PART TWO

Indigenous Modernity
For a major exhibition titled *Rainbow and Dragonfly*, held from September 2014 through March 2015 at the National Taiwan Museum in Taipei, a large billboard greeted visitors and passersby with four distinct examples of Taiwanese indigenous textile manufacture, of varied pattern and age, all dominated by the color red. Inside, displays of Atayal cloth occupied fully one-half of the palatial museum’s first floor. It was a complex installation: one-hundred-year-old, disembodied fabrics were juxtaposed with updated designs on sleek black mannequins; colonial-era ethnological surveys shared space with large color photos of contemporary weavers consulting them; and numerous imperial-era postcards illustrated the diversity, antiquity, and daily uses of the displayed fabrics.

The Taiwan Government-General established the National Taiwan Museum in 1908, at the height of Japan’s camphor wars against the Atayal, Sediq, and Truku peoples who produced much of the cloth in this exhibition. The museum’s current structure was completed in 1915, the year Sakuma Samata left office and declared victory in the war against the northern tribes. As the scorched earth, free-fire zones, and land-dispossession policies of that era displayed the negative effects of sovereign power, the coterminous planning, construction, and stocking of the museum exemplified the positivities generated under TGG auspices in the colonial period.

The *Rainbow and Dragonfly* exhibition, housed in a neoclassical, neocolonial edifice, was in good measure a dusting off, repackaging, and repurposing of the artifacts collected among indigenes during the Japanese occupation. Therefore, it revealed how colonial ethnography, museum practices, and photography were (and remain) active partners in the sustenance and revival of Atayal culture, which
was also packaged in this exhibition as an element of Taiwan’s national heritage. The silhouette outline maps of Taiwan’s geobody that decorated the exhibition mark out Atayal and Paiwan homelands as the familiar second-order geobodies found on Inō’s 1900 map (see figure 2). *Rainbow and Dragonfly* illustrated the difficulty of imagining modern Taiwan without its indigenous complement or indigenous Taiwan without its modern complement.

This chapter recounts a 150-year history of indigenous-outsider transactions centered on red-dyed cloth. It explains how the oldest artifacts in the *Rainbow and Dragonfly* exhibition conjoined global trade circuits, cross-cultural technological adaptations, colonial collecting, and Atayal social reproduction. In a word, this thread of colonial and postcolonial history illustrates how indigeneity and modernity coproduced each other.

GLOBAL ENTANGLEMENT AND LOCAL RESPONSES

U.S. consul to Taiwan James W. Davidson dated the “beginning of the commercial career of [Taiwan] . . . from 1858, when the two Hong Kong firms, Jardine Matheson & Co. and Dent & Co. first engaged the Formosan trade.” Between that year and 1865, British, Russian, French, and American diplomats signed treaties with the Qing to open Danshui, Tainan, Jilong, and Gaoxiong to foreign commerce. The next decade saw a lucrative tea, camphor, and sugar export boom. Taiwanese merchants and laborers organized and directed most of the trade, while a few scattered Western missionaries, exporters, and a lone British consul constituted the meager foreign presence. However, the frequent disappearance of mariners on and off the coast (see chapter 1) prompted a few foreign agents to leave the security of ports to ransom survivors or locate their remains. Others traversed the island out of curiosity, to find commercial opportunities, or to win souls for Christ.

The guarantees of safety to foreigners spelled out in the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858, however, were moot in interior destinations beyond the limits of Qing administrative control. For such journeys, local trading-post operators and subofficials known as tongshi (interpreters) outfitted visitors with provisions, advice, and guides. Among the most noted items of purchase were gifts for indigenous hosts. U.S. consul to Xiamen Charles LeGendre’s 1869 meeting with the Tuilasok chief Toketok (nudged to fruition with a baggage train of gifts) and Captain Douglas Cassel’s 1874 meeting with Sabaree chief Isa (also concluded with lavish displays of generosity) are two prominent examples of the importance of gifts for borderland diplomacy (see chapter 1). So too with the aforementioned treks by Ueno Sen’ichi, Hashiguchi Bunzō, Kawano Shuichirō, and other Japanese emissaries to the “savage territory” in the 1890s. Gifts performed multiple functions in these settings. They were initially a means of paying for services rendered or expectations of future assistance, to be sure. But they were much more.
Presentations of gifts were also occasions for recording the emotional states of recipients and gauging the dispositions of little-known peoples as either “greedy,” “honest,” or “uncorrupted.” Gifts also fostered trade dependency among indigenes. The regulation of gift giving was also implemented to reform mores, punish misdeeds, and incentivize compliance. Finally, gifts were recycled and repurposed. Manufactured containers were brought back to villages for reuse, while red-dyed textiles were disassembled and reassembled into traditional cloth and clothing, to be reexported to anthropologists, curators, and tourists as cultural items. As commodities in the Japanese curio, art, and souvenir markets, or as objects of aesthetic or scholarly contemplation, the reexported cloth and clothing became touchstones for metropolitan discourses on progress, primitivism, and cultural relativism. As such, these objects took their place next to the Gwanghwamun Gate in Seoul, Korean celadon wares, or bamboo and wickerwork from Taiwan.

In a famous consular report that recounted his 1869 encounter with Toketok, Charles LeGendre wrote:

I gave the chief one hundred and eighty yards of red camlet, a small pistol, a single-barrel shot gun (unserviceable), and a spear . . . an ivory spy-glass and case . . . some beads, and a quantity of rings, bracelets, and a case of gin . . . Toketok had not expected this attention, and he was evidently much touched by it. “If you have brought all this to buy me,” said he, “you have taken a useless care, for you had my word; but if you hand me these presents as a token of friendship, I receive them with pleasure.”

Toketok’s reported speech, to the effect that the 180 yards of red camlet and other gifts were mere “tokens of friendship” and that LeGendre had “taken a useless care,” is significant for reprising assertions that indigenes were disinterested in material gain or profit. Toketok’s soliloquy, recorded after the fact and at the end of a translation relay from Paiwan to Minnan Chinese to English, does not jibe with less florid descriptions of similar transactions. Other travelers to Taiwan recorded Toketok’s businesslike collection of cash fees for the upkeep of stranded sailors. LeGendre himself remarked in unpublished writings that Toketok’s leadership of the eighteen tribes was financially draining and that the leader was known to drive hard bargains for ransoms of foreigners. Douglas Fix has argued that when LeGendre arrived in Langqiao in 1867, Toketok’s influence was at an apogee. By 1869, his hold on power had become precarious, in part for lack of funds. But if LeGendre’s imputation of native simplicity to a master negotiator rings false, it was not exceptional.

Edward House, a journalist who accompanied the Japanese invasion in 1874 and championed all of LeGendre’s political positions, made similar observations. House had occasion to witness coastal Han Taiwanese bargain with troops for land, provisions, and wages as the army built its first camp, while House also reported on Japanese conferences with the Tuilasok and Sabaree leaders to negotiate alliances, passage, and land for an east coast garrison. At a June 8 meeting,
House wrote of Paiwan emissaries that “hints of the presents that were awaiting them at headquarters did not affect their resolution, and it seemed impossible to move them, when suddenly Isa, stirred by what impulse I cannot imagine, unless it may have been the recollection of having made a promise at the time of his last visit, announced that he would go.”

For House, as for LeGendre, indigenes were indifferent to gifts but anxious to honor commitments. When Isa and a group of his confederate Paiwan headmen ceded a plot of land on the east coast for Japanese occupation, House wrote that offers “of payment were made, but the chiefs declined compensation, with the carelessness to gain which I have spoken of as characteristic of them.” House drove home his larger point with a comparison: “The savages [House’s term for the Paiwanese] have nothing whatever of the Chinaman in their exterior aspect, and their ways of life are totally separate. The divergence of their disposition is most strikingly shown in the contrast between the insatiable greed of the West Coast [Han] and the indifference to gain of the mountaineers.”

LeGendre himself had several occasions to express vitriolic attitudes toward assorted Chinese officials and interpreters for their bad faith and greed, presaging Japanese scorn for Han Taiwanese who purportedly cheated indigenes in the so-called “border trade.” In detailed reports of individual encounters, however, we find that the stark line House and others drew between the “Chinaman” and the “mountaineer” did not hold, calling into question their judgments that Han and indigenous attitudes toward profit or material gain were antithetical. For example, Toketok—the quintessential noble savage in the passage quoted above—himself slept in a Chinese bed, while one of his brothers could read and write Chinese. Isa, his successor as the dominant political figure in lower Hengchun, understood spoken Chinese. The “half-caste” allies and hirelings whom LeGendre and House distanced from China for having lived beyond the reach of Qing territory were referred to as “Chinese” by Douglas Cassel in unpublished correspondence—a contradiction that the American consul adjusted with a heavy editorial hand.

In the long run, as this chapter shall argue, the triad of reinforcing stereotypes—impartial Japanese, avaricious Chinese, and innocent indigenes—became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Japanese policies grounded in this discourse would eventually isolate Atayal, Sediq, Truku, Bunun, and Paiwanese from the market economy. To be sure, the economies of upland rural Taiwan were not nearly as monetized or commoditized as the Han-dominated lowlands when Japanese colonists arrived in 1895. Therefore, a different sensibility and approach to commerce, gain, and valuation plausibly obtained in and beyond the savage border of Taiwan. At the same time, since this stereotype was resistant to empirical disconfirmation and durable in the face of historical change, it also functioned as a racial attribute, fixing certain populations with particular immutable characteristics in the discourses and legal apparatus of the colonizing power.
Like other travelers during the treaty-port period, LeGendre had an ax to grind with the local Qing officials, who seemed to thwart his every initiative, and Hakka intermediaries who profited from their monopoly on access to interior settlements. The everyday forms of resistance LeGendre faced are unsurprising, since his ability to travel to the interior of Taiwan was a direct result of the success of British arms in mainland China. Traders and diplomats in post-1842 Chinese treaty ports, LeGendre prominent among them, discovered that the stroke of a pen in Tianjin or Beijing did not magically transform Taiwan into a welcoming site for foreign residence or an arena of untrammeled access.

There is probably more than a kernel of truth to the perception that indigenes were more open to negotiation with foreigners than Han Taiwanese, since they sought allies in struggles against settlers or Qing officials over resources and territory. That is to say, the “greedy Chinese, innocent indigene” trope may have fairly reflected the experiences of individual diarists. There is also the possibility that Toketok’s attitude toward gifts was context specific, dynamic, and grounded in a cosmology more intricate and meaningful than the sort of crass considerations that suggest themselves in LeGendre’s and House’s accounts. Anthropologist Kamimura Tōru has suggested as much by reconstructing a network of Parijarijajo (“Paiwanized” Puyuma) chiefs and big men that was connected by patterned exchanges resembling a kula ring.

In Kamimura’s view, the Langqiao Peninsula’s indigenous Skaro lineages, with Tuilasok’s Toketok first among them as the big stride chief (ōmata tōmoku), ritually subordinated common Paiwan village chiefs (such as the Mudan headman, for example) through gifting relations. These transactions resembled tributary relations in some regards—as they featured hierarchical yet reciprocal ritual exchange—while they partook in some aspects of a kula ring, insofar as hierarchies were ratified only when equilibrium was restored at the termination of a cycle of gifting and countergifting. In Kamimura’s reconstruction, Toketok, as the big stride chief, and Isa and the secondary great chief (futamata tōmoku) traveled widely to seasonal festivals to present finished goods such cloth, ritual daggers, alcohol, and millet cakes “downward.” In return, subordinate chiefs, themselves members of aristocratic Paiwan lineages, countergifted “upward” with domesticated and hunted meat and presentations of large quantities of alcohol at banquets. When LeGendre and his men showed up with a large cargo of finished goods, which he lavished upon Toketok in exchange for alcoholic beverages and roast meat, Toketok situated LeGendre, quite publicly, in the position of one to whom fealty is rendered in return for protection, thereby inverting the ōmata tōmoku’s place in the gifting cycle—he became a receiver of finished goods instead of a supplier. If such were the case, then Toketok’s hesitation to receive gifts can be interpreted as appropriate behavior for an ōmata tōmoku in a ritual gifting context. Kamimura regards the instances of Toketok’s more avaricious
bargaining as “enclave” transactions conducted outside the sphere of ritual relations and networks.\textsuperscript{13}

Paiwan and Puyuma chiefly genealogies, foundation myths, and the specifics of prestations at festivals were not recorded until after the Japanese arrived as a colonizing power in 1895. Therefore, this more nuanced view of indigenous dispositions to gifts was not available to LeGendre, House, Mizuno, Kabayama, and the other men who became Toketok’s and Isa’s unwitting amanuenses. In the absence of countervailing explanatory frameworks, their treaty-port era jottings were elevated from commercial intelligence reports to sociological verities. For one, the musings of LeGendre and House, a U.S. consul and a journalist for the \textit{New York Post}, respectively, were widely disseminated and archived for posterity in libraries and repositories. In addition, and more importantly, hundreds of LeGendre’s reports, missives, and memoranda were translated into Japanese and read by Japanese officials. Ueno Sen’ichi, an assiduous consumer and translator of treaty-port documents, elaborated upon LeGendre’s discourse in his seminal official writings in the 1890s, while Mizuno Jun himself echoed similar sentiments. Mizuno’s early pronouncements as Taiwan’s highest ranking civil official in 1895 cemented the “greedy Chinese, innocent indigene” binary in TGG circulars and archived reports.

As a permutation of the above-mentioned treaty-port era discourse, the trope of the “innocent” indigene took on new valences in colonial Taiwan. The Qing dynasty and its corrupt mandarinate were no longer relevant. The new foils were the untrustworthy bicultural border denizens discussed in chapter 2, the “interpreters” (tongshi). This substitution of tongshi for mandarins mirrored the configuration of northern Taiwan’s camphor forests as another “closed country” to be opened as an arena for high-velocity capitalism. Partly because they contained forests that sustained populations of animals, sources of clean water, fish, vegetables, and other resources, indigenes defended these lands with alacrity.

Nonetheless, the contest here was not between proto-environmental subsistence producers and rapacious capitalist invaders. Rather, the savage territory was an active zone of ongoing economic exploitation, like Chinese ports before the arrival of Western gunboat diplomacy. As Takeshi Hamashita has written of this maritime economy, the new entrants—this time the Japanese—did not displace an isolated traditional economy with profit-driven, translocal commercial activity. Instead, they overlaid a new system of rules and procedures and connected an existing system to wider currents of global trade. In this milieu, aptly described by Antonio Tavares as a late-imperial exchange economy, indigenes, Han Taiwanese, and operators who straddled both groups exploited these forests for commodities, not just birds, deer, firewood, and mushrooms.

As the Taiwan Government-General turned its attention to camphor as a fiscal boon for its ailing balance sheet, Japanese attributions of greed and faithlessness to tongshi (interpreters) reflected frustration with “toll states” that earned money by taxing and monopolizing access to camphor producers. For actuarially minded
administrators in Taipei and Tokyo, this intermediary layer of brokers presented an obstacle to the efficient extraction of high volumes of product.\textsuperscript{14} The trope of Chinese greed and indigenous honesty also justified colonial rule. As Japanese displaced interpreters, private militias, and Qing armies as agents of dispossession, the insistence upon indigenous innocence and victimhood validated Japanese policies to annex land, engage in forced relocation, and restrict Han immigration. Because indigenes did not understand the concept of private property, ran the argument, they could not make legal claims to title deeds for land. Consequently, their legalistic transformation into economic wards of the state allowed the government-general to sell off “excess land” to logging companies, in a repeat of the gambit used in Hokkaidō vis-à-vis Ainu peoples in 1899.\textsuperscript{15}

Like any other colonial project, however, Japanese rule contained its own internal tensions, while it underwent historical vicissitudes. A competing discourse generated by these same cross-border exchanges identified Atayal red-striped capes as an element of a distinctive cultural ensemble. From the viewpoint of colonial ethnology, any cloth, implement, word list, or social convention that attached to “Atayalness” possessed a measure of intrinsic worth. As Scott Simon has noted, the ethnonym Atayal is a Japanese-era creation. Today, this imposed category has become an object of heated political contestation in the postcolonial period.\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand, its origins were far from nefarious. The Japanese man who put the word Atayal into play recorded it as an autonym, a term provided to him in collaboration with agentive Atayal peoples.

In fact, the term Atayal had its origins in a dissenting discourse. Yamaji Katsuhiko’s study of the centrality of Atayal textiles and Paiwan woodcarving to Japanese-indigenous relations over the past century is important in this regard. Echoing the findings of Hu Chia-yu, Yamaji notes that early Japanese descriptions of Atayal cloth juxtaposed them with other elements of ethnic identity—face tattoos, housing architecture, origin myths, and so on—to construct Atayal people as an ethnos. Hu’s translation from Inō’s famous 1900 survey is instructive: “The less abstract the costume design becomes, the higher its intellectual level tends to be. The more concrete [a] costume decoration becomes, the higher its intellectual level. . . . Thus, the weaving patterns of the Atayal costumes consist of straight lines and angles and elements arranged without clear order . . . , which reflect a lower intellectual level. The embroidery designs on the Paiwan costumes consist of pictorial animal figures . . . which demonstrates a higher intellectual level.”\textsuperscript{17}

By the 1920s, however, such antiseptic (and at times derogatory) descriptions gave way to aesthetic engagement and emotional investment. As was the case with Paiwan wood carvings, Bunun song, and Amis dance, Atayal weaving provided Japanese academics, tourists, and impresarios with a means to rejuvenate a Japanese self ravaged by the atomism and dislocations of urbanized modernity.\textsuperscript{18}

Haruyama Meitetsu has argued that the colonial history of Taiwan cannot be written in isolation from political developments in Tokyo. For Haruyama, the
twists and turns in the history of Taiwan's administration were intimately linked to regime turnover in Japan's central government. Haruyama rightly insists that Japan's ruling elites were a dynamic and internally divided group and that one must specify “who, what, and where” when imputing motives and causality to “the metropole” in the study of colonial Taiwan. The same can be said for Japanese consumer, artistic, and literary tastes. They too were various and protean, and they constituted a dynamic aspect of Taiwan's history, as well.

In his 1991 book *Entangled Objects*, Nicholas Thomas devised a useful framework for elucidating the long-term imbrication of indigenous renaissance with colonialism and its legacies, and for bringing translocal networks and economies to bear on the siloed studies of nationalist history or community-based ethnography. In his study of asymmetrical historical interactions between British imperial agents and Fiji and Samoan Islanders, Thomas proposes the “entanglement” metaphor as an alternative to “incorporation” (a triumphalist or extinction narrative of global capitalism's rise to dominance) or “comparison” (the critique or lionization of capitalism through comparison with putatively alternative economic logics). The “entangled objects” model, which I employ in this analysis, steers a course between ascertaining the rate and extent of the periphery's transformation by the core (“incorporation”) and the meticulous reconstruction of internally coherent idealypical systems of meaning (“comparison”). The former method is that criticized by Haruyama as too deterministic and reliant on Marxist stage theories, while the latter approach comes from the efforts to write “internal” histories of indigenous peoples that filter out “external” influences.

To illustrate, from an “incorporation” perspective, LeGendre's presentation of the red cloth to Toketok is salient because it facilitated an agreement between a U.S. emissary and a powerful chieftain. The arrangement was but one in a series of ad hoc accords whose breakdown fomented the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in May 1874. As a result of this invasion, the Qing initiated more aggressive policies against indigenes from 1875 through 1895, further eroding their autonomy. Shortly thereafter, mechanized Japanese military might brought indigenous populations to heel beginning in 1903. By 1915 or so, Japan delivered the coup de grâce to indigenous sovereignty, ushering in an era of subordinate existence in the global division of labor and the colonial racial pecking order. In this rendering, 180 yards of red camlet is fungible—any gift might have served the same function. This conclusion is at odds with the inordinate attention paid to the specific contours of materiality by contemporary observers. Moreover, as an extinction narrative, the “incorporation model” does little to help us understand current developments in indigenous peoples’ rights recovery and renaissance or the continued attractions of primitivist consumerism.

Using the comparative method would lead us in a different direction, and it also raises problems. Based on the voluminous travel reports and diplomatic correspondence available for southern Taiwan and anthropological fieldwork
studies of Paiwanese kinship, political structure, and ideology, one could ascertain the role of red camlet in the redistributive political economy of the Eighteen-Tribe Confederation. Using models constructed by political anthropologists of Polynesia, one could then hypothesize to what extent Toketok was a chief or a big man, or try to figure out how his brushes with the global economy transformed his leadership style from one type to the other.

Having established the internal logic of Langqiao’s political economy and the meaning of gifts within it, one could then contrast it with the logic of monopoly capitalism and national sovereignty to identify what is distinctive, autochthonous, and original about Paiwanese social organization. Like incorporation analyses, comparativist studies yield important insights. But as Thomas notes, the methodological insistence upon “difference” in comparative work has a tendency to consign actors in these systems to parallel, containerized temporalities, an analytical fiction that is belied by the phenomenon of meaningful cross-cultural exchange.

An “entangled objects” analysis instead lingers a bit longer on the materiality of LeGendre’s gift to take notice of the fact that indigenes refashioned imported red cloth to create what has come to be known as Atayal traditional clothing (see figure 28). Illustrations and Japanese ethnological displays (see figure 29) helped stabilize this marker of Atayal tradition.

These garments in turn took on a variety of local meanings, values, and usages that had little relevance to the story of international relations but were, nonetheless, crucial for social reproduction in indigenous societies. Following LeGendre’s red camlet through another iteration, we observe that the articles that have come to be known as traditional Atayal cloth were in turn reappropriated by Japanese of various stripes for a multitude of purposes during the colonial period (and beyond). As museum pieces, objects of study, and popular items at souvenir stands, Atayal textiles came to symbolize either a particular ethnic group or the artistic genius of an ancient, vanished race of Austronesians (see below).

Fast-forward to contemporary times: Taiwan Indigenous Peoples have refashioned elements of Japan’s colonial-period repository of material culture. The revival of Atayal weaving practices, partly based on consultation of textiles collected during colonial times and preserved in Japan, now illustrates claims of Atayal distinctiveness and autochthony. The same can be said for Paiwan, Rukai, and Saisiyat cultural revivals in the post-1980s milieu.

As we have seen in the introduction and the first two chapters of this book, indigenes received, in the form of gifts (with strings attached), tons of red cloth—as remnants, garments, bolts, or even flags. We have also seen how the Taiwan Government-General clamped down on gifting by 1900. In the post-Pacification Office dispensation, what LeGendre called “tokens of friendship” were deployed as the candy backed by the whip of trade embargoes and punitive expeditions. During the period of Japan’s “primitive accumulation” of an indigenous storehouse of cultural artifacts, anthropologists entered into these transactions. They wrote about,
sketched, photographed, and collected these items, then supplied museums and expositions with evidence of indigenous ethnic integrity, local genius, and archaic vibrancy. Concurrently, trading-post operators accepted Atayal cloth as specie and retailed it to tourists and collectors, diffusing weavings widely to Japanese and international collectors.
Much of the indigenous cultural material that was photographed or preserved for posterity was collected during the “lost decade” of Japanese rule (1895–1905), which is usually considered a period of passivity, at worst, or simplistically as one dominated by a policy of “nurture.” However, during this decade, the peoples beyond the savage border who had kept the Qing state at arm’s length dazzled Japanese officials in search of allies and informants with their song, dance, festivals, folktales, and handicrafts. Indigenous emissaries to feasts and parleys posed for photographs and paintings; indigenous artifacts were collected by rural officials in exchange for tobacco and red thread that was subsequently distributed to shore up headmen’s claims to authority; and indigenous textiles purchased in cross-border trade were boxed up and shipped to Japanese museums and industrial expositions to line the pockets and enhance the profiles of Japanese anthropologists (see figure 29). These myriad transactions had the cumulative effect of institutionalizing a view of indigenes as racially and culturally distinct from each other and from Han Taiwanese.

The contemporary world is politically and economically dominated by settler states and their majority populations. Therefore, indigenous peoples, for both commercial and political reasons, often find themselves forced to perform...
identities that meet the expectations of outsiders, whether in court or in the marketplace. Cultural reification was certainly a prominent legacy of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. The objects discussed in this chapter, then, remain in play as articles of ethnic pride and as exhibits in the high-stakes game of indigenous renaissance and recovery.\textsuperscript{27}

**Tokens of Friendship and the Innocent Aborigine**

The themes of victimization, trade dependence, and exploitation punctuate descriptions of indigenous-outsider relations from the very first written records about Taiwan. Chen Di’s 1603 *Account of the Eastern Barbarians (Dongfan Ji)* explains that Fujianese traders brought “agates, porcelain, cloth, salt, and brass” to Taiwan to trade for deer horns, hides, and meat. Chen laments that indigenes had “developed some desires” leading “rascals [to] cheat them with junk.”\textsuperscript{28} Two decades later, Commander Cornelis Reyersen observed indigenes exporting diverse animal products for “coarse porcelain and some unbleached linen.” These exports were brokered by the “Chinese living there, who . . . married local women.”\textsuperscript{29} A February 1624 Dutch East India Company record suggests that trade dependency gave Chinese immigrants near the future Taiwan-fu leverage disproportionate to their numbers: “In almost every house . . . one, two, three, nay sometimes even five or six Chinese are lodged, whom [indigenes] keep very much under control. . . . Likewise they themselves are bullied by the Chinese for not giving them food or not working hard enough. *The Chinese immediately threaten to deprive them of salt, which means they are dependent on them.*”\textsuperscript{30}

As we saw in chapter 2, the history of interpreters throughout the Qing period reveals a long record of economic ties that exceeded the boundaries of imperial administration. Jumping ahead to the treaty-port period, we return to the disappearance of fifty-four shipwrecked Ryūkyūans on Taiwan’s southern peninsula in 1871. The calamity brought Meiji Japan’s first official visitors to Taiwan. In particular, the observations of Mizuno Jun merit scrutiny. Mizuno would return to Taiwan as the top civilian official in the Taiwan Government-General at its inception in 1895.

In 1873, Ambassador Soejima Taneomi dispatched a twenty-two-year-old Mizuno, who was studying Chinese on the continent, from Hong Kong to Danshui to investigate conditions surrounding the deaths of the Ryūkyūans.\textsuperscript{31} Upon arriving at Dakekan, Mizuno’s party trekked eastward on a steep woodcutter’s path toward the so-called savage border. Mizuno was told that areas of Chinese habitation were marked by the russet color of denuded forests, while the indigenous areas were lushly green. Mizuno’s informants told him that this divide ran the length of Taiwan. It was patrolled by armed Han and indigenous guards on either side.
In a clearing used to initiate cross-border parleys, on May 23, 1873, Mizuno hailed a group of passing Atayal people. The men fled to the hills at the sight of Mizuno’s armed Chinese guides. Two Atayal women, however, stayed behind. They explained that their village had been the victim of a ruse. Chinese traders had promised the delivery of Western goods to lure unsuspecting Atayal people into the clearing. The Chinese subsequently kidnapped the Atayal men and ransomed them later in exchange for titles to land. To overcome their reticence, Mizuno offered to distribute large quantities of red cloth, à la LeGendre, if the two women could bring an Atayal headman down from the mountains. Mizuno noted that indigenes coveted red cloth most of all. The next morning, he presented the two women with gifts of red cloth, matches, small daggers, and pearls. That afternoon, the chief sent a different women’s contingent down the mountain. Mizuno supplied each with a “foot or two” of red cloth. Finally, Mizuno presented the chief with a live pig and two large jars of shōchū liquor. With this presentation of “tokens of friendship,” Mizuno had accomplished the “principal goal of his mission, to look into savage strengths and weaknesses, degrees of intelligence and ignorance, and manners and customs.”

Although Mizuno did not record population figures, estimates of military strength, or routes to interior villages (as later travelers would), the intelligence he collected on his mission to Dakekan was put to use a quarter century later. Every transaction in Mizuno’s account was premised on the Dakekan peoples’ desire to obtain imported goods—twenty-two years before the onset of Japanese colonial rule. At the same time, as first governor-general Kabayama Sukenori’s civil administrator, Mizuno issued proclamations and oversaw policies based on his estimation that the seiban (raw savages, i.e., unassimilated) were generally victims of the cunning and duplicitous Han Taiwanese.

George Taylor, an imperial maritime customs agent for the British crown, attested to the popularity of red woolens in southern Taiwan during the same era. Taylor observed that the red color alone made the cloth desirable, since the brightness achieved by Western dyeing techniques could not be achieved by local methods. These “serges,” as they were called, were quickly pulled apart and combined with sturdier local ramie, hemp, and china-grass fiber to make durable clothing. Taylor complained that for everyday use, Taiwanese weaves were still dominating the market, much to the embarrassment of the British official, who had hoped that his machine-made cloth would flood the market.

Ueno Sen’ichi’s 1891 report (see chapter 1) stated that purchasing presents for the indigenes was most necessary for entering the savage territory. Accordingly, Ueno brought along “liquor, tobacco, glass beads, Western red-dyed thread, brass buttons, white ceramic buttons, and so on.” Like so many Japanese officials who followed him, Ueno insisted that presents to indigenes be distributed equally, from the youngest child to the paramount chief. If one indigene were treated too kindly and another too carelessly, hard feelings would result, wrote Ueno. In return for
these “tokens of friendship,” chief Watan Yūra produced sweet potatoes and a bundle of rice stalks from a “head-carrying bag” and presented them to Ueno. After this exchange of gifts, Ueno’s mission ended. He concluded that Atayal people were simple and trusting, but they were also quick to anger and never forgot a slight. Like Ueno, Captain Watanabe, during the previously discussed August 29, 1895, mission to Dakekan, distributed gifts equally among Atayal emissaries to a diplomatic meeting. According to Watanabe’s report, Atayal valued manufactured goods highly, as they swaddled the empty liquor vessels, great and small, into bundles to carry back to their villages (see figure 11). Yet the chief showed no interest in the silver coins he was given. Hashiguchi Bunzō’s follow-up mission also commenced with the distribution of red cloth, tinned meat, handkerchiefs, ornamental hairpins, short daggers, tobacco, and alcohol. Hashiguchi wrote that the Jiaobanshan embassy men were adorned with trademark Atayal red-striped capes. Hashiguchi emphasized the importance of red serge (a rough woolen), which he distributed in equal shares. To produce the distinctive red garments, Hashiguchi reported, the women took the serge apart and wove the dyed thread together with locally produced ramie fiber.

Based on his experience with the Jiaobanshan emissaries, Hashiguchi, as director of the Office of Industrial Promotion (Shokusan-bu), proposed that each Japanese garrison near the savage border stock gifts for distribution to neighboring tribes. The Civil Affairs Bureau accordingly sent memoranda to the subprefects of Tainan, Miaoli, Yunlin, Yilan, Hengchun, and Puli explaining their importance. It specified that scarlet cotton fabric, red beads, flower hairpins, cigars, daggers, red blankets, red serge, and hand towels were all to be stocked. Every item on the proposed inventory matched one that was distributed by Hashiguchi to the Dakekan emissaries three days earlier, on September 8, 1895. As recounted in chapter 1, after the Pacification Office was opened in mid-1896, station chiefs were ordered to meet with headmen on appointed days and distribute presents. The belief that indigenes treasured their gifts and would do just about anything to receive them informed the office’s optimistic charge. With bolts of red cloth, bags of salt, and bottles of sake as inducements, these hundred men would survey the political, demographic, mineral, vegetative, and military strength of some seven-hundred-odd settlements in uncharted territory.

In addition to having power as political and diplomatic implements, red-dyed textiles were also known as inducements to commence trade relationships. On September 30, 1895, an anonymous Civil Affairs Bureau translator (tsūyakukan) told a Japanese metropolitan readership that adroit gifting could open Taiwan’s interior to Japanese camphor merchants. The cost of gifts to chiefs was about one yen per camphor tree in Miaoli, he reported. These gifts included red, black, brown, or purple cloth scraps for women and guns, swords, sake, and tobacco for men. To obtain the camphor trees, he wrote, local Chinese also traded Nanjing coins or rings and bracelets made of pearl and lead. The selling price of a camphor
tree was sixty or seventy yen—a more than sixtyfold return on investment. This particular correspondent surmised that indigenes did not understand the value of currency or the difference between silver and gold. He wrote that they accepted one or the other based on color preferences for yellow or white and that one could even use shards of glass or chunks of metal for currency in some areas.40

In October 1895 Ueno Sen’ichi’s 1891 report resurfaced in a commercial guide published by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in Tokyo. The guide reiterated Ueno’s advocacy of red cloth as a rain-making gift and as the price of entry to the “savage territory.” Moreover, it duly reproduced Ueno’s capsule history of Han aggression, which partly attributed land dispossession to the supposed indigenous character traits of simplicity, illiteracy, and lack of foresight. The Chinese, according to this iteration of Ueno’s now recycled report (itself a distillation of translated, paraphrased, and plagiarized passages from Western travelers), were greedy, cunning, and unscrupulous.41

A November 1896 report issued by the Industrial Promotion Section began its discussion of camphor with a predictable admonition that travelers stock “liquor-meat-cloth,” especially Western imported red-dyed cloth. It then excoriated the residents of Beipu as dishonest indigenes to justify stationing armed guards in the area to protect camphor workers. In addition, countering the economic innocence argument, the report announced that indigenous headmen in Qing times required frequent cash payments, in addition to feasts and gifts, to keep the peace.42

A series of internal memoranda from the Luodong (Yilan) section chief for aborigine affairs also engaged in the rhetoric of indigenous victimization in commerce. He urged honest, fair-dealing Japanese immigrants to insert themselves into the “aborigine trade.” If they didn’t, he warned, the profits would remain in the hands of unscrupulous Chinese who set off violent cycles of revenge feuds by cheating Xitou and Nan’ao peoples.43 The Luodong office claimed to have brokered marriages between the commercially minded jukuban (acculturated savages) of Alishi village and daughters of the Atayal Nan’ao villages to strengthen government ties with the mountain peoples. The district office held a large wedding banquet at which over a hundred Nan’ao Atayal guests were feted in May 1899. The Japanese official also encouraged the adoption of indigenous males into jukuban households in order to recruit these bicultural couples to act as interpreters. Qualifying the stereotype of Atayal disinterest in material gain, this scheme was premised on the lure of trade goods and wealth to inspire the Nan’ao villagers to place their daughters and sons among the trading villages at the foot of the mountains.44

As we have seen, Japanese accounts of diplomatic gifting repeatedly insisted that indigenes were acutely sensitive to “equal distribution,” whether it was equal measures of cloth or portions of boiled meat. It is hard to discount such reports as projections or stereotypes, since they exist in so many forms. But did such behavior mean that indigenes were egalitarian, unselfish, and innocent of the profit motive?
At distribution events, a Japanese official could proclaim that his emperor would not play favorites. In kind, indigenous emissaries equally distributed goods among their own followers, at least in the presence of Japanese officials. But these happy structural isomorphisms had their limits. According to infantryman Irie Takeshi, Puli prefect Hiyma Tetsusaburō doled out the expected blankets and jars of liquor at his wedding to the daughter of the Paalan chief near Wushe. Complications arose, however, when Hiyma, unable to distinguish Toda and Truku men from the Paalan men, distributed gifts to everyone. Angered by the fact that their rivals from Toda and Truku received gifts, the Wushe men ambushed them after the banquet and took their gifts at gunpoint. Irie reported that the Wushe men asserted their right to receive the gifts first and then to redistribute them to other locals as they saw fit. After all, their chief had conducted a marriage alliance with Hiyma. Hiyama’s successor in Puli, Nagano Yoshitora, triggered the same response by distributing presents to Toda emissaries after a feast in 1898. On their way back home, the Toda men were ambushed by Wushe men. In the ensuing battle, Toda and Wushe suffered fifteen and two casualties, respectively.

Moreover, detailed lists of gift items in the manuscript records of traveling district officials reveal that more expensive gifts were earmarked for headmen. These unequal distributions were, in fact, routine. In summary, some individuals and groups of indigenes did not view material goods as fungible commodities that could be reduced to a value expressed in monetary terms. Nonetheless, these goods were still highly valued, were sites of contestation and competition, and were deployed by indigenes as either commodities or political currency.

TRADING POSTS, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, AND PUNITIVE EMBARGOES

Saitō Otosaku, Pacification Office chief in Linyipu, articulated the growing chorus of criticisms directed at Hashiguchi’s gifting policy in an 1898 white paper. In his preface, Saitō wrote: “One must take care in distributing gifts to the indigenes; if it is done carelessly, it can lead to feelings of injustice and foment anger, or it can cause lethargy and shiftlessness . . . We must not distribute gifts without a reason; we must certainly not distribute luxury goods; we must not give in to demands for goods; when gifts are requested, we should give no more than is absolutely necessary.”

In language that reflects a newfound confidence in the Japanese government’s ability to command rather than placate, Saitō composed a well-calibrated scale of gift categories. He reserved the Hashiguchi-style “tokens of friendship” for first-time visitors to government offices. Return “guests” would have to earn their gifts. For example, to receive goods classified in Saitō’s top-shelf categories, indigenes would have to perform “labor on roadwork, afforestation projects, or stock-raising/farming enterprises . . . or service as savage auxiliaries (banhei).” Such efforts would be rewarded with “thick cotton shirts; black cloth, light cloth, table salt,
matches, and so on”; “buttons, all colors of wool thread, combs, tobacco, Nanjing pearls, and so on”; and, for especially meritorious service, guns and ammunition.

Saitō recommended that farm tools, seeds, and stock be freely given because they would wean the indigenes from their hunting economy. He argued that firearms and ammunition, though necessary for the time being, should be phased out, because hunting in and of itself was a vestige of savagery. Saitō also envisioned the government-managed trade as a source of profit. Lesser categories in Saitō’s typology, which ranged from hoes and hatchets to hairpins and fans painted with nishiki-e scenes, were to be stocked as trade items.

A plan that may have been influenced by Saitō’s report was implemented in Yilan in mid-1901. It restricted trade to government-licensed agents who would operate with set exchange rates. For example, one deer pelt was listed as equivalent to two feet of red woolen cloth or nine catties of table salt; one bear bladder equaled two iron pots or one suckling pig; three catties of wood ears equaled five catties of salt or a skein of thread; and so on. The government would profit from this trade and use the proceeds for “indigenous betterment,” which meant building schools and transporting and lodging chiefs’ families who came down the mountain to enroll in the pilot education programs. The conversion of gift-distribution centers into trading posts was central to the trade-for-education program attempted in Yilan in 1901 (see figure 30). While these projects can be understood as attempts

**Figure 30.** Trading post at Jiaobanshan. *Ribon Gaiyō* (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokufu minseibu banmu honsho, 1913), n.p.
to give indigenes a “fair shake” vis-à-vis their wealthier Han neighbors, these trading posts quickly turned into instruments of punishment, conquest, and income generation for the Japanese state.

In 1899 Gotō Shinpei launched the Taiwan Government-General’s camphor monopoly, along with other measures, to increase revenue to support his vision of an efficiently run surplus-extracting colony. As Antonio Tavares has shown, the official Japanese plan for camphor—to export large quantities of uniform quality with profits accruing to Japanese capitalists—posed a direct threat to the Atayal, Saisiyat, and other northern indigenes, whose leaders were accustomed to leasing forest land, collecting tolls, or organizing production themselves. Accordingly, cases of Atayal and Saisiyat violence against Japanese officials accelerated. In response, the Pacification Offices were abolished in June 1898, and rural installations for aborigine management began to emphasize the importance of embargoes, smuggling, illicit trade, and contraband. As northern tribes put up stout armed resistance to logging-company encroachments, government officials began to worry less about the injury done to indigenes by crafty Chinese and to express outrage that Han traders would subvert Japanese bans on weapons, ammunition, or even salt to blacklisted tribes.

Taipei prefectural governor Murakami Yoshio urged that the tribes responsible for a June 1900 armed uprising near Dakekan, which cost over a thousand Chinese and Japanese lives and destroyed much property, be completely cut off from trade and from receiving gifts. Friendly villages would have only a partial ban on trade, in Murakami’s plan. Murakami sent out strict regulations requiring merchants to be registered and calling for a complete ban on commerce in guns and salt to troubled areas. Murakami believed that villages could be crushed and brought to heel after a few months of deprivation of life’s necessities. In September of the same year, the Balisha district chief in Yilan sent out a similar memorandum, calling for selective trade embargoes against villages who defied the government’s authority. He stipulated that feasting and trade would be permitted for tribes who had made amends for their crimes or who were above suspicion.

Such a policy might have seemed wildly optimistic in the era when Ueno and Hashiguchi were being led by their guides into terra incognita to purchase interviews with “demanding” headmen and chiefs. Yet, by 1900, by following the Pacification Office’s directive to regularly supply gifts to headmen as an incentive to “heed invitations to arrive and be transformed,” the Yilan district offices rerouted enough traffic or created enough new demand to be in a position to open and close the spigot.

In 1902 two major developments conspired to minimize the centrality of the diplomatic and pedagogical functions of “entangled objects” and accentuate the punitive power of their regulation. First, the Ri Aquai Rebellion, which pitted an indigenous–Hakka–Han coalition of camphor producers against the government-general, taught the Japanese that force would be required to make northern
Taiwan’s interior safe for capitalism. Under Ri Aguai’s domination, camphor production was too decentralized, too beholden to toll-state politics that ran on bribes, and too unproductive to meet the camphor monopoly’s requirements for black ink on the annual balance sheet of colonial management. Second, Gotō Shinpei, through a combination of adroit manipulation and cold-blooded assassination, brought the Japanese campaign against armed Han resistance to completion that same year. In late 1902 an Indigenous Affairs Section was placed under the Police Bureau.

In July 1905 Government Order 56 strictly regulated all “aborigine trade” merchants. Although private traders were still allowed to operate, they required government permits. All trade items were to be registered and declared, along with the names of all employees and coworkers. The long list of surrender ceremonies that punctuate the annals of aborigine administration after 1906 shows that resumption of borderland trade was important to indigenous leaders. In January 1906 the four villages of Fanshuliao (Ahou Prefecture) promised not to seek contraband trade goods from camphor workers on the savage border as a condition of resuming trade. In May 1906 the Wushe (Tgdaya) tribes agreed to leave their weapons at home to conduct business at trading posts and to stay at specially designated lodgings during sojourns for commerce.

In the summer of 1909, the government-general put strict embargoes and rations at the center of its much publicized “Five-Year Plan to Subdue the Indigenes.” On October 9, 1909, after applying for terms of surrender, certain Dakekan tribes were permitted “one rice-bowl of salt per month per person” as “gifts,” though not as “trade items.” The tribes agreed to cease taking heads, to surrender their guns, and to submit to biannual inspections for weapons. Toda’s terms of surrender on October 17, 1909, also stipulated that indigenes could not negotiate the price of goods at the reopened trading posts. Moreover, matches, salt, and daggers would be excluded from the list of trade items and supplied as gifts to Toda residents in amounts determined by the government-general. The following day, the Malepa tribes submitted to similar terms, accepting a ban on trade in salt, matches, and daggers in exchange for subsistence-level handouts. On November 11, 1909, the Xalut tribes also surrendered, again foreshewing the right to trade in salt, matches, and daggers.

On April 1, 1910, the government-general began to operate its own trading posts, instead of merely supervising trade. The management of this trade was entrusted to the Taiwan branch of the Patriotic Women’s League (Aikoku Fujinkai), while the former system of privately run licensed trading posts remained as a parallel system operated by Han Taiwanese. Echoing Saitō Otosaku’s memorandum of 1897, this system announced its intention to reform indigenous character by suppressing the instinct to hunt. Special commissioner Marui Keijirō inspected these trading posts in 1913 and urged that the Women’s League be stripped of the contracts (and that private trading posts be abolished, as well). In a painstakingly
detailed accounting of exchange rates for adzuki beans and salt rations, among other commodities, Marui pointed out that the Women’s League was fleecing the indigenes. He believed, consistent with earlier reports about Han avarice, that such unfair dealing would provoke anger in the long run. Marui argued against the participation of Chinese merchants on the grounds that their bad moral character was corrupting by its very nature. He even linked the presence of venereal disease among indigenes to Chinese traders. As a substitute, he recommended the Saitō plan as the only way forward: use indigenous consumer appetites and trade dependency as a lever to reform indigenous character through the promotion of weaving, planting, and stock breeding.

A heavy hand was required, Marui argued, because indigenes were still mentally deficient in terms of their capacity to function as economic moderns. For example, Marui suggested that they be paid only in tools or other durable goods instead of cash for labor on roads and other public works. Why? They might foolishly spend their wages. Marui expressed frustration that indigenes hiked kilometers of mountain trails to save six thousandths of a yen on a catty of salt. He attributed this stubbornness to the well-known desire of indigenes to be treated fairly—if salt cost 5 sen per catty in Wushe, he wrote, then Toda men would not pay 5.6 sen for it at the nearest trading post but would instead walk all the way to Wushe to get the “fair price.”

Soon after Marui’s report was released in October 1914, Government Order 85 called for the establishment of official trading posts to replace the Women’s League institutions. These posts would be operated by police captains (keibu) and assistant captains (keibu-ho), who would report to district heads. All posts would work with fixed barter schedules, to be set at the prefectural level. Following Marui’s plan nearly to the letter, the circular that accompanied the new trading-post regulations stated:

The goal of trade in the indigenous territory is completely for education. To have success, we will pay high prices for cereals, legumes, ramie, rattan, and wicker goods; we will sell farming implements and pig and cattle stock at low prices. We want to instill an agricultural ethos among them. We will pay low prices for deer antlers, deer penis, animal pelts, and bones, to discourage hunting.

Moreover, villages that are not submissive will have their rations of salt severely limited. If we interrupt the flow of salt, that will give them some time to reflect upon their situation. This is a way to exercise coercion without resorting to brute force. It is a “soft policy.” We are willing to sacrifice profit for the government to attain our goal of making the indigenes into farmers.

In the short term, the new policy failed to deter hunting. In the February 1917 issue of the government organ Taiwan Gazette, ethnologist Mori Ushinosusuke explained that 70 percent of the value of indigenous “exports” exchanged at trading posts consisted of animal products obtained in the hunt. Mori wrote that indigenes
could not afford metal pots, salt, or fabrics without hunting. In addition, hunting put meat on the table. Mori highlighted the economic irrationality of indigenous agriculture when prices for crops were so low: at the time of his writing, a deer penis still brought five yen, bear bladders ten yen, and a good set of deer antlers thirty to forty yen in some markets. In short, a couple of well-aimed shots or smartly set traps was equivalent to months of toil in the fields or on road crews.

As we have seen in the foregoing, indigenes were, at least in some contexts, demonstrably motivated by the prospect of cash earnings, material benefit, and personal advantage, according to the records of the Taiwan Government-General itself. But these anecdotal examples, no matter how legion, did little to disrupt the view that indigenes were ipso facto irrational, childlike creatures who lived on the “fruits of the chase” and required tutelage. A 1935 article in a Japanese policemen’s magazine titled “The Economic Sensibilities of Savages and [Savage] Customs” provides but one of many examples of this resilient trope.

It maintained that indigenes did not customarily buy or sell goods based on considerations of market price but instead valued them in accord with traditional value. This estimation was the same one that ruled out the upper Hengchun Paiwanese from being included in the regularly administered territories with the lower Hengchun Paiwanese in 1904 (see chapter 1). With so much home-brewed liquor to be had for free, the article continued, there was little incentive for drink-loving indigenes to worry about having cash on hand. Therefore, they spent their ready cash until they were flat broke. These sweeping generalizations were illustrated with a large photograph of several Tsou men downing bamboo cups of wine with gusto. The author conceded that some indigenes maximized profit and adopted a market mentality, thanks to colonial policies of tutelage. He congratulated the police and hopefully noted that the indigenes were losing their backward habits and becoming more like Japanese.

But if indeed some Atayal and Saisiyat farmers were making profits in business, it is hard to see how Japanese policies were to thank for this result. Imposed trade dependency, embargoes on necessities, fixed prices at the trading posts, and an onerous licensing system were not aimed at producing profit-seeking, utility-maximizing individuals but rather hard-working, surplus-producing, and pacified imperial subjects.

TEXTILES IN EXPOSITIONS, MUSEUMS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Colonial-period writers, especially officials, considered the early years of the occupation to have been ones of passivity regarding aborigine policy. Outposts were lightly staffed and underfunded, to be sure. Moreover, most of the government’s resources were poured into the war against the so-called “bandits” (dohi) from 1896 through 1903—who were mostly nonindigenous, as far as the Japanese
could tell. Therefore, there is some truth to the view that the era of “red-cloth diplomacy” was a historical cul-de-sac. But for the ethnologists whose taxonomic work, photography, collecting, and display efforts are still bearing fruit in Atayal ethnic revival movements, the years 1895–1903 were remembered as a golden age.

To bring our story full circle, then, we return to the National Taiwan Museum, site of the *Rainbow and Dragonfly* exhibition. The revered aborigine expert Mori Ushinosuke was the first curator of the indigenous materials at the museum, and he left a long shadow. Mori was an interpreter for Tokyo University anthropologist Torii Ryūzō, who made four anthropological surveys of Taiwan between 1896 and 1900. Mori was also a junior contemporary and sometime rival of the famous historian, folklorist, ethnologist, and taxonomist Inō Kanori (1867–1925), a formidable collector in his own right. To this day, Mori Ushinosuke’s ethnographic photographs are prominently displayed in the National Taiwan Museum’s permanent exhibition and in other Taiwanese museums. Along with Inō’s and Torii’s collected materials, photographs, and biographical information, these collectors and the artifacts that contributed to ethology are often celebrated and, to the best of my knowledge, the collectors are rarely considered as plunderers or exploiters of indigenous heritage.64

During the first decade of colonial rule, at the pacification outposts, government halls, and army garrisons, these Meiji-period anthropologists photographed, measured, interviewed, and collected artifacts from the indigenous representatives who showed up to receive gifts or have a social drink. Inō Kanori’s field notes, Torii Ryūzō’s published travelogues, and Mori’s serialized memoirs all describe the period as a time when demobilized Japanese soldiers, Han–indigenous interpreters, ethnologists, government officials, and indigenous headmen assembled to conduct business, exchange information, and size each other up.

In the era before participant observation, anthropologists like Inō worked quickly and gathered evidence opportunistically. Discussions about gift items, as we saw with Hashiguchi’s confused conversations about the loan/gift of blankets to the Jiaobanshan emissaries, acted as prompts to initiate discussions between parties that had very little to discuss, given the language problems that plagued these encounters. The precious materials also functioned as the currency of access.

Inō wrote that in the “course of distributing various items colored red, which they generally like, such as scraps of red cloth, red yarn, red Japanese flags, and ornate hairpins,” he had divined key aspects of the Atayal guests’ mental life (shisō). There are echoes of Ueno Sen’ichi’s 1891 report in Inō’s 1896 update, but there are important differences. Like Ueno, Inō observed a reverence for the gifts, polite manners in receiving them, and a lack of selfishness among the recipients: they insisted that everyone receive the same gifts.

But Inō’s report did not compare the Atayal people (as he would later call them) favorably to the Han Taiwanese, nor did he dwell on their simplicity or innocence.65 Instead, Inō learned the local names for the numerous types of clothing
and adornment that were fashioned from these gifts and illustrated his account with several carefully labeled sketches. Having established that the female visitors from the Wulai area were similar in appearance to the women brought from Dakekan by Hashiguchi in 1895 (see above), Inō classified them as coethnics. To the question, “By what name do you refer to yourselves?,” Inō heard the reply, “Taiyal,” from members of each contingent. Inō recorded this term in Roman script, announcing a new scientific outsider’s perspective on non-Han peoples in Taiwan. As he noted, the Qing terms shengfan and shufan (literally “raw savages” and “cooked savages”) were externally imposed political categories. Atayal, in contrast, was a self-designated ethnonym, according to Inō.66

In 1898, Inō launched a bulletin to publish research on Taiwan Indigenous Peoples. For the inaugural issue, he published a photomontage with representatives of eight tribes. The Atayal man in the montage was from the Wulai area, probably a member of the troop that visited Taipei in 1896. Due to technological constraints and the infrequent access Inō had to sitters, Inō’s montage was cobbled together out of black-and-white studio portraits and field photographs of uneven quality. This illustration could not capture the brilliant reds that were distributed to Atayal woman at Japanese outposts as the raw materials for the textiles that would in turn mesmerize Japanese souvenir hunters, ethnographers, and art fanciers. To remedy this problem, Inō commissioned a color painting as a substitute for display at the 1900 Paris Universal Exposition. While the photomontage displayed the Atayal man and woman in a simple vest and Chinese blouse, respectively, the painting took considerable artistic license to adorn them in ornate, bright-red traditional Atayal clothing.67

It appears that Inō rarely left ethnological-survey encounters empty-handed. Inō Kanori’s large collection of cloths, carvings, and other implements formed the basis for the Taiwan National University Museum of Anthropology collection. The lion’s share of Inō’s over 430 specimens were obtained from his family in Iwate Prefecture by Utsurikawa Nenozo in the late 1920s, and they were the material foundation for the academic study of indigenous material culture in Taiwan at the PhD level.68

Mori Ushinosuke returned to Inō’s site in late 1902 and early 1903 to photograph Watan Yūra and his family. Mori took multiple portraits of individuals and groups from Wulai and Rimogan (just upriver), with a focus on garments and cloth production especially. Five of these portraits were exhibited in nearly life-size reproductions for the five million visitors who attended the 1903 Osaka Industrial Exhibition. The Osaka posters were transported to the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair and then picked up by American news services for further reproduction (see chapter 4). Besides the large impact the Osaka Expo had on the propagation of Inō’s map and taxonomy and Mori’s photographs, it also had a direct link to contemporary Taiwan. According to the National Taiwan Museum’s hundredth-anniversary guide, Mori
first came into contact with the exhibit of aboriginal culture at the [Osaka Industrial Exhibition] in 1903. Five years later, the Japanese government established the Affiliated Memorial Museum of the Business Property Bureau to commemorate the completion of Taiwan’s railroad network. Ranging from collecting objects for display, assortment of exhibit facilities, to the allotment of proper space, Mori had a hand in every aspect of exhibits. In 1915, the Taiwan Viceroy’s Office Museum . . . was finally completed and the specimens . . . were transferred to the new location. Mori transferred to the new museum and worked there until his retirement in 1924.69

To the extent that the TGG museum was the first stop for visitors and a school of colonialism for Japanese officials, Mori’s foundational work as the supplier, curator, and analyst of large collection of Atayal fabric in Taipei perhaps did more to associate “Atayals” with culture bearers than any of his myriad activities. On the photographic front, at the height of their popularity, Mori’s textile-rich Wulai photographs were reproduced in Japanese geography textbooks, commercial publications, and government reports, while Inō’s ethnic map found its way into the Japanese school curriculum.70

By 1915, the year Sakuma’s scorched-earth campaign terminated, any primary or high-school teacher in Japan had at hand the materials to demonstrate that Taiwan was inhabited by a number of ethnic groups, each in possession of its own customs, languages, and territories. With the installation of Mori’s collection at the Taipei museum, the same could be said of any important guest or ambitious official in Taiwan. This was a true accomplishment for the ethnologists. At this time, the overwhelming image of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, even in textbooks but especially in newspapers, photo albums, and postcards, was of armed savage enemies of the state who would either soon go extinct or assimilate to Japanese culture.

ETHNIC TOURISM AND INDIGENOUS ART FORMS

As the frontier wars over camphor wound down in the 1910s, Atayal villages near Jiaobanshan and Wulai became regular stops for Japanese tourists and visiting dignitaries. The Atayal textiles that incorporated the red threads introduced in the treaty-port period could now be obtained at tourist-friendly trading posts as authentic indigenous cloth. During Japanese colonial rule, these garments made the transition from items of local consumption and everyday use to exported, high-quality handicrafts and art objects. In 1920, the protagonist of Satō Haruo’s novella Wushe reported that the trading posts were stocking inferior knockoffs of the “genuine indigenous textiles” he sought,71 while visiting Crown Prince Hirohito himself viewed an Atayal weaving demonstration in a Taiwan exhibition hall in 1923. The prince reportedly expressed admiration for their purity, color, and boldness of expression.72 The indigenous trading posts and weaving demonstrations were also on the itineraries of Prince Chichibu in 1925 and Prince Asaka
Tangled Up in Red

in 1927. A photo of the sword-bearing Asaka and his police escorts towering over three female Atayal weavers was splashed on the cover of the December 1927 issue of the *Taiwan Gazette*.⁷³

In 1933 the eminent scholar and critic Ozaki Hotsuma urged colonial officials to enforce Japan’s Important Arts Preservation Law in Taiwan so that traditional Atayal textiles, along with Paiwan woodcarvings, could be preserved as “national treasures.” Ozaki rued the extent to which indigenous culture had been degraded in Taiwan since its golden age. He believed that Atayalic artistic abilities had peaked in the distant past, when the world’s most archaic form of linear patterned cloth had emerged in the mountains of Taiwan. He argued that these artifacts, if preserved in a repository for scholarly and artistic appreciation, would reflect well on the empire itself. For Ozaki, the “normally administered areas” of Han residence possessed nothing of interest, except for derivative pieces imported from the continent.⁷⁴

Like the Japanese aesthetes who praised the genius of Goryeo-era pottery while Japanese merchants undercut its production by flooding Korea with cheaper manufactured wares,⁷⁵ Ozaki did not connect the current “degraded state” of Atayal weaving to Japanese imports or other policies that eroded traditional forms of production. As early as 1900, the Government-General began to facilitate the construction of textile factories in Xindian. The local indigenous affairs field office recorded with satisfaction that Atayal women were being trained in Xindian and in Wulai to run the machines.⁷⁶ By 1938 journalist Harrison Forman, who shot numerous photographs at the same indigenous village visited by Princes Hirohito, Chichibu, and Asaka in the 1920s, observed that Atayal textiles had become luxury goods for local people. Traditional clothing required two weeks of labor to produce a single garment, wrote Forman, while secondhand Japanese clothing sold for about the price of two day’s labor on a road gang.⁷⁷ In a letter to the editor of *Natural History*, Forman lamented that “the women too are dressed by the Japanese in cotton kimonos, which are symbolic of a movement that will rob another one of the few remaining native groups of the world of their own traditions and culture.”⁷⁸ Forman’s photograph, like a similar one by journalist Adachi Gen’ichirō taken in 1936, depicts Atayal women in Japanese clothing at work producing traditional garments for export, all while consciously posing for ethnic-tourism photographs (see figure 31)

LEGACIES AND DILEMMAS

Since the late 1980s, NGOs, the central government, and county offices have dispersed funding for indigenous language school curricula, the revival of dormant public rituals, and the manufacture of indigenous textiles, sculptures, and other items of material culture. As a result, the post-1990 affirmations of face-tattooing and head-taking, and the rediscovery of Atayal textiles and traditional music and
Figure 31. Atayal women wearing imported clothing and weaving traditional clothing, 1936. Tanaka Kaoru and Adachi Gen’ichirō, *Taiwan no yama to banjin* (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1937), facing p. 92.
dance, have erased much of the public and private stigma formerly attached to Atayal culture by Japanese and Han neighbors over the past century. The consultation of colonial-era ethnological writings, illustrations, and photographs has been a crucial component in many, if not all, of these revivalist projects. The Japanese-period documentary record has been important for the authentication of native traditions in Taiwan. This recourse to materials preserved and stored by outsiders is testament to the transformative effects of the government-general’s relocation and assimilation policies, followed by decades of cultural oppression under the GMD. In a word, both the Japanese and the Taiwanese states have had a hand in deracinating Taiwan’s Austronesian populations. Perhaps more significantly, under GMD rule, 80–90 percent of Taiwan’s indigens converted to Christianity, while roughly 50 percent migrated to urban environments antithetical to the maintenance of early twentieth-century markers of ethnic distinction.

Recent ethnographic research suggests that top-down cultural politics are integral to the twenty-first-century indigenous renaissance in Taiwan. Anthropologist Michael Rudolph has noted that, as Christians, many indigens did not initially identify with the revitalized symbolism, languages, and ceremonies that were being promoted by “elite traditionalists.” A period of time was required for adaptation and reappropriation. Scott Simon has written extensively about the emergence of an indigenous elite in the 1950s in response to GMD changes in property law and rural administration. These political operators often use identity politics to fulfill their own political ambitions and are sometimes viewed with derision by their rank-and-file constituents. Mitsuda Yayoi corroborates the general pattern: educated elites formulated and promoted particular versions of indigenous ethnic identity and subsequently mobilized followers to achieve state recognition for a given interpretation of tradition. Hu Chia-yu has identified the same dynamic but tempers this view with the judgment that after a period of elite domination, the revitalization movement found a home in everyday life and rural indigenous villages. In the twenty-first century, she argues, “the enhancement of local cultures and indigenous identities are intertwined with the promotion of Taiwanese consciousness and identity…”

Can indigenous renaissance in Taiwan, therefore, be likened to top-down cultural revitalization projects in other postcolonial situations? Critical scholarship of the Indian case has suggested that unifying symbols of Indian, Hindu, or Maharashtra continuity, cohesion, and distinctiveness have been invoked by cultural elites to quash internal dissent in the name of national survival. In Taiwan, on a much smaller scale, energized groups of activists have won official recognition for their ethnic groups to become eligible for office holding, public funding, and political patronage that accrue with the state’s imprimatur. Since 2001 the number of recognized indigenous groups in Taiwan has climbed from nine to sixteen. While the motives of such leaders and their followers are mixed and complicated, these battles have occurred in an institutional framework that incentivizes the
homogenization of particular ethnic identities and the accentuation of differences among them. And it was precisely these two processes that Inō Kanori and Mori Ushinosuke sought to consolidate as collectors, exhibitors, editors, and writers in the early twentieth century.

Some would consider it irresponsible to put the Taiwan indigenous renaissance on a par with postcolonial Indian nationalism. The move to historicize putatively timeless entities such as the Atayal can undermine indigenous claims to an autonomous political identity, according to this line of thought. James Clifford’s classic study of the courtroom travails of the Mashpee Indians, whose legal claims to rights and resources hinged on their ability to document the autochthony and continuity of their community by recourse to visible markers of culture, is a case in point. To suggest that any indigenous identity has been staged, as I have done in this chapter, can be considered an attack upon the claims to collective redress that are part and parcel of indigenous rights recovery movements.

However, not all proponents of preservationism are indigenes laboring against staggering odds to regain stolen rights or establish a modicum of dignity. In post–martial law Taiwan, Han intellectuals who have invoked indigenous “otherness” as a tool for revitalizing Taiwanese national culture or for pulling Taiwan out of China’s cultural orbit are primarily interested in Taiwan Indigenous Peoples as symbols. The symbolism of authentic, timeless, and non-Han indigenous peoples secures Taiwan’s Austronesian heritage in this discourse. The problem here is that the preservationist ethos encoded in essentialist definitions of ethnic belonging can backfire by creating unreasonable expectations that have grave real-world consequences. The notion that indigenous peoples are inauthentic or not truly indigenous if they do not wear traditional clothing or bear other markers of ethnic difference easily recognized by outsiders is, in fact, a common one. This fixation on authenticity shades into the political view that visibly assimilated indigenous peoples should ipso facto lose rights or privileges (such as access to waterways and hunting grounds or preferential treatment on university-entrance or civil-service exams). The specter of the inauthentic (and undeserving) indigenous person is never far from the surface.

As was the case in the period of Japanese colonial rule, there are scholars today who find certain elements of indigenous cultures intrinsically valuable and of high aesthetic worth. Han anthropologists have worked in recent years to reinstate reconstructed forms of indigenous dance and song into the fabric of everyday life by promoting public performance as education. One critic of this movement has asked:

Shall those young [indigenes] who have been in contact with Han society for a long time identify with an image . . . that has stagnated for several decades or centuries? Or shall they identify with a culture that has—as a result of inevitable historical development—interacted with other ethnic groups? And what kind of “Aborigines” shall non-Aborigines identify with? Is it possible that [Han preservationists]—
order to redress the Han’s former hegemony or for reasons of political correctness—unconsciously bring all possibility for the Aborigines’ pluralist cultural development to an end?  

In this view, the interests of curators, ethnologists, neoprimitivists, and progressive Han activists are pitted against the majority of indigenous who have lived among the Han for many decades and who do not wish to turn back the clock. This proposition assumes that visible markers of identity, which perhaps define indigenous to outsiders, somehow exhaust self-conceptions of belonging from an emic perspective. Hu Chia-yu’s study of Saisiyat memory, identity, and ritual life controverts such a view. She indicates that indigenous ethnic identities in Taiwan are also maintained through oral transmissions that interact in complex ways with material artifacts. Hu writes:

. . . non-verbal expressions are heavily emphasized [in] Saisiyat ritual practices. However, the persuasiveness of ritual materials is combined with elaborated multisensory operations. The process of practicing rituals, touching sacred objects, tasting ancestral foods and drinks, listening to ritual speeches or songs, and making body movements are all perceived as major sources of sensory multiplicity. The senses as embodied powers are mediated through the material properties of sacred objects, ritual foods, or stylized bodily actions. Thus . . . the ancestral past is continuously sensed, recognized and articulated in the present to build and secure permanence in the Saisiyat community.

In other words, the meanings of these objects for those who treasure them as mnemonic sites cannot be divined by mere visual inspection or abstract contemplation. They derive their identity-making efficacy through use in specific contexts that are largely unavailable to outsiders.

The three Meiji-era collectors who did so much to preserve, categorize, and enliven these objects for outsiders, Inō Kanori, Mori Ushinosuke, and Torii Ryūzō, could scarcely have imagined, I think, that Saisiyat, Atayal, Bunun, and other indigenous groups would still be around in the twenty-first century to utilize their collections. If their taxonomic labors and collecting proclivities have furthered indigenous renewal and persistence, as it seems they have to some extent, this long-term consequence was unintended, although not contrary to the spirit of their work in its own context.