility is a subcategory of affirmation in an absolute sense. Ultimately, [one may say as a critique] that the immediately apparent sense [of an affirmation] in an absolute sense is the occurrence [of the predicate for the subject] in actuality. [However, this apparent sense] does not affect adversely the generality [of occurrence], as they say with respect to existence. And if the possibility [proposition] is modalized, then it is more suitable [to take the] absolute [to be modalized as well].

The sixth [investigation is as follows.] Nonperpetuity indicates the common absolute and nonnecessity [indicates] the common possible. [The members of each respective pair] oppose each other with respect to their qualities [of affirmation and negation] and coincide with respect to their quantities [i.e., being universal and particular,] owing to the fact that these propositions are restricted by [the modalities of nonperpetuity and nonnecessity]. [This is so] because [the modalities of nonperpetuity and nonnecessity] remove the relation [between the subject and predicate], without there being any difference [between them and their respective pairs with reference to quantity]. So the compound [modalized proposition] is [actually] more than one proposition, because the consideration
of its unity and multiplicity pertains to the unity of the judgment. And the multiplicity of [the latter] is either owing to its difference with respect to quality or subject or predicate. There is no fourth [reason for its multiplicity].

The seventh [investigation is as follows.] The four relations that [can] hold between [two] simple [concepts] are with respect to the truth [of the application of each concept] of a thing. In propositions, [however, this] cannot be imagined, because they are not predicated [of anything]. [These four relations] obtain in [propositions] only with respect to their truth in the actual world. Next, one judges that [one of these four] relations holds [between two propositions] with a view to the senses [of propositions that occur to the mind] with immediacy [i.e., not on the basis of reflection]. As for basing this discourse on subtle principles that are demonstrated in philosophy, well, that is a level [of discussion that one gets into] after this discipline [of logic] has been completed. [However,] given that [it is not the subtle principles that are at stake,] they say that the absolute necessity [proposition] is more particular, in an absolute way, than the absolute perpetuity proposition.

Then it should not be difficult for you to extrapolate the relations among the aforementioned modalized [propositions]. If you dive deep, you will know that the common possible is the most general of propositions and that the special possible is the most general of compound [modal propositions]. [You will also discover that] the absolute possible is the most general of [propositions] with respect to actuality, that the absolute necessity [proposition] is the most particular of the simple [propositions], and that the special conditional is the most particular of [all] the compound [modal propositions] with respect to an aspect.

On Conditionals

Section. 32. A conditional [proposition] is one in which judgment is passed that a relation [between a subject and predicate] exists on the determination that another [relation holds]. [Such a judgment] is either [owing to the fact that, with respect to each other, the two relations stand in a state of] entailment, mere chance, or absolutely. [Depending on the state of this relation, conditionals are] entailing connectives, chance [connectives], or absolute [connectives]. If it is judged [in the conditional] that the two relations mutually exclude each other—whether it be that [1] they both cannot be true and both cannot be false or [2] only that both cannot be true or [3] only that both cannot be false (whether as cases of mutual opposition or by chance or in an absolute sense)—then it is [1] a real disjunctive or [2] anti-joining disjunctive or [3] anti-empty disjunctive. [And each of these is such that the disjunct holds owing to] mutual opposition or by chance or in an absolute sense.

With respect to the anti-joining and anti-empty disjunctives, one may consider the mutual exclusion of the truth [of the two relations] and of the falsity [of the two relations] in an absolute sense. In this sense, these two would be more general [than the originally offered senses of these two types].
These are the realities of the affirmative [conditionals]. As for the negative [conditionals], well, they are the removal of the affirmations. Thus, the negative entailing connective is one in which is judged that the entailment [between the antecedent and the consequent] is negated, not that the negation is entailed. On the basis of this [general rule,] analogize the rest [of the cases].

Next, if the judgment in [the conditionals] is according to a specific and exact determination [found in the antecedent], then it is a singular [conditional proposition]. Otherwise, if the quantity of the judgment is made clear, in that it applies in all determinations of the antecedent or in some of them, then it is a quantified universal or particular [conditional proposition]. Otherwise, [if no such clear determination is given], then it is an ambiguous [conditional] proposition. The natural [conditional] is nonsensical.

The quantifier of the universal affirmative in the connective [conditional] is "when" and "whenever it is the case" and "whenever." In the disjunctive, it is "perpetually." The quantifier of the universal negative in both [conditionals] is "it is not at all the case." The quantifier of the particular affirmative in both [conditionals] is "it may be"; and the quantifier of the particular negative in both [conditionals] is "it may not be." [The quantifier of the latter may also be constructed] by means of the inclusion of the particle of negation with the quantifier of the universal affirmative [conditional]. For the ambiguous [conditional proposition, one employs] “if,” “when,” “or,” and “either/or.” The Shaykh said “if” intensely signifies entailment, “when” [does so] weakly, and “since” is like that which is between [the two]. This is problematic.

There is no judgment with respect to the extremes of the conditional [proposition] at the moment [the two extremes are part of the conditional]. [This judgment] is neither entailed before [the two extremes are joined] nor after their analysis [i.e., after they are separated]. Given this, the determining factor in the truth and falsity of the conditional [proposition] is the judgment about the conjunction or disjunction [of the two extremes], just as [the determining factor] in the affirmation and negation [of the conditional is the affirmative and negative judgment of conjunction and disjunction]. Indeed, [the two extremes of a conditional proposition] resemble two predicatives or two conjunctives or two disjunctives or two different types. The mutual implications among the [various types of] conditionals and their mutual oppositions are treated in the lengthier works, though these are not very useful [to know].

[The following] is the conclusion [of the discussion of the conditionals and] it consists of [various] investigations. The first [is as follows.] It is a prevalent [belief] among people that, [in] two mutually entailing things, one must be a cause of the other or that both must be effects of a single cause. [An example of such a case is that which exists between] two things in a subjoined relation. This is something for which there is no proof. However, one can seek a proof for the falsity of [this position] in that the nonexistence of the nonexistence of the Necessary the Exalted
entails His existence; and vice versa. And if the nonexistence of the Necessary
the Exalted were impossible in itself, then the nonexistence of the nonexistence
[of the Necessary] would not depend on something else. [This is so] because, if
one of two contradictories is impossible, then the other contradictory is necessary.
[Now] it is clear that His existence is not an effect, so that there is a mutual entail-
ment between existence and the nonexistence of nonexistence, without any causal
[aspect]. So reflect on this!320

The second [investigation is as follows]. There is a disagreement about [the possi-
bility] of an absurd antecedent, with respect to the way things are given, entailing
a consequent, with respect to the way things are given.321 Among them is one who
denies [this possibility] absolutely and one who denies it when the consequent is
true.322 The statement of the Shaykh suggests this latter [position] and, given this,
he states that the removal of both contradictories entails their joining and that
there is no entailment in [the proposition,] "If five is even, then it is a number"
with respect to the way things are given.323 Among them is one who claims that
the entailment exists when the consequent is a part of the antecedent.324 This is
an arbitrary [specification of a general principle]. Among them is [also] one who
claims that [the entailment between an absurd antecedent and either an absurd
or true consequent] exists when there is a relation between [the antecedent and
the consequent].325 "This is the most widely known position. Given this [require-
ment of a relation], he states that the absurd antecedent must not stand in a rela-
tion of mutual exclusion with the consequent. For mutual exclusion [forces] the
separation [of two things], whereas mutual entailment precludes it.326 Against this
[condition of the absence of mutual exclusion between the antecedent and the
consequent is the argument that] this [i.e., the entailment along with the mutual
exclusion of the antecedent and the consequent] will reduce to two affirmative
entailing [conditionals], the consequent of one of which is the contradictory of
the consequent of the other.327 [However,] the opponent does not grant that these
two [entailing connective conditionals] exclude each other.328 Among them is
[also] one who states that the intellect does not resolutely declare that an absur-
dity entails an absurdity or a possibility at all.329 However, there is no objection in
[the intellect’s merely] allowing for this [possibility as a mental determination].330
And this is the true [position]. For the intellect judges [only] with respect to the
world of actuality. If something lies outside [this actual world], it does not fall
under the judgment [of the intellect].331 Its mere supposition of [this thing] as
being from [the actual world] is of no use in [the possibility] of judging [this thing
with respect to the actual]. That the judgments with respect to actuality carry over
into the world of [mere mental] determination is doubtful.332

The third [investigation is as follows]. In the explanation of the universal
[entailing and mutually opposing conditionals], the Principal [philosopher]
restricted mental determinations and contexts to those that may be compatible
with the antecedent, even if these [determinations] should be absurd in
themselves. He explained that if we make the determinations general, then it will follow that the entailing and mutually opposing conditionals would not be universal at all. For if the antecedent is supposed along with the nonexistence of the consequent—or with its existence in the disjunctive—it does not entail the consequent—nor does it nullify it in the case of the disjunctive. An objection is raised against this position in that an absurdity may entail two contradictories or it may exclude them both. Given this, we do not concede that the universal conditional with unrestricted determinations of the antecedent is not true. It is responded that the intention by his statement, “the universal conditional will not be true at all,” is that no certain resolve will obtain for its truth. For possibility does not supply necessity. I answer that one must apply the restriction with reference to possibilities in themselves. So understand this!

The fourth investigation is as follows. In the chance conditional, one may take into account the truth of the two extremes or one may suffice with the truth of the consequent only. So it may be composed of an absurd antecedent and a true consequent. For that which is true with respect to the way things are given remains as such, along with the supposition of each absurdity. The Principal philosopher made this composition explicit. The truth is that if the consequent opposes the antecedent, the chance conditional is not true. Otherwise, the joining of two contradictories would be possible. The first type of chance conditional, i.e., one in which both extremes are true, is called the special chance conditional and the second, i.e., one where only the consequent need be true, is called the common chance conditional.

It is said that the chance conditionals also consist of a link between the antecedent and the consequent, because one thing’s being-along-with another is something that is possible i.e., not necessary. So there is a cause for the two possibly being together. Thus, it is said that the difference between the chance and entailing conditionals is that, in the entailing conditionals, one is conscious of the link, as opposed to the chance conditionals. There is an objection to this position, namely, that being-along-with is something that may be by chance and that something’s being a cause in an absolute sense does not necessitate a link between the two things that occur with each other when the cause is with respect to two different aspects. Remember this!

The fifth investigation is as follows. They say that real disjunction in a real disjunctive proposition can only be between two parts, as opposed to the anti-joining and anti-empty disjunctive. A group holds the doctrine that disjunction in an absolute sense obtains only from two parts, neither more nor less. Indeed, propositions like “Every sense is either possible or impossible” are composed of a predicative and a disjunctive part. Some claimed that, in an absolute sense, the disjunction in the aforementioned case may be composed of more than two parts.
The truth is [that the] second [position is correct].346 [This is so] because disjunction is a single relation and a single relation can only be conceptualized between two [parts]. [Against this view, there is an objection] that is mentioned, namely, that in this [argument] there is a prepositing [of the sought conclusion]. [This is so] because if, [in positing this rule,] one intends every single relation, whether it be disjunctive or something else, then this is [precisely] what is being disputed.347 Otherwise, [this rule] is not useful. One would reject [this objection] by means of that whereby the [supposed circular] implication of the Major [premise] of the first [figure by its conclusion] is [also] rejected.348 So contemplate [this]!

So the real [disjunctive] is only composed from a proposition and its contradictory or what is equal [to the contradictory]; the anti-joining [disjunctive] is formed from [a proposition] and that which is more particular than its contradictory; and the anti-empty [disjunctive] is formed from [a proposition] and that which is more general than its contradictory.349 [Remember] this!

The sixth [investigation is as follows]. Among them is one who claimed that the particular entailment [holds] between every two things, even [between] two contradictories. [Given this,] the universal negative entailing [connective conditional]350 the universal affirmative real [disjunctive conditional]351 and the universal chance [conditional]352 would be false. [This claimant] demonstrated [his position] by means of the third figure. It is [as follows]. Whenever the collection of two things obtains, then one of them [also] obtains; whenever the collection obtains, then the other [of the two things also] obtains. [One can prove this] in the first [figure] by converting the Minor [premise].353 [Given this,] some verifiers desired to rid themselves of [this problem by the argument] that the collection entails the part only if each of the parts has a role to play in [the collection's] requiring [the entailment of any part].354 And it is clear that, [in the case in question,] the other part has no role to play [in such an entailment]. Rather, it is like something extra.

Against this [argument is the objection] that entailment does not require [that one thing] necessitate or effect [another]. For [entailment] is only the impossibility of the separation [of two things]. So the connection of two things in this manner [of nonseparation] is sufficient in [the case of entailment].355 The Shaykh said that when the antecedent is supposed along with the nonexistence of the consequent, it entails the nonexistence of the consequent. So he holds to the doctrine that the collection entails the part [without the aforementioned requirements of necessitation].356 Some of them desired [to be rid of the problem] in [stating] that we do not concede that universal [proposition],357 because the collection may be impossible. When [such a collection] is [mentally] determined to exist, it is separated from [its] part.358 This is the correct [position].

One thing remains and it is that we claim this [particular] entailment [to exist] between each two actual things. We demonstrate [this entailment] by taking this
universal [proposition] with a consideration of actual determinations. [Given this,] the special chance universal is false. So contemplate [this].

On Contradiction

Section. 33. Two things are contradictories of each other when one of them is the removal of the other. Given this, they say that contradiction is [a kind of] repeated relation and that everything has [exactly] one contradictory. The doctrine that conceptualizations have no contradictories [pertains to] a different sense [of contradictory].

There is a doubt [about contradictories] and it is that, if we take all the senses such that nothing is left out of [this totality of all senses], then the removal [of the totality] would be its contradictory. [Yet] this [contradictory of the totality] would be included in the totality. So the part would be the contradictory of the whole. And this is absurd. Something similar to this [argument] is used to critique [the doctrine that] a relation and the two things between which it is a relation are mutually distinct. The solution is that the consideration of meanings does not come to an end at a limit. However, the nonexistence of an addition requires coming to an end at a limit. Thus, taking the totality in this fashion is to consider two mutually exclusive things [to be valid]. So consider this.

The mutual contradiction of two propositions is their difference such that the truth—by virtue of itself—of each [proposition] requires the falsity of the other and vice versa. And this [difference] takes place via the affirmation [of one proposition] and the negation [of the other] when the removal [in the negation] is of the exact [affirmation]. Thus [for the contradiction to be valid] there must be a unity of the predicative relation, which they enumerated as the famous eight unities [of predication]. Some of them subsumed some [of these elements of unity] under some others.

Regarding [contradictories,] there is a doubt; and it is [as follows]. Affirmation is the contradictory of negation. Anyone who denies this goes against consensus. The negation of negation is also [an act of] removing it. Thus one thing has two contradictories. Anyone who adheres [to the idea of the] self-sameness [of these two contradictories] commits an error. For the difference in meaning is necessary and, for me, it is a sufficient [reason for the validity of the doubt]. The sound solution is that, in reality, negation is not put in an additive relation to anything except an existence with respect to its very self or [an existence] that is for another. So the negation of a negation is the removal of the existence of negation, which [existence of negation] has either the same force as an affirmative negative-subject [proposition] or an affirmative negative-predicate [proposition]. So the negation of the negation that belongs to the negative [proposition] is a negative [proposition of the negative-subject or negative-predicate type], [which] is the contradictory of the affirmative negative-[subject or affirmative negative-predicate proposition]
respectively. The contradictory of the negation of a negation] is not the positive/simple negative [proposition]. So reflect [on this] and be thankful!

Then, [two contradictory propositions] differ with respect to their quantities owing to the fact that two universals [may both be] false and that two particulars [may both be] true. [They also differ] with respect to their modalities; for the removal of a [modal] quality is another [modal] quality. One who affirms [contradiction] between two temporal absolutes, imagining [for himself] that they are like singular [propositions], has made an error. For the removal of the existence [of a thing] at a specific time may occur by the removal of [that] time.

Thus the contradictory of the [absolute] necessity [proposition] would be a common possible. For the perpetuity [proposition], it would be a common [absolute], which is more general than the absolute spread [proposition] in which the judgment is that the relation is actual at some time. [The contradictory] of a common conditioned [proposition] is a temporal possibility [proposition] in which it is judged that the necessity [relation] that is by virtue of the description [of the substrate by the subject tag] is negated. [For] the common conventional [proposition, the contradictory] is the temporized absolute [proposition] in which it is judged that the actuality [of the relation] that is by virtue of the description [is negated]. [The contradictory of] the absolute temporized [proposition] is the possibility temporized [proposition] in which it is judged that the necessity [of the relation] that is by virtue of a [specific] time is negated. [The contradictory of] the absolute spread [proposition] is the perpetual possibility [proposition] in which it is judged that the necessity [of the relation] that is by virtue of a [temporal] spread is negated. Thus they hold [to be the case]. [These rules] are only effective when the condition in the negations of these modalized [propositions] is a condition of that which is negated, not of the negations.

The compound [modal proposition] is a proposition [composed of] multiple [parts]. The removal of that which [has] multiple [parts] is [also] something [that has] multiple [parts]; and it is [tantamount to] the removal of one of the two parts in the manner of the anti-empty [disjunctive]. The universal [compound modal proposition] does not differ when it is analyzed [into parts] and [when it remains] compounded. So its contradictory is an anti-empty [disjunctive] compounded of the two contradictories of the two parts. When something more general than the explicit [form] and the implied equivalent is meant by the contradictory, then it ought not to be considered problematic that a conditional [disjunctive proposition should be a contradictory of a predicative proposition] or that an affirmative [proposition should be a contradictory of a modalized affirmative proposition].

[The case of] the particulars [that are compounded] is different. For in them, the subject of the affirmation and negation is the same [when the parts are compounded]. So the two particulars [that constitute the analyzed parts of the compound] are more general [than the compound particular]. The contradictory of the more general is more particular than the contradictory of the more particular.
The way [to find the contradictory is to allow] oscillation between the two contradictories [of the predicate] of the two [analyzed] parts with respect to each of the individual instances of the subject.\textsuperscript{385} So [the contradictory] is a predicative proposition that oscillates with respect to its predicate.\textsuperscript{386}

Having been informed about the realities of compound [propositions] and the contradictories of the simple [propositions,] you should [now] be able to extract the details [for various cases]. In the conditional propositions, the difference in quality and quantity [between two contradictories is retained, but the contradictories must be] the same with respect to their genus and species. So understand this!\textsuperscript{387}

\textit{On Conversion}

\textbf{Section. 34.} Symmetrical and equivalent conversion is the switching of the two extremes of the proposition, while retaining the truth-value and the quality. [The term \textit{converse}] may be applied to the proposition that is obtained owing to [the switching] when it is the most particular of the entailed [conversions].\textsuperscript{388}

The universal negative [proposition] converts to [a proposition] like itself [in quantity and quality] by means of an absurdum proof. In this case, it involves joining the contradictory of the converse with the original [proposition] to yield an absurdity. Thus the truth of the contradictory [of the converse], along with the original [proposition], is impossible. So the [posited] converse must be true along with it; and this is what was sought.

If our statement, “Nothing that is a body extends infinitely in [any of the] directions,” is taken as an extramental [proposition], its converse is true when the subject is nullified, owing to the falsity of the infiniteness of extensions. If it is taken as a real [proposition], we refuse the truth [of the original proposition], because it is true that everything that extends infinitely into directions is a body.\textsuperscript{389} The particular [negative proposition] does not convert because of the possibility of the generality of the subject [in a predicative proposition] or of the antecedent [in a conditional proposition].\textsuperscript{390}

The affirmative simpliciter—whether it be a universal or a particular—converts to a particular [affirmative] because affirmation is a joining [of the subject and predicate via instances].\textsuperscript{391} But [it does not convert] as a universal, because the predicate or the consequent may be [more] general [than the subject and antecedent respectively].\textsuperscript{392} The predicate in our statement, “Every old man was young,” is the relation [i.e., “was young,” not just “young”]. So its converse is “Some of those who were young are old.” Our statement, “Some species is man,” is false because “Nothing that is a man is a species” is true. The latter converts to that which contradicts [“some species is man”].\textsuperscript{393} The secret in [resolving this problem] is that, in customary predication, it is the truth of the sense of the predicate [for the instances of the subject] that is taken into account, not the sense of the predicate itself.\textsuperscript{394}
Neither the disjunctives nor the chance [conditionals] have converses because [the conversion] lacks benefit. As for [conversion] with respect to the modes, well, among the universal negatives, the two perpetuats [i.e., the absolute necessity and absolute perpetuity] and the two commons [i.e., the common conditional and the common conventional] convert like themselves [i.e., while maintaining the modes by means of ad absurdum [proofs]. The way to make the proof correspond to this claim about the [conversion] of necessity [propositions] is [as follows]. If [the necessity converse] is not the case, then the possibility [converse] is true. The truth of the possibility [proposition] entails the possibility of the truth of the absolute [proposition]. For by necessity we mean here the most general meaning. However, the truth of the absolute [proposition] is absurd. So its possibility is absurd; and so the truth of the possibility [proposition] is [also] absurd. Determine, by analogy to this [case,] the explanation about the common conditional [proposition]. For the relation of the temporal possibility [proposition, which is the contradictory of the common conditional proposition,] to the absolute temporal [proposition] is like the relation of the [common] possibility [proposition] to the [common] absolute [proposition, as was just noted].

It is commonly believed that the necessity [proposition] converts to the perpetuity [proposition] and that the common conditional [converts] to the common conventional [proposition]. The conversion of the necessity [proposition] to the perpetuity [proposition] is proved [in the following way]. If we mentally determine that what is ridden by Zayd is limited to a horse, along with the possibility [that it may be] a donkey, then it would be true that, by necessity, nothing that is ridden by Zayd is a donkey. The necessity converse [i.e., “By necessity, nothing that is a donkey is ridden by Zayd”] would not be true. To this [argument] one responds that this [foregoing outcome] requires the separation of perpetuity from necessity with respect to those things that are universal. And owing to [this disagreement on the issue of necessity conversions,] they differed about the conversion of the two possibility [propositions]. Anyone who held the doctrine that necessity [propositions] convert like themselves, likewise held the doctrine of the conversion [of the possibility propositions like themselves]. And anyone who did not [hold it to be so], did not [hold the other to be so either]. Next, this difference [exists] only according to the opinion of the Shaykh. As for the opinion of al-Fārābī, well, their conversions to what is like them is agreed on.

On the [issue of the conversion of the perpetual negative proposition to itself], there exists a doubt of al-Rāzī in the *Mulakhkhhas*. [The doubt] is that writing is possible for man and that which is possible is perpetually possible. Otherwise, a transformation [of possibility into necessity or impossibility] will follow. Thus, perpetual negation is [something] possible. So, if [perpetual negation] converts [to itself], then “perpetually, nothing that is a writer is a man” will be true. And this [latter] is absurd. [This absurdity] does not follow by virtue of the
supposition that the possibility [actually occurs]. Otherwise, it would not be [the kind of thing that is] possible. So it must be by virtue of the conversion. The solution is that the possibility of perpetuity does not follow from the perpetuity of possibility. Don’t you take into account nonstable things whose possibility is perpetual and whose perpetuity is not possible? Do you doubt that the persistence of motion is impossible by virtue of its very self? Given this, it becomes clear that the eternity of possibility and the possibility of eternity do not entail each other. So take this [solution to heart]!

The two special [universal negative] propositions convert to two common [propositions], along with [the condition of] “nonperpetuity with respect to some [cases].” [This is so] because the nonperpetuity of the base [proposition] is equivalent to an absolute affirmative and it only converts to a particular [absolute affirmative]. If you reflect on our statement, “Nothing that is a writer is stationary, for as long as he is writing, not perpetually,” you will grow certain that the two [special propositions] do not convert to [propositions exactly] like themselves.

The rest [of the modalized negative propositions] do not have converses. For the most special of these is the temporal and it does not convert to a possibility [proposition] because of the truth of “Nothing that is a moon is eclipsed at a specific time [i.e., at the time of quadratures], but not perpetually,” along with the falsity of “Possibly, something that is eclipsed is not a moon.”

Among the particular negatives, only the two specials [—the special conditional and the special conventional—] convert. For these two convert to [modes] like themselves [i.e., to specials]. [This is so] because the two descriptions [i.e., of the subject and the predicate] mutually exclude each other with respect to the same underlying substrate, given the status of the first part [of the proposition]; [but the two descriptions] come together in [the underlying substrate at other times], given the status of the second part. So just as this underlying substrate is not B for as long as it is J, it is not J for as long as it is B. And this is what the sought conclusion is.

Among affirmative propositions, the two existential, the two temporal, and the common absolute [propositions] convert as common absolutes by a reductio and ekthesis [proof]. [The proof is as follows]. We suppose the substrate of the subject as something and predicate upon it the description of the subject and the description of the predicate. Then we say: let us suppose the J which is B as D; so D is B and D is J. So some B is J in actuality, via the third [figure]. [The proof] via conversion is that the contradictory of the converse converts, so as to revert to that which is incompatible with the original [posit].

The two perpetuity and the two common [propositions] convert to absolute temporals via the [various] aforementioned means. The two special [conditional and conventional affirmative propositions convert] as temporal, nonperpetuity [propositions]. As for [their being] temporal, well, this is because [temporals] are entailed by the two common [propositions] and that which is entailed by the common is detailed by the special. As for [their being] nonperpetuity [propositions,
well, if it were not so, then the tag would be perpetual. And so the predicate would be perpetual. Yet it had been supposed that it was not perpetual.\footnote{421} 

\textit{On Contradictory Conversion} 

\textbf{Section. 35.} Contradictory conversion\footnote{422} is to [take] the contradictories of the two extremes and to flip [their positions], while preserving the truth and quality [of the original proposition].\footnote{423} This is [the position of] the ancients. For the later [logicians] it is the making of the contradictory of the second [part] into the first [part] and [the making] of the first [part] exactly as it is into the second [part], while [generating] a difference in quality and preserving the truth [of the proposition].\footnote{424} In the sciences, it is the first [type] that is considered [to be suitable]. [As for conversions,] the case of the affirmatives is [the same as] the case of the negatives in straightforward [conversions] and vice versa.\footnote{425} The explanation of [these types of conversions] is the [same as the] explanation [for regular conversions].

Now there is a doubt from two perspectives. The first is that our statement, “Every nonjoining of two contradictories is what is not a participant with the Creator,” is true, although its [contradictory] conversion, “Every Participant with the Creator is the joining of two contradictories,” is false. You have to derive its truth as a $\textit{ḥaqīqī}$ [proposition]. So understand [this]!\footnote{426} [If this conversion is accepted,] then it would be possible for you [to claim] the entailment of the mutual truth of all impossible [propositions]. So impossibility would be one nonexistence, just as existence is one existence. [Thus] the permissibility of an absurdity’s entailment of another absurdity, in an absolute fashion, would be confirmed.\footnote{427} 

The second [doubt is as follows. First,] let us lay out a premise: it is “Whenever the existence of something does not entail the removal of an actual nonexistence [i.e., one that immediately precedes this existence,] it is perpetually existent.” Otherwise, its existence entails the removal of that nonexistence. So we say, our statement, “Whenever that which is generated exists, its existence entails the removal of a nonexistence in actuality,” is true. This converts, by means of this [contradictory] conversion, to that which stands opposed to the premise that was laid out.\footnote{428} The solution is to deny that there is a mutual exclusion between the two affirmative entailing [conditionals], even if their consequents are contradictories.\footnote{429} This [conundrum] is [called] the “doubt of entailment.” It has other presentations that shake [the ground under one’s] feet.

\textit{Syllogisms: Definitions} 

\textbf{Section. 36.} That which leads to assent is [called] argument and proof.\footnote{430} [In arguments and proofs] there must be a suitability [between the signifier and the signified] either by way of inclusion or by way of entailment.\footnote{431} [Proof] is limited to three [types].\footnote{432} Its underlying foundation is the syllogism,\footnote{433} which is a statement composed of propositions, from which, by virtue of their [very selves], another statement is entailed. By means of [this restriction of] “entailment by virtue of their
very selves,” [the logicians] excluded [from the category of syllogisms] those [syllogisms that conclude] by virtue of an extraneous premise.\textsuperscript{434} [1] Either [this extraneous premise] does not follow [from one of the premises of the syllogism.] as it is the case in the equivalent syllogism. This latter is composed of two propositions, wherein that which is related to the predicate of the first [proposition] is the subject of the other [proposition]. [An example is] “\textit{A} is equal to \textit{B}” and “\textit{B} is equal to \textit{J}.” From [this equivalent syllogism] follows—by means of [the extraneous premise,] “Everything that is equal to the equal of \textit{J} is equal to \textit{J}”—that “\textit{A} is equal to \textit{J}.” For when [this extraneous] premise—such as [a premise of] entailment or dependence—is true, then the conclusion is true. Where [the extraneous premise is] not [true]—as in the case of halving and duplicating—[the conclusion] is not [true].\textsuperscript{435}

The limitation [of proof to the three types] is not compromised by the exclusion [of the equivalent syllogism] because [a proof] leads [to assent] by virtue of itself.\textsuperscript{436} As for the case of [the aforementioned syllogism,] along with the [extraneous] premise, well, it reduces to two syllogisms, given that it is a syllogism in relation to the fact that \textit{A} is equal to that which is equal to \textit{J}.\textsuperscript{437} There is no proof that indicates that the [middle] term must be repeated in its entirety.\textsuperscript{438}

[2] Or [syllogisms may come about by virtue of extraneous premises that] are entailed [by the original premises, but] with contradictory terms.\textsuperscript{439} [An example is] your statement, “The nullification of a part of substance necessitates the nullification of the substance; whatever is not a substance does not necessitate the nullification of substance.” From this is entailed, by means of the contradictory conversion of the second premise, that “the part of a substance is a substance.”\textsuperscript{440} I do not know of a strong way of excluding this type [of syllogism from the category of syllogisms]. For [a contradictory conversion] is like the equivalent conversion, except that the mutual contradiction of terms makes it something very distant from nature.\textsuperscript{441} [Against this last point] there is a certain objection.

Next, if, [in the definition of syllogism], the entailment [of the conclusion] is taken with respect to the way things are given, then [the conclusion is also] in this respect.\textsuperscript{442} And if [its definition] is considered in accordance with [one’s] knowledge—and this is the more popular [view]—then the intended [sense of entailment] is [that the conclusion] obtains following on one’s grasping of [the fact that the minor term] is subsumed [under the middle term]. [This latter is] Avicenna’s doctrine. The [following of the conclusion upon one’s knowledge of certain facts] is [1] owing to [God’s] habit or [2] owing to causal generation. Or [it is by way of] the preparation [of the mind].\textsuperscript{443} [These are the three positions] according to the differences of the schools.

\textit{Types and Parts of Syllogisms}

37. [A syllogism] is exceptive\textsuperscript{444} if the conclusion or its contradictory is mentioned in it with respect to its form, [not just with respect to its matter]. Otherwise, it is a connective [syllogism]. If [the latter] is composed of plain predicative
[propositions], then it is a predicative [connective syllogism]. Otherwise, it is a conditional [connective] syllogism. The subject of the sought [conclusion] is called the minor [term] and that in which [the minor term is found] is the Minor [premise]. The predicate [of the sought conclusion] is the major [term] and that in which [the major term is found] is the Major [premise]. That which repeats is called the minor [term].

The proposition that is made a part of a syllogism is [called] a premise and its two extremes are [called] the two terms. The connection of the Minor with the Major is [called] a tie and a mood. The form and relation of the middle to the two extremes of the sought [conclusion] is [called] a figure. [When] the middle is the predicate of the Minor and the subject of the Major, [one gets] a first [figure syllogism]. It is called the first figure] because it is according to a natural ordering. [When the middle is] the predicate of both [the extremes, one gets] the second [figure], which is so close to the first [figure] that someone claimed it is obvious in terms of its producing a conclusion. [When the middle is] the subject of both [extremes,] one gets the third [figure]. [When a syllogism] is the converse of the first [figure, one gets] the fourth [figure]. [This latter] is very far [from the natural ordering], so that the two shaykhs dropped it from consideration. Each form reduces to the other by means of the conversion of that with respect to which it differs from it. There is no syllogism [formed] from two particular or from two negative [premises]. The conclusion follows the lesser of two premises with respect to quantity and quality, [as is discovered by complete] induction.

Conditions of Syllogisms

38. In the first [figure,] the affirmation of the Minor and the universality of the Major is a condition, so that [the minor may be] subsumed [under the middle]. There are sixteen possible moods for each figure. Here [in the first figure,] the condition of affirmation causes the exclusion of eight [moods] and the condition of universality [removes] four [moods]. So four [moods] are left: the two affirmatives, along with the two universals, which yield four sought [conclusions] by necessity. The fact of yielding four conclusions] is among the specific properties [of the first figure,] as is the [fact of yielding a] universal affirmative [as a conclusion].

Now there is a well-known doubt, which has two aspects. The first is that the conclusion depends on the universality of the Major and, conversely, [the universality of the Major depends on the conclusion]. [This is so] because the minor [term] is among [those things that fall under] the totality of the middle [term]. So this is circular. Its solution is that the expressed [form] depends on the compressed [form] and the judgment differs with respect to the differences of the descriptions [supplied by each term]. So there is no difficulty [here].

The second [doubt] is [the following]. Our statement, “The vacuum does not exist; everything that does not exist is not sensed,” which yields the conclusion
“the vacuum is not sensed”), even though the Minor is a negative [premise]. Indeed, whenever the negative relation is repeated, it yields a conclusion. Its solution (as it is said) is that [the Minor] is [actually] an affirmative negative-predicate [proposition and that] this is indicated by [the fact] that the negative relation is made a mirror for the instances in the Major.448 I say that it is up to you to prove, from this point on, that this affirmative [negative-predicate proposition] does not lead to the claim of the existence [of the subject, i.e., the vacuum]. So reflect on this!

In the second [figure, the condition is] that the two premises should be different with respect to quality and that the Major should be universal. Otherwise, differences [in the conclusions] will be entailed.449 [Differences in conclusion are] the proof of [a syllogism’s] sterility. So the two universals conclude as a universal negative. Those [premises] that differ with respect to quantity conclude as particular negatives by an ad absurdum [proof] and by means of the conversion of the Major or Minor, whereupon the ordering [of the premises is converted]; and then the conclusion [is converted].

In the third [figure, the condition is] that the Minor should be an affirmative and that one of the two [premises] should be universal. Thus the two affirmatives, either with the affirmative universal [as the Major] or with the [affirmative] universal [as the Minor], along with the particular affirmative, conclude as a particular affirmative. [And the two premises,] either when the universal negative [is the Major] or the universal [affirmative Minor], along with the particular negative [Major], conclude as a particular negative. [This comes about] either by means of an ad absurdum proof or by means of the conversion of the Minor or the Major, whereupon the ordering [of the premises is converted]; and then the conclusion [is converted]. Or [this comes about] by means of the reversion [of the syllogism] to the second figure, by means of the conversion [of both premises].

In the Shifāʾ, [it is said that] though these two [figures, i.e., the second and third] revert to the first, they still have a [special] property. [The special property] is that it is natural with respect to some premises that one of the two extremes is specified for subjecthood or predicatehood, such that, if [the premises] were converted, they would not be natural. Thus it may be that the natural arrangement comes about only via one of these two [figures]. So one cannot dispense with them. [Remember] this!

[The condition] in the fourth [figure] is that both [premises] must be affirmative and that the Minor must be universal; or [the condition is that] they must both differ [with respect to their quality] and that one of them should be universal. Otherwise, differences [in the conclusions will be produced]. So the universal affirmative, along with the four [other premises that are productive in the first figure], yields a conclusion; the particular [affirmative Minor produces a conclusion], along with the universal negative; the two [Minor] negatives [produce a conclusion], along with the universal affirmative [Major]; and the universal
negative [Minor], along with the affirmative particular [Major yields a conclusion]. [In these cases, the conclusion] is a particular affirmative, if there is no negation [in the premises]. Otherwise, [it yields] a particular negative, except with respect to one [of the moods], by means of an ad absurdum [proof] or by means of the conversion of the order [of the syllogism], after which the conclusion [is converted]. Or [the conclusion is derived] by means of the conversion of the two premises or of the Minor or of the Major.

Modal Syllogisms

39. As for [the conditions of productivity] in view of the mode in mixed [syllogisms], well, in the first [figure], the actuality of the Minor [is a requirement,] according to the doctrine of the Shaykh. [This is so] owing to [the explanation] that has preceded.\(^450\) He and the Imām [Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] held the position that the common possibility [Minor] yields a conclusion, because it is a possibility [premise], along with [any] Major [premise]. So it is possible [for the possibility] to be actual, along with [the Major]. For no absurdity is entailed from the supposition of [a possibility as] actuality. So the conclusion is entailed.\(^451\)

It is sometimes responded that the possibility of the existence [of a thing], along with [another thing], is not entailed by the existence of the possibility of [that] thing with the other [thing]. Do you not see that it is possible that the actualization of the Minor may nullify the truth of the Major? [This response has] a critique.\(^452\)

At other times, [the challenger responds by] precluding the entailment of the conclusion on the determination of the actualization [of the Minor. This is so] because the judgment in the Major [applies] to that which is the middle in actuality with respect to the way things are given. So reflect [on this]!\(^453\) The truth is that to take possibility in the most particular sense is [to take it as the] equivalent of absoluteness, [in the same manner] as perpetuity is equivalent to necessity in the most general sense.\(^454\) So the conclusion follows; otherwise, it does not. Next, the conclusion will be like the Major [in terms of its modality,] if [the Major] is not among the four descriptive [propositions].\(^455\) Otherwise, [the conclusion's mode] will be like the Minor, [though] the restriction of existence and of the necessity that is specific to the Minor would be dropped from it. To the [conclusion] would be added the restriction of existence [that is found] in the Major.\(^456\)

In the second [figure, the conditions are the following]. [1] The Minor must be a perpetuity [premise] or the Major must be [one of] the negatives that converts and [2] the possibility [premise must occur] with the necessity [premise] or the Major [must be] a conditioned [premise].\(^457\) The conclusion is a perpetuity [proposition], if [one of the premises has] perpetuity. Otherwise, [the conclusion will have the mode of] the Minor, [though] the restriction of existence and necessity [found in the Minor] is dropped [from the conclusion].\(^458\) There is a critique [of this position].\(^459\)
In the third [figure, the conditions are] what [they are] in the first [figure]. The conclusion is like the Major [in its mode] in those [cases] in which it is other than the [four] descriptives. Otherwise, [the mode of the conclusion] is like the [mode of the] converse of the Minor, with the restriction of nonperpetuity [found in the converse] dropped from [the conclusion], and [the restriction] of the nonperpetuity [found] in the Major added to [the converse]. You will come to know the status of the mixed [modals] in the fourth [figure] in the lengthy works.

**Conditional Syllogisms**

40. Next, the conditional [syllogism] is composed of two conjunctives or two disjunctives or a predicative and a conjunctive or a predicative and a disjunctive or a conjunctive and a disjunctive. The four figures are produced from them and the foundation [of these five types] is the first [type].\(^{460}\) The natural one is that wherein the two premises share a complete part.\(^{461}\)

The conditions for yielding a conclusion and the state of the conclusion in [the conditional] are as they are in [connective syllogisms formed of] attributives. That two entailing [conditional propositions] yield an entailing [conditional] as a conclusion is obvious. Now, there is a doubt. It is that it is true that “Whenever two is odd, it is a number; and whenever [two] is a number, it is even” though the conclusion [“whenever two is odd it is even”] is false. Its solution is as it is said, [namely,] that the Major is precluded from being an entailing [conditional]; it is only a chance [conditional].\(^{462}\) [To this solution] the response is given that our statement, “Whenever it [i.e., two] is a number, it [i.e., two] exists,” is an entailing [connective conditional], because the numberness [of two] depends on the existence [of two]. Likewise [is the case of our statement,] “Whenever it [i.e., two,] exists, it is even.” Thus, given your own claim, this yields as a conclusion what you precluded.\(^{463}\)

I say [in response to the foregoing] that you should preclude the Minor [from being accepted as valid]. For we do not concede that the numberness of the odd two has existence as its cause, because things that are impossible are not caused.\(^{464}\) And [you may] preclude the Major [from being accepted] on the basis of the fact that the general does not entail the particular, because the existence of the odd two falls within the totality of the existence of two.\(^{465}\) Indeed, [this Major premise] is true as a chance [connective conditional]. If you hold fast to [two's being even] as among those things that are the necessary concomitants of the quiddity [of two], then the truth of the supposed conclusion entails its falsity with respect to this answer. So ponder [this]!\(^{466}\)

As a solution [to this doubt], the Shaykh chose, on the basis of his opinion [i.e., that an absurd antecedent does not entail a true consequent], that the Minor is false.

I say, our statement, “Whenever two is not a number, it is not odd,” is true as an entailing [connective]. For the nullification of that which is general entails the
nullification of that which is particular. [Then] by means of contradictory conversion, it converts to that Minor. Given this, the weakness of the doctrine [of the Shaykh] becomes obvious. The truthful answer is that it is precluded that falsity [exist in the given] conclusion, given that it is allowed that two mutually exclusive things may entail [each other]. The rest of the investigation [of these points] is

*Exceptional Syllogisms*

41. The exception [syllogism] is composed of two premises—a conditional and a positive or negating [premise]. The conditional must be an affirmative entailing or an excluding [type]. Either the conditional or the exception [must] be universal. With respect to the conjunctive [conditional premise,] the positing of the antecedent [as the second premise] yields as a result the positing of the consequent. [This is so] because the existence of that which entails entails the existence of that which is entailed. [However,] the converse is not the case, because that which is entailed may be more general [than that which entails]. [Again, with respect to the conjunctive conditional,) the negation of the consequent [entails] the negation of the antecedent. For the nullification of that which is entailed entails the nullification of that which entails. [However,] the converse is not the case.

There is a doubt [concerning all this; indeed,] it is said that it is extremely difficult to resolve. [The difficulty is] that the [consequent’s] negation may not entail the negation [of the antecedent] owing to the fact that it may be impossible for that which is entailed [i.e., the consequent] to be nullified. So, if [this impossibility of the consequent’s nullification] were to be actual, no entailment would remain [between the antecedent and the consequent], along with [this actualization]. So the entailment of the nullification of that which entails [i.e., the antecedent] would not be entailed. I say [that] its solution is that, [in] reality, entailment [means] the impossibility of the disengagement [of two things] at all times. So the time of disengagement—that is, the time when entailment ceases to remain—is included in [that] totality [of time]. So [the time of] this preclusion [of *modus tollens*] reduces to [the time of] the preclusion of the entailment, though [this entailment] was already supposed [as given]. This is absurd.

In the disjunctive [conditional], the positing [of a side of the disjunction] yields the negation [of the other side], as [in] the anti-joining [disjunctive]. The negation [of one side yields as a conclusion] the positing of the other, as [in] the anti-empty [disjunctive]. The real [disjunctive] yields the four conclusions.

*Compound Syllogism*

42. A compound syllogism—with explicit conclusions or implicit [conclusions]—[comprises several] syllogisms. Among [compound syllogisms] is the ad absurdum. It is that in which is intended the affirmation of the sought [conclusion] by
means of the falsification of its contradiction. This [syllogism] reduces to the connective and exceptive [syllogism].

**Induction**

43. Induction is a proof in which, on the basis of the status of the many, something is proved about the totality. [An example is] your saying, “Every animal moves its lower jaw when it chews, because man and horse and cow and other [things] that we have encountered are such.” [Induction] only gives mere belief because it is possible [that a falsifying case] has not appeared. [In this example, such a case] is as it is said about the alligator. 476 Claiming [that the universal] binds [all the particulars] is not necessary, as [it is found] in the doctrine of al-Sayyid [al-Jurjāni] and his followers. 477 Otherwise, [induction] would proffer certain resolve, even if the [resolve in an induction] is grounded in [the mere] claim [that the same judgment applies to the unknown cases]. Indeed, [in induction,] positing the claim [that] most [of the instances are such and such] is necessary, because belief follows that which is more general and which overwhelms [that which is the lesser case]. For this reason, the judgment [in the induction] remains [valid] as it was, [i.e., as a universal,] for that which is other than the alligator. 478

Now, there is a doubt. [Let us] suppose that there are three people in a house—two Muslims and one non-Muslim—but it is not known exactly which particular one [is Muslim and non-Muslim]. So, each one that you see should be believed to be Muslim, on the basis of the rule regarding majorities. 479 Then, whenever you are certain that two precise ones of them are Muslims, you are certain that the remaining one is a non-Muslim, based on the [original] supposition [that two of the three are Muslims] and the [principle] that the belief in that which entails entails the belief in that which is entailed. So it would follow that each one of them is believed to be a non-Muslim and this nullifies that which was originally asserted, [i.e., that each one would be believed to be a Muslim]. 480

Its solution is that, when that which entails is two things, the fact of its belief entailing the belief in that which is entailed requires the belief that both of the [former two] obtain together. [It is not suitable] that each one of them should be believed [to obtain] separately. 481 The second [i.e., the belief in each one being a Muslim separately,] does not entail the first [i.e., the belief in each two being Muslims together]. And that which obtains is the second. So there is no difficulty. Reflect [on this!]

I say [that this response may be] challenged [in the following manner]. The existence of the third [i.e., the existence of the two together,] is entailed by the existence of the two [separately]. So the former obtains just like the latter. If you say that that which obtains of the third [i.e., the two together,] is that between whose individual [cases] there is separation—[as such,] it is taken into account [with reference to its parts,] one by one—[whereas] that which entails is the consideration of the individual [cases] taken together. 483 then I say that that which entails
certainty [with respect to the outcome] is the certainty in the third, [i.e., the existence of the two parts] in an absolute sense. Both types, [i.e., overwhelming belief and certainty in that which entails,] entail.

However, it may be said that there is no difference in the two forms of the certainty that entails owing to the absence of something that necessitates the separation [between the parts]. Rather, the difference [between these two forms] by virtue of [mental] consideration. However, that with which we are concerned, [i.e., overwhelming belief,] well, it is other than this. So ponder [this!]

**Analogy**

44. Comparison is to prove something about a particular on the basis of [another] particular by virtue of something shared [between them]. The legal scholars call it analogy. The first [particular] is the root; the second is the branch; and that which is shared is the cause that joins [them]. There are [various] ways of establishing that something is a cause [of the sort mentioned above]. The foundational [aspects of this are two. The first] is concomitance and it is called copresence and coabsence. It is the tie [between two things] with respect to existence and nonexistence. They say that concomitance is an indication that that which stands as the base is a cause [of the judgment] that revolves [about it]. The second aspect is repeated examination. It is called classification and successive elimination. It is to probe the attributes [of the root] and to nullify some of them, so that the rest may be specified [as the cause]. [Analogy] offers mere belief. The details are in [books of] legal theory.

**Principles of Demonstration**

45. The disciplines [related to assent] are five. The first is demonstration. It is a syllogism that has premises that are certain. [These premises] are derived from the intellect or are transmitted. For transmission may give certain [knowledge]. Of course, pure transmission [without any foundation in and dependence on reason] is not like this. Certainty is a firm conviction that is unshakeable and that corresponds to that which is actual.

The principles [of demonstration] are [as follows]. [(1) The first is] primary propositions, which are those with respect to which the intellect has firm resolve, owing to the mere conceptualization of the two extremes; [this conceptualization may be] a priori or theoretical. [Primary propositions] differ [from each other in that some are] obvious and some are obscure. That the a priori ones are a priori is [as obvious as the fact that] to know is to know [that one knows] is among [primary propositions]. And this is the correct [view].

[(2) The second principle is] propositions that are dependent on one’s natural orientation. These are those [propositions] that need a tie [between the two
extremes] that is not absent from the mind. They are called propositions whose syllogisms are [found] alongside them.493

[(3) The third principle is] propositions related to things witnessed. [These are obtained] either by means of the external senses—and these are [(3a)] sensible propositions—or by means of the internal senses—and these are [(3b)] internally induced [propositions]. Among the latter are [(3b1)] estimative [propositions that relate] to things that are sensed [externally]494 and [(3b2)] those [propositions] that we discover in ourselves without the means of our [external sensible] instruments.495 The truth is that the senses do not offer anything except a particular judgment. Those who deny that they offer [even a particular judgment] are deaf and blind.

[(4) The fourth principle is] intuited propositions. This is the occurrence [to the mind] of ordered principles all at once. [In the case of these propositions,] no witnessing [of sensibles] is necessary, let alone the repetition [of such witnessing, contrary to] what is said. For sought conclusions that are [purely] intellective may be intuited.496

[(5) The fifth principle is] propositions based in experience. [For these propositions] there must be a repetition of an act, so that one may have firm resolve [in accepting them]. Some [logicians] disputed whether they are among the propositions of certainty, just as [they disputed about whether] intuited propositions [are certain].

[(6) The sixth principle is] propositions that are universally circulated.497 [These] are the reporting of a group such that the intellect determines their collusion in the fabrication [of the report] to be impossible. The determination of a [specific] number [of reporters] is not a condition [for such reports]. Rather, the determining factor is a numerical limit [of reporters] that offers certainty. It is necessary [in such propositions that they] end with the senses and that there be an equality [of the number of reporters] in the [whole range of the transmitted report], the ends and the middle [included].498

These three [propositions, i.e., those intuited, those based in experience, and those universally circulated,] may not be elicited as proofs against someone unless he shares [in believing these propositions, along with the opponent].

One of them limited the [classification of] primary certain [propositions] to a priori [propositions] and propositions related to things witnessed. And he has a certain reason [for doing this].499

Types of Demonstrations

46. Next, when the middle [term] is a cause for the judgment in actuality, then a demonstration propter quid [occurs]. Otherwise, a quia demonstration [occurs], whether [the middle term] is an effect [of the joining of the extremes] or not.500 [When it is an effect, the quia demonstration] is called a proof.501 A proof on the basis of the existence of the effect of something that it has a cause is [still a
demonstration] *propter quid.* [An example is] your statement, “Everybody is composed; everything that is composed has something that composes it.” [That this is a demonstration *propter quid*] is correct. For in a *propter quid* demonstration the fact of the middle’s being a cause for the existence of the major for the minor is what is taken into account. [The middle’s being a cause] for the existence of the major in itself [is not taken into consideration]. There is a big difference between [the first and the second consideration].

There is a doubt [about the division of demonstration into these two types. The doubt] is that the Shaykh held the doctrine that certain knowledge of that which has a cause does not obtain except with a view to [the knowledge of] the cause. That which does not have a cause is either obvious in itself or is such that any explanation of it with respect to certainty is to be abandoned. Is this not but the razing of the palace of *quia* demonstration? The solution is that perhaps his intention is that universal knowledge—and this is perpetual certainty—is either obvious with respect to the cause or obvious with respect to itself. Particular knowledge may come about by necessity or by means of a demonstration other than the *propter quid.* So reflect [on this!]

**Dialectics**

47. The second [discipline related to assent] is dialectics. It is composed of commonly accepted [propositions] that are judged [by the intellect to be valid]. [Their validity is] [granted] owing to the agreement of [people's] opinions [on a given matter] because of the concern with general welfare or the sympathy or pride in one's heart or moral or humoral influences. [These propositions] are true or false. Because of this, it is said that humoral constitution and habits have a role to play in beliefs. Each people have their specific commonly accepted [propositions]. Sometimes [these kinds of propositions] get confused with primary [propositions] and they are distinguished [from them] when [the intellect] is freed [of its contents]. Or [dialectics is composed] of propositions that are merely granted to be true by two opponents, such as a legal scholar’s granting that the command [form indicates] obligation. The objective [of dialectics] is to force the opponent [to one's position] or to defend [one's own] opinion.

**Rhetoric**

48. The third [discipline related to assent] is rhetoric. It is composed of accepted opinions that are taken from one about whom one holds a good opinion. [Such a person can be from among the] friends of God and sages. Anyone who counts that which is taken from prophets, upon them be peace, to be among [such propositions] has made an error. [Or rhetoric is composed] of propositions presumed to be true which are judged [to be valid] owing to the preponderant [possibility of their truth]. Among the latter are included propositions based on experience,
intuited propositions, and universally circulated [propositions] that have not reached the point of being resolutely believed. The aim [of rhetoric] is to cause those things to obtain that are beneficial or harmful for earthly or otherworldly life. [This is] as the rhetoricians and orators do.

_Poetics_

49. The fourth [discipline related to assent] is poetry. It is composed of image-eliciting [propositions]. These are propositions whereby one is made to imagine [something], so that the soul is affected in being sad or happy. For [the soul] is more submissive to the imagination than it is to assent, especially when [poetry] is in accordance with a fine meter or is recited with a sweet voice. The objective [of this discipline] is to affect the soul, [so that] it is caused to be attracted to or to flee from [something]. [This effect] is like its conclusion. 506

_Sophistics_

50. The fifth [discipline related to assent] is sophistics. It is composed of estimative propositions, such as “Everything that exists can be pointed out.” The soul is subservient to the [faculty of] estimation. So estimative [propositions] are sometimes not distinguished by the soul from primary [propositions]. Were it not that the pure intellect defends against the judgment of the estimative [faculty], the confusion [between the two types of propositions] would be perpetual. Or [sophistics] is composed of those propositions that resemble true ones either in form or in meaning. [An example of propositions that resemble true ones in terms of their meaning is] when things that are extramental are taken to be mental or vice versa. 507 The objective [of sophistics] is to cause the opponent to fall into error. Sophistry is more general [than sophistics]. For the former is false either in terms of its form or its matter. 508 If a sophist confronts a philosopher [with sophistry], then the former is [called] a philosophaster; if he confronts a dialectician [with it], then [he is called] a disturber of the peace. [Remember] this!

_Final Thought_

51. That [argument,] which is composed of the superior and inferior [types of propositions, falls in the category of the] inferior [type]. 509 So figure this [out!]

_Conclusion_

52. The parts of the sciences are [only] the problemata. The principles are among the means [whereby one resolves the problemata]. 510

_END_
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. I do not use the expression “Indian” to refer to nation-state boundaries. I use it interchangeably for South Asia and as a shorthand for those domains that were under direct or indirect Mughal suzerainty at some point in the history of the region. This, too, should not be interpreted as a connotative concession to contested categories, but only as a way to set up a vague regional referent.

2. The so-called Niẓāmī curriculum was, properly speaking, a method of scholarly training. I do not use the expression to indicate a rigid set of texts or classes. For further discussion, see Ahmed, “Dars.”

3. One may, for example, conveniently read El-Rouayheb, “Myth”; El-Rouayheb, “Status”; Ahmed, “Logic”; Ahmed, “Systematic Growth”; and Ahmed, “Post-Classical.” One of the earliest demonstrations of dynamism in the discipline of astronomy during the so-called period of decline is supplied in Saliba’s History; and it is passionately argued by him in Saliba, Islamic Science, esp. chapter 7. In the field of philosophy and philosophical theology, an early call to reassess the narrative, along with important preliminary observations, is found in Wisnovsky, “Nature”; in the field of logic, we were set on the right path by the meticulous work of Tony Street in such articles as “Outline,” “Arabic Logic,” “Avicenna and Ṭūsī.”

4. See Ahmed, “Systematic Growth”; Ahmed, “Post-Classical.” For the premodern period, detailed and direct accounts of the social, institutional, and political contexts for the production of philosophical and logical works are generally rare. Therefore, relevant work of this sort often has to be accomplished inferentially, by analogizing with the evidence from the modern period and occasional anecdotes from the premodern period, as well as by the reconstruction of narratives out of atomic and dispersed data in the historical sources. In addition, the intricacies and internal logic of the technical aspects of rationalist
disciplines are sufficiently rich for one to be able to theorize about the architectonics of the text as a function of its social and institutional life. These limitations may be contrasted with the material available for a fuller social history of the reading and writing practices of literary and historical sources for premodern Islam (Hirschler, *Written Word*) and for the integrated social and intellectual history of commentarial practices for other disciplines, such as *hadith* (Blecher, *Said the Prophet*).

5. Commentaries in Muslim and non-Muslim traditions served a number of functions, many of which were connected to pedagogical ends. These included the elucidation of difficult passages, lexicographical clarifications, identifications of authorial citations, editorial interventions, introduction of headings, interlinear translations, pictorial representations, and so on. Such practices were often meant to be useful tools for engaging the hypotext in the context of study. However, they generally did not contribute to commentarial lives as diachronic dialectical spaces, which is the main point of entry into my theoretical investigations into the *Sullam* tradition. On some of these functions of commentaries, see the articles assembled in Ahmed and Larkin, eds., *Ḥāshiya*. See Bruckmayr, “Phenomenon,” on translation as dynamic “shadow commentary” and on alternative sites of commenting; this article also discusses the pedagogical use of tables in the context of commenting.

6. In a certain fashion, these commitments are echoed in Compagnon, *Le Démon de la théorie*, 20ff.

7. There is indeed no paucity of a robust and dynamic internal literary history and criticism that stretches across the full chronological range of the tradition(s). To track some of these contributions, one may, for example, look at the works of the premodern scholars studied recently by Harb, *Arabic Poetics*; some samples of such works are available in Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics*, and numerous studies have appeared on the subject. Modern and contemporary scholars who write in non-Western languages from an internal vantage point include, for example, Fārūqī, (*Shiʿr*), ʿAbbās, (*Tārīkh*), and Nayyar (*Lisâniyyât*). Discussions of important topics, such as authorial attributions, and theoretical reflections on the discursive functions of Arabic poetry are also evident in such works. For example, Ťāhā Ḫusayn's discussion of poetic attribution to pre-Islamic figures is grounded in his understanding of religious and political partisanship during the early history of Islam; he explains in his work why such misattribution took place and points out that early critics were skeptical about the survival of much pre-Islamic poetry. Similarly, Adūnīs offers a sweeping history of the transformation of the discursive functions of Arabic poetry from pre-Islam to modernity in his *Muqaddima*. However, these discussions and works are mostly concerned with literary history and criticism, not with theory, as a second-order disruptive reflection on established categories of analysis. The discussion of *sariqa* (often translated as plagiarism), however, is more in line with what I have in mind. Although such contributions are also concerned with the aesthetic principles and expectations that would render such an act blameworthy or praiseworthy, they can easily be extended to reflect on how authorship, genre, and originality were conceived by various participants in the tradition. See Ḫusayn, *Fi al-Shiʿr al-jāhilī*, 247ff. and von Grunebaum, “Plagiarism,” 234 (where a brief survey of classical views is offered and briefly analyzed): “From all indications it is evident that originality played a very considerable part in the formation of the Arabs' literary judgment. It is no less evident, however, that the Arabic concept of originality, and hence the concept of plagiarism as well, do not coincide with those that have been current in the West for the
last three or four centuries." My notions of the growth of the lemma and of tahqiq (below) overlap with this view. A model theorization of authorship, originality, and genre is presented in Kilito, Author; he grounds himself fully in the Arabo-Islamic tradition. In recent years, some scholars of Arabic and Islamic Studies have theorized textual practices, as I define theory here and for reasons that I have outlined, on the basis of premodern sources of the tradition. See, for example, Behzadi, "Polyphony" (esp. page 10, where concerns with Eurocentrism are articulated). I will refer to some other relevant works below.


9. This is to be contrasted with the standards of education in the madāris of Cairo between the seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries, when the study of the rationalist disciplines appears to have been limited; the same appears to be the case in West Africa. See Berkey, Transmission, 12–14; Hall and Stewart, “Curriculum.” However, further investigation is required to confirm these initial impressions. Cf. El-Rouayheb, “Mubārakshāh.”

10. Both the dates of al-Yazdī and his alleged student, ʿAbdallāh al-Tulanbī, are given variously in the sources. Though I have not investigated the matter further, there is a distinct possibility that these discrepancies are the product of narratives meant to establish scholarly authority. On this phenomenon in the rationalist disciplines, see al-Rahim, Creation, 15–23.

11. One might note, for example, Walter Young’s work on proto-jadal theory found as early as the Kitāb al-Umm of al-Shāfīʿī. This theory was not shaped by the Organon, and it contributed to the emergence of the classical disputation theories. The latter, in turn, developed further in interaction with the logical tradition into the postclassical ādāb al-baḥth works. The case of Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī (d. 684/1285), a literary theorist, is similar; he placed the traditions of classical Arabic poetics in conversation with the poetics of Aristotle (via al-Fārābī and Avicenna) to generate a new theoretical system. See Young, Dialectical and Heinrichs, Arabische Dichtung.

1. THE LADDER OF THE SCIENCES AND ITS COMMENTARIES

1. Although formally and as a matter of principle there are differences among these types of hypertexts, in practice, they are often irrelevant. In this regard, see the very helpful comments by Barakātī in ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, al-Qaww (2–4). See also Gutas, “Aspects” (34), on the fluidity of such terms that describe various forms of commentary for the classical period. And see the broader observations of chapter 2 below that help substantiate this choice. Recently, Van Lit has attempted a general definition of commentary in terms of what he calls the "structural textual correspondence" among cases of written output. I am sympathetic to this approach as a way of organizing data, but I limit my analysis to those cases that he would put under the category of the “restricted commentary tradition.” I cannot be certain that the theory of the commentary presented in this book would also apply to the larger categories he mentions. See Van Lit, “Commentary.”

2. A number of other works on logic were important in India. These included the Shamsiyya of al-Kātibī (via al-Taḥtānī’s commentary), the Tahdhib of al-Taftāzānī (especially via the commentary of al-Dawānī and the supercommentary of al-Harawī), the Risāla
\[fî \, t-tašawwur \, wâ-t-tasdiq\] of al-Taḥtānī (especially via the commentary of al-Harawi), al-Abhari's Īsāghūjī (via the commentary attributed to al-Jurjānī), the Badi' al-mīzān of ʿal-Abdallāh al-Tulanbī (on the Mizān al-mantiq), and the Kubrā and Şuhrā of al-Jurjānī. On the latter two texts and the question of attribution to al-Jurjānī, see El-Rouayheb, Development, 87ff. See also ʿArshī, Catalogue, 242ff., as well as Ahmed, “Logic.”

3. Not all commentaries on the Sullām were complete; nor were all of them designated as shurūḥ. The earliest commentarial efforts were generally applied to the entire text of the Sullām. Thereafter, three gateway commentaries and some of their leading supercommentaries defined its reception. The commentary of Mubārak, for example, is on the entire text, but it is mainly engaged for its disquisitions on epistemology and ontology; the commentary of Ḥamdallāh was devoted only to the section on Assents (though see below for further comment). Its thrust is concerned mainly with the theory of mental objects, and commentaries on it, even when complete, tend to be immersed in this topic. The commentary on Ḥasan is only on the Conceptualizations. Although it shares various aspects with the first two, it appears to reduce the space devoted to issues not traditionally considered to belong to the field of logic. Details about the production of these commentaries and their supercommentaries are below.

4. See, for example, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, Ḥall; and Muṣṭafābādī, Tahqīq.

5. On Rafīʿ al-Qadr’s (Rafīʿ al-Shaʾn) imperial ambitions, see Faruqui, Princes, 312–13.


7. The Farangī Maḥallī scholarly tradition began in Sihālā and, in the late eleventh/seventeenth century and with an imperial bequest, was located to Lucknow when its fountainhead was murdered. Its system of education, called the Dars-i Niẓāmī, became pervasive in the Subcontinent and continues to be the framework of madrasa education in South Asia today. The scholars of this tradition trace their intellectual lineage to the Shirāzī circle of scholars (on whom, see Pourjavady, Philosophy; Ahmed, “Logic”). For studies of the intellectual networks and careers of Farangī Maḥallī scholars, see Malik, Gelehrtenkultur; Robinson, ‘Ulama.

8. See Ahmed, “Sullām”; Ahmed, “Philosophy”; Ahmed, “Logic.” Al-Bihārī is mentioned by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq (Sudda, 2v) as a student of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Sihālāwī; the author then states, “Rather, he was a student of his student.” This latter must be al-Shamsābādī (about whom see also Lakhnawi, Nuzha 6:785).

9. See Ahmed, “Logic,” 323ff., where a number of trees representing these intellectual genealogies are presented. On the Dashtakī circle of scholars, see Pourjavady, Philosophy (especially, the introduction).


11. For further details about al-Jawnpūrī as a channel to Dāmād’s works, see Nair, “Muhībballāh.”


13. See Ahmed, “Jawnpūrī.” See also al-Sahāranpūrī’s introductory comments to his collection of Mubārak’s self-commentary on the Sullām, fol., 1v.


15. The commentary of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq (Sudda, 2) calls it an abridgement (Mukhtaṣar). But an abridgement (as the term implies) of which earlier text(s)? As we will observe below, the Sullām advanced logical doctrines culled from a broad base of the preceding logical
and philosophical tradition in the form of an organically unified, concise, and inventive text; this new text was often a patchwork of various voices, as we will see in chapter 2 below. On the Mukhtasār as a genre, “a condensation which follows for the most part the wording of the original,” see Gutas, “Aspects,” 35. As he points out, however, the various genre terms are fluid; fixing a meaning to them is often a futile exercise.

17. Al-Sā’inpurī, 2v.
19. Firūz, Sirāj, 2v.
23. Lakhnawī, Nuzha 6:831.
24. His date of death is given as 1187 AH in Lakhnawī, Nuzha 6:695.
26. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq, Sudda, 2v–3r.
28. El-Rouayheb, Development, 188ff.; Ahmed, “Logic,” 235; Lakhnawī, Nuzha 6:734. On the impact of al-Harawī on the reception of the Mawāqif of al-Ijī in India, see Ahmed, “Mawāqif.” It is unlikely that Mubārak had studied directly under al-Harawī, given the age difference between the two scholars. What is more likely is that the former’s teacher, Muḥammad Sāliḥ, had studied with him. On this topic, see Raḍā, “Qāḍī Mubārak.”
31. As Qāḍī Mubārak notes, the project was begun while he was a student; this is a claim that squares with the curricular practice of writing commentaries as part of one’s training. ‘Arshi (Catalogue 4:386–87) states that the work was completed in 1730, sixteen years after the reign of Awrangzīb. This must be a miscalculation.
33. Muḥammad Amīr was the qāḍī of Gūpāmaw. The same post was also held by Mubārak’s brother, ‘Abd al-Ḥanī. See al-Lakhnawī, Nuzha 6:752, 6:807.
34. ‘Arshi, Catalogue 4:386ff.
35. See the introductory comments by al-Sahāranpurī, Minhuyāt.
36. See chapter 2 below.
37. Al-Lakhnawī, Nuzha 7:989. Other later cases are mentioned at 8:1189 and 8:1201.
38. Al-Lakhnawī, Nuzha 7:1106.
39. This must have taken place before Ahmad Shāh’s accession to the throne, which occurred in 1748, a year after Hāmdallāh’s death. See “Aḥmad Shāh,” EI2.
41. ‘Arshi, Catalogue 4:376–77. In one instance, Mullā Ḥasan’s commentary on the Taṣawwurāt of the Sullām has been misidentified in a catalog as Ḥamdallāh on the
Taṣawwurāt. These types of errors are possible given the overlap of commentarial expressions. See the witness, *Manṭiq ʿArabī*, 103 Nadwat al-ʿUlamāʾ, Lucknow. The opening lines of the commentary by Ḥamdallāh, as supplied by ʿArshi, for example, share expressions with Mubārak’s commentary.

42. ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, *Islāmī*, 33.


52. That a number of commentaries were written for the benefit of students is easily verifiable. For example, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy (*Hall*, 254) points out that when his student reached the discussion of the absolutely unknown, he composed a short treatise to overcome its difficulties. Furthermore, the remarks at the end of Turāb ʿAli’s commentary on Ḥasan by Wali Muḥammad intimate that the commentary was composed for the benefit of students. See ʿAlī, *Taʿlīqāt*, 174ff.

53. Where possible, I have placed each author in the century in which he died and relative to those who came before and after him. I have not tried to place authors within specific years or decades, although I have made some general effort at approximation. When the death date of the author was unknown, I have determined the position in relation to others for whom we do have such information. At times, the dates of composition have been helpful, especially when no further personal information has been available. More specific dates are available in the body of this chapter; the trees are only meant to give a visual sense of the clustering of commentaries and of the networks that produced them.

54. I do not mean to suggest that the tradition had explicitly determined either that the *Sullam* itself should not be studied directly or that it should only be studied in view of the positions expressed by these gateway commentaries. Rather, I mean to say that these commentaries exercised significant influence in the reception history of the *Sullam*, such that they were engaged by other commentaries of the same order and were the subject of a large number of second-order commentaries. A large part of the explanation for the rise in the status of these commentaries lies in the dense scholarly networks that perpetuated them. The phenomenon is somewhat similar to that of al-Rāfiʿī and al-Nawawī, on the one hand, and that of al-Ramlī and Ibn Ḥajar, on the other, in relation to the reception of Shāfiʿī law. However, unlike the latter case, the *Sullam* tradition is not concerned with questions of authority on formally-articulated grounds. See El-Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya.” For the rationalist disciplines, the importance of scholarly genealogies in shaping exegetical traditions is discussed by Wisnovsky (“Genealogy”) with reference to the reception of the *Ishārāt* of...
Avicenna. Just as in some cases of the second phase of commentarial writing on the Sul-lam, the commentaries on the Ishārāt after al-Ṭūsī were inflected by the weight of scholarly lineage. Yet, as we will observe below, several such lineages were available to the Sullam tradition; many competed with each other; and in a number of cases, because of horizontal commentarial influences, genealogy did not always deter duly critical approaches. As a contrast to the Ottoman case, the Sullam gateway texts were not chosen via an imperial process of canon formation. For Ottoman canonization practices, see Burak, “Reliable Books.”

57. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 6:304; Catalogue Bankipore, 76. Ḥasan had become the leading scholar of Lucknow after the departure of his father’s paternal cousin, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, for Shāhjahānābād amid rising sectarian tensions (see below). Ḥasan took a trajectory very similar to Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, departing Lucknow in the 1760s, also in response to rising sectarian tensions. After seeking royal support with limited success in Fayḍābād and Shāhjahānpūr, he eventually arrived in Rampur and received the patronage of Nawwāb Fayḍ ʿAli Khān. This is where he died.

58. See Ahmed, “Baḥr,” EI3, to which the details above offer some correctives.
63. Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:442. Mubin is the main commentarial lens that is used in part III for commenting on the Sullam. The modern scholar, ʿAbd al-Salām Khān (Barr-i ʿAGHīr, 51) makes a very useful observation about the study of commentaries in the Dars-i Niẓāmī: “Because [Mullā Mubīn’s] commentaries and glosses have the particularly distinguishing characteristic that they make the hypotext truly easy, my teachers would tell me not to have recourse to them when engaging in deep reading (muṭālaʿa) the base text. The reason is that the effort required in extracting the intention of the original text—which is the real objective of deep reading—thereby disappears. [My teachers] used to say [as a pun], ‘Don’t look at Mubīn!’ [Mubīnrā mabīn]!” On deep reading and its methods, especially as discussed in treatises devoted to the subject, see El-Rouayheb, Intellectual, chapter 3. With reference to the Dars-i Niẓāmī and the place of commentarial reading and writing within it, El-Rouayheb’s insightful observations about the shift from orality to textuality with the rise of deep reading require some modulation. As written mediums, the hypotexts and hypertexts were meant to guide and exercise the reader as a master would, in the oral medium, to resolve various conundrums. In other words, the texts were to remain sufficiently elusive and allusive, in order to require the independent effort of the reader; but they were capable of giving directions to the reader to resolve difficulties of various grades and natures. The commentary perpetuated an oral presence within the written text as a substitute for the dialectical space of the oral/aural. This conclusion is borne out not just in the forthcoming chapters but also in the remarks of various observers about the methods of teaching in the curriculum. For example, Nadwī (Hindīstān, 103) notes that the main concern of the so-called Niẓāmī curriculum was to create the capacity in the student to investigate and engage in deep reading. Those who studied the curriculum while using methods of verification (tahqīq) would not have command in any specific discipline but would emerge so as to be able to become
specialists in any discipline in their future efforts. He then writes, “Mullā Niẓām al-Dīn’s method was such that he would not be concerned with the particular aspects of the books; rather, he would take the books as a means (dharīʿa) to training in the discipline.” This same method of training, for example, was adopted by his son, Bahr al-ʿUlūm, in the teaching circle of Kamāl al-Dīn al-Sihālawī. In a related episode, Bāballāh al-Jawnpūrī (see below) was tested by Niẓām al-Dīn on some problemata. He gave a taḥqīq of arguments for and against them. In other words, taḥqīq was the deployment of an independent effort that was cultivated by muṭālaʿa to articulate positions and proofs for and against a given position and its arguments. This method was guided by the very nature of the commentarial texts set down for this purpose, as we will observe below. See Ḥāshimi, Tadhkira, 53ff. The same ideas are expressed in Ṣiddiqi, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 24. For a historical study of decisive shifts toward textualization from orality between the fifth/eleventh and tenth/sixteenth centuries, see Hirschler, Written Word, esp. chapter 3. Although Hirschler’s topic mainly relates to the popularization of reading and writing practices, his overall analysis, especially insofar as it concerns curricular transformations, is broadly relevant for understanding the emergence of a writerly culture in the setting of the madrasa.

64. ʿArshī, Catalogue 4:304. A manuscript of his gloss on Mīr Zāhid al-Harawī’s (d. 1101/1689–90) commentary on the Risāla quṭbiyya of Taḥtānī, found in the Rampur Raza Library, is dated 1154/1741. This gives some indication of the age of the author and suggests that the commentary on the Sullam could conceivably have been composed in the 1730s or 1740s.

67. Henceforth, I shall refer to the commentators simply by the name of the author, as is traditionally the practice in South Asia.

68. See Malik, Gelehrtenkultur, 532; Ṣiddiqi, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 26–30.
69. Al-Lakhnawī, Nuzha 7:936.
70. Fuyūḍ al-Raḥmān, Mashāhīr, 242.
71. Khān, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 79.
72. Al-Lakhnawī, Nuzha 8:145, 8:1163, 8:1186.
73. Some other authors also appear in the margins of the lithograph: Qāḍī Mubārak; Mawlānā Muḥammad ʿAẓīm; Mawlānā Faḍl-i Ḥaqq; Mawlānā ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq; and Zulfī. I have not been able to identify the last scholar (some have been mentioned above and others will be discussed in detail below). The remaining commentators did not actually comment on the Sullam Bahr al-ʿUlūm (some in fact preceded the author). Rather, as was the practice in the preparation of such collected commentaries, the editor took their commentaries on other traditions of the Sullam and creatively applied them to suitable passages from Bahr al-ʿUlūm. This phenomenon of deploying the past in the service of the future text complicates our understanding of the practice of commenting and authorship. The same phenomenon is visible in the lithograph print of Ḥamdallāh’s commentary that appears with al-Qandahārī’s glosses (see below). In this regard, the introductory comments of ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm b. Aminallāh in his commentary on Ḥasan (see below) are also instructive. The commentator informs us that his uncle, Muḥammad Yūsuf (see below), had written a commentary on Ḥasan that had opened up the meanings of its hints and obscurities. Then a student asked him to write a commentary. The author complied with the request and,
following an editorial effort, added to the commentary the various earlier notes. Thus, the commentary of ʿAbd al-Ḥalim was itself a compound of his own expressions and notes mixed with those of his uncle. It is, therefore, instructive to observe that the same lithograph of this work appeared once under a modern cover that lists ʿAbd al-Ḥalim as the author and once under the authorship of Muḥammad Yūsuf (see bibliography).

74. The only modern edition of a premodern commentary on the Sullam is this very work (see bibliography). As we will see below, the historical reception of the Sullam Qāḍī Mubārak, the Sullam Ḥamdallāh, and the Sullam Mullā Ḥasan was far more robust and pervasive.

75. Khān, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 35.
76. ʿArshī, Catalogue 4:376–78.
77. Perhaps the madrasa was named after the famous one in Shīrāz that was part of the legacy of the Dashtakis.

80. The commentary does not appear to have survived in its entirety. Marginal notes are found in the Rampur Raza Library (MS 3408/10289D).

82. Khayrābādī, Khayrābād, 50.
83. Khān, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 31.
84. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 6:696.
85. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:1035. See also Khayrābādī, Dār, 17ff.
86. Wisnovsky (“Nature”) gives the date of death as 1231/1815.
87. Tīhrānī, Dharī ʿa, 1: 2824
88. Ḥakīm Sharīf was trained by sons of Shāh Walīallāh, and his intellectual lineage does not appear to intersect with scholars generally associated with the transmission and study of the Sullam. See Speziale, “Khān.”

89. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7: 63, 235, 798.
90. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:171.
91. On Dildār ʿAlī’s political theology, see Rizvi, “Faith Deployed.”
92. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:186.
93. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:954; Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Sharḥ, 90. For further comments on the patronage they received and the establishment of Shiʿi madāris at their behest, see Cole, 204ff.

94. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:373. A number of his students were Kākūrawīs. See al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:932, 7:957, 7:1046.
95. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:995.
96. Mufti Ismāʿīl was also known as al-Landanī, since, after occupying the post of the qāḍī of Lucknow, he was sent to England as an ambassador. See al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:916.
100. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:120, 7:134.
102. Al-Lakhnawi Nuzha 7:1075, 8:1220; Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Sharḥ Sullam, 93.
103. Al-Lakhnawī *Nuzha* 7:938.
104. Al-Lakhnawī *Nuzha* 7:1082.
105. Al-Lakhnawī *Nuzha* 7:936.
106. He was a first-order commentator on the *Sullam*. See below.
110. Al-Lakhnawī, *Nuzha* 8:74. The commentary of Ilāhī Bakhsh constitutes another among many examples of compounded commentaries expressed by the agency of a single author. This commentary, published in lithograph form at the behest of Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. al-Ḥājj, contains within it a large number of commentaries by earlier scholars. In several cases, after commenting on a passage, the author explains that he has supplied a synopsis of the position of a particular scholar, along with some changes and additions. The sigla at the beginning of the book mention the following commentators who were culled for this work. As we will note, for example, in the case of al-Qandahārī below, a number of these earlier commentators did not actually write on Ḥamdallāh, although their contributions were used by Ilāhī Bakhsh in his commentary on the latter. Firūz, Bahr al-ʿUlūm, ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq, Mūbīn, Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Jawnpūrī, Mubārak, ʿAbīm, al-Labkānī, ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm al-Lakhnawī, Ḥakīm Sharīf Khān, Asadallāh al-Panjābī, Turāb ʿAlī, Ḥaydar ʿAlī b. Ḥamdallāh, Qāʾim ʿAlī, Ghulām Yahyā, Bābālāh al-Jawnpūrī, Nūr al-Ḥaqq al-Rāmpūrī, Sirāj al-Ḥaqq al-Rāmpūrī, ʿĀlam (sic) Sandilāwī, Dīlār ʿAlī, ʿĀlam (sic) Sandilāwī, and Aʾzām ʿAlī all appear in the commentary. The commentary also uses two anonymous commentaries—commentaries on the *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd* and the commentary of Taḥtānī on the *Maṭāliʿ* of al-Urmawī. See Ilāhī Bakhsh, *Sharḥ*.
112. A copy of the *Sullam* in the Khuda Bakhsh Library, Patna, was prepared from the copy of a scholar by the name of Fayḍ Ahmad. See *Catalogue Bankipore* 21:71.
113. Al-Lakhnawī, *Nuzha* 7:1066, 8:171. His students included a number of Shiʿī scholars.
114. ʿArshī, *Catalogue* 4:384–85. The work was initially completed in 1250/1834 and rewritten in 1261/1845 for the author’s sons.
116. Late antique commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon* were also often written with a view to the curriculum in the context of student training. And, as in the case of Ḥamdallāh, the practice cut across denominational lines. See Adamson, “Aristotle.”
117. For a helpful summary account of the intellectual genealogy and contributions of the Khayrābādīs, see Qādirī, *Khayrābādiyyāt*.
119. On the scholars of Tonk, many of whom contributed to the rationalist disciplines, see Khān, *Tadhkira*. A detailed intellectual biography of Barakāt Aḥmad, whose father was the physician to Nawwāb Muḥammad Wazīr Khān (r. 1250/1834–1282/1865) of Tonk, was written by his grandson: see Barakātī, *Barakāt*. It was during the nawwāb’s reign that maʿqūl scholars began to arrive in the principality. See Khān, *Ṭārikh-i Tūnk*, 80.
112. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1344.
113. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:970.
114. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1180.
115. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:383. The madrasa was established in 1188/1774; its first head was Bahr al-`Ulum. See Islam, `Ulamā-yi Rāmpūr, 43.
116. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:989. Shihāb al-Dīn lived to over a hundred, so that his training under Bahr al-`Ulum, who died when he was at least twenty-seven years old, is not unlikely.
118. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:889, 7:1048, 7:1124. See Khān, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 54, where some of the scholar’s writings are also mentioned.
119. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:1127.
120. His commentary on Mubārak was published in lithograph form in 1262/1846. See `Alī, Al-Ta’liq.
121. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1305.
122. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:970.
123. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1180.
125. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1344.
126. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1180.
128. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:889, 7:1048, 7:1124. See Khān, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 54, where some of the scholar’s writings are also mentioned.
129. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:1127.
130. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1284, 8:1293. Prior to his teacher Muḥammad Yūsuf, `Abd al-Ḥalām had taught at the same madrasa for about ten years and produced a number of students. See Jawnpūrī, Tārīkh, 89ff.
131. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:995.
132. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:995.
133. Fuyūḍ al-Raḥmān, Mashāhīr, 3.
134. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 7:948, 7:1004, 7:1107, 8: 1284, 8:1293. Prior to his teacher Muḥammad Yūsuf, `Abd al-Ḥalām had taught at the same madrasa for about ten years and produced a number of students. See Jawnpūrī, Tārīkh, 89ff.
137. Fuyūḍ al-Raḥmān, Mashāhīr, 2.
138. Al-Lakhnawi, Nuzha 8:1322. Ṣādiq appears as Ṣiddīq in the lithograph version of this work, published with additional commentary by `Ubaydallāh al-Qandahārī in 1424/2003 in Quetta. See Mubārak, Majmūʿa, 2.
139. Ibn Fidāʾ, Ḥāshiya, 3.
140. Fuyūḍ al-Raḥmān, Mashāhīr, 11.
141. Ibn Fidāʾ, Ḥāshiya, 31ff.
143. Fuyūḍ al-Raḥmān, Mashāhīr, 88.
144. Fuyūḍ al-Raḥmān, Mashāhīr, 330. See Balyāwī, Diyā’. This commentary was highly influential and is regularly used in South Asian madāris.
145. See above and Ahmed, “Logic,” as well as the summary trees above.
146. Šāh al-Hayy, Islāmi`ulūm, 359.
147. Nūrānī, Faḍl-i Ḥaqq, 18ff.
149. Al-Lakhnawi (Nuzha 8:1263, 8:1189) mentions that he taught Mubārak in Bhopal. The sources also mention that Sulṭān Aḥmad b. Šāh Bakhsh al-Qandahārī, who was born and raised in Qandahār, studied under a certain al-Qāḍī Muḥammad Nūr al-Qandahārī, who was a commentator on Mubārak. Sulṭān Aḥmad later arrived in Khayrābād to study under Šāh al-Haqq al-Khayrābādī. Although I have been unable to identify his teacher,
the connection with Afghan scholars to the legacy of Mubārak, as noted in this section, is intriguing. See al-Lakhnawi, *Nuzha* 8:1235.


151. See Nuʿmānī, al-*Tuḥfā, alif*.


153. Three premodern Indian commentaries are said to have been written on the *Ufuq*—by Faḍl-i Imām, by Faḍl-i Ḥaqq, and by Bahr al-ʿUlūm, who was known to teach Mubārak to his students. All commentaries engage only a small portion of the base text. Manuscripts are found at the Rampur Raza Library (3636/11468D, 3639/8121M, 3640/4713D). I have not come across the commentary on the work by Faḍl-i Imām that is mentioned by Qādirī (*Khayrābādiyyāt*, 23).

154. I will say more on the *Ufuq* and its relation to the *Sullam* below. It was taught by Faḍl-i Imām, his son, his grandson, and the latter’s student Barakāt Aḥmad.

155. We recall that Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq was one of the earliest commentators on the *Sullam*. Mubīn’s own commentary on the *Sullam* was written at the behest of Wāli allāh b. Ḥābiballāh.

156. Al-Lakhnawi, *Nuzha* 7:1135; See El-Rouayheb, *Development*, 192. Ḥasan’s defense of al-Dawānī’s position on the Liar Paradox, noted by El-Rouayheb, however, was already available in Mubārak’s commentary.


158. Al-Lakhnawi, *Nuzha* 7:1075


161. See al-Lakhnawi, *Nuzha*, 8: 1354, where the date of death is given as 1035/1626. This is an obvious transposition of the numbers. It appears this way in Khān (*Barr-i ṣaghīr*, 80).


165. Khān, *Barr-i ṣaghīr*, 45. As we will observe below, although the earliest commentaries on the *Sullam* generally engaged the entire work, starting in the late twelfth/eighteenth century, commentarial work, both in the first and second order, generally began to be limited to the section up to the conditionals. Where commentaries did address the entire breadth of the *Sullam*, the focus remained entrenched on issues of propositional semantics, especially insofar as they related to questions of ontology. This was partly the result of the *Sullam*’s own orientations and partly those of the commentators. I present an overview of such features of the *Sullam* in the next chapter. The trend to comment up to the section on conditionals was sustained until the modern period, especially in the Urdu commentaries produced for the express purpose of training students. Şiddīqī (*Barr-i ṣaghīr*, 28) makes the insightful observations that “Mullā Ḥasan, Ḥamdallāh, and Qādī Mubārak are books on logic. However, most of the investigations in these works pertain to theology and metaphysics, such as divine knowledge, simple production, compound production, the extramental existence of the natural universal, mental existence, etc. Mullā Jalāl [al-Dīn al-Dawānī’s commentary on the *Tahdhib*] is considered to be a book that inspires deep discussion, but within the curriculum, its greater part is devoted to a commentary on the preface. And this part relates mainly to those expressions that the author has written in praise [of God and the Prophet].” As I will explain below, many of these topics relate to the *Sullam*’s concern with
paradoxes of propositional semantics that depend on what the subject term can capture. As such, these metaphysical questions constitute the general orientation of the Sullām.

166. Khān, Barr-i ṣaghīr, 53; Khān, Abjad 3:264.
168. Fuyūḍ al-Rāḥmān, Mashāhīr, 11.
169. I have not been able to gather further information about the intellectual genealogy of this scholar. His commentary is titled Inṭāq al-fuhūm; it was published by the Maṭbaʿ-yi Mujṭabāʿi in Delhi in 1322/1904. The note on the back of the publication indicates that the commentary was written precisely so that it may accompany the publication of the Sullām. We noted a similar case with Muḥammad Ilyās al-Pīshāwāri, who worked for the same printing press. See ʿAbd al-Bahāʿ, Inṭāq, last page (unnumbered).

170. For a history of the Dār al-ʿUlūm, including the departure in its institutional and curricular features from earlier madāris, see Metcalf, Islamic Revival, 87ff.

171. Fuyūḍ al-Rāḥmān, Mashāhīr, 129.
173. Fuyūḍ al-Rāḥmān, Mashāhīr, 394.
174. Fuyūḍ al-Rāḥmān, Mashāhīr, 376.
175. This commentary is called the Ḍūmām al-fuhūm, and it was published between 1947 and 1961 in Dhaka by the Imḍādiyya Library. See al-Pīshāwāri, Ḍūmām.
176. On the rise of Urdu and its adoption for religious writing and training in the late thirteenth/nineteenth century, especially among Deobandi scholars, see Metcalf, Revival, 206ff.

177. Multānī, Badr al-nuṣūm.
179. Sītāpūrī, Mīzān al-ʿulūm.
180. Ḥamīd al-Rāḥmān, Kashf al-ʿulūm.
182. In making this claim, I do not take into account the various anonymous Persian lexical interventions found in many witnesses of the Sullām’s commentarial tradition. Various lithographs and manuscripts in Indian libraries also include anonymous glosses that obviously cannot be part of this narrative.

183. This break in continuity in the tradition of the Sullām, for example, is to be contrasted with the intensification of commentarial activity in the disciplines of Ḥadīth and Qur’ānic exegesis among the scholars of Deoband. The commentarial work in such disciplines can be explained partly with reference to the defense of the Ḥanafī madhhab, a concern that was shared among scholars connected by master-disciple networks. For further details, see Zaman, “Tradition.”

184. See El-Rouayheb, “Revival.”
185. See chapters 3 and 4.

2. THE LADDER OF THE SCIENCES: CONTENTS AND ORIENTATIONS

4. For a general intellectual biography, Van Ess, “Träume.”
6. For a list of Indian commentators on these works, see ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, Islāmī, 352ff.
7. ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, Islāmī, 352ff.
8. Würsch, “Abdallāh al-Tulanbī.” The idea that he studied under ʿAbdallāh al-Yazdī should be reconsidered in view of their death dates.
12. The details may be gauged from the headings in the translation of part III of this book.
13. As noted above, the commentarial tradition of the Sullam is generally more invested in questions of epistemology and propositional semantics, especially as the latter relate to the subject term of propositions; it is much less absorbed in the aforementioned topics.
16. al-Yazdī, Tahdhīb, 64.
17. Al-Siyālkūṭī on al-Jurjānī, Shurūḥ al-Shamsīyya 2:2. I shall not comment here on the commentarial debates about whether it is to the statement or to the speaker that truthfulness and falsity apply. See, for example, al-Siyālkūtī on al-Jurjānī, Shurūḥ al-Shamsīyya 2:4.
18. Taṭānī, Sharḥ al-Maṭāliʿ, 46
20. The Liar Paradox has a long history in the tradition of Arabic logic. I focus here quite narrowly on those texts that were known to be part of al-Bihārī’s textual milieu. Other than these, a number of pre-Sullam treatises on the Liar are collected in Dawāzdih risālih dar pārādūks-i durūghgū, in which al-Dawānī and al-Dashtaki figure prominently. Other discussions are brought to light in Miller, “Brief History”; Alwishah/Sanson, “Early Liar”; and Alwishah/Sanson, “Al-Taftāzānī.” The latter, as we will see, will be relevant for this discussion.
21. As we will note below, the commentarial tradition raises the question whether the compressed form of the proposition is still a proposition, given that the latter must have a certain number of parts. The Sullam’s assertion that the proposition is only complete by means of three things (part III, section 24) is understood by some of the tradition to mean that it cannot have more than three parts. In such cases, it is understood that when taken as a report, a proposition always consists of three parts—the subject, predicate, and existential copula. When this same report is taken as that about which something is reported, it need not consist of the existential copula. These matters are nicely summarized in Ajmīrī, “Baḥth.”
23. In this case, “entailed by” is not a logical operator. Less idiomatically, one would state, “This proposition (subject) is (copula) that which is entailed by that proposition (predicate) [hādhihi l-qadiyya lāzim tilka l-qadiyya].”
27. The idea that a proposition can report about another proposition, and that, in principle, it can also be its own subject, had already been expressed as early as al-Ṭūsī. The solution of the latter scholar, however, does not employ the notions of expressed and compressed considerations of the proposition in order to overcome the problem of self-referential. The Liar is problematic, he asserts, because it claims truth and falsity in a case where there are no two distinct things—a report and that about which there is a report. Again, al-Bihārī’s primary effort is to show that such a distinction can be produced in view of the compressed and expressed considerations of the statement. See Alwishah/Sanson, “Early Arabic Liar,” esp. 120–22.
29. Al-Dawānī, Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb, 39v. See also Rezakhany, “Solution.” This condition for counting something as a report is to be distinguished from the condition that it cannot be neither true nor false, as presented, for example, by Sainsbury (Paradoxes, 111ff.) as a potential explanation for the defect in the paradox.
30. Mubīn, Mirʾāt 1:104.
31. See Rezakhany, “Solution,” where he mentions several other self-referential statements posited by al-Dashtakī that al-Dawānī would be forced to accept. For example, “Every statement is either true or false” is a statement that falls in the class of statements. In making a claim about all statements, this statement is also making a claim about itself as a member of the class. The Sullam itself does not name al-Dawānī in the course of this discussion; however, as a guide to its inner meanings, al-Bihārī’s self-commentary makes the target explicit. See Mubīn, Mirʾāt 1:103.
32. See Rezakhany, “Solution,” where al-Dawānī is reported to accept “Every praise belongs to God” either as a report or a performative. The distinction between the two rests on the former’s being a report about something actual; the latter is not such. In Quine’s terms, the solutions of al-Dawānī and al-Bihārī would both point to their understanding of the paradox as veridical. The idea here is that an absurd conclusion is established here by virtue of sound arguments. The seeming absurdity, in turn, forces one to investigate the underlying propositions and assumptions. In the case of al-Dawānī, as in the case of the barber paradox discussed by Quine, the paradox simply proves that reports of the Liar sort are not reports at all. On the other hand, al-Bihārī’s analysis exposes a finer distinction among propositional types that accommodates the validity of the conclusion. See Quine, “Ways.”
33. The solution offered is reminiscent of the one proposed in a very different context by Bhartṛhari (fl. fifth century CE), a scholar who wrote in Sanskrit. Appealing to the intention of the speaker, he argues that in the course of making a statement or of cognition, the very statement and the cognition cannot become their own objects. The texts under consideration here, however, do not appeal to intention and address. See Houben, “Bhartṛhari’s Solution.”
34. As Rezakhany has shown, this criterion is actually not cited by al-Dawānī in his other writings on this issue. Instead, the main challenge he records is that the report must be about an actual relation (nisba wāqiʿiyya). Since the Liar fails to report on such a
relation—rather, it generates the relation in the course its production—it cannot be a statement. Intriguingly, al-Dawānī produces an account of al-Ṭūsī’s solution to the paradox where the demand for an essential difference between the report and that about which it is a report is mentioned. This is precisely what is mentioned in al-Dawānī’s analogy with the sketch quoted above and is fulfilled by the Sullam’s solution. See Rezakhany, “Solution.”

35. Having stepped into the implicit dialectical space of the lemma, Mubīn ultimately rejects the solution offered by the Sullam. See Mubīn, Mir ‘āt 1:104.

36. See Ahmed, “Postclassical” and the observations by Street, “Ḥillī,” 280–82.


38. See part III, section 29.

39. This observation becomes a central element in Mubārak’s critique wherein he claims that a compressed proposition does not have a relation, so that it is not actually a proposition. This is refuted, in further extensions of the commentarial exercise, by Ḥasan. The latter points out that the subject, predicate, and relation are all distinct realities that may not be one and the same by virtue of themselves. The fact that they are taken to be one, i.e., considered together in one instant, or taken distinctly, i.e., sequentially, does not change their nature. Since the compressed proposition has all three elements, it is still a proposition. Having overcome Mubārak’s challenge, he then goes on the refute al-Bihārī by pointing out that the compressed proposition requires that about which it is a report. This can surely not be the expressed proposition itself, as this would result in circularity; nor can it be another compressed proposition, because this will result in an infinite regress. Thus, that about which it reports is its very self, and it is this line of argument that now allows him to revert to al-Dawānī’s position. See ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm, al-Qawl, 99ff. For a study of debates about the number of parts of propositions, see El-Rouayheb, “Proposition.”

40. Al-Sāʾinpūrī also points out that “All praise belongs to God” is not a parallel case, so that its rejection as a report is acceptable. Unlike later commentators such as Mubin, he does not reject the Sullam’s solution.

41. Fīrūz, Sirāj. The manuscript does not list page numbers, but the discussion immediately follows the lemma.

42. Fīrūz, Sirāj. The quotation is on the immediately following page.


44. See part III, section 28.


47. Barakatallah, *Raf*', 37n.3. In this same footnote, he points out that this technical term (*hisā*), is new and that it is different from the usage of the majority. As we will note below, the origins of this usage predate the *Sullam* and its commentaries, and it is ultimately this innovative source that was responsible for the fecundity of the commentarial work on this lemma. The slippery concept is summed up by Turab 'Ali, *Ta liqāt*, 51n3: “This [dis-course], though it is clear, is not devoid of subtlety.”

48. See, for example, the further division of the universal in accordance with what is real [*bi-hasabi l-haqiqa*] into the *shakhs*, *fard*, and *hisā*, in Bahar al-*Ulūm, Sharh Sullam*, 148, marginal note by Muhammad Ilyas. Further extended challenges to the division are found at Tunki, *Ta liqāt*, 50–51. Barakatallah (Raf', 37n2), in the course of his detailed discussions, points out that the debates about the nature of the *hisā* are rampant. The greatest investment into the issue at this juncture is found in Khayrabadi, *Ḥāshiya*, 88ff.

49. Al-Khayrabadi, *Ḥāshiya*, 88ff. The italicized statement is al-Khayrabadi’s direct reference to Ḥamdallah’s discussion.


54. Al-Siyaluki on al-Jurjani, *Sharh al-Shamsiyya*, 32, 38. Unfortunately, I did not have access to Al-Siyaluki’s third-order commentary on the *Maṭāli‘*, although I suspect that much of the reference in the commentarial tradition of the *Sullam* to his commitments comes from his third-order commentary on the *Shamsiyya*. Unlike the latter, by the seventeenth century, the *Maṭāli‘* had become a minor logic text in India. Moreover, al-Siyaluki on the *Maṭāli‘* could be read via al-Siyaluki’s third-order commentary on the *Shamsiyya*, where he refers to it quite frequently. In the course of the relevant discussions, various commentators also refer to al-Siyaluki’s third-order commentary on the *Shamsiyya*; they rarely refer to the commentary on the *Maṭāli‘*. See the references in Mubin, *Mir‘at* 2:92, 95 and to Muhammad Ilyas in Bahar al-*Ulūm, Sharh Sullam*, 145, marginal note.


57. See for example, part III, section 19, note 91, 95 (the eminent scholar), section 29, note 245, 264, 265; Mubin, *Mir‘at* 1:55, 107, 2:74 passim.


59. See Mubin, *Mir‘at* 1:127, 149, 164. Some references to Avicenna come via the intermediate of al-Tahtani’s commentary on al-Urmawi’s *Maṭāli‘*, which constitutes an important backdrop to the *Sullam*’s formation. This is surprising, since, to the best of my knowledge, al-Tahtani on al-Urmawi had ceased to be the most significant curricular text in India by the time the *Sullam* was composed. See Mubin, *Mir‘at* 2:116.

60. See Mubin, *Mir‘at* 1:66, 98, 131, 179; 2:5, 8, 10, 67, 80, 87, 88, 111, 121, 122, 125, 129, 140, 143, 196, 204. On the importance of al-Khunaji for the formation of the
logical tradition, see El-Rouayheb, “al-Khûnajî”; on Mîrzâ Jân al-Shirâzî, see Pourjavady, “Bâghnawi.”

61. See, for example, Mubîn, Mir’ât 2:54–55, 80, 108–9, 132–33 (theology), 2:8–9, 1776–77, 218–19, 221, 229 (legal theory). See also Mubârak, Kitâb Sullam, passim, for extended discussions of divine knowledge. See also El-Rouayheb, “Theology” for a broad historical overview of the relationship between the mutakallimûn and manâṭiqû in the Islamic tradition.

62. On the commentarial inflection of the hypotext in view of its own philosophical moment and concerns, see Ahmed, “Postclassical.”

63. Majmû at al-Sullam, 2 (in margins).

64. Again, as I noted above, this is a phenomenon that requires some investigation, since Dāmād was not included in the Dars-i Nizâmi. The Ufuq, however, was studied among the Khayrâbâdîs as an additional part of the standard curriculum. The latter tradition, however, postdates the Sullam and Mubârak. See Qâdirî, Khayrâbâdiyyât, 29; there the Ufuq is mentioned as an advanced logic text in the Khayrâbâdî tradition.

65. Explicit and implicit references to the Ufuq are found, for example, on the following pages of Mubârak’s commentary (in ’Ali, al-Ta’lîq): 24–25, 63, 92, 124, 153, 191.

66. Part III, section 20 (on universals).

67. In the sense that the fact of being compounded/a composite requires an agent, so that what is compounded is neither necessary nor impossible.


69. A number of scholars mentioned above, such as al-Tahtânî, al-Dawânî, and al-Jurjânî, are also embedded within his discussions.


71. See al-Jawnpûrî, Shams, 130.

72. The commentary of Baḥr al-‘Ulûm covers a greater tract of the hypotext than al-Khayrâbâdî’s, although the questions it immerses itself in are the same. The latter’s commentary covers the discussion only though the introductory comments on simple production and the semantics of the predication of existence, ending with comments where the text reads: “From the principle of simple production issue extensions that are the foundations of the most difficult problemata of philosophy.” See Dâmâd, Musânnafât 2:17; al-Khayrâbâdî, Hâshiyat al-Ufuq, 365. The manuscript is incomplete, so it is not clear to me how much more of the hypotext was engaged by the author.

73. See Ahmed, “Postclassical” Baltussen makes similar observations about the broader philosophical programs that guided the mature phases of Late Antique philosophical commentaries. The aim was to seek philosophical truth in the process of hypertextual work, not merely to explicate the hypotext. See Baltussen, “Ancient Philosophical Commentary.”

74. See Ahmed, “Postclassical,” as well as below.

75. See part III, section 4.

76. Part III, section 17.

77. Part III, section 4.

78. Part III, section 17.

79. See part III, section 17, and the commentary offered there.

80. See part III, section 20.
82. Mubīn, Mirʾāt 1:161.
83. See Mubīn, Mirʾāt 1:161.
84. Mubīn, Mirʾāt 1:161.
85. See Fazlıoğlu’s important contribution (“Reality,” 25), where further equivalents, based on Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī’s (d. 751/1350) Maṭlaʾ-ḫusūṣ al-kilam fi maʿānī fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, are given. The idea that it is the Active Intellect is expressed, for example, by al-Ṭūsī. See also al-Ḥillī, Kashf, 104.
86. Mubīn, Mirʾāt 1:161.
88. This interpretation of the term overlaps partly with the analyses presented in some literature (see Fazlıoğlu, “Mentality,” as well as Hasan, “Foundations,” which latter was kindly brought to my attention by Robert Morrison). However, it is also meaningfully distinct from them, especially with reference to the Sullam tradition. For example, I do not disagree with Fazlıoğlu’s thesis that “nafs al-amr was considered to encompass that which is true in both the extramental and mental worlds.” However, if the claim is meant to cover post-Jurjānī developments, then the further qualification that nafs al-amr is “an objective world comprising ultimate reality” is not sufficiently fine-grained; such an ultimate reality, for example, may guarantee the truth of a propositional claim whose contents may themselves be false. As we will observe, the Sullam tradition does not always accommodate the idea that “certain mental entities and judgments, such as falsehoods, do not exist in nafs al-amr. For instance, the statement ‘the number five is even.’ This judgment does not exist in nafs al-amr despite the fact that it is a conceivable mental judgment.” As we will witness in detail below, taken as given posit, such statements not only exist fi nafs al-amr, but they can also be subjects of second-order propositions that may, therefore, be true fi nafs al-amr. Put differently, although the contents of such propositions may be false fi nafs al-amr (that is their first-order frame of reference), once posited, they are real and propositions about them can be true—and both fi nafs al-amr. Fazlıoğlu’s interpretation is grounded partly in his understanding of some versions of the key phrase “maʾa qāʾiʾ n-nazār ‘an kulli iʿtibārīn wa-fardīn” in various sources, such as ‘Ali Ṭūsī (d. 887/1482). The relevant and key passage from the latter source is the following: “inna nafsā l-amr maʾānīhu nafsu sh-shayʾ fi ḥadda ḥāṭīhi ʿalā anna l-amra huwa sh-shayʾu nafsuhu fa-idhā qulnā sh-shayʾu kadhā fi nafsī l-amr kāna maʾānīhu annahu kadhā fi ḥadda ḥāṭīhi wa-maʾā nā kawhihi kadhā fi ḥadda ḥāṭīhi anna ḥāḍhā l-ḥukma lahu layṣa bi-iʾtibārī l-muʾtabir wa-fardī l-fāriḍ bal law quṭiʾa n-nazārā ʿan kulli iʿtibārīn wa-fardīn fa-hāḍhā l-ḥukm thāḥitun lahu sawāʾun kāna sh-shayʾi mawjūdan fi l-khārīj aw fi dh-dhihin.” Fazlıoğlu renders it in the following manner, which requires some critical emendations: “The meaning of nafs al-amr is the identity of something in its essence, per se, ‘the amr’ being the thing itself. Thus if we say: this something is in nafs al-amr, it means that it is thus in its essence, per se. The meaning of its being thus in its essence, per se, is that this judgment regarding it is not due to someone making a mental construct nor to someone putting forth an assumption; indeed even if thought were cut off from every mental construct and assumption, this judgment [regarding the thing] would still be fixed whether the thing exists externally or in the mind.” I translate the passage in the following manner: “The meaning of nafs al-amr is ‘the very thing within the ambit/scope of its very self’ in [the sense] that the matter is the very thing itself. For if
we say, ‘This thing is such and such fi nafs al-amr,’ its meaning is that ‘This thing is such and such within the ambit/scope of its very self.’ And the meaning of its being such and such within the ambit/scope of itself is that this judgment [that it is such and such] belongs to it not owing to the [mental] consideration of someone and the [mental] supposition of someone; rather, [the judgment belongs to it] if one disregards each [mental] consideration and [mental] supposition. Thus, the judgment would exist for [this thing] whether this thing exists extramentially or in the mind.” The emphasis here is on the issue of taking the mental consideration into account in passing the judgment. Thus, although a proposition such as, “The number five is even” is a product of mental consideration, judgments about this proposition or about the conceptualization of the number five as even, given as such, would be true fi nafs al-amr once this proposition or conceptualization is taken in virtue of its very given and posited self, i.e., without a view to the fact of consideration. In this regard, the translation of fi haddi dhātihi as “in respect of its own definition” (in Hasan, “Foundations,” 182) also requires reconsideration: the Arabic phrasing does not naturally accommodate it—the idiomatic manner of putting it would be “in virtue of its very self,” as in “al-kalima taẓallu wasilatan . . . wa-laysat ghāyatan bi-haddi dhāṭīhā/discourse is a means, not an end in virtue of its very self”—and the fact that it would always presuppose an object prior to the mind’s working does not explain how propositions such as “The square circle is impossible” are true fi nafs al-amr. For the subject term has no verifying criterion, prior to being posited, in virtue of which the proposition would be true or false fi nafs al-amr. Further, the aforementioned proposition is not true “in respect to its own definition,” but it is true within the scope of its very given self. See Fazlıoğlu, “Reality,” 26–28; and Hasan, “Foundations,” 179ff., for a detailed analysis of the concept up to and including al-Jurjānī.

89. See part III, section 26.
90. See part III, section 26.
91. See part III, section 26.
92. As noted above, this move relies on the principle that the denial of the absolute is also the denial of the restricted.
95. See part III, section 26.
96. Reading tadullu for yadullu.
98. The foregoing analysis might suggest that the Sullam tradition inclines toward abandoning realism and thereby the traditional theory of truth by correspondence. I would caution against such a conclusion. Rather, in a certain way, the Sullam is geared toward expanding the scope of what Putnam calls the ready-made world, not endorsing the idea that it is the description (or mental manipulation) of the item of correspondence relative to which the latter is said to have intrinsic properties. When the mind posits an item, it exists also as a given (nafs al-amr) relative to a frame, e.g., a mentally determined restriction on the subject. Once the item-cum-frame populates the realm of the given, certain propositions are true and false of it intrinsically by the logic (not the frame) of the same “Furniture of the World” whereby claims about other items are true. See Putnam, “Ready-made.”
99. See Al-Sā inpurī, Sharḥ, 82r.
100. *Haqiqatan*, in this context, is a reference to mentally real propositions, whose subjects are determined mentally. See part III, section 29.

101. As in the case of *haqiqatan*, so here, *bi-t-tahqiq* is a reference to *haqiqiyya* propositions, the subject of which has been determined mentally. See part III, section 29 and Mubin, *Mirʾāt* 2:65.

102. See part III, section 29.

103. See, for example, Mubin, *Mirʾāt* 2:63.


106. Al-Sāʾinpūrī, *Sharḥ*, 83r.


108. This is either Nizām al-Dīn b. Quṭb al-Dīn or Kamāl al-Dīn Sihālawī.


111. Al-Sāʾinpūrī, *Sharḥ*, 82r. This quotation is an elaboration of a similar argument made by al-Dawānī in his discussion of the Liar Paradox (see above). Here, al-Sāʾinpūrī bends its details to make a different argument—not about the truth-aptness of propositions, but about the ontological status of a concocted mental object.

112. An interesting parallel discussion is found in Quine, “From a Logical Point of View.” One of the things that concerns Quine in an ontologically expanded world is that there would be lacking an independent criterion, for example, for determining what is meaningful and what is not. For example, even the most generous ontologist, who grants that Pegasus exists because even its denial presupposes it, would have to reject round squares by virtue of the meaninglessness of the concept. By contrast, the mentally considered given, as noted here, is its own criterion of verification: the even-five is simply the number 5 intrinsically as it is mentally considered to be even, and given as such, it is then open to propositional claims, with respect to the given frame.

113. The ontological frame of the *Sullam* tradition appears to be generally vast. By this claim I do not mean to suggest that it aims to populate the ontological space indiscriminately or that it does not recognize certain ontological hierarchies. Rather, it recognizes that reports must be true or false in reference to a posited and given ontological frame. The same report—say, “Zayd is standing”—may be true *fi nafsī l-amr* when the frame of reference is the given Zayd who is standing in my opinion, and it may be false when the frame of reference is the given Zayd who is not standing extramentally. These distinctions do not lead to an overall philosophical reflection on the nature of worldmaking and truth, as expressed, for example, by Goodman. Nevertheless, with due caution, I quote the following from his *Ways of Worldmaking*, to prod reflection: “Consider, to begin with, the statements, ‘The sun always moves’ and ‘The sun never moves’ which, though equally true, are at odds with each other. Shall we say, then, that they describe different worlds, and indeed that there are as many different worlds as there are such mutually exclusive truths? Rather, we are inclined to regard the two strings of words not as complete statements with truth-values of their own but as elliptical for some such statements as ‘Under frame of reference A, the sun always moves’ and ‘Under frame of reference B, the sun never moves’—statements that may both be true of the same world. Frames of reference, though seem to belong less to what is described than to systems of description: and each of the two statements relates
what is described to such a system.” These frames of reference are the worlds we make by means of various manipulations—by ordering, sifting, grafting, eliding, and so on. The frame of reference may also be constructed by the act of showing, for example, in a work of art: “Exemplification and expression, though running in the opposite direction from denotation—that is, from the symbol to a literal or metaphorical feature of it instead of to something the symbol applies to—are no less symbolic referential functions and instruments of worldmaking.” Goodman then goes on to point out that, with such frames of reference, “truth cannot be defined or tested by agreement with ‘the world;’ for not only do truths differ for different worlds but the nature of agreement between a version and a world apart from it is notoriously nebulous. Rather . . . a version [of the world] is taken to be true when it offends no underlying beliefs and none of its own precepts” (emphasis mine). See Goodman, Ways, 2, 12, 17.

114. By these observations, I do not mean to suggest that the logic of the Sullam’s tradition is antirealist. Indeed, I would strongly caution against any intuition that imagines it to be endorsing the idea that the truth of a proposition can be demonstrated in view of its correspondence with another proposition or by virtue of a certain perspective. Quite the contrary, the truth of a proposition is determined by its correspondence with a state of affairs. It may so happen in various cases that the state of affairs is a certain perspective or a proposition that is posited as given by the mind. Propositions that report about this perspective or another proposition, as given, without taking into account the fact of the perspective (ma’a qaṭʿi n-nazar ‘an i’tibāri mu’tabirin), are accommodated within a realist system of truth. Cf., Prado, Searle, esp. chapter 4.

115. See, for example, Mubin, Mirʾāt 1:65–66; 116; 2:15, 52, 107, 156–57, 169; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, Sharḥ Sullam, 179.

3. ANATOMY OF THE COMMENTARY: AN INTERNAL VIEW

1. The archive is available at the following link: https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/14163931.

2. Editor, “Khāṣṣ Bāgh.” An alternative account of the events leading up to the debate is offered in Ṭāḥā, “Munāẓara.”

3. Editor, “Khāṣṣ Bāgh.”


6. Perhaps the idea may be put in a loose analogy with certain thirteenth-century notions of authorship in biblical exegesis. Here the human author was considered to be the one who mediated between the text and the primary efficient cause (the original author, God). As operative and instrumental causes of the text, human authors were “allowed a certain amount of individual power; they were not mere cogs in a smoothly-running divine machine. In the same way, an auctor of Scripture, being a cause which existed between the first efficient cause (God) and the effect (the text), was granted his personal purpose . . . . In Biblical inspiration, God inspires an auctor to write with a sublimity which far exceeds his normal powers. But this does not mean that the normal powers of the human instrument are thereby either destroyed or disregarded” (Minnis, Medieval, 82–83). In a similar fashion, in each moment of textual production, the past constituted the principal authorial
moment that was spoken by the future text. It was the source of authority for the future text, in the same manner as “God is the source of all auctoritas; after Him comes the human auctor who is responsible for what is actually said in a given text . . ." (Minnis, Medieval, 82–83) (emphasis mine). As Minnis explains, the auctor (author) is one who is imbued with auctoritas (authority/sanction) by virtue of another. From this perspective, the future text was only operative commentary. Yet with reference to itself, i.e., insofar as it shared in the authorship of a past text, the commentary was also the hypotext and the principal cause of future commentaries. As such—and as we will see this in more detail below—the commentary authored the authorizing precursor text. See Minnis, Medieval, 1–2, 10–12, 82.

7. Recent studies of Helen Keller’s authorial practices have shed much light on the saturation of the proprietary written text with both sense perception and otherness. In The Story of My Life, Keller writes, “It is certain that I cannot always distinguish my own thoughts from what I read, because what I read becomes the very substance and texture of my mind. Consequently, in nearly all that I write, I produce something which very much resembles the crazy patchwork I used to make when I first learned to sew . . .” Keller’s method of the imitation and adaptation of the works of others was mediated by the sense of touch whose immediacy infuses her memory, as much as her body, as the written word. The written commentary was similarly a mediating space in which the dialectic of others took original form and that the author had previously heard and even performed; thus, the commentator’s written commentary, although polyphonous, had only one agent author. The quotation here is taken from the thought-provoking article by Swan, “Touching Words,” 88; on authorial polyphony, see Behzadi, “Polyphony,” where the possibility of the author as a conductor of voices is explored.

8. The Dominican, Richard Fishacre, distinguished between the human author of a text as its instrumental efficient cause and the divine author as its principal efficient cause. Admitting that some part of the Scripture was written by humans, he adds that “not they themselves but God both wrote and spoke by them, as the principal efficient cause by the instrument” (Minnis, Medieval, 78–79; emphasis mine). The same notion is expressed by Guerric of St. Quentin on Isaiah: he distinguishes between authors as moving and operating causes; the human author is the latter, which the Holy Spirit moves to write. Yet what is written belongs to the agency of the human. The motive text/cause is, therefore, an imbuing force.

13. In her analysis of “Hadera” by Yehuda Amichai, Kronfeld observes that the opening lines of the poem are a self-quotation from an ordinary phone conversation. “The conversational allusion embeds in its positioning as the opening exemplum of the poem’s meditation a canonical and highly literate intertextual dialogue [with the medieval Hebrew poet Shmuel HaNagid]” (Kronfeld, Severity, 122–25; emphasis mine). The lemmata of the brief oral debate at Rampur similarly embed a textual tradition that unfolds in the formal commentarial meditations that followed, although, as I will argue below, this exercise cannot formally be called intertextual. See, also chapter 3 as a whole: there Kronfeld complicates theories of influence and intertextuality in a manner that shares elements with my understanding of the commentarial exercise.
14. See, for example, Ahmad, “Al-Tāmma”; Sharīf, “al-Rimāḥ” in the archive for which the link was provided above.

15. Sharīf, “Kayfiyyat”; ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, “‘Ajāʾib.” in the archive for which the link is provided above.

16. In a recent monograph, El-Rouayheb has pointed out the important shift in Ottoman scholarly traditions from the oral student-teacher pedagogical modes to the private deep reading of written texts (muṭālaʿaʾ). With reference to the texts of South Asia that I examine here, my claim is different in a subtle, but significant way. My argument is that the hypotext of any order was bound tightly to and imbued with a tradition of cyclical orality. Such texts reflected accretions of living debates—some of which spilled back into the oral medium—in the form of prompts and hints, so that they deliberately guided the future commentator to revive the past and to innovate within its constraints. Put another way, these texts were not very different from a living teacher whose directives would lead the student to assume agency. El-Rouayheb’s observation that the tradition of dialectic (ādāb al-baḥth) played an important role in this development of reading practices is also instructive with reference to South Asian commentarial traditions. Yet here again, with reference to the texts at hand, I would argue that it is the hypotexts themselves that were written in a subdued dialectical mode. As such and via various hints, they compelled the future commentator to flesh out and develop these dialectical challenges. In innumerable cases, one finds a cryptic remark or expression in the hypotext that appears to be out of place. Often, the hypertext would state that this is a response to a projected question (ḥādhā jawāb suʾāl muqaddar)—a reference to the questioner (sāʾil) and the responder (mujīb) in the context of debate—and it would then proceed to animate the implicit dialectic textually. An example of this manner of curating the future text is presented below with reference to al-Khayrābādī’s comment, “fa-l-ʿudhr al-ʿudhr.” For cases of suʾāl muqaddar, see Mubīn 1:109, 161f., 170, 182–84, 2:13, 463ff. See El-Rouayheb, Intellectual, chapter 3.

17. This mode of authorship relates in some respects to Kronfeld’s model that bridges the divide between influence and intertextuality. In her analysis, intertextuality does not result in the erasure of the author; nor does the relation of influence between a precursor text and the ephbe (to use the expression of Harold Bloom) result in the anxiety-ridden conquest of the past. Rather, the late author exercises a “resistant intertextual agency” in “his or her struggle with textual authorities.” The past is recycled and reinvented—in an iconoclastic fashion—and its hierarchical status is repeatedly renegotiated in the process. The authorial agent exists, along with a historical corpus; intertextuality in its recognized sense ceases to be a useful framework, and canonical hierarchy is leveled. See Kronfeld, Severity, 144ff. Commentarial writing, however, recognized the authority and sanction of the cumulative/synchronic lemmata of its hypotexts. Yet insofar as these texts were authored and actualized by the latest hypertextual agent, properly speaking, this mode of scholarly production appears to fit neither the influence nor the intertextual model. In relation to the anticipated future agent, the hypotexts were in potentia and they recycled/reinvented themselves at each phase of their actualizations as their hypertextual manifestations. It is also in this manner that the hypotexts influenced (i.e., flowed through and inhabited) their hypertexts, without the implication of textual domination. There are no clear-cut entities that one might denote as agents and patients, from the past to the future or in reverse, in the commentarial framework. On the reversal of influence, see Baxandall, Patterns, 58ff.
18. The distinctions I am making here should be disambiguated from those of Barthes in his *S/Z* and *The Pleasure of the Text*. Barthes presents the readerly text, the text of pleasure, as one that is received in a passive manner; it is the conventional text that is given meaning through existing coded structures. This text has no interstices in its fabric that must be filled by the recipient. The writerly text is identified as a text of bliss. This is the text that subverts the comfortable pleasure of the recipient, and, in the suspended space of the interpretive possibilities, he performs the text and rewrites it beyond the fixed code. In both cases, the author, once she has given the text, is dead—what remain are the text and the reader. It is the reader on whom the pleasure and bliss descend. The living commentarial tradition (the hypotexts and hypertexts), by contrast, is writerly in the sense that each latest writer is the agent that actualizes the base text and is also the base text *in potentia*. The bliss of the text is always retained in the hypotextual writer who suspends himself in the prompts and gestures to the future writer. And each such writer's hypertextual persona's bliss lies in writing the past insofar as he is guided to a textual archaeology by *its* hypotext. In other words, authorial voices are absorbed and incarnated by design in each future and guided authorial performance; they are neither subordinated nor dead. Dynamic rewriting thus occurs within the constraints of the previously authorized authorial incarnations. It is not subversive. With this distinction in place, I wish to point out that Barthes's pronouncements sometimes come close to my observations: "With the writer of bliss (and his reader) begins the untenable text, the impossible text. This text is outside pleasure, outside criticism, *unless it is reached through another text of* bliss: you cannot speak 'on' such a text, you can only speak 'in' it, *in its fashion*, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm the void of the bliss (and no longer obsessively repeat the letter of pleasure)." And although the commentarial, cryptic prompt is the vehicle of bliss ("Whoever speaks, by speaking denies bliss . . ."), it is not the case that, as commentary, the text of bliss "imposes a state of loss . . . unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions . . ." Indeed, quite the opposite is the case: repetition by the latest authorial agent is required by the allusive prompts, the interstices, of each hypotext that is incarnated in the controlled innovations of the hypertext. The hypotext calls to be written by the hypertext but is not an open field for the future author to exercise uncontrolled interpretive agency. See Barthes, *Pleasure*, 14–22; Barthes, "Death."

19. We may think of the commentaries of al-Khayrābādī as the textual medium from which the oral debate between Barakāt Aḥmad and al-Bihārī emerged. This debate, in turn, was articulated by the commentators in written forms—in advertisements, reports, and short formal commentaries. These written forms, in turn, led to oral debates, which, in turn, were actualized again in textual forms, including the short commentary. In this set of cycles, one can take the oral debate as a precursor form of the *matn*; this latter is fulfilled in the commentarial textual form, which, because the *matn* is itself grounded in earlier layers of commentaries, must revert to them in periodic upheavals. This, as we will see in the case of the *Sullam*, is the basic logic of the *matn*-commentary cycles.

20. Editor, "Khāṣṣ Bāgh."

21. Bakhtin posits the dialog as the key feature of novelistic style, one that allows the novel to be determined as a genre insofar as it transcends monologic discourse. My claim about the commentarial tradition is similar, though not identical. He writes, "From the point of view of stylistics, the artistic work as a whole . . . is a self-sufficient and closed
authorial monologue, one that presumes only passive listeners beyond its own boundaries. Should we imagine the work as a rejoinder in a given dialogue, whose style is determined by its interrelationship with other rejoinders in the same dialogue (in the totality of the conversation)—then traditional stylistics does not offer an adequate means for approaching such a dialogized style . . . Stylistics locks every stylistic phenomenon into the monologic context of a given self-sufficient and hermetic utterance, imprisoning it, as it were, in a dungeon of a single context; it is not able to exchange messages with other utterances; it is not able to realize its own stylistic implications in a relationship with them; it is obliged to exhaust itself in its own single hermetic context” (Bakhtin, Dialogic, 274). My point is rather that each of the lemmata of the hypotext—whether technically a base text or a commentary—occupies a subdued and potential dialogic space that calls for being fulfilled and exposed in its relationship with other texts by the work of the hypertext. The visible interaction with other lemmata is not essential to the hypotexts of a commentarial tradition, although such interaction of course exists in some measure in them. Rather, what grants unity to the genre is the dialectical and dialogic relationship that is realized in the hypertext. It is in this form of dialog, precipitated explicitly by the hypertext at the behest of the hypotextual prompt and gesture, that the hypotext breaks free of its ostensibly hermetic and monologic mode.

22. This mode of authorial agency that both actualizes the past and is precipitated and curated by it is distinct from other premodern modes of writing. Hirschler (Historiography), for example, has meticulously discussed how authorial agency operates via various techniques of emplotment in historical works. The latter technique appears to me to be more prevalent in literary/historical works than in philosophical commentaries. Still, there is a loose comparison that can be drawn: certain introductory sections of philosophical commentaries may metaphorically present the broad operative frame of the commentary in the same manner as the opening sections of historical works may metaphorically announce modes of emplotment. As an example, compare the discussions in chapter 4, section I, below, with Hirschler, Historiography, 67ff.

23. As we noted above, this underlying layer comprised some of al-Khayrābādī’s treatises and commentaries in which he had taken critical stances against some aspects of the earlier tradition. These critical stances were themselves challenged by al-Bihārī’s teacher, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawī. While maintaining his agency, al-Bihārī was speaking in the voice of his own teacher very much as Barakāt Aḥmad was speaking in that of his teacher. Their commentators and reporters, in turn, fulfilled the task in a similar fashion. The victory of each participant, therefore, implied that of a series.

24. Although the rebuttal was written by Ṭāhā, the author of the “Ifāḍa” does not distinguish between him and his teacher, al-Bihārī. As mentioned above, the author of the “Ifāḍa” was himself a student of a student of Barakāt Aḥmad and had taken up the challenge in both his name and in the name of Chuttan Ṣāḥib.

27. This is a case of formal dialectical engagement. Naqḍ was a technical move in ʿādāb al-baḥth. Indeed, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz argues that al-Bihārī’s criticism was also off the mark because al-Khayrābādī was disputing via naqḍ, not analogical reasoning.

31. Again, in this framework, it is the latest writing that not only sustained but also cultivated the cumulative authorial voice. The “prestige of the individual” was such that, in each case, it authorized the future text and authored the past. The readerly commentary was the death of textual potentialities. The diametrically opposite position is articulated by Barthes: “Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue . . . but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author.” See Barthes, “Death,” 142, 148.
34. The aforementioned expressions in Arabic play a technical role in formal dialectics. They are conveniently presented in a glossary by Young, *Dialectical*.
40. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that notions of the genuine and originary emerged as essential conditions of the modern regime of authorship owing to the heroic self-presentation of the Romantic poets. They came to be entrenched in our valuation of the work of authors and of their oeuvre in large part because of the commercial concerns of late writers and their publishers. Often, these concerns of the proprietor catapulted legislative debates and were ultimately enshrined in copyright law. Late- and premodern commentarial writing in South Asia generally developed in the absence of such extratextual frameworks; the latter were also responding to the growth of print culture and its monetizing publics. In the case of the commentary, original genius is not a necessary or relevant condition of dynamism. See Jaszi and Woodmansee, “Introduction”; Jaszi, “Author Effect”; Feather, “Rights.”

4. ANATOMY OF THE COMMENTARY: A VIEW FROM ABOVE

3. This same mode of production appears to be operative in premodern Arabic poetry. Kilito (*Author*, chapters 1 and 2) presents a theory of poetic innovation within the ambit of tradition. A poet who does not say everything can proliferate his influence in the future, for “if an idea submits to continuous acts of fathering, it does so because it suffers from a deficiency or incompleteness” (Kilito, *Author*, 20).
5. For some similar common *topoi* in the opening sections of literary works, see Orfali, “Art.”
7. Similar sentiments are expressed by a number of commentators. For example, in his *Ḍiyāʾ*, al-Balyāwī writes, “These are glosses that have been appended to the *Sullam*
I called them Ḍiyāʾ al-nujūm ... like their name, they are a guide [hudan] — another laden Qurʿānic expression — that appears on the surface [fi ḥ-zāhir] to be a brief epitome [mukhtāsar] and that, in reality, is a fountainhead of pearls” (Balyāwī, 2). In other words, the work is both a brief exposition and a source, a hypotext, to be mined for its hints.

8. Al-Sahāranpūrī, iv.

9. These observations can easily be confirmed by a number of other cases. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm b. Aminallāh, commenting on the commentary of Mullā Ḥasan on the Sullam, makes the same claims about his hypotext: “Muḥammad Ḥasan posited, in the course of penning his expressions for the commentary [on the Sullam], beneficial penetrations [tadqīqāt], hearing which made the ears of minds wonder [yuʿajibu istimā uḥā ʾadhāna l-adhhān]; and, in the course of his renderings [of the problemata], he ordered pearls of verification [tahqiqāt] that neither man nor jinn had heard before. And so ... my paternal uncle, Mawlānā Muḥammad Yūsuf ... wrote notes that removed the veils of its hints [kashafat astāra ishārātihi] and clarified its insolubles, so that no veils were left upon the faces of its meanings.” Thus, in this case as well, the hypertext of Mullā Ḥasan both resolves its own hypotext and calls on its future commentaries to unravel the hints and insolubes that it integrates within its exercise. That neither man nor jinn had heard the likes of its wonder-inspiring discourse is an allusion to Qurʿān 72:1ff (qul ūḥiya ilayya annahu ʾstamaʾa nafaran mina l-jinni fa-qālū inna samiʾān ḥur ānan ʿajaba), another case of the apotheosis of the hypotext (Mullā Ḥasan, 10). Similarly, Muḥammad al-Sāyaḍūrī, in his commentary on the Sullam, promises both to unveil the meanings and secrets (asrār) of the hypotext and also to “gather in [the exercise of clarification] the treasures of subtle matters [jāmiʾan fīhi kunūza d-daqqāʾiq].” He then prays, like his hypotext, that his commentary should be famous in the lands, “as the sun illuminates in the middle of the day” (1 recto, 2 verso). And again, Muḥammad al-Mubārakī al-Jawnpūrī writes, “One of the sharp scholars insisted that I write a commentary on the treatise, called the Sullam al-ʿulūm ... So I began ... to render its [meanings] and I undertook [this effort] in a writing that is formally minimal, but abundant in its meanings, [containing] rare, precious pearls ... and I called it, so that [its name] would correspond to the meaning[s it contains], The Ascension of Apprehensions (Miʿraj al-fuhūm)” (al-Mubārakī, 1 recto). As in a number of cases above, so here, the commentary is operative on its hypotext, while containing within this exercise and in contracted form, gems of meanings. The title of the commentary is obviously a double entendre: the work is something that will raise the reader's understanding of the cryptic meanings of Sullam al-ʿulūm while also taking him up into its own "divine" mysteries. It is akin to the miʿraj of the Prophet that gave access to mankind the divine will and remained, in terms of itself and its significance, a journey into the mysteries.

10. Substantiating cases are practically innumerable, and I will refer to some of them in the footnotes and in a brief excursive section at the end of this chapter.


13. This lemma was also discussed above with reference to fī nafs al-amr.


16. The inflection point is especially interesting in that the call to redress is deliberate, thus extending the life of the text. It is not tantamount to the author’s admission or the
reader's claim that self-understanding is lacking on the author's part. The latter case, for example, is presented by Campbell (Philosophy, 256), and Ḥālī (Yādgār, 180). I owe the reference to the latter case to S. Nomanul Haq.

20. Most commentaries understand “fa-tadabbar!” to be a command to redress and the refutation offered by al-Bihārī to be problematic. Mubārak (Kitāb, 203), for example, writes, “It is not hidden that existence is an expression that refers to the coming about and actualization of the essence in a certain [ontological] locus. It is not subsumed under any of the categories. Thus, it is not described by increase, deficiency, intensity, and weakness—though one of the two [loci] of existence be actual and the other [mentally] supposed—except by way of error. [This error] would be with the consideration that actual existence is real, so that the predication [in such a case] would be more perfect and more complete than [existence] that is [mentally] supposed and figurative.” In similar fashion, Fīrūz (the manuscript does not have page numbers) states that al-Bihārī’s command is a hint that the refutation is not considered to be sound (fīhi ishāra ilā anna hādhā ghayr mustaḥsan). Mubārak (Kitāb, 203–4) offers an alternative interpretation to the effect that only the sense (mafhūm) of impossibility exists in the mind, not that which corresponds to it. The latter is a description of that which is impossible (that which is described)—namely, the impossible instances—and, in terms of its ontological status, is like that which is described. The point is that neither the thing described nor the description has an ontological locus. Mubārak proposes that perhaps this is what the expression “fa-tadabbar!” is meant to suggest. This would mean that al-Bihārī holds that the locus of the existence of the description is dependent on the locus of the existence of the thing described. As we will observe below, this is not his position.

21. As we will note below, such identifications were calls to initiate textual excavations within commentarial cycles.
22. Ḥamdallāh, 69.
23. This is the explicit position of al-Bihārī, part III, section 28.
24. Ḥamdallāh, 69.
25. Ḥamdallāh, 69. We might recall that this is precisely the interpretation the later commentator, Mubīn, had offered. In this case, then, a second-order commentary is voicing its hypotext by appeal to an earlier first-order commentary. This is one example of the synchrony of the commentarial tradition and of the appropriation of authorial voices that I explored above. Furthermore, as we will note below, in refuting the third position, al-Bihārī was actually conceding a principle that he explicitly denied for a rather different set of reasons. Indeed, the commentaries were led to this realization in the course of figuring out what the command to reflect meant. The details are offered below.

26. We might recall of course that Ḥamdallāh’s commentators understood his explanation to be an erroneous concession for the sake of argument. The nature of this error will become apparent below.
27. Al-Sāʾinpūrī, Rampur, 84r.
28. Fīrūz (the manuscript does not supply page numbers).
29. Ḥamdallāh, 69.
30. Part III, section 29.
31. See, for example, Bahr al-ʿUlūm, Sharh (Kuwait), 393n1, 395n3, 399nn2–4, 402n2 passim; Mubin 2:70, 2:89, 2:95 passim.
32. I have changed battiyya to ghayr battiyya for sense, as we will see below.
33. Al-Mubārakī, 91v–92r.
34. Al-Mubārakī, 92r. On negative-predicate propositions, see the translation in part III, section 29, and the notes there. The commentators inform us that the negative-predicate proposition was invented to overcome precisely the kinds of conundrums that are addressed in this lemma.
35. This is the appeal to the sense of fi nafs al-amr that I expressed above and that has been my justification for translating it with the expression, “with respect to the way things are given.” As I explained previously, that which is given may be both mind-dependent and also entirely mind-independent.
36. Al-Mubārakī, 92r.
37. Al-Mubārakī, 92r.
38. Part III, section 29. The fuller argument is expressed as follows: wa-lammā kāna l-ittiḥād taqdīriyyan fa-l-muthbat lahu aydan yajūzu an yakūna taqdīriyyan wa-lā thubūta [li]-l-muthbat fa-innahu far ʿu l-muthbat lahu (Since the unity [of the subject and predicate] is based on a determination [of the supposition of instances and the application of the mentally-determined tag of these instances] that for which something exists may also be determined. There is no existence for that which exists for something [outside of this determination]; for it is dependent on/derivative of that for which something exists). This has all, of course, already been incorporated in the discussion of al-Mubārakī above.
39. I have refrained from mentioning the first aspect of the refutation, as it appears to have had no traction in the commentarial tradition concerned with this lemma.
40. Firūz (the manuscript lacks page numbers). Al-Sāʾinpūrī (82r) has the following: “Know that it is commonly-held [al-mashhūr] that the existence of a thing for a thing is derivative of/dependent on the existence of that for which it exists and that [it] follows from it. [This position] is refuted [nuqida] by means of ‘existence’ [wujūd] since its existence for a quiddity is not derivative from the latter’s existence in the locus [zārf] of existence. Otherwise, it would follow that a single quiddity would have infinite ordered existences.” In Mubarak (Kitāb, 19), one reads: “It is commonly [al-mashhūr] on the tongues of the majority that the existence of a thing for a thing is derivative of the existence of that for which it exists in its locus. Against it is mentioned the refutation by means of ‘existence.’ For being derivative with a view to [existence] entails that a single thing would have infinite existences.” I mention these examples here to point out that these passages overlap with each other because they incorporate verbatim a quotation from the self-commentary of al-Bihārī without attribution. The differences among the passages can be ascribed to the phenomenon of lemmatic growth within the commentarial context—here the self-commentary becomes the commentarial lemma and it expands in the course of the commentary’s engagement with it as the latest commentator’s own authorial voice, as I have discussed above. The lemma, truncated at different joints, sees considerable growth even in these early commentaries. However, since the details they present are not directly relevant to the discussion at hand, I do not present them here. The full quotation from the self-commentary, along with the proper
attrition, is found in al-Mubārakī, 89v. It also ends with the command, fa-tadabbar, which is taken by the commentator to be a hint (ishāra) toward a relevant argument in Avicenna's Taʿlīqāt.

41. A number of early commentators offer rather innovative solutions to this conundrum. I will discuss some of these in the section on dynamism below.

42. Fīrūz (the manuscript does not give page numbers).

43. Reading li-mafhūmihi for mafhūmihā for sense.

44. Al-Sāʾinpūrī, 82v.

45. al-Mubārakī, 89v–90r. This same sort of compromise with universal principles in view of exceptional cases is recorded by al-Sāʾinpūrī. He explains that, given the difficulties with a predicate such as “existent,” it was decided that the principle would apply in every instance, save “existent.” See Sāʾinpūrī, 82r.

46. Mubārak, Kitāb, 197.

47. Mubārak, Kitāb, 199.

48. Mubārak, Kitāb, 199.

49. Mubārak, Kitāb, 199.

50. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (Delhi), 153.

51. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (Delhi), 153.

52. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (Delhi), 153n1.

53. This is reminiscent of the method of taṭbīq applied broadly in various disciplines.

54. In the printed edition of the Ufuq, this section covers about forty pages. The main arguments were compressed within a page of the Sullam, as we observed above. Dāmād, Muṣannafāt 2:5–50.

55. Dāmād, Muṣannafāt 2:6. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (Taʿlīqāt, 1r) grapples with the ambiguity of this statement, ultimately arguing that any interpretation must square with the principle of simple generation which Dāmād endorses.

56. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Taʿlīqāt, 4vff. The details of this discussion lie outside the scope of this book. However, I would like to bring to the reader’s attention the fact that the long disquisition of more than fifty pages ends with a refutation of Dāmād’s signature doctrine of ḥudūth dahrī. This indicates the extent to which Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s interest at this juncture of the lemma of the Sullam was also tied to a metaphysical concern. For a discussion of how a hypotextual lemma can be bent to the interests of the philosophical moment of the hypertext, see Ahmed, “Post-classical.”

5. A TRANSLATION AND STUDY OF THE SULLAM

1. Contrast the sublime theory of translation presented by Benjamin, “Task.” In his evaluation, what I accomplish here would be misguided: “Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel” (emphasis mine). On the issue of untranslatability because the act of translation militates against the structures and histories of the whole of the language of the original, see Ortega y Gasset, “Miseria.”
2. For Nietzsche’s ruminations on the Roman practice of translation as conquest, see Nietzsche, “Übersetzungen.”
4. In this regard, Foucault’s observations are quite apt: “How can one define a work amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death? A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory” (“Author,” 207–8). Foucault is of course speaking in this case about the single author, whose death has allegedly shifted our gaze to the work itself. But the work itself presupposes a unifying and prior principle—perhaps the notion of the author of the text or of the oeuvre—whose function it is to delimit the discursive space. The problem would persist even if, in the case of commentaries, we discard traditional notions of authorship in favor of an agentive performer. In this case, we would be thinking of the Sullam tradition as a discursive continuity. But then what are the criteria for determining the boundaries of this tradition? Indeed, even if the idea of a single author as a delimitation of the text is adopted, the recognition of the text as a work in progress still complicates the task of the editor. On the continuity of the authorship and editorial work of a single author, see the case of al-Thaʿālibī, as presented by Orfali, “Art.”
5. On this lemma, see Ahmed, “Postclassical.”
6. The introductory comments rhetorically allude to some aspects of Arabic logic. For example, yuntiju brings to mind the productive syllogism whose premises are productive of the conclusion, as much as it suggests the Qur’ānic lam yalid (He does not beget). Jihāt is a reference to the physical directionality and modes of contingent beings, as well as to the modes of propositions. Proper assent (tasdiq) is generated by the suitable deployment of the discursive tool of logic. Here it is reduced to a nondiscursive belief in God. Similarly, the reference to the cure brings to mind the famous Cure (Shifāʾ) of Avicenna. Here the Prophet is the cure insofar as he is the proof (dalīl), which, in the field of logic, is a reference to methods of deriving knowledge (especially the syllogism). In the last lines, muqaddimāt (vanguards) is the same as premises in logic; and ḥujja—proof—delivers certainty in a demonstrative syllogism. Here the proofs are the family and Companions of the Prophet. Thus, even as the author opens his work on logic, he mentions, perhaps as a literary trope, a parallel path that would lead to certainty in matters of religion.
7. This may well be an allusion to Najm (star) al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s Shamsīyya. In other words, the author hopes that his base text will have the same or greater success than that quintessential logic book.
8. Thus, though it is clear to someone that he knows/conceptualizes something in the same unmediated fashion in which he feels happiness or perceives light, giving a definition of knowledge is extremely difficult.
9. I have generally translated tasawwur as conception and tasdiq as assent. Both technical expressions can occur as referring either to knowledge items (e.g., the conception “man” or the assent to proposition p) or to acts (e.g., one’s conceptualization of man or one’s granting assent that A is B). I have used conception/conceptualization and assent/granting assent, depending on the contextual usage of the expressions.
10. The expression i’tiqādan li-nisba khabariyya can be translated as “belief owing to a predication relation.” However, the commentaries explain that assent is the same as
judgment and that it is a belief in the said relation. See, for example, Majmūʿ `at al-Sullam, 50n1b; al-Pishāwari, Dumām, 7. The equivalence of assent with judgment is a position of the philosophers, as explained in the commentaries, including those mentioned in this endnote. This position is contrasted with those of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and the later philosophers. See also Muḥammad Yūsuf, Sharḥ Sullam, 31n8

11. In other words, there is no relation between two things in this case. In summary, then, we get the position that knowledge is conception; and conception is what is directly present for the one who apprehends. The object of this knowledge is then divided into the relation that holds between a subject and a predicate (e.g., the relation that holds between man and animal) and that with respect to which no relation is posited (e.g., man). In other words, there is a broader category of conception/knowledge, under which simple conception and the conception of the relation between two items falls.

12. Thus, as we will see below (and as was discussed above), propositions and absurdities can also be objects of knowledge.

13. This same doctrine is also expressed by Mullā Ṣadrā. See Lameer, Conception, 102. “Al-Fāḍil al-Sandīlī”—namely, Aʿlam Sandīlawī, as reported by Barakatallāh—explains that this position is based on the doctrine of things themselves obtaining in the mind (ḥuṣūl al-ashyāʾ bi-anfusihā). For we conceptualize things that have no extramental existence. In other words, things’ existence and their conceptualization occur only in the mind. So it is not that the simulacra (ashbāḥ) of objects of knowledge occur to the mind; rather, what is present in the mind, as a conceptualization, is precisely what is known. On this doctrine, then, there is an essential unity of what is known and the fact of knowing (Barakatallāh, Rafʾ, 8n1). This question of the relation between knowing and objects of knowledge was a major leitmotif of the logic texts related to the Sullam. In addition to the commentaries, a number of independent treatises were also written on the subject; the discussion of course extended to a period well before the publication of the Sullam. A broad overview is presented in al-Ajmīrī, ʿIlm. This Urdu work is a very useful guide to questions of epistemology in the Muslim South Asian context and it cites arguments all the way up to the early twentieth century. See also Ahmed, “Post-Classical,” for further comments on epistemology in the Sullam.

14. This is so because, as noted above, the object of knowledge and knowledge are one. So, if one conceptualizes assent, the object, i.e., assent, would be the same as the conceptualization, i.e., knowledge. Cf. the views of Ṣadrā: Lameer, Conception, 120ff.

15. The point is that, insofar as knowledge is something that is conceptualized, this conceptualized form that comes to obtain in the mind is what is known. However, insofar as this form is something that subsists in the mind, i.e., it is not something that comes to obtain in the mind, it is knowledge. A loose analogy would be that, insofar as a form comes to inhere in matter, it is that form; and insofar as it inhere in the matter, the form is enmattered.

16. Al-Fāḍil Aʿlam al-Sandili, as reported by Barakatallāh, explains that the state of hearing (al-ḥāla al-samʿ iyya) is knowledge, such that it has mixed with things that are heard. It makes sense, then, to think of any kind of knowledge as a state of apprehension that is particularized by a specific object by a process of inseparable mixing. This means that the state and the object retain their essential distinction but are never particularized without each other. In this sense, one can say that knowledge and its object
are not one and the same, in the same way as one can say that form and matter are not one and the same. But, just as form and matter need each other for particularization and are always found united, so knowledge and its object are united (Barakatallāh, Raf’, 9n1). In the case of simple conception and assent, the thing known has two distinct forms. The form mixes with the apprehending state, which, in this mixed state, is knowledge. Thus, knowing as conception and knowing as assent, even though both are states of apprehension, are distinct in the same manner that tasting sweet and sour, though both are states of tasting, are distinct.

17. That is, A → B → A

18. That is, A → B → A → B → A . . . .

19. This is a very elliptical version of the burhān al-taḍʿīf. One takes two infinite lines, the one said to be double the other. The amount by which one is greater than the other can be counted only after one has traversed to a point at which the shorter of the two lines ends. But the shorter one is infinite and such a traversal implies a finite set of counted numbers. A finite set of counted numbers implies a finite thing that is counted. But one had started with an infinite line. And so, even though one had started with an unobjectionable situation—the doubling of any countable series—one has been led to an absurdity. This means that the infinite ordered series cannot exist.

20. Anything that is generative of the knowledge of something is predicated of that thing. For example, “rational animal” supplies the definition of man and is, therefore, predicated of man. However, we know that assent is not predicated of conception. Similarly, conception is not generative of assent, because that which is generative of something is the cause whereby the effect’s existence becomes preponderant; yet conception is indifferent with respect to whether a relation holds or fails to hold between two things. On the other hand, that a relation holds or fails to hold is a definitive feature of assent.

21. So far, the author has argued that knowledge and the thing known are distinct, so that, even if one conceptualizes assent, their essential difference is not thereby shown to be unreal. He has also argued that not all conceptualizations and assents are primary; at least some are theoretical/discursively derived. By appeal to his version of the burhān al-taḍʿīf, he has also shown that not all conceptualizations can be derived from others; the same applies also to the assents. In other words, at least some conceptions and assents must be primary and at least some must be theoretical/discursively derived. And now he has argued that conceptualizations cannot be generated by assents and vice versa; in other words, both areas of knowledge must have certain primary and certain nonprimary items of knowledge. Given that there must be certain conceptions and assents that are discursively acquired, can that which leads to their acquisition be simple? He states that it cannot be simple, because that which is simple, by definition, does not have ordered parts; yet acquisition is something that occurs in a sequentially ordered fashion. This ordered system of acquisition is discursive thinking and cogitation. Al-Bihārī will go on to argue that this ordering, which leads to the acquisition of knowledge (i.e., conception and assent), is the remit of the discipline of logic.

22. This view is akin to the one introduced by al-Khūnajī and embraced by al-Kātibī and al-Taftāzānī, in that it does not limit the subject matter to secondary intelligibles and declares its remit to be broader. In addition, al-Bihārī highlights the key qualification that the subject matter is intelligibles insofar as they lead to conception and assent. As such, he
distinguishes the subject matter of logic from that of other disciplines, such as general metaphysics. On Khûnajî, see El-Rouayheb, “Post-Avicennan Logicians.”

23. For example, one may give assent to the existence of fire, and then ask why it is that such assent is given. The response may be that one has observed smoke. Such a proof does not explain why the fire exists; rather, it explains why assent to the fact of its existence is given. On the other hand, one may ask why the smoke exists, and the response may be that it is owing to the fire's burning of wood. In this case, the proof explains why the thing—smoke—exists with respect to its very given self. The former type of proof is called innî and the latter is called limmî.

24. The paradox of the absolutely unknown was a recurring subject of inquiry in various disciplines, ranging from logic to theology. For an anthological study, starting from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Râzî's Mulakhkhas (the first instance of the occurrence of the problem in this form), see Lameer, “Ghayr.”

25. Barakatallāh explains the position of his great-great grandfather on this issue as follows. The statement, “Everything on which a judgment is passed (maḥkūm ʿalayhi) must be known (maʿlūm)” converts, by means of a contradictory conversion, to, “Whatever is not known (lam yakun maʿlūman) is not something on which a judgment is passed (maḥkūm ʿalayhi).” This is equivalent to “It is impossible for whatever is absolutely unknown (majhūl muṭlaq) to have a judgment (ḥukm) [passed on it].” And this is the proposition that is under consideration in the main text. The problem is that this final form of the proposition is derived from one that requires an object of judgment to be known; and in the last proposition, a judgment is certainly being passed on something, i.e., the judgment of the impossibility of judgment on what is unknown. This unknown, therefore, according to the original proposition, must be known. The other possibility is to concede that some “absolute unknowns” may have a judgment. But this contradicts the universal that was posited. (Barakatallāh, 13n5).

26. In other words, it is known with respect to its very self (i.e., it is known as that which is unknown) and it is absolutely unknown with respect to that which is not its very self (i.e., it is unknown as that thing which is unknown). Traces of the solution offered by the Sullam are already apparent in Abhari’s Tanẓīl (see Lameer, “Ghayr,” 408ff.).

27. The point is that “the absolutely unknown” may occur to the mind as something on which the judgment cannot be passed. As such, it is known. But insofar as the sense of “the absolutely unknown” is understood to stand in place of something that has no conceptualization, then it is not known. In other words, when it stands in place of a sense, it is known per se, but insofar as it stands in place of something unknown, that unknown thing is unknown per accidens. It appears that this difficulty was thought to fall under the category of the Liar Paradox (on which see below). Barakatallāh (13n6) sets up the following thought experiment to highlight the paradox. Imagine that Zayd is empty of everything except the sense of the “absolutely unknown.” Now, if we take ṬAmr and ask whether Zayd knows him, then, if he knows him, ṬAmr must fall in the category of “the absolutely unknown,” as this is the only thing he knows. And so he would be unknown if he is known. On the other hand, if he is unknown, then he falls in the category of the absolutely unknown and is, therefore, known, since this is the only category known to Zayd. Both situations require one to posit something in a class by virtue of which this same thing must be posited in the contradictory class.
28. The author is arguing, against classical doctrine, that utterances are posited for meanings and concepts as such. They are not posited for mental forms that are specified by conceptualization or as concrete entities.

29. If something signifies all of a thing, it also signifies part of it. Thus, “man” signifies a rational animal as well as rational simply.

30. I translate *iltizām* in this context as “compound-implication” to distinguish it from *ilzām* (implication; attachment) and *istilzām* (entailment). A compound-implication is in a compound relation with an imposition, as explained above.

31. Here the main text is hinting at the issue of how one may clearly distinguish metaphorical signification from signification by compound-implication. Barakatallāh (1513) mentions that the logicians make it a requirement for signification by compound-implication that there should be an intellect-based transfer from the posited to the implied sense. The scholars of the Arabic language (*ahl al-ʿarabiyya*) reject this because, if metaphor and implied sense collapse into the same system of signification, then according to the rule of the logicians, a cause's implication of the effect and a body's entailment of space would fall under metaphor. But this is clearly incorrect. The space for metaphor must, therefore, be kept clear of such extensions of language; it must rest on an extension that is grounded in conventional usage. Mubīn (1:63) explains that the intellected implication is such that the intellation of one thing follows from the intellation of another. For example, when the intellect conceptualizes the meaning of evenness and twoness, it finds a relation between these two. And so, when it conceptualizes twoness, it is also led to the conceptualization of evenness. In the case of conventional implication, it is owing to customary usage that, when one meaning of an expression is conceptualized, another one is conceptualized as well. An example is the conceptualization of generosity on the conceptualization of Ḥātim, the proverbial exemplum of Arab hospitality.

32. Signification by inclusion is also based on the intellect's extension of a complete and posited meaning. In this case, the intellect proceeds from the whole to the part. But it is used in the sciences; so why should signification by entailment be excluded? Mubīn (1:66) identifies the challenger as al-Ghazālī.

33. Barakatallāh explains that al-Bihārī is alluding to a point of contention between the logicians and linguists. The former take the position that signification in an absolute sense is not dependent on usage and intent; rather, it is dependent only on correspondence with the posited meaning. Correspondence with the posited meaning is the only type of signification recognized by logic and it is this signification that is intended and used per se. The other two types of significations are per accidens. Given this, as secondary and accidental forms of significations (since these significations are neither intended nor used), when they exist, they imply signification by correspondence. See Barakatallāh, 1612; see also Mubīn, 1:66–67.

34. As Barakatallāh explains, this is a response to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who claimed that signification by correspondence entails signification by compound-implication, because the conceptualization of every quiddity implies the conceptualization of at least some of its necessary concomitants. This is the case, according to al-Rāzī, at least with respect to the recognition that a thing is not what is other than itself. For a necessary concomitant of a sense is that it is not other than itself. In principle, then, any signification by complete correspondence implies every sense other than itself insofar as it implies that it is not other than itself. Al-Bihārī's response, as we see, is that the mind is not always led to this implication;
however, in signification by compound-implication, the mind is always led to that by which it is implied. See Barakatallah, 16n3; Mubin, i:67.

35. A mirror’s function is to reflect some item either back to itself or to some subject. In looking at the mirror, it is this functionality, not the very mirror itself, that is relevant. In the same fashion, a particle’s function is to reflect the relation between two things that are other than itself. Its own meaning is not independent of the function it has in relation to that which is other than itself.

36. Al-Pishāwarī (Ḍumām, 22) mentions the example kāna Zayd qāʾīman, where kāna functions to point out the state of Zayd in relation to standing, just as “in” functions to convey the relationship of that which occurs before and after it.

37. “I walk” and “You walk” have obvious subjects and are propositions. As such, they are susceptible to being true or false; but for logicians, verbs are not susceptible to truth or falsity; nor indeed are they compounds. For the grammarians, the two are verbs merely by virtue of the fact that they can be conjugated and refer to time. For logicians, these criteria are not sufficient, as verbs cannot be truth-apt or compound. On the other hand, “He walks” or “Walking” do not have obvious subjects and are, therefore, not truth-apt. Indeed, they represent paradigmatic verb forms. See Al-Pishāwarī, Ḍumām, 22.

38. The point is that one can say, “A particle governs the genitive case,” and thus pass a judgment on a particle. According to al-Bihārī, this is a not a judgment on the meaning of the particle, but on the utterance itself.

39. For example, in the act of the imposition of the meaning of “tu” the possibility of its usage for various individuals was taken into account; however, in usage it is never applied to several individuals.

40. For example, primariness would apply in the case of the universal existence, since that which is necessary of existence has this universal in a primary way and the contingent has it in a secondary way. An example of priority would be the universal “light” that is applied to the sun because of its own essence and of the earth accidentally, i.e., owing to an external agent. Ambiguity in universals with respect to intensity pertains to qualities; with respect to increase, it pertains to quantities. In other words, certain universals are applied properly to things owing to their greater participation in them and to others in a derivative sense. See al-Pishāwarī, Ḍumām, 24.

41. That is, in the category of substance.

42. That is, not in the category of substance.

43. In other words, there is no body that is more body than another nor blackness that is blacker than another. The modulation is only in the description of that which is in a relation with the accidental. For example, something with one coat of black may be said to be less black than something with three coats. But this does not mean that there is modulation in the body or in the accident black that comes to inhere in it. See Mubin, 1:85.

44. The more intense presentation of an accidental serves as a basis for abstracting the concept of the universal for the weaker presentation. This does not mean that the more intense is a composite of the weaker cases. Since there is no modulation, the universal concept is the same in all cases; it just presents itself more intensely in certain cases and it is these cases that allow the intellect to abstract the universal. The estimative faculty’s help is needed because the instances present themselves to the senses and the intellect does not have sensibles as its objects.
45. That is, this does not occur via a process of elaboration in figurative language.

46. Both possibilities may be entertained: insofar as an arbitrarily invented utterance for a meaning is one where there is no tie among its various meanings, it seems to fall in the class of homonyms; and insofar as the various meanings come to be tied to such utterances only after the moment of the original imposition, they seem to fall in the class of transferred meanings.

47. A murtajil is what is originally posited for a meaning and then posited for another, without any relation between the meanings. An example is jaʿfar, which refers to a small stream in its original imposition; then it is transferred from its original meaning and made to refer to a person as a proper name. Yet there is no ostensible relation between the first meaning and the second. A transferred utterance is one where an utterance is used for a meaning other than the originally posited one and this meaning also comes to assume the status of a direct point of reference for the utterance. The transfer occurs owing to a relation between the first and the second meaning. For example, in the field of legal theory, the utterance uṣūl is taken to mean legal principles. This is owing to a double transfer of meaning: asl means root; the root of a body of knowledge is that on which it is based; and that on which legal norms are based are the principles of the law. All three meanings maintain currency in usage, as in homonymy. However, this case is distinct from homonymy in that, in the latter, the multiple meanings occur because of an original imposition, whereas, in this case, the multiple meanings occur because of a transfer from an original imposition. See Mubin, 1:91; Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Fawātiḥ, 1:8. A legislative transferred utterance would be something like salah, which meant prayer in the original imposition and then, by a secondary imposition, came to mean a specific ritual form. A specific customary transferred utterance would be a technical term, such as ism, which means name in the original imposition but means a noun in the language of the grammarians. And a general customary transferred imposition would be dābba, which is taken from the verb to crawl, in the original imposition, to mean any animal with four legs. See al-Pishāwārī, Ḍumām, 26.

48. This is a very important and interesting discussion about the limits that may be placed on figurative usage. In principle, for example, one may draw any kind of relation between an original posit and a derived meaning. Such an approach, it is imagined, would result in frequent miscommunications. On the other hand, if one limits figurative speech to those cases that are specifically heard in the speech of the Arabs, then the nature of such speech, as extension, loses force. In such a case, figurative speech would reduce to recorded usage. It is argued, therefore, that for speech to count as figurative, the general types of links between the literal and derived speech must have been attested in the speech of the Arabs. For example, if their speech includes cause-effect relations between the literal and the figurative meaning, then any speech of this sort would count as a valid case. See Mubin, 1:95–96.

49. For example, in the composite statement, “I put him up,” one cannot simply substitute “place” for “put” in order to generate the expression, “I placed him up.” The simple utterance “put” has “place” as a synonym, but the soundness of “I put him up” is among the accidentals of “put” that “place” lacks. Thus, another utterance cannot simply be substituted for “put,” even if it is its lexical synonym.

50. These issues are discussed in detail in Islamic legal theory. See, for example, Gleave, Literalism, 29ff.
51. Mubīn (1:100) explains that the dispute pertains to whether the unity of the meaning is taken both with respect to itself (bi-dh-dhāt) and with respect to the consideration of the composite nature of the utterance (bi-i'tibār at-tarkīb) or only with respect to the former. In the first case, one can claim that the simple and compound are not synonymous. In the second case, the two are synonymous insofar as they indicate the same meaning. The example given is “man” and “rational animal.”

52. In other words, the information is complete, and nothing needs to be added to it.

53. This appears to be a rather important commitment regarding the nature of what an information-bearing statement must be. The Sullam casually limits it to the actual, without further explanation. Mubīn (1:100) states the following: “The report [is] the transmission [of information] about an actual affair with respect to its very givenness (al-amr al-wāqiʿī fī nafs al-amr); and [the affair] is that about which a report is given (al-maḥkīʿanhu).” In a sentence, it is the being of the subject such that (min haythu) the judgment that the predicate would be affirmed or denied of it is correct.” What is then the import of the expression “such that” (min haythu)? Mubīn explains that the modality (haythiyya) governing that about which there is a report changes along with the different types of predication: when the predication is about essentials, that to which the judgment pertains is the very essence itself; when the predication is about existence, the report is about the dependence of existence on an agent. Similarly, in conjunctive conditional propositions, the report is about the fact that the antecedent is such that it cannot be separated from the existence of the consequent. Given these details, it appears that Mubīn takes the “actual” to be encompassed by a broad domain of that about which something is reported: the report can be about an essence itself, about the reliance of existence on an agent, about the fact of an implication relation, and so on. Mubīn brings the discussion to a close with the following comments that also have a bearing on the analysis of the next section: “So the report has the same sense as a statement and proposition, whereas that about which something is reported (al-maḥkīʿanhu) is its verifying criterion (miṣdāquhā). Given this, there must be a difference between the two of them owing to their very selves, because of the fact that a relation is included in a report and it is nonexistent in that about which there is a report. As for what is commonly held, well, it is that ‘that about which there is a report’ is an expression [referring] to the relation insofar as it exists with respect to itself (‘ibāra ‘ani n-nisba bi-ḥasab wujūdihā fī nafsihā). In this view, the difference between the two would not be owing to their very selves, but owing to the consideration that the relation [between the subject and predicate] that is observed in a proposition is a report. This [same report], without a view to these specific aspects (khuṣūsiyyāt) [that emerge owing to the aforementioned fact of mental observation], insofar as the existence of [the relation] is with respect to itself, is ‘that about which there is a report.’” In other words, a report can be about any actual relation between two things; as such, the relation asserted between the two things is observed mentally. And that about which there is a report is a state of affairs that exists with such a relation. The distinction between the two is, therefore, owing to the fact of observation, not because of any difference, by virtue of their very selves, between a report and that about which there is a report. Put in yet another way, that about which there is a report would be, for example, the conjunctive relation between the antecedent and the consequent in a conjunctive conditional; the observation of this fact of relation between the two would be a report. This would allow one to consider second-order reports about other given reports as reports about the
actual with respect to the given. Finally, as I have discussed above, the actual can be taken as an independent category and \(\text{fi nafs al-amr}\) is to take it the way it is given, i.e., not with a view to some aspect of it insofar as it is highlighted by the mind.

54. The solution was discussed in detail above.

55. The expression comes from mathematics and is perhaps meant to indicate that the problem proceeds ad infinitum without a solution. Mubin (1:104) states that \(\text{asamm}\) is used in its literal sense of “deaf,” since one never hears a solution to this problem.

56. An example of a restricted deficient compound is “The slave of Jon,” since one of the parts, Jon, is a restriction on the other, the slave. An example of a mixed deficient compound is given as “Ba’albak,” since two utterances here are joined into one and have become a single utterance. See Mubin, 1:104–5.

57. That is, without regard to whether this mental sense actually obtains extramentially or not.

58. In other words, if one can conceptualize that a sense applies to more than one instance, then it is a universal.

59. Impossible universals are those that have no extramential instances in actuality, but the mere sense of the universal allows the intellect to suppose such instances. An example is “the Participant with God” (since the tradition takes there to be only one God). Necessary and possible universals are those that have individual instances by necessity or contingency. See Mubin, 1:106.

60. Al-Bihārī is responding to the challenge that a child and an old man with limited sight may see different things and identify them all as one; and the same may be true of one’s seeing of specific, but indistinguishable, eggs and then having one form of them imprinted in the mind. As such, the child, who cannot distinguish between the form of the father, mother, brother, and sister, would actually identity each of them with one form, say, of the father. Similarly, the old man with limited sight might see Hassan, Amin, Sumayyah, and Madeline, and, thinking they are all Hassan, would take all the particulars to be the latter. In the example of the egg, a person may be shown different eggs, without being told that they are in fact different eggs. He might then take the form of the egg imprinted in his mind to refer to each one of them, thinking that they are all one and the same egg. In each case, given the definition above, a particular—father, Hassan, egg—becomes a universal, because it refers to several instances. As usual, al-Bihārī does not elaborate on the solution, pointing out doctrinally and only as a quick hint that, in such cases, the intellect does not allow the multiplicity of the instances when they are collected under one rubric. It is in the commentaries that al-Bihārī’s hint is fleshed out. For we learn that the meaning of universal requires that the various instances occur to the subject not by way of substitution (\(\text{tabdīl}\)), but by way of being collected together under one rubric. In the examples at hand, each instance, though indistinguishable from another, occurs as a substitute of the previous one, not as an instance, which, when collected with others, would fall under one rubric. In fact, if the instances were so collected, the intellect would not allow father, Hassan, and egg to apply to the several cases gathered under them. See al-Pishāwarī, Dumām, 30; Mubin, 1:106.

61. If it is the extramential form itself that obtains in the mind, then if several people have the mental form of the former, this extramential particular has become multiple. As such, it can be said of many things (i.e., the mental forms) and can be a predicate for them. Yet extramential particulars are not supposed to be universals or predicates.
62. The second part of the definition would have solved the problem, because the extramental Zayd is not extracted from the mental Zayds and is not their shadow. Rather, the mental forms are extracted from the extramental Zayd.

63. If this solution were granted, then one form, Zayd, would have multiple mental shadows, each one in each mind. And there would not be one shadow, extracted from many instances, that captures them all. In other words, the second part of the definition that requires one shadow to be extracted from the multiple cases is violated by the case, where in fact multiple shadows are being extracted from one case.

64. In other words, what is needed in a universal is that one shadow, extracted from the multiple instances, should capture the many instances, not that there should be many shadows of one thing.

65. This would be the case because of the doctrine of things themselves obtaining in the mind. The argument is that, if we imagine that the form of the extramental Zayd itself obtains in the mind, then, when it occurs to multiple minds, we end up with several abstracted Zayds, each one of which is true of the one extramental Zayd. At the same time, since it is the extramental form itself that is taken to obtain in the mind (and not its simulacra), then the extramental Zayd himself is true of each of the mental forms. And insofar as they are one and the same, if the first is abstracted from and is the shadow of the second, so the second is abstracted from and is the shadow of the first. In this sense, it is entirely proper to say that it is the extramental Zayd that is the shadow of the mental Zayds and is extracted from them. A further consequence in this scenario is that both the mental forms of Zayd and the extramental Zayd function both as the universal and the particular. See Mubīn, 1:108–9.

66. In other words, a universal is that whose sense applies to many extramental things.

67. Since the definition of the universal is now clearly articulated as that whose sense applies to many extramental things, the test for whether the doubt is valid has also been identified. If the mental form in any individual mind may correspond to many extramental things, then this mental form would be a universal. In the case at hand, even if there are multiple minds, each with its own form of Zayd, each one is still a particular form of that one extramental Zayd. It precludes the possibility of its application to multiple extramentals. As such, neither the mental form nor the extramental Zayd is a universal.

68. These are universals because the intellect does not preclude their multiplicity in the extramental world (unlike the case of Zayd above). Al-Pishāwārī (Ḍumām, 32) explains that supposed universals are said to be universals insofar as they are contradictories of existing realities. For example, “nothing” is a supposed universal and a reality insofar as it is the contradictory of an existing reality, i.e., “thing.” A fuller explanation of this cryptic passage is given by Mubīn (1:109). He explains that the challenge is that a universal is defined as that which may conceivably be said of extramental multiplicities; yet, recognized universals, such as second intentions, cannot have multiple extramental instances. So the definition of the universal is flawed. The response is that, since second intentions and supposed universals as such do not have an ipseity and a particularity (al-hādhiyya wa-l-khuṣūṣiyya) any more than “thing,” their mere conceptualization does not force the intellect to preclude the possibility of their extramental multiplicity. There is no denotative specificity for these items—unlike the case of the extramental Zayd or the particular mental forms of this Zayd, for example—that precludes this possibility. We recall, however, that second intentions,
insofar as they are mental objects, do have a specific nature, at least according to the various commentators of the Sullam. Thus, the only way to make sense of this suggestion is to recognize that, once a conceptualization is posited, it may be taken with regard to itself and without regard to the fact of its mental concoction. As a conceptualization, there is nothing about the second intention that precludes the possibility of its multiplicity; in consideration of it as a certain kind of conceptualization, it is a this, so that such a possibility cannot be granted.

69. Real particulars, which have the characteristic of not being said of many, are also relative particulars, because they fall under certain universals. The difference between the two types is simply that the real particular is defined in terms of itself, i.e., that which is not said of many. The relative particular is defined in terms of its relation to universals, i.e., that which falls under a universal.

70. An example would be “man” and “rational.”

71. This is to say that, with respect to some instances, the two universals will mutually differ and that, in some respects, one will be more general than the other and, in others, it will be more specific. Al-Pishāwari (Dumām, 34) gives the example of “animal” and “white” as two universals. The individual instance “black horse” will fall under animal, but not white; “white garment” will fall under white, but not animal; and “white horse” will fall under both. With respect to the first two instances, there is a mutual distinction between the two universals, and each is either more general or more particular than the other. But the differentiation is not complete, since there is an overlap with reference to some instances.

72. In other words, with respect to the instances of one universal, the other will pick them all out, but not vice versa. So this is also a partial differentiation. Examples are “man” and “animal.” Thus, the four types of universals are those that (1) completely overlap with each other; (2) completely fail to overlap with each other; (3) partly fail to overlap with respect to both universals; and (4) partly fail to overlap with respect to one universal, but not with respect to the other.

73. As we will see below, the discussion is clearly about universals and sets, but in keeping with this opening statement, I have generally adopted “thing” as a translation and in the explanations.

74. Al-Pishāwari (Dumām, 34) explains as follows. Let us assume that the two contradictories of “man” and “rational,” i.e., “nonman” and “nonrational,” are not equal. Then there will be certain instances of “nonman” that are not “nonrational,” so that they are rational. This in turn means that rational and man are not equal, since the former also picks out instances of the contradictory of the latter. But this is absurd, because the two were given as equals. Thus, the contradictory of the posit, i.e., that “nonman” and “nonrational” are not equal, must be the case. See also Mubīn, 1:113.

75. The contradiction of the mutual truth of two universals over instances is the denial of their mutual truth over these instances. Otherwise, the Sullam asserts, the two will be mutually differentiated, because one of two mutually equal things would include instances of the contradictory of the other. This is the Sullam’s argument for the equality of the contradictories of two things equal with respect to their truth-value; it requires the critical step that the denial of the mutual truth of two equal universals over instances results in their mutual differentiation, such that one picks out instances of the contradictory of the other.
According to the challenger, the denial of the mutual truth of two equals with respect to instances does not reduce to the assertion of their mutual differentiation, i.e., that one must be exactly that which is true of the contradictory of the other. It only reduces to the denial of their mutual truth over all instances. The elaboration in Mubīn (1:114) is that mutual differentiation presupposes existential import, whereas the negation of mutual truth does not. Take, for example, “man” and “rational” as two equal universals. Their contradictories would be “nonman” and “nonrational.” If it is false that “Every nonman is nonrational,” then the contradictory, “Some nonman is not nonrational,” must be true. But this latter does not entail “Some nonman is rational” because a divested (maḍūla) negative proposition does not entail the truth of an affirmative. The subject of the former may have no existential import, but the latter must. Thus, one can claim that the mutual truth of the universals is removed; this is mere negation, but it does not necessitate mutual differentiation, because the latter requires existential import. In turn, if differentiation cannot be guaranteed, a critical step in al-Bihārī’s proof cannot be granted.

76. “The nonthing” and “the nonpossible” are examples. This is a further proof of the claim of the challenger. The argument is that if we take “thing” and “possible” as two equal universals, then by the reductio argument used above, some instances of “nonthing” will fall under “possible,” so that a mutual differentiation between “possible” and “thing” would be generated. But there are no instances of “nonthing,” so that all we can really assert is the absence of mutual truth, not mutual differentiation grounded in the instances picked out.

77. Mubīn (1:115) offers the following observations. If “Everything is possible,” then “Every nonthing is non-possible” (the two contradictories of two equals are equal). The latter, however, is to be taken with the force of the negative “Whatever is not a thing is not possible.” Its negation is “Some of what is not a thing is not a nonpossible” (the removal of the mutual truth). This last proposition is the same as “Some of what is not a thing is a possible” because the negation of a negation is an affirmation. And this last is equivalent to “Some nonthing is a possible” (mutual differentiation). Thus, the removal of mutual truth entails mutual differentiation, a key step in the proof. The encompassing concepts that would allow the foregoing argument to work must be those that do not have a negation attached to them. In such a case, their contradictories include negation, so as not to require existential import. By contrast, “Every non-Participant with God” is the equivalent of “every joining of two contradictories” because these two are impossible. However, the contradictories of these two would yield that “Every Participant with God is a joining of two contradictories.” This latter would require that the subject exist; but it does not. Following these discussions, Mubīn (1:116) expresses the concern that the purpose of logic is to supply general rules and that such exceptions to propositions and the rules governing them seem to violate the project of logic.

78. “The non-Participant with God,” for example, is an encompassing concept because it applies to everything that is in actuality (fī l-wāqi’); its contradictory will not pick out any instances.

79. For example, let us take animal and man, the former as the more general and the latter more particular, where the former entirely encompasses the latter. The rule is that if the general does not exist, the particular does not either; but the general may exist even in the absence of the particular. Given this rule, if we take the contradictories of animal and man as nonanimal and nonman respectively, then nonman will be more general than
Notes

240

nonanimal. This is so because if there is no nonman, then there is no nonanimal either, though nonman (say, a horse) can exist, even if there is no nonanimal. See Mubīn, 1:116.

80. This is the meaning described in the last endnotes.

81. The point is that man, as a universal, is encompassed by the more general notion “nonjoining of two contradictories.” By the rule posited above, nonman would be more general than the joining of two contradictories. But this leads to at least two problems: nonman is not necessarily something that would be predicated of the joining of two contradictories (horse is an example); and the joining of two contradictories has no existential import, so that it cannot be taken as the subject of a proposition. This means that the aforementioned rule about contradictories is flawed.

82. This is so because the contradictory of the more general would now become more particular.

83. That which is necessary carries an impossibility of nonexistence and that which is impossible carries a necessity of nonexistence. Thus, where one can claim the necessity of \( x \), one can also claim the impossibility of \( \neg x \). Given that a general possibility is defined as that which includes the special possible and the necessity of \( x \), the nongeneral possible is equivalent to the impossibility of \( x \). This would not pose a problem were it not for the confusion that the necessity of \( x \) also implies an impossibility. And this gives the impression that the nonspecial possible is the general possible; but every nongeneral possible is also a non-special possible. Thus, every nongeneral possible is a general possible. See Mubīn, 1:117.

84. This fallacy is also discussed in Avicenna. See Ahmed, “Barbara.”

85. Since the general possible is an all-encompassing concept—given that it includes everything that is not impossible—it can be excluded from the rules of the relation of the generality and particularity of contradictories.

86. The relationship between the contradictories of two types of things is investigated in this section. The first set of two things overlaps; the second set of two things is entirely distinct from each other. In such cases, the contradictories will have partial differentiation from each other.

87. The foregoing discussion was about generality and particularity in an absolute sense, such that whatever was a particular fell within the class of the general. In the case to be discussed, the particular and general may share some instances, but not necessarily all; in fact they must be differentiated from each other at least by virtue of some instances. The Sullam wishes to establish the rule that the contradictories of such cases will be distinct from each other with respect to some total set in which neither can participate.

88. So when one thing is true, the contradictory of the other is true; and vice versa. This would mean that there must be some total set within which the contradictory of the two must not overlap, i.e., they must have a mutual differentiation with respect to some instances. Examples are given below.

89. The argument is very condensed. The Sullam is arguing the point that, when there is a relationship of complete mutual distinction between two things, then their contradictories will stand in a relationship of partial distinction. Let’s take up the first example as an illustration. Nonstone and nonanimal have a partial differentiation by virtue of the total differentiation between their contradictories, stone and animal. The differentiation is partial because nonstone and nonanimal do overlap, for example, in the case of an instance, such as a wooden chair. Yet the contradictory of nonstone, stone, must fall only within the space
of nonanimal; and the contradictory of nonanimal, animal, must only fall within the set, nonstone. These are the ranges within which the two contradictories would be differentiated. See Mubin, 1:118.

90. Mubin (1:118f.) writes that there is a relationship of overlap between white and man, because they may both be said truly of a white man, and each may also be true without the other. The same relationship holds between their contradictories, nonman and nonwhite. For example, they may both be true of a black horse, and each may be true of something of that the other is not: for example, nonman would be true of a white garment, to the exclusion of nonwhite, and nonwhite would be true of a brown man to the exclusion of nonman. This relationship, in turn, implies a particular mutual distinction between the two contradictories, precisely in the space of the original overlap. Similarly, stone and animal stand in a relationship of mutual distinction, but their contradictories, nonstone and nonanimal, have partial overlap (as in the case of chair, above). This implies that there is also a partial mutual distinction between these contradictories.

91. Mubin (1:119) explains that, if we take thing and nonman as the two universals, then there would indeed be overlap between them; the relationship would not be of absolute generality and particularity, because nonman would exclude man, which would still be a thing, and both would include horse. Now, according to the rules just established, there would be a relationship of overlap between one of these universals and the contradictory of the other. Yet here, between nonthing and man, there is no overlap (and, by implication, no particular distinction). The reason is that, though the contradictory of nonman would be particular in relation to thing, nonthing would not be particular in relation to nonman. There is no existential import that nonthing carries.

92. The universal’s reality is either the same as that of each of the individual instances or it is a reality that is completely shared by these instances and another species. A case of the former is man (species), a reality shared by John and William; a case of the latter is animal (genus) a reality shared completely by John and William and horses. Or the universal may be something that is not shared completely among species, though some other reality may be shared by them. An example would be rational (specific difference) as that which is specific to man, but not shared with other species of animal.

93. This is of course the enumeration of the five predicables: three are internal to a reality, i.e., constitutive of it; and two are external to it, i.e., nonconstitutive. The last two types are risible (property), specific to a single reality (man), and walking (common accident), not specific, but shared among animals.

94. The accident, taken absolutely, is something that inheres in a substrate, but is neither a predicate nor conditioned by the substrate. The accidental is the accident unconditioned by any qualification, including the condition of absoluteness; it is a universal that is a predicate and is said of many. See Mubin, 1:121.

95. Identified as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 907/1501 CE) in his Ḥāshiya qadīma (on Qūshjī [d. 879/1474] on Ṭūsī’s [d. 672/1274] Tajrid al-‘aqāʿ id) by Mubin (1:121).

96. For example, white, without any explicit conditions or considerations, i.e. with respect to itself, is that which will be predicated of something by its very nature; so insofar as it is what it is, it will be an accidental. With the condition that it should subsist in something, it will be that very thing in which it subsists (such as a white gown); so it will be a substrate. Finally, with the condition that it should not be conditioned in any way,
including that it should be in a substrate, it would be an accident. Thus, the claim is that there is no real distinction between the three; the distinction lies in the mode of consideration. See Mubin, 1:121.

97. The examples relate to Islamic positive law on the number of permitted wives and the purity of water. In the former case, four is an accidental in relation to women since it is external to them. In the latter case, the cubit is an accident as it inheres in the substrate water. Yet both are being predicated, thereby indicating a unity between them and their substrates. The distinctions among them are, therefore, only owing to mental consideration. See Mubin, 1:122.

98. We can take the example of man as a substrate and of knowledge as the accident and of knowing as the derivative accidental.

99. Al-Dawānī had argued that there is an essential unity between the accident, the accidental, and the substrate for the accident. The difference among them is owing to the three considerations pertaining to the conditions noted above. Now the accident does not signify the substrate in which it inheres or any relation between itself and the substrate, since these are unified; because the accidental is mentally derived from the accident, it does not signify these things either. Nor does the accidental signify the accident, since it is derived from it. See Mubin, 1:122. Ḥasan (Sharḥ, 125ff.) offers a detailed discussion and refutation of this position.

100. The reader might ask what the accidental is if it signifies neither the relation of the accident and the substrate nor the substrate with the inhering quality. The answer is that it only functions to the extent that it supplies a description such as black (aswād) in the unconditioned sense, as explained above. “Black,” as accidental, does not mean “black thing” in the general manner, or “black swan” in the specific manner; nor does it mean the accident black. Mubin offers a useful example to clarify this point. He states that if the sense of the substrate were included in the meaning of the accidental, then the result would be that a thing would be predicated of itself. In turn, this would mean that the predication was of necessity, though an accidental is not predicated of necessity of its substrate. For example, if risible (al-dāḥik) included the substrate, it would mean “the man who has laughter” (al-insān lahu al-dāḥk). Thus, in saying that “man is risible,” one would really be saying that “man is a man who has laughter.” And this would be true of necessity. Mubin (1:122) elaborates further and offers a response.

101. See Ḥasan, Sharḥ, 129: “[That which] aids the doctrine of this speaker in his claim of the unity of the accident and the substrate is that the sense of Avicenna’s statement [should be taken to be the following.] There is a unity of the existence of the accident and the substrate; the unity of the existence of two things entails the unity of their essences, since two mutually distinct things do not unify for [Avicenna]. This is an extreme error and Avicenna is absolutely innocent of what the claimant attributes to him. For the doctrine of the unity of the essence and existence of that which inheres and the substrate is among the most ridiculous things.” For further comments on refutations of this reading of Avicenna and on arguments against him, see Mubin, 1:123.

102. Thus, for example, the genus would be said of man and horse and cow, as the reality of each of these is different.

103. For example, “animal” as a response to “What is it?” when asked about man, horse, and cow, captures the quiddity of each one insofar as all of what these quiddities share is
contained in the response. On the other hand, “body” does not capture all that is shared among the quiddities of man, horse, and cow (such as the fact of being sentient).

104. Species or a complete definition is offered in response to the question, “What is it?” when it is asked about the specific quiddity of Zayd (man, rational animal). It is also offered when one inquires about Zayd, John, and William, when they have a shared reality (man). However, when the question is asked about a horse, Zayd, and a cow, all of which have distinct realities, then genus is offered in response to the question (animal).

105. If the genus is the complete shared reality of a thing and is essential for it, then two genera of the same level cannot exist for a single essence. The reason is that one of them would be redundant and dispensable. However, that which is essential for something cannot be dispensable. See Mubīn, 1:126f.

106. If there were no unity of existence for the species and genus, then the latter would be distinct from the former and would not be predicated of it (yet genus is predicated of species). There are two reasons for this outcome. The first is that, if the species is the product of the addition of a specific difference to a genus, then both of the latter are parts and causes of the species. Yet a part is not predicated of the whole; nor is a cause predicated of the effect. Secondly, one may certainly say that the intellect can join together a specific difference and a genus to form a species. Yet, as mental parts are not parts with respect to reality, all one would have constituted in this fashion would be a composite quiddity that only corresponds in some way to reality. Thus, species and genus are unified with respect to existence and do not exist by means of two distinct existences. See Mubīn, 1:127.

107. The genus is something divested of positive existence (amr mubham). It has positive investment only insofar as it is a species (as we will see below). As such, it cannot temporally exist before the species, i.e., in a manner that it first exists and then has a specific difference added to it. However, one may say that genus does have priority in terms of conceptualization. See Mubīn, 1:128.

108. This is an example meant to demonstrate that genus, in itself, is an ambiguous and a nonpositive/divested reality that has no existence unless it is a species. Color must exist as black or green or blue, etc. But black is not something external that is added (amr zaʿid khārij) to color to make it a black color. Color is itself black color or green color or blue color, etc. The separation of its parts is a product of mental exercise, but these mental parts are not real; they are not added together piecemeal to generate a species of color. This in turn is meant to prove the unity (ittiḥād) of species and genus in mental and extramental realities and to refute the doctrine that species are generated by means of the joining of parts (indimām). See Mubīn, 1:127f.; Qāḍī, 99ff.

109. This statement is meant to disambiguate the nature of genus and species. For it may be argued that, just as the genus is ambiguous unless it exists as a species, so a species is ambiguous unless it exists as an individuated instance. The response is that the genus must exist as species in order for its meaning to obtain. As for the species, the individuated instance is needed for one to be able to point to it, not so that its meaning may obtain. Such a meaning is already a positive and invested reality.

110. If body is taken with the condition of absoluteness and no qualification—such as capable of growth, sentient, and so on—can be added to it, then it is matter. As such, it cannot be predicated of man. See Mubīn, 1:129.
111. For example, if body is taken with the condition of the addition of growth to it, then it is a species of body simpliciter. See Mubin, 1:129.

112. That is, without regard to any condition, be it the condition that something is added or the condition that nothing is added. It is as such that the body is said of many. See Mubin, 1:130.

113. A composite essence is anything whose reality is composed of form and matter, such as a body; a simple essence is one that is not composite, such as whiteness and blackness. See Mubin, 1:130.

114. Mubin, (1:130) explains that matter and genus exist with reference to the composite and simple only because of the supposition of the intellect and by means of analysis; they do not exist with respect to the way these things are given outside mental manipulation. Therefore, since the intellect takes, for example, that which is simple as a genus, i.e., unconditionally, it is not always apparent how genus would not be true of it when it is taken with a view to another consideration, i.e., with the condition that nothing be added to it. As Mubin puts it, “genus obtains with the consideration of a meaning [i.e., unconditionality] that the intellect supposes to exist with respect to the simple; and matter obtains only when [the intellect] makes [that which is taken unconditionally] specific. [This happens] insofar as [the simple] is taken with the condition that nothing [is added to it], while it is [also] specified in relation to the unconditionality that is on the level of genus” (Mubin, 1:130). In other words, the consideration that the simple must be taken with the condition that nothing is to be added to it (so that it may be considered as matter) must occur insofar as the simple is taken by the intellect as unconditioned, i.e., insofar as it is genus. Hence the difficulty.

115. When a specific difference (say, rational) is taken unconditionally (lā bi-shārt ṣayʾ), it is predicated of man; if it is taken with the condition of a specific individuation (bi-shārt ṣayʾ), then it is the species man itself; and when it is taken with the condition that it is not to be specifically individuated (bi-shārt lā shayʾ), then it is neither predicated of man nor is it the species man. In the last case, it is a form, and it stands as a constitutive cause of the species man or as a cause of the positive existence of the genus. As such, it is a cause of man, and a cause can neither be the same as an effect nor be predicated of it. See Mubin, 1:131ff.

116. In other words, genus, species, specific difference, property, and common accident all fall under “universal.”

117. This is a problem that is discussed under the category of the natural universal, which shall be presented below. The gist of the problem is that, since the universal is said of all the predicables, it is more general than all of them, including genus. As such, it is the genus of all the five predicables. By the same token, since the universal is a genus for them, genus is properly said of it; and so it is also an instance of genus and, therefore, more specific than it. See Mubin, 1:134.

118. When one considers the essence of genus as that which is said of many different realities in response to the question, “What is it?” then it is essentially a universal (since a universal is that which is said of many different things). And so “universal” becomes a genus of the genus. However, the universal may in fact be other things (such as a species), so that its being a genus is something that is true of it insofar as one of its particulars (in this case, genus) comes to substantiate it accidentally; in this sense, the universal’s being a genus is nonessential to it. See Bahr al-ʿulūm, 83; Mubin, 1:134.
119. The objection was that, since a universal is a genus and a genus is a specific instance of a universal, then a universal is an individual instance of itself. However, an individual instance is other than a thing of which it is an individual instance. So a universal is something other than itself. The solution, as noted, is that a universal is a genus only accidentally, though a genus is a universal essentially.

120. It is given that everything exists as individuated in the sense that it is a substrate that is individuated by something other than it, i.e., an individuation that obtains for it by virtue of something else that comes to inhere in it. As a substrate and so by virtue of itself, a universal is both existent and is said of many. It is a particular by virtue of something other than itself, i.e., something accidental to it. Thus, by virtue of itself, the universal exists as that which is said of many; and by virtue of the individuating accident, it is particularized and is divided into many instances. See Mubin, 1:136.

121. The commentaries explain this very cryptic statement to be a response to the challenge that, if the individuation is the universal itself or a part of it (and not because of something that comes to inhere in it accidentally), then the universal cannot be said of many (since it is individuated essentially). As such, then, the universal will actually be a particular. The response is simply not to grant that particularization is something essential or internal (dākhil) to the universal. In fact, particularization is itself a thing that is nonexistent in itself (amr ʿadamī) and is extracted by a mental process from a particularized universal at whichever level a universal may exist (species, genus, etc.). For example, the species man exists as a particularization of the genus animal, a particularization that has come to inhere in it and is not essential to the genus. There is then no essential difference between man and horse as genera; the difference lies in the mind's abstraction of that which particularizes the genus. Similarly, there is no difference between Zayd and 'Amr as species; but as individuals, the difference lies in the process of the mental consideration of certain aspects of the particularized species that allows for a physical pointing out of this Zayd and this 'Amr. In principle, this position would lead one to the denial of any real particularization of any entity (or perhaps to wahdat al-wujūd). On this, see the comments in Mubin, 1:137, 166ff.; Bahr al-ʿulūm, 83–84, 107ff. (esp. 112–13); Mubārak, 159ff.

122. In other words, each reality is a species insofar as the reality is taken along with the consideration of the act that restricts it by that which falls under it. This consideration of the act of restriction is that whereby the hīṣa obtains. For example, the reality "animal," when taken with the act of restriction by what falls under it, "man," causes the hīṣa "animal-as-man" to obtain. Thus, the hīṣa obtains by means of the consideration of the act of restriction that posits a reality in a governed relation—the animality of man (ḥaywāniyyat al-insān)—with what lies under it. The species is the reality of each thing when so considered. The Sullam commentaries on the subject terms, which will be discussed below, take hīṣa to refer to that substrate with respect to which the act of restriction is taken to be internal to the consideration of the substrate, but the restriction is considered external to it. Existence-as-Zayd, for example, is a hīṣa of existence insofar as the act of restricting existence by Zayd is taken into consideration; but Zayd himself is not a restriction in the consideration of this part of existence that is Zayd. See Mubin, 1:137.

123. The real species is a universal said in response to the question, “What is it?” with a view to its parts. A relative species is a universal said in response to the same question, but with a view to what lies above it. For example, man is a real species in view of the shared
realities of Zayd, John, and 'Amr, which are its parts. However, animal is a relative species since it is a species in relation to the genus "natural body capable of growth"; it is, however, the genus of man, horse, and cow. Mubīn (1:138) explains that a quiddity can be understood in three ways: (1) that which is said in response to "what is it?"; (2) that by virtue of which a thing is what it is; (3) that which obtains in the intellect. According to him, the Sullam holds the third of these to be the real meaning of a quiddity. As such, then, Ethiopian and Roman are also quiddities and these are said of particulars like Zayd, John, etc. But the response to "What is it?" when asked of Romans and Ethiopians would not constitute the relative species of Zayd, John, etc. This is so because they are Romans, Ethiopians, etc. *because* they are humans. It is for this reason that the qualifier is added that the response cannot be based on something that is itself mediated.

124. The simple species does not have any species above or below it, such as the intellect (which only has the genus "substance" above it; the ten celestial intellects are its individuated instances). The ordered species has species both above and below it, such as animal. See Mubin, 1:141.

125. The *infima species* and the *summum genus*.

126. In other words, a genus is a genus in consideration of the fact that it is more general than something and a species is a species in consideration of the fact that it is more particular than something. This is a distinction between the two in view of the fact that the same thing, such as animal, is both a species and a genus: it is a species when it is taken in a governed relation to its parts (animal-as-man is a species) and it is a genus when it is an unconditioned substrate (animal simpliciter is a genus of man).

127. See Mubin (1:142): The question, "Which thing is it?" distinguishes a specific difference from species and genus (these latter are said in response to "What is it?"). And the qualifier, "with respect to its substance," distinguishes specific difference from property, which is said with respect to the accident of a thing, not with respect to its essence.

128. These are all consequences if it is granted that the specific difference is the cause of the positive and defined existence of the genus. The first is that, as a cause of the genus, the specific difference itself cannot be caused by the latter. The second is that, as a simple and constitutive essential cause, the specific difference can only be related in this manner to one reality. If a second specific difference were also to constitute independently the same reality, one of two essential constitutive elements would be dispensable. In such a case, that which is essential for a thing would be separable from it. The third consequence is that only one single species can be constituted by a single specific difference; otherwise, a simple reality would produce two effects. The fourth consequence is related to the third, in that, if a specific difference were the cause of the positive reality of the genus, then it would be the cause of two distinct species in its relation to two genera of the same level. In this fashion it would be essentially constitutive of two distinct realities. The fifth and final consequence is that the specific difference of substance would be substance. Otherwise, it would be accident, as is claimed by the *ishrāqīs*; but this cannot be the case because the accident requires substance in order to exist and so cannot be its cause. See Mubin, 1:145–48.

129. See Mubin, 1:149: The possibility is false because the categories are the most general of predicates and a specific difference is not among the categories.

130. The specific difference is either the most general of things or falls under such a thing. The former cannot be true, because (among other reasons) it falls under the category
of what is shared by many. So, if one inquires about what it is that essentially distinguishes a specific difference from other such shared things, the response is that it is distinguished by such and such a specific difference. One then inquires about what distinguishes this specific difference. And so on. In other words, in order to give a definition of specific difference, one has to fall into an infinite regress. See Mubin, 1:149–50.

131. The solution is that the specific difference is simple and is not constituted by anything essentially. If it were composite and the general sense—that which is shared by many—were constitutive of it, then it would require a specific difference to distinguish it from others. For example, animal is constitutive of man, horse, and cow. A specific difference is therefore needed for each of these, so each may be distinguished from the other. See Mubin, 1:150.

132. Taken by itself, the proximate specific difference of man is rational and of horse it is neighing; both of course fall under animal. Now, if we take the collection of man and horse, then this collection will also fall under animal in the same way. Yet this collection will now have two proximate specific differences, rational and neighing. But it was stated earlier that two specific differences cannot be constitutive of the same reality.

133. This is another rather cryptic statement. The commentators explain that the doubt mentioned above is grounded in the premise that the universal is true of its individual and collective instances in the same way. Now the objection is that this very premise on which the doubt is based is incorrect. The reason is that if it were true that a universal is said of its individual cases and the collection of them in the same way, then we would say that a compound of form and matter is "cause" in the same way that we say that form and matter is—each of them—a "cause." But, if we do allow this, then the compound, which is the effect of the collection of the form and matter, would be its own cause in the identical way. Since this is absurd, the grounding premise must be incorrect. See Mubin, 1:151.

134. The effect itself is one, although its being an effect is owing to multiple causes. Taken as a unity, this effect is not a cause. It is only from the perspective of being compounded from causes that the effect is said to be a cause. But it is only a cause with a view to this consideration, not in view of reality. Thus, the objection to the premise that led to the doubt is averted. See Bahār al-ʿulūm (96), whose slightly alternative matn readings have been adopted here.

135. This second objection is also against the doubt-producing premise that, if a universal is true of an individual instance, it is also true of a collection of such instances in the same way. The challenger states that, by this premise, we would have to grant that the "participant with the Creator" is possible, though it is held to be philosophically impossible. The reason is that the collection of two "participants with the Creator" would also be a "participant with the Creator" (given the premise above). It would also be a compound; each compound, by its very definition, requires its parts and each of the parts, insofar as they are parts of the compound, require each other. As such, then, the parts are possible in relation to each other. This would make a collection of "the participant with the Creator" both a "participant with the Creator" and possible, though it was established that no participant with the Creator could be possible. The premise must, therefore, be incorrect. The response is simply that this absurdity is produced with a view to the projected and supposed truth of something, not because of the way things are by virtue of their given selves. In other words, once considerations are posited in a certain way—in this case, once we have already
supposed the existence of the collection of “the participant with the Creator”—the absurd consequence will simply unfold from the posited terms of the argument. However, such a proof need not relate to anything insofar as it is independently given prior to the mental posit. See Mubīn, 1:153.

136. The solution to the doubt is simply that, though the universals that apply to individual instances also apply to the collection of those instances, the collection itself is a unity. So those universals also apply to the unity as a unity. For example, man is a rational animal, and horse is an animal that is capable of neighing. The collection of man and horse is animal. So animal is both rational and capable of neighing. But this would lead to the problem of a genus having two distinct proximate specific differences. However, according to the solution, animal has the universals rational and capable of neighing apply to it as a unity as well, not as distinct specific differences. The specific differences are two with reference to two things—man and horse; but they are a unity with reference to the collection of man and horse. Now an objection to this solution is that the unity produced out of two can itself be added to each of these two to produce a fourth unity, which can then be added to the first three to produce a fifth and so on. And this would lead to an absurd infinite regress. The response is that such a regress is only a product of mental consideration, especially of the consideration of the first two things twice, once each by themselves and once as a unity, and so on. Such infinite regresses are the result of mental constructs and are not real in themselves. They can come to an end when the process of mental consideration is interrupted. See Mubīn, 1:154–55.

137. Throughout these passages, I have translated \( lāzīm \) as concomitant owing to the requirement of the sense of the arguments. Given this, I have also translated \( luzūm \) as concomitance and \( mulāzama \) as mutual concomitance (and not, for example, as entailment or implication, which I normally prefer). The reason is that the author begins with statements in view of which entailment and implication or implicans or implicatum, etc., defined as the impossibility of separation or the necessitation of a connection, do not make sense. In other contexts, concomitance is more suitably a translation of \( dawarān \). For further discussions of \( mulāzama \) in the more usual sense of the expression, see Young, “Mulāzama,” 336ff.

138. Examples are as follows. Inseparable property of man: risible; separable property of man: writing in actuality; inseparable accident of crow: black; separable accident of crow: flying in actuality. Finally, separable accidents and properties may be separable in principle but may in fact be perpetual. An example is the movement of the heavens. See Mubīn, 1:156.

139. An extramental necessary concomitant would be blackness for an Ethiopian and a mental necessary concomitant would be “being a subject” for “\( A \)” in the proposition “\( A \) is \( B \).” See Mubīn, 1:156–57.

140. The author is pointing out that perpetual accidents that are separable in fact belong in the class of necessary concomitants. For example, one may claim that motion is separable from the heavens but is perpetually present with them. However, this motion is actually by virtue of the fact that it is necessarily entailed by the First Cause. As such, it is in fact not separable at all; its separability is impossible. See Mubīn, 1:157.

141. Three concomitants have been established so far: (1) concomitant of the quiddity; (2) concomitant of external existence; and (3) concomitant of mental existence. Now, it is known that neither extramental nor mental existence has any part to play in determining
the concomitants of the essence. However, does existence in an absolute sense have any such part to play?

142. This is yet another loaded and cryptic statement that makes sense only in the context of the commentaries. Mubīn explains that the underlying issue is hinted at in the reference to the theologians, who claim that God’s existence is not identical to His essence. The philosophers argue that there are really only three options: the first is that existence is a part of God; the second is that it is external to God; and the third is that it is identical to His essence. The first is rejected because it implies compoundedness, which would lead to the conclusion that God is contingent and not necessary. The second is rejected because an existence that is external to God would require a cause for it to inhere in God. Such a cause must then exist first, so that one would raise the same question about it. This would lead to an infinite regress. This leaves only the third position. The position adopted by the author is that of the theologians, who claim that God’s existence is an external necessary concomitant of the essence of God. Since such a concomitant is necessary for that of which it is a concomitant by definition, it does not require existence, in an absolute sense, as its extraneous cause. Thus, it is not necessary for existence taken absolutely to play a part in determining the concomitants of an essence. See Mubīn, 1:158f.

143. The reason is that, if the conceptualization of the concomitant follows from the conceptualization of that of which it is the concomitant, then the judgment of the concomitance also follows from the conceptualization of both. In other words, if one grants the former, the latter is also granted, thus making the former the more particular case of the latter.

144. In other words, we do not need a proof to demonstrate that both types exist. This is known in a primary fashion. See Mubīn, 1:160.

145. See the discussion in chapter 2 above.

146. For an analysis of this lemma, see chapter 2. Mubīn (2:161) points out that the statement that the infinite regress would end with the interruption of mental considerations appears to contradict the final statement that infinite regress in such cases is not absurd. The solution he offers is that the statement is not to be taken to be an assertion of the absence of absurdity but as a valid claim by virtue of its form: since infinite regress does not exist, one can assert a negation of it. This is so, since negative propositions may have empty subject terms.

147. The logical universal is simply “that which is said of many” and the natural universal is that of which this is said, such as “man,” which is said of many. The former has its appellation because the property of universality is a concern of logic; the latter is a nature, i.e., a reality (ṭabī‘alḥaqīqa). See Mubīn, 1:162.

148. An example of an intelleced universal is “universal man,” which is a consideration of the reality “man” insofar as it is being considered by the intellect as a universal. It obtains only in the intellect. The logical universal also obtains only in the intellect. See Mubīn, 1:162.

149. For example, the sense of species is the logical species, man is a natural species, and man-as-species is an intelleced species. See Mubīn, 1:162.

150. In other words, the intellect considers it insofar as it is stripped of all its accidentals.

151. The last type is considered without regard to anything other than the natural universal itself. Everything, including existence and nonexistence, are disregarded in its consideration in this manner and only its essence and what is essential to it are considered. This is so because, in itself (fīḥaddi’dhātihā), an essence neither requires nor precludes
existence, which is accidental to it. So in itself, such a natural universal neither exists nor fails to exist. Given that it is unconditioned with respect to any accidentals, there is also no requirement that one of two contradictories must obtain for it. See Bah̄r al-ʿulūm, 101; Mubīn, 1:162f.

152. This is another highly elliptical statement. As usual, here the author is responding to an unarticulated objection. The objection is that the natural universal is a general class, divided into three subclasses—the abstracted, the mixed, and the absolute. But the natural unconditioned universal was precisely the absolute. So the natural universal in the absolute sense is the natural universal as a general class. So, how can the unconditioned/absolute sense of the natural universal be a part of the general class. For this would be to divide something into itself and two other things (given that there are three divisions of the natural universal, as just mentioned above). The response is that the natural universal, in the most general manner, does not even have the qualification “absolute.” Thus, “absolute” is one of the types that falls under it. See Mubīn, 1:163.

153. This position is consistent with the discussion of the relation of genera and specific differences. As noted above, each genus has only one proximate specific difference and vice versa. Given this, the existence of the genus and the specific difference is one, though, as existents, the two are distinct in mental consideration. The same may be said of form and matter, as noted above. Similarly, echoing his position above, the author states that the particularization of the natural universal, such as man (which is the only way for it to have positive existence), is the existence of extramental individuated humans.

154. In other words, such a position would be that the individuation of the natural universal is a result of mere mental consideration; it is nothing real by virtue of itself. See Mubīn, 1:165.

155. It seems that the argument is that if the specific individuations of the natural universal are themselves matters of mere mental consideration and the only thing that is real, i.e., not a matter of mere mental consideration, is the natural universal, then insofar as these individuations are sensed, so is the natural universal. If these individuations are sensed in themselves, then the natural universal is sensed in itself (color, light, e.g.); and if they are accidentally sensed, the universal is also accidentally sensed (body, e.g.). The position that individuations are nonexistent by virtue of themselves appears to be that of the Sufis and it is related to the saying, “I did not see any contingent except that I saw God in it.” In other words, the various individuations are shadows of the real existent, God; and insofar as these considered types are apprehended, so is God. As an analogy, the various individuations are considered types; and insofar as they are sensed, so is the natural universal of which they are instances. See Mubīn, 1:165–66.

156. Mubīn (1:165–66) disagrees with this position, pointing out that the sensibles are things that have specific accidentals, such as location. That which is divested of such accidentals cannot be sensed.

157. This is the doctrine that the extramentally existent is not compounded of a universal and its particularization. Rather, it is a simple particular, without any parts. The universals are extracted from these and have no existence apart from this mental consideration. See Mubīn, 1:167.

158. If the extramental existent, say Zayd, is entirely simple, then how can one extract “rational” and “animal” from it? For these latter two must be true of Zayd and must,
therefore, correspond to him as two distinct universals. So Zayd must be a composite, but he was taken to be simple. The two mutually distinct things are the simplicity and the compoundedness of Zayd.

159. The correct position is that the abstracted universal exists in the mind. Mubin interprets the judgment of the Sullam thus. See Mubin, 1:169.

160. This is a rather important passage that ties, as an undercurrent, many of the underlying themes of the work together. It has been established so far that the natural universal, when it is mixed with accidentals, does exist in extramental reality (take, for example, the universal “man,” which exists in the individuated instances as walking, talking, etc.). Likewise, the absolute natural universal also exists extramentally insofar as it is particularized in individual instances of “man.” But in this latter case, the mental consideration is indifferent to anything other than the universal itself, including existence and nonexistence. However, the universal that is divested of all accidentals—mental and extramental—cannot, by definition, exist extramenteally, since to exist extramentally, it must have its extramental accidentals. If the Platonic Forms are such abstracted universals, then they also cannot exist extramenteally, though of course Plato held this to be the case. Now a further problem is whether such universals can exist even mentally, because to exist mentally, they also entail certain mental concomitants, though they are supposed to be entirely divested of all concomitant accidentals. Yet surely, if they also cannot exist mentally, then how can one pass any judgment about them, including the judgment that they cannot exist mentally? The answer the author provides to this paradox can be taken as an underlying axiom of the work, namely, that the intellect can conceptualize anything, including contradictories. See Mubin, 1:169; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 112.

161. The verbal identification would be no more than to turn the mind to the consideration of other forms that already have a positive existence. For example, in the identification of “lion” one may say that it is an asad. The real identification would offer the genus and specific difference. See Mubin, 1:169–70.

162. These are two subdivisions of the real identification. The former would be for something like man and the latter for something like a griffin. This position is of course based on the doctrine of things themselves (not their image-forms/simulacra—ashbāḥ) obtaining in the mind; it is only in this sense that one can state that, if the extramental existence of the form is known, then the form is with respect to reality. See Mubin, 1:170.

163. In other words, if one is true of something, the other is also true of it. For example, if man is true of something, so is rational animal.

164. The function of identification is to distinguish a thing from other things. Neither that which is more general nor that which is more specific than a thing is able to identify it in this manner. As noted, the thing identified and that which identifies it must both be equal with respect to their truthful applications to the instances. For example, “animal” cannot identify man, because it picks out not just man, but also horse, ox, etc. The two are not equal with respect to their truthful application over the same instances. See Mubin, 1:172.

165. This is the position of the ancients, for whom distinction from just some (not all) of what is other than the thing identified is sufficient. However, if one wishes for a complete identification, then the condition of the equality of the identifier and thing identified is posited as a necessary condition. See Mubin, 1:173; Bahr al-ʿulūm, 118.
166. In other words, in a complete definition, it is necessary to restrict the genus with the specific difference and vice versa. The reason is that this is one composite form corresponding to a unified defined thing. See Mubin, 1:174.

167. In other words, it is divested of any positive individuated existence and may be said of many things, as was discussed above.

168. This discussion is in keeping with what preceded. As one may conceptualize anything, one may certainly also conceptualize a genus *insofar as* it is intellected *along with* certain restrictions, with a consideration that these restrictions are internal to the genus, not something added to it. As such, this intellected genus is simple, individuated, and unified. For example, the genus animal may be taken in the mind as a simple type that is internally restricted by rationality that is included in it (rationality is not something taken to be externally added to it). As such the genus animal is still a genus and does not change into the species man; rationality is simply that whereby the mind causes this genus to obtain as a positive reality. See Mubin, 1:176.

169. In other words, in the case of the mental analysis and consideration of the genus as something that has not obtained positively, one may observe the different parts as not unified. This would be a consideration that is opposite the consideration where the genus is taken as including a restriction that causes it to obtain positively as a unity. See Mubin, 1:176.

170. With respect to the consideration at hand, the genus is given as ambiguous and various other parts are attached to it as external to it. In other words, it is not given as something unified that obtains along with parts that are internal to it. The former is the definition and the latter is the thing that is intellected. In the case of the latter, none of the parts can be predicated of another; nor can any part be predicated of the whole. See Mubin, 1:176.

171. In the sense that one part is described, and the other part is the description for the first. See Mubin, 1:177.

172. This long passage on definition is consistent with earlier discussions of the ontological status of definitions. We may recall that, for al-Bihārī, the positive existence of any genus is because of the specific difference, which is united with it in actual fact. The distinction between the genus and the specific difference is a function of mental operations; otherwise, the genus is itself ambiguous, i.e., divested of a positive existence and individuation. In line with this position, al-Bihārī is claiming that each one of the definitional parts is distinct from the other, with a view to a certain mental consideration. As such, no part of a definition can be predicated of another part or of the composite of the parts. However, when the ambiguous status of a genus is restricted and limited internally by another mentally considered definitional part, then the unity of the two obtains a positive existence. It is this unified thing that we call the thing defined; and it is in this sense that the definition and the defined thing are identical. The definition may properly be predicated of such a thing. A passage from Mubin (1:177f.) is quite helpful here. He writes: “The genus is ambiguous (*mubham*) with respect to the specific differences that come to inhere [in it] and with respect to the species composed from it, and [the genus] may not have a positive reality and may not obtain (*tahaqquq*) without these two—for actually obtaining and existing cannot come about without individuation (*ta‘ayyun*). And since [the genus] obtains when its ambiguity is removed because of these two, it obtains also in the mind because of these two. However, since conceptualization pertains to everything, it pertains also to the genus.
insofar as it is unique [i.e., insofar as it is individuated internally by means of a specific difference]. So it has a unique existence in the mind, insofar as it is intellected, not insofar as it has a positive existence [by virtue of itself]. This is so because it has no positive existence [by virtue of itself] either in the mind or in extramental [reality] without the connection with specific differences. So, insofar as it is intellected, the mind creates a unique existence for it. Then it adds something to it, like a specific difference. [However,] this addition is not something extraneous to the genus that attaches to it, like form in relation to matter and whiteness in relation to the body, lest the genus be something [with a positive existence] in itself and the addition be something else that is added to it (as in the case of a form and whiteness). Rather, it is such that the mind qualifies the genus with this addition, so that the genus may have a positive reality and individuation by means of it. So the genus comprises this meaning and this meaning is encompassed in it. So, with respect to this encompassing and comprising, when the genus becomes a positive reality, it is not something [other than what was added to it]. For it is owing to becoming a positive reality that it becomes individuated; it does not change [into something else because of this]."

173. For example, to identify or define "man," one may use the definiens man or rational animal. The former is nothing other than the definiendum and the latter is nothing other than all the parts of the definiendum, which is the same as the definiendum. Thus, in both cases, the definiens is nothing other than the definiendum; it supplies something that was already available.

174. Al-Bihārī has adopted the position that there is indeed a distinction between the tafsīlī and ijmālī existence of a thing. The former is the definition, where all the parts are distinct in actuality; the latter is the thing defined, where the parts are unified in actuality. As such, al-Rāzī’s critique that to identify a quiddity by means of definitional conceptualization is nothing other than to supply something that has already obtained (given that the parts of the thing defined is the thing itself) and that all conceptualizations are, therefore, primary (and not acquired), is rejected. Al-Bihārī’s position is rather interesting, in that he is arguing that it is by means of definition, i.e., the mental act of giving a positive existence to an ambiguous genus by means of the specific difference that is included (not added externally) in it, that the thing defined comes to obtain as individuated. This leaves open the question of whether any defined quiddity is real outside such mental operations and considerations. To put it differently, the positive existence of each level of conceptualized quiddity is dependent on the particularized and individualized instances (animal-as-rational, living being-as-animal, etc.) that are the product of mental specification. Thus, substance is only an ambiguous intellected thing that is a positive existence only insofar as it is qualified/restricted mentally as, say, body; body is an ambiguous intellected thing that is a positive existence only insofar as it is qualified mentally as, say, growing body. And so on. See Mubīn, 1:178f. and especially Bahr al-ʿulūm, 112ff.

175. The main issue being discussed here is whether providing a better-known synonym for an expression is an act of conceptualization or an assent. Al-Bihārī’s position is that it is the former. The implicit challenge posed to him is that when we explain that a certain term is posited for a meaning, we do make a judgment. Thus, for example, we may ask, “Is lion posited for this meaning?” In this case, the fact of being posited is predicated of the utterance “lion” and, as such, we have a judgment and, therefore, an assent. Al-Bihārī’s response is that the investigation of whether an utterance is posited for a meaning falls within the
discipline of language and lexicography, not within the field of logic. That there is a judgment about something in the discipline of language and lexicography has no impact on whether or not it is among conceptualizations in the field of logic. See Mubin, 1:182.

176. Given this, conceptualization is merely to produce a certain form in the mind that is like the thing that is being conceptualized. However, one may recall from the foregoing discussion that conceptualization is a productive act, not one that reflects a given reality. The claim that a particular conceptualization reflects a reality—mental or extramental—would fall within the category of assent. Again, it is worth noting that that which is defined is itself nothing other than the definition produced by the act of identification and conceptualization.

177. Al-Bihārī has laid out that, except for implicit judgments associated with an identification (for example, that a conceptualization is a complete definition or that it is fully inclusive of all its instances, and so on), no identification can be considered impossible or precluded from being. Yet scholars had a consensus that all identifications are allowed. His response is that this was a position that was adopted only for a moment and abandoned rather quickly.

178. In other words, when there is an implicit claim that an identification excludes all instances that it is supposed to exclude and includes all that it is supposed to include and when such a claim is shown to be false, then an identification is nullified. However, note that these are implicit claims in addition to an identification, which is in itself only a conceptualization.

179. Thus, the final position appears to be that all identifications are allowed. In like manner, various descriptions of a thing, given as its identifications, are allowed. However, insofar as there is an implicit claim that a particular identification offers a definitional conceptualization, only one identification can be correct. This is so because a thing has only one definition. In principle, then, all identifications and conceptualizations are allowed, provided they do not implicitly violate the demands of their function.

180. Propositions have three or four parts, as we will see below. A simple utterance has no discrete parts and no part of it indicates a part of its meaning. Thus, if the simple utterance were to be identified in a manner such as to have discrete parts, it would in fact be operating as a proposition. Yet, insofar as it is simple, it would not have any parts. Thus, one would end up with a proposition that is simple. And this is not accepted doctrine. See Mubin, 1:186–87.

181. In a nominal identification, the identifying utterance(s) indicate only what the simple identified utterance indicates. If it were taken to provide the discrete elements in the meaning of the simple utterance, then the simple utterance, which indicates a simple meaning, would be taken to have parts. As such, the nominal identification would actually be operating like a real definition. See Mubin, 1:187–88.

182. See Mubin, 1:188: The simple utterance does not supply any meaning by virtue of itself. For if the utterance signifies any meaning, it would be necessary to have knowledge of the imposition of the simple utterance for this meaning. This means that one must first have knowledge of the meaning for which the utterance is posited. And this is circular. Given this, the simple utterance cannot be given as a definition; it corresponds to a simple intelligible. Now, one may claim that the compound utterance also does not supply any meaning, because it also signifies by virtue of linguistic imposition. The response is that
the compound utterance signifies by virtue of the linguistic imposition of the simple utterances, not by virtue of the linguistic imposition of the compound utterance. In other words, whereas the very act signifying a meaning by a simple utterance relies on fixing its meaning, signification by a compound does not presuppose positing a meaning of the compound. That meaning is conveyed by virtue of the fixed meaning of the simple utterances. Thus, there is no circularity in the case of the compound. The upshot is that, since the compound can supply a meaning, it can be used definitionally for that which needs to be defined; conversely, as it cannot supply a meaning (it can only stand in as posited for a known/given intelligible), the simple utterance cannot be so used.

183. Al-Bihārī’s argument is that simple utterances may only be used in nominal identifications and do not offer a real identification. A nominal identification only brings the meaning to the presence of the mind and does not bring any meaning into positive existence. See Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 124f. and Mubin, 1:188ff. for a detailed discussion of the problems and aporiae arising from these discussions.

184. There are two types of judgments—one whose object is the subject and predicate as a unity, and the other, which requires the conceptualization of the subject and predicate and then considers the relation between the two. In the second form of judgment, the relation between the two is taken into account not in itself—but only insofar as each of the subject and the predicate is conceptualized with respect to each other. As we have seen consistently in this text, we again see the author staking a very specific philosophical claim without pressing his proofs. His position is one among a host of others that were the subject of extended discussions and debates. For example, (1) some held the position that the object of the judgment is a proposition insofar as it is composed of an independently conceptualized subject and predicate and of the relation that is dependent on them. (2) Others held that the judgment pertains to the nondiscrete meaning of a proposition obtained in a primary fashion or after the discrete parts are assembled. (3) Still others held that the judgment pertains to the subject and predicate in such a state that the relation between the two is a copula. (4) Finally, others endorse the position that the judgment pertains to the relation expressed by the copula itself. Al-Bihārī’s position is the second one, taken in the sense of the nondiscrete form of the proposition, as suggested also in the subsequent passages. However, there is some disagreement in the commentaries about how one ought to interpret his commitments in this passage. See Mubin, 2:4–6.

185. The first two parts are the subject and the predicate. I have chosen to read ikhbāriyya, as the nisba appears to be doing the job of producing a sentence from the other two parts. The number of the parts of a proposition was a major subject of debate in the tradition. Some of the arguments for the various positions are mentioned by Mubin (2:7). On the history of the debate on the parts of proposition, see El-Rouayheb, “Does the Proposition.

186. The commentaries explain that ẓann is a type of assent in which a person allows for the truth of something considered more likely to be true, though the possibility of the truth of the less likely opposite still persists. Accepting the truth of the less likely of the two is called wahm. The cryptic statement of the author concerns the debate over whether the intellect allows for the likely and unlikely in a mere opinion. If that were the case, a proposition would comprise four parts, i.e., subject, predicate, assent that relation x holds and assent that relation not-x holds. But this latter possibility of it consisting of four parts has already been rejected. Thus, given that the parts of a proposition are three, the concession
in the case of *ẓann* is still to the preponderant (*rājiḥ*) possibility, i.e., to only one relation. However, *when* the mind observes the other possibility, it yields to it in a weaker mode of concession. Further categorizations are found in al-Pishāwāri, *Dūmām*, 67.

187. A restrictive relation is one where one of the extremes is a condition for the other, without the existence of a judgment for the conditioning extreme. Given this, the judgment pertaining to such propositions oscillates between the existence and nonexistence of the dependent extreme. Now, the underlying issue in this discussion is explained by Bahr al-ʿUlūm in the following manner. For the later philosophers, conceptualization and assent are essentially the same and the difference between the two is only with respect to their objects. Similarly, doubt and assent are two distinct types of judgments; their difference relies also on two distinct types of relations to which they are tied. This brings the total parts of the proposition to four: subject, predicate, restrictive relation, complete relation. See Mubīn, 2:9; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 130.

188. In other words, the judgment is neither that the relation between the subject and predicate is affirmative nor that it is negative. The judgment oscillates.

189. What is apprehended in both cases is the information-bearing relation. Such a relation must first be posited, so that assent or doubt may then pertain to it.

190. Al-Bihārī adopts the position of the ancients that conceptualization and assent are essentially different and that the parts of the proposition are three, not four. His argument is that one cannot have doubt until one has two propositions about which one may have doubt. In other words, propositions to which one assents that a predicate applies or fails to apply must first be formulated before one can have an oscillation in one’s opinion. Given this, and unlike the later philosophers, he does not believe that doubt and assent differ only with respect to that which each considers and that they are otherwise essentially the same. Instead, he holds that the two are essentially different and that with which they are concerned (i.e., the information-bearing relation that something is or is not the case) is the same. See Mubīn, 2:9f.; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 130.

191. This is a doubt raised by the later philosophers against the ancients. The point is that, if a proposition is complete with only three parts—subject, predicate, information-bearing relation—then propositions should also obtain with only these three parts even in cases of doubt, since the latter contains all these parts. This is so because when all the parts of a thing obtain, the thing obtains as well. However, it is commonly accepted that no proposition obtains in the case of doubt. So the proposition must consist of more than three parts. See Mubīn, 2:10.

192. When the parts that constitute “writer,” i.e., “rational” and “animal,” obtain, it does not necessarily follow that that which is whole and complete per accidens owing to these parts should also obtain. The reality of “writer” as a constituted whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts “rational” and “animal,” i.e., “man.” Yet “writer” may fail to obtain even when the parts do. Similarly, though all the parts of a proposition may obtain, a proposition may still not obtain, since it is a whole per accidens. The condition required to make the proposition obtain is the apprehension of the allowance of the relation between the subject and the predicate, i.e., *idhā ṣān*. See Mubīn, 2:10–11.

193. In other words, assent would itself be a condition of the obtaining of a proposition.

194. If the essential parts of a proposition have obtained—and these are three—then it must also obtain. It need not require the consideration of an intellect or anything
extraneous to its essential parts to be what it is. Essentials are constitutive of the essence and inseparable from it, so that nothing that is extraneous and created for an essence can be considered essential to an essence. See Mubīn, 2:12–13.

195. The diacritics indicate that something is a subject and a predicate. Once this is understood, the existence of the copula between them is entailed by signification by entailment (see above for this mode of signification). See Mubīn, 2:16.

196. This is clearly a problematic claim.

197. I take the parenthetical clarifications on the authority of Mubīn, 2:17.

198. Mubīn (2:18) explains that in the proposition, “If the sun rises, the morning exists,” the judgment is that the tie between the antecedent and the consequent is one of mutual entailment. In other words, there is already a link between the antecedent and the consequent and the object of the judgment is this link.

199. Mubīn (2:18–19) explains that, for the grammarians, the statement, “If the sun rises, the morning exists,” should be parsed as, “The morning exists in the state of the rising of the sun or at the time of the rising of the sun.” In this case, the judgment pertains to the application of the predicate to the subject in the apodosis insofar as it is restricted by the condition mentioned in the protasis. The judgment does not apply to the link between the antecedent and the consequent. A potential issue with the position of the grammarians is that it reduces conditionals to attributive propositions. Mubīn responds that indeed the grammarians do not recognize a distinction between the two and that, if one were to grant a distinction, the most one could say is that one is an absolute attributive proposition and the other is an attributive proposition that is restricted by some condition. Finally, he points out that the difference between the logicians and the grammarians may also be explained in terms of their objectives. The logicians are interested in syllogistics, which can only be fertile in the case of conditionals when there is a connective judgment between two relations (If $A$ is $B$, then $B$ is $C$; and if $B$ is $C$, then $C$ is $D$; and so on). It appears that the connective judgment is of the entailing type and it maps on neatly to syllogistic entailment (If it is the case that if $A$ is $B$, then $B$ is $C$; and if $B$ is $C$, then $C$ is $D$; then if $A$ is $B$, then $C$ is $D$). The grammarians, on the other hand, are concerned with idiomatic usage. Thus, when it is said, "If you enter the house, then you are divorced," the intention is not to inform one of the tie between the protasis and the apodosis. Rather, the intention is to indicate that divorce will take place at the time of one’s entering the house; entailment is not at issue.

200. That is, the position of the grammarians.

201. So far, al-Bihārī has offered a defense of the position of the logicians. He has done so on the basis of the principle that a conditional like “If Zayd were a donkey, he would bray” would be decidedly true, even if the consequent (Zayd brays) is not true in actual fact. Thus, the judgment applies to the tie between the antecedent and the consequent, not to the consequent alone. If the judgment were to apply to the consequent, as is the case for the grammarians, then the conditional itself would be false (though it is granted to be true). The reason is that, if “Zayd brays” simpliciter is false with respect to what is actual, it is also false that, with respect to the actual, he brays while he is a donkey. The latter is a restricted state of the absolute statement, “Zayd brays,” and it is constituted of two parts—the absolute statement and the restriction. If one part is false ("Zayd brays"), so is the restricted composite ("Zayd brays while he is a donkey"). So the position of the grammarians on the conditional is incorrect: they cannot grant the truth of the conditional, interpreted
as a restriction on the consequent, since the consequent is false in an absolute sense. See Mubin, 2:19.

202. Al-Dawānī’s argument is that the absolute must include both that which is with respect to the way things are given and that which is determined for things to be. In the case under consideration, only that braying of Zayd that is with respect to the way things are given is negated. But this does not reduce to the absolute negation of Zayd’s braying. For he brays when determined under a certain condition, viz., of being a donkey. Thus, though the principle that the negation of the absolute entails the negation of the restricted is true, the absolute is not being negated in this case. Since the absolute is not being negated, the proof against the grammarians fails. It is worth noting that fi nafs al-amr is being used here as a synonym of fi al-wā qi’. See Mubin, 2:20–21.

203. In other words, though one might wish to argue that “Zayd brays” is an absolute statement that encompasses the actual and mentally restricted cases, such a position cannot be grounded in signification by correspondence (though perhaps it may be grounded, for example, in signification by entailment).

204. This is a reference to the following problem. If Zayd exists and he has nobody who is his equal, then it is correct to say that Zayd has no corresponding equal (zayd ma’dūm u’n-naẓīr). However, it is not correct to say that Zayd is nonexistent (zayd ma’dūm). The former statement claims Zayd’s nonexistence insofar as it is relative to and restricted by a consideration of the existence of his equal: Zayd is nonexistent given the condition that his equal exists. The latter statement, viz., Zayd is nonexistent, affirms his unconditional nonexistence. This leads to the problem that the latter is absolute and the former is restricted and the falsity of the absolute should entail the falsity of the restricted. Now the solution offered above, namely, that the absolute consists of all the parts that are restricted, would help overcome this conundrum as well. The meaning of “Zayd is nonexistent” is actually that Zayd himself with respect to himself is nonexistent; and the meaning of “Zayd’s equal is nonexistent” is that Zayd is nonexistent with respect to his equal. The two cases are parallel, and both are restricted. The negation of just one part of the absolute does not mean that the absolute itself has been negated. Thus, the principle of entailment noted above is not violated and one can indeed say that Zayd is nonexistent (i.e., he is nonexistent with respect to himself) is false and that Zayd’s equal is nonexistent (i.e., that Zayd is nonexistent with respect to his equal) is true. These are two parts of the absolute, such that the falsity of one does not entail the falsity of the other. See Bah r al-’ulūm, 134–35; Mubin, 2:23–4.

205. Since al-Dawānī’s argument appears to overcome the position of al-Jurjānī, al-Bihārī now offers a different argument in defense of the logicians’ claims.

206. For example, the joining of two contradictories—if it is the case that both p and not-p—entails the removal of both contradictories—it is the case that neither p nor not-p (this is an example of something entailing its contradictory); and if nothing exists then Zayd is standing and Zayd is not standing (this is an example of something entailing two contradictories). Thus, it appears that the claim is that an absurdity can entail both its contradictory and two contradictories (and not just that anything entails its contradictory and two contradictories). See Mubin, 2:24. For early discussions and debates about the entailment of two contradictories from impossible antecedents, see El-Rouayheb, “Impossible.” It appears to me that the discussion was motivated by an effort to show that the reductio proof is not necessarily valid, since the contradictory consequents are entailed by the absurdity
contained in three conjoined premises. As we will see immediately below, the implicit rejection of such a reductio (i.e., when the antecedent is absurd) was essential to resolving certain paradoxes and to upholding the logicians’ interpretation over that of the grammarians.

207. The further elaboration of this paradox is as follows. Given that the contradictory conversion must be false, so must the conclusion from which it is derived also be false. And the conclusion is, “Whenever the claim is not affirmed, something is affirmed.” Now the reason for this falsity must lie either in the form of the syllogism or in one of the premises. The form and the minor premise, i.e., “The contradictory of the claim is affirmed,” are not false. The former is clearly a first figure syllogism and the latter is the simple fact of the truth of something when its contradictory is denied. So the error must lie in the major premise, i.e., “Whenever the contradictory of a claim is affirmed, something is affirmed.” But then the problem is that because of the reductio forced by the absurdity of the conclusion, the contradictory of this very claim must be affirmed, though we just proved that when the contradictory of a claim is affirmed something is affirmed is a false principle. As we will see, in order to overcome this paradox, al-Dawānī and others claim that the contradictory conversion does not lead to a reductio ad absurdum. The reason is that it is absurd that nothing should be affirmed. Given that the claim (the consequent) is entailed by what is absurd, it is also absurd, since an absurdity entails an absurdity. So the contradictory conclusion, “Whenever nothing is affirmed, the claim is affirmed” is actually true. Thus, one need not go through the logical steps of the reductio that lead to the paradox. Yet al-Bihārī aims to show that granting the principle that an absurdity entails an absurdity while also adopting the grammarians’ hermeneutics of conditionals lands one in yet another paradox (as we will see below). See al-Pishāwāri, Dumām, 74. There is of course an inherent interest in this paradox on which a number of treatises were written in India. Yet one should recall that, in this context, it is being referred to only as a case that is resolved by appeal to the principle that an absurdity entails an absurdity. This principle (directly) and the paradox (indirectly) are relevant for resolving the debate between the logicians and grammarians about whether, in a conditional proposition, the judgment applies to the tie between the antecedent and the consequent or to the apodosis as restricted by the protasis. It is only on the logicians’ reading of a conditional that one can claim that an absurdity entails an absurdity and that this position allows one also to grant two contradictory consequents of the same absurd antecedent, without generating two contradictory conditionals. The only solution to the paradox is both to accept the principle that an absurdity entails an absurdity and the logicians’ reading of conditionals.

208. If the absurd protasis (i.e., that nothing is affirmed) supplies the restriction under which the predicate applies to the subject in the apodosis, then both the affirmation and negation of the predicate in the apodosis would be governed by the same protasis. The reason is simply that those who hold the grammarians’ position also grant that an absurdity is compatible with two contradictories.

209. This is a rather important discussion about the difference between the logicians’ and the grammarians’ interpretation of conditional propositions. For the former, a conditional connective proposition only asserts the tie between the antecedent and the consequent. Its contradictory is simply the denial of such a connection. Thus, since the principle is adopted that an absurdity entails an absurdity (and so two contradictories), the aforementioned paradox is resolved. For if “Nothing exists/is affirmed” is the absurd antecedent,
then “Zayd is standing” and “Zayd is not standing” can both be granted as consequents. However, “If nothing exists/is affirmed, then Zayd is standing” is not the contradictory of “If nothing exists/is affirmed, Zayd is not standing.” Rather, the contradictory of the former is “It is not the case that if nothing exists/is affirmed, Zayd is standing.” The two conditionals generated by the principle of absurdity are not contradictories. On the other hand, for the grammarians, the protasis supplies the condition under which the predicate in the apodosis applies to its subject. As one and the same condition cannot function as the grounds for the application of a predicate and its contradictory with respect to the way things are given, the position of the grammarians is incorrect. On their reading, the principle of absurdity would force the truth of the two following contradictory propositions: “Zayd is standing at the time when nothing exists/is affirmed”; and “Zayd is not standing at the time when nothing exists/is affirmed.” Given this, for the grammarians, the paradox, which depends on the recognition of the principle of absurdity, is not resolved. See Mubīn, 2:27–28; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 136ff.

210. In such a case, the subject is taken insofar as it is what it is, without the consideration of any condition, including the condition that it should be taken absolutely. See Mubīn, 2:29.

211. In such a case, the subject is taken as a mental unity that is a generality in relation to its instances. To put it differently, whereas, in the first case, the subject “man” would be taken as “man as such,” in this second case, it would be taken as “man insofar as it is a mental unity that is generally applicable to many.” The generality of the subject is only by virtue of the fact of its being observed mentally from a certain aspect; it is not by virtue of the thing being observed. See Mubīn, 2:30.

212. An example of this proposition would be “John is some human.”

213. If the judgment is true of the instances, then it is true of some instances, and if it is true of some instances, then it is true of the instances. This entailment works on the understanding of ambiguity among the later logicians, for whom the predicate applies to instances both in cases where the quantifier is made explicit and where it is not. For the ancients, the ambiguous proposition was one where the subject is the thing as such and the judgment was applied to it, not to its instances. See Mubīn, 2:31.

214. The judgment applies per se to that which is known per se; that which is known per se is a mental object and a reality. The individual instances that are extramental are known per accidents, i.e., insofar is the judgment applied to the mentally known reality transfers to them. See Mubīn, 2:33.

215. That which is affirmed is a propositional reality and its ontological status need not stretch beyond being such a reality. What is known in a proposition is the judgment that is passed about the object that obtains in the mind, i.e., the universal. The particulars are known via its intermediary. However, if that about which something is judged in reality are the universals (and the particulars are known only per accidents), and if an affirmation requires the existence of that of which it is an affirmation, then all such universals must also exist in reality. Yet, it is well-known that “nonliving” and “whatever is not living” are universals that constitute the subject terms of affirmative propositions and that no positive and invested nature or reality can be assigned to them. See Mubīn, 2: 35.

216. In other words, they are known via the intermediary of the knowledge per se of the reality that obtains in the mind.
217. When language is conventionally posited, an utterance like “man” is posited with a consideration of its universal sense that is known in itself. However, the universal corresponding to this utterance, though known in itself, is not that for which the utterance is posited in itself. Rather, it is posited in itself for the individual instances that fall under it. Similarly, that for which something is affirmed is known in itself, but it is not that about which the judgment is made in itself. Conversely, that for which the judgment is made in itself, i.e., the individual instances, are not known in themselves, but they are still known in reality because that aspect whereby they are known (via the universal reality that is mentally known per se) is still unified with them. In sum, that which is known in itself is posited for that which is known per accidens, i.e., that about which the judgment is passed in itself; and the aspect that is known per se is still unified with that of which it is an aspect. So the thing of which it is an aspect is known in reality per accidens. See Mubin, 2:35.

218. That is, whether a proposition’s subject is positively invested or divested or negative. See Mubin, 2:35–36.

219. That is, whether the subject is positively invested or divested or negative and whether the predicate holds per se or per accidens. See Mubin, 2:36.

220. That is, without a view to whether this is per se or per accidens. See Mubin, 2:36.

221. In other words, the reality of an affirmative proposition (iṣāb) is an assertion about the existence (thubūt) of the predicate for the subject. That it is primarily an affirmation for a nature, a sense, an individual instance, and so on, is something extraneous to the reality of an affirmation.

222. An example of the latter is al-ḥamdu li-llāh, i.e., all praise belongs to God.

223. Lā min rajul fī d-dār. Rajul is an indefinite that occurs after the negation lā.

224. In other words, though jīm and bāʾ occur as simple items in writing (ja and ba), in articulating them one would utter each of them as a compound noun— jīm, bāʾ— as in the Qur’ānic alif-lām-mīm. The reason given in the commentaries is that such a mode of articulation precludes the possibility that the statement is about the letters themselves. An argument, attributed to al-Siyālkūtī, is that this purpose is in fact better served in articulating the letters as simple items. For ja and ba have no meaning, so that they are taken to stand as tags for everything, whereas jīm and bāʾ , in addition to standing as tags, also refer to specific letters. See Mubin, 2:39.

225. An example is “Every man is an animal,” which is such that the predicate applies to each single instance of man. This is different from the second case, where “every” is used in the sense of a collection of individual instances.

226. In other words, the natural proposition consists of the first type of “every” (as in “Every animal is a genus”) and the singular or ambiguous propositions consist of the second type of “every” (as in “Every/each pomegranate is eaten” and “This house is not sufficient space for every man”).

227. In other words, customary usage recognizes only those instances to fall under the tag that are not mentally considered. But this is one among several interpretations.

228. Thus, a Byzantine would not be excluded from being a substrate of “Every black” because, though presumably no Byzantine is black, it is not impossible that it should be so; in other words, since it is possible for a Byzantine to be black, the tag “black” may pick him out. See Mubin, 2:46ff.
In other words, the intellect cannot suppose that a tag picks out a substrate simply because it is not precluded as a possibility; it must suppose this with respect to the way things are in actuality (i.e., at some time—past, present, or future). This of course raises the issue of what is meant by the combination of *bi-l-fiʾ* and *fi nafs al-amr*, especially since the explanation is that Avicenna allowed such actuality to obtain either with respect to extramental existence or mental supposition. For presumably, mental supposition can posit anything to be actual as long as it is not impossible. If it is meant that one is to consider the matter with respect to the essence of the substrate itself (and not something extraneous to it), so that everything except what is precluded by the essence of the substrate itself can be used as a description/tag of the subject, then his position is not necessarily distinct from that of al-Fārābī’s. In this case, the intellect can certainly consider the essence of a Byzan
tine and, without contradiction, posit it actually to exist as picked out by the tag “black” at some actual time. Assuming that Avicenna is being more restrictive in his usage of the tag, it makes sense that the combination of *bi-l-fiʾ* and *fi nafs al-amr* is supposed to refer to some realist ontology, i.e., one that includes not just the essence of the substrate but all its necessary concomitants insofar as they are existentially posited in some ontological space. Thus, though a Byzantine would not be excluded from “every black” under al-Fārābī’s interpretation (because its essence, “human,” does not preclude this possibility), he would indeed be so excluded for Avicenna, because, insofar as he exists in some broader and given ontological space, his necessary concomitants make “black” impossible for him in actuality (i.e., in the posited past, present, or future). Of course, Byzantines need not ever exist extram
tentially for this reading of Avicenna to work, since all that is required is the restriction of *fi nafs al-amr* as the given ontological space for their mentally supposed actual realization. In this sense, then, *bi-l-fiʾ* *fi nafs al-amr* is not really what is essential and actual—for again, essentially and actually Byzantines may be black. Rather, the expression refers to a posited ontological space within which the intellect may suppose something to be actual in the past, present, and future (a realized or projected actuality). *Nafs al-amr* is thus a slippery concept precisely because it is a shifting and posited ontological domain. It is that which is the very *given*—an essence, an essence that exists with its necessary concomitants, the concrete world, a propositional claim, an absurdity, an absurd implication, an object of knowledge insofar as it is restricted or considered with a modality (*haythiyya*), *without regard to the fact* that it has been so restricted or modulated, and so on—with in the scope of which (*fi nafsīḥi*/*fi haddī dhātiḥi*) a claim may be said to be true or false. For further discussions, see Mubīn, 2:47ff. and chapter 2 above.


231. See Mubīn, 2:49: “The meaning is that predication is the unity of two distinct things whose difference obtains in intellected existence, [while the unity is] in accordance with another kind of existence, such that the two are united in this latter type of existence. [This latter existence] can be a positively obtained extramental existence, such as the unity of animal and rational . . . or a determined [extramental existence], such as the unity of the genus and difference of the griffin . . . or a mental [existence] that has positively obtained, such as the unity of the genus and difference of knowledge . . . or a [mentally] determined [existence], such as the unity of the genus and specific difference of the Participant with the Creator.” The position appears to be that the subject and predicate are united in a certain mode of existence, but their distinction appears in the case of intellection. See Mubīn, 2:49ff.; al-Pishāwāri, *Dumām*, 84.
232. In other words, the unity of the subject and predicate may be by virtue of themselves, such as the unity of an essence with what is essential for it; or the unity may be by virtue of something else, i.e., some intermediary, such as the predication of writer for risible, where the one is predicated of the other by virtue of both being properties of man. See Mubīn, 2:50.

233. In this case, the subject and predicate are not identical, but that to which they refer (mīṣlāq) is one and the same thing (e.g., “Necessary” and “Existence”). The first type of primary predication is called “primary prерeflective predication” (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-badīhī) and the second one is called “primary theoretical predication” (al-ḥaml al-awwalī an-naẓarı), since, though there is an identity of the subject and predicate, this is revealed after discursive investigation. See Mubīn, 2:49.

234. In this case, the aim of predication is to convey that the subject is among the instances of the predicate; this in turn means that whatever is an instance of the subject is also an instance of the predicate. Mubīn (2:52) points out that this mode of predication is the one customarily used in the sciences because it allows for syllogisms to be productive.

235. In all these cases, the predicate is taken to be something that comes to inhere in the subject (ḥāll), as opposed to cases of primary predication. See Mubīn, 2:52.

236. For example, “Animal is predicated of man.”

237. There is complete overlap between the subject and predicate with respect to their truthful application of instances. The predicate is said of whatever the subject is said of. Mubīn (2:53) points out that primary predication and customary predication both fall within this category of predication.

238. For example, rational animal is predicated of man and man is predicated of man as primary predications.

239. Insofar as these are encompassing notions, they are predicated of themselves. For example, “sense” is that which is understood and it applies to all particular senses that are understood. Thus, it applies to itself as well. Similarly, the common possible is that which is not impossible and applies to all things that are not impossible. Since it is among one of such things, it applies to itself. See Mubīn, 2:54–55.

240. For example, a particular is that which may not be said of many. Thus, a particular is what is true of John, William, Smith, and so on. As such, it is in fact predicated of many and it is a universal concept in this regard; as such, the contradictory sense of the sense of particular would be applied to it. Similarly, “nonsense” is itself a sense in the mind; so “sense” is predicated of it. See Mubīn, 2:54–55.

241. The problem being alluded to is that, in primary predication, a sense is necessarily predicated of itself and its denial of itself is absurd. In the common form of predication, certain senses are in fact predicated of their contradictories. Yet of course these same senses must be predicated of their own selves in the primary mode of predication. As such, for example, it is true to say both that “A nonsense is a sense” and “A nonsense is a nonsense.” Thus, there appears to be a contradiction that a sense is both predicated of its own self and denied of its own self. Al-Bihārī is pointing out that these are two different modes of predication, so that there is no real contradiction. See Mubīn, 2:56.

242. Two propositions can be contradictories of each other only if they are also with respect to the same time, subject, etc.

243. There are three ways in which the predicate may be conceptualized. It may be conceptualized with the subject; in this case, it will be united with it in existence, but no
difference between the two would exist (bi-shart shay'). It can be conceptualized without the subject; in this case, it will be distinct from it (bi-shart lā shay'), but it cannot be unified with it. And it can be conceptualized on its own, i.e., simpliciter. In this case, it will be distinct from the subject conceptually, but will exist only as unified with it; in this way both the difference between the two and their unity will be possible. The predicate, in itself, is ambiguous and its positive existence obtains only with the condition of being with the subject. It is this last manner of conceiving the predicate (lā bi-shart shay') that overcomes the problem noted above. See Mubīn, 2:57.

244. Examples of the four types of predications: “Every man is an animal” (where the subject and predicate are united and the relationship is essential); “The body is white” (where the predicate subsists in the subject, but the relationship is not essential); “Four is even” (where the predicate is extracted out of a contemplation of the subject); “The sky is above us” (where the predicate is extracted from a consideration of some matter beyond the subject). See Mubīn, 2:58.

245. A predicate must be said of the subject in one of the ways mentioned for it to be true of it. Simply because a predicate is taken by the mind to be with a subject does not allow one to affirm it truthfully in a proposition. This is a rather important and recurrent subject of the Sullam and one that tugs at a standing leitmotif about the nature of propositional truths. The issue here is that one may conceptualize the being even of the number five. In some system, with respect to the way things are given in that system (fi nafs al-amr), this may be granted. However, according to al-Bihārī, this does not mean that the predicate “even” is truthfully applied to “five,” because it is not related to “five” in one of the ways enumerated above. Mubīn’s statement that the evenness of five is based on the fact that all the conceptualized senses exist with respect to the way things are given (binā’ an ’alā anna l-mafhūmāti ’t-taṣawwuriyya kullahā mawjūda fi nafsi ’l-amr) is very instructive. It suggests that fi nafs al-amr refers to a certain given system (real or imagined) considered with respect to itself. See Mubīn, 2:58. See discussions of this central issue in chapter 2 above.

246. The context or the locus may be the extramental or mental space. See Mubīn, 2:59.

247. Thus, if something exists for something extramentally, then that for which it exists must also exist extramentally. This is the basic point being made, but as is frequently the case, the commentaries point out that the matn is engaged in overcoming an underlying issue. Mubīn (2:59) informs us that the generally accepted position is that a thing for which something exists must first exist. This principle leads to a problem when that which exists for something is existence itself. For example, according to this principle, in the claim, “Zayd exists,” Zayd must first exist for existence to exist for him. This first existence of Zayd must then require another existence so that the former existence may exist for him. And so on. Given this difficulty, we are told, al-Dawānī adopted the position that the existence of that which exists for something is not dependent (far’) on the prior existence of that for which it exists; rather, it entails the existence of that for which it exists. In other words, if a predicate exists for a subject in a particular context (mental, extramental, and so on), then it entails that the subject also exist similarly; the existence of the predicate is not derivative of the prior existence of the subject. Al-Bihārī’s contribution in this case is to draw the fine distinction that the existence of the predicate is derivative (far’) in relation to the consideration (i’tibār) of positive actualization (not existence) of the subject and that the existence of the subject is entailed (mustalzam) in relation to the consideration of the existence (not
Notes

actuality) of the predicate. Put differently, the priority of the subject is granted as an actuality that a substrate has in relation to its accidental; it is not a priority in terms of temporal existence. This position is based on the adoption of the metaphysics of simple generation (ja’l basīṭ). For further discussion on this lemma, see chapter 4.

248. These are propositions where the claim is made on the grounds of mentally posited conceptualizations, but the claims may also be witnessed and verified. See Mubīn, 2:61.

249. This is a reference to mentally real propositions whose subjects are mentally determined. See Mubīn, 2:65.

250. At this stage, Mubīn (2:63–4) offers a very useful intervention. He points out that there are two ways in which fī nafs al-amr may be understood. The first is that which is possible; in such a case, what exists in the mind exists within the ambit of the way things are given (i.e., with respect to a given ontology of possibles). This first type of fī nafs al-amr is more general than what is in the mind, since whatever is in the mind is within the class of that which is possible. The second type of fī nafs al-amr is the existence of something in an absolute sense, either with respect to a given ontology of possibles or with respect to the concoctions of the mind (such as the being even of five). The consideration of these latter types, as they are given, is their consideration fī nafs al-amr. Although al-Bihārī seems to restrict propositions to the first type, in the next phrase he opens the possibility of having absurd subject terms, provided the sense of the subject term can be established. In other words, if there is a sense (mafhūm) of “the equal of God,” though no individual instance of it may exist fī nafs al-amr in the first sense, one may still posit it as a subject of propositions fī nafs al-amr, in the second sense.

251. That is to say, that it does not exist.

252. In other words, the intellect may posit something absurd (such as “the Participant with God”) as a universal notion and the judgment would then apply to this universal insofar as it exists in the mind. Yet insofar as it exists in the mind, it exists with respect to the way things are given and, therefore, it is not impossible. It is impossible with respect to the sources of its obtaining, i.e., its individuation and individual instances. Thus, when it is said that the Participant with God is impossible, it does not mean that the “Participant with God” as an existent mental entity is impossible. Rather, it means that it cannot obtain with respect to any individual instances. See Mubīn, 2:65.

253. As in the case of ḥaqīqatan above, so here, bi-t-ḥaqīq, is a reference to ḥaqiqiyya propositions, whose subject has been determined mentally. See section 29 above and Mubīn: 2:65.

254. Mubīn (2:65) explains that everything that is conceptualized exists with respect to the way things are given “because it is described with the attribute of thingness and having a sense (ash-shay ‘iyya wa-l-mafhūmiyya).” Thus, insofar as it is what it is, i.e., this given conceptualization, one cannot judge that it is impossible. However, when one takes into consideration that whereby this universal may come to obtain positively, then the judgment of impossibility does apply to it.

255. In other words, it does not apply to conceptualized natures in the mind or to conceptualized natures insofar as they pick out instances. See Mubīn, 2:66.

256. Mubīn (2:67) identifies him as al-Taḥtānī.

257. The argument is that propositions whose predicates negate their subjects are actually negative propositions, not affirmative ones. An example would be “No Participant with
the Creator is possible with respect to existence," as opposed to "The Participant with the Creator is impossible." See Mubīn, 2:67.

258. The logician is identified as al-Taftāzānī. See Mubīn, 2:67.

259. These are a few alternative solutions offered to the paradox related to affirmations over absurd and impossible subjects. The underlying reason is that the proponents of these positions hold that the predicate applies to individual instances and not to natures. The first alternative is that the affirmative propositions are actually reducible to negatives. And since the latter do not require the existence of the individual instances of the subject term, the problem is resolved. For al-Bihārī, this is a random solution, since then all affirmatives would be reducible to negatives and there would be no essential difference between the two. The second alternative is to hold that the conceptualization of the subject term occurs only in the state when the judgment is being made. Thus, with respect to the requirement of the existence of the subject, there is no difference between these problematic affirmative propositions and negative propositions. Al-Bihārī states that this solution does violence to one's a priori notion, namely, that the existence of a thing for another thing presupposes the existence of that about which something is affirmed. See Mubīn, 2:67–68.

260. The next suggestion is that the individual instances should be supposed to be those that would be picked out by the impossible concept and that the proposition should be taken to be saying that such individual instances are impossible with respect to the way things are given. To this solution, the objection is that this violates the principle that that which is described have at least as much real existence as the description. To put it another way, the predication does not occur in the same ontological locus and context as the subject. In the case at hand, we have the conceptualized nature that is mentally real, as explained above, and it is a tag for its supposed and determined instances, instances that exist mentally as underlying the tag. These instances are declared to be impossible with respect to the way things are given prior to the mental posits. And this violates the principle that that for which something exists must be at least as real as that which exists for it. The assumption is that the mental space of supposition has an inferior claim to reality than the mind-independent ontological space. See Mubīn, 2:68–69.

261. The first kind of description is one where the subject and the predicate have independent existence, such as blackness and chair. The former is added to the latter in the act of description; both must exist within the same ontological space. For example, if the chair is extramental, the blackness must be as well. "The chair is black" is a proposition where the describing occurs within the same context and ontological space, i.e., the extramental. In the second case, the description is extracted from the subject itself. For example, the subject may be "man" and the description may be "rational." In this latter case, all that is required is that the subject exist. This is so, because when the intellect observes the subject, it extracts the description from it from the very act of observation; the description is valid within the same context and ontological space as the subject. See Mubīn, 2:69–70.

262. Al-Bihārī is referring to two different types of acts of describing. The first is one where the description and that which is described have two distinct existences. The two are joined to each other. In these cases, the ontological context or space with respect to which the act of description takes place must be the same as that in which the attribute and the thing described exist. For example, in the affirmation "The body is black" both the
body and black must exist in the same ontological locus and context. The second type of
description is one where the description itself is extracted from the thing described. In this
case, only the thing described need occupy the same ontological context and space with
respect to which the act of description takes place. For example, given the consideration of
“man” by the intellect, “universality” would be attributed to it; yet there is no requirement
that universality should exist independently in the mental locus, as it is extracted once
the ontological locus of the subject is given. Next, when the act of description is taken in
an absolute and unqualified sense, then the description itself need not exist in the same
ontological context and space as the act of description. This is so, because some part of
the absolute—the description that is extracted—does not require this (so the absolute can-
not require it either). However, the description must of course exist simpliciter. See Baḥr
al-ʿUlūm, 161–62; Mubīn, 2:70.

263. Both the thing described and the attribute must exist in some way, though the latter
need not exist in the same ontological space as that with respect to which the description
occurs. This is exemplified in the case of the sky and upness. The attribute is extracted with
reference to an extramental individual instance, and though this attribute is with reference
to what is extramental, it is itself only existent mentally, i.e., as a mental extraction (there is
no such extramental thing as upness).

264. In this new type of proposition, the negation is predicated of the subject, whereas
in a traditional negative proposition, the negation is simply the denial of the predicate
for the subject. An example of the traditional negative proposition would be “Zayd is not
standing” (Zayd qāʾīm nīst) and an example of the negative-predicate proposition would
be “Zayd is not such the he is standing” (Zayd nīst qāʾīm ast). This new proposition is also
distinct from the divested (maʿdūla) proposition, in that the latter is only an affirmation of
a divested predicate of a subject (“Zayd is non-standing”). Mubīn explains that the motivati-
on for the invention of this type of proposition is to overcome the issues that hinder the
generalization of logical rules. For example, an affirmative proposition requires the exis-
tence of instances of the subject; however, as noted above, “The Participant with the Creator
is impossible” poses a problem in view of this rule. The newly invented interpretation allows
one to read the affirmative proposition as a negative one: “The Participant with the Creator
is not such that He is not impossible” (sharīk al-bārī nīst mumtaniʾ nīst). Similarly, the rule
that the contradictories of two equals are equals is violated by the case of “thing” and “pos-
sible.” This is so because, while it is true that “Every possible is a thing,” it is not possible that
“Every impossible is nothing,” because the latter is an affirmative proposition and requires
the existence of the subject. A similar problem emerges with contradictory conversions:
though it is true that “Every possible is a thing,” in the contradictory conversion, which
is an affirmative, one cannot take “nothing” as a subject term. The new type of proposi-
tion is presumably such as not to require the existence of subject instances in cases of
affirmation; these latter are the equivalent of traditional negative propositions. Conversely,
the traditional negative propositions are equivalent to these new affirmative propositions.
See Mubīn, 2:72–73; al-Pishāwarī, Dumām, 94.

265. That is, regardless of whether the negation applies to the subject or not.

266. Mubīn (2:74) points out that the intellect is inclined to the principle that the
existence of a thing for a thing requires that the latter exist. This principle is granted no
exception by the intellect even in cases where a negation is predicated of the subject. In
the case at hand, a negation exists for the subject; insofar as there is an affirmation copula that establishes a relation between the subject and the negation-predicate, the subject must still exist.

267. In this case, *fi nafs al-amr* includes both those mental conceptualizations that obtain, such as thing, possible, man, etc., and those that do not and are merely posited, such as nonthing, the impossible, etc. See Mubīn, 2:74.

268. In other words, given that the affirmative negative-predicate proposition and the traditional negative proposition mutually imply each other’s truth, and given that one’s natural inclination is to require that the subject exist in an affirmative, it must also exist for the negative. The problem with this claim, as noted above, is that this requirement undermines certain basic rules of logic, such as contradictory conversion. The response, which is a leitmotif, is that all conceptualizations exist in the mind, either as positively having obtained or determined to do so, with respect to the way things are given. These include general senses, such as “thing” and “common possible” and their contradictories, such as “nothing” and “impossible.” The upshot is that these kinds of propositions were invented to overcome certain problems of logic, but they require that they and their counterparts mutually imply each other with respect to their truth-values. If this is granted, then ultimately it would also have to be granted that all propositions—affirmative or negative—have subjects that exist at least mentally with respect to the way things are given. This is presented as the position of al-Dawānī.

269. It has been argued that the two types of propositions mutually entail each other with respect to their truth. This is based on the idea that, even in a traditional negative proposition, the subject exists as a *taqḍīr fi nafs al-amr*. This is presented as the position of al-Dawānī, as explained by Mubīn: “*It is said*—and the one holding this position is the verifier al-Dawānī—*the truth is that* this affirmative negative-predicative proposition is a mental proposition because the description of the subject by the negation of the predicate from it obtains only in the mind. So it requires the existence of the subject in the mind, not extramentally. Thus, there is a mutual implication between it and the extramental negative [proposition, whose subject also exists in the mind as determined]. Mental existence is meant [to convey] existence with respect to the way things are given. Thus is overcome the false notion that the mental proposition requires the existence of the subject in the mind and the negative [proposition] does not require its existence at all. So, [it is argued on this basis,] how can there be a mutual implication, [i.e., with both being true or false together,] between the two of them? Rather, [it is said,] the negative [proposition] is more general than this [new type] of affirmative [negative-predicative] proposition. [Yet the mutual implication of truth is correct] because all conceptualized notions exist with respect to the way things are given.” And given that the subject of the traditional negative proposition, insofar as it is a concept with respect to the way things are given, exists in the mind (at the very least as that which is other than what it is not), the denial of mutual implication, based on the issue of the requirement of the existence of the subject, can be rejected. Next the author hints that this claim is problematic. The commentaries point out that no such mutual truth is entailed between the two propositions, because the traditional negative proposition requires the conceptualization of the subject in the mind only at the time of the judgment, but the affirmative of the new type of proposition requires the existence of the subject for as long as the negation exists for it. See Mubīn, 2:74.
270. In other words, since a privative predicate (blind = nonseeing) is applied to the subject, the proposition is understood to be divested in its meaning, even though it is uttered without the particle of negation attaching to the subject or the predicate. Since a proposition is called divested because of the attachment of the particle of negation, the proposition under consideration is not divested. See Mubīn, 2:75.

271. The purpose of this comment is to distinguish among various types of propositions. For example, the negative proposition that is positively invested (Zayd is not a stone) is simple in relation to the negative divested proposition (Zayd is not a nonstone); in the latter, a negative particle is compounded with one of the extremes. There are four types of propositions: mujība muḥaṣṣala (also, simply muḥaṣṣala), sāliba muḥaṣṣala (also sāliba basīta, mujība maʿdūla, sāliba maʿdūla).

272. In terms of truth-values, the simple negative proposition is more general than the affirmative proposition that is divested with respect to its predicate: whenever the divested affirmative of this sort is true, the simple negative is also true; but not vice versa. So, whenever it is true that Zayd is a nonstone, it is also true that Zayd is not a stone. However, as a simple negative proposition may have nonexistent subjects, it may be true, while the affirmative that is divested with respect to the predicate may not be so. As far as the syntax is concerned, the simple negative would be stated as zayd laysa huwa bi-qāʾim. See Mubīn, 2:76.

273. I think this would be exemplified by al-asad huwa laysa huwa bi-mārid. With reference to Avicenna, Kaukua (“Negative Judgment”) offers a thought-provoking analysis of the human potential intellect’s unique capacity for producing negative judgments. This psychological element is absent in the Sullam.

274. An example of the first would be “Necessarily, every man is an animal”; an example of the second would be “Necessarily, every man moves his fingers, as long as he is writing, but not always.” See Mubīn, 2:79.

275. The argument that matters and modes are the same is predicated on the underlying idea that philosophical matters are instances of the logical modes. The former concern necessity, impossibility, and possibility with respect to the relation of existence, whereas the latter concern necessity, impossibility, and possibility with respect to relation simpliciter. Thus, in philosophy, one is concerned, for example, with the necessity of existence that may be said of a subject; in logic, one is concerned with the necessity of any relation with respect to a subject. The difference between the two, therefore, is with a view to the consideration of the specification or generality of the predicate (existence or not), not with a view to the consideration of their reality and meaning. See Mubīn, 2:80.

276. Mubīn (2:80) ascribes the position to al-Ījī. Mubīn adds that al-Ījī did not realize that the distinction he is drawing depends on the differences in the predicates associated with necessity, impossibility, and possibility; the distinction does not depend on the different meanings of necessity, possibility, and impossibility themselves.

277. Philosophical matters pertain to the necessary, possible, or impossible existence of something, whereas logical modes refer to the necessary, possible, or impossible predication of something for something. Now, if these two types were the same, then the necessary concomitants of a quiddity would be taken to be necessary in themselves/because of their very selves. For example, to say that four is necessarily even—in the sense that it is necessary with respect to its existence—would amount to saying that even is necessary in
itself. However, it is necessary only insofar as it is necessitated by four. Modalized logical propositions, therefore, affirm the necessary existence of something for something (\textit{wujūb ath-thubūt}); this does not reduce to a claim of the necessary existence of something in itself (\textit{wujūb al-wujūd}). The former is logical necessity, whereas the latter is philosophical necessity. See Mubīn, 2:81.

278. The assertion of the necessity of the concomitants of quiddities does not entail that they are necessary of existence in themselves, though this latter would be absurd, if it were entailed, since there cannot be more than one such Necessary of Existence in Itself. By its very definition, the Necessary of Existence in Itself cannot be a concomitant necessitated by another. So the implication—that if the two necessities are one and the same, then the concomitants of a quiddity would be necessary in themselves—does not follow. What is entailed in this case is the necessity of existence owing to another, though this is not absurd, since such multiplicities are not metaphysically problematic. So though the implication does follow, it is not absurd, so as to serve as a proof of al-Ījī’s claim.

279. Mubīn (2:82) explains that, for the ancients, there were only three matters—necessity, impossibility, and possibility. For the moderns, matters relate to any quality that modifies a relation between a subject and a predicate.

280. In other words, there is no difference in the meaning of a special possible proposition, whether it is an affirmation or a negation; the difference exists only in the fact of the articulation of an affirmation or a negation. The affirmation and negation are interchangeable. See Mubīn, 2:84.

281. That is, the common conditioned and the common conventional.

282. That is, the absolute temporalized and the absolute spread.

283. In other cases, these modalized propositions are restricted by the condition that the relation does not hold in perpetuity. Thus, for the first two, the restriction ends up determining the modality as more specific than the common; in the case of the latter two, the restriction of nonperpetuity removes absoluteness. See Mubīn, 2:84.

284. In other words, this is how Alexander of Aphrodisias understood absolute propositions. See Ahmed, “Barbara.”

285. If it is the case that “Necessarily, every man is existent, for as long the substrate of man exists,” then, for as long as the substrate exists, every man is existent by necessity. Otherwise, it would be the case that, under this qualification, “It is possible that some man is not existent,” which proposition contradicts the posit. Next, it is known that man is not necessary of existence in himself, but only contingently existent. So it is the case that “It is contingent (i.e., special possible) that every man is existent.” So the proposition is both an absolute necessity and a special possible. See Mubīn, 2:86.

286. In the former, necessity conditions the relation between the subject and predicate at all times at which something exists; in the latter, something is necessary owing to the condition of existence (i.e., the existence itself is the condition of necessity). The two cases are, therefore, different. Thus, the necessity owing to the existence does not contradict the contingency that spreads over times of existence. See Mubīn, 2:86.

287. The absolute necessity proposition is supposed to assert the necessity quality between the subject and the predicate (e.g., “Necessarily, every man is an animal”), without any conditions. And it is more general than perpetual necessity, since, in the latter, necessity is conditioned by perpetual existence. Now the argument seems to be that, if a predicate
exists of necessity for a subject (animal for man, for example), then the subject must also exist of necessity. In principle, then, an essential and unconditioned necessity predication actually reduces to a conditioned necessity of the perpetuity type. For "Necessarily, every man is an animal" to be true, man must necessarily exist, since the truth of the necessity of the predication entails the truth of the necessity of the subject. By this argument, it would appear that absolute necessity propositions would properly be limited to necessity that follows on perpetuity; that is, there appears to be a reduction of alethic necessity to statistical necessity. See Mubīn, 2:86–87.

288. The author is repeating his argument in a slightly different manner. The point is that the necessity in question is not conditioned by the existence of the subject. Otherwise, the necessity of an essential for an essence would be conditioned by the existential generation of the essence; this would imply that essentials are separable and are caused for that of which they are essentials by some factor other than themselves; and this possibility is roundly denied. The necessity in question obtains when the essence exists, not because of the existence of the subject. Mubīn writes: “The gist of the response is that the proof of the challenge, namely, his statement, ‘when the existence of the subject is not necessary, nothing would be necessary for it at the time of its existence’ gives the impression that the necessity of the existence of a thing for a thing is conditioned by [the latter’s] existence. This is contravened by the existence of essentials for an essence. For essentials exist for an essence and their existence for it is necessary with respect to the time of its existence, not on the condition of its existence.” See Mubīn, 2:87–88.

289. It is generally held that an affirmative proposition is true with the restriction of the existence of the subject, whereas a negative proposition does not need to satisfy this restriction. In this sense, the negative proposition is more general than the equivalent divested affirmative proposition. The argument being presented is that, if the restriction of the existence of the substrate is added to a negative necessity proposition, then it would have to satisfy the same conditions as an affirmative. It would, therefore, not be more general than its equivalent divested affirmative.

290. Since there are no existent griffins, this negative proposition would not be true. Yet its contradictory, “It is possible for some griffins to be human,” is also false. This would mean that there is actually no contradiction between these two propositions, since both are false in the case of the nonexistence of the subject. But such a contradiction is recognized as a logical rule. See Mubīn, 2:88.

291. The necessity negation would then reduce to the following: “It is necessarily not the case that the griffin, for as long as it exists, is a man.” It would not mean this: “For as long as it exists, the griffin is necessarily not a man.” In other words, the negation applies by necessity to the affirmation that is conditioned by the requirement of existence. The negation itself is not conditioned by this requirement. The gist of the argument is that, by the negation, one intends that the existence of the predicate for the subject at all times of the existence of the latter does not obtain by necessity. Mubīn explains (2:88–89): “And this is the necessity of the negation of that which is restricted, not the necessity of the restricted negation.”

292. In this proposition, the negation necessarily applies to the affirmation of the eclipse of the moon insofar as it exists at the time of quadratures; in other words, it is a necessary denial of the eclipse of the moon under the condition “as long as the substrate exists.” Again,
the negation is not itself conditioned by this requirement; it is simply a negation of the affirmation which applies under these conditions.

293. And this contradicts the statement that by necessity, nothing that is a moon eclipses. Mubīn (2:89) explains that it is the case that every moon actually eclipses; and so it possibly eclipses. Yet it is also true that it is necessarily to be denied that every moon eclipses, i.e., for as long as it exists (for example, at the time of the quadratures). Thus we have the truth both of an affirmative possibility and of a negative necessity.

294. This highly elliptical claim may be unpacked as follows. It was noted above that absolute necessity was considered more general than perpetual necessity because the former may be true without the condition of the perpetual existence of the subject that was posited for the latter. Now, in principle, as noted earlier in the text, the contradictions of two things that stand in a relation of generality and particularity have an inverse relation of generality and particularity. Thus, if the same conditions of interpretation are applied to the negative necessities as were applied to the affirmative necessities, then the absolute necessity negative would be more particular than the perpetual necessity negative (since necessity negations are taken, in this interpretation, as necessity negations of affirmations, conditioned or unconditioned). But this interpretation was precisely what is required by the response to the doubt, wherein it is argued that the necessity negation applies to the affirmation that is conditioned, not that the necessity negation is itself conditioned. However, the logicians are not willing to grant the kind of generality-particularity relation that emerges as a consequence of this move. Rather, they hold the two types of negative necessities to be equal; they mutually entail each other (if something is necessarily denied of something in perpetuity, it is also necessarily denied of that thing at all the times of the substrate and vice versa). Now the problem would be resolved if the negation were itself conditioned by the posited condition, because in that case, it would not be a negation of the conditioned affirmation. However, this cannot be granted, because it would lead back to the absurdity that the response was trying to overcome in the first place. See Mubīn, 2:89–90.

295. Thus, in the end, the only solution is to allow that the negation itself is conditioned by existence and that it is not a negation of an affirmation that is so conditioned. Then, in order to overcome the problems that follow, one may simply say that it is sufficient that, in the case of negation, existence may be simply a mentally determined (muqaddar) existence.

Now, does muqaddar encompass merely supposed and absurd types and does the affirmative only allow non-muqaddar types? Whatever the response to this question may be, Mubīn certainly acknowledges that both may be analyzed with respect to the way things are given (fī nafs al-amr). See Mubin, 2:91 for various challenges to basic syllogistic rules that follow from these aforementioned considerations.

296. This case is practically identical to the one noted above. We may say that it is true that “By perpetuity, Zayd is existent for as long as he exists” (since the proposition itself provides the condition of the modality) and that “With general absoluteness, Zayd is non-existent,” since his existence is not necessary. Both these propositions are true with respect to the same matter, so that, with respect to their truth conditions, they cannot be distinguished from each other. However, they are contradictions of each other insofar as they assert contradictory predicates of the same subject. See Mubin, 2:92.

297. Such is the case even though the perpetuity proposition asserts the perpetual existence of the subject and the absolute general proposition asserts its nonexistence. In
other words, both propositions, though they assert contradictory predicates of the same
subject, are true. Since they are both true with respect to the same matter, they are not each
other’s contradictories.

298. In other words, existence can properly appear as a predicate in such cases
and the problem that the two—absolute and perpetuity propositions—have the same truth-
value persists. It is false that the Active Intellect does not exist in actuality, because its
cause, the Necessary in Itself, does exist in actuality. So the contradictory, i.e., that perpetu-
ally the Active Intellect exists, must be true. In such a case, existence is indeed a predicate of
a perpetuity proposition. See Mubin, 2:93.

299. Thus, the statement, “Every writer moves his fingers, for as long as he is a writer,”
would be an example of the first type, and the statement, “Every writer is a man, for as long
as the substrate is described by writer,” would be an example of the second type. In the first
case, the descriptive tag/appellation is that owing to which the predicate holds of neces-
sity for the substrate; in the second case, the predicate is necessary owing to the substrate
of the subject, while the tag has no role to play in this necessity and is only for temporal
specification, i.e., for all times during which writing takes place. As for the case of overlap,
the following examples are offered by Mubin. “Necessarily, everything that is eclipsed is
darkened for as long as it is eclipsed” is a necessity proposition wherein the predicate holds
both at the time of the application of the tag (that which is eclipsed, by its nature, will be
darkened, regardless of the tag) on the substrate and owing to the application of the tag
(the tag “eclipsed” necessitates the predicate “darkened”). On the other hand, “Necessarily,
every writer moves his fingers at the time of writing” requires the application of the predi-
cate (moving his fingers) owing to the tag; in the absence of the tag, there is no necessity
of the application of the predicate to the substrate. In other words, the tag has a part to play
in the necessity of the predicate and is not just a temporal marker for the necessitating sub-
strate. The two interpretations overlap with respect to some cases. See Mubin, 2:94.

300. Mubin, 2:95, parses thubūt as thubūt ḥikāʾī. The point is that a common possibility
proposition does affirm the occurrence and nonoccurrence of something for something,
along with the quality of this relation as a possibility. Such an affirmation is something gen-
eral and it is sufficient to allow one to count something as a proposition; the relation that
is affirmed may carry the quality of possibility or actuality. In other words, the quality of
actuality is not a requirement for something to count as a proposition. All that is required is
the consideration of the fact of the relation itself, not whether the relation obtains.

301. Although it is true that the apparent sense of an affirmation is to take the occur-
rence of the predicate for the subject with respect to actuality, this does not undermine
the fact that the absolute sense of occurrence is actually the most general—its mode can
be actual, possible, impossible, etc. This is precisely the position with respect to existence,
whose apparent sense is extramental existence. However, it is in fact more general than
that and includes, for example, mental existence. Beyond the immediate sense, one does
take existence in an absolute sense unless otherwise specified. Regarding the question of
modalizing absolute propositions, Mubin adds that the absolute proposition in this case
is that which is the contradictory of the perpetually absolute (ad-dāʾima al-muṭlaqa); the
latter is a proposition in which the relation between the subject and predicate is asserted
to hold in actuality for all times during which the subject exists. The contradictory would
deploy a statistical modality. On the other hand, the absolute that is the contradictory of the
eternal proposition (ad-dāʾima al-azaliyya) is not modalized. For here the contradictory is the denial of the existence of the predicate for the subject in actuality itself. See Mubin, 2:97–98.

302. This is also because the strength of the relation in an absolute proposition lies somewhere between that of necessity and possibility propositions. Thus, if the weaker and stronger propositions are modalized, so is the one that lies between them. See Mubin, 2:98.

303. In each pair, the first implies the second, but the first is not equivalent to the second. See Mubin, 2:98.

304. Thus, if the proposition of nonperpetuity is affirmative and universal, the absolute common will be negative and universal; the same will be true for the absolute nonnecessity-common possible pair.

305. The argument is as follows. A nonperpetuity proposition of the sort, “Every man is a writer, but not perpetually,” signifies by entailment that “By general absoluteness, every man is not a writer.” This means that the nonperpetuity negates the relation between the subject and predicate (the difference of quality) when the proposition modalized by it is understood as implying a general absolute; however, the quantity is maintained in each type of proposition (in this case, universality). Now, given that the two propositions are presumably equivalent with respect to their truth-values, the question being asked is whether the first proposition is actually a compound proposition that expresses the second, simple proposition. The compound proposition would consist of two parts, one indicating the proposition (A is B) and the other the restriction (the relation does not hold in perpetuity). The response is rather uninspired: a proposition is compound or multiple when the judgment is multiple; and the judgment is considered to be multiple when there is a difference of quality, subject, or predicate. See Mubin, 2:98–99.

306. As discussed above, these are the four relations of equality, difference, general encompassment, and overlap. These relations hold between two concepts with respect to truth. For example, if it is true that rational is said of something, then man is also said of this thing. This is a relation of equality between these two simple concepts with respect to their truthful predication of the same thing. See Mubin, 2:100–101.

307. Thus, in the case of propositions, it is not the truth of the predication that determines the kind of relation that holds among them; rather, it is the truth of these propositions with respect to the actual world that determines these relations. Thus, for example, if the proposition “The roof exists” is true in actuality owing to its obtaining in actuality, then the proposition, “The walls exist,” must also be true, because the wall must obtain for the roof to obtain. But this is not inversely the case. So the former proposition is more particular than the latter. Put more starkly, on the analogy of simple concepts, al-Bihārī is arguing that, when it is the case that one proposition is true with respect to actuality and the other one is also always true in the same manner, then the two are equivalent; otherwise, there is a relationship of encompassing, etc. See Mubin, 2:101.

308. As usual, Bihārī is cryptically responding to a critique, which must have been known to his readers. He is stating that one may object that necessity propositions are more particular than perpetuity propositions is a false principle. This is so because whatever is perpetual is perpetual because it is so necessitated by another. In this sense, then, perpetuity cannot be without necessity (and this must be so for it to be more general than necessity); and of course necessity also implies perpetuity. Given this, they must stand in a relation of
equality, not generality and particularity. At this juncture, Mubīn draws some very interesting distinctions between the task and developmental order of logic and philosophy. See Mubīn, 2:101.

309. Mubīn, 2:103, explains that there are two aspects to the special conditional: one may take its necessity to hold for as long as the description holds; or one may take the necessity to hold on the condition of the description. It is the former that yields a relationship of encompassing and the latter that yields a relationship of overlap.

310. Mubīn (2:105) explains that the disjunctive is called real because there is a real separation between the two relations; it is called anti-joining, because the two relations cannot be joined; and it is called anti-empty, because one relation must be true.

311. There are thus nine different types of disjunctive conditionals: real mutually opposing disjunctive; real chance disjunctive; real absolute disjunctive; anti-joining mutually opposing disjunctive; anti-joining chance disjunctive; anti-joining absolute disjunctive; anti-empty mutually opposing disjunctive; anti-empty chance disjunctive; anti-empty absolute disjunctive.

312. Originally, the last two types of disjunctives were presented with the condition only that the two may not be true together and only that the two may not be false together. Now, if we remove the condition only, then the mutual exclusion of truth and falsity would be considered in an absolute sense. For the anti-joining disjunctive, this would mean that the two relations cannot both be true; but then it may be the case that they are both not false together either. Similarly, for the anti-empty disjunctive, the two relations cannot both be false together (i.e., at least one must be true); but, in an absolute sense, it may be that both are not true together either. Given this, the absolute senses would be more general than the ones qualified by only. And if the qualified is true, so is the absolute, but not vice versa. In addition, the absolute senses are also more general than the real disjunctive, since if two relations are neither both true nor both false together, then they are also not true together absolutely and not false together absolutely. See Mubīn, 2:106.

313. The negation of a conditional that asserts the entailment between the antecedent and consequent means the negation of the entailment between the antecedent and the consequent. Thus, the negation of “If \( p \), then \( q \)” (\( q \) entailed by \( p \)) is not “If \( p \), then not \( q \)” but “It is not the case that if \( p \), then \( q \)” (\( q \) is not entailed by \( p \)). The remaining types of negative conditionals are to be understood on the basis of this general rule. Thus, negative chance connectives are those in which the relation of chance between the antecedent and consequent is negated, and the negative disjunctive is one where the relation of disjunction is negated, etc. See Mubīn, 2:106.

314. As is consistently the case with the Sullam, so here again have a very dense passage that presupposes much of the reader in terms of his or her knowledge of living debates. The author is proceeding from the position that all conditionals must take into account the determinations of the antecedent in passing judgment on whether a relation between the subject and the predicate holds in the consequent (note that this is not a judgment about the truth or falsity of the consequent). An example of a specific and exact determination would be “If you came riding to me today, I would honor you.” This is a specific and exact determination (it is only when you come riding today) in view of which the consequent is judged to hold. In a universal conditional, one would take into consideration all determinations of the antecedent. Examples would be as follows: “Whenever Zayd is a man, he
is an animal”; and “Perpetually, either a number is odd or it is even.” In other words, there are no specific or particular determinations of the antecedent under which the judgment that the consequent holds is invalid; it is valid under all determinations of the antecedent. In a particular conditional, one would take into consideration some of the determinations, as in “It may be that if something is an animal, it is a man” (i.e., it is only under certain determinations of animals that the consequent holds). In an ambiguous conditional, one simply does not know the determination—whether it is specific and exact or particular or universal—not that the determination does not exist. An example is “If the sun rises, morning exists,” as one does not know whether the consequent is valid under a specific or particular or universal determination (is it valid in view of this rising of this sun or for some cases of the rising sun or, indiscriminately, in all cases of the rising sun?). Thus, in all cases, the judgment applies on the determination of the antecedent, whether this is known explicitly or not. Now, in the case of a natural predicative proposition, we may recall that there is no specific or quantified subject (known or unknown). In such cases, the nature, say, of man, and not this man or the individual instances that fall under man, is under consideration. However, this is not problematic for predicative propositions in principle, though such readings of propositions are not serviceable for the sciences, as the tradition of the Sullam notes repeatedly. For the conditional proposition, on the other hand, specification or quantification (implicit or explicit) is necessary, since the judgment of the validity of the consequent occurs with a view to the determination of the antecedent proposition; since there cannot be any such determinations of antecedents that govern natural subjects, no conditionals can be formed with them. See Mubīn, 2:107; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 179.

315. This is yet another cryptic reference to one of the problemata. The commentaries indicate that the claim is made by Avicenna in the Shifāʾ. They then go on to point out that Avicenna’s doctrine is that the particles of condition indicate the existence or failure of entailment. It is in view of this that he has made the claim that certain expressions suggest a strong entailment and certain others weak ones. Thus, for example, to say that “If (in) the Judgment Day arrives, then people will be judged” is not correct because “if” is meant for strong entailment, whereas, in this case, it is not the Judgment Day, but the will of God, that entails the judgment on the people. The proper expression ought to be that “When (idhā) Judgment Day arrives, people will be judged” since “when” is a weak form of entailment. The commentarial tradition of the Sullam challenges this reported claim of Avicenna with the argument that “if” is incorrect in the first conditional because it implies uncertainty, whereas Judgment Day is certain; in other words, to say, “If Judgment Day arrives” suggests that it may not arrive. In this case, “when” (idhā) is correct because it in fact implies that Judgment Day is certain. One important aspect of conditionals ought to be noted here; its more detailed discussion is offered by the author in the passages below. Though I have used the expression “entailment” and its cognates to translate luzūm, it does not appear to me that the author is arguing for a causal tie between the antecedent and the consequent either in logical or ontological terms. Rather, the intention appears to be that a particular thing follows on the existence of another thing; given this, I had considered using “concomitance” and its cognates to render this finer point. In other words, though an entailment connective is such that q follows on the givenness of p, the connective does not assert that q follows because of p. What one has is instead a relation of the attachment of the consequent to the antecedent (taʿliq al-amr ʿalā amr); such an attachment/entailment may be strong or weak. See Mubīn, 2:109 and below.
316. This is a rather important consequence of the Sullam’s theory of conditionals. The truth or falsity of the conditional is not grounded in the nature of the antecedent or the consequent. It is grounded entirely in the judgment passed about the tie between the two extremes (i.e., the antecedent and the consequent). In other words, one holds that, given \( p, q \) (given that \( A \) is \( B \), \( C \) is \( D \)). This in turn means that conditional propositions may allow for almost any set of propositions to be true or false, affirmative or negative, as part of a system of logic, including impossible antecedents and absurd consequences. And this ultimately means that even absurdities may be conceptualized (i.e., insofar as all conditional propositions of the sort described here may also be conceptualized). See Mubin, 2:109f., Bahr al-’Ulûm, 179–80.

317. Given that, as extremes of conditionals, there is no judgment that pertains to the antecedent and consequent, they only resemble different types of propositions. Indeed, they may resemble a predicative and a conditional, as in “If it is the case that if the sun rises, then the morning exists, then the sun’s rising has something to do with the rising of the morning.”

318. See Mubin, 2:112–13 for some elaborations on the mutual implications.

319. For example, fatherhood, when intellected, naturally entails sonhood, and vice versa. Mubin, 2:113.

320. Of two mutually entailing things, both may be necessary in themselves and no relation of causal dependence of any sort may exist between the two. \( wujûd \) is necessary in itself (affirmative necessity). \( ʾ\)Adam \( wâjib \) is impossible in itself (negative necessity), so that the \( ʾ\)adam \( ʾ\)adam \( wâjib \) is necessary in itself, since if something is impossible, its contradictory is necessary. \( ʾ\)Adam \( ʾ\)Adam \( wâjib \) and \( wujûd \) \( ʾ\)Adam \( wâjib \) mutually entail each other. Yet neither is caused by the other or by another cause; both are necessary in themselves. Thus, the aforementioned doctrine of a causal tie in cases of mutual entailment is rejected. This is further evidence that, in the case of conditionals, luzûm and its cognates ought best to be translated by an expression such as “concomitance”; or if the expression “entailment” (or one of its cognates) is used, it should be understood in the sense that, given \( x, y \) exists, without the further sense that \( x \) itself causes the existence of \( y \). It is in this sense that “entailment” is used in this translation at the relevant moments. See Mubin, 2:114.

321. The discussion pertains to true connective entailing conditionals.

322. The first logician denies that an absurdity can entail any consequent—whether the consequent is true or false—and the second denies that it can entail a consequent when the latter is true. Mubin (2:116) explains that the first position is clearly false, because, as explained before, in the case of conditionals, the judgment passed on extremes, insofar as they are extremes, is irrelevant. The judgment is simply that a relation holds in view of the existence of another relation. The second position is argued on the basis of the principle that an absurdity entails an absurdity. Thus, a false consequent may be entailed by an absurd antecedent. Now, Mubin (2:116) offers some very interesting distinctions in analyzing the second case. For example, the conditional entailing connective such as “If man were not an animal, man would not be sentient” is true not as a chance, but as an entailing connective. This is so because the consequent is false. On the other hand, in the connective entailing proposition, “If five were even, then it would be a number,” the entailment is false with respect to the way things are given (fi nafs al-amr); however, it is still true by way of logical entailment (bi-ṭariq al-iltizâm). With respect to the way things are given, it is a chance
connective conditional, not an entailing one; however, it is an entailing connective conditional with respect to logical entailment. Thus, in this case, it appears that fi nafs al-amr designates the space of an ontology of the actual, not just any given ontology: since five is not even in the actual world, it cannot entail a truth in the actual world. However, as the subject of a given antecedent, its being even does entail the consequent that it is a number. This assessment runs into the problem that a causal tie is being presupposed between the antecedent and the consequent. In other words, the idea that, in an ontology of the actual, something cannot entail something else assumes that the former is the cause of the latter or that both are caused by a third element within the ontology of the actual. Though this position is one that is already problematic for the author and a number of his commentators, its concession does not tilt the judgment in favor of the position being articulated here. For in this case, if the antecedent and consequent are both absurd with respect to an ontology of the actual, then both are nonexistent with respect to this ontology. And no nonexistent thing can cause or be caused by a nonexistent thing.

323. The first group that denies the possibility absolutely requires that both the extremes of the conditional should be true. Thus, the truth or falsity of the consequent is irrelevant, given that the antecedent is not true. This position has already been discussed above and has been refuted. The second group accepts the possibility in cases where the consequent is false, but not when it is true. This is based on the principle that an absurdity can entail another absurdity, but an absurdity cannot entail a nonabsurdity. It is in view of this that Avicenna's position that the denial of both contradictories entails the joining of two contradictories is mentioned. This would be the case since both extremes are absurd. In this same vein, then, an example is, “If man is not an animal, then man is not capable of moving by volition.” This would be an acceptable entailing connective, because both the antecedent and the consequent are false. However, the example given by Avicenna, i.e., “If five is even, then it is a number” is not an entailing connective. It is only a chance connective (see endnote above). Regarding this same conditional, the commentators add that, as a logical entailment (i.e., not with respect to the way things are given in view of an actualist ontology or with respect to mere chance), this conditional is in fact true. The reason given is that, if one were to opine that five is even, then he must also say that it is a number. In other words, it is by virtue of the being even of five that the consequent is granted. However, with respect to the way things are given in an actualist ontology (fi nafs al-amr), this is not a true conditional. The reason is that when something false obtains by virtue of certain antecedents, then that by virtue of which it obtains is also false. This is a general principle under which the rule of conditional derivation, with respect to the way things are given in an actualist ontology, may be collapsed. Now, the claim is that a conditional may be based on a first figure syllogism and that, if this first figure syllogism is false, then so is the conditional. Here is the argument. The evenness of five entails the numberness of five only because of the truth of the proposition “Every even is a number.” In other words, the syllogism being tested is “Every five is even; every even is a number; so every five is a number.” The major premise (every even is a number), however, is false owing to the posit of the minor premise (a particular case of the universal in the major) of a certain type of even (i.e., five-even), which is not a number, since we accept as true that no number is five-even (and by conversion that no five-even is a number). This argument of course has its challenges. For one, it appears that the challenge to the major premise emerges on the grounds of the validity of
the minor, which is posited as mentally determined to be so; however, the minor itself is rejected because it does not correspond to an ontology of the actual (every five is a number on the grounds of the evenness of five, which cannot be granted because there is no such thing as five-even; in turn, this means that not every even is a number, i.e., that even which is five). In this vein, it is pointed out that the determination (taqdīr) of the truth of the being even of five does not affect the actuality of things (umūr wāqiʿiyya). Further, it is stated that the truth of the predicative proposition, “Every even is a number,” does not affect the truth of a conditional. Indeed, the former, in its affirmative form as a predicative proposition, requires the existence of the subject, whereas the latter only requires the supposition of the antecedent for the consequent to be valid. “The truth of a thing, upon the determination of a supposition of something, does not entail its truth on [this determination] in actuality” (wa-ṣidqu shayʿin ‘alā taqdiri fardī shayʿin lā yastalzuṣidqahu ʿalayhi fī l-wāqiʿ). See Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, 183–84; Mubīn, 2:115f. A further argument against Avicenna, culled from the self-commentary of al-Bihārī, is as follows. One would grant the truth of “Whenever two is not a number, it is not odd,” because whenever that which is general (number) is denied, that which is particular (odd) is also denied. By contradictory conversion, one would also have to grant the truth of “Whenever two is odd, it is a number.” In this case, an absurdity entails a truth. See Mubīn, 2:116–17.

324. This would be true regardless of the truth of the consequent. For example, “If the collection of the Partner with the Creator and the Creator exists, then the Partner with the Creator exists”; and “Whenever both contradictories are negated, then one of them is negated.” See Mubīn, 2:117.

325. The argument is that entailment between two absurdities or between an antecedent absurdity and a consequent truth is allowed on the posit of some relation between the two. Given this position, the simple and minimal rule would be that the antecedent and consequent should not be incompatible. Otherwise, two incompatibles would be true along with each other. See Mubīn, 2:118.

326. In other words, the antecedent must not preclude the possibility of joining with the consequent. If this condition is satisfied, one can have a conditional with any sort of antecedent and consequent, such as “If Zayd were a donkey, he would bray.” If the absurd antecedent entails that which it excludes, then two things that exclude each other will follow, namely, the separation of the antecedent and the consequent and the absence of separation. See Mubīn, 2:118.

327. One may posit two affirmative conditionals, such as “If A obtains, B will obtain,” and “If A obtains, B will not obtain”; if the former expresses an entailment, then the latter is a case of mutual exclusion. The condition for an entailing connective presented just now is that it is that where a relation exists between the antecedent and a consequent, such that there is no mutual exclusion between the two. Thus, for the former to obtain as an entailing connective, the latter must be its contradictory, i.e., false on the condition of its truth; otherwise, A will entail B and will exclude it. Thus, as noted above, A will be joined to and separated from B.

328. Mubīn explains that if the intention is “If one of the two things obtains, then the other fails to obtain,” then this can be conceded; however, it is still not impossible for such mutually exclusive things to both be the case. For the proposition reduces to the higher-order entailment: “If one of them obtains, the other does not obtain.” This proposition,
which is an expression of mutual exclusion, should be the contradictory of the proposition that expresses mutual entailment: “If one of them obtains, the other one also obtains.” These higher-order propositions are in fact such that the consequent of one is the contradictory of the consequent of the other. However, the propositions are not actually contradictories of each other, insofar as the contradictory of an entailment is its negation, not another entailment. Thus, both these higher-order propositions, which manifest the quality of mutual exclusion and entailment between the antecedent and consequent, respectively, can be true. Given this, the argument used to posit the condition of relation between the antecedent and the consequent fails. The situation is further explained with reference to the rule that an absurdity can entail an absurdity, so that an absurd antecedent can entail a consequent and its contradictory, as in the case here. It is with this determination that, with respect to the way things are given, both the higher-order propositions noted above can be true (fa-yumkinu ṣidqhumā ʿalā hādhā t-taqdīr fī nafs al-amr). The usage of taqdīr and fi nafs al-amr, again, is interesting. It points to the polysemy of the latter term, grounded in the notion of givenness (as discussed in chapter 2). In this particular case, the determination is the rule that an absurdity entails an absurdity and it is on the basis of this that, fi nafs al-amr, the two propositions can be true (since the same antecedent entails two contradictories that mutually exclude each other and that, in turn, generates the absurdity of something both entailing and excluding something). In other words, in the case at hand, fi nafs al-amr refers to a given logico-ontological space (not the actual or an ontology of the actual) within which certain things hold; here it is the space of a certain given rule of logic. To put it differently, with a view to the determination that an absurdity entails an absurdity, the absurd outcome is neutralized. See Mubīn, 2:118.

329. The reason is that the intellect cannot specify any relation between absurdities at all. See Mubin, 2:119.
330. This is a rather important point. The author is suggesting that the intellect cannot pass judgment on that which has no reality at all, either in actuality or with respect to the way things are given. However, the intellect may posit something for this thing and then pass judgments. See Mubin, 2:119.
331. In other words, it is not subject to resolute judgment (jazm), but to judgment with respect to posited determinations (tajwīz). See Mubin, 2:119.
332. The Sullam is resisting the possibility of the entailment of absurdities from absurdities as a resolute judgment. The commentaries and glosses suggest that this may not be a justified position and they reduce the discussion back to paradoxes. In a typically elliptical phrase, the Sullam is stating that resolute judgments cannot be sustained with respect to a merely posited world; and the notion of absurdity resides precisely in such a posited world, so that there can be no resolute judgment about it. The reason is that judgments pertaining to the actual world become doubtful (i.e., not resolute) when taken with respect to a mentally posited world. Given this, judgments about posited things with respect to the posited world are even less certain with respect to the actual world. This argument is rather weak and is not fully developed in the commentaries. See Mubīn, 2:120. Among responses to this position is the statement of Bahr al-ʿulūm (186) that the premises of the proof that allow the intellect to pass judgments on such things and on notions such as the absurd are owing to some intermediary posit in the actual. With respect to such intermediary posits, the intellect may in fact judge with certainty and, by their agency, posit judgments about the absurd
that is a mere posit. Similarly, the absurd certainly has an actual status with respect to the way things are given. For example, it has the status of not being actual.

333. For example, one may have the proposition, “Whenever John is a man, he is an animal.” This proposition is universally true under all determinations that are compatible with the antecedent, including John’s being a writer, walker, father, the sun’s rising, the donkey’s braying, and so on; and the determinations may also include those absurdities that may be joined with the antecedent, such as the horse’s braying and the donkey’s neighing. Thus, according to this report, Avicenna wished to limit the scope of the determinations under which the universality of the entailing and mutually opposing conditionals may hold to those that are not incompatible with the antecedent. See Mubin, 2:120; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 186.

334. This highly elliptical passage is claiming that, if the restriction of the compatibility of the antecedent and its determinations is removed, then one would end up with either the affirmation of two contradictories in the conjunctive or of the denial of two contradictories in the disjunctive universals. For example, on the determination of the antecedent along with the non-existence of its own consequent, the former would entail both its consequent (insofar as it is the consequent of this antecedent) and its contradictory (insofar as the determination posits its nonexistence). Thus, an antecedent insofar as it is an antecedent must be compatible with the determinations that are posited for it. Universal conditionals would be invalid if the determinations are entirely unrestricted in relation to the antecedent. See Mubin, 2:121; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 186–87.

335. The point is that, since an absurdity may entail another absurdity, the condition that the determination of the antecedent, insofar as it is an antecedent, must be compatible with it, is not acceptable. Thus, one may posit a universal conditional entailing proposition of the sort, “Whenever $p$ is the case, even under the determination that not-$q$, then $q$.” In such a case, $p$ entails both $q$ and not-$q$. Yet this is unproblematic, since, $p$, as antecedent, entails $q$; the determination of not-$q$, along with $p$, produces an absurdity in the antecedent (since not-$q$ is incompatible with it), so that $p$ may entail both $q$ and not-$q$ as a consequent. See Mubin, 2:121.

336. The objection is that we have a case where the determination of the antecedent is such that it yields two contradictories. Still, such a conditional is taken to be true as a universal because of the rule that an absurdity entails an absurdity. So the condition of compatibility between the antecedent and the determinations must be dropped. The response is that Avicenna was speaking about a firm resolve in the truth of something and that, in the case of absurdities, there is only a mental allowance (tajwiz) that an absurdity entails another, not a firm resolve in the truth of this entailment. Thus, where firm resolve is concerned, the condition he posited must be maintained. See Mubin, 2:121. Further rather intriguing discussions can be found in Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 187.

337. This is a natural outcome of the preceding response. If the intention of Avicenna is to speak only about certain resolve (jazm), then the restrictions under which the compatibility of the antecedent with the determinations is to be considered must be those that are with respect to the realm of that which is possible with respect to the given ontology of the actual. The determinations cannot yield absurdities in the antecedents. This of course complicates matters for Avicenna and circumscribes the operative space of the conditionals from propositions conditioned with respect to restrictions/determinations in
themselves (so as to allow that absurdities entail absurdities) to restrictions/determinations with respect to possibilities themselves, i.e., possibilities with respect to the given ontology of the actual. See Mubīn, 2:121ff.

338. This would follow for the reasons laid out above, i.e., that the consequent must be compatible will all given determinations of the antecedent. Thus, “If man is not rational, then he is rational” would be excluded. On the other hand, a proposition such as “If Zayd is a donkey, then he is a body” would be sound, since a chance conditional may have an absurd antecedent and a true consequent. Mubīn (2:122) explains further: “The gist is that, although the truth of the consequent is sufficient for the truth of the chance [conditional], still the former must also be true in accordance with the determination of the antecedent. So it must not oppose the antecedent. For if [the consequent] were to oppose [the antecedent], it would not be true in accordance with the determination [of the antecedent], because mutual opposition precludes this. So the chance [conditional] would not be true.” Thus, it appears that both the entailing and the chance conditionals share the feature that the antecedent and the consequent must be compatible. The consequent is posited with a view to the antecedent and its restricted determinations; and the combination of the latter and the consequent must not produce incompatibility. Finally, at this moment in the commentary, again a tension between posited mental determinations and the actual reemerges. Mubīn (2:122) points out that it is indeed the case that “that which is true remains so even on the supposition of each absurdity; [mental] determination does not change something that is actual.” It appears, therefore, that the antecedent and its determinations together both have a role to play in the entailment of the consequent (the latter must be compatible with the former) and that the former is also restricted by the consequent insofar as the latter must be congruent with an ontology of the actual. For example, “If man is irrational, he is rational” is not a true chance conditional, since the mental determination of man in the antecedent opposes the consequent, which is true in accordance with how things are given in an ontology of the actual. On the other hand, “If Zayd is a donkey, then the sun will rise in the east” is a true chance conditional because the mental determination in the antecedent does not oppose/is not incompatible with the consequent, even when the truth of the latter is determined with respect to an ontology of the actual. It seems, therefore, that compatibility with an ontology of the actual that is asserted in the consequent is the restriction on the mental determinations of their antecedents. There is some seepage between pure mental supposition and the actual.

339. This is obviously the case because the common chance conditional would be true if the special chance conditional is true—the latter is more restricted than the former.

340. The argument is that, in the chance conditional, there is a possible, nonnecessary tie between the antecedent and the consequent. Insofar as there is a tie, it is like the entailing conditional. As we see in the next statement, the possible occurrence of the two with each other must have a cause. As the effect of this cause, the fact of their being together is necessary; in other words, their being together is contingent with reference to themselves, necessary with reference to their cause. If this is so, the chance conditional would not be different from the entailing conditional, where there is a tie between the antecedent and the consequent that is necessary. Mubīn, 2:122–23.

341. Two things may consistently be each other’s concomitant owing to a single cause. However, if the cause applies to them in two different manners, thus producing them
together but independently of each other, no tie between the two is necessitated. And since there is no such tie, chance conditionals are not the same as entailing conditionals. See Mubīn, 2:123.

342. The reason for this position is that the real disjunctive describes a relation of contradiction between two sides; and a thing has only one real contradictory. Thus, if one side is true, the other must be false. If the disjunction consists of more than two parts (Either A or B or C), then at least one part must have the same truth-value as one of the other parts; this would violate the rule of real disjunction. On the other hand, the other two types of disjunctives may describe contraries. In the anti-joining disjunctive, the affirmation of one implies the denial of the other, though indeed all sides may be denied. In the anti-empty disjunctive, at least one part must be true, but this does not preclude the truth of the other parts as well. In other words, in these latter two types of disjunctives, two parts may have the same truth-value, so that there is no real disjunction between them. Given this, these types may have more than two parts. See Mubīn, 2:124.

343. In other words, even the anti-joining and anti-empty disjunctives would be made up of only two parts. This is so because, in an absolute sense, a disjunctive, which includes all three types, is that in which there is a disjunction between the parts. Given this, the following argument is presented by the proponents of the view that a disjunctive may have only and exactly two parts. Let us say that a disjunctive proposition is made up of three parts; then one of the extremes would be, say, p, and the other extreme would be q; or it would be s; or it would be (q and s). In the first case, s would be excessive; otherwise, there would be no disjunction between p and s, given the disjunction between p and q. In the second case, q would be excessive; otherwise, there would be no disjunction between p and q, given the disjunction between p and s. And in the third case, there would be only two parts: p or (q and s). See Mubīn, 2:124–25.

344. This proposition, for example, ought to be read as: “Either every sense is necessary or every sense is possible or impossible.” This is an expansion of “Every sense is either necessary or not necessary.” See Mubīn, 2:125.

345. The reason given is that the aforementioned propositions are clearly composed of more than two parts and that to reduce them to two is mere acrobatics. See Mubīn, 2:125.

346. This is the position that the disjunctive, in an absolute fashion, cannot have more than two parts.

347. The challenge is leveled against the idea that every relation in all types of propositions is a single relation between two things. Now this claim requires that one also already know that a single relation in a disjunctive is also between two things; otherwise, the universal rule would not be true. However, the issue of the relation between two things in the disjunctive is precisely what needs proof on the basis of the general rule. In other words, for the universal principle to hold, the particular that needs to be proved via this principle also needs to hold true. This is circular. See Mubīn, 2:125.

348. This is a cryptic reference to the rather well-known argument that, in the first figure, the truth of the major premise depends on the truth of the conclusion. In other words, the universal premise is true only insofar as the particular conclusion that falls under the universal is also true. Thus, in the first figure syllogism, “The world changes”; “Whatever changes is generated in time”; therefore “The world is generated in time,” the problem is that “whatever changes” includes the world, so that the truth of the universal major
premise depends on the truth that the world is generated in time. This latter was the sought conclusion. The response to this argument is that the major premise is understood in a compressed (ijmālī) form, not an expressed (tafsīlī) form. The latter specifies the particulars that are contained under the former, but the former does not depend on its truth on the particularities of the latter. This is presumably a primitive (badīhī) notion, so that no further proof is forthcoming in the text. If, however, this position about the nature of universal major premises is accepted, then the objection is successfully challenged. See Mubīn, 2:126.

349. Here are some examples: (1) Either this number is even or it is not even; either this number is even or odd; (2) Either this thing is a tree or a stone (since stone is more particular than nontree, which is the contradictory of tree); and (3) Either this thing is a nontree or a living thing (since “living thing” is more general than tree). See Mubīn, 2:127.

350. It negates entailment.
351. It asserts the exclusion of the two parts.
352. It asserts the chance occurrence of the two parts together.
353. Always, if \(A\) and \(B\), then \(A\); always, if \(A\) and \(B\), then \(B\); sometimes, if \(A\), then \(A\) and \(B\); so sometimes, if \(A\), then \(B\). See Mubīn, 2:128.
354. Thus, the aforementioned argument will work if the collection were, for example, “body,” and the parts were “form” and “matter.” In this case, each of the parts contributes to the collection as a whole, such that the entailment of the whole of any of the parts also entails the other parts. On the other hand, a collection of “man” and “nonman” does not consist of such parts, so that the entailment of a part by the whole does not also imply the entailment of the other part. To put it differently, in the case that fails, in the major premise the collection may obtain with respect to one of the parts and, in the minor, it may obtain with respect to the other part, without there being any tie between the parts via the collection. So the middle term—the two parts—is not shared to yield a valid syllogism. On the other hand, in the case where the syllogism does conclude, the terms overlap by virtue of the whole that, as a collection, entails each part, which, in turn, entails the other part. In other words, each part, with reference to the same collection, also entails the other part. The reason this matter is being investigated is that, were the claim valid that, under some determination, anything entails anything, then a thing would also entail its contradictory. For example, “Whenever man and nonman are given, then man is given; whenever man and nonman are given, then nonman is given; so, under this determination, when man is given, nonman is given.” The upshot is that man entails nonman. The commentaries do point out that this argument is valid only with respect to the way things are given, i.e., in an ontology of the actual. With reference to mere logical entailment, the argument fails. This is so because, if any whole is posited, then there does exist an entailment between it and each of its parts. Such a whole may indeed be an absurdity. In such a case, each of the parts would be logically entailed but not entailed with respect to the way things are given in an ontology of the actual. See Mubīn, 2:129.

355. The point being made is that entailment does not imply necessitation or causal connections. Given this, the idea that the part should have a role to play in necessitating or causing the whole (or that a part should have a role to play in the whole’s entailment of the other part) is problematic. See Mubīn, 2:130.

356. Perhaps the argument is that the collection can entail the part even without necessitation, given that it can do so even in cases where the antecedent entails the nonexistence
of its own consequent. In other words, entailment is sufficient for the proposition to be valid and the argument against particular entailment that rested on necessitation fails. See Mubīn, 2:130.

357. That is to say, they do not accept the universal rule that whenever the collection obtains, one of the parts obtains, etc.

358. The claim of Avicenna is meant to support the idea that at least a particular entailment exists in all conditionals. The response is that some collections do not exist because they are absurd. On the determination of their existence, since they are absurd, they entail absurdities. Thus, their parts, which were taken to be constitutive of them, would be separated from them, because they would be absurd and nonexistent. Again, there appears to be slippage between a mentally determined ontology and an ontology of the actual. It appears that, as entailments, the consequents would obtain no less than the mentally determined absurdity of the antecedent; but they would fail to obtain with respect to what is given as an ontology of the actual. On this, see the next paragraph. See Mubīn, 2:130.

359. This is to say that whenever the collection obtains, one of the parts obtains, etc.

360. So the propositions would be: “Whenever the collection of two things obtains in actuality, one of them obtains in actuality”; “Whenever the collection of two things obtains in actuality, the other obtains in actuality”; so “It may be that when one of them obtains in actuality, the other one obtains in actuality.” This is a particular entailment between two things in accordance with some determinations with respect to an ontology of the actual. See Mubīn, 2:131.

361. The reading of the conditional being proposed is that, under all determinations of the antecedent that are conditioned by actuality, the consequent is true, without any relation (ʿalaqā) between the two. It rejects the more encompassing idea that the mental determination is itself actual when it is posited. The former is more particular. See Mubīn, 2:131.

362. This is a relative, such that if \(x\) stands in a relation of \(y\) with \(z\), then \(z\) also stands in a relation of \(y\) with \(x\). For example, if John is William's brother, William is John's brother. In the current example, if something is the contradictory of something, then the latter is the contradictory of the former. See Mubīn, 2:131.

363. Contradictories that relate to the truth or falsity of something for something (i.e., propositions) do not apply to conceptualizations. However, conceptualizations may indeed have contradictories—a sense may be taken in itself (without its application to anything) and may be denied. Thus, horse is the contradictory of nonhorse. See Mubīn, 2:132–33.

364. This would be the case since the contradictory of the totality is a sense and, since the totality included all senses, the contradictory would be included in the totality.

365. The author is alluding to the following analogous issue. Let us take the collection of all relations. Such a totality will have a relation with each of its parts. This means that any relation that the totality has with one of its parts will be included in the totality of all relations. And in such a case, the totality will be a relatum. Yet the relation that the totality has with any of its parts is itself a part of the totality, and is, therefore, not something distinct from it. It turns out that the relatum is not distinct from the relation; yet this distinction is a well-known doctrine. Further, a relation between the totality and the part is posterior to the totality; at the same time, as all the relations are constitutive of the totality, they must be prior to it. The solution to this problem of the identity of the relata and the relation would be the same as the solution to the problem of the totality of all senses. See Mubīn, 2:133–34.
366. The solution being offered is that the supposition of this set of meanings presupposes a potentially infinite set (since new meanings are added to the set and since meanings are potentially infinite). At the same time, this same set is being supposed as bounded (since it is a complete and closed totality). This reduces to a consideration of an absurdity under the tag of the “totality of meanings.” See Mubīn, 2:134.

367. In other words, it is the very truth of the proposition that requires the falsity of the other; the entailment of the falsity of the other cannot be by implication or by any other mediated form. For example, although if “Zayd is human” is true, “Zayd is not rational” is false, the former is not the contradictory of the latter, because its truth, by virtue of itself, does not entail the falsity of the latter. It is only by means of the mediated truth that a human is a rational animal. See Mubīn, 2:135.

368. In other words, since the negation must be of the exact affirmation, the predicative relations in both propositions must be identically conditioned. It cannot be, for example, that an affirmation asserts a predicative relation with respect to the past and the negation concerns the present. The unity in two contradictories must be of subject, predicate, time, space, condition, relation, part and whole, potentiality and actuality, and predicative relation. These actually come to nine, though perhaps the last is a function of the validity of the first eight. See Mubīn, 2:135–36.

369. The notion of affirmation does not depend on the notion of negation, though the notion of the negation of a negation does depend on it. Thus, the two contradictories of a negation (i.e., affirmation and the negation of a negation) are different. See Mubīn, 2:137.

370. In other words, negation relates either to a substance or an accident.

371. If it is the negation of the existence of the thing itself, the negation applies to the subject; if it is a negation of the existence of a thing for another, then it applies to the predicate. In both cases, one has an affirmative proposition with the negation existing either on the side of the subject or on the side of the predicate. The negation of the negation is thus the negation of the existence of the one of these two types of negations in an affirmative proposition. These types of propositions were discussed above in the section on predication.

372. Here the reference is to the as-sāliba al-mawḍūʿ and as-sāliba al-maḥmūl, as just discussed.

373. If negation is taken in an absolute sense, then its contradictory is the affirmation; and each thing is supposed to have only one contradictory. The doubt that is presented is that affirmation and the negation of negation are two different things, though both are contradictories of a negation. The solution argues that, insofar as a negation is the removal of the existence of something itself or of the existence of something for another, then the negation of a negation is the removal of the existence of the negation. Thus, for example, one would negate the negation existing in an affirmative negative-subject proposition and end up with a negative negative-subject proposition. In other words, the negation of a negation is simply the removal of the negation that exists for a subject or a predicate (in an affirmative negative-subject proposition and an affirmative negative-predicate proposition respectively). This produces the contradictory negative negative-subject or negative negative-predicate proposition. The upshot is that an affirmation is the contradictory of a simple negative proposition, whereas the negation of a negation is not the contradictory of the simple negative proposition. Rather, it is the removal of the existence of negation, as
found, for example, in an affirmative negative-subject or negative-predicate propositions. It is, therefore, not the case that one single thing has two contradictories. Rather, we are dealing with negations in two different senses. See Mubin, 2:137–38.

374. The temporal absolutes are taken to be restricted by a specific time, just as singular propositions are taken to be restricted by a specific subject. The argument is that, just as the contradictory of a singular proposition is another singular proposition, so the contradictory of a temporal absolute is another temporal absolute. In the case of the singular, the contradictory of the affirmation is the denial of the predicate of the same singular subject (e.g., Zayd is tall; Zayd is not tall); so, the argument goes, the contradictory of a temporal absolute is the denial of the predicate of the subject with respect to the same temporal absolute, i.e., the same specific time. If this argument is sound, then the general principle that two modal contradictories have different modalities is incorrect. Mubin (2:140) informs the reader that this is al-Khûnajî’s position.

375. The position that is being refuted is reported to be that of al-Khûnajî. It is argued that he analogized temporal qualifiers to subject quantifiers. Thus, a perpetuity proposition was like a universal and a temporally specific proposition was like a singular proposition. Given this, since a singular proposition is negated by the removal of the predicate of that very subject, a temporally specific proposition would be negated by the removal of the predicate for that very time. Thus, “The moon eclipses at time \( t \)” (i.e., when the earth interposes itself between the moon and the sun) would have as its contradictory “The moon does not eclipse at time \( t \).” This would violate the principle that the modes of two contradictories must be different. Instead it is argued that this aforementioned contradictory is more specific than the true contradictory of the absolute temporalized proposition. The true contradictory denies the temporal condition (which must obtain for the affirmation to be true) and is, therefore, more general as a negation than the denial that is specific to it. See Mubin, 2:140.

376. For example, the contradictory of “Perpetually, everything that trots snorts for as long as it trots” is “Absolutely, everything that trots does not snort at some of the times that it trots.”

377. The condition “For as long as . . . ”

378. The author is stating that conditions, such as “for as long as \( x \),” restrict that which is negated, i.e., the modal quality; they are not restrictions on the negation itself. Thus, in a conditioned proposition, such as “By necessity, every A is B, for as long as \( z \),” the temporal condition governs the modal relation of necessity between A and B. The negation of this proposition is not itself restricted by the given condition. Thus, the contradiction is not “By necessity, some A is not B, for as long as \( z \);” rather, the contradiction would negate the modal quality of necessity insofar as it is restricted by the temporal condition. See Mubin, 2:141–42.

379. Thus, the contradiction will have two parts, just like the original proposition. And at least one of the two parts must be negated.

380. A proposition such as “Not perpetually, every man is a writer” is equivalent to the two following propositions: (1) “Every man is a writer,” and (2) “No man is a writer.” The contradictory is, therefore, also twofold: (1) Either “Some men are not writers,” or (2) “Perpetually, some men are writers.” The contradictory of the compound proposition is, therefore, a nonempty disjunctive, where the negation of either one of the sides suffices to contradict the whole (though both sides may be negated). This is based on the principle
that the negation of the part nullifies the compounded whole. See Mubin, 2:144, where a
refutation of this argument is presented.

381. As is consistent throughout this text, this comment is a response to an underlying
objection, i.e., that the contradictory of a proposition should be of the same generic type as
the proposition and should differ from it in quality, i.e., in affirmation and negation. How-
ever, here we have an affirmative compound predicative proposition whose contradictory is
an affirmative conditional disjunctive proposition. Thus, the contradictory is of a different
genus and retains the quality; this violates the principle noted above. The response is that
these restrictions and rules do not apply when the contradictory is taken in a general sense.
In such cases, the contradictory may indeed be of a different genus and may retain the qual-
ity. See Mubin, 2:144; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 202.

382. The subject is the same in the affirmation and negation of these particular propo-
sitions when the compound propositions are in their compounded form. However, when
they are analyzed into parts, the two propositions may pick out different subjects. For exam-
ple, “Not perpetually, some men are writers” may be analyzed into “Some men are writers”
and “Some men are not writers.” In the analyzed form, the “some” in the two propositions
may pick out different instances; so their contradictories would not be proper contradicto-
ries of the compound proposition. See Mubin, 2:144–45.

383. This is so, since the compounded particular proposition such as “Not perpetually,
some men are writers” is restricted by a temporal restriction, whereas the analyzed forms
“Some men are writers” and “Some men are not writers” are absolute and unrestricted. So
the analyzed form is more general than the compounded form. See Mubin, 2:145.

384. Thus, unlike the case of the universal compounds, one cannot take the contradic-
tories of the two analyzed particulars to be equivalent to the contradictory of the compound
particular. In fact, they will be more particular than the contradictory of the compound.
Given this, the contradictory of the compounded particular also cannot be the condi-
tional anti-joining disjunctive that comprises the two analyzed propositions. Again, this
is because the contradictory of each analyzed part is more particular than the contradic-
tory of the compound; and this opens up the possibility that such a contradictory may
not cover all the instances of the contradictory that is more general. See Mubin, 2:145 for
additional reasons why such a move in deriving contradictions would not be fruitful in the
present case.

385. Thus, for example, the contradictory of “Not perpetually, some bodies are ani-
mals” is “Perpetually, every body is either an animal or not an animal.” See Al-Pishāwari,
Dumām, 135.

386. The problem is as follows: the analyzed form of the compound particular will be
more general than the compound itself—because the subject terms of the analyzed forms
may pick out additional subjects in the affirmative and negative; given this, the contradic-
tories of the analyzed forms will be more particular than the contradictories of the compound
forms; this in turn will mean that the contradictories are not equivalent; and it will also
mean that when the compound is false, the contradictory of the analyzed is also false. This
would mean that the contradictory of the analyzed cannot be equivalent to the contradic-
tory of the compound. The solution is to relate the subject term to each individual instance
of the subject and then to apply contradictory predicates to it. For example, the contradic-
tory of “Not perpetually, some body is animal” is “Each and every body is either always
animal or always not animal.” This method implicitly accounts for all possible individual instances, so as to resolve the problem of additional subject terms that may be picked out by the analyzed form of the particular. Note that this proposition is not a disjunctive conditional (anti-joining or otherwise), wherein the truth of just one part delivers the truth of the entire proposition. See Mubīn, 2:145.

387. In other words, the contradictories of conditionals are the same as the conditionals with respect to whether they are conjunctive or disjunctive (genus) and whether they are entailing, chance, and so on (species). They must differ with respect to their qualities and quantities (i.e., in terms of their affirmation and negation and their universality and particularity). The commentaries do point out that, in view of the foregoing discussion, this rule applies only to the explicit forms of the conditionals. As for the implicit contradictories that are equivalent, we have already seen, for example, that a compound predicative has a conditional disjunctive as its contradictory. See Mubīn, 2:146–47.

388. For example, a necessity proposition may convert to a necessity proposition, but it also implies perpetuity. In such cases, only the most particular of the converses (in this case, the necessity one) will properly be called a converse.

389. This is a response to the implicit challenge to the rule that the truth-value is preserved in a valid conversion. If we say that nothing that is a body extends into directions infinitely, then its converse must be that nothing that extends into directions infinitely is a body. The converse goes through in a khariji reading where “that which extends infinitely,” since it does not exist extramentally, is denied as a subject in the converse. Thus, the converse is true, along with the original proposition. In the haqiqi reading, given that the subject term is determined to exist in a certain way, one may say that everything that is extended infinitely is a body. For though there may be no such infinitely extended things in extramental reality, once posited by an act of mental supposition, they would be bodies within the ambit of the given supposition. Under this determination, by conversion, it would be true that some bodies are infinitely extended. And this latter proposition contradicts the original proposition that no body extends infinitely. So the problem is solved in that, in the khariji reading, the conversion is allowed and, in the haqiqi, the original proposition, “Nothing that is a body extends infinitely in [any of the] directions,” is not granted. See Mubīn, 2:150.

390. “Some animals are not human” and “It may be that if something is an animal, it is not human” are two examples. There are only two possibilities of conversion—either as a particular or a universal. As a particular, the conversion would require the general to be negated of its particular (some humans are not animals; it may be that if something is a human, it is not an animal); this is absurd. The conversion cannot be true as a universal, because already the particular is not true. See Mubīn, 2:150.

391. Thus, the same instances, whether they are all or some, would be the site of the joining of the converted subject and predicate. See Mubīn, 2:151.

392. The reason that a universal affirmative does not convert to a universal affirmative is that, in a converse, the subject may end up being more general than the predicate. For example, “Every man is an animal” would convert to “Every animal is a man.” However, this is invalid, because the predicate in the converse does not apply to all instances of the subject, which is more general. The same issue would emerge in a conditional proposition. See Mubīn, 2:151.
393. Given this, it would appear that the particular affirmative does not convert to a particular affirmative: If “Some man is a species” is true, then “Some species is a man” must also be true. However, “Nothing that is a man is a species,” which is true, converts to “Nothing that is a species is a man.” This nullifies the validity of the particular affirmative conversion.

394. This extremely elliptical set of claims has the following function. One may argue that the universal affirmative does not convert to a particular affirmative because even if “Every old man was young” is true, it need not be true that “Some young men are/were old.” The response is that the proper predicate of the original proposition is not “young.” Rather, it is “used to be young.” So the original proposition is to be understood as “Every old man used to be young” and this converts to “Some of those who used to be young are old.” The second issue alludes to the conversion of the particular affirmative. Surely, it seems that “Some species are man” is true, since “man,” “horse,” etc. are all species. Yet it is not true that some men are species. The reason for this sophistry, explains al-Bihārī, is that the predicate in the original posit applies on the level of the correspondence of the meaning of the subject and the predicate. Surely, insofar as man is said of many, it is a species insofar the latter is also said of many; and vice versa. However, in ordinary usage, the predicate applies to the subject not by virtue of the correspondence in their meaning; rather, it applies to the subject insofar as the latter stands for its individual instances. There are no real instances of species, such that man would be true of them; rather, since “man” is precisely that whereby “some species” is expressed, the relation between the two is one of notional correspondence, not of the predicate of something over the real instances of something. It is for this reason that the ordinary particular affirmative conversion does not seem to go through. See Mubīn, 2:152–53.

395. This is the case regardless of whether these conditionals are disjunctive or conjunctive.

396. Mubīn (2:153) adds that they do have conversions, but there is nothing useful that is gained from them. For example, to say that either \( x \) or \( y \) is no more useful than saying either \( y \) or \( x \).

397. That is, conversion not with respect to quantity but with respect to modalities. See Mubīn, 2:154.

398. For example, “By necessity, nothing that is a man is a stone” converts to “Nothing that is a stone is a man.” “By necessity, no writer has resting fingers for as long as he is a writer” converts to “Nothing that has resting fingers is a writer for as long as he has resting fingers.” And so on.

399. In other words, by necessity is meant both that necessity which is by virtue of itself and that necessity which is by virtue of another. That both types of necessities are denied entails that the ensuing contradictory possibility entails the possibility of the truth of the absolute proposition. For it may be the case that, if the necessity by virtue of another is not denied, that, though something may be possible in itself, it may still be impossible by virtue of some necessity that obstructs its actualization. In such a case, the possibility proposition would not entail an absolute proposition.

400. The argument is as follows. If the absolute is made the minor premise of the first figure and the original premise is made the major, it would yield that a thing would be denied of itself. For example, if it is true that “By necessity, nothing that is a stone is a man,” then it is true that “By necessity, nothing that is a man is a stone.” Otherwise, it is true that “Possibly, some man is a stone.” Then, if this entails “Absolutely, some man is a stone,”
and the latter is joined to the original proposition, “By necessity, nothing that is a stone is a man,” one would have the conclusion, “By necessity, some man is not a man.” Since the conclusion is absurd, then the minor premise, i.e., the absolute proposition, is absurd; and if the latter is absurd, its possibility is absurd; and if its possibility is absurd, then the possibility proposition that entailed it must be absurd. And if the possibility proposition that entailed it is absurd, then its contradiictory, the necessity conversion, must be true. See Mubīn, 2:154–55.

401. Al-Bihārī wishes to argue that “By necessity/perpetuity, no writer has stationary fingers for as long as he is writing” converts to “By necessity/perpetuity, nothing that has stationary fingers is writing, for as long has it has stationary fingers.” To prove this, he takes the contradictory of this common conditional, i.e., the temporal possibility [proposition], to be true. And it is “Possibly, something that has stationary fingers is writing, for as long as it has stationary fingers.” As above, this possibility may be assumed to be true, without leading to an absurdity, viz., the absolute temporal, “Something that has stationary fingers is actually (bi-l-fiʿ) writing, for as long as it has stationary fingers.” If we join this latter proposition to the posited proposition, “By necessity/perpetuity, no writer has stationary fingers for as long as he is writing,” we get “By necessity/perpetuity, something that has stationary fingers does not have stationary fingers, when it has stationary fingers.” And this is absurd. The rest of the argument would then proceed along the familiar lines of the ad absurdum proof. See Mubīn, 2:155.

402. This is so because it is possible that something that is a donkey is ridden by Zayd. Thus, a necessity proposition would fail to convert to a necessity proposition.

403. This is yet another cryptic response. The full version is that the sciences are concerned with universals, not with particulars. And the necessity that does not convert to a necessity is of a particular, not a general and universal type; the former is a necessity by virtue of another, whereas the latter is a necessity either by virtue of another or by virtue of itself. The general/universal necessity cannot be separated from perpetuity, as is presented to be the case with the supposed converse. In other words, though the perpetuity converse is valid, it is irrelevant for the sciences. The details of the claim are as follows. Given that what is ridden by Zayd is actually a horse, it is necessary that a donkey is not ridden by him; but this is not a necessity by virtue of itself, but a necessity because Zayd actually rides a horse. Thus, it is not necessary that what is ridden by Zayd is not a donkey; rather, it is perpetually the case that it is not a donkey. On the other hand, if it were necessary in the most general sense that what is ridden by Zayd is not a donkey, then it would indeed be necessary that a donkey is not ridden by Zayd. At this juncture, Mubīn notes that the universal rules of the sciences actually accommodate particulars as well; to think that universal rules should be only about universals or that which is the most general is to conflate rules with objects of that rule. He writes, “In the sciences, one does not investigate real particulars, but particulars in an absolute sense. Necessity in the most particular sense is not among real particulars; rather, it is particular in relation to the most general sense [of necessity]. So what is it that precludes one’s investigation of it in [the sciences]?” See Mubīn, 2:156–57.

404. These are the special and common possibility propositions.

405. Here the commentators point out that since, in Avicenna, the subject term actually applies as a tag for the instances (and not just possibly) and that the predicate may pick out the individual instances, when the conversion takes place, the predicate will actually pick
out the instances and the subject will apply to them possibly. But given the requirement that
the subject term must pick things out actually, the overlap will not necessarily take place
with the same modal strength. In the example noted above, that which is ridden by Zayd is
actually a horse. We may say that it is possible that the actual donkey is possibly ridden by
Zayd. But we may not say that the actual ridden by Zayd (i.e., the horse) is possibly a donkey
(since the actual horse cannot be a donkey). Since al-Fārābī allows the subject and predicate
terms both to be possible, the conversion will go through. Finally, the proofs of the conver-
sion of possibilities to themselves depend on the validity of the conversion of necessities to
themselves. So, if one holds the latter, one can prove the former. Otherwise, the proof would

406. As noted above, the conversion becomes problematic in view of Avicenna's read-
ing. So the difference in opinion among logicians emerges insofar as various interpretive
angles and arguments are applied to Avicenna in the course of one's claim of the valid-
ity or the failure of the validity of the conversion of possibility propositions. The Fārābīan
reading of the subject term allows for a relatively straightforward conversion of possibility
propositions.

407. This is the case because the perpetuity of possibility implies the possibility of per-
petuity. To put it differently, if it is always possible that A is B, then it is possible that A is
always B. The same principles will operate in the case of the negation: if it is always possible
that A is not B, then it is possible that A is never B. See Mubin, 2:158.

408. If we allow “Perpetually, no man is a writer” to convert to “Perpetually, nothing that
is a writer is a man,” then we will have violated the principles noted above. For the contra-
dictory of the latter, namely, “Possibly, something that is a writer is a man,” is true; and it is
ture on the grounds that it is the converse of “Possibly, whatever is a man is a writer.” And
this latter means that it is perpetually possible that whatever is a man is a writer. Thus, it
cannot ever not be possible that whatever is a man is not a writer (otherwise, possibility
would transform into impossibility). Hence it can also never be possible that something
that is a writer is not a man; in other words, it is perpetually possible that something that is
a writer is a man. And this contradicts the perpetuity universal negative converse that
was posited above. See also Mubin, 2:158.

409. This is owing to the assumption that taking that which is possible as actual does
not in itself lead to an absurdity. So the supposition of possibility as actual is not the culprit.

410. Thus, the perpetuity universal negative conversion to something like itself is false,
according to al-Rāzī.

411. An example would be motion, which is perpetually possible insofar as it is a first
perfection; but it is not possibly perpetual, since it is nonstable and nonintegral by defini-
tion. See Ahmed, “Motion,” for a discussion of this idea and for references to the relevant
secondary literature.

412. The negative special conditional and the negative special conventional proposi-
tions convert to common conditional and common conventional propositions, respectively.

413. This cryptic passage may serve as yet another example of a loaded prompt that
is meant to exercise the commentator in various ways. The claims and argument are as
follows. The universal negative special conditional and the universal negative special con-
ventional convert to the universal negative common conditional and the universal negative
common conventional, respectively. The reason is that the universal common conditional
and the universal common conventional both entail common [propositions]; and what
the common entails, the special also entails. Thus, the specials will entail that which the
commons entail. However, there is a condition of \( \text{lā dawām fī l-ba'ād} \) that is attached in
the converses. The reason is that, in the original proposition nonperpetuity applied to all
cases, so that it functioned as a universal absolute affirmative. The converse of the latter is
a particular absolute affirmative. Now, by way of example, the author refers to the conver-
sion of the cognate universal negative proposition and mentions that one should be able
to determine that the condition of nonperpetuity with respect to some cases applies also
in the case of the special. Thus, “Nothing that is a writer is stationary for as long as he is
a writer, but not perpetually with respect to all cases.” The nonperpetuity claim is actually a
universal affirmative proposition, “Every writer is stationary in actuality.” In other words,
the first part of the compound negates being stationary of all writers under the condition
of their being writers. However, the second part of the compound asserts that this claim is
valid for all writers, but it is not valid for any of them in perpetuity. The compound proposi-
tion converts to “Nothing that is stationary is a writer for as long as it is stationary, but not
perpetually with respect to some cases.” The second part of the compound is equivalent to
“Some of what is stationary is a writer in actuality,” i.e., not all that is stationary is a writer
in actuality (at some time in the past, present, or future), since there are some cases, such
as the sun, that are stationary, but is never a writer. Thus, on the basis of one’s reflection on
the common case noted here, one comes to know how the special cases convert. See Mubīn,

414. These would include the following propositions: absolute conventional, absolute
spread, absolute common, common possible (all among the simples), temporal, spread,
existential nonnecessity, special possible (all among the compounds). See Mubīn, 2:162.

415. Among the remaining modalized propositions, the temporal is the most specific
and it fails to convert to the most general. Given this, it cannot convert to the less general;
nor can those that are more general than it convert to the most general, so that they also
cannot convert to the less general. With this argument, al-Bihārī is able to forego the enum-
eration of all cases. See Mubīn, 2:162.

416. This proposition is false, because of the truth of its contradictory, “By necessity,
everything that eclipses is a moon.”

417. The case is as follows. To say that, “By necessity/perpetuity, some writers do not
have resting fingers for as long as they are writers, but not perpetually (i.e., in actuality, at
some time, some of what is writer does have resting fingers)” is to assert that the descrip-
tion “writer” and the description “having resting fingers” are incompatible. They cannot
combine for one and the same underlying substrate under the first part of the proposi-
tion. Now the second part of the proposition that states that this does not hold in perpetu-
ity does allow that, at certain times, that which is the underlying substrate of the subject
term will be described by the predicate. However, these other times exclude the description
of the substrate by the subject term. Thus, for as long as one of the descriptions applies to
the underlying substrate—whether it be the subject or predicate—the other one does not.
Thus, for example, the aforementioned proposition converts to, “By necessity/perpetually,
some of what has resting fingers is not a writer, for as long as it has resting fingers, but not
perpetually (i.e., in actuality, at some time, some of what has resting fingers is a writer).”
See Mubīn, 2:163.
418. The issue is the conversion of a proposition like “Some humans are writers in actuality, (1) not always, (2) or not by necessity, (3) or at some specific time, (4) or at some time (but not always).” This would convert to “Some writers are humans in actuality.” The proofs given for this conversion are given either by reductio or ekthesis or conversion. The first one is as follows. If it is not true that some writers are humans in actuality, then its contradictory is true, i.e., “Perpetually, nothing that is a writer is human.” If this is joined to one of the original propositions, we get, “Perpetually, some humans are not humans.” And this is absurd. The proof via ekthesis is clear enough in the main text. The proof via conversion is as follows. We take the contradictory of the converse, i.e., “Perpetually, no writers are humans.” This converts to “Perpetually, no humans are writers.” This contradicts the original posit. So the converse itself must be true. See Mubīn, 2:165.

419. These are the affirmative necessity and perpetuity and the affirmative conditional and conventional common propositions.

420. This argument was presented above in the conversion of universal negative special propositions.

421. The explanation of this argument is that the predicate is conditioned by the condition of the tag. Thus, if, in the converse, that which is conditioned (the predicate) is taken to be perpetual, then the condition (the tag) is also taken to be perpetual. But the condition in the converse was posited as the nonperpetual conditioned predicate in the original proposition. If the nonperpetuity of the conditioned predicate in the converse is denied, then the tag and, therefore, the predicate will be perpetual. And this outcome will contradict the posit of the original proposition. For example, if it is false that some of what is B is J, but it is not J perpetually, then it is true that it is J perpetually. However, insofar as its being J is conditioned by its being B and, if its being J is perpetual, then so is its being B. Yet in the original proposition it was posited that what is J is B, but not perpetually. Put differently, both in the original and in the converse, being J conditions being B and vice versa, with respect to a substrate. But both descriptions are separable from the substrate. If that which is conditioned holds perpetually in one case, then the condition holds perpetually as well. The latter is that which is conditioned in the converse; and this implies that, in the converse, the condition holds perpetually as well. Yet this is an absurdity, insofar as the original proposition asserts that that which is conditioned does not hold perpetually of the substrate (implying that the condition does not hold perpetually either). So the converse that attaches the condition of nonperpetuity is correct. See Mubīn, 2:166.

422. That is, contraposition.

423. Thus, for example, the affirmative predicative proposition, “Every man is an animal,” would have the contradictory conversion, “Every notanimal is notman”; and the affirmative conditional proposition, “If p then q,” would have the contradictory conversion, “If not-q then not-p.” In both cases, the conversions are true and affirmative, just like the original propositions.

424. Thus, for example, “Every man is an animal” would have the contradictory conversion, “Whatever is not an animal is not a man.”

425. In other words, the universal affirmative converts to a universal affirmative in a contradictory conversion, just as a universal negative converts to a universal negative in a regular conversion; however, the particular affirmative does not convert to a particular affirmative, just as the particular negative does not convert to a particular negative in a regular
conversion. Generally, the rules of regular conversion applied to affirmatives become the rules for negatives in contradictory conversion and vice versa. See Mubīn, 2:168–69.

426. The highly compressed argument is as follows. In this case, the converse, if it is true, must be a ḥaqqī proposition, although the original is a khārījī. Properly speaking, a khārījī proposition’s converse must be a khārījī proposition, so that one now has a case where the general rule of contradictory conversion fails. The main issue with the khārījī converse is that it posits as its subject term something that is nonexistent. The converse would work as ḥaqqī in the sense that if the partner with the Creator were to exist, then, insofar as it were to be described in this fashion, it would be the joining of two contradictories. It must be ḥaqqī because there are no extramental instances that the tag picks out and because the truth of the proposition is conditioned by a hypothetical absurdity (which may entail an absurdity, i.e., the joining of two contradictories). It is worth noting again that this doubt follows on the reading of the later logicians that is rejected by the Sullam as being unsuitable for the sciences. And again, the reason for its scientific unsuitability is that the reading would have led to an absurdity whose resolution requires either the concession of a problematic extramental existent or the appeal to mental hypotheticals. Neither option is acceptable insofar as logic is a tool for the sciences, which concern themselves with what is real (ḥaqāʾiq). As a discipline in itself, logic allows such propositions. See Mubīn, 2:169.

427. If we were to allow the contradictory conversion for absurdities, then we would do so only with the understanding that absurdities and impossibilities are all indistinguishable. This in turn would mean that they are all mutually true and are mutually predicated of each other as one and the same thing (since a thing is true of itself). Yet we have seen throughout that the Sullam is keen to resist the idea that absurdities entail absurdities in an absolute fashion. See Mubīn, 2:169–70.

428. The contradictory conversion would be: “Whenever the existence of something does not entail the removal of an actual nonexistence, it would not be generated (i.e., it would not be existent).” This contradicts the posit that “Whenever the existence of something does not entail the removal of an actual nonexistence, it is perpetual (i.e., it is always existent).” The commentaries point out that this discussion is inspired by Ibn Kammūnā’s proof for the eternity of the world. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (217) presents it as follows: Let us say that the totality of generated things is such that its existence does not entail the removal of a nonexistence that precedes it. If this is not true, then, “If it exists, then it entails the removal of a nonexistence.” Then by modus tollens we get this: if it does not entail the removal of a nonexistence, then it does not exist. This is absurd, because if it does not entail such a removal, then it is perpetual, not nonexistent. Therefore, the original posit—that the totality of generated things is such that its existence does not entail the removal of a nonexistence that precedes it—must be true. Yet this original posit is the contradictory of the principle laid out by the Sullam at the beginning of the doubt.

429. In their simplified versions, the two conditional propositions are: “If it does not entail the removal of a nonexistence, then it does not exist (i.e., it is not perpetual)”; and “If it does not entail the removal of a non-existence, then it always exists (i.e., it is perpetual).” According to the rules presented earlier, these two conditionals are not actual contradictories.

430. Mubīn (2:113) points out that dalīl is a technical term and that ḥujja is in common usage; the two are synonymous. He also points out that a syllogism may be referred to by the former term.
431. The relation of inclusion is found in connective syllogisms, inductions, and analogies. In the first, the proof regarding the particular, i.e., the conclusion, is based on the status of the universal major that includes it; in this case, the signifier includes the signified. In the second, the particulars yield something about the universal conclusion; so the particulars signify and potentially include the universal. In the third, one particular yields another owing to an underlying cause that encompasses/includes them both. Entailment is a reference to the production of assent on the basis of syllogisms compounded of disjunctive and conjunctive propositions. In such cases, the conclusion is not included in any way in the premises. It is certainly possible to think of proof as the signifier and that which is proved as the signified. This is especially warranted, given that ishtimal is being used in the same sense as taḍammun; and of course iltizām is a term that has occurred before in the context of signification theories. The point is that proofs and that which is proved are such that, by virtue of themselves, they lead to each other by way of that which is included in them, or the proof leads to that which is proved as an entailment of that which lies outside of it. Other explanations are also given by Mubin (2:173).

432. Syllogism (proof of a universal or particular on the basis of a universal), induction (proof of a universal on the basis of particulars), and analogy (proof of a particular on the basis of another particular). See Mubin, 2:174.

433. This is so, since, of the three types of proofs, syllogism is the only one that leads to certainty.

434. In other words, propositions beyond those from which the syllogism is constructed cannot be considered in the derivation of the conclusion in a proper syllogism.

435. These are different types of metapremises. The extraneous entailment premise, for example, would be “That which is entailed by A is entailed by that whereby A is entailed.” The extraneous premise of dependence would be “That which depends on that which depends on something also depends on that something.” The case of an extraneous duplicating premise, for example, would be, “That which is the double of something is the double of that of which the latter is a double.” For further discussion, see Mubin, 2:176.

436. The problem being alluded to is that an equivalent syllogism leads to assent, but it is neither induction nor analogy. If it is also not a syllogism, then those types of proofs that lead to assent would be more than three. The response is that the text is concerned with limiting those proofs that lead to assent by virtue of themselves, not to assent simpliciter. Thus, though it is granted that the equivalent syllogism does lead to assent, it does not do so by virtue of itself (as it requires something extraneous); the enumeration, therefore, is not affected. See Mubin, 2:177.

437. This statement alludes to the argument that one may claim that the equivalent syllogism is properly speaking a syllogism, since it is of the following form: A is equal to B; B is equal to J; so A is equal to J. However, this syllogism only concludes, along with the following syllogism: A is equal to that which is equal to J; everything that is equal to the equal of J is equal to J; so A is equal to J. Thus, when taken by itself, the original syllogism concludes only by means of something extraneous; or it concludes with the addition of something extraneous. In the first case, it is not a proper syllogism because it does not conclude owing only to itself. In the second case, we are in fact dealing with two syllogisms; but the enumeration pertained to one syllogism. See Mubin, 2:178.

438. This is another allusive and cryptic statement. The claim is based on the observation that the equivalent syllogism does not have a completely overlapping middle term; so
it cannot be a syllogism at all. For example, “A is equivalent to B; B is equivalent to C” has “equivalent to B” as the predicate of the minor premise and “B” as the subject of the major premise. Thus, there is no complete overlap of a middle term. However, given that there is no doubt that the conclusion “A is equivalent to C” is valid, it is sufficient for the middle term to overlap to some degree (and not entirely). See Mubin, 2:178.

439. As evident in the argument below, the contradictory conversions that are entailed by the original premises will have terms that will be the contradictory of the originals.

440. The contradictory conversion of the second premise is: that whose nullification necessitates the nullification of substance is a substance. The full argument is as follows. The nullification of a part of substance necessitates the nullification of substance; the nullification of that which is not a substance does not necessitate the nullification of substance. The latter has the contradictory conversion: that whose nullification necessitates the nullification of substance is a substance. This, along with the first premise, yields that the part of substance is substance. See Mubin, 2:179.

441. In other words, this move is valid, though it does not occur to the mind as naturally and readily as the equivalent conversion. However, this fact does not make the conversion or the syllogism invalid. For if the natural occurrence of something to the mind were a criterion of validity, then the fourth figure syllogism would not be valid. See Mubin, 2:179–80.

442. In other words, the conclusion would follow with respect to the way things are given, regardless of one's consideration or observation of any matter.

443. This highly dense passage lays out two different manners in which entailment is understood in the definition of a syllogism. The first of these asserts that entailment is understood without respect to the consideration of any knowing agent. In other words, it is the simple fact of something being true owing to the truth of something else. The other type of entailment involves the fact of an agent’s knowledge of the relation of terms. Now, the ensuing question is how, on the basis of such knowledge, anything is entailed. Here three positions are offered. The first, that of the Ashʿarites, is that God creates the knowledge of the conclusion in the agent upon his knowledge of the certain facts. The second position is that of the Muʿtazilites, who argue that the knowledge of the conclusion follows causally on the knowledge of certain facts, much like a key turns with the turning of the hand. The third position, that of the philosophers, is that the investigative theoretical enterprise and orientation produce a certain preparation of the mind to receive the emanation of the result from the Emanative Giver. The second and third of these types involve a necessitation of the knowledge of the conclusion on the heels of certain types of knowledge, whereas the first does not. See Mubin, 2:180–81.

444. I prefer to use “exceptive” in the sense of “taking out” because, in the case at hand, it not only conveys repetition (which is accidental to the fact of taking out), but also remains close to the Arabic istithnāʿ. The Arabic was originally a translation of prosthesis, which conveys the addition of an assumption. The second premise in the exceptive syllogism is indeed such an assumption, extracted from the first premise. See Avicenna, Deliverance, 43 (where a brief explanation of this type of syllogism is offered and where I use “repetitive” as a translation). See Gyekye, “Term.”

445. The combinations are: universal affirmative-universal affirmative; universal affirmative-universal negative; universal affirmative-particular affirmative; universal negative-particular affirmative.
446. This is the rather well-known argument about the circularity of first figure syllogisms. For example, “Every man is an animal; every animal is a substance; so every man is a substance.” The major premise is true only insofar as all its instances are substances. One of these instances is man, whose participation in substance is revealed by the conclusion that one is seeking. Thus, the major premise depends on the conclusion.

447. As we have already noted, the logical tradition has a set of tools available to overcome such paradoxes. In this case, the difference between the compressed and expressed forms of propositions is being deployed (this was encountered earlier in discussions of conditionals and the Liar Paradox). The argument is that, in the Major premise, the judgment of the major term on the minor is understood in a compressed form via the application of the major on the middle; the middle includes the minor as its instances. The conclusion presents this judgment in an expressed form. As we noted with the Liar Paradox, judgments in compressed and expressed forms are distinct from each other. See Mubin, 2:187–88.

448. The rule that the first figure must have an affirmative is not violated here because the Minor premise is actually an affirmative. This is proved by the fact that the subject of the Major, which serves as a tag or mirror for the individual instances of the Major is the very negative relation that is asserted in the Minor. In other words, the Minor is “The vacuum is not existent” and “not existent” serves as a mirror for the individual instances of the Major, whose subject term is “whatever is not existent.” As Mubin explains, the subject tag in the Major is the same as the predicate in the Minor. For further discussion, see Mubin, 2:188.

449. In other words, if these conditions are not observed, no uniformity of conclusion can be expected.

450. The explanation is that the subject term picks out its substrate in actuality. So, if the Major, for example, states that $C$ applies by necessity to that to which $B$ (actually) applies, and the Minor states that $B$ applies possibly to that to which $A$ (actually) applies, then the middle would not guarantee the transfer of $C$ to $A$.

451. The foregoing is a relatively standard account, but it is worth a full explanation, especially since it appears to contradict the immediately preceding statement. When there is a common possibility Minor, for the conclusion to follow, one must assume the Minor as actual; this move is considered to be valid, since no absurdity follows from the assumption of a possibility as actual, along with the necessity of the Major. This satisfies the condition that the Minor must be actual (though of course it is so on a nonabsurd assumption). The important point to notice is that the commentators recognize that this conclusion operates within a hypothesized space (‘alā taqdīr), given the premise is also hypothesized and determined in a certain fashion. See Mubin, 2:196.

452. This is an important challenge to the proof for Minor possibility mixed syllogisms. It claims that the Major may be such that the actualization of the possibility of the Minor may in fact nullify the truth of the Major, so that the supposition of its actuality cannot be simply granted. Now, the text mentions that there is a critique against this objection, but of course, as a prompt, it does not actually provide it. Mubin (2:196) quotes from the self-gloss of al-Bihārī and informs us that the underlying objection has to do with the claim that if one were to argue that the actual possibility of existence can be supposed, without absurdity, as the actual existence of that possibility, then the actual possibility of the eternity of generated entities can be supposed to entail the actual eternal existence of those generated entities. And this cannot be granted. Al-Bihārī responds by stating that, in the original proposition,
we are concerned with a modal notion, and, in the entailed proposition, we are concerned with a statistical notion; the two do not necessarily entail each other, so that no absurdity follows from this example. A response to al-Bīhārī is also offered; it is that the issue here is not really that the possibility of actualization should be taken to entail the actualization of the possibility without leading to an absurdity. The issue here is that the actual possibility of a thing, along with another thing, does not lead to the actualization of the possibility of the thing along with that other thing. In other words, I may claim that \( x \) is actually possible and that \( y \) is necessary, and I may also claim that \( x \) is possibly actual and that \( y \) is necessary. There is no absurdity in this. But I may not simply claim that it is possible that \( x \) is actual, along with the necessary \( y \). See Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 229.

453. In the Major premise, the predicate applies to that which is the subject in actuality with respect to the way things are given. This same subject, which is the middle term, is the predicate in the Minor premise. In the latter, however, the predicate does not apply in actuality with respect to the way things are given; rather, it applies on the condition of the mental supposition of actuality. The middle term, therefore, is not the same in the two premises and does not join the two extremes. As in a number of earlier cases, so here al-Bīhārī’s expression “fa-tafakkar!” is meant to prod the commentator not to reflect on and retain the ideas he has offered in his text but to challenge them. Mubīn (2:197) takes up this task and excavates al-Bīhārī’s self-commentary in order to extend the discourse. He writes: “It is possible to affirm the [supposedly] precluded premise, in that one may say that if the possibility Minor actually occurs along with the Major, then the Minor would be actual along with it; and whenever [the Minor] is actual, the conclusion follows.” Thus, it would be the case that, on the condition of the mental supposition of the occurrence of the Minor along with the Major, the conclusion would follow. The gist of this move is to embrace the actuality of the Major that is valid with respect to the way things are given into the condition of the supposed actualization of the possibility Minor; the two occur together within the mentally determined space, though the actuality of the Major extends beyond the space of supposition. Thus, on this kind of mental determination, the conclusion is valid. See Mubīn, 2:197.

454. The argument is as follows. Necessity in the most general or absolute sense includes both necessity by virtue of itself and necessity by virtue of another. This same necessity is the equivalent of perpetuity. For the latter is necessity because of another, which is included in absolute necessity. The contradictory of the most general and absolute necessity is the most particular possibility, i.e., that which denies necessity both by virtue of itself and by virtue of another. The contradictory of perpetuity is absoluteness, as we saw in the section on contradictories above. Now, given the principle that the two contradictories of two things that are equal are also equal, it turns out that absoluteness and the most particular possibility are also equivalent. Since a Minor absolute does allow for the conclusion to follow, the syllogism is productive. However, as Mubīn points out, the conclusion is an absolute proposition, not a possibility proposition in the most general sense. For the latter sense of possibility is possibility by virtue of itself; and such possibility may indeed be impossible by virtue of another, so that its supposition as actual may indeed be absurd. See Mubīn, 2:197–98.

455. These are the common conditioned, common conventional, special conditioned, and the special conventional.
This highly condensed passage is opened up by Mubīn in the following manner:

"The moods that obtain from the mixtures of some modalized [propositions] with others are 169. [This is so] because, according to what is well-known, modalized propositions are thirteen; when multiplied with themselves, [the total] comes to 169. On the condition of actuality, twenty-six fall by the wayside. This is obtained by the multiplication of the two possibility [propositions] with the thirteen. So 143 remain as the conclusions. In yielding conclusions, the main points are [the following]. When the Major is other than the four descriptives—i.e., the nine that are necessity, perpetuity, general absolute, general possibility, temporal, spread, nonnecessity existential, nonperpetual existential, and special possible—the conclusion is a modalized proposition like the Major. If the Major is one of the four descriptives—i.e., common conditioned, common conventional, special conditioned, and special conventional—and the Minor is any proposition whatever from among the actualized [types], the conclusion is a modalized proposition like the proposition which is the Minor. However, if there is the restriction of non-perpetuity in the Minor . . . or the restriction of nonnecessity, then we drop the restriction and what remains is the conclusion. Likewise, if we find a specific necessity in the Minor that is not shared with the Major, we also drop it. [This would be as in the case] when the Minor is a necessity and the Major a perpetuity, we would drop the necessity of the Minor. So the perpetuity would remain and this would be the conclusion. Next, we turn to the Major. If there is no restriction of nonperpetuity in it . . . then, after nonperpetuity and specific necessity is dropped, that which is preserved from the Minor would be precisely [the mode] of the conclusion. If the restriction of nonperpetuity is in the Major . . . we add it [in the conclusion] to that which is preserved [of the mode of the Minor]." See Mubīn, 2:199.

Thus, the conditions are that the Minor must be any kind of perpetuity (necessity or perpetuity premise) or that the Major negative must convert and that, when one premise is a possibility, then the other must be a necessity or the Major must be either a general or special conditioned premise. See Mubīn, 2:199.

The conclusion will have the mode of the Minor, though the restriction of existence, in the sense of nonperpetual and nonnecessary existence, will be dropped. Similarly, any descriptive or temporal necessity in the Minor will be dropped from the conclusion. See Mubīn, 2:200.

The critique, which is laid out in the self-commentary and discussed in the commentaries, is that this syllogism will conclude in the way indicated if the negative necessity and conditioned premises do not convert like themselves. However, as discussed previously, they do convert in this fashion. So, limiting the conclusion to perpetuity is not correct. Given that the Major necessity premise does convert to a necessity premise, the conclusion may be a necessity premise. See Mubīn, 2:200.

Of the five different combinations, the first, i.e., the one from two conjunctives, is the base for assessing the others.

An example is "If A is B, then C is D; if C is D, then E is F; so if A is B, then E is F." Here the Major and Minor share the consequent and antecedent with each other completely.

The Major premise, "Whenever two is a number, it is even" is not true as an entailing conjunctive conditional, given that the antecedent is governed by the consequent of the Minor. In this latter case, i.e., when it is governed in the Major by the consequent of the Minor, it fails to be true in all determinations that whenever it is a number, it is even.
Obviously, in this case, this limitation exists because, under a certain posited determination, the numberness of two is odd; and this precludes its being entailed by number as even. The condition for yielding a conclusion was that the connective here should be an entailing type. Yet here it is a chance connective. So no conclusion follows. See Mubīn, 2:204.

463. It is being said that the Major premise in the aforementioned syllogism ("Whenever two is a number, it is even") is clearly an entailing connective, given that one cannot have two’s being a number without the condition of evenness; this is like saying that whenever two is a number it exits, given that two’s being a number cannot be realized without the condition of its existence. If, then, the Major here is an entailing connective, then it was in the previous syllogism as well. And if so, then the response to the doubt, namely, that the Major was in fact a chance connective, does not hold. Of course the issue here is that the antecedent in the Major has been conditioned by the consequent of the Minor, which was true on the determination of two as odd. As such, the evenness of number-as-two is not entailed in all posited determinations.

464. The Minor is “Whenever two is a number, two exists.” The argument is that this premise should be rejected, because the odd-two does not exist. In other words, the Minor cannot be accepted to be valid under all determinations—when two is odd, it does not exist. As a further elaboration, Mubin points out the earlier discussion in the Sullam, where it was argued that the determination of the supposed existence of the impossible does not preclude its impossibility in the actual. The analogy is given that the collection of the two Participants with the Creator is itself a Participant with the Creator; thus, some Participant with the Creator is compounded; and whatever is compounded is possible. Yet the Participant with the Creator is impossible. This problem was addressed with the claim that, within the ambit of a determination, a thing may be said to be dependent on another, though, at the same time, this mode of dependence does not invalidate the impossibility of the thing. And so the numberness of the two-odd, on the condition of a mental supposition, would depend on the existence of two in the same manner as the collection of the two Participants with the Creator, on the condition of the mental supposition of such a collection, would depend on the existence of the two parts of the collection. The fact that both cases (the two-odd and the Participants with the Creator) are impossible does not affect the space of posited determinations. Mubin offers a response to this position as well. See Mubin, 2:205–6.

465. The Minor premise was given as “Whenever two is a number, it exists.” This premise was challenged in view of the positing of two-as-odd; the latter is an absurdity and cannot exist. If, however, it is granted that it could exist, then the Major must be rejected. The Major premise was given as “Whenever two exists it is even.” This premise is not granted as an entailing connective because such an entailment would require a move from a general to a particular. In this case, the general is the existence of two and the particular is the existence of two as even. However, given the mental determination of two as odd, two may exist as odd and not just as even. Thus, the move from the general (two) does not entail the particular (two-as-even). See Mubin, 2:206; Bahr al-ʿUlum, 240.

466. This final statement endorses the original doubt. The argument is that the necessary concomitants of a quiddity follow under all determinations of that quiddity. Thus, it would be granted as an entailing connective that whenever two is a number it is even; and this premise would be granted as an entailing connective in the sense that it is the quiddity of two that entails its evenness. If this is the case, then the conclusion that whenever two is
odd it is even would also be true; this is so because, as a consequent entailed by the antecedent, evenness would be true of two under all determinations (even under its determination as odd). However, it is known that an odd-two is not even. Thus, the conclusion would be both true and false under claims about the quiddity of two. See Mubīn, 2:206–7.

467. The denial of numberness of two, which is more general, entails the denial of oddness of it, which is more particular. Then the contradictory conversion yields, “Whenever two is odd, it is a number,” which was the Minor under suspicion. See Mubīn, 2:207.

468. In other words, the conclusion is accepted that “If two is odd, it is even.” The argument for this is that, if the antecedent is absurd, on the determination of its actuality, another absurdity may follow. See Mubīn, 2:208.

469. The premise either affirms or negates a part of the conditional, which is the first premise. Thus, for example, “Whenever Zayd is a man, he is an animal; he is a man; therefore, he is an animal.” Or “Whenever Zayd is a donkey, he brays; but he does not bray; so he is not a donkey.”

470. In other words, in a conjunctive conditional, one part entails the other and, in a disjunctive conditional, one part entails the exclusion of the other.

471. This is because of the general rule that the existence of the more general does not necessarily indicate the existence of that which is more particular. See Mubīn, 2:209.

472. It appears that the argument is as follows. If it is the case that (a) if $p$ then $q$, then (b) if not-$q$ then not-$p$. Now this is a rule of entailment, such that the denial of (b) would entail the denial of (a). However, it may be the case that the denial of (b) is impossible. The suppression of its actuality would be tantamount to the suppression of an absurdity, which, in turn, would entail an absurdity (on the basis of the rule that an absurdity entails an absurdity). In other words, (a) would be absurd. But it is on the condition of the validity of (a)—$p$’s entailment of $q$—that (b) was granted. If (a) is absurd, (b) cannot be granted. Thus, the modus tollens rule is not valid under all determinations, i.e., in an absolute fashion, as it was originally asserted. See Mubīn, 2:209–10.

473. The argument is that entailment means that two items should not be disentangled from each other. Now, on the supposition of the actualization of the nullification of a consequent, which nullification is impossible in itself, the antecedent and therefore the entailment will also be impossible. And since the entailment is impossible, that which follows from it, i.e., the modus tollens, will not be valid. The proposed solution is that entailment means the impossibility of the disentanglement of two things at all times, including determined times. Given this, the determined time during which the entailment fails (from $a$ to $b$, as in the endnote above), i.e., the period of the supposed actual nullification of a consequent that is impossible in itself to nullify (i.e., the nullification of $b$), is also among such times. This means that entailment will fail exactly when it was posited as being valid. And this is absurd. See Mubīn, 2:210.

474. This would be the case, for example, in: “This number is either odd or even.” It is odd; so it is not even. It is even, so it is not odd. It is not even; so it is odd. It is not odd; so it is even.

475. An example of the former is: $A$ is $B$; $B$ is $C$; so $A$ is $C$. $C$ is $D$; so $A$ is $D$. An example of the latter is: $A$ is $B$; $B$ is $C$; $C$ is $D$; so $A$ is $D$.

476. In al-Khayrābādī’s commentary on Ḥamdallāh on the Sullam it is explained (as presented on the basis of a quotation of al-Jurjānī) that there are three types of inductions.
In the first case, all the particular cases are enumerated (istiqrā’ tāmm) and the judgment is passed with certainty (qaṭʿī) on each of the cases; this is also called a qiyās maqsam. The result is that one has certain resolve (jazm) with respect to the universal proposition that is generated out of this process. In the second case, all the cases are enumerated, but the judgment on them is on the grade of considered opinion (ẓann). In such cases, one’s knowledge of the universal proposition is also of the same epistemic grade. In the final case, the enumeration is based on a claim, namely, that there is another particular that has not been taken into account, so that its state is not known; this is the deficient induction (istiqrā’ nāqiṣ). However, on the basis of the overwhelming generality of the enumerated cases, one has the considered opinion that the state of the unknown case is the same as that of the known cases. In other words, even in the absence of a complete enumeration, one holds the considered opinion/overwhelming belief (not firm resolve) that the universal proposition is true. In all these cases, the universal binds either a complete or an incomplete set of particulars. Then a single judgment is passed on the particulars and, by their mediation, this judgment is taken to be valid of the universal as well. The epistemic grade of the judgment of the universal is as explained above. See al-Khayrābādī, Ḥāshiyat Sharḥ Hamdallāh, 394–95; Balyāwī, Diyā’, 204n5.

477. One of these followers is identified as al-Siyālkūtī. See Balyāwī, Diyā’, 204n6. Balyāwī mentions that al-Siyālkūtī first quoted al-Jurjānī’s refined statement on the difference between deficient/incomplete induction and syllogisms and then defended his position that there has to be at least an implicit claim that the universal binds all the particulars. In the absence of such a claim (whether it is grounded in a complete enumeration of the particulars or a partial one, along with the assumption that the same judgment applies to the unknown cases), the judgment would not transfer from the particulars to the universal. Here we have again a case of the base text alluding to a recent scholarly dispute, which has led its commentators to proceed with a piecemeal excavation of the layers. The course of the excavation in this case is al-Bihārī to al-Siyālkūtī to al-Jurjānī.

478. In other words, the universal judgment that all animals chew by moving their lower jaws stands—on the grounds of its truth for the majority of the cases, with the exception of the case of the alligator. In induction, all that is needed for the transfer of the judgment from the particulars to the universal is that it should be valid for the majority of the cases. See Mubīn, 2:214.

479. This is the preceding rule that the more general and more numerous/overwhelming case governs the judgment passed of the whole. Thus, if two of three are Muslims, then the belief that one of them from the set is Muslim overwhelms the belief that he is not Muslim. Thus, the judgment passed about each of them would be that he is a Muslim.

480. This is a rather densely argued passage. The argument is as follows. Let us suppose that there are three individuals in a home and we know that two of them are Muslims and one is non-Muslim. On the basis of the rule of induction, i.e., that which applies to the majority and the more general applies to the whole, one would believe in the fact of each one of the three being Muslim. However, the following scenario complicates this assessment. We know that the supposition of two of the three as Muslims will entail the supposition of the third as non-Muslim. Such a supposition can be posited and determined for each of the three combinations of two individuals as Muslims (1–2, 2–3, 1–3) and yield the belief that the remaining and alternating third is a non-Muslim. This would be a perfectly
valid move in an exceptive syllogism (If \(A\) and \(B\) are Muslims, then \(C\) is not a Muslim; \(A\) and \(B\) are Muslims; \(C\) is not a Muslim) with a determined antecedent of the conditional and a hypothesized exceptive premise. And this in turn would mean that each of the three would be believed to be non-Muslims. This of course contradicts the earlier posit that was based on the rule of induction, i.e., that the overwhelming belief would be that each of them is a Muslim. Thus, the fact that two of them are Muslims entails that each of them is Muslim (owing to the rule of induction) and that two of them are Muslims entails that each of them is a non-Muslim (based on the fact that the third must be a non-Muslim, since belief in that which entails—\(A\) and \(B\) are Muslims—entails the belief in that which is entailed: \(C\) is a non-Muslim). So the fact of two being Muslims entails that each is a Muslim and a non-Muslim. This is absurd; and so it appears that the rule of induction is wrong. See Mubin, 2:215.

481. In other words, there are two distinct operations involved. In the case of induction, one takes into account that each person in a Muslim, without regard to the others; then one takes into account that the other person is a Muslim, without regard to the others. And so on. In the case that entails that the third person is a non-Muslim, one takes the remaining two to be Muslims together. See Balyawi, Diyaʾ, 205nn4–5.

482. The solution is that the assumption of the third person's being a non-Muslim is based on the posit that the two others are Muslims, taken together. However, the original assumption that two of them, taken individually, are Muslims does not entail the assumption that two of them, taken together, are Muslims. And it is the latter assumption that is needed for the absurdity to emerge. See Mubin, 2:216.

483. In other words, the author's claim that, when the two obtain, they obtain together, is not useful in overcoming the response to the conundrum because the parts of that which obtains are still distinct and individuated. However, that which entails that the third person is non-Muslim is the being-together of the parts as a unity.

484. The outcome is that which is entailed, i.e., that the third person is non-Muslim.

485. In other words, whether the parts may be separated or whether they exist as a unity is irrelevant to the fact of their being capable of entailing something. All that is required is that there be certainty that there exist two parts with a certain shared characteristic; this is sufficient for the entailment.

486. If my certainty that \(A\) and \(B\) obtain—whether separately or together—entails my certainty that \(C\) obtains, then my overwhelming belief that \(A\) and \(B\) obtain entails my overwhelming belief that \(C\) obtains. As in the case of certainty, so here it is irrelevant whether they obtain as individual cases or as joined together as a unity.

487. The gist of the argument is that, in the case of certainty, the parts taken together or separately entail in both cases, because neither the intellect nor nature requires that such entailment not take place owing to the different forms the entailing parts take. Indeed, such differences in their forms are actually the product of mere mental consideration and are not real. On the other hand, in the case of overwhelming belief, when the parts are taken separately, they do not in fact entail judgment on the remaining parts. Rather, for such judgment to exist, the parts must be taken together. Thus, there can be no analogy between entailing certainties and entailing beliefs. And so the solution offered to the paradox still exists. With the last phrase, fa-taʿammal, al-Bihari invites the reader to defend him against this response. See Mubin, 2:217–18; Bahr al-ʿUlum, Sharh Sullam, 246.
488. The first method of discovering the cause is to notice that a certain feature of that about which judgment is to be passed always exists with the judgment and is never non-existent when the judgment is valid. This concomitance serves as an indication that the cause for the judgment is that very feature. Thus, when this feature is present for other things, the same judgment is applied about them.

489. This is the process of analyzing piecemeal the attributes of the root, so that the cause of its similarity with the branch may be determined. For example, one may say that the reason that the house is generated in time is owing to its being a composite or merely being contingent or that the reason is existence. The last two would be rejected, the first because contingency, in itself, is not a cause for the generation of something in time (the superlunar world is contingent, but not generated in time) and the latter because existence is common even to non-generated things (such as the Necessary). So its relevant cause, one that it shares with its branches, is the fact of being a composite. In other words, that which is a composite would also have the judgment passed of it that it is generated in time. See Mubīn, 2:219.

490. In other words, those premises that are grounded in transmitted information and are not based simply on reason may produce certain knowledge. However, such premises must ultimately be proved on the basis of reason. For example, a transmitted report can be taken to be certain only on the grounds of one’s reasoned investigation about the truth of the transmitter. If the latter were established on the basis of itself, this would be a circular argument; if it were established on the basis of other reports, the regress would be infinite. See Mubīn, 2:220.

491. Thus, certainty excludes mere belief that is not of the grade of a firm conviction; and it excludes compounded ignorance (i.e., one’s ignorance of the fact that one is ignorant), which may be a firmly rooted belief, but does not correspond to the actual; and it excludes a firm belief in the actual that is grounded in blind imitation (taqlīd), since such belief may be shaken by the intervention of a skeptic. See Mubīn, 2:221.

492. This is of course a perfect example of a dogmatic assertion in the base text that was a hotbed of debate. It is meant to serve as a site of dispute. See Mubīn, 2:221.

493. These kinds of propositions include the proof for their own validity. However, they are not derived via a dialectical or deliberative process. Rather, they are present, along with the middle terms, to the mind. For example, unlike the primary propositions, where the mere conceptualization of the two extremes generates their tie, in propositions that are dependent on the human’s natural inclination, the conceptualization of the two extremes generates a middle term. This middle term exists, along with the conceptualization of the two extremes in the form of a syllogism. Thus, when one conceptualizes the number four and evenness, one also conceptualizes “that which is divisible into two equal parts.” So one gets the syllogism: “Four is divisible into two equal parts; whatever is divisible into two equal parts is even; so four is even.” Thus, “Four is even” is a proposition that falls in the aforementioned category. See Mubīn, 2:222.

494. An example would be one’s sensing danger from the wolf one encounters in the wilderness.

495. An example would be our feeling of hunger.

496. Intuited propositions are those in which, once the sought conclusion is presented, the principles underlying them become apparent all at once, given that the cogitative
movement is initiated. They are contrasted with fitriyyāt in which the principles are immediately apparent with the conceptualization of the extremes of the sought conclusion. The cryptic response to the issue of witnessing and repetition alludes to the claim that intuited propositions are like propositions derived from experience. The mere difference between the two is that, in the former, the quiddity and causality of the cause is known, whereas, in the latter, only the causality of the cause is known. It is claimed that, in both cases, when a symptom and a repeated experience is given, the mind forms a link between the two intuitively. In contrast to this doctrine, al-Bihārī is arguing that intuited propositions need not require that one witness anything by one’s senses at all. See Mubīn, 2:224; Bahr al-ʿUlūm, Sharḥ Sullam, 252.

497. I do not intend “universally” to be taken literally. As the author explains, the reports have the weight of certainty, not because everyone circulates them but because the number of transmitters and the contexts of circulation are such as to rule out collusion. In legal theory, these reports are contrasted with others, such as the khabar al-wāḥid, that cannot rise to the level of certainty by virtue of themselves.

498. The issue of the required number of reporters is discussed in books of legal theory at length. Here, as in certain cases above (such as analogy), the Sullam is echoing important points of discussion in other disciplines, such as legal theory and the science of the narrations of the Prophet. The main point is that the number of transmitters of the report must be such that the intellect should be able to rule out the possibility of collusion among them. In addition, the chain of the reporters must end with an eyewitness of the event and the number of transmitters at all stages of the transmission must be such that the intellect rules out collusion at every stage. See Mubin, 2:225–26.

499. In other words, all such propositions are limited to only two broader types. The commentaries report this as the position of al-Rāzī and explain that the fitriyyāt are subsumed under the badīhiyyāt and the mujarrabāt, mutawātirāt, and the hadsiyyāt all fall under the mushāhadāt. The former categorization is said to make sense because the fitriyyāt do not require anything other than the conceptualization of the terms themselves; the latter set makes sense because all the three types require the input of the senses. See Mubin, 2:226.

500. In the former case, the middle term is the cause of the existence of the major in the minor. In the latter, it demonstrates the fact of the major being in the minor.

501. An example would be: “This person has a fever; whoever has a fever has a putrid humoral mixture; so this person has a putrid humoral mixture.” The middle term is the effect of the person’s having a putrid humoral mixture. See Mubin, 2:226.

502. Generally, it is argued that, in a propter quid demonstration, the middle term must be a cause and that, in a quia demonstration, the middle term must be an effect. This would suggest that, when the middle term is an effect, one cannot have a propter quid demonstration. Al-Bihārī is pointing out that this is a false conclusion. For the middle term may be an effect of the major, but insofar as it is the cause of the joining of the two extremes, the demonstration is still propter quid. For this is what is really needed in such demonstrations, not that the middle should be a cause of the major in itself. In the example, being composed is an effect of an agent. However, it is by virtue of the fact of being composed that a body has an agent. By contrast, it is not by virtue of the fact of having a fever that someone has a putrid humoral mixture. See Mubin, 2:227.
503. In other words, any explanation that is grounded in a theoretical investigation cannot be expected in such cases, since there is no cause whereby the judgments may be demonstrated. See Mubin, 2:228.

504. The point is that knowledge can be of those things that have a cause. Thus, certain knowledge of such things would require knowledge of their cause and this would be a demonstration propter quid. Or knowledge is of those things that have no cause. In such a case, either one knows these things without demonstration, or one cannot give a demonstration of them. Thus, it appears that only the propter quid demonstration is valid. See Mubin, 2:228.

505. The solution is that Avicenna is thinking of two kinds of certainty. The first kind is the certainty that is perpetual, since its object is unchanging; and this certainty may come about by means of itself or by means of the knowledge of the cause. Examples would be that the whole is greater than the part or that every body has that which composes it (based on the syllogism that whatever is a body is composed and whatever is composed has that which composes it). Both these kinds of certainties are universal and unchanging, because their objects do not change. The second kind of certainty, by contrast, pertains to that which changes. And it may be arrived at by necessity, as in our knowledge that the sun is bright; or it may be derived by means of a demonstration that is not propter quid and universal, as in our knowledge that Zayd is generated by a cause on the basis of the demonstration that Zayd exists and that whatever exists is generated by a cause. It is being argued that Avicenna must be speaking about the first type of certain knowledge; and this does not mean that the second type is not acknowledged by him. As a consequence, one may argue that demonstration embraces both types of certainties and that the quia demonstration is still valid insofar as it relates to particulars. See Mubin, 2:228; Mubārak, 309ff.

506. Black has argued that, reconciling a tension in the Greek commentarial tradition on Aristotle, logicians writing in Arabic were able to maintain the classification of rhetoric and poetics as logical arts by deploying the broader category of assent under which they were also subsumed. Assent, in its association with psychological notions such as idhʿān (acquiescence/yielding), was related to statements that were both truth-apt and not truth-apt. It is this same kind of analogy that is being asserted here. See Black, Logic.

507. This is a reference to the following syllogism that yields a false conclusion owing to the resemblance, in meaning, of certain false propositions to true ones. Substance exists in the mind; everything that exists in the mind subsists in the mind; everything that subsists in the mind is an accident. So substance is an accident. The failure of this particular syllogism lies in the equivocal manner in which the meaning of substance is being used. In the first instance, to say that substance exists in the mind is to speak of the mental secondary substance. In the conclusion, however, substance is being taken in the sense of the extramental primary substance. See Mubīn, 2:232.

508. The discipline of sophistics leads to error only on the basis of false premises that mislead. Sophistry is more general in that one may have either false premises or false syllogistic forms that lead to error. See Mubin, 2:232.

509. This is a response to the implicit argument that the disciplines cannot be just five, since one can have arguments with mixed propositions. The response is that one would classify such arguments with the discipline that corresponds to the weaker type of proposition. Mubin (2:233) points out that perhaps the expression “tadabbur!” is an indication to the reader that she should challenge the view presented in the matn.
510. This is a challenge to Avicenna's position that the parts of the sciences are three: subject matters (mawḍūʿ ʿāt), problemata, and principles. A discussion is found in Mubin, 2:233f. and Bahr al-ʿUlūm, 271ff.
GLOSSARY

‘adam non-existence
adāt particle
ahl al-‘arabiyya grammarians
‘akd al-naqīḍ contradictory conversion
‘aks conversion
‘aks mustaqīm symmetrical conversion
‘aks mutasāwin equivalent conversion
‘aks al-tartīb conversion of the order (of the syllogism)
alāqa tie; link
‘aqd hamli predicative connection
‘araḍ accident
‘araḍ ‘āmm common accident
‘araḍī accidental
asīl root; principle; secundum comparandum
awlawiyya priority
awwaliyya primariness
awwaliyyāt primary propositions
āya indication
‘āyn individuated entity
badīhi what is apprehended in a primary fashion
bi-dh-dhāt per se/by virtue of its very self
bi-l-ʿaraḍ  
per accidens/not by virtue of its very self

bi-l-fiʿl  
in actuality

bi-l-quwwa  
in potentiality

bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ  
conditioned absolutely

bi-sharṭ shayʾ  
conditioned specifically/conditioned by something

burhān  
demonstration

burhān innī  
quia demonstration

burhān limmī  
propter quid demonstration

burhān al-taḍʿīf  
demonstration against actual infinity by appeal to compounds

dalāla  
signification

dalāla ʿaqliyya  
signification related to the intellect

dalāla ṭabiʿiyya  
natural signification

dalāla waḍʾiyya  
conventionally-posited signification

dalīl  
proof; indicant; signifier

ḍarb  
syllogistic mood

ḍarūra  
necessity

ḍarūra azaliyya  
eternal necessity

ḍarūra dhātiyya  
necessity by virtue of the substrate

ḍarūra wasfīyya  
descriptive necessity

dawarān  
concomitance

dawām  
perpetuity

dhāt  
substrate

dhāṭī  
essential

dhihn  
mind

farʿ  
branch; primum comparandum

fard  
instance

fard dhīhni  
mental supposition

fardi  
supposed

faṣl  
specific difference

fi ḥaddī dhātihi  
within the scope of its very givenness

fi nafs al-amr  
within the scope of the very given

fitriyyāt  
propositions dependent on one’s natural orientation

ghayr mutanāhin  
infinite
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ḥadd</td>
<td>definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥadd akbar</td>
<td>major term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥadd asghar</td>
<td>minor term</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥadd awsat</td>
<td>middle term</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥadd tāmm</td>
<td>complete definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥādhiyya</td>
<td>specific denotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥādir</td>
<td>that which is present</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥadsiyyāt</td>
<td>propositions based in intuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥāla</td>
<td>state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥal basīt</td>
<td>simple “whether”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥal murakkab</td>
<td>compound “whether”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥaml bi-dh-dhāt</td>
<td>predication per se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥaml bi-l-ʿarād</td>
<td>predication per accidens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥaml bi-l-ishtiqaq</td>
<td>predication by derivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥaml bi-l-muwāṭaʿa</td>
<td>predication by complete overlap</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥamlīyya</td>
<td>attributive proposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥaml shāʿi ʿmutaʿārif</td>
<td>customary and commonly known predication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥaqīqa</td>
<td>reality; literal meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥaqīqa ʿalā l-īlāq</td>
<td>reality simpliciter</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥaqīqa dhihiyya</td>
<td>mental reality</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥaqīqa khārijiyya</td>
<td>extrametal reality</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥaqiqī</td>
<td>real; proposition that includes mental objects</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥāshiya</td>
<td>extreme</td>
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<tr>
<td>hayʿa tarkibiyya</td>
<td>compositional form</td>
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<td>ḥikāya</td>
<td>report</td>
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<td>ḥujja</td>
<td>proof</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥukm</td>
<td>judgment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḥukm ḍamanī</td>
<td>implicit judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḥusūl al-ashyāʿ bi-anfusihā</td>
<td>the obtaining of things themselves [in the mind]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>huwiyya</td>
<td>ipseity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>huwiyya basīta</td>
<td>simple ipseity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idāfa</td>
<td>relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idhʿān</td>
<td>assent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idrāk</td>
<td>apprehension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ifāda</td>
<td>communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ījāb 
affirmation

‘ilm 
knowledge

‘illa 
cause

‘illa jāmi‘a
 tertium comparationis

iltizām 
compound implication/signification of what is extraneous to the posited meaning

ilzām 
implication; attachment

inḍimām 
joining of parts

infiṣāl 
disjunction

inshā‘
 non-truth-bearing utterance

intizā‘
 extraction

ism al-ishāra 
demonstrative noun

isti‘āra 
metaphor

istilzām 
entailment

isti‘māl 
usage

istiqrā‘
 induction

i‘tibār 
mental consideration

i‘tiqād 
belief

ittiḥād 
unity; oneness

ittiṣāf wa-in‘ikās 
exclusion and inclusion; co-absence and co-presence

ittiṣāf inḍimāmi 
description that is added to the subject

ittiṣāf intizā‘i 
description that is extracted from the subject

ittiṣāl 
connection between two (relations)

jadāl 
dialectics

ja‘l basīṭ 
simple generation

ja‘l murakkab 
compound generation

jawhar 
substance

jazā‘ 
apodosis

jazm 
resolve

jidhr aṣamm 
Liar Paradox

jiha 
mode; direction

jins 
genus

jins al-ajnās 
highest genus/summum genus

jins ba‘id 
distant genus

jins qarīb 
proximate genus
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jism</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juz’</td>
<td>part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juz’ī</td>
<td>particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juz’ī ʾhaqiqi</td>
<td>real particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juz’ī iḍāfi</td>
<td>relative particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalima</td>
<td>verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khabar</td>
<td>truth-apt sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khārijī</td>
<td>extramental; proposition that only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accommodates mind-independent objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khāṣṣa</td>
<td>property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khaṭāba</td>
<td>rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khulf</td>
<td>absurd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khusūṣiyya</td>
<td>particularity; specificity; particular nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli</td>
<td>universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli ʾaqli</td>
<td>intellected universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli mantiqi</td>
<td>logical universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli tabiʾi</td>
<td>natural universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli tabiʾi makhlūf</td>
<td>natural mixed universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli tabiʾi mujarrad</td>
<td>natural abstracted universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulli tabiʾi muṭlaq</td>
<td>natural absolute universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulliyān mutasāwiyyān</td>
<td>equal universals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kulliyān mutabāyīnān</td>
<td>mutually distinct universals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>là bi-sharṭ shay</td>
<td>unconditioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ</td>
<td>utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ mufrad</td>
<td>simple utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ murakkab</td>
<td>compound utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ murakkab nāqiṣ</td>
<td>deficient compound utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ murakkab nāqiṣ imtīzājī</td>
<td>deficient compound mixed utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ murakkab nāqiṣ taqīyīdī</td>
<td>deficient compound restricted utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafẓ murakkab tāmm</td>
<td>complete compound utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>läzīm</td>
<td>concomitant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>luzūm</td>
<td>concomitance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mabdaʾ</td>
<td>principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>māddā</td>
<td>matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maʿdīl</td>
<td>divested noun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maʿdūm</td>
<td>nonexistent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mā ḥaqīqī | real “what”
mahmūl | predicate
mafhūm | sense
mafhūm shāmil | all-encompassing sense
mahall | substrate
māhiyya | quiddity
mahki ‘anhu | the object of a report
mahkūm ‘alayhi | object of judgment
mahmul | predicate
mahsūsāt | propositions based in things witnessed
majāz | figurative
majāz mursal | non-metaphorical figurative speech
majhūl muļaq | absolutely unknown
majmā’ | collection; set; group
maj‘ul | generated
ma‘lūm | object of knowledge
malzūm | that which entails; concomitant
ma‘nā | meaning, mental object; entative accident
manqūl | transmitted; utterance transferred from its original meaning
mansha’ | source
mantıq | logic
maqūl | predicated; category
ma‘qūl | intelligible
ma‘qūl thānī | secondary intelligible
ma‘rūd | substrate
mas‘ala | problema
mā shāriha | explanatory “what”
mathal aflāṭūniyya | Platonic Form
matlab | question
matn | base text/hypotext
mawdū’ | subject matter; subject term; substrate
mawjūd | existent
miṣdāq | verifying criterion; verifying referent
mīzān | correct balance (logic)
muʿarrif
- that which gives knowledge of something

muʿallafl
- composite

mubham
- ambiguous; unindividuated

mufassal
- expressed

mufrad
- simple

mughalaṭa
- sophistry; paradox

muḥāl
- impossible; absurd

muḥassal
- invested (with positive existence)

muhmal
- indefinite

mujarrabāt
- propositions based in experience

mujmal
- compressed

mukhtaliḥāt
- mixed modal syllogisms

mulāḥaẓa
- mental observation

mumkin
- possible

mumkin ʿāmm
- general possible

mumkin khāṣṣ
- special possible

mumtaniʿ
- impossible

muqaddar
- mentally determined

muqaddim
- antecedent

muqaddima
- premise

muqaddima kubrā
- major premise

muqaddima ṣughrā
- minor premise

muqaddima ajnabiyya
- extraneous premise

muqawwim
- constitutive

murādaṭa
- synonymy

murtajil
- arbitrarily invented utterance for a meaning

muṣāḍara
- pre-positing the sought conclusion

muṣawwirāt
- image-eliciting propositions

mushakkak
- modulated

mushtarak
- homonym

mutaʿayyin
- individuated

muṭābaqa
- correspondence/signification of the totality of a posited meaning

mutafāriq
- separable

mutanāfiyān
- mutually exclusive
mutanāhin finite
mutashakhkhāṣ individuated
mutawātīrāt universally-circulated propositions
muthbat lahu that of which something is affirmed
muṭlaq absolute
nafs al-amr the very given
nafy negation
naqīd contradictory
naqlī transmitted
natīja conclusion of a syllogism
nazār theoretical investigation
naw’ species
naw’ ‘ālī highest species/summum genus
naw’ al-anwā’ lowest species/infima species
naw’ haqīqī real species
naw’ ḫādīfī relative species
naw’ mutawassīt intermediary species
naw’ sāfil lowest species/infima species
nisba relation
nisba bayna bayna intermediate relation
nisba ḥabariyya predication relation
nisba mutakarrīra repeated relation
nisba taqyīdiyya restrictive relation
qaḍīyya proposition
qaḍīyya dāʾima muṭlaqa absolute perpetual proposition
qaḍīyya darūriyya muṭlaqa absolute necessity proposition
qaḍīyya dhīhniyya mental proposition
qaḍīyya ma’dūla divested proposition
qaḍīyya maḥšūra quantified proposition
qaḍīyya masḥūṭa ʾāmma common conditioned proposition
qaḍīyya masḥūṭa khāṣṣa special conditioned proposition
qaḍīyya muḥāṣṣala positive/invested proposition
qaḍīyya mujība juṣʾiyya particular affirmative proposition
qaḍīyya mujība kulliyya universal affirmative proposition
qaḍīyya mumkīna ʾāmma common possible proposition
qaḍīyya mumkīna dāʾima perpetual possibility proposition
qaḍiyya mumkina hīniyya
qaḍiyya mumkina khāṣṣa
qaḍiyya munharīfa
qaḍiyya muntashīra
qaḍiyya muntashīra mumkina
qaḍiyya muntashīra muṭlaqa
qaḍiyya musawwara
qaḍiyya muṭlaqa ʿāmma
qaḍiyya muṭlaqa waqtiyya
qaḍiyya muwajjaha
qaḍiyya rubāʿiyya basīta
qaḍiyya rubāʿiyya murakkaba
qaḍiyya sāliba juzʿiyya
qaḍiyya sāliba kulliyya
qaḍiyya sālibat al-maḥmūl
qaḍiyya shakhṣiyya
qaḍiyya sharīyya
qaḍiyya sharīyya ittifāqiyya ʿāmma
qaḍiyya sharīyya ittifāqiyya khāṣṣa
qaḍiyya sharīyya munfaṣila
qaḍiyya sharīyya munfaṣila haqīqiyya
qaḍiyya sharīyya munfaṣila māniʿat al-jamʿ
qaḍiyya sharīyya munfaṣila māniʿat al-khulūw
qaḍiyya sharīyya muttaṣila ittifāqiyya
qaḍiyya sharīyya muttaṣila luzūmiyya
qaḍiyya sharīyya muttaṣila muṭlaqa
qaḍiyya thulāṭhiyya
qaḍiyya thunāʿiyya
qaḍiyya ʿurfiyya ʿāmma
qaḍiyya ʿurfiyya khāṣṣa
qaḍiyya waqtiyya

temporal possible proposition
special possible proposition
distorted proposition
spread proposition
absolute spread possibility proposition
absolute spread proposition
quantified proposition
common absolute proposition
temporal absolute proposition
modalized proposition
simple quadripartite proposition
compound quadripartite proposition
particular negative proposition
universal negative proposition
negative-predicate proposition
singular proposition
conditional proposition
common chance conditional proposition
special chance conditional proposition
disjunctive conditional proposition
real disjunctive conditional proposition
disjunctive conditional anti-joining proposition
disjunctive conditional anti-empty proposition
conditional chance connective proposition
conditional entailing connective proposition
conditional absolute connective proposition
tripartite proposition
bipartite proposition
conventional common proposition
special conventional proposition
temporal proposition
Glossary

qadiyya waqtiyya daruriyya  
temporal necessity proposition
qadiyya waqtiyya muflqa  
absolute temporalized proposition
qadiyya wujudiyya la-da'imiyya  
nonperpetual existential proposition
qadiyya wujudiyya la-daruriyya  
nonnecessity existential proposition
qanun  
rule
qarina  
contextual clue; tie between premises
qasd  
intention
qawl  
statement
qayd  
qualification; restriction
qiyas  
syllogism; analogy
qiyas iqtiranii  
connective syllogism
qiyas istithnai  
exceptive syllogism
qiyas kamil  
perfect syllogism
qiyas al-khalf  
a syllogism that concludes by way of a reductio ad absurdum
qiyas mafsul al-natatij  
implicit compound syllogism
qiyas mawsul al-natatij  
explicit compound syllogism
qiyas murakkab  
compound syllogism
qiyas al-musawah  
equivalent syllogism
qiyas sharri  
conditional syllogism
rabita  
copula
rabita ghayr zamaniyya  
non-temporal copula
rabita zamaniyya  
temporal copula
raf  
removal
rasm nagiis  
deficient description
rasm tamm  
complete description
sabr wa-taqsim  
examination and successive elimination
safsat  
sophistics
sab  
negation
shabah  
simulacrum
shak  
doubt
shakl  
syllogistic figure
shamil  
ineclusive
shartiyya  
conditional proposition
shubhat al-istilzam  
doubt/paradox of entailment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>shidda</td>
<td>intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṣifa</td>
<td>attribute; quality; state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṣūra</td>
<td>form; image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṣūra ḏhiḥniyya</td>
<td>mental form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tabūyun juzʿī</td>
<td>particular mutual distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tabdīl</td>
<td>substitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṭabiʿa</td>
<td>nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taḍammun</td>
<td>inclusion/signification of a part of the totality of the posited meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tafaruq</td>
<td>mutual differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taḥaṣṣul</td>
<td>positive existence/obtaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tajrīd</td>
<td>abstraction</td>
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<td>tālī</td>
<td>consequent</td>
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<td>comparison</td>
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<td>compounding</td>
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<td>tarkīb khabari</td>
<td>sentence-making composition</td>
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<td>tartīb</td>
<td>ordering</td>
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<td>taṣawwur</td>
<td>conception/conceptualization; imagination</td>
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<td>taṣdīq</td>
<td>assent; assenting</td>
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<td>modulation</td>
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<td>tawqīt</td>
<td>temporal demarcation</td>
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<td>thubūth</td>
<td>affirmation; existence</td>
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<td>‘unwān</td>
<td>tag</td>
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<td>‘urf</td>
<td>convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waḍʿ ‘āmm</td>
<td>general positing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wahm</td>
<td>estimation; estimative faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wajh</td>
<td>aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wājib</td>
<td>necessary</td>
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<tr>
<td>wājib al-wujūd</td>
<td>Necessary with respect to existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wāqiʿ</td>
<td>actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wujūd</td>
<td>existence</td>
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<td>yaqīn</td>
<td>certainty</td>
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<td>Word</td>
<td>Translation</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>zann</td>
<td>belief; mere belief; false belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zarf</td>
<td>circumstance; locus; context</td>
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<td>zill</td>
<td>shadow</td>
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<td>ziyāda</td>
<td>increase</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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INDEX

a priori, 113, 165, 169, 192–93, 266n259
ʿAbd al-Bahāʾ, Muhammad, 44, 46–47ffig.
Abhari, Athir al-Din, 5, 51, 200n2, 231n26
abridgment, 13, 200n15
abrogation, 161
absolute necessity. See necessity proposition
absolute negation, 172, 258n202
absolute proposition, 171, 180, 182–83, 270n284,
273n301, 274n302, 290n399, 291n400,
299n454; absolute and ambiguous
proposition, 171; absolute common
proposition, 173, 274n304, 293n414; absolute
general proposition, 272n296, 29; absolute
affirmative, 183; absolute perpetuity
proposition, 173–74, 182; absolute possible
proposition, 174; absolute temporal
proposition, 171, 180, 182–83, 287n374,
291n401; absolute temporalized proposition,
171, 180, 270n282, 287n375; Alexandrian
absolute proposition, 171; particular absolute
affirmative 293n413; universal absolute
affirmative, 293n413
absolute universal, 158–59
absolute unknown, 147, 231n24
absurd antecedent, 176–77, 189, 259n207, 209,
277n322, 279n326, 280n328, 282n338
absurdity, 74, 82–85, 87, 112–13, 116, 131–32,
146, 152, 155, 157–58, 163–64, 167–69, 171,
176–77, 179, 181–82, 184, 188–90, 211n32,
229n12–30n19, 238n74, 247n133, 135–249n146,
258n206, 259n207, 208, 209, 262n229,
263n241, 265n250, 252, 266n259, 270n278,
272n294, 277n316, 322, 278n323, 279n325,
280n329, 332, 281n331, 335, 336, 337, 282n338,
284n354, 285n258, 286n366, 291n401,
292n409, 294n421, 295n426, 298n451,
299n452, 301n465, 304n482; principle of
absurdity, 260n209
244n116, 245n120, 246n127, 218,
248nn38, 140, 286n370, 307n507; accidental,
97–99, 128, 147, 149–50, 153, 158–59, 161, 167,
232n33, 233n43, 44, 234n49, 241n94, 96,
242n107–108, 244n118, 245n119, 121, 249n151,
250n155, 156, 251n150, 265n247, 297n444
acquisition [discursive], 109, 146, 152, 160,
230n21, 253n174
Active Intellect, 77–78, 173, 215n85, 277n298
ādāb al-baḥth, 5–6, 95, 199n11, 220n16, 222n27.
See also dialectics
ādāb al-muṭālaʾ. See muṭālaʾ ʾa
ʿadam al-wājib, 277n320. See also wujūd al-wājib
affirmation, 58, 80, 82, 112, 136, 163–66,
168–73, 175, 179–81, 186, 190, 235n53,
239n77, 258n204, 259n207–209, 260n215,
261n217, 221, 264n245, 266n259, 267n264,
268n268, 269n272, 270n280, 271n289–292,
272n304–5, 273n300–1, 281n334, 283n342,
286n368–289n392, 299n453, 302n469;
principle of affirmation, 112
affirmative proposition, 76, 80, 112–13, 165–66, 170, 180, 183–84, 186–87, 260n125, 261n221, 266n259, 267n264, 269n272, 271n289, 286n371,373, 293n413, 294n425; absolute affirmative, 183; affirmative conditional, 175, 279n257, 294n419,423; affirmative conditional disjunctive proposition, 288n381; divested affirmative, 271n289; affirmative entailing conditional, 176, 184, 190; affirmative negative-predicate proposition, 179, 187, 268n268, 286n373; affirmative negative-subject proposition, 179, 286–287n373; affirmative predicative proposition 294n423; affirmative simpliciter, 165, 181; particular absolute affirmative 293n413; traditional affirmative, 170, 267n264, 268n269; universal absolute affirmative, 293n414;

affirmative: conversion, 290nn393,394, 294n423; copula, 130, 136; copula simpliciter, 170; necessity, 272n294, 277n320, 294n419; particular [quantifier], 166, 188; tie, 130; universal [quantifier], 166, 187. See also affirmative copula

Afghan, 34, 208n149; Afghanistan, 35

ahl al-ʿarabiyya, 232n31. See also grammarians

Aḥmad, Maqbūl, 93–94

Aḥmad, Sayyid Barakāt, 31, 36, 39–40fig., 91–96, 105, 206n119, 208n154, 221n19, 222n24

Ajmīrī, Muʿīn al-Dīn, 91, 93, 210n21, 229n13


Aligarh, xiii, 26, 31, 41, 48

Aligarh Muslim College, 48

allusion [commentarial], 3, 13, 23, 48, 52, 56, 63, 69, 86, 107–108, 110–11, 114–15, 118–19, 122, 130, 132, 135–36, 144, 203n63, 219n13, 221n18, 224n9, 228n7, 232n33, 285n365, 296n437,438, 303n477, 306n496. See also anticipatory [aspect of commentary]; cryptic; disambiguation; gesture; hint; prompt; subduced

Alwar, 36

ambiguity, 111, 120, 156, 160, 165–66, 171, 175, 227n55, 233n40, 243n, 252n170,172, 253n174, 260n213, 264n243, 270n314. See also disambiguation [commentarial]

Amīr, Muḥammad [Qāḍī Mubārak’s son], 15, 201n33

Amīthwī, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, 92

analogy, 57, 74, 86, 97–99, 101, 103–104, 170, 175, 182, 192, 222n27, 274n307, 278n375, 296n436, 301n464, 304n487, 306n498. See also qiyās; syllogism

ancients, 69, 162, 165, 171, 184, 251n165, 256n190,191, 260n213, 270n279

Anglo-Oriental College. See Aligarh Muslim College


anticipatory [aspect of commentary], 95, 99–100, 102, 112, 220n17. See also cryptic; gesture; incompleteness; subduced

apodosis, 78, 164–65, 257n199, 259n207,208, 260n209

aporia, 6, 108, 115–16, 117fig., 255n83

apprehension [noetic], 73, 145, 162–63, 229n116, 230n16, 250n155, 256n189,192; apprehending state, 146, 230n16

Arabs, 163, 198, 234n48

Aristotelianism, 4

Aristotle, 4–5, 199n11, 206n116, 307n506

ʿArshī, Imtiyāz ʿAlī, 16, 201n41

Ash’arites, 297n443

assent (tāṣīq), 6–7, 15–16, 26, 72–73, 145–47, 161–63, 184–85, 192, 194–95, 200n3, 212n43, 228nn6,8, 229n14, 230n120,21,22, 231n23, 253n175, 254n176, 255n186, 256n187–190, 296n431,436, 307m506

astronomy, 197n3

attribute (ṣifā), 59, 127, 147–48, 152, 169, 192, 265n254, 266n262, 267n263, 305n48

attributive proposition. See proposition

auctor, 218–196; auctoritas, 219n6


Avicenna (principal scholar; al-Shaykh), 1, 4–6, 51, 69, 83–4, 154, 156, 159, 162, 166–67, 175–78, 182, 185–86, 188–90, 194, 199, 203n54, 213n59, 227n40, 228n6, 240n84, 242n101, 262n229, 269n273, 276n315, 278n323, 279n323, 281nn333,336, 285n358, 291n405, 292n406, 297n444, 307n505, 308n510. See also al-Ishārāt; al-Najāt; al-Shifā’

Avicennian: logic, 5; synthesis 6; innovation, 7

Awrangzib ʿĀlamgīr, 12, 15, 17, 201n31
Badī‘ al-mīzān, 51, 200n2. See also Mizān al-manṭiq: Tulunbī, 'Abdallāh
Baghnāwī, Mīrzā Jān. See Mīrzā Jān Shirāzī
Bahādur Shāh I, Quęp al-Dīn Muhammad Shāh 'Alām, 12, 14, 201n21
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 221n21
Balyāwī, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, 36–37, 39–40fig., 44, 46–47fig., 207n144, 223–240n7, 303n477. See alsoḌiyāʾul-nujūm
Banārāsī, Amānallāh, 12, 17, 19fig.
Bāndawī, [Mawlānā] Ṣiddīq Aḥmad, 45
Bankipore, 94
Bādawānī, Muḥammad Ashraf, 16, 21fig.
Barthes, Roland, 221n18, 223n31
base text [commentarial], 7, 93–94, 96, 101, 107–8, 133, 145, 203n63, 208n153, 221n18, 222n21, 228n7, 305n477, 305n492. See also gateway commentary; hypotext; matn; patchwork; self-commentary
battī proposition. See definitive proposition
Bazdawī, Abū Ḥasan, 13
Benares, 94
Bengal, 16–17
Bharthari, 211n33
Bhopal, 30–31, 207n149
Bihār, 12
Bihārī, Ghulām Yaḥyā b. Najm al-Dīn, 27, 32–33fig., 104, 206n110. See also Liwāʾ al-hudā
Bihārī, Ṣayyid Aḥmad, 93, 97–104
Bihārī, Ṣayyid al-Wahhāb, 91–105, 221n19, 222n23, 24
branch (farʿ), 192, 305n489
British East India Company. See East India Company
Buhār, 22
burhān al-taḏʿ if, 230n19, 21
burhān inni. See quid demonstration
burhān limti. See propter quid demonstration
Cairo, 199
category, 225n20, 233n41, 42, 246n129
Categories, 6
causal: generation, 185; production, 137; tie, 276n131, 277n130, 278n132
Chawrāṣi, Shaykh Dānīyāl, 12, 19fig.
celestial intellects, 246n124
circularity, 7, 146, 162, 178, 186, 212n39, 255n182, 283n147, 299n146, 305n490
citation [commentarial]. See quotation
classical period, 1, 4, 99n1
 cogitation, 146, 230n21, 305n496. See also mental manipulation; mental process
command [commentarial; ifham, taʾammal, tadabbur, taʿakkār, etc.], 111–12, 114–16, 117fig., 119–22, 125–27, 131, 134fig., 225n20, 227n40, 299n145, 304n148, 257n159. See also allusion; gesture; hint; prompt
commentarial aspects. See allusion; anticipatory; base text; citation; command; commentarial cycle; cryptic; cumulative; curatorial; cyclical; disambiguation; excavation; exegesis; fulfillment; gateway commentary; gesture; hint; hypertext; hypotext; incompleteness; matn; obscurity; patchwork; prompt; quotation; self-commentary; subdued
commentarial cycle, 3, 93, 101, 103–104, 108, 115–16, 225n21. See also cyclical [commentarial aspect]; Dawānī-Dashtaki commentarial cycles
compound-implication (iltizām), 148, 232n30, 31, 34, 233n34, 277n322, 296n431. See also implication
compound production. See jaʾl murakkab
compound syllogism (qiyās murakkab), 190, 296n491
compound utterance, 52, 54, 148, 150–51, 254n182, 255n182
compressed (muṣmal): proposition, 53–60, 210n21, 211n27, 212n39; reading, 53–56, 58–60, 150, 211n27; report, 55, 57–59, 150. See also expressed proposition
INDEX

conception/conceptualization (continued) 192, 200n3, 212n43, 216n88, 228n9, 229n13, 230n20, 21, 232nn28, 29, 31, 34, 36n59, 237n68, 238n68, 243n107, 249n145, 251n160, 252n172, 253n174, 254n176, 179, 255n184, 256n187, 2190, 263n66, 268nn267, 268, 269, 277n316, 285n363, 305n493, 306n499; conception and assent, 73, 145–46, 212n43, 228n9, 230n21, 256nn187, 190

concomitance, 75–76, 136, 157–58, 171, 189, 192, 232n34, 248n137, 249n141, 251n160, 262n229, 269n277, 270n278, 276n315, 277n320, 282n341, 301n466, 305n488; principle of mutual concomitance, 158

conditional (sharṭiyya) [proposition], 44, 51, 54–55, 78–80, 87, 125, 131, 163–65, 174–77, 181–82, 184, 189, 208n165, 235n153, 257n199, 259n207, 209, 260n209, 276n311, 313, 314, 316n314, 277n316, 317, 320, 321, 322, 279n327, 281n334, 282n338, 283n341, 285n358, 289n387, 392, 290n395, 294n423, 295n429, 298n447; chance conditional, 177–78, 182, 189, 189, 282n338, 339; conditional disjunctive, 180, 288n381, 289n387; conjunctive conditional, 190, 235, 300n462, 302n470; connective conditional, 190, 173–76, 178, 189, 259n209, 277n322, 278n322, 323, 281n333; chance connective conditional, 174, 189, 275n313, 277n312, 322, 278n323, 301n463; connective entailment conditional, 277n321, 322; contradictory conditional, 259n207; disjunctive conditionals, 178, 190, 275n311, 289n387, 290n395, 302n470. See also affirmative proposition; conjunctive proposition; connective proposition; disjunctive proposition; universal proposition

conditional syllogism (qiyās sharṭiyya), 51, 189; conditional connective syllogism, 186

connective proposition, 296n431; conjunctive conditional proposition, 190, 235, 300n462, 302n470

connective: absolute connective, 174; connective entailment proposition, 277n322; connective entailment conditional, 277n321, 322; connective judgment, 257n199; negative chance connective, 275n313. See also conditional connective syllogism (qiyās iqṭirānī), 15, 185–86, 189, 296n431

consensus, 74, 102, 161, 163, 179, 254n177

contingency, 236n59, 270n286, 305n399

contradiction, 4, 7, 51, 167, 179–80, 185, 191, 238n75, 269n241, 271n290, 283n342, 287n378, 288n384; contradictory consequent, 258n206, 259n207; contradictory predicate, 272n296, 273n297, 288n386; contradictory proposition, 180, 260n209; modal contradictory, 287. See also conversion; joining of two contradictories

conversion, 7, 51, 70, 144, 164, 161–88, 190, 231n25, 259n207, 267n264, 268n268, 278n323, 279n323, 289n388–390n388, 291n400, 401n403, 405, 292n405, 506, 410, 293n413, 294n418, 421, 423, 425, 295n426, 427, 428, 297nn439, 440, 441, 300n457, 459, 302n467; contradictory conversion, 7, 144, 164, 184–85, 190, 231n25, 259n207, 267n264, 268n268, 279n323, 294n423, 424, 425, 295n426, 427, 428, 297n439, 440, 441, 302n467; conversion of possibility proposition, 292n406; conversion of major, 187; conversion of minor, 178, 187; conversion of necessity proposition, 182, 289n388; conversion of universal negative special proposition, 294n420; conversion and contradiction rules, 7, 51; necessity conversion, 182, 291; perpetuity universal negative conversion, 292n408, 410

copula, 54, 130, 136, 163, 170, 173, 210n23, 255n184, 257n195, 268n265; temporal copula, 163; nontemporal copula, 163

copular existence, 11

criterion of posteriority, 59, 128

cryptic [aspect of commentary], 56, 99, 102, 117, 122, 220n16, 221n18, 224n9, 237n68, 243n121, 247n133, 249n142, 251n186, 274n308, 276n315, 281n348, 291n403, 292n413, 296n438, 306n496. See also allusion; anticipatory; gesture; hint; obscurity; subdued


See also cyclical; fulfillment; incompleteness; patchwork

curatorial [aspect of commentary], 3, 48, 107, 111, 116–17, 130, 133–35, 220n16, 222n22. See also patchwork; quotation

curriculum, 1, 6, 8, 11, 16, 26, 34, 36, 38, 44–45, 49, 51, 56, 68, 197, 201n31, 203n63, 204n63, 206n116, 208n165, 209n170, 213n59, 214n64. See also Dars-i Niẓāmī

cylical [aspect of commentary], 68, 92–94, 101, 108, 115, 130, 133, 135, 220n16. See also cumulative; commentarial cycle
INDEX

Dabraba-yi Sikandari [newspaper], 91, 95
Dāmād, Mir Bāqīr, 12, 17, 20, 38, 63–66, 72, 96, 130, 132–33, 134fig., 135–38, 200n11, 214n64, 227n155, 56. Also see Imādat; al-Ufuq al-mubīn; Yememi Wisdom
Dār al-ʿUlūm Deoband, 36–37, 43–45, 49, 209n170
Dars-i Niẓāmī, 1, 6, 11, 17, 20, 108, 197n2, 200n7, 202n51, 203n63, 214n64
Dashtaki: circle, 12, 200n9, 205n77; Ghiyāth al-Dīn, 6; Ṣadr al-Dīn, 102–103, 210n20, 211n31
Dawānī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 6–8, 17, 51–52, 56–57, 60–61, 69, 79–81, 102–4, 118, 127–30, 132–33, 134fig., 136, 137–38, 164, 199n2, 208nn156, 165, 210n20, 211n31, 32, 34, 226n32; definitive (battī) proposition, 123, 125, 130–32, 134fig., 226n32; definitive reading of proposition 130. See also nondefinitive
Delhi, 14–17, 20, 22, 27–29, 31, 36–37, 44, 47, 209n169
Deoband, 17, 36–37, 44–45, 46fig., 48–49, 209n176, 183
derivation: conditional, 278n323; principle of (farʿ iyya), 127, 129–30, 132, 135, 137–38
Dhaka, 14, 209n175
Dhamtūrī, Muḥammad Ḥanīf b. Abī al-Ḥanīf, 44, 46–47fig.
dialectics, 16, 52, 69–70, 101, 194, 223n34; Dialectics, 6 See also ʿadāb al-baḥth; disputation
Dihlawī, Shāh Waliallāh, 205n88
disambiguation [commentarial], 68, 121–122, 125
disjunction, 174–75, 177–78, 180, 189–90, 275n133, 281n334, 283n132, 285n386, 287n140; real disjunction, 177, 283n134, 284n134, 285n135
See also disjunctive (munfasila) [proposition], 174–75, 177, 180, 182, 189, 275n131, 281n334, 283n132, 285n135
See also also Rampur debate
disputation. See also ʿadāb al-baḥth; debate
divested: predicate, 267n264; subject, 261n218, 219; universal, 251n160
divested proposition, 170, 172, 269n270, 271, 272, 271n289
divine: author, 219n8; knowledge, 72–73, 208n165, 214n61; law, 161; text, 110; will, 224n49
Diwī, ʿAbd al-Salām, 12, 19fig.
See also Balyāwi, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm
doctrine: of causal tie in cases of mutual entailment, 277n320; of conversion of the possibility propositions like themselves, 182; of entailment, 136; of the logicians, 164–65; of the simulacrum and the image, 103–104; of things themselves obtaining in the mind (ḥuṣūl al-ashyāʾ bi-anfusihā), 229n13, 237n65, 251n162; of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd), 73; of the unity of the essence and existence of that which inheres and the substrate, 242n101; of the verifiers, 159, 165; that a form in the mind is identical to its object with respect to its quiddity, 98; that all conceptualizations are primary, 161; that certain knowledge of that which has a cause does not obtain except with a view to the knowledge of the cause, 194; that conceptualizations have no contradictories pertains to a different sense of contradictory, 179; that disjunction in an absolute sense obtains only from two parts, 177; that the two related things in a mutually
doctrine: of causal tie (continued)
distinct, 179; that knowledge and the thing
that is known are one and the same thing,
73; that necessity propositions convert like
themselves, 182; that species are generated by
means of the joining of parts, 243n108; that
the collection entails the part, 178; that the
essential is created for the essence for which
it is essential, 163; that the extramentially
existential is not compounded of a universal
and its particularization, 250n157; that the
real simple has two distinct forms that
correspond to the simple, 159

Dumām al-fuhūm, 209n175, 229n10, 233nn36,37
234n47, 236n160, 237n68, 238n171,74, 256n186,
259n207, 262n231, 267n264, 288n185 See also
al-Pishāwari, Sayyid Anwār al-Ḥaqq

East India Company 22, 37

ekthesis [proof], 183, 294n418

entailment (istilzām), 11, 79, 127–30, 132,
134–135, 138, 157, 164, 170, 174–76, 178,
184–85, 188, 190, 232n130,31,32, 248n137,
257nn198,199, 258n203,204, 260n213, 274n305, 275n313, 276n315, 277n320, 278n323,
279n325, 280n328, 281n336, 282n338, 284n354,355, 285n356,286,360,
286n367, 296nn431,435, 297n443, 301n465,
302nn472,473, 304nn485,487; causal
entailment, 157; entailing conditional,
176–77, 184, 189, 277n321,322, 282n340,
283n341; Dāmād’s modified principle of
derivation and entailment, 137; entailing
conjunctive conditional, 300n456;
entailing connective, 174–76, 178, 189,
276n315, 277n321,322, 278n323, 279n327,
301nn465,466; entailing connective
conditional, 176, 178, 189, 278n323,
300n456; principle of entailment, 79, 127,
129–30, 258n204; paradox of entailment
(shubhat al-istilzām), 11
epistemic grade, 301n476
epistemology, 1, 70–72, 74, 100, 200n3, 210n13,
229n13
equivalent conversion, 181, 185, 297n441
equivalent syllogism (qiyyās al-musāwāw), 185,
296n436,438
essential: nonnecessity, 171; nonperpetuity, 171;
perpetuity, 173
Eurocentrism, 3, 199n17
excavation [commentarial; textual], 52, 56–58,
66–67, 69, 71, 86, 94, 105, 107, 111, 120–25, 132,
135, 137–38, 221n18, 225n21, 299n453, 303n477.
See also disambiguation; exegesis
exceptional syllogism (qiyyās istithnā ṭ), 185, 190–91,
297n444, 304n480
exegeis [commentarial], 105, 110, 123, 202n54;
Qur’ānic exegeis, 209n183; Biblical exegeis,
218n6. See also excavation
existential copula, 210n21. See also copular
existence
expressed (muḥaṣṣal) proposition, 53–58, 60,
211n27, 221n39; expressed reading, 53, 58–59;
expressed report, 57–58. See also compressed
proposition
extramental existence, 84, 112–13, 159, 168–169,
208n165, 229n13, 251n160,162, 262n229,231, 273n301; extramental existential, 83, 159, 250,
295; extramential reality, 160, 168, 243n108,
251nn160,162, 253n172, 289n389
extraneous premise, 185, 296n435

Fārābī, Abū Naṣr, 4, 69, 166, 182, 199n11,
262n229, 292nn405,406; Fārābīan Aristote-
lianism, 4–5; Fārābīan reading of the subject
term, 292n406
Farangī Mahālī, 6, 15, 17, 30, 35, 37, 41, 48–49, 52,
71. See also Farangi Mahallī
(Bahr al-‘Ulūm). See Bahr al-‘Ulūm,’ ‘Abd
al-‘Ali
Farangi Mahallī, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Muḥammad
Sa’d, 32–33fig., 35, 39–40fig., 42fig., 46fig.,
Farangi Mahallī, ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm b. ‘Abd al-Rabb,
30, 32–34fig., 35, 39–40fig., 42–43fig., 206n110
See Lakhnawī, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm b. Aminallāh
Farangi Mahallī, ‘Abd al-Ḥayy b. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm,
32–33fig., 44, 46–47fig., 92, 100, 105, 202n52,
222n23
Farangi Mahallī, Anwār al-Ḥaqq, 32–33fig., 44,
46fig.
Farangi Mahallī, Barakatallāh b. Ahmadallāh,
30, 32–33fig., 41, 42–43fig., 44, 46–47fig.,
64, 144, 231n47, 229n13, 230n16, 231n25,27,
232n31,33,34. See also Raf’ al-ishtibāh
Farangi Mahallī, Ghulām Muṣṭafā. See Sīhālīwī,
Ghulām Muṣṭafā
Farangi Mahallī, Khādim Ahmad b. Ḥydar b.
Mubin, 40
Farangi Mahallī, Mulla Muṣīn. See Sīhālīwī,
Mullā Mubīn b. Muḥibballāh
Farangi Mahallī, Muḥammad As’ad. See
Sīhālīwī, Muḥammad, As’ad
INDEX

339


Farangi Mahalli, Muḥammad Sa‘īd. See Sīhālawī, Muḥammad Sa‘īd

Farangi Mahalli, Muḥammad Yūsuf b. Aṣghar, 29, 32–33fig., 35, 39–40fig., 41, 42–43fig., 204–205n73, 207n134, 224n9. See also Sullām Mullā Ḥasan; Sullām Qāḍī Mubārak

Farangi Mahalli, Niẓām al-Dīn. See Sīhālawī, Niẓām al-Dīn

Farangi Mahalli, Nūr al-Ḥaqq, 30, 32–33fig., 44, 46fig.

Farangi Mahalli, Waliālāh b. Ḥabīballāh, 32–33fig., 38, 40, 42–43fig., 46–47fig., 208n155

Farangi Mahalli, [Muṭṭi] Zuhūrūllāb b. Muḥammad Wafī, 28–30, 32–33fig., 35, 37fig., 40–41, 42fig., 46fig., 49

Farangi Mahallis [family; scholars], 12, 17, 20, 22, 24, 28–30, 34–35, 37–38, 40–41, 44–45, 47–48, 200n17

Farangi Mahalli, Waliālāh b. Ḥabībballāh, 32–33fig., 38, 40, 42–43fig., 46–47fig., 208n155

Farangi Mahalli, [Muṭṭi] Zuhūrūllāb b. Muḥammad Wafī, 28–30, 32–33fig., 35, 37fig., 40–41, 42fig., 46fig., 49

Farangi Mahallis [family; scholars], 12, 17, 20, 22, 24, 28–30, 34–35, 37–38, 40–41, 44–45, 47–48, 200n17

Farangi Mahalli, Waliālāh b. Ḥabībballāh, 32–33fig., 38, 40, 42–43fig., 46–47fig., 208n155

Fatīhpūrī, Kāmil al-Dīn al-Sīhālawī. See Sīhālawī, Kāmil al-Dīn

Fawātīḥ al-rahāmūt [commentary on Musallam al-thubūt], 23, 234n47

Fayḍābād, 203n57

Fayḍābādī, ʿAlī Bakhsh al-Ḥanafi, 30, 32–34fig., 206n110

figurative speech, 149–50, 225, 234n48

figure (shākī), 7, 143, 178, 183, 186–89, 259n1207, 278n123, 283n348, 290n400, 297n441, 298n146, 448; first figure, 143; second figure, 186–88

First Anglo-Afghan War, 35

Fīrūz b. Maḥābbā. See Ibn Maḥābbā, Fīrūz

Fishacre, Richard, 219n8

five predicables, 155, 241n93, 244n117

Foucault, Michel, 228n4

fulfillment [commentarial; hypothetual], 45, 66, 93–96, 98, 100, 104–105, 111–112, 117, 119, 133, 135, 144, 212n34, 221n49, 222n23. See also cumulative; cyclical; incompleteness

Galen, 4

gateway commentary, 5, 7, 22, 25, 36, 45, 48, 200n3, 202–203n54. See also self-commentary

general possible, 153, 240n83, 85; non-general possible, 153, 240n83. See also special possible

gesture [commentarial], 13–14, 45, 52, 96, 105–8, 119, 221n18, 222n21. See also allusion; anticipatory [aspect]; command; cryptic; hint; incompleteness; prompt; subdued

Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid, 69, 232n32

grammarians, 78–80, 148, 164, 233n37, 234n47, 257n199, 201, 258n202, 259n206, 207, 208, 209, 260n209; doctrine of the grammarians, 164

Guerric of St. Quentin, 219n8

Gūpāmawī, 17, 20, 24, 31, 36, 38, 47–48, 201n33; Gūpāmawī scholars, 17, 20, 27, 38

Gūpāmawī, [Qāḍī] Iritādī ‘Ali, 28


Gūpāmawī, Muḥammad ‘Īwād Khayrābādī, 24, 25fig.

Gūpāmawī, Quṭb al-Dīn b. Shihāb al-Dīn, 18fig., 21fig., 24, 25fig., 27, 32fig., 39fig.

Gūpāmawī, Shihāb al-Dīn, 15–17, 18fig., 19fig., 21fig., 24, 25fig., 27, 32fig., 38, 39fig.


ḥadīth (discipline), 29, 198, 209n183, 306n498

ḥadīsiyyūt. See intended proposition

haecceity, 74–75

Ḥāfiz al-Mulk, Nawwāb, 22

Ḥāfiz Darāz. See Ibn Muḥammad Śādiq, Muḥammad Aḥsan

Ḥakim Sharif ibn Akmal. See Ibn Akmal, Ḥakim Sharif

Ḥamdallāh [commentary on Sullām]. See Sullām Ḥamdallāh

Ḥamid al-rahāmūt, 22

Ḥanafi school of jurisprudence, 12–13, 209n183
impossible universals, 236n59
incompleteness [commentarial], 62, 93, 112, 118.
See also curatorial; fulfillment; obscurity; subdubed
independent verification. See verification
India, 1, 2, 5–7, 11–12, 20, 28, 45, 50–52, 55, 68, 71–72, 86, 199, 201n28, 210nn6,10, 213nn54,59, 259n207; North India, 1, 20, 49. See also Pakistan; South Asia; Subcontinent
individuation, 98, 145, 159–60, 162,
243n109, 244n115, 245nn120,121, 246n124, 250nn153,154,155, 251n160, 252nn167,168,172, 253nn172,174, 265n252, 304n483
induction, 186, 191, 296nn431,432,436, 302n476, 303nn476,477,478,480, 304nn480,481
infima species
infinite existence, 126, 226n40
infinite regress, 76, 126, 137, 156–58, 212n39, 236n55, 247n130, 248n136, 249nn142,146
innī proof. See qua demonstration
intelleced: implication, 232n31; genus, 252n168; species, 249n149; universal, 158, 249n148
intelligible, 78, 147, 157, 162, 230n22, 254–255n182; secondary intelligible, 151, 158, 230n22
internal senses, 193
intertextuality, 3, 106, 219n13, 220n17
al-Intibāh [commentary on Ḥamdallāh], 118–20
intuited propositions, 193, 195, 305–306nn496,499
ipseity, 159, 237n68
İsâhâji, 5, 51, 200n12; commentary attributed to Jurjâni on, 51, 200n12
al-Ishârât wa-l-tanbîhât, 5–6, 202–203n54; commentaries on 203n54; Tüsi’s commentary on, 5; Tahtânî’s commentary and arbitration, 5
Ishrâqi. See Illuminationists
istilzâm. See entailment
i’timâr substrate. See substrate
Jang, Muḥammad ‘Ubaydallâh Khân Firûz, 31
Jawnpûr, 35
Jawnpūrī, Bâballâh, 27–28, 32fig., 204n63, 206n110
Jawnpūrī, Muḥmûd, 12–13, 17, 21fig., 23, 70, 72, 200n110,113. See also al-Shams al-bâzigha.
Jawnpûrī, Muḥammad ‘Ali Muḥârakî, 14, 20, 123–32, 134fig., 224n19, 226n38, 227n140,45. See also Mi’râj al-fuḥâm
ja’l basît (simple generation/production), 128–30, 132, 135–38, 214n27, 227n55, 265n247
ja’l muraqqab (compound generation/production), 11, 71–72, 208n164
Jihâyisî, Ghulâm Muḥammad b. Ghulâm Rasûl al-Jawlâkî, 37, 39–40fig.
joining of two contradictories, 82, 134, 165, 169, 176–77, 184, 239n77, 240n81, 258n206, 278n323, 295n426; non-joining of two contradictories, 152–53, 184, 240n81
Jurjâni, Sayyid Sharîf, 5–8, 51, 54–55, 69, 78–81, 164, 191, 200n2, 212n43, 214n69, 215n88, 216n88, 258n205, 302n476, 303n177. See also al-Mawâqîf fī ‘ilm al-kalâm
Khayrābādī, Šīfattallāh Husaynī, 15, 18fig., 19fig., 21fig., 24, 25fig., 27, 32fig., 38, 39fig.
Khayrābādī, Turāb 'Alī b. Nuṣratallāh 'Abbāsī, 37, 39–40fig.
Khayrābādīs [family; scholars], 27, 31, 36–38, 45, 48–49, 72, 91, 102, 206n117, 214n64
Khuda Bakhsh Library (Patna), 206n112
Khūnajī, Afdal al-Dīn, 5, 69, 213–14, 230n22, 287nn374,375
Labkani, 'Imād al-Dīn, 28, 32–33fig., 206n110
Lahore, xi, 24, 48
Lāhūrī, 206n110, 207nn130,138, 209n182
Lakhnawī, Mirzā Lakhnawī, Anwar
Lakhnawī, Lakhnawī, Anwar
Lakhnawī, Lakhnawī, Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Ḥāqq, 17, 18fig., 25fig.
Khitāb al-Umūm, 199
Kubrā[logic work], 5, 51, 200n7, 204n63, 205nn77,93, 207nn124,133,134, 209n170
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Lakhnawī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fārūqī, 12, 19fig.
Maṭbaʿ-yi Mujtabāʿī, 26, 209n169
mathematics, 236n55
*al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām*, 6, 68, 201n28; commentary by Harawī on Jurjānī on, 6, 68, 201n28
*Maʿārij al-ʿulūm*, 38
mental abstraction. See mental extraction; mental invention; mental posit; mental supposition
mental concomitant, 251n160
mental consideration. See mental determination.
mental determination, 60–66, 71, 73–83, 86, 87, 112–15, 119, 121–22, 124, 126, 131, 151, 157–60, 166, 168, 176, 178, 182, 192–3, 216n98, 217n100, 226n38, 242n100, 243n106, 245n121, 248n141, 249n142, 250n155, 251n160, 252n168, 253n174, 262n231, 265n253, 268n269, 272n295, 279n323, 282n338, 285nn258, 360, 361, 299n453, 301nn463, 464, 304n480, 306n496; mentally determinative times, 79; nature of mental considerations, 75; See also mental manipulation; mental extraction; mental invention; mental posit; mental supposition
mental entity, 74, 76, 215n88, 265n252. See also mental object
mental existence, 83–85, 157, 159, 208n165, 248n141, 262n231, 268n269, 273n301; mental existent, 75. See also extramental existence
mental extraction, 77–78, 85, 128, 137, 149, 151, 154, 159, 170, 237n62–65, 245n121, 250n157, 158, 253n172, 264n244, 266n261, 267n262, 263 mental form, 148, 151, 232n28, 236n60, 61, 237n62, 65, 67, 68
mental imprint, 86, 146, 236n60
mental instances, 74, 114–15
mental invention, 71, 78, 83–86, 215n88, 217n112, 238n68, 265n250. See also mentally real mental locus, 77, 267n262
mental manipulation, 83–87, 137, 216n98, 244n114. See also mental process
mental object, 70, 74, 76, 78, 81, 85, 104, 112–13, 200n3, 217n111, 238n68, 260n214, 215. See also mental entity
mental parts, 243n106, 108
mental posit, 59–61, 115, 129, 131, 216n88, 248n135, 265n248, 250, 266n260, 280n328. See also proposition
mental process, 137, 245n121. See also mental manipulation
modal proposition, 7, 174; compound modal
proposition, 174, 180; modalized proposition,
171, 173–4, 180, 183, 270nn277, 283,
274nn301, 302, 305, 293n415, 300n456
modal syllogism, 7, 51, 188
modality, 7, 171–73, 180, 188, 235n53, 262n299,
270n283, 272n296, 273n301, 287n374,
290n397; modal quality, 180, 287n378
modernity, 198
moderns [scholars], 171, 270n279
modulation, 71–72, 119, 149, 233n44
modus tollens, 190, 295, 302n473
mood [syllogism], 186, 188, 300n459
morphology, 148
muftī, 28. See also qāḍī
Muḥammad, Abū al-Fatḥ, 93
Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya b. Ali, 29
Muḥānī, Kamāl al-Dīn al-Husaynī, 29, 32–34fig.,
41, 42–43fig.
uḥṣāqiq. See verifier
Muḥibb ‘Alī Pūr (Bihār), 12
Muḥammad, Muzammil, 208n165, 224n9, 228n6,
306n498
Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya b. Ali, 29
Mühānī, Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, 29, 32–34fig.,
41, 42–43fig.
muḥaqiq. See verifier
Muhābballāh
Mullā Ḡusayn, 208n165, 224n9, 228n6,
306n498
Mullā Jalāl [commentary]. See Tahdhib al-
mantiq
Mullā Šadrā. See Šadrā
Mullā Sarīkhi. See Ibn Fidā’i Muḥammad,
Muzammil
Mūlānī, ‘Atā’ al-Ḥamān, 44, 46–47fig.
Muntaz al-Dīn, Mawlānā, 44, 46–47fig.
Munkhab al-Maḥsūl, 13
Murādābād, 29, 35
Musallam al-thubūt, 13, 14, 23; commentary
by Niẓām al-Dīn Sihālāwī on, 14. See also Fawātiḥ al-raḥmūt
Muʿṭāla’a, 144, 203–204n63, 220n16
Nabi, Ghulām, 35
Nadī, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Ḥayy, 16, 210n6
nafs al-amr, 2, 76–87, 114, 118, 124, 129, 215–16n88,
22, 24n13, 226n35, 235–36n35, 258n202, 262n229,
264n246, 265n250, 268mn267, 269, 272n295,
277–78n322, 280n328
Najībābād, 29
al-Najāt, 6
Nānūtawī, ‘Abd al-Rahīm, 43, 46–47fig.
naqī [ādāb al-baḥth term], 99, 101, 136, 222n7
Nasāfī, Abu ‘l-ʿAlā Barakāt, 13–14, 23. See also al-Manār
Nāṣīrābād, Dildār ‘Alī, 28–29, 32fig., 38, 41,
42fig., 43, 46fig., 49, 206n110
Nāṣīrābādī, Husayn b. Dildār ‘Alī, 28–29, 32fig.,
41, 42fig.
Nāṣīrābādī, Muḥammad b. Dildār ‘Alī, 28–29,
32fig.
natural body, 246n123
natural inclination, 170, 268n268, 305n493
natural proposition, 261n226; natural conditional
proposition, 175; natural predicative
proposition, 276n314
natural species, 249n149
natural subject, 276n314
natural universal, 158–159, 166, 208n165, 244n117,
249nn147, 251, 250nn152, 253, 251n160;
absolute natural universal 251n160; natural
unconditioned universal, 250n152
nature, 61–63, 70–72, 74, 82–83, 113–14, 116, 123,
125, 147, 154, 160–61, 165, 168–70, 185, 203n63,
212n39, 238n68, 241n96, 243n109, 249n147,
260n216, 261n221, 265n255, 266n259,
273n299, 276n314, 277n316, 304n487
Nawawī, Yahyā ibn Sharaf, 202n54
necessary concomitance, 75–76, 157–58, 232n34,
248n137, 249n142
necessity: negation, 271n291, 272n294, 295;
negative, 172, 272n295, 273n310, 300n459;
premise, 188, 300n, 457, 459; link/relation, 172,
177, 180
necessity proposition, 171–72, 174, 180, 182,
270n285, 271n287, 273n299, 274n302, 308,
289n388, 291nn402, 403; absolute
necessity proposition 171–72, 174, 180–82,
270nn285, 287, 271n287, 272n294, 299n454; absolute
necessity negative proposition, 272n294; absolute nonnecessity proposition,
274n304. See also conversion; doctrine
negation: of the absolute, 79–80, 164,
258n202, 204; of conditional; 275n313;
of entailment, 275n313; of existence, 124,
286n371; of mutual truth, 239n75, 77; of
negation, 179–79, 239n77, 286n371, 373. See also necessity negation
negative proposition: negative necessity
proposition, 172, 271nn288, 289, 272n294,
277n320, 300n459; negative-predicate
INDEX

proposition, 124, 170, 179, 187, 226n34, 267n1264, 268nn268, 269, 286n173, 287n173; negative-predicate affirmative proposition, 170; traditional negative proposition, 170, 267n1264, 268n1269

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 228n2

Nizāmī curriculum. See Dars-i Niẓāmī

nominal identification, 161, 254n181, 255n183

nondefinitive (ghayr battī): proposition, 123–26, 129, 131–32, 134, 226n32; predicative proposition, 125, 131; reading of proposition, 125–26, 128–29, 131; semantics, 131. See also definitive nondiscursive: belief, 228n6; epistemology, 1

nonexistence: of the consequent, 177–78; of the necessary, 175–76; of the nonexistence of the Necessary, 175–76; of the subject, 271n1290

non-generated things, 305n489

non-joining of two contradictories. See joining of two contradictories

non-metaphorical figurative speech, 149

non-Participant with God, 152, 239n77. See also Participant with God.

North African tradition, 5

North India. See India

noun, 147–50, 162–63, 166, 234n47, 261n224

Nuẓhat al-khāwāṭir wa-bahjat al-masāmī ʿwa-n-nawāẓir, 26

Nūmānī, Abū ʿUbayd Manẓūr Aḥmad, 37, 39–40fig.

obscurity [commentarial], 14, 16, 70, 93, 95, 108, 110–11, 114, 116–17, 135, 204n73. See also allusion; gesture; hint; incompleteness; subdued occult, 111


ontological status of universals, 7

orality, 48–49, 91–94, 96, 100, 105, 111, 117, 133, 135, 203n63, 204n65, 220n16; oral debate, 93–96, 100–101, 105, 219n13, 221n19; oral dialectical space, 2, 48, 94, 105, 117, 133, 203n63; oral medium, 16, 91, 96, 203n63, 220n16

Organon, 4, 6–7, 199n111; commentaries on Aristotle’s, 206n116

Oriental College Lahore, 48

originality, 3, 107, 111, 120, 198n7, 199n7; original text, 52, 67, 110, 133, 135, 203n63

Ottoman scholarly tradition, 203n54, 220n16

overwhelming belief, 192, 303n476, 304n480,486,487. See also zann

Pahlavi, 4

Pakistan, 35

Pālanpūrī, [Muftī] Sa’īd Aḥmad, 45, 46–47fig.

Panjābī, Asadallāh, 28, 206n110

paradigm shift, 87

paradox of entailment. See entailment.

paradox of the absolutely unknown, 11, 101, 231n24

Participant with Creator/God, 70–71, 78, 112–13, 115–16, 118–19, 121, 124, 131, 157, 169, 184, 236n59, 239n177, 247n135, 248n135, 265n252, 266n257, 267n1264, 301n464; non-Participant with God, 152, 239n177, 248n135

particular: real, 152, 238n69, 291n403; relative, 152, 238n69

Pashto, 44–45

Pashtun scholars, 34–36, 38, 45, 48–49

patchwork [commentarial], 14, 50, 52, 61, 66, 68, 122, 201n15. See also curatorial; incompleteness; quotation

Patna, xiii, 206n112

Peripatetics, 98–99

perpetual accident, 248n140; perpetual creation; perpetual existence, 184, 270n1287, 272nn294,297; perpetual necessity, 172, 270n1287, 272n294; non-perpetual existential, 171, 300n456; See ḥudūth dahrī

perpetual proposition; 171, 173; perpetually absolute proposition, 273n301; perpetual negation, 182; perpetual negative proposition, 182; perpetual possibility proposition, 180. See also perpetuity

perpetuity: perpetuity converse, 291n403; perpetuity of possibility, 182–83, 292n407; perpetuity premise, 188, 300n457; perpetuity proposition, 7, 173–74, 180, 182–83, 188, 272n297, 273n298, 374n308, 287n375; nonperpetuity, 171, 173, 183, 189, 270n283, 274nn304,305, 293n315, 294n421, 300n456. See also perpetual proposition

Peshawar, 26, 35

philosophy, 12, 75, 143, 155, 171, 174, 197, 214n172, 269n275, 275n108; philosopher, 72, 156, 162, 176–77, 195, 229n10, 249n142, 256nn187,190,191, 297n444; philosophaster, 159, 195
physician, 28, 30, 206n119
Pishāwāri, Miyān ʿAbdallāh b. Miyān Abrār Shāh, 36, 39–40fig., 46–47fig.
Pishāwāri, Muḥammad ʿAbdullāh b. Muḥammad Ayyūb, 26, 209n169, 213n48
Pishāwāri, Sayyid Anwār al-Ḥaqq, 44, 46–47fig., 233n36, 237n68, 238n71. See also Ḍūmma ḥ al-fuhūm
Pisha ḍ wārī, ʿUbaydallāh, 44, 46–47fig.
plagiarism, 121, 198, 221. See also sariqa
Plato, 159, 251n160
Platonic Forms, 159, 251n160
poetics: classical Arabic, 198n7, 199n11; Aristotelean 199n11; Poetics, 6, 195, 307n506. See also rhetoric
poetry, 194; Arabic poetry, 198n7, 223; pre-Islamic poetry, 198n7. See also poetics
polysemy, 77–78, 112, 280n328
postclassical, 1–2, 4, 6, 13, 107, 135, 199n11
Posterior Analytics, 6
predicables
preponderance, 194, 230n20, 256n186
primitiveness, 149, 233n40
princely patronage, 92
princely state, 22, 37, 93

principle of derivation. See derivation principle of entailment. See entailment principle of exclusion and inclusion, 161 principle of mutual concomitance. See concomitance principle of simple generation/production. See jaʿl basīt
print culture, 12, 43–45, 49, 223n40
printing press, 26, 44, 72, 209n169
problems, 2, 50, 73, 94–96, 109, 129, 195, 204n63, 214n72, 224n9, 276n315, 308n510
prompt [commentarial], 52–53, 56, 58, 73, 86, 96, 100–101, 105, 108, 117, 122–23, 130, 133, 138, 220n16, 221n18, 222n21, 292n413, 298n452. See also allusion; command; gesture; hint; subdued
proof text, 96, 102–4. See also sanad
Prophet Muḥammad. See Muḥammad
prophets, 194
proposition: ambiguous, 165–66, 175, 260n213, 261n226; absolute and ambiguous, 171; arithmetical, 168; attributive (hamliyya), 163–64, 189, 257n199; absolute attributive, 257n25; based in experience, 193–94, 306n496, 499; compound proposition, 181, 274n305, 287n380, 288n182, 293n413; compound modal proposition, 174, 180; existential nonnecessity, 171, 183, 293n414, 300n456; existential nonperpetual, 171, 183, 300n456; extramental proposition, 168; extramentally real proposition, 168; general absolute proposition, 173, 274n305, 300n456; geometrical proposition, 168; impossible proposition, 184; image-eliciting proposition, 195; mental, 168, 170, 268n269; mentally real, 168, 217n100, 265n248; primary, 192, 194–95, 305n493; second-order, 85, 215n88; tripartite, 163; truth-aptness of, 53–54, 56–58, 217n111, 233n37, 307n510; unipartite, 161. See also absolute; affirmative; compressed; conditional; connective; definite; definite; divested; expressed; haqīqī; intuited; khārijī; modal; natural; necessity; negative; nondefinitive; perpetual; perpetuity; possible; special possible; temporal
propositional: object, 87; reality, 260n215; semantics, 2, 5, 7, 38, 70, 81, 129, 208n165, 209n165, 210n13; subject, 53, 63; truth, 264n245
propter quid demonstration, 193–94, 231n23, 306n502, 307n504, 505. See also quia demonstration

INDEX
INDEX

Sullam al-ʿulum (continued)

20–21, 58–59, 83, 120–21, 128; the Sullam tradition, 11, 36, 44, 50, 72–73, 76–78, 81, 92, 107, 198n5, 202n54, 203n54, 215n88, 216n98, 217n113, 218n114, 228n4. See also Diyaʾ al-nujum; Dumān al-fuhūm; Mīrāt al-shurūh; Mi rāʾ al-fuhūm; al-Sirāj al-wahhāb; Sullam Hamdallāh; Suddat al-ʿulum; Sullam Baḥr al-ʿulum; Sullam Mullā Ḥasan; Sullam Qādī Muḥarrak

Sullam Baḥr al-ʿulum, 16–17, 21fn., 22–24, 25fn., 26, 30, 34, 37, 39, 137, 204n73, 213n48, 244n118, 245n121, 247n134, 250n151, 251n160, 253n174, 255n183, 256n187, 258n204, 260n209, 267n262, 276n314, 277n316, 279n323, 280n332, 281n333, 334, 336, 288n381, 295n428, 299n452, 301n465, 304n487, 306n496, 308n510; self-commentary by Baḥr al-ʿulum, 23, 136–37

Sullam Hamdallāh, 16–17, 24–31, 34–5, 37–38, 48–49, 63, 65–69, 120–121, 123, 200n3, 202n41, 204n73, 225n25; commentary on, 26–31, 32–34fn., 34–35, 37–38, 41, 44, 48, 63, 66–69, 95, 118–23, 123, 200n3, 201n41, 204n73, 205n74, 206n110, 208n165, 302n476; commentary by ʿAbd al-Haq Khayrābādī on, 30; commentary by Dīdār ʿAlī on, 28; commentary by Ilāhī Bakhsh Faydābādī on, 30, 34fn., 206; See also Rafʿ al-ishtibāḥ; al-Intibāḥ

Sullam Mullā Ḥasan, 21fn., 23–4, 25fn., 26, 29, 32fn., 35, 38, 40–41, 42–43fn., 48, 200n3, 201n41, 202n52, 204n73, 205n74, 208n165, 224n9, 242n99, 101; commentary on, 40–41, 42–43fn., 200n3, 202n52, 204n73; commentary by Muḥammad Yūsuf on, 40–41, 42–43fn., 204–205n73, 224n9; commentary by Turāb ʿAlī on, 42fn., 202n52


summum genus, 246n125

superlunar world, 305n389

syllogism, 5–7, 15, 51, 143, 166, 184–93, 228n6, 257n199, 259n207, 263n234, 272n295, 278n323, 283n348, 284n354, 295n430, 296n431–

34, 434, 436, 437, 298n438, 441, 443, 444, 298n452, 299n454, 300n459, 301n463, 303n477, 304n480, 305n493, 307n505, 507

syllogistics, 7, 257n199, 272n295

syntax, 269n272

Syriac, 4

tabīʿa. See nature

Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn, 5, 51, 56, 69, 199, 230n22, 266n258. See also Taḥdīḥ al-mantīq

Tāḥā, Muḥammad, 93, 97, 218n2, 222n24

Taḥdīḥ al-mantīq, 5–8, 51–52, 55–57, 199n2, 208n165; commentary by Dawānī on, 6–8, 51–52, 56–57, 199n2, 208n165; supercommentary by Harawī on Dawānī on, 8, 51–52, 199n2; commentary by Yazdī on, 6, 8, 51, 212n43

taqhāq. See verification

taḥrīr, 98–99

Taḥrir al-qawaʿ id al-mantiqiyya. See al-Shamsiyya

Taḥtānī, Qub al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 5–6, 8, 51, 54, 66–69, 71, 91, 104, 137, 199n1, 204n64, 206n110, 212n43, 213n59, 214n69, 265n256; See also Matālīʿ al-anwār; Rīsāla fi t-taṣawwur wa-t-tasdiq; al-Shamsiyya

Taṣrid al-iʿtīdād 103–104, 206n110, 241n95; Qūshījī’s commentary on, 103. See also al-Hāshiyya al-qadīma

al-Tanqīb, 13

Tanzīl al-afkār, 231n26

taqlīd, 102, 305n492

ṭābiʿa, 227n53

temporal proposition: absolute temporal proposition, 171, 180, 182–183, 287n374, 291n401; absolute temporalized proposition, 171, 180, 270n282, 287n375; temporal absolute proposition, 180, 287n374; temporal possibility proposition, 180–82, 291n401; absolute temporalized proposition, 171, 180, 270n282, 287n375

temporal copula, 163

temporal qualifier, 287n375

textbook, 1, 5–7, 11, 13, 50–52, 69–70, 73, 86, 135. See also handbook

textual archaeology. See excavation (commentarial; textual)
textual base, 96, 103–104, 138, 144. See also base text; matn
textual erasure. See textual violence
textual history. See textual past
textual past, 58, 72, 94, 122, 132–33, 137
textual violence, 3, 108
textuality, 3, 93–94, 135, 203n63
textualization, 49, 94, 100, 111, 204n63

theology, 7, 11, 28, 69, 157, 197n13, 208n165, 231n24, 249n142. See also ’ilm al-kalām
Tonk, 31, 36, 43, 48, 206n119
transmission (naqʿl), 102, 109, 149, 192–93, 235n53, 306n498; transmitted information/report/text, 102–103, 193, 305n490
Tulanbī, ’Abdallāh, 51, 199n10, 200n2, 210n8. See also Badīʿ al-mīzān
Tūnkī, Ḥaydar ‘Ali, 31, 32–33fig., 34, 39fig., 42fig., 43
Tūnkī, ’Abdallāh b. Ṣābir, 31, 32–34fig.
Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn, 5, 103, 203, 211–12, 215n88, 241n95. See also Tajrīd al-ʿātiqād
al-Ufuq al-mubīn, 12, 38, 63, 67–72, 95–96, 132–38, 208n153, 154, 214n66, 165, 227n54; commentaries on, 38, 72; commentary by ’Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī on, 72, 138, 214n72; commentary by Bahr al-ʿulūm on, 71–72, 136–37, 208n153, 214n72, 227n155, 56; commentary by Fadl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī on 72, 137, 208n153; commentary by Fadl-i Imām al-Khayrābādī, 38, 72, 208n153
al-ʿUfūq al-nāfiʿa, 23
universal major premise, 283–84n348, 296n431
universal existence, 233n40
Urdu, 8, 43, 45, 49, 209n176, 229n13; commentary, 11, 44–45, 49, 208n165
Urmawī, Sirāj al-Dīn, 5, 51, 67–69, 206n110, 213n59. Also see Maṭāliʿ al-anwār uṣūl al-fiqh, 5, 6, 13, 249n47 uṣūl-i munāẓara. See ādāb al-baḥth
verification (taḥqīq), 2, 60, 92, 94–99, 101–5, 109–10, 137, 149, 151, 153, 163, 171, 199n7, 203n63, 204n63, 210n101, 224n9; independent verification, 2, 96, 102, 105; traditionalist verification, 2 verifer (muḥaqiq), 57, 61, 70, 79–80, 109, 130, 136, 159, 164–65, 178, 268n126 verifying criterion (miṣdāq), 60, 86, 116, 128, 136–37, 216n88, 235n53, 263n233
waḥdat al-wujūd, 73, 245n121
writerly: culture, 105, 204n63; medium, 94; process, 105; dialog, 119; text, 221n18 wujūd al-wājib, 277n130. See also ʿadam al-wājib wujūd rābiṭī. See copular existence
Yazdī, ’Abdallāh, 6, 8, 51, 199n10, 210n5. See also Tahdhib al-mantiq
Yemeni Wisdom, 130
žann, 81, 255–56n186, 303n476. See also overwhelming belief
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