PART I

British Multiculturalism
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is composed of several nations, and therefore has always been culturally diverse. Yet “multiculturalism” did not arise as a distinct phenomenon in Britain until after 1945, when the country was transformed by the end of Empire. This chapter provides an overview of this modern British multiculturalism. It supplements the existing literature by situating recent developments within the overall trajectory of postwar British multiculturalism and politics, highlighting connections to broader national debates and contextualizing the other chapters in this volume.

Our goal is therefore primarily descriptive rather than normative, so here we will largely ignore the philosophical literature. Instead we focus on the relevant UK policy and law, outlining the central features of this framework. We trace the development of this distinctive multicultural “regime” and identify aspects of the postwar political landscape that influenced it. There are several ways of delineating British politics during this period, but the three most important traditions for understanding the evolution of British multiculturalism are social democracy, conservatism, and what we call British exceptionalism, a Whiggish view of the world that valorizes the evolution and exportation of British political institutions, values, and ideas. The first two have dominated national politics via the two major parties, yet operate partly against the background of the last. Our central thesis is that the interactions between actors situated within these three traditions have conditioned the particular form multiculturalism has taken in the UK, entangling it in wider debates over immigration, nationality, and citizenship.

The central dilemma facing postwar Britain was how to understand its role in the world, and the idea of Britishness itself, in a nonimperial context. Britain
responded to this challenge by undertaking a radical overhaul of its law relating to nationality and citizenship. As well as creating the modern welfare state, an expansive redefinition of British nationality was passed in 1948 with little fanfare, in the main because a widespread belief in British exceptionalism combined with prominent strands of conservative and social democratic thinking to ensure cross-party support. The British Nationality Act 1948 was intended to secure Britain's place at the head of a robust Commonwealth of Nations, but instead led to an unexpectedly large influx of nonwhite migrants. The speed and scale of this immigration challenged British national identity, and put pressure on the new welfare state. Ultimately, this postwar reconstitution of the British polity gave rise to a distinctive form of “British multiculturalism,” which combined tough immigration controls with an internal regime of citizenship rights, race-relations legislation, and pluralistic accommodations for minorities. This framework of law and policy has persisted in its broad outlines from the mid-1960s until the present, but since the turn of the millennium there has been a reaction against some aspects of it. The recent shift is more pronounced in rhetoric than policy, however, and therefore British multiculturalism may be better understood as undergoing a “rebalancing” rather than a “retreat.” Whatever the correct characterization, we suggest that Brexit and renewed calls for Scottish independence are entangled with current disagreements over multiculturalism. Understanding these connections in turn highlights that multiculturalism raises fundamental questions regarding the structure and purpose of the British polity.

For the sake of clarity, we have split our narrative into five sections: the period of open borders between 1945 and 1962; the emergence of the distinctive British approach to multiculturalism between 1962 and 1979; the persistence of this “regime” under pressure from the Conservative Party governments of 1979–97; the developments under New Labour and the subsequent Conservative governments from 1997 to 2016; and finally, the connections to the recent referendum on EU membership and renewed calls for Scottish independence.

1945–1962: THE PERIOD OF OPEN BORDERS

The British state was created in 1707, and Linda Colley has argued forcefully that a distinctive understanding of “Britishness” was first forged through the struggle against France and the period of empire-building that followed. Historians still debate the precise impact of imperialism on British domestic culture, but we believe it is clear that the Empire was a fundamental part of British national identity from at least the mid-Victorian period up until the mid-twentieth century. Decolonization after 1945 therefore threatened both Britain’s international standing and its sense of self. In response, postwar governments tried to position Britain at the head of a Commonwealth sphere of influence that would allow key aspects of British identity and influence to be preserved, albeit in a slightly diminished form.
The importance of spreading its forms of governance has been a long-standing theme in British public discourse, and a key justification of the Empire was that—unlike other European forms of imperialism—it would ultimately prepare its colonies to rule themselves. Shifting from an overt “Whig imperialism” to a more egalitarian “Commonwealthism,” was therefore a natural response to the problem posed by decolonization, and a continuation of British exceptionalism rather than a rejection of it. As Randall Hansen demonstrates in his measured and detailed analysis, this Commonwealth vision had bipartisan influence in the immediate postwar period, when the question was not whether, but how, to achieve it.

The Attlee government’s solution was to redefine British nationality in 1948 in such a way as to simultaneously reaffirm and transform the relation of Britain to her colonies. Until the British Nationality Act 1948, there was no legal definition of citizenship in UK law, which revolved around the concept of subjecthood. Subjecthood was granted automatically to everyone born within the British Empire and Commonwealth, nominally giving recipients all the privileges attached to the status of British subject equally. One of these privileges, albeit one that had previously existed primarily as a convention, was the right to migrate to Britain. Ireland had already rejected the unilateral ascription of British subjecthood to its citizens, but the immediate trigger for reform was the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946, which defined Canadian citizenship for the first time and made British subjecthood for Canadians dependent on that citizenship, rather than being a direct grant from the British Crown. This change meant there was now the potential for conflict between subjecthood dependent on domestic citizenship and the universal British version.

The 1948 British Nationality Act attempted to reconstitute common subjecthood status throughout the Commonwealth and Empire by creating a new citizenship in UK law, and making all grants of British subjecthood dependent on some form of citizenship, whether in Britain or elsewhere. The two most important categories of citizens under the Act were “Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies” (CUKCs) and “Citizens of Independent Commonwealth Countries” (CICCs). These two categories covered the vast majority of British subjects, with the former receiving subjecthood directly from the UK and the latter via their domestic citizenship. Both had broadly the same rights in relation to the UK, including the right to live and work there, to vote, and even to stand for Parliament. The crucial legal effect of the British Nationality Act 1948 for our purposes was twofold. First, it gave statutory form to a right to immigrate to the UK previously possessed only as a convention (and even then unevenly), granting this right to the vast majority of those in the Empire/Commonwealth. Secondly, it linked this right to a new form of citizenship conferred by the UK on almost everyone in the Empire who was not a citizen of an independent country.

Part of the motivation for these reforms was that the right to migrate to the UK was considered a clear—but largely symbolic—way of reasserting Britain’s status.
as the “mother country,” and thereby its commitment to the freedom and equality of both its individual subjects and the nations in the Empire and Commonwealth. Astonishingly, there is little indication that any of the politicians involved thought that this right would be utilized on a mass scale, instead presuming that prewar patterns of migration, which largely consisted in a flow from Britain to the “Old” Commonwealth, with a small number in return, would continue as before. Nevertheless, the 1948 Act opened the UK to the possibility of legally protected mass immigration from the predominantly nonwhite countries of the “New” Commonwealth. Contrary to popular belief, however, active recruitment from these countries was limited to a few employers; the Attlee government looked primarily to continental Europe to meet postwar labor shortages. In fact, the Labour government and its Conservative successor sought to discourage further New Commonwealth immigration by “informal” means, pressuring the Jamaican, Indian, and other governments to put administrative roadblocks in the way of potential immigrants. It is equally clear, however, that this was conducted as private government-to-government business, because any attempt to distinguish between Old and New Commonwealth immigrants would have been seen as racist, undermining the rhetoric of British Exceptionalism that justified the UK’s role as the head of a multiracial Commonwealth. This would have had potentially devastating effects on foreign relations and Britain’s conception of itself in the postwar world.

The commitment to the Commonwealth informed by British exceptionalism aligned with elements of the other two traditions. Anti-racism and the creation of a citizenship that provided a full range of civil, political and socioeconomic rights were central parts of Labour’s postwar project. This meant that social democrats—and some liberal conservatives—could not as a matter of principle countenance race-based immigration restrictions and usually assumed that the new “Marshallian” citizenship would effectively assimilate new migrants into Britain. In addition, there was a powerful group in the Conservative Party—and some in Labour—who saw a special connection between Britain and the anglophone Old Commonwealth. Many Conservatives may have wanted to restrict nonwhite immigration, but when faced with a choice between restricting all Commonwealth immigration or none, they opted to reject any restrictions at all in order to keep the door open to those in “Greater Britain.”

Given this confluence of interests, further legal reform restricting New Commonwealth immigration was impossible during this period, with the Colonial Office effectively exercising an institutional veto. Despite racially tinged public and political pressure, this impasse remained in place until the late 1950s, when a variety of factors removed the impediments to immigration reform. Once social democratic and conservative actors were no longer politically restrained by the goal of securing Commonwealth relations, anti-immigrant public opinion produced further legislation on immigration and nationality. Out of this arose a distinctive British form of multiculturalism.
By the 1960s, it had become clear that Britain would not be able to secure the Commonwealth as a distinct sphere of influence, which diminished the immediate political influence of British exceptionalism. The resulting shift in focus onto Europe and the United States paved the way for immigration reform, and a compromise between the two main parties and traditions in terms of how to deal with cultural diversity. The result was a bifurcated legal framework of multiculturalism, which consisted, on the one hand, of tough external immigration controls parsed in increasingly racialized terms, and, on the other, of a strong internal race-relations regime of broad citizenship rights that rejected “assimilation” in favor of “integration.” This dichotomous approach defined multiculturalism as a political issue in the British context.

As the Commonwealth ideal faded in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the influence of the Colonial Office declined markedly, allowing the Ministry of Labour to push for immigration restrictions. Pressure for reform increased after race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958 highlighted growing public resistance to nonwhite immigration. Conservative and Labour backbenchers began to question the assumption that the flow of immigrants could effectively be assimilated by granting citizenship rights. Informal measures could no longer stem the tide, and rumors of impending controls resulted in a spike of immigrants arriving from the New Commonwealth during 1961. All of this led Harold Macmillan’s government to pass the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962.

In legal terms, the difficulty facing the Conservative Party under Macmillan was how to restrict the immigration of individuals who were all British subjects, and many of whom were British citizens. Although it would have been possible to simply exclude individuals from independent Commonwealth countries such as Canada and India (i.e., CICCs), that would still have allowed large-scale immigration by CUKCs from countries that were not yet independent, since their citizenship status was the same as that of those born in the UK. The government could have created a specifically British citizenship distinct from citizenship in the colonies, but it was reluctant to offend the inhabitants of the remaining colonies by unilaterally changing their citizenship status. In any event, any attempt to do so would have involved a lengthy period of legal and political wrangling and was therefore unattractive. Instead, the Conservatives opted to keep the basic structure of the British Nationality Act 1948 in place, but to amend it so as to limit the right of entry to: (i) those born in the UK; and (ii) those CUKCs whose passports were issued under the authority of London rather than by a colonial administration. These restrictions on entry were coupled with a nominally race-blind work-voucher scheme that prioritized skilled workers and capped immigration for each category at a certain limit.
The overall effect of the 1962 reforms was to make almost all CICCs and those CUKCs born and living in the colonies subject to immigration control, which meant you could possess the primary citizenship status of a CUKC without having a right even to enter Britain, let alone live there. The Bill passed despite opposition from the Labour Party, which nevertheless did nothing to overturn the Act after it returned to power in 1964, when the focus shifted to what form of immigration control there should be, and how to deal with those that had already arrived. Yet once the initial taboo against any form of immigration control had been breached by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, growing hostility to nonwhite immigration made further legislation inevitable. There was another Act in 1968 in response to the Kenyan crisis, which shamefully abandoned the Asians in Kenya to their fate by unilaterally revoking their right of entry as CUKCs after the fact, thereby denuding their citizenship of any meaningful protections. More legislation followed in 1971, restricting immigration even further. The Immigration Act 1971 employed criteria that turned even more decisively on race, such as the notorious “patriality” requirement, which allowed most white descendants of British colonists into the UK but effectively barred nonwhites. Nevertheless, it must be understood that none of this could do much to stem the tide of family reunifications, despite gradual tightening of the rules for determining cases of secondary immigration from this period on.

The correlate of this tightening of external immigration controls in racialized terms was the imposition of an increasingly potent internal race-relations regime over the same period, with acts passed by Labour in 1965, 1968 and 1976. The 1965 Race Relations Act outlawed discrimination in public places and incitement to racial hatred, and set up the Race Relations Board. The 1968 Act extended nondiscrimination to the key areas of housing and employment and created the Community Relations Commission. The 1976 Act amalgamated the two previous bodies into the (now defunct) Commission for Racial Equality, and introduced the idea of indirect discrimination. Measures were put in place at the local level too, with the establishment of Community Relations Councils and Racial Equality Councils. These reforms, although arguably inspired by the universalist aspects of the social democratic tradition, were nevertheless accompanied by a conscious shift in the mid-1960s away from “assimilation” to “integration.” In a famous statement in May 1966, Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins clearly articulated a racially diverse conception of Britishness that did not require assimilation into the dominant anglophone culture, saying: “Integration is perhaps rather a loose word. I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot,’ which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman. . . . I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”
This shift meant that “Britain turned against the idea of assimilating her immigrants earlier than any other country in the Western world,” instituting a series of exceptions from general laws for ethnic, racial, and religious minorities. These accommodations were accompanied by a high degree of funding and activism engaged with the needs of minority communities. The price of external immigration control extracted by the predominantly anti-racist social democratic tradition and the more liberal wing of the Conservative Party was therefore a generous internal multicultural regime. This cross-party consensus emerged around the time of the Labour government’s White Paper on immigration in 1965 and can be attributed to the interaction of aspects of the traditions with the historical circumstances and the goals of political actors.

The Conservative Party was willing to accept this compromise, since its leadership struggled over this period to restrain overtly racialized interpretations of conservatism. The dominant “One Nation” conservatism exemplified by Harold Macmillan pursued social welfare through pragmatic paternalist policies; it did not seek to reverse the basic thrust of the welfare state, yet still clung to a conception of the country that drew on British exceptionalism. Its organic conception of community and nation in historical (but not directly racial) terms was, however, challenged by the scale and speed of New Commonwealth immigration. Some Conservatives, such as Enoch Powell and Cyril Osborne, put up increasingly strident opposition to nonwhite immigrants on the grounds they could not be effectively assimilated. In doing so, these Conservatives blurred the line between cultural and ethnic/racial difference, tying arguments over immigration to issues surrounding race, which in turn colored debates over citizenship, Britishness, and multiculturalism. The majority of the Conservative Party leadership were avowedly anti-racist, but as concern about Commonwealth relations became less influential, they struggled to restrain the more prejudiced elements of their party. The Conservative leadership was therefore willing to maintain a bipartisan consensus to keep immigration out of front bench politics as much as possible, even though it might present them with something of an electoral advantage in the short term.

There was also something of an uneasy balance within the social democratic tradition and the Labour Party that helped bring about the bifurcated approach to multiculturalism. During this period, social democracy was predominantly marked by an optimistic progressivism aimed at enhancing welfare through a combination of state action and community organization, primarily in the form of legal rights ascribed to all citizens equally by central government. Nevertheless, there was also strand of social democratic pluralism that sought the decentralization of political power and a diversity of free associations that would allow a more open, flexible form of community. Within the Labour Party, this meant that strong anti-racist and anti-imperialist elements had to be balanced against the suspicion of the working class and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) that large-scale
immigration could lead to unemployment, and would damage the power of collective bargaining and hence standards of living. There were numerous examples of racial prejudice on the shop floor, but nevertheless the TUC was officially anti-racist, and the influence of that principle on the social democratic movement as a whole was so strong that Labour took a more consistently pro-immigrant line than the Conservatives. The combination of the universalist parts of the tradition with the more pluralist strand thus arguably led to the toleration and preservation of differences within a framework of broad citizenship rights.

The different strands of social democracy and conservatism in British politics ensured that the price of restrictive immigration reform was a strong internal race-relations regime and a notable degree of internal cultural pluralism. This consensus represented a balance between the two main traditions and parties, and elements within them. Nevertheless, the racial overtones of public discourse and the subsequent immigration reforms are impossible to ignore. Part of the problem, as Christian Joppke argues, was that the expansive definition of citizenship introduced in 1948 could not be used itself as the sole criterion for restricting immigration. In the face of public resistance to the influx of people from the New Commonwealth, immigration restrictions had to be recast to operate on proxies of birth and ancestry, which in the British legal and political context effectively meant race. The ultimate legacy, therefore, of the cross-party influence of British exceptionalism in the years immediately after World War II was twofold. Firstly, it triggered reforms that intertwined race, immigration, nationality, and citizenship in law and politics. Secondly, it helped create a distinctive British approach to multiculturalism comprised of tough external immigration controls and an internal race-relations regime of broad citizenship rights and pluralist accommodations.

1979–1997: AN UNEASY STATUS QUO

Given Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s dominance of the political landscape in these years, and her deserved reputation for anti-immigration rhetoric, radical policies, and political confrontation, one might expect her control of central government to have led to significant changes in the approach to multiculturalism. In fact, the existing bifurcated regime was broadly maintained in policy terms, although support for it was no longer entirely bipartisan.

In terms of immigration and nationality law, the British Nationality Act of 1981, which finally overturned the legal regime created by the 1948 Act, was a significant piece of legislation, but it was not as radical a departure from the practices of the preceding two decades as is often claimed. The 1981 Act repealed the 1948 Act, “all but abolished the status of British subject,” and finally put in place a clear definition of British citizenship, which corresponded directly to the right to live in Britain. The remaining CUKCs were split into two different categories, but neither of these received the right to enter the UK. The controversial terminology
of “patriality” was done away with, but its effects were largely preserved by a shift away from a pure *jus soli* that gave British nationality to almost anyone born on UK soil to include elements of a *jus sanguinis* approach, making British citizenship dependent on having a parent who is a UK citizen or “settled” in Britain.\(^50\) Crucially, it would seem that the criteria for immigrating to the UK under the British Nationality Act 1981 were much the same as under the Immigration Act 1971, and a version of the status quo was thus preserved in immigration law.\(^51\) Nevertheless, Thatcher's anti-immigration rhetoric embodied a cultural nationalism with racialized undertones, as demonstrated by her infamous appearance on World in Action in the run-up to the 1979 election. It must also be noted that many of the secondary immigration rules were significantly tightened from this point on in ways that seemed to target nonwhite immigration.\(^52\)

The other arm of British multiculturalism also remained broadly in place, despite more direct attacks on it by the Thatcher governments.\(^53\) Thatcher's brand of neoliberal “conservatism” was still committed to universal citizenship rights, albeit shorn of the welfarist elements, and so she had no reason to attack the difference-blind aspects of the race-relations regime, leaving this part of the bipartisan consensus largely intact. Elements of the “integration not assimilation” approach also survived during this period, since Thatcher governments passed many accommodations for minorities that extended Labour Party policies of the 1970s.\(^54\) Surprisingly, Thatcher's attack on the welfare state as a whole failed to undermine the basic thrust of the multicultural regime, even if it weakened it in some respects. In part, this was because implementation of much of the relevant welfare provision was in the purview of local governments dominated by the Labour Party. For instance, local authorities were charged under section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 with eliminating unlawful discrimination and promoting equal opportunity, and were permitted under the Act to advertise jobs in specialist presses in order to encourage more applications from minorities. In some cases this morphed into de facto affirmative action hiring policies and thus increased diversity. The correction of “indirect discrimination” also allowed more interventionist policies, and section 35 permitted the provision of services targeted directly at the special needs of minority groups, a trend that increased after the Scarman Report on the Brixton riots of 1981. Anti-racism and multiculturalism became core parts of teacher training and the curricula designed predominantly at the local level, much of which was inspired by the pluralist rhetoric of Lord Swann’s 1985 Report on Education.

The perceived excesses of some local government, most notably in Liverpool and London, were utilized by central government in the 1980s as a reason to reduce local funding and power. Yet even afterwards local authorities had substantial funds under their control, and significant welfare responsibilities for community services, housing, and education. During this period social democracy in Britain was therefore expressed through a more activist anti-racism and valorization of difference, and the Labour Party became closely associated with a commitment to
multiculturalism. Overall, British multiculturalism became “entrenched” during this period at the local level, and so the distinctive bifurcated approach arising out of the postimperial experience remained largely intact. In the face of neoliberalism, however, the compromise between social democracy and conservatism—and the strands of universalism and pluralism within them—transitioned into an uneasy balance between more homogeneous parties and different levels of government.

1997–2016: RENEWAL, RETREAT, REBALANCING

New Labour’s form of social democracy had important consequences for British multiculturalism. Its leading practitioners hailed primarily from the Fabian strand of social democracy, which traditionally placed great faith in a liberal democracy informed by social science. This inheritance meant their reinterpretation of the tradition was heavily impacted by modern social science research and techniques, which affected how they conceived of and responded to political issues, including multiculturalism. The two most influential strands of social science on New Labour were new institutionalism and communitarianism. Whereas Thatcher promoted markets, competition, and the “hollowing out” of the state, New Labour drew on new institutionalism to defend the use of broader “networks” of governance, consultation, and private/public partnerships within a context of “joined up government.” Whereas Thatcher declared, “there is no such thing as society,” New Labour drew on a communitarianism that valorized shared values and an “active citizenship” comprised of both rights and duties. And whereas Thatcher attacked the economic “dependency” engendered by the welfare state, New Labour drew on both new institutional and communitarian conceptions of social capital in order to reduce exclusion.

New Labour impacted multiculturalism in a variety of ways, marrying a pluralist idea of local governance—including devolution—that emphasized difference to a revitalized sense of citizenship, trust, and obligation to the community. It also reasserted the value of the welfare state, extended the scope of the race-relations regime and hate speech laws, and consolidated UK anti-discrimination law. There was a relaxation of the position on nonwhite immigration through the dropping of the controversial “primary purpose” immigration rule, which had previously been used to limit the right of British citizens (predominantly of South Asian ethnicity) to bring their spouses to the UK. Overall, therefore, New Labour initially reinvigorated the bifurcated framework, with the publication of the report by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000 perhaps being the “high-water mark” of postwar British multiculturalism.

British multiculturalism was put under strain, however, by events in the early 2000s. Race riots in the north of England in 2001 were the initial trigger for a reevaluation of multicultural policy, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the London bombings of July 2005. The
government responded with a more strident emphasis on the need for immigrant and minority communities to assimilate British values and traditions, with similar views articulated by the nongovernment Left in David Goodhart’s famous series of articles in Demos and Prospect. This shift can be seen in numerous statements by figures such as Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, the various reports on the 2001 riots, David Blunkett’s introduction to the 2002 White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven, the introduction of “ideological” criteria for community group funding, and in the fact and form of the new nationality test and citizenship ceremonies. These changes were accompanied by a tightening of immigration and asylum law and draconian anti-terrorism legislation. Security measures were also linked explicitly to assimilationist policies which often muddled together counterterrorism work with community relations. British Muslims became particular objects of public and governmental suspicion, which exacerbated criticism of multicultural policies from both majority and minority groups.

Policies and rhetoric in this vein have been continued by the governments of David Cameron and Theresa May. Both Cameron and May are self-described “One Nation” conservatives, construing national identity in terms of a shared and cohesive set of values. Prime Minister Cameron famously declared in 2011 that the “state doctrine of multiculturalism” had failed, explicitly citing it as a cause of domestic terrorism because of its putative role in “weakening our collective identity,” advocating instead the need for a “muscular liberalism” that asserts “British values.” This rhetoric was strengthened after the 2015 election, when he introduced anti-extremism legislation and adopted further immigration restrictions, commenting: “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone. It’s often meant we have stood neutral between different values. And that’s helped foster a narrative of extremism and grievance. . . . This Government will conclusively turn the page on this failed approach. As the party of one nation, we will govern as one nation, and bring our country together. That means actively promoting certain values.” Brexit has meant that the stance on immigration has hardened further under the May governments, as has the accompanying rhetoric regarding social cohesion and shared values.

British multiculturalism therefore initially underwent a revival during this period. That has been followed by something of a backlash, however, which draws on elements in all three of the main political traditions we have identified. New Labour relied on both new institutionalism and communitarianism, thereby simultaneously affirming difference and social cohesion, and advocating both local community governance and efficient public administration. New Labour’s version of social democracy therefore initially led to a renewal of British multiculturalism, but its disparate commitments have come under pressure from events since 2001, and the Labour Party has responded by reemphasizing the centralizing and homogenizing aspects of its tradition at the expense of the pluralistic
This shift toward social cohesion and shared values has been followed by Conservative politicians in recent years, who have drawn on long-standing parts of their own tradition in doing so, including an emphasis on institutions and values that have evolved historically. The result has been an overall tendency in British political discourse since the millennium to juxtapose “multiculturalism” and liberal nationalism, and to advocate more robust forms of the latter. The dominant articulation of the national community in current British public discourse is therefore in terms of political and moral values, which are frequently couched in the language of British exceptionalism. The appeal to “unique” British values and practices is, however, usually accompanied by an emphasis on anti-racism and the culturally diverse nature of modern Britain. It is therefore plausible to argue, as Meer and Modood do in this volume, that recent events should not be understood as a full-scale retreat from the postwar approach of “integration not assimilation,” but rather as a “rebalancing” of Britain’s distinctive bifurcated approach to multiculturalism in the light of current concerns.

It is noteworthy, however, that in articulating their liberal nationalisms for the new millennium, the leaderships of both major parties have often utilized language reminiscent of the form of British exceptionalism popular after World War II. The imagery of Empire was invoked even more directly by the campaign to leave the EU, which explicitly framed Brexit as an opportunity to rekindle Britain’s globe-straddling past. It was perhaps inevitable that the May governments have sought to sell Brexit to the public in similar terms, yet they have been accused—not unfairly—of expressing their liberal nationalism in ways that play on the ethno-culturalism that marred the referendum. In so doing, they have arguably echoed problematic aspects of the conservative tradition (and the Conservative Party) that were prominent during the birth of British multiculturalism in the 1960s. These recent articulations of national identity are unpopular with some aspects of the social democratic Left, which has a deep-seated commitment to anti-racism, multiculturalism, and difference. The lukewarm opposition to Brexit of the current Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn—largely driven by traditional social democratic fear of the effect of highly mobile foreign labor competing with British workers—has, however, hampered resistance to the overall trend toward homogenizing forms of nationalism.

2016 ON: BREXIT AND BEYOND

Our narrative has taken us from 1945 to the present day, demonstrating that for much of this period the basic form and understanding of British multiculturalism has remained broadly stable. This consistency is to some extent the result of the path-dependency created by the postwar immigration, nationality, and citizenship reforms, themselves partly inspired by British exceptionalism. We suggest that it is also because the underlying policy regime has been able to balance aspects within
and across social democracy and conservatism—and the two main political parties through which they are expressed—over time. We end, however, by complicating our story. We analyze Brexit and renewed calls for Scottish independence, illustrating the ways in which both issues are at least partly rooted in debates over multiculturalism. This not only enriches our understanding of British multiculturalism, but also suggests that its proper scope reaches beyond current discursive boundaries to include basic constitutional issues.

Brexit was driven by conflicting evaluations of multiculturalism, national identity, and the worth of multiple citizenships. Resistance to immigrant multiculturalism was a substantial factor in the Leave vote. Immigration, multiculturalism, race, and security were frequently conflated in public discourse during the campaign, most succinctly in the UK Independence Party’s notorious “Breaking Point” poster depicting a massed column of mostly nonwhite, young male migrants in southeastern Europe. This played into the narrative that multiculturalism has damaged social cohesion, making Brexit part of a broader contest over national identity. The emotive nature of nationalism complicated the debate, with immigrant multiculturalism—and thereby the EU—seen by some Leave voters as undermining what it means to be British. Differences in the national identities that underlie “Britishness” complicated matters even further. A significant sense of Englishness correlates more strongly with Euroscepticism than Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish identities do, and this may be linked to divergent views as to whether—and which—national identity is threatened by immigration and multiculturalism. In addition, many UK voters identify as European as well as British, adding a further layer to the conflict between plural identities.

The various national identities in contemporary Britain are in turn entangled with the multiple citizenships at play. Most referendum voters possessed both European and British citizenship, with many Leave voters feeling that the former has undermined aspects of the latter. This is partly because the economic impact of the freedom of movement conferred by EU citizenship has likely varied—at least in the short term—across different demographics and geographical areas in the UK. This has strengthened the perception that the welfare state is under threat, even if it seems likely that any such problems in reality have more to do with austerity than immigration. The erosion of the economic elements of British citizenship central to the multicultural regime—and the postwar national settlement more broadly—are therefore also part of Brexit. Political aspects of different citizenships were also in conflict, and many who voted Leave were concerned about a loss of British political sovereignty to the EU and a lack of institutional accountability. The high-handed dismissal of these very real concerns by the Remain campaign, and the EU itself, was unhelpful.

Yet a lack of democratic responsiveness is arguably a problem within the UK itself, with the 62 percent of voters in Scotland who wanted to remain in the EU being overridden by those in England and Wales. Proponents of Scottish
independence therefore paint Scotland as different from other parts of the UK in its embrace of both multiculturalism and immigration. These purported differences partly underpin the SNP’s claim that Scotland suffers a “democratic deficit” within the UK that was mitigated by devolution, but has been exacerbated by Brexit. Although this argument is couched in democratic language, we have argued elsewhere that it implicitly relies on the claim that the cultural nation is a necessary condition of successful liberal-democratic politics. This claim connects Scottish independence to the political theory of multiculturalism, most notably Will Kymlicka’s defense of political autonomy for “national minorities” based on the role culture plays in meaningful choice and self-respect. Whether or not this “cultural nationalism” is ultimately persuasive—which we strongly doubt—our analysis makes it clear that recent claims of Scottish independence are not just closely connected to multiculturalism and Brexit in a causal sense, but also on a deeper theoretical level.

CONCLUSIONS

Our narrative suggests that the roots of our current political confusion can be uncovered through understanding the trajectory of multiculturalism in postwar Britain, which arose as a response to the destabilizing of British power and national identity by decolonization. This chapter has argued that modern British multiculturalism is the direct consequence of the failed postwar attempt to construct a geopolitically relevant Commonwealth of Nations, itself inspired by a widespread belief in British exceptionalism. The result has been a distinctive bifurcated form of multiculturalism, comprised of tough external immigration controls coupled with an internal regime made up of citizenship rights, race-relations legislation, and pluralistic accommodations for minorities. A broad consensus in favor of this distinctive type of multiculturalism was maintained from the mid-1960s until the early 2000s. In recent years, however, there has been something of a shift toward more assimilative forms of liberal nationalism, frequently articulated through the rhetoric of British exceptionalism.

Multiculturalism in modern Britain as a demographic fact and policy framework is thus primarily the result of nonwhite immigration after 1945. The overall effect of the postwar transformation of Britain has been to ensure that debates over multiculturalism, citizenship, and national identity are entangled with one another. The connection between multiculturalism and postwar immigration is widely acknowledged by public actors, as is the ineluctable role of race. Yet the broader effects of the postwar legal and political reforms on multiculturalism in the UK are often ignored. Framing “British multiculturalism” in terms of integrating nonwhite immigrants obscures the deeper challenges to national identity and liberal-democratic governance posed by decolonization. The British nation and state are deeply connected to empire, which continues to cast a shadow over
contemporary debates even as we try to move beyond its legacy. This is illustrated by the inability of political actors of both Left and Right successfully to articulate a vision of modern Britain without drawing on some form of British exceptionalism, directly invoking imperial imagery, or lapsing into ethnically tinged nationalism. This suggests that Britain has not yet negotiated the dilemmas posed by the dissolution of the Empire, nor forged a stable identity without it. 85

Both Brexit and Scottish independence are best understood as part of these ongoing and interrelated contests in Britain over multiculturalism, national identity, and citizenship. We suggest that the failure in current political discourse to appreciate the interrelated nature of these issues has several problematic consequences. Firstly, it facilitates the divisive, racially charged rhetoric that allows multiculturalism—as immigration to become an empty signifier for all of contemporary Britain’s social ills. Secondly, it has hampered the ability of the different factions within the two major parties to agree on the cause, scope, and import of Brexit, contributing to a lack of clear political alternatives. Thirdly, it hides the connection between multiculturalism and broader questions of governance, reducing the possibility of addressing all the relevant issues in a holistic manner. And lastly, it glosses over the historical claims, normative values, and accounts of the nation that implicitly inform contemporary public discourse, but which may not stand up to public or intellectual scrutiny when foregrounded.

Multiculturalism in Britain should be understood as raising questions regarding its basic constitutional structure, and even the purpose of Britain as a polity. Recent events may therefore call for more than simply “rebalancing” the existing legal framework. British multiculturalism may not be amenable to top-down policy solutions; rather, it may require restructuring our modes of governance, and perhaps the United Kingdom itself, from the ground up.

NOTES

1. We follow Harry Goulbourne in seeing the postwar changes as a “sufficient condition” for calling Britain a multicultural country. See his Race Relations in Britain Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1998), 26. For a longer-term view, see Panikos Panayi, An Immigration History of Great Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2010), 28ff. See also Rieko Karatani, Defining British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth, and Modern Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2003), who emphasizes the importance of decolonization but also traces the links between the postwar reforms and earlier imperial practices.

2. For convenience we use the terms “United Kingdom” and “Britain” interchangeably, including Northern Ireland in the latter. We use “Old” and “New” Commonwealth to distinguish the white-settler colonies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand from other colonies in the Empire which were never intended to be permanently settled by the British, and whose relationship to Great Britain was marked by more nakedly extractive practices.

3. See Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), to whom we are indebted for much of the basic thrust and structure of our narrative. We also rely on Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Karatani, Defining British Citizenship.
Our focus is therefore narrower than much of the literature in sociology, cultural studies, and history, which usually looks at multiculturalism as a broader social phenomenon, or explores the role of the Empire in national identity through detailed examination of particular aspects of British society and culture. In order to provide an overview within the space available, we have focused on the bare legal and political bones, which still provide a clear sense of the nature and development of British multiculturalism, and how it relates to postimperial dilemmas in national identity and governance.

We have not included new liberalism and its associated political parties in our narrative, as during this period it was either indistinct from social democracy and the Labour Party on the relevant issues or politically marginalized. The traditions we utilize here to help understand British multiculturalism are aggregate concepts we delineate according to our purposes, which means they are justified by their descriptive and explanatory traction across the entire postwar period. Not only do the interactions between the various forms of social democracy, conservatism, and British exceptionalism provide a plausible account of the birth of British multiculturalism just after World War II, they continue to explain features of its development right up until the present day, including the recent "rebalancing," Brexit, and renewed calls for Scottish independence. As aggregate concepts, the traditions also help to explain general features of British national identity, which is itself necessarily an abstraction from the intentional states of individuals. See Richard T. Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, "Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture: Multiculturalism and Scottish Independence," in *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 21, no. 1 (2018): 65–86. And see Mark Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) for a full account of our postfoundational methodology.


8. "The British nation was defined by its imperial task: it was this that raised the British above other nations" (Hall, "British Cultural Identities," 37).


10. Hereafter "BNA 1948."

11. There were some minor exceptions, such as the children of foreign diplomats. For an excellent discussion of the development of British law in relation to subjecthood, nationality, and immigration...
before the twentieth century, see Karatani, Defining British Citizenship, starting on p. 40 with Calvin’s Case (1608). The ascription of subjecthood had been complicated historically by some colonies having their own naturalization laws, which also conferred the status of British subject, albeit solely within their own territory, as opposed to the direct, automatic, and universal grant of British subjecthood from the Crown. The granting of British subjecthood was systematized and rendered uniform by the creation of the “common code” around World War I, but even then local autonomy over immigration legislation meant that the Dominions were able to exclude some British subjects (primarily nonwhites) from entering their territory and, through legislation and administrative measures, create their own nationality and something like their own de facto “citizenship.” Thus the “universal” rights of British subjects were restricted in practice if not in theory. Nevertheless, the common status of British subject was seen as playing an important role in binding Britain and the Empire and Commonwealth together. See Karatani, ibid., 76–90, and Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 36–39.

12. See the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1935. Ireland was considered an anomalous case, however. Canadian nationality had been previously defined as separate from British in the Canadian Nationals Act 1921, but this was done in such a way that it was not a departure from the common code. See Karatani, Defining British Citizenship, chaps. 2 and 3, and Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 42.


20. While we do not deny that the ultimate immigration regime and subsequent legislation warrant charges of racism, we follow Hansen and Joppke in seeing elite political opinion as responding to public racism rather than, as is supposed by some historians, driving and constructing it (for the opposite view, see Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997]). We take this view for several reasons. Firstly, as political scientists our presumption is that ceteris paribus in democratic systems, politicians follow public opinion rather than determine it, and even when British political elites are out of step with public opinion on social issues, they tend to be more “progressive” rather than less so. We do not claim that postwar British political elites were free of racism—far from it—but as Hansen points out in Citizenship and Immigration, 245ff., it seems unlikely that the prevalence of casual public racism and incidents of racial violence were the result of a concerted campaign by Westminster and Whitehall rather than deep-rooted attitudes in the populace. Secondly, Paul’s explanation seems to take cross-cutting racism to be the dominant motivation for politicians of all parties and persuasions in relation to immigration. As our sketches of social democracy, conservatism, and British exceptionalism make clear, however, there are different strands of each tradition, and the traditions vary in both content and prominence over time. It is more intuitively plausible that the motivations of the relevant political actors varied according to the particular aspects they drew on from their own traditions, and that the overall political and legal outcome was a result of the interaction of these differences, rather than a single factor that cut across all of them. This accords more closely with Hansen’s analysis and seems particularly likely given the prominence
of anti-racism in the social democratic tradition and the plurality of interrelated issues involved (race, citizenship, nationality, imperialism, international relations). Thirdly, this approach fits with our overall methodological commitments, which draw on postfoundational modes of analysis, as discussed above. For example, our postfoundationalism leads us to presume the sincerity of the statements of historical actors regarding their motivations in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, and we find Hansen's account of the primary sources convincing in this regard.

21. Although Karatani argues convincingly for a “continuity” between British imperial citizenship and immigration policies before and after World War II, her narrative does not fundamentally conflict with ours, because she also makes it clear that: (a) up until 1962, immigration restrictions did not apply to British subjects desiring to move to Britain precisely because of imperial concerns and the subsequent attempt to secure Britain's place at the head of a multicultural Commonwealth; and (b) it was the series of immigration reforms from 1962 on that were the primary legal mechanism for constructing who “belonged” to Britain, and hence postimperial “Britishness.”

22. See Stuart James Ward, “A Matter of Preference: The EEC and the Erosion of the ‘Old Commonwealth’ Relationship,” in Alex May, ed., *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 156–80, for an account of the weakening of the Commonwealth ideal. It was further damaged by the exit from the Commonwealth of South Africa and Rhodesia. The Suez Crisis in 1956 had also been a significant blow to Britain's international prestige and sense of itself as a great power, pushing it closer to the United States.


30. Spencer, *British Immigration Policy Since 1939*, 122, and Karatani, *Defining British Citizenship*, 130ff., show the primary aim of the work voucher scheme was not to control immigration per se, but to reduce or even eliminate nonwhite immigration from the New Commonwealth.

31. Prime Minister Edward Heath’s acceptance of large numbers of Asians from Uganda in similar circumstances in 1972 should not be seen as a reassertion of the Commonwealth ideal, given his clear Eurocentrism and the fact that those taken in from Uganda by the UK—28,000 out of 50,000, with the rest being taken by other countries at the UK’s request—were admitted as refugees, not citizens, even if they were eventually naturalized.

32. The CIA 1962 had been grafted onto the BNA 1948 in such a way that many Asians in Kenya who were excluded from Kenyan citizenship after independence were CUKCs with passports issued under the authority of London, and therefore had a right to immigrate to the UK. The basic effect of the CIA 1968 was to restrict the right of entry of entry into Britain to those CUKCs born in the UK or who had at least one parent or grandparent born there, which left the door ajar for some primary immigration from the white Old Commonwealth but little else. See Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration*, 169ff., and Spencer, *British Immigration Policy since 1939*, 140ff.

33. Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, chap. 4. The only government defeat was on new immigration rules in 1972, but that was tied politically to EU accession and was swiftly reversed in any event. See Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration*, 201–2.


36. All abbreviated to “RRA [Year]” hereafter.

37. See Panayi, Immigration History of Great Britain, 268ff., for a useful summary of these Acts and their main provisions. Also Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, chap. 7, and Goulbourne, Race Relations in Britain since 1945, 100ff.


40. See Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 223–33, for a useful discussion.

41. See Karatani, Defining British Citizenship, 177n99; Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 150; Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 223; and Panayi, Immigration History of Great Britain, 269, for details of this “consensus” and the 1965 White Paper.

42. For useful accounts of these long-standing aspects of the Conservative tradition, see Julia Stapleton, Public Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), and Robert Leach, British Political Ideologies (London: Prentice Hall, 1996).

43. See Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 88, 119–120; Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 104; and Spencer, British Immigration Policy since 1939, 126ff.


45. On the TUC position and practice in general, see Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 130–31, and Goulbourne, Race Relations in Britain since 1945, 85.

46. See Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, chap. 4.

47. Hansen argues convincingly in Citizenship and Immigration that the 1948 reforms (and thus postimperial concerns) are primarily responsible for the trajectory of the various legal reforms that followed and thus, in our parlance, for the structure of British multiculturalism. Karatani’s argument does not fundamentally conflict with this claim.


49. See Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 213–14; Goulbourne, Race Relations in Britain since 1945, 54; and Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging, 42–43.

50. Broadly, a permanent resident, see Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging, 43. Karatani Defining British Citizenship, chap. 3, also shows how elements of jus sanguinis had been present in previous regimes, particularly the rules introduced around the time of World War I.


52. E.g., through the primary purpose rule. See also Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 114ff., and Spencer, British Immigration Policy since 1939, 147ff., especially regarding the Immigration Act 1988.

53. See Favell, Philosophies of Integration, chap. 4, 233. Favell’s account is slightly different from ours, although this seems mainly in emphasis. For instance, he stresses the way the bifurcated British
approach to multiculturalism can be cast as a public order issue in the UK, and argues that the Marshal-lian idiom is as much a justificatory myth as a driving political motivation. He does agree that British multiculturalism is the result of a pragmatic compromise, which traditionally balances pluralist and centralist elements, and that these pluralist elements are under threat (see chap. 7 generally and 233–34 and 252–53).


56. We refer here not simply to prominent Labour Party members such as Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Peter Mandelson, but also to academics and private sector researchers, such as those working at Demos, the Foreign Policy Centre, and the Institute for Public Policy Research.

57. See Mark Bevir, New Labour: A Critique (London: Routledge, 2005) for a fuller account of this argument. The New Times project of the late 1980s and 1990s, spearheaded by Stuart Hall, has “retro-spectively been heralded as New Labour’s intellectual compass” by some; see Pathik Pathak, The Future of Multicultural Britain: Confronting the Progressive Dilemma (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 98ff. Nevertheless, arguably the version absorbed into New Labour, was filtered through the formal social science of new institutionalism, and therefore differed importantly from Stuart Hall’s more radical democratic vision of it, as evidenced by his subsequent rejection of New Labour.


64. Quoted in Meer, Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 24.


67. For a discussion of these reports, see Pitcher, Politics of Multiculturalism, 100–101.

68. See ibid., 67ff. For a more positive view of these, see chapter 2 by Meer and Modood in this volume. These tests were in part designed by Bernard Crick and came into force in 2005; they were revamped by the Cameron government in 2013 to include British “values” and “history.” See Home Office, Life in the United Kingdom: A Guide for New Residents, 3rd ed. (London: Home Office, 2013).

69. See Meer, Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 22–23, and chapter 2 by Meer and Modood in this volume.


74. In his keynote speech at the 2012 Labour Party conference the then Labour leader Ed Miliband took the extraordinary step of claiming the label “One Nation” for Labour.

75. See Pitcher, Politics of Multiculturalism.


79. Ibid., 355–56 and n. 4.


82. “Alex Salmond: We Must Leave UK but Maintain Our Other Unions,” *Herald*, July 12, 2013.

83. Ashcroft and Bevir, “Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture.”
