PART ONE

The Anatomy of a Rebellion
From Wet Diplomacy to Scorched Earth

*The Taiwan Expedition, the Guardline, and the Wushe Rebellion*

INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 1930, Japanese patrolman Yoshimura Katsumi passed through the hamlet of Mehebu (near Wushe) during a wedding celebration. There, a Sediq man, one Tadao Mona, beckoned him for a drink. Yoshimura brusquely refused, thereby slighting Tadao publicly. Tadao’s hands were bloody from butchering meat for the festival repast. Nonetheless, he touched Yoshimura’s freshly laundered uniform and left a red stain. Yoshimura angrily struck Tadao twice on the hand with a cane. Along with his younger brother Bassao Mona, Tadao wrestled Yoshimura to the ground and returned the blows. The next day, their father, headman Mona Ludao, went to the nearby Japanese police box with bottles of millet wine in hand to formally apologize. Much to Mona’s chagrin, the branch chief, Sugiura Kōichi, refused the gift and apologies. Instead, Mona and his sons were reported to Sugiura’s superiors. Mona was told to expect severe punishment; the possibilities ranged from detention to a punitive expedition against his entire village. Yoshimura’s report and Sugiura’s handling of the matter drove Mona into the arms of other rebellious Sediq men. Mona Ludao himself led the bloody Wushe Rebellion three weeks later. In the October 27, 1930, assaults, Tadao Mona’s squad killed Yoshimura Katsumi in the first wave.¹

These events of early October, known as the “Yoshimura beating incident” (*Yoshimura ōda jiken*) have been recounted (and sometimes embellished) in numerous government inquests, Japanese memoirs, document collections, and overviews of the Wushe uprising.² A popular 2001 comic book reconstructed the dispute for a general audience of post–martial law Taiwanese, while the blockbuster 2011 movie *Seediq Bale* dramatized it in a multilingual feature film.³ There
are conflicting facts in these accounts. We are left to wonder: What type of meat bloodied Tadao’s hands? How many Japanese patrolmen visited the wedding? How many bottles of wine did Mona offer to Sugiura? Did Mona jump in and help assault Yoshimura, or did he break up the fight? But regarding the main sequence of events, all accounts agree: a wedding took place on October 7; a fight between Yoshimura and Tadao erupted; and Mona Ludao’s attempt at informal mediation was rejected in favor of an administratively determined punishment.

From Mona’s perspective, Sugiura’s recourse to superiors constituted a rejection of Mona’s chiefly authority to resolve disputes on the basis of his status as a revered Sediq headman. At the same time, the administrative hand-off subordinated Sugiura; it was an admission that he was not Mona’s equivalent, a “local Japanese chief” with wide discretionary powers. This indeed was a momentous change, and it signaled the termination of rule by the outcasts of empire on both sides of the “savage border.” The Yoshimura beating incident exemplified the regime’s efforts to dispense with an intermediary layer of quasi officials at its geographic extremities.

In the new order, the authority of Japanese officials and indigenous leaders would be derived solely through competition and recruitment through the public-school system and the police bureaucracy. At least theoretically, this new hierarchy, on both sides of the ethnic divide, reached all the way up to the emperor in Tokyo, thereby unifying the island administratively—almost.

WET DIPLOMACY AND EARLY JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE

Six decades prior to Yoshimura’s pointed refusal to drink with Tadao Mona, outsiders with business on the edges of Qing territory in Taiwan accepted alcoholic beverages from indigenes and stuck around to imbibe them at close quarters. We can think of such transactions as instances of “wet diplomacy.” Throughout the island, alcohol was consumed as a liquid, but in northern Taiwan, the preferred method was called “conjoined drinking” (gōin), which entailed contact with an interlocutor’s saliva (see figure 4). The term “wet diplomacy” is therefore descriptive of a particular type of activity, but it also denotes an ideal-typical form of human interaction. The phrase is not used in this study to distill a particularly “Japanese” form of sociability but rather is adopted to account for the frequent and repetitive descriptions of diplomatic drinking in the source material, and for the insistence of historical actors themselves that the relationships thus consecrated were personal and not abstract or contractual. This ideal type contrasts with durai (dry) interaction, which is fungible. Wet bonds must be renewed with periodic expressions of fealty, while dry relationships are rule governed and attach to social roles or official ranks rather than individuals.¹

In the late 1890s and early 1900s, the early years of formal Japanese rule in Taiwan, wet diplomacy was the coin of the realm along Taiwan’s savage border. It
Figure 4. Two Atayal men engaged in "conjoined drinking," near Wulai, Taiwan, ca. 1900. The man on the right is Bato Watan of Rahao. Narita Takeshi, *Taiwan seiban shuzoku shashinchō* (Taipei: Narita shashin seihanjo, 1912), 39.
evinced continuity with the precedent-setting practices of the Taiwan Expedition in the 1870s. In both instances, Japanese officials, merchants, and scholars entered into personal relations with indigenes to secure forbearance, goods, labor, or guidance. In the course of these transactions, indigenous merchants, chiefs, and interpreters established bonds of trust with particular outsiders. These relationships frequently involved intermarriage (see chapter 2). In the wet diplomatic context, favoritism and loyalty were expected—in fact, they were the whole point.

Indigenous leaders sought access to Japanese goods and political patronage to gain advantage over local rivals or to shore up authority within their segmented polities. Therefore, from their perspective, the notion that all Taiwanese would be treated equally as children of the emperor was anathema. This Japanese policy was formally known as “nondiscrimination” (isshi dōjin). Under it, all loyalty and obligation were directed toward a single apex, the emperor—thus making isshi dōjin structurally analogous to modern nationalism, which also channels loyalty upward as it postulates horizontal fraternities of juridically equal and interchangeable subject-citizens. Indigenous Taiwan’s small-scale, nonstate polities were inimical to the instantiation of isshi dōjin, however, because they were held together by the politics of redistribution. Here, chiefly authority was augmented by public displays of favoritism vis-à-vis other indigenes and successful warfare against neighboring enemies.

Japanese isshi dōjin proclamations promised impartiality for all Taiwanese but were nonetheless premised on Japanese preeminence. That is to say, even the most fair-minded Japanese officials believed that indigenes were savages squatting on the emperor’s land. However, as long as chiefs were receiving gifts, publicly engaging in joined-mouth drinking with Japanese colonists, or themselves apportioning banquet victuals, the vagaries of language allowed indigenous leaders to convert wet-diplomatic encounters into political capital vis-à-vis followers and rivals. But in the long run, the logics of centralized administration and bureaucratic rationality were incompatible with the protocols of wet diplomacy.

To overcome the paradoxes of wet diplomacy and establish a less particularistic and labor-intensive form of rule, the TGG stationed guard posts along a scorched-earth trail known as the aiyūsen (see figure 5) to enclose the Atayal, Sediq, and Truku settlements of northern Taiwan. This denuded landscape provided clear lines of fire, while it physically divided northern Taiwan into two distinct zones: one for imperial subjects and another for outcast rebels. From 1903 through 1915, government forces extended the scorched-earth barrier and then marched it inward. The Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan, as a modern political-cultural formation, emerged from the ruins of these scorched-earth campaigns. The surrender ceremonies themselves, and the nakedly asymmetrical power relations they enforced, epitomized “dry” interpersonal relations—the lists of demands Japanese policemen read from their elevated platforms were couched not in the language of reciprocity and benevolence but as orders for compliance upon pain
of punishment (see figure 6). The trade-starved, bombed-out, and battered indigenous delegations were summoned to these spaces as supplicants. To resume trading relations and stop the shelling, they were forced to surrender their weapons and listen to lists of conditions enforced by carrot-and-stick methods, rather than renewed displays of friendship, as called for in wet diplomacy (see figure 7).

Yet after the highlands were largely disarmed, wet diplomacy did not dry up. The guardline campaigns had, in fact, exhausted the Taiwan Government-General. In the late 1910s through early 1930s, state-society relations were left in the hands of rural district police officers, their indigenous wives, and local chiefs such as Mona Ludao. These districts remained outside the tax base and were labeled "special," "savage," or "aborigine." I will refer to this phase of Japanese rule as the era of "native authority," following Mahmood Mamdani.6

Wet diplomacy solved several problems for the Japanese, as it did for the Qing in earlier times: with a meager budget, the government-general established itself in the highlands despite linguistic and cartographic ignorance. From the strategic choke points thus established, information could be collected and relationships forged. However, wet diplomacy hindered the efficient and reliable extraction
of resources from the upland forests, and it blurred the boundaries of state sovereignty along the so-called “savage border.” This chapter plots the history of indigenous-Japanese relations around the forced march from wet diplomacy to scorched earth, and then from scorched earth to native authority. It further posits an isomorphism between wet diplomacy and the low-velocity milieu of tributary interstate relations. By the same token, it will argue for a congruence between dry human relations and the horizontal integration of space that is presupposed by the regime of rule from a distance. This latter mode of governance, in turn, sought to facilitate the generation, accumulation, and funneling of surplus wealth to state coffers.

TREATY-PORT TAIWAN AND THE MUDAN VILLAGE INCIDENT

As with the 1930 Yoshimura beating incident, the 1871 shipwreck of the Ryūkyūans in Taiwan could have been resolved locally, on the spot. In each case, recourse to central authorities occurred in the context of increased volumes and velocities of resource extraction in these imperial peripheries. Such pressures catapulted
otherwise unexceptional events to historical turning points. The 1930 Wushe uprising was set off by the Japanese government’s heightened demand for timber in central Taiwan. Yoshimura himself was brought to Wushe to supervise a Sediq labor force in felling and hauling gigantic cedars, at fixed wages, to complete a series of public works projects. Yoshimura was not locally embedded, as some of his superiors were, but was a specialist hired to accelerate the process of forest exploitation. When his tone-deaf rejection of Tadao’s entreaty caused a ruckus, his supervisor Sugiura construed the wedding brawl as an assault on imperial authority and sent his report up the chain of command, escalating matters beyond the point of no return.

Six decades earlier, a longer chain of events, with a larger cast of characters and an even higher body count, presaged a similar set of problems at the outer margins of state-administered territory in Taiwan.

The increase in Asia-bound commerce that followed the Opium Wars (1839–42) turned the Taiwan Strait into a major thoroughfare in the China trade. After two treaty ports were opened there in 1860, Taiwan’s “poorly charted and still-unlighted coasts” and rocky shallow waters became a graveyard for boats and their crews. One tally estimates that about “150 foreign vessels . . . foundered in the
vicinity of the Taiwan coast between 1850 and 1869 of which over thirty were plundered or burned. Another calculates that at “least forty-six Western merchant ships” disappeared or were destroyed from 1861 through 1874. Most infamously, in December 1871 near Bayao Bay, Taiwanese murdered 54 shipwrecked sailors from Miyakojima (Ryūkyū Islands / Okinawa), an act that occasioned the invasion of over 3,000 Japanese troops beginning in May 1874 (see map 3).

Most historical accounts of the 1871 shipwreck are based on the recollections of a Japanese official and two Miyakojima survivors. Oral testimonies of the protagonists, their rescuers, and local officials were jotted down in 1872 and subsequently combed over by generations of scholars in Taiwan, Japan, the Ryūkyū Islands, and beyond. Chou Wan-yao summarized this scholarship in a recent review article, while Miyaguni Fumio has republished the primary-source materials. Ōhama Ikuko has mined archives in Taiwan and Japan (including Okinawa) and reconstructed the events with great care. In addition, local historian and native of Kuskus village Valjeluk Mavaliu has collated written evidence with his geographical and genealogical knowledge, while Mudan resident and oral historian Gao Jiaxin (Lianes Punanang) has interviewed a dozen or so Paiwan elders (including Valjeluk Mavaliu), to provide a local perspective.

The drama was set in motion by the November 30, 1871, departure of four tribute ships from the castle complex of Shuri (near Naha), on the island of Okinawa. The ships were returning to Miyakojima and the Yaeyama Islands in the Ryūkyū Kingdom. Within sight of Miyakojima, the ships were blown off course and succumbed to a typhoon on December 12, 1871. One of the ships from the Yaeyama Islands was lost forever, but another landed on Taiwan’s western coast. The survivors of the latter wreck made it back to Naha through the good offices of Qing officials. Of the two Miyakojima ships, one made it safely back to its port of origin, but the other—the famous one—capsized off the east coast of southern Taiwan, near Bayao Bay.

There were sixty-nine passengers on the ill-fated Miyakojima ship. Three of them perished trying to get ashore. The other sixty-six made landfall five days after the horrible storm. Soon after, they encountered two Chinese men who reportedly warned them away from traveling inland among dangerous Paiwan peoples. It is difficult to know what transpired at this juncture. The survivors’ deposition indicates that the sixty-six Ryūkyūans were robbed by the Chinese and decided to part ways with their hosts. They spent the night in makeshift outdoor lodgings and set out the morning of December 18. As they wandered westward, they encountered men with large earrings and distended earlobes, presumably Paiwanese.

The Ryūkyūans followed the Paiwanese to a settlement of fifteen or sixteen thatched homes, Kuskus, where the lost mariners were given water and food and were put up for the evening. The provision of water by Kuskus residents, for them at least, symbolized an offer of protection and friendship, according to Valjeluk Mavaliu. The deposition claims that during the night, they were robbed again by their Kuskus hosts. In the morning, a departing group of hunters ordered the
Map 3. Taiwan, the Ryūkyū Islands, the Langqiao Peninsula, Mudan, and Satsuma, in East Asia.
Ryūkyūans to stay put and offered to return with enough game to provide a feast. However, the presence of so many armed men, coupled with the rumors of head hunting that had greeted them on shore two days earlier, impelled them to make a break for it while the hunting party was absent.

Dozens of the fleeing Ryūkyūans found shelter in the home of seventy-three-year-old Hakka trading-post operator Deng Tianbao (named “Old Weng” in the deposition\(^{16}\)) and his thirty-year-old son in a nearby settlement of five or six houses. Most Taiwanese Hakka (Kejia) people immigrated from Guangdong Province. Throughout Taiwan, the Hakka established settlements in foothills and acted as commercial conduits between Austronesians in the mountains and Han people of Fujianese extraction (Hok-los) in the plains.\(^{17}\) Valjeluk Mavaliu writes that Deng was married to a Paiwanese woman named Utjau,\(^{18}\) a common practice for cross-border merchants in this area.

That same day, Paiwan men caught up with the Ryūkyūans. They forcibly entered Deng’s compound. Dozens of Ryūkyūans were dragged out and slaughtered in a courtyard; others were caught in flight. Nine Ryūkyūans avoided detection in Deng’s home, and another three escaped (and were captured by other Paiwanese subsequently). The other fifty-four were killed in the melee. The next day, the nine survivors were removed to the much larger Hakka settlement of Poliac (Baoli) and put under the care of the village head, Yang Youwang—Deng’s son-in-law. Poliac was an ammunition depot, trade junction, and place of arms manufacture. Hakka merchants transshipped powder, shot, and guns to Paiwan buyers inland from this location (see map 4).

In addition to securing the safety of these nine, Yang also arranged for the ransom of the three separated men. Yang Youwang then sheltered these twelve survivors for about forty days, before sending them to the administrative seat of Taiwan Prefecture (Taiwan-fu, today’s Tainan). The Ryūkyūans were returned to Naha in July 1872, over seven months after the four ships were hit by the typhoon.\(^{19}\)

Although it became a truism among Japanese officials and subsequent chroniclers that Paiwanese Mudan villagers murdered the seafarers, residents of Kuskus, today known as Gaoshifo, were the assailants.\(^{20}\) It has been proposed that the violence resulted from the Ryūkyūan visitors’ ignorance of guest etiquette (they ate and ran), or that the captors could not find buyers to pay ransom and thus killed them.\(^{21}\) Gao Jiaxin’s oral histories provide another plausible explanation. Sixty-six adults, unable to communicate in the local languages, walked into Kuskus farmland and began taking food and trampling over hotly contested village boundaries. On top of these nuisances, efforts to feed and shelter dozens of strangers, who brought no provisions and could not make themselves understood, strained Kuskus resources and hospitality. Finally, the intruders were killed as punishment for their multiple misdeeds.\(^{22}\) The best estimates put the population of Gaoshifo at 250 at the time.\(^{23}\) Therefore, one can imagine that caring for sixty-six guests would have been a major, to say nothing of disruptive, undertaking in this sparsely populated area of rural Taiwan.
Whatever the motivations of the people who killed the Ryūkyūans, the slaughter did not immediately raise eyebrows in Japan. While a few officials who happened to be in Beijing or Naha in mid-1872 got wind of the massacre, it did not become a full-blown international incident until April 1874. The 1872 repatriation of the twelve survivors from Poliac to Fenggang to Taiwan-fu to Fuzhou appears
to have been by the book. In fact, the Qing system for repatriating Ryūkyūan shipwreck victims on the shores of China (including Taiwan) settled 401 incidents over the course of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. Qing policy throughout its realm was to provide food, clothing, and ship repairs for stranded mariners. Reciprocal agreements with neighboring powers returned Chinese shipwreck survivors to the Qing realm from Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the Ryūkyūs in over 700 incidents during the same period.24

Edwin Pak-wah Leung has argued that this regional repatriation system worked without visible complaint until the arrival of the Western-centered treaty-port regime in the late nineteenth century. He notes that the Ryūkyūan court itself did not request Japanese officials to intercede on its behalf regarding the fifty-four victims of the 1871 shipwreck. It was Japanese officials visiting Okinawa who lobbied for the invasion. The Ryūkyū monarch Shō Tai (Shang-tai), instead of requesting Japanese aid, sent a reward to Chinese officials in Fuzhou after the return of the twelve survivors from Taiwan. In fact, Ryūkyūans had been stranded on Taiwanese shores on fifty-three recorded occasions between 1701 and 1876 and were repatriated by the Qing in each instance.25 Because such incidents were unexceptional and because Japan’s expedition to avenge the deaths of the fifty-four Ryūkyūans occurred over two years after the event, the question of the timing of the 1874 invasion has been of great interest to historians. Quite rightly, scholars have looked to Japan’s national politics and diplomatic history for answers, decoupling the May 1874 invasion from the December 1871 shipwreck.

At the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868), state-to-state relations within East Asia had yet to become international and are more properly termed interdynastic, or the “tributary system.” To assure that diplomacy demonstrated the sovereign’s centrality and paramountcy, tributary courts received official delegations from other states at specified times and for periods of limited duration. The missions followed carefully prescribed routes, performed minutely orchestrated guest rituals, and returned home. Much has been made of the cultural chauvinism and hierarchical ordering that informed diplomatic practice under this system. In this analysis, however, the important hallmarks of tributary forms are not their validation of a generalized, transhistorical sense of Chinese superiority but rather more portable features that can be extended to other premodern regimes. Namely, tributary relations were tailored to the specificity of each diplomatic transaction. Guest rituals in this system were adjusted for differences between supplicant states or even for the size of missions. Tributary relations also eschewed the notion that interstate relations be put on a permanent, contractual, and routinized basis. In their emphases on the necessity for periodic renewal and forthrightly particularistic forms,16 Qing, Tokugawa, and Joseon guest rituals bore a family resemblance to the “wet diplomacy” described above.27

According to Takeshi Hamashita, “modernity” did not overpower encrusted East Asian “tradition” with the coming of the Western treaty ports at the conclusion
of the Opium Wars. Rather, the Atlantic powers overlaid a new set of institutions, practices, and personnel onto existing Chinese, Japanese, and Korean maritime trade circuits. Independent of the new trade, intra-Asian commerce experienced its own growth spurt in the nineteenth century. East Asian politicians and merchants themselves could be eager proponents of trade-volume expansion, tariff standardization, harbor improvements, and efficient customs agencies. In a word, Hamashita demonstrated that the routinization of cross-border commercial practices within Asia, rather than threatening dynasties, could, in fact, strengthen central authority. The ideological divide in dynastic circles was not so much between moderns and traditionalists but about means to increase, regulate, or reject higher volumes of foreign trade in order to protect sovereignty.

These debates about how to meet the challenges and opportunities presented by the arrival of industrial capitalism in East Asia raged in Japan during the interval between the December 1871 killing of the Ryūkyūans in Deng Tianbao’s courtyard and the May 1874 Japanese invasion of Taiwan. Simultaneously, the Japanese government struggled to assert authority throughout its three major islands of Honshū, Kyūshū, and Shikoku. Rural rebellions against increased taxes, compulsory education, and military conscription, as well as the “chastise Korea debate” (seikanron) at the higher levels of government, formed the backdrop for the 1874 invasion. Saigō Tsugumichi’s occupation of southern Taiwan, therefore, not only aimed to clear the Langqiao Peninsula of parasites who leached wealth from the global system but also advanced the Meiji project to stamp out regionalism and resistance to central authority within Japan.

As Norihito Mizuno put it, the varied projects subsumed under the Taiwan Expedition—to colonize the Langqiao Peninsula, to siphon off samurai discontent with a foreign adventure, and to assert exclusive sovereignty over the Ryūkyū—all conformed to a single logic: the young Meiji state’s heightened threat perception vis-à-vis its industrialized competitors in the arena of nation-state imperialism.

It will be recalled that the lack of succor for shipwrecked American whalers at the hands of Japanese local officials energized the U.S. government to pursue a “water and wood” treaty with the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1867) in 1853. The 1854 Treaty of Peace and Amity, signed between the United States and Japan on the heels of two U.S. naval missions led by Commodore Matthew Perry, was aimed at a Japanese government actively hostile to shipwreck victims, and by extension, to untrammeled access to the ocean’s natural resources. America’s whalers were extending their range deeper into the Pacific, making the problem of shipwrecks on Japan’s shores a persistent one if Americans were to keep increasing oil consumption. Under threat of naval bombardment, the Tokugawa Shogunate signed the 1854 treaty with the United States and a subsequent 1858 treaty to open trade and treaty ports.

The government in Edo managed to dodge the bullet of foreign invasion, but its actions met with dire consequences. After the shogunate signed these
unpopular instruments, civil wars erupted throughout the realm, in addition to a wave of political assassinations. When rebellious Satsuma (a southwestern domain in Kyūshū) shore batteries fired on British ships in 1863, also to protest Japan’s new policies of openness, British naval bombardment nearly decimated the castle town of Kagoshima. The Outgrowths of this civil strife, brought on by a central government’s overreach to satisfy the demands of mercantile powers, fomented the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868.

As the Tokugawa regime was teetering on its last legs, U.S. consul to Amoy (Xiamen) Charles LeGendre reprised, on a smaller scale, the 1853–54 U.S. missions to Tokyo in Langqiao, Taiwan. In the fall of 1867, LeGendre concluded a verbal agreement with the Langqiao headman Toketok to protect shipwrecked sailors from assault, robbery, and ransoming on Taiwan’s south coast. The agreement, like the 1854 Japan-U.S. treaty, reflected the efforts of maritime powers to make the seas safer for greater volumes and velocities of commerce. The LeGendre-Toketok negotiations, like the U.S.-Japan talks of the late 1850s, averted armed confrontation in the short run, while they placed unbearable strains upon Toketok’s ability to hold together a loose confederation of subordinate polities. Toketok’s problems, in fact, mirrored those of the Tokugawa government vis-à-vis Western gunboats.

LEGENDRE EXTENDS THE TREATY-PORT SYSTEM TO LANGQIAO

In April 1867, LeGendre made his first journey to Taiwan to investigate an American shipwreck that became known as the Rover incident. The consul’s visit ignited a seven-year fuse that exploded with the landing of four Japanese warships in Langqiao in May 1874. The barque Rover bottomed out on Taiwan’s south cape in March 1867. After it capsized, the Rover’s captain, his wife, and his crew were murdered on shore by Koaluts (a Paiwan tribe) while trying to secure help. The one survivor of the attack, a Chinese man, reported the incident to authorities in Gaoxiong after making his escape. Thereafter, a British steamer left the same port to investigate but was turned back by the eruption of musket fire from the camouflaged and elevated positions of the Koaluts. LeGendre headed to the south cape for a ten-day tour. He failed to find survivors or remains since he could not secure local guides.

While LeGendre plotted his next move in Xiamen, U.S. vice admiral H.H. Bell launched a frontal attack from the location of the Rover’s wreck. Ignoring the advice of LeGendre, Bell skipped a stop at the port town of Siaoliao. LeGendre had suggested that Bell activate the “mediating networks” of Hakka, Hok-Lo, bicultural, and Paiwan villagers that connected the port of Siaoliao to the protected and isolationist Koalut polity. Going it alone instead, Bell successfully landed, but soon after, one Lieutenant Captain Mackenzie was shot through the heart by a Koalut marksman during an uphill infantry charge against unseen defenders.
The American warship pulled anchor and shelled the Koaluts from a safe distance, apparently inflicting great damage. But without access to kin, trade, and alliance networks, Bell could not locate survivors or discover who specifically had killed the crew of the *Rover.*

As a treaty-port consul in Xiamen, which subsumed Taiwan on the American diplomatic organizational chart, LeGendre took the Langqiao Peninsula’s opacity as a professional and personal affront. A letter to LeGendre from the Taiwan circuit attendant regarding the *Rover* referred to Articles 11 and 13 of the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin to state “that whenever within the jurisdiction of the Emperor of China, anyone shall molest Americans, the military and civil authorities must, on hearing of the same, try to punish the authors.” However, the note added—and this became the sticking point for years to come—“the Savage country does not come within the limits of our jurisdiction, and our military force is not able to operate in it.” Finding this response unsatisfactory, LeGendre took the matter all the way to the top (short of an imperial audience). In person, he proposed to the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, Wu Tang, that the Langqiao Peninsula be occupied by Chinese inhabitants and garrisoned permanently by Qing forces.

Langqiao’s meager population—about fifteen thousand people, of whom three thousand were indigenous, seven thousand or so bicultural, and another four or five thousand Hakka and Hok-lo—and its variety of unknown (to Chinese officials) languages and inaccessible terrain did not commend the extension of civil and military administration to this remote corner of empire. Understandably, Wu did not formally consent to LeGendre’s proposals, but neither could he ignore them. It is testament to the force of British and French arms and the demonstration effects of the 1860 sacking of Beijing that LeGendre could obtain a meeting with Wu, who sat at the apex of an administrative unit that governed perhaps thirty million Qing subjects. It was surely in this larger context that the American’s numerous requests, if not honored, were generally entertained.

Wu Tang’s successor, Ying Gui, therefore allowed LeGendre to accompany a military tour of Langqiao led by General Liu Mingdeng in September 1867. LeGendre recounted travel to Langqiao from the prefectural capital, Taiwan-fu, as an arduous affair. Although ranking Qing officials extended LeGendre diplomatic courtesies, transportation was halting. LeGendre rode on a sedan chair in proximity to General Liu, but his journey was delayed by bad weather and slow communications. As one moved south, the last Chinese city on the coast, Fangliao, was literally the end of the road. To go beyond, Liu’s troops (who numbered about five hundred), built a forty-mile path—supposedly at LeGendre’s urging—before the expedition could proceed (see map 5).

LeGendre’s contemporary accounts of his progress through Taiwan, which he appears to have kept scrupulously accurate within the limits of his knowledge, do not suggest that Taiwan was divided into two separate zones, Chinese and indigenous (see figure 3). He would adopt this divisive view later, after his trips to the
Map 5. Principal administrative centers, contact zones, and political boundaries mentioned in this book. The Taiwan Government-General’s 1909–20 prefectures are in all capitals. The lighter area of the map is TGG-demarcated Aborigine Territory (ca. 1905–45).
island ceased and his knowledge was, in a sense, weaponized for use in the diplomatic arena. As Bruce Greenfield wrote of the Lewis and Clark journals, expedition accounts subsume numerous genres of writing, each with its own source of authority. For LeGendre the amateur scientist and aspiring author, recording surfeits of local detail established his credibility and retained reader interest. At the same time, LeGendre wrote in a combative, legalistic style to prosecute his official duties. In this register, later complicated by his advocacy of a Japanese invasion, his descriptions of Taiwan lost much of their veracity and took on a hortatory aspect.

During this 1867 procession and follow-up tours in 1869 and 1872, LeGendre entered a region of marked ethnic diversity and hybridity; its indigenes—predominantly Paiwan—presented outsiders with a confusing array of settlements, confederations, and diplomatic forms. The principle Paiwan people that LeGendre dealt with are known as the Eighteen-Tribe Confederation. The eighteen tribes were considered to have been under Toketok’s leadership in Western sources, though the bases of that leadership and what it entailed were murky to contemporaries and remain an object of research and speculation.

These eighteen tribes (including the Kuskus who killed the Miyakojimans and the Koalut who killed Mackenzie) were of Paiwan ethnicity. The primary political and residential unit was a village, with populations ranging from seventy-five to four hundred people; these villages were mostly located in the mountains beyond the western coastal plain. Paiwan villages were militarily predominant in Langqiao before 1875. They collected taxes and tribute from Han settlers. Among the Paiwan lived a smaller population of Amis people, migrated from Taidong, and people of plains indigene descent known as Makatao. Four lineages—of Puyuma or Beinan ancestry—produced the locally paramount “big stride chiefs” (ōmata tōmoku) such as Toketok and Isa. The four noble clans of lower Hengchun viewed themselves, and were treated by Paiwans, as distinctly “foreign.” Later Japanese ethnologists referred to the lineages as Skaro peoples, or Paiwanized Puyuma. The four Skaro clans were revered as descendants of militarily powerful invaders; the southern clans that Toketok and Isa headed were also feared as efficacious and dangerous magicians.

Villages, such as Kuskus, Sabaree, and Tuilasok, were located less than forty meters above sea level and sat astride well-traveled river corridors. Others, such as the feared Koaluts and Mudans, were more geographically isolated. Hakka peoples in Langqiao inhabited trade junctions between the plains and the mountains and frequently intermarried with Paiwan peoples. Today Hakka people are normally grouped with Han Chinese, but outsiders such as LeGendre and his interpreter, William Pickering, considered them a distinct people. Most remarked upon was the village of Baoli (Poliac), proximate to the two largest coastal Han settlements, Checheng and Siaoliao. This Hakka village also guarded the entrance to the valley that led to Kuskus (see map 4).
Less well-defined groups, variously called “plains savages” or “half-castes,” are less easily described by ethnic labels. I will refer to them as bicultural, although many of them were tricultural. The man known to history as Miya belongs to this category. He was familiar with Paiwanic and southern Chinese languages and was related through kinship, commercial, and professional networks to a Paiwan confederation chief, a Qing general, and the headman of Siaoliao town. One of Langqiao’s few ports, Siaoliao was a Han-dominated coastal village that LeGendre referred to as “half-caste.” Miya would become LeGendre’s factotum in Langqiao and then go on to help the Japanese establish military operations there in May 1874.

Han peoples known as Hok-los, mainly from Fujian, were the majority population of nonindigenous people in Taiwan. They also resided in Langqiao, and they were known to be in competition with Hakka settlements, if not engaged in actual armed conflict. As LeGendre and Pickering, his interpreter, were quick to point out, however, common cause, such as the arrival of Qing soldiers or defense against Paiwans, could bring these two groups together as temporary allies.49

The Paiwan peoples of the extreme south, who most concerned General Liu Mingdeng’s Qing scouts in September 1867, maintained their military preponderance with supplies of shot, powder, and metal, purchased from Hakka traders in exchange for mountain products (furs, meat, medicinal ingredients, loot from shipwrecks). Further north near Fenggang, where Japanese troops would camp in mid-1874, Han settlements paid taxes or tribute to Paiwan villages.50 So-called “aborigine rents” were relatively light; they did not fund infrastructure but were paid out as protection money. Villagers also paid taxes to Paiwans farther south, with the important exceptions of larger settlements such as Checheng and Siaoliao.

To summarize, for people who hoped to conduct business in Langqiao circa 1870, it was imperative to know how particular settlements were connected together and to secure the aid of people who could mediate the appropriate constellations of polities suited to a particular type of errand. Administrative ranks such as LeGendre’s were of little help unless they were attached to armies on the move, generous caches of gifts, or personal connections to embedded locals.

Returning to LeGendre’s mission: A little over two weeks after the U.S. consul’s September 6, 1867, arrival, he and General Liu entered the town of Langqiao behind a color guard of fifty flag bearers. The townspeople prepared shrines and memorial tablets for the arriving mandarin and foreign dignitary. The locals prostrated themselves accordingly. Eight sedan bearers carried LeGendre. The consul was not bothered by the fact that he could neither read the ceremonial calligraphy produced for his benefit nor understand conversations between Liu and the reception committee. Separating himself from the seemingly unwholesome conditions of the Chinese town, LeGendre camped outside Langqiao with an interpreter and a few attendants. From there, he ran a shadow operation in parallel to the more expansive Qing effort, sending emissaries to find Toketok, the man whom General Liu had planned to negotiate with, as well.51
LeGendre believed that Liu’s large armed retinue would impede negotiations, so he ended up meeting Toketok on neutral ground with five interpreters and a guide. The October 10, 1867, tête-à-tête lasted about forty-five minutes and ended abruptly. Toketok brought about two hundred men under arms; he had mustered some six hundred for a previous meeting in Poliac, even though his home village of Tuilasok had a population of less than one hundred.

From LeGendre’s perspective, Toketok was willing to negotiate because LeGendre himself and the war hero Lieutenant Captain Mackenzie (shot by a Koalut man) were brave men whom Toketok could respect. Time and again, LeGendre emphasized the personal nature of his relationship with Toketok and praised the frankness and simplicity of the Paiwan leader. He also claimed that Toketok would not deal with Han people or Qing emissaries because of their lack of courage. During the 1874 expedition itself, Toketok’s successor as paramount chief of the eighteen tribes reportedly expressed a reluctance to deal with anyone but LeGendre, so important was the personal connection forged during the 1867, 1869, and 1872 visits to Langqiao.

It is impossible to weigh the extent to which personal ties such as the ones articulated by LeGendre mattered to the Langqiaoans. LeGendre’s linguistic transactions occurred through interpreters, usually more than one. Moreover, he could not read or understand Chinese dialects. Thus the speech he imputed to Toketok, or that which LeGendre’s successor, Commander Douglas Cassel, heard from Toketok’s successor, Isa (see below), must be taken as approximations. While Toketok may have resented Qing officials and found common cause with the frustrated treaty-port official LeGendre, and while it was undoubtedly a bold stroke to meet Toketok with such a small escort, LeGendre’s diplomatic offensive had at its back a massive Qing army and at its front a seasoned commercial interpreter who laid much of the groundwork for the meeting. Moreover, as shall be explored later in this book, Toketok was able to ritually incorporate LeGendre into a sphere of exchange and tribute by orchestrating the receptions of gifts and dispositions of banquets in accord with local forms (see chapter 3).

William Pickering recalled several visits to Toketok as an emissary from Langqiao residents and asserted that LeGendre’s meeting was but an afterthought and a ceremonial ratification of negotiations largely completed by Pickering himself. More importantly, while LeGendre was discussing the finer points of shore safety with Toketok on October 10, over five hundred Qing troops, spies, and interpreters were fanning out across the peninsula threatening to exterminate the Paiwan and advertising the fact that many more Qing soldiers lay in reserve on the mainland. LeGendre’s introduction to the region, it should be recalled, was his grand entrance to Langqiao with General Liu at the back of a color guard and in the front of an army.

Despite this general atmosphere of intimidation, the actual terms of the “treaty” (which was never acknowledged by LeGendre’s superiors in Beijing, despite his
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repeated efforts) suggest that Toketok was not overawed by the Qing troops. Some of the stipulations resemble the 1854 U.S. treaty with Japan: shipwrecked mariners were to be provided with basic provisions and shelter and would be brought ashore at only specified locations. However, there were major differences. For example, the 1854 treaty with Japan stipulates that U.S. sailors could not be confined at close quarters like the Dutch in their compound in Nagasaki but must be allowed to move about freely. It also leaves open the possibility of putting U.S. consuls at one or both “wood and water” stations (Shimoda and Hakodate). In contrast, Toketok’s agreement restricted foreigners to coming ashore in a very specific location and did not allow them to “visit the hills and villages” of Paiwans. When Toketok revisited the 1867 discussions, he also asked for the right to kill visitors without red flags (unless they were victims of nautical accidents).

It appears that some sailors were actually saved thanks to the agreement with Toketok. However, LeGendre’s personalized brand of treaty making was insufficient to effect his stated aims. Upon returning to Langqiao in 1869 and 1872, LeGendre had to reactivate local networks anchored by Miya—who was not a salaried Qing official—just to locate Toketok. Then he was informed that the treaty would have more force if it could be renewed annually with personal meetings between the U.S. consul and the Paiwan headman. In addition, as the celebrated massacre of the Ryūkyūans revealed, Langqiaoans understood the agreement as valid only for sailors who could be linked to LeGendre himself (non-Asian mariners). And just as problematic, from a treaty-power viewpoint, was the fact that Toketok’s promises did not carry much weight beyond Tuilasok, one of the smallest settlements of the eighteen tribes.

After LeGendre left Taiwan in late 1867, Governor-General Ying Gui wrote a memorandum to the Qing central administration in Beijing with recommendations to keep foreigners out of Langqiao completely. Instead of backing LeGendre’s proposal to integrate Langqiao more tightly into the treaty-port economy, he tried to prevent the area from becoming a flash point for diplomatic disputes with Westerners. Ying Gui also proposed stationing troops and officers and appointing a few local headmen (Hok-Lo, Hakka, and bicultural) to rescue shipwreck victims after the fact. These representatives and troops would be stationed in coastal Fenggang and Fangliao, not in Paiwan territory as LeGendre had envisioned. The Qing plan was premised on an indirect form of supervision. In short, these proposed Qing measures were consonant with the older, low-velocity tributary mechanisms described above for ameliorating, rather than preventing, incidents like the Rover.

The indefatigable LeGendre countered again. In an official letter to his Qing counterpart, he urged that better roads, a large garrison, and monthly displays of Qing naval force off the south coast—leavened with threats of trade embargoes on powder, shot, and other necessities—would bring the Paiwan to heel and reduce the menace they posed to commerce once and for all. Writing in 1869, LeGendre showed awareness that his propositions would dramatically increase Qing budget
outlays. And indigenous villages would be forced to deal routinely with soldiers
and settlers under his plan—a sure recipe for bloodshed.

According to the Qing records of the October 1867 proceedings, Taiwan officials
agreed with General Liu that fort construction on the south cape would pro-
voke the Paiwanese (whom they termed “savages”). Based on the events of 1875,
we know that the Qing ministers had cause for concern. In the years immediately
following the Taiwan expedition of 1874, Koalut, Saparek, and Mudan raids into
lowland territory killed many, and one follow-up Qing expedition was massa-
cred. Even in 1867, without hindsight, it seemed to Qing officials that anything
less than extermination or permanent occupation would add to the disorder that
LeGendre sought to alleviate. As LeGendre himself pointed out, nonindigenous
Langqiaoaans who paid taxes to Paiwanese were getting off lightly. Were the Qing
to extend its administration south of Fangliao, the financial burden would fall on
them. Like his American counterparts who negotiated treaties with the Tokugawa
Shogunate, then, LeGendre was urging the Qing to become more activist in ways
that would surely create chaos, violence, and tax increases. The goal, in each case,
was to expand the arena of global commerce in the name of a “general good” that,
at least for the foreseeable future, did not include very many East Asians.

It was not the case that all residents of Taiwan suffered at the hands of the
activist American consul. For example, the residents of LeGendre’s base of opera-
tions in Siaoliao, where Japanese troops would also set up shop in 1874, eagerly
joined efforts to extend the treaty-port economy’s reach. Wages for guide service,
in addition to transshipment opportunities for the spoils of wreckage and profits
from more legitimate forms of coastal trade, enriched Siaoliao residents in the
1860s and 1870s. Even before the arrival of LeGendre in 1867, the post–Opium War
increase in intra-Asian junk traffic redounded to Siaoliao’s economic benefit.

When LeGendre received word in early 1872 that Toketok wished to see him
again, it was through Miya (the son of a Siaoliao headman mentioned above) and
his network that arrangements were made. Again the occasion was shipwreck
trouble, this time the London Castle. To assist in this case, LeGendre took the ini-
tiative without an official invitation and started for Taiwan in his capacity as a
“piracy-suppressing consular official.” LeGendre briefly docked at the walled city
of Taiwan-fu to apprise “civil and military authorities of the island” of his mis-
sion. Without personally visiting local officials in the prefectural capital, LeGendre
steamed south and docked at Fangliao on March 1, 1872, with his picked men.

LeGendre expected to find a garrison at Fangliao, in addition to personnel
entrusted with securing castaways from Paiwanese hosts or captors, per his nego-
tiations with Qing officials in 1867 through 1870. LeGendre found instead that the
Qing had attached a single “military messenger” to the local headman. LeGendre
turned to unnamed civilians for aid, but they proposed a service fee that LeGendre
declined to pay, perhaps on principle. The next morning, LeGendre’s team dis-
embarked farther south, near Siaoliao. When the party arrived on March 2, a
U.S. consulate interpreter named James Johnson—himself a native of Xiamen, a
veteran of the American Civil War, and a resident of New Jersey—sought out a Siaoliao man named Miya. Miya had been LeGendre’s guide to the area in 1867 and 1869, and for his efforts as a member of Liu Mingdeng’s militia in 1867, he “was awarded the fifth military rank by the Taiwan” circuit intendant.

Johnson finally located Miya. He and LeGendre then hatched a plan to visit Sabaree, a Paiwan settlement about an “hour’s walk from” the coast. LeGendre and Miya hired another guide and “twenty seven Chinese coolies” to haul the required gifts for diplomacy with the Paiwans. LeGendre described Miya and his other Siaoliao guide as “half-castes,” by which he meant people conversant in spoken Chinese (probably the Minnan variant) and a Paiwan dialect.

A Paiwan man named Isa (also known as Esok or Yeesuk) presented himself to Miya and Johnson as the responsible leader in Sabaree, the via point for LeGendre’s meeting with Toketok. Like Miya and Johnson, Isa had met LeGendre on a previous occasion. After spending one evening in Sabaree, the U.S. consul, Miya, the Siaoliao guide, James Johnson, and twenty-seven porters walked another two hours inland to Tuilasok. Today, Highway 200 in Pingdong County runs through this same corridor; it is about two and a quarter miles from Sabaree to Tuilasok. In 1872, Tuilasok was the abode of Toketok. In Tuilasok, LeGendre and his large entourage were made to wait because Toketok had been detained on matters in a different village. Upon Toketok’s return, animals were slaughtered for a feast.

LeGendre inquired about the disposition of shipwrecked sailors in the area since the 1867 agreement. It turned out that Toketok had aided a few groups but had never heard from Qing authorities about their ultimate safety. LeGendre took this lack of communication or recompense as a sign of Qing bad faith. LeGendre’s other reports emphasized that Paiwan settlements were jealous about the entry of outsiders and that Toketok was contemptuous of Qing officials. James Horn’s reports, quoted approvingly by William Pickering, painted Toketok as a shrewd manipulator and ransom taker. It is not clear why LeGendre expected the relationship between Qing officials and a toll-state broker such as Toketok to have been more cordial, routinized, and intimate. In fact, despite having a Siaoliao network in place and having met Toketok on two previous occasions, it was no small matter for the U.S. consul himself to locate Toketok and conduct business.

It was during this visit to Siaoliao that LeGendre first heard about the plight of the fifty-four Ryūkyūans. Based on his interview with Toketok, LeGendre darkly hinted that the Chinese themselves were responsible for their deaths because the Qing government had refused to staff frontier outposts with agents who could expedite the ransom payments that would have saved the Ryūkyūans.

The various eighteen tribes, as they were called, had populations of a couple hundred people—some more, some less. Their economies were of modest scale, compared to the nations that sent ships halfway around the world. Housing large groups of strangers who required shelter, food, water, and “supervision” strained
local resources—to judge from the constant refrain that payment to the hosts was a sticking point for release. Sensibly, LeGendre urged that regular gift distribution and timely payments were key to securing the victims of shipwrecks. Oddly, LeGendre appears not to have considered the probability that large and routine payments to confederation leaders such as Toketok would have only increased their independence from the Qing, as well as the Hakka and bicultural settlements who provided LeGendre himself access to Paiwan representatives.

But if strong and independent chiefs posed threats to the smooth functioning of a treaty-port maritime economy, so did weak ones. As Toketok explained it himself at the 1872 meeting, his authority among the confederated eighteen tribes was contested and not wholly dependable. At the banquet, LeGendre maneuvered Isa of Sabaree and Toketok of Tuilasok into explaining their exact political relationship, which turned out to be one of rivalry. As the public face of diplomacy with outsiders, Toketok made plenty of local enemies by collaborating with outsiders. Accordingly, Qing officials did reward Toketok with gifts and payments to help him maintain that authority, noted LeGendre. (We will find Mona Ludao facing the same dilemma in 1930, when Taiwan was under Japanese rule.)

Having said his farewells to Isa and the assembled Sabaree men at his second feast of the day, LeGendre headed back to Siaoliao on the coast, never to engage in palavers, gift exchanges, and toasts with Paiwan political leaders again. The date was March 5, 1872.

THE MEIJI RESTORATION AND THE 1874 INVASION OF TAIWAN

Between 1867 and 1872, Charles LeGendre made a total of eight trips to Taiwan. As LeGendre was shuttling back and forth from Xiamen to Taiwan-fu and making circuits of the island, the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan was overthrown. The successor state was promulgated in 1868 with a sixteen-year-old emperor named Mutsuhito as the figurehead and symbolic apex/center. Mutsuhito is known to history as the emperor Meiji. A group of samurai, mostly from the old feudal domains of Satsuma and Chōshū, strove to build a state that could resist the impositions of industrialized Euro-American powers. Thus, the so-called Meiji oligarchs set out to collapse the status-group distinctions and regional inequalities sanctioned by the Tokugawa dynastic state. At the same time, they positioned the nascent national geobody within a complex regional system at the intersection of Western international society and the East Asian tributary system.

Almost from the start, Meiji diplomats tried to do away with tributary protocol because it diminished the dignity of the Japanese emperor by referring to him as a mere “king,” a subordinate to the Middle Kingdom (Qing) emperor. Facing their neighbors, the Meiji oligarchs promoted the new form of state-to-state relations (see introduction). Japan’s central authority, the Council of State, launched a
number of ill-fated diplomatic initiatives to the Korean court in the 1870s to abolish older practices, finally imposing a trade treaty in 1876 through the use of force.70 Regarding Japan's more powerful neighbor, the Qing dynasty, negotiation was the only way forward. An early treaty was signed with the Qing in 1871. Many in Japan, however, found it objectionable for retaining the irksome extraterritoriality clauses of Western treaties with Japan and China. To revise the 1871 Qing treaty, diplomat Yanaihara Sakimitsu went to Beijing in 1872. There, he read about the murder of the fifty-four Ryūkyūans in Langqiao from the official gazette, Jingbao. Yanaihara sent the clipping to Minister of Foreign Affairs Soejima Taneomi in Tokyo in May 1872. This letter put the incident on the central government's radar even before the survivors returned to Naha. After the shipwreck victims were repatriated on July 12, a visiting Kagoshima man, Ichiji Sadaka, caught wind of their plights while in Naha and relayed the news to Kagoshima Prefecture governor Ōyama Tsunayoshi.

Since 1609, the Ryūkyūs had been tributary to both Satsuma domain (which subsumed Kagoshima castle town) in Japan and the Qing empire. On August 29, 1871, the domains in Japan were abolished, and the Ryūkyūs were, on paper at least, folded into the new entity of Kagoshima Prefecture.71 However, there was still a court in Shuri castle of Naha, and the Ryūkyūans considered themselves tributary to the Qing. It was precisely during the Miyakojima sailors' ordeal in Taiwan (November 30, 1871, through July 12, 1872) that central administrators in Tokyo were devising institutional and pragmatic stratagems for integrating Ryūkyū into the Japanese state, destroying the legitimacy of the Shō dynasty, and separating Ryūkyū from China. Because of its timing, then, the shipwreck was a godsend for Japanese who sought a firmer international claim to exclusive sovereignty over the Ryūkyūs.

Kagoshima governor Ōyama’s August 31, 1872, letter urged Meiji to punish the Taiwanese for harming his subjects (the ill-fated Miyakojima tribute mission) in order to “spread the imperial prestige abroad and succor the angry spirits of Your islanders below.”72 In October 1872, these bottom-up rumblings from Kagoshima gained traction in Tokyo with the aid of Charles De Long, the American minister to Japan. Seeking to drive a wedge between the Qing and Japan, De Long stirred the pot by drawing Minister of Foreign Affairs Soejima Taneomi’s attention to the Taiwan shipwreck and suggesting that it be made the occasion of an armed expedition. To further his aims, De Long introduced Soejima to LeGendre, who was just six months past his last visit to the Langqiao headmen Isa and Toketok. The two statesmen discussed Taiwan with the aid of LeGendre’s extensive map collection. By December 1872, Soejima convinced the Council of State to hire LeGendre as a high-ranking advisor to the Japanese court.73

The Meiji emperor himself received Soejima and LeGendre on March 9, 1873, and issued a rescript granting Soejima full authority to avenge the deaths of the Ryūkyūans.74 They both set off for Beijing in mid-March 1873 to ratify a revised
version of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1871. But there was also an unannounced goal for this mission: Soejima and Yanaihara Sakimitsu would put the Ryūkyū shipwreck case before Qing officials to notify them of an invasion of the areas of Taiwan “beyond Qing government.” LeGendre thought the Qing might actually cede a portion of the island and allow its permanent occupation by Japan without a fight. On June 21, back-channel negotiations conducted by Yanaihara, his interpreter, Zheng Yan'ning (Tei Entei), and three Qing officials named Mao Changxi, Dong Xun, and Sun Shida addressed the 1871 shipwreck.

The Japanese side, according to later testimony (the correspondence was not preserved), claimed to be the rightful defenders of the beheaded Ryūkyūans. They informed Qing negotiators that Japan would send a punitive expedition to Taiwan to find the murderers and punish them. The Japanese delegation argued that Taiwan was so starkly divided between its governed, Chinese territory and its ungoverned, indigenous territory that a foreign army could militarily occupy the latter without appreciably affecting the former.

Qing statesmen, led by Li Hongzhang himself, did not acknowledge these side talks as part of the formal diplomatic mission. The Qing view that emerged from the discussions nonetheless defined the Ryūkyū Kingdom as tributary to the Qing; the 1871 shipwreck was an internal matter. According to Beijing, the Qing magistrate’s repatriation of twelve survivors to Naha demonstrated sovereignty. They considered the case closed. Qing officials stated that the savages (banmin, seiban) were but one of many border peoples whom the empire allowed to maintain separate customs and usages. Qing claims that the assailants were beyond the pale of civilization (kegai) and yet within the imperial realm were seized upon by Japanese negotiators, who made much of the term kegai in subsequent diplomatic squabbles regarding the righteousness of the 1874 invasion.

By failing to restrain wreckers on the south coast, the Japanese side reasoned, the Qing had forfeited its claims to jurisdiction in Langqiao. The Japanese delegates argued that it was their right and duty to “chastise” the “barbarians,” either before a European power filled the vacuum by annexing Taiwan as a colony, or before enraged Japanese vigilantes stormed the island in defiance of all governments. The diplomats returned to Japan with the Mudan village incident left unresolved.

Foreign Minister Soejima resigned in the aftermath of the October 1873 debates among Council of State oligarchs over invading Korea (the seikanron affair). Therefore, plans for the invasion of Taiwan remained dormant that winter. In the spring of 1874, however, they were revived to mollify Satsuma men such as Saigō Tsugumichi. In the wake of the seikanron hollowing out of Japan’s central administration, the Taiwan invasion held together a fractured oligarchy by throwing a bone to expansionists who remained in Tokyo. On May 4, Ōkuma Shigenobu was put in charge of the “Taiwan Savage Territory Office” to occupy Langqiao. As the plans to invade Taiwan became public knowledge, Western diplomats declared their neutrality in deference to the Qing, though sub rosa support for Japan was also in
Recalibrating in light of foreign pressure, Ōkubo Toshimichi, a leading member of the council, cabled the expedition’s commander, Saigō Tsugumichi, to delay the mission. In contravention of Ōkubo’s order, on May 2, 1874, Saigō sent the first transport with 1,200 soldiers to Taiwan, with three more to follow.

The Japanese expeditionary force deployed 3,658 men between May and December 1874. LeGendre himself did not participate, but his network was put to good use by General Akamatsu Noriyoshi and Douglas Cassel, a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy charged with operations planning. The first Japanese ship arrived in Langqiao Bay on May 7. It docked at Siaoliao, where LeGendre had disembarked for the 1872 mission recounted above.

The lengthy correspondence between Ōkuma Shigenobu and Charles LeGendre reveals that cooperation with local agents in Siaoliao was anticipated, as well as some sort of alliance with Toketok and the Tuilasok Paiwans. LeGendre recommended that Siaoliao headman Miya be sought out before troops disembarked. According to LeGendre’s instructions, the Siaoliao and Tuilasok men were to be threatened with an invasion force of twenty-five thousand men and utter extermination. They had narrowly escaped suspicion for collusion in the deaths of the fifty-four Ryūkyūans, LeGendre warned through Cassel, because they had extended courtesies to LeGendre in 1872.

Commander Cassel arrived in Langqiao with Fukushima Kunari, the Japanese consul at Xiamen, on May 6, 1874, aboard the vessel Yūkōmaru. Cassel had also taken a commission from the Japanese government to execute the punitive expedition to Taiwan. The Chinese-American interpreter James Johnson was sent ashore to locate Miya and his relatives. A payment of cash was offered to retain the services of the leading family of Siaoliao, while LeGendre’s threats and promises were issued on shipboard. The following week, through Miya’s orchestration, the Japanese hired around five hundred Chinese laborers, organized by headmen, at wages of thirty cents per day. The local economy received another boon from the sale of provisions and land rentals. Journalist Edward House remarked sardonically about the entrepreneurial spirit of local Langqiaoans, who leveraged their bargaining power without hesitation.

On May 10, Cassel sent Johnson, Miya, and attached Siaoliao interpreters to arrange a meeting with Tuilasok leaders. Miya had reported Toketok’s death earlier, so plans to work through his successor, Isa of Sabaree, were put into place. The first diplomatic encounter between Japanese officers and the Langqiao confederation was held on May 16. The encounter took place at the village of Wangsha, a small settlement called “semi-savage” in Japanese accounts and “half-caste” in English accounts—signifying its location in the foothills at the entrance to the areas of Paiwan domination.

Three Paiwan headmen agreed to meet with the Japanese on neutral ground. They refused to enter the Japanese camp near Siaoliao, and they resisted requests to enter their own villages beyond Wangsha in the mountains. The Sabaree chief Isa,
who took charge of the Paiwan delegation, brought a large retinue of armed retainers. Cassel acted as General Akamatsu’s translator, it appears, while he also issued his own declarations as LeGendre’s surrogate. Johnson translated for Cassel (from English into southern Chinese), while Miya translated for Johnson (from southern Chinese into a Paiwan dialect). Journalist Edward House reported: “The interview was not very long, and although the colloquy was necessarily slow, requiring triple translation each way—from Japanese into English, thence into Chinese and again into the savage dialect, with the same process in reverse in replies—there was little occasion for extensive discussion. The mere forms of meeting and recognition, and the interchange of a few reassuring words were about all that was really required.” Three Snider rifles were given to Isa and the other Paiwan headmen, and the meeting was concluded with drinks and a feast.

Aspects of the scene described above were repeated late into the summer of 1874. In published writings, journalist Edward House and LeGendre emphasized the warm relations that permeated indigenous-outsider relations in Langqiao. Saigō Tsugumichi’s 1902 obituary claimed that he wore the silver bracelet received from Paiwan headmen at one of these feasts into old age. This bracelet was immortalized in a postcard set issued on the twentieth anniversary of his death and in a photo attached to a 1936 tribute to his Taiwan days, financed by Saigō’s family and admirers.

But Gatling guns, military parades, and intimations of larger troop deployments were subsequently brandished to intimidate the Paiwan emissaries who received Japanese gifts. And as Japanese troops began to use this firepower to destroy Paiwan bodies, villages, and landscapes, it became easier to arrange meetings. Thereafter, the conferences lost the character of diplomatic encounters and became occasions for the Japanese to enumerate demands and specify the parameters of acceptable conduct.

This paradigm shift is illustrated by the second major meeting between Japanese forces and Paiwan headmen, held on May 25, 1874. This meeting occurred three days after a battle that broadcast the Japanese Army’s capacity for carnage loudly and clearly. The May 22, 1874, Stone Gate Battle broke out during the search for perpetrators of an earlier Paiwan ambush. According to Cassel, the Japanese troops blundered into Stone Gate for lack of discipline—merely to avenge the death of a single soldier. The two or three hundred Paiwanese defenders at Stone Gate were led by Alok and his son. Both were killed in the melee, along with another thirty or so Mudan warriors. Many more were wounded. On the Japanese side, between four and seven were killed and over a dozen wounded (accounts vary). News of Alok’s death and the ferocity of Japanese troops—who severed a dozen Paiwan heads and brought them back to camp with other trophies of war—prompted Isa and other leaders to seek out Commander Saigō in order to avoid becoming the next victims.

The May 25, 1874, conference was attended by Commander Saigō himself and was held at Miya’s personal residence. The main forces of Paiwanese guards and
Japanese soldiers were kept away, since there was mutual suspicion. The five Paiwan delegates themselves arrived with a cow, ten chickens, hides, and millet wine. Saigō “ordered a very large package of very handsome presents to be brought,” which “consisted of two superb Japanese swords, packages of silk, woolen and cotton cloths, and a variety of . . . ‘fancy goods.’”

The Japanese side, through the same three layers of translation that obtained during the first meeting on May 16, admonished Isa and the others that . . . there were two tribes of people with whom we [the Japanese forces] have a deadly quarrel, and that not one single man of these should escape the death which they deserved at our hands. These were the [Mudan], and the [Kuskus] who had helped them, and that, as sure as the sun rose in the East and set in the West every man of these wicked people should surely die by our hands. But that we had heard that some of the people from [Sabaree] and [Tuilasok], and the other Southern tribes had availed themselves of the mountain roads to go round and join our enemies, these treacherous and murderous [Mudan], and I wished to solemnly warn him that if this were really done, the most dreadful punishment would fall upon him and all his people.

Isa, who led this delegation, did not require Miya’s third layer of interpretation; like Toketok’s brother and his adopted son, Bunkiet, Isa could understand spoken Chinese. He assented to the demands that Japanese troops have free access to the peninsula and that Mudan and Kuskus men not be harbored. Cassel then promised to distribute flags to sixteen of the eighteen tribes of Langqiao—Isa asked to receive them personally. The absence of the flags would then identify the Mudan and Kuskus foes as fair game for Japanese soldiers to fire upon at will. Imperial Japanese presumption of indigenous collective guilt, and the delineation of free-fire zones marked out for generalized punishment, would reemerge in the early twentieth century in the camphor wars against the Atayal, Saisiyat, Truku, and Sediq peoples of northern Taiwan.

Since the Japanese did not have actual flags on hand for villages to hoist for protection, numbered certificates with the names of the villages and headmen were issued and then distributed as promissory notes on the flags (see figure 9). It is hard to imagine how such placards might have shielded civilians from collateral damage or cases of mistaken identity. In any event, Japanese official histories reproduced facsimiles of them in their accounts of the occupation, as if to document the army’s precision and discrimination, in the midst of a rough-and-ready display of brute force that sent a message not dissimilar to that of the French crown’s execution of the regicide Damian, as famously reconstructed by Michel Foucault. Against this backdrop of imminent threat, Cassel wrangled an agreement out of Isa for permission to build another fort in Langqiao, this time on the east coast. The sufficiently rattled Isa accepted. After these terse communications were relayed back and forth, Saigō’s gifts were distributed while cups of “Chinese
“samshu” were passed around so the gathered parties could “drink Friendship” (Cassel’s words) to conclude the proceedings.89

The expedition’s only set-piece, scripted military operations—drawn up to punish the alleged killers of the Ryūkyūans—were raids on Mudan and Kuskus settlements from June 1 through June 3. These search-and-destroy missions were carried out by three detachments. They hacked through tough terrain and numerous improvised Paiwan defense works to cross the narrow peninsula. The sweltering heat, swollen rivers, Saigō’s nocturnal bivouac, and army food shortages became part of the mission’s lore. Although it was celebrated in press reportage and colorful wood-block prints as a glorious affair, the climax was less so: the burning of a few Paiwanese settlements in Mudan and neighboring Ernai. These villages were abandoned before the Japanese arrived, because they had been warned away by the skirmish at Stone Gate.90

To formalize the victory over Mudan, a triumphal procession was held at the Kameyama headquarters just south of Siaoliao on June 5. Three days later, delegates from numerous tribes came to meet Saigō. In American accounts, nine different certificates were redeemed for proper flags. In a Japanese account, based presumably on more detailed reports, sixteen flags were distributed that day.91 At this meeting, the Japanese troops reinforced the lessons taught at Stone Gate and in the village-burning exercises of early June by displaying their Gatling guns and massed troops in formation. Resistance was futile. Again, gifts—though of a less generous nature—were distributed. Here, Isa consented to a Japanese fort at a specific location on the east coast, while refusing the offer of rent for the land.

The June 8 meeting can be interpreted as the culmination of a series of meetings with lower-Hengchun headmen that commenced in 1867 with LeGendre’s first confab with Toketok. This sequence of complex encounters can be viewed as a progression of sorts. That is to say, over the course of seven years, wet diplomatic exchanges between Paiwan leaders and outsiders—effected by offers of gifts and pledges of mutual obligation—gave way to more scripted encounters wherein formalistic, rule-laden edicts were issued simultaneously with threats of violence. Initially, for LeGendre to meet Toketok on September 10, 1867, with a few interpreters, it required weeks of advance planning and mediation. Toketok made the U.S. consul wait and finally granted him a brief audience in his own compound. The first Japanese meeting with Isa, on May 16, 1874, was held on neutral ground, while the second one, on May 25, occurred in Miya’s courtyard within shouting distance of Camp Kameyama. For the June 8, 1874, meeting, Saigō and his men didn’t budge but instead waited for the Langqiao headmen to visit Saigō’s headquarters (see figure 8). As Edward House reported, by then the Japanese had reckoned the total Paiwanese population of Langqiao at three thousand people—fewer than the number of Japanese forces brought to bear on the peninsula. The outcome of the military contest was longer in doubt by June 8. Therefore, the Paiwan emissaries were treated as supplicants.
On July 1, a fourth meeting included the recently vanquished Mudan representatives. Sakuma Samata (who would become the fourth governor-general of Taiwan in 1906) acted as Saigō’s delegate at this session, which was held in Poliac, the Hakka settlement that functioned as the gateway to the interior. Much had happened since the June 8 conference at Camp Kameyama. On June 22, the Qing plenipotentiary Shen Baozhen visited Langqiao and demanded that Saigō cease operations. Saigō was not empowered to negotiate with Shen, but the writing was on the wall. Japanese troops would be leaving in the near future and would not colonize Taiwan. Nonetheless, Sakuma read a battery of prohibitions and warnings to the assembled headmen and issued flags. By November, at least fifty-three flags had been doled out to Paiwan emissaries (see figures 9 and 10). 

But wet diplomacy was not yet dead in Hengchun, despite the complete reversal in power relations. In August, the Tuilasok headman invited Commander Saigō for a banquet with representatives from the interior of southern Taiwan. Saigō traveled by sedan chair across the peninsula. They stopped at Isa’s compound in Sabaree and then arrived for a large banquet in Tuilasok. His translator Mizuno Jun’s description documents indigenous-Japanese interpersonal relations at their dénouement. Mizuno recalled:

A chief from a neighboring village with about ten men showed up, and a twilight feast ensued. A Chinese style wooden table was set up out of doors, and on top of it was pork gravy, deer, and pheasant with sweet potatoes, all cooked in a big pot and spread out on the table. The local sweet potato *shōchū* was ladled out of a big rice-cooking pot, and we were strongly urged to drink. While many of that day’s
honored [Japanese] guests were renowned for their drinking abilities, they were no match for the amount of alcohol served at this banquet. This huge banquet appeared to consume a lifetime of wealth for the Indigenes to prepare, and this should have produced the best feelings of affection. However, the strong insistence that people continue to imbibe produced some uneasiness and perplexity . . .

Men then joined in a circle and began to dance and sing. Before leaving, Saigō attempted to do a little dancing himself, to the great delight of all present. The dancing was not unlike the obon dancing done in the Tokyo area. When the savages saw Saigō do their dance that evening, they were pleased beyond limit.

Unlike the exchanges of toasts, drinks, and presents at the May 16 feast attended by Isa in Wangsha, Saigō’s interactions with Tuilasok hosts in August were of no diplomatic import. By late July, all combatants had declared submission to Japan, and fighting had ceased. Monotony had set in among the soldiers. Morale sank to new lows, and homesickness, boredom, and fatigue became widespread. Danny Orbach has unearthed a Japanese veteran’s memoir stating that young recruits, egged on by their officers, were shouting from the treetops to Saigō himself, “Let’s go home!” when the commander made his rounds.

In addition to flagging morale, malaria visited Japanese military camps. From late August through November, the outbreak—abetted by insufficient shelter, heavy
rains, lack of medicine, food scarcity, and poor sanitation—took over 550 Japanese lives. Of the army’s 500-strong contingent of laborers, over 120 perished. Reports in the Japanese press about illness at camps began to surface in late July; by October they had become routine. Journalistic reports were based on rumors and provided wildly fluctuating statistics. But all reports agreed that Taiwan’s climate was “miasmic” and unhealthy for Japanese people, an image of the island that persisted into the twentieth century. As Chen Xuan has pointed out, however, many Paiwan people also died from diseases spread by Japanese troops and workers, while Fujisaki Seinosuke, a colonial official, himself blamed lack of resources, planning, and medical knowledge for the high death toll. In other words, the ravages of illness, which were fiftyfold more lethal than combat in Langqiao, cannot be attributed to “tropical conditions” but rather to imperial overreach.

Up until the time of the troops’ departure in December 1874, small groups of Japanese scouts made forays around the peninsula to learn about its social conditions and ethnic complexion. Numerous visits to headquarters near Siaoliao or the northern encampment in Fenggang for banquets or displays of military hardware were frequent. Importantly, no attempts were made to extract resources for commercial export from Langqiao or to police the day-to-day activities of the peninsula’s inhabitants. There were reports of insubordinate troops committing sexual harassment and petty crimes, but Langqiao did not become the site of the ethnic cleansing threatened by Cassel aboard the Yūkōmaru on May 7, 1874.

LANGQIAO AND THE SPECTER OF PUBLIC POWER

After the December 1871 killing of the fifty-four Ryūkyūans, Qing district and provincial officials treated survivors with utmost care; at the next rung below, local literati and traders in southern Taiwan paid ransoms to save some lives and took it upon themselves to properly inter the remains of the dead. The slain Ryūkyūans were enshrined in mass graves that were subsequently feted at biannual rites to calm their spirits. In short, the murders of Ryūkyūans may have occurred beyond the formal limits of Qing jurisdiction, but they did not occur beyond the pale of civilization, as diplomats contended. Edwin Pak-wah Leung’s and Chou Wan-yao’s contentions that the dynastic system for handling shipwrecks worked without complaint are important, for they speak eloquently to the Qing court’s centripetal orientation, its narrow base of legitimacy, and its incompatibility with high-velocity capitalism.

As Chou and Leung indicate, the complaint against the Qing for the deaths of the Miyakojimans was launched by Kagoshima activists, not the Ryūkyūan court. The activists who remonstrated for revenge, it should be noted, were not interested in extending the parameters of the treaty-port system. Their project was nonetheless intimately connected to the horizontal integration of the Meiji state. As power was centralized in Tokyo, and the “general good” redefined as the bottom line
on a *national balance sheet* instead of in terms of the exemplary moral conduct of officials, the Satsuma activists—all samurai—advocated an attack on Taiwan to retain political relevance. While it is tempting to view them as members of an emergent national citizenry, aggrieved by the loss of newly imagined conationalists from Miyakojima, the Satsuma men Kabayama, Saigō, and Ichiji were “domain nationalists,” in all likelihood. Nonetheless, the fact that low-ranking men in a geographically remote prefecture were able to exert political pressure on the Tokyo government is significant. The post-Tokugawa state could not ignore bottom-up expansionist impulses, for it had to shore up its multiregional coalition via appeals to patriotism. If the Meiji oligarchs were to build a state strong enough to remain sovereign in an unforgiving social-Darwinist world order, they would require more than tacit acceptance of the central government’s primacy. Satsuma’s active commitment to the Meiji modernization project was crucial, so Ōkubo and the central leadership launched the expedition even against foreign objections and those of fiscal hawk and pragmatist Kido Takayoshi.

Qing support for limited forms of restorative justice and its tolerance of wrecking and unsanctioned violence on the periphery of its realm were relics of dynastic rule. The Qing did not rest its legitimacy on claims to embody, represent, nurture, and defend every one of its citizens, no matter where they were located. Its representatives even spoke of Paiwanese subjects as “beasts” and people of such low status that honorable governments would avoid any association with them. The Qing’s inward orientation, as so many have noted, was not conducive to building national strength, as was made painfully clear when Li Hongzhang was left to fight Japan’s imperial forces with his regional navy in 1894. Its anachronistic and low-velocity approach to diplomacy was best articulated in a formal response drafted by four members of the Zongli Yamen to pointed questions of Ōkubo Toshimichi at the September 14, 1874, negotiations for Japan’s withdrawal from Taiwan. The Qing ministers wrote:

> In the aboriginal territory the Chinese Government let the indigenes keep their customs. Those who are able to pay tax pay it. Those who are talented enter nearby schools. We enforce generous and lenient policy to bring them up to a high level of edification. They are subject to the officials of the nearby districts. China stresses a gradual process of government, and has no intention to forcefully or too rapidly subjugate them. The natives of Hainan Island are treated the same. China has many regions of similar condition and every province has its own practices.

In other words, the Qing realm included many areas deserving of special treatment, depending on local conditions and levels of economic development. In some areas, it was appropriate to govern very little, if at all. Consequently, at the margins of Qing rule in Langqiao, LeGendre and then Saigō were forced to rely upon a collection of headmen, brokers, and guides for hire to locate allies in their search for the remains of fellow countrymen or in pursuit of malefactors who had killed them.
Jürgen Osterhammel has argued that such “cross-border lobbies” of “pirates and partisans, semiprivate military operators and warlords” stitched the world of prenational empires together. It could not have been otherwise, given the limited state capacities of these far-flung multiethnic states, separated as they were by vast stretches of unadministered territory. As the international system consolidated itself around industrialized nation-states, however, these interstitial groups were displaced, ideally, with functionaries who answered to center-generated directives. Osterhammel terms this process “horizontal integration.”

Ōkubo rebutted the Zongli Yamen’s position paper, quoted above, with point-by-point objections that called for the horizontal integration of Langqiao with the Qing empire. Ōkubo asserted that “a nation is responsible for the control of crimes, and when crimes are not punished, then there is no law, therefore no national jurisdiction.” In addition, he stated that “tax is a contract agreed to between the ruler and the ruled, and must be applied uniformly upon every citizen and subject within the domain. Making any exception would reduce the payee into tributary status and as not owing allegiance to the ruler.” To his list of criteria for demonstrating sovereignty, Ōkubo added compulsory education. He charged that “the education of only a very small minority of a tribe could not be regarded as ‘civilizing’ the whole aboriginal population.” Thus, Ōkubo advocated universal education for rural Taiwan at a time when the Japanese system itself only operated in fits and starts. Kido Takayoshi, Japan’s minister of education in 1874, argued against Ōkubo’s plan for outfitting an expedition to Taiwan for this very reason: Japan’s own public-school system was woefully underfunded, and the nation could not afford foreign adventures until it put its own house in order.

Ōkubo railed against Qing officials who “preside remotely and abandon the indigenes to their criminal undertakings.” Such leniency, he urged, was “tantamount to not having any jurisdiction.” Lastly, Ōkubo attacked Qing policies of attraction and voluntary submission, stating that “two hundred years of gradualism was a bit too slow.” Some thirty years later, Japanese parliamentarian Takekoshi Yosaburō would make an identical argument to his own central government: TGG policies of voluntary submission through benevolence were too gradual, leaving the empire vulnerable at its extremities, he argued.

The endless rounds of wet diplomacy that characterized political transactions in Langqiao before 1874 were symptomatic of “the infra-power of acquired and tolerated illegalities” that provoked LeGendre and formed the basis of Ōkubo’s case against the Qing. At the same time, as Carol Gluck, Takashi Fujitani, Robert Eskildsen, Marlene Mayo, Danny Orbach, and Hyman Kublin have demonstrated amply, the Japan of 1874 had barely made a beginning on stamping out tolerated illegalities, regionalism, dynastic myopia, and threats to central authority within its own borders. It is thus unsurprising that many of Ōkubo’s charges against the Qing were based on international law as interpreted by Gustave Boissonade, who accompanied Ōkubo to Beijing on September 10, 1874, as his advisor.
The French legal scholar also coached Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru on the fine points of international law as they extended the treaty-port system to Korea by military force and diplomatic cunning in the mid-1870s. Therefore, when Ōkubo alluded to constructions of sovereignty in Beijing that resembled the instantiation of public power, he referenced the abstract writings of jurists such as Emer de Vattel, Friedrich Martens, and Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, and not conditions in Japan. Ōkubo was not suggesting that the Qing behave more like the Meiji government, but he was rearticulating his own fledgling government’s centralizing aspirations in a different setting. The Qing negotiators simply refused to play by these new rules (the Koreans would have less success rebuffing such arguments in 1876), and the Japanese ended up withdrawing from Taiwan that December.

LeGendre himself did not envision the creation of a disciplinary society or the establishment of public power to end Langqiao’s threats to shipping. While LeGendre was still getting his feet wet in treaty-port diplomacy in the late 1860s, his vision for southern Taiwan was indigenous autonomy under Qing suzerainty. Like Native Americans or New Zealand’s Maori peoples, Taiwan’s Paiwans could be left to manage their own affairs but would be denied the ability to enter into agreements with foreign powers. The Qing would be responsible for “restraining them” and indemnifying injured foreigners. If the Qing could not accomplish these tasks, it would forfeit the territory. A few years later, in mid-1874, after LeGendre had been removed from Taiwan for a couple of years, his view hardened. His new plan B for treaty-port era reterritorialization was extermination. If they could not be pacified, foot draggers who impeded access to sea-lanes were expendable. As an alternative to extermination, LeGendre proposed making Langqiao into a Japanese penal colony, developing it along Australian lines. In all of these scenarios, there was no provision for dispersing power throughout a population to make it self-actuating, as was the goal of the Meiji oligarchs vis-à-vis Japan’s own citizens. At the same time, the Qing policy of gradualism, or letting border peoples maintain separate customs until they “came around,” was also ruled out.

This newly emerging liminal space between the old Qing posture of letting distant tribes in Hainan or Langqiao maintain their own customs until they came into the fold of “civilization” and the concurrent Meiji policy of horizontal integration at all costs for Honshū, Kyūshū, and Shikoku created the ground for the transformation of southern Taiwan’s natives into indigenous peoples.

THE QING-JAPANESE INTERREGNUM AND UENO SEN’ICHI

In 1890, Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō ordered Ueno Sen’ichi to Taiwan to investigate its commercial potential. In late December, Ueno set sail for Danshui (a port near Taipei). In early 1891, Ueno departed Danshui “to meet a chief (doshū)” as part of his mission. Ueno described his destination as “the Tokoham region,
which occupies a majority of the savage [territory] (seiban chū mottomo daibubun o shimuru Tokohamu chihō ni shite).”¹¹⁴ Ueno used the term “Tokoham” (Dakekan) loosely; the route he described brought him not there but rather to Atayal peoples then known as the eight villages of Marai (near today’s Wulai). Ueno departed Taipei on a sedan chair, crossed a broad plain to Xindian, and from there traversed several creeks to the villages known as the Quchi tribes (Wulai, Raho, Raga, and Rimogan—see map 6).

By 1891 the Quchi area was a well-established trading junction for Atayal peoples to barter furs, bones, organs, and medicinal plants for cloth, iron, gunpowder, and ornaments with Chinese traders. It can be considered the functional equivalent of Poliac in Hengchun. Quchi analogously connected Xindian, and by extension Taipei/Danshui, to the mountain settlements and forests south along the Nanshi River (then known as the Xindian River). As early as 1871, European and American writers knew to travel there to pick up guides and information on their way to the interior. On the map Charles LeGendre published that year (which made its way into Japanese military archives along with Ueno’s handwritten report), the river junction abutting “Koo-cheu” (Quchi) is tagged “Chiankoey the name of all the places where exchanges between the Chinese & Aborigines take place.” According to Consul LeGendre, the Border Tower, just downriver, was a no-man’s-land between a southward-moving Han frontier and the indigenous villages tucked in the mountains.¹¹⁵ As was the case when LeGendre advanced south past Fangliao in Langqiao, traders moving south past Quchi were dependent upon such intermediaries as they could find and went past the “savage border” at their own peril.

In 1882 assistant Imperial Maritime Customs officer William Hancock also stopped in “Kochu” (Quchi) en route from Xindian. The year Hancock wrote, oolong tea exports from Taiwan were increasing annually, a trend that may have contributed to some of the frontier chaos and violence he witnessed. Hancock remarked on the presence of trading posts and Atayal-Chinese interpreters. According to Hancock, Chinese settlers in Quchi were still in danger of headhunting raids, despite their inroads as settlers and tea cultivators. When he finally obtained passage to an Atayal village, he noted the presence of many severed Chinese heads. Since these borderland “illegalities,” to use Foucault’s terms, did not directly affect Westerners, Hancock did not remonstrate with the Qing to fix the problem, in contrast to the activist consul LeGendre just a decade earlier.

Hancock hired the services of a bicultural interpreter/tracker to continue inland. He stopped at a trading post to purchase samshu liquor for distribution. His guide, who quickly donned Atayal garb, weapons, and adornment before alighting, brought a small group from the interior, who were then duly plied with liquor. Convinced that Hancock was generous, they consented to a visit to an area that appears to have been close to Rimogan, upstream from Wulai. There, in a scene reminiscent of Saigō’s big August 1874 feast in Tuilasok, Hancock danced in
Map 6. Dakekan, Jiaobanshan, Quchi, Wulai, and Rimogan, ca. 1910. The lighter area of the map represents the Aborigine Territory.
a circle with Atayal women, ate roast pork, and poured down cups of alcohol with his hosts. He was led back to Quchi by a different path than the one by which he had arrived, and he noted in his consular report that the village was well hidden from outsiders.\textsuperscript{16}

Following in Hancock’s tracks a decade later, Ueno finally found a guide “who could speak the Aborigine language a little.”\textsuperscript{17} Ueno ordered him to arrange a parley with the paramount chief (shūchō no gotoki tōmoku). Taking his leave, Ueno’s interpreter removed his “Chinese-style” clothing, pinned up his queue, donned a tunic, waist dagger, and Atayal-style cap, and set off to find the paramount chief.\textsuperscript{18} After a long wait, the interpreter returned with six Atayal people. The guests were a “paramount chief” named Watan Yū, his wife and daughter, and three retainers. After Ueno distributed the expected presents, Watan Yū produced sweet potatoes and a bundle of rice stalks from a “head carrying bag.” After this exchange of gifts, the chief, along with the other five, stood up at once and took turns striking Ueno in the chest with their right arms. Ueno asked the Chinese-language interpreter (tsūben) what this meant, and the interpreter replied that it was a sign of affection and happiness. It literally meant that the indigenes considered Ueno as kin, as a member of the “tribe/race” (dōjinshu). Ueno then reciprocated by striking Watan Yū’s chest with his right hand.

As the festivities continued, Ueno showed Watan a bottle of sweet potato shōchū purchased at a trading post along the way. As Ueno was about to open it, Watan asked if he could take the bottle back to his own village for later consumption. Ueno convinced him that both sides should consume it together, on the spot, in the spirit of fraternity. Quite joyfully, according to Ueno, the imported liquor was consumed. Ueno’s attention to detail reveals his belief that every gesture and gift was freighted with meaning. Ueno noted that, as in a Japanese tea ceremony, after taking a drink, each person would wipe the rim of the bowl to show purity of intention before passing the bowl to the next person.\textsuperscript{19}

Upon his return to Tokyo, Ueno published a detailed record of his observations, along with information gathered from Western missionaries and Qing sources he was privy to as a Japanese consul. These appeared in the February 1892 issue of the \textit{Tokyo Geographical Society Journal}. Ueno also hit the lecture circuit to alert Japanese entrepreneurs about business opportunities in Taiwan and on the continent.\textsuperscript{20} Ueno then addressed the Tokyo Geographical Society’s March 22, 1895, meeting. Brandishing the earrings and cape he had received from Watan Yū and his wife, Ueno reported that the unconquered “savages” regarded the Chinese as enemies. Like Hancock before him, he portrayed Atayal people as innocents, who stood little chance against their cunning civilized neighbors, the Chinese.\textsuperscript{21}

During his tenure as consul at Wonsan, Korea, Ueno recopied and edited his 1891 travel notes and submitted a handwritten draft to the Imperial Army’s General Staff, signing the updated report October 25, 1894.\textsuperscript{22} Three months later, the General Staff published Ueno’s report under the title “A Gazetteer of Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{23}
All of these iterations institutionalized the notion that Taiwan’s population was divided between victimized indigenes and Han aggressors and that the former constituted a population of natural allies who could be won over with gifts of cloth, jars of liquor, and a willingness to participate in wet diplomatic transactions. Because Saigō and Ueno were short-timers, their interactions with indigenes were perforce of a different order than those of Qing officials or Han settlers. Thus their codified and serially reproduced assurances that relations of hostility or intimacy were attributable to the respective characters of Chinese, Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, and Japanese were based on false premises. These Japanese visitors, backed by the armed might of an occupational force or the implicit threat of Qing armies, were not charged with extracting raw materials from Taiwan’s interior, nor did they take responsibility for maintaining the peace between rival indigenous groups or between lowlanders and highlanders. Their faith in the efficacy of wet diplomacy would be severely tested when the Japanese government took over from the Qing and found itself torn between the notions of public power as expressed by Ōkubo Toshimichi in Beijing and the practical necessity of ruling within the constraints of finite resources. They would begin, as it turned out, by letting border peoples keep their own customs and by exercising leniency.

FEASTING, GIFTING, AND DRINKING: ATAYAL-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY IN THE COLONIAL ERA

On August 2, 1895, Admiral Kabayama Sukenori signed papers transferring the sovereignty of Taiwan to Japan aboard a ship in Jilong Harbor. Within a month, forty-six men under a garrison commander named Watanabe trekked southeast toward the mountains to initiate official relations with Atayal representatives. He chose the junction town of Dakekan, a gateway to the mountain trade. After marching for a couple of miles, Watanabe waited for a delegation of Atayals. Emissaries numbering seven, two of them women, showed up. The soldiers distributed gifts of liquor, tobacco, silver coins, and tinned mackerel to the seven red-caped representatives. The expected drinking soon ensued. As two o’clock rolled around, the chief reminded Watanabe that a five-mile journey back into the mountains awaited. He promised to meet the Japanese later at the same spot. On September 4, a mission headed by section chief of industrial development (shokusan-buchō) Hashiguchi Bunzō (future Taipei governor) set out from Taipei to follow up. After negotiating the actual spot and timing over days of weather delays and messages shuttled through an interpreter, the summit commenced on September 8.

The Japanese lined up the twenty-two Dakekan-area residents on a field. Then Taipei governor Tanaka Tsunatoku read a statement: “You have come from afar, down from the mountains, bringing even your women and children. We are overjoyed to meet with you here. We set out for Dakekan yesterday to meet with you
because we wanted to establish good relations and to apprise you of matters of official import. To see you here in good health bearing a compliant (onjun) attitude makes all of us very happy.”

These introductory remarks, made to “test the attitude of the indigenes,” were followed by a toast, and the liquor was produced. Like Watanabe and Ueno before them, Hashiguchi and Tanaka found themselves at close quarters with their Atayal counterparts. In Hashiguchi’s case, the intimacy produced mild discomfort tinged with amusement. Hashiguchi explained at a lecture before the Tokyo Geographical Society: “As everyone knows, when Germans make agreements, they face each other, put their hands like this, (Hashiguchi motions in imitation) and drink beer together. The indigenes are a little different. Touching their mouths together, they both drain the same cup. I don’t mean to boast, but when I said ‘how about some sake,’ immediately one came at me with his mouth and I joined him . . . If one cannot bear to do such things, one cannot associate or communicate with the indigenes at all.”

This was not the first time a high-ranking Japanese official joined mouths with an Atayal man. In September 1873, Mizuno Jun—then a government language scholar and interpreter—accompanied future governor-general of Taiwan Kabayama Sukenori to Suao Bay (near Yilan) on reconnaissance. Upon meeting a delegation in the Nan’ao area, Kabayama’s group distributed spirits manufactured in Fujian in exchange for servings of the local alcoholic beverage, probably a fermented millet wine. Farther along, at a subsequent feast, shōchū was ladled out to the thirsty and tired Japanese travelers. The headman grabbed Kabayama’s colleague Naritomi Seifū by the shoulder and forced their mouths together so they could down the liquor out of the same cup.

Returning to the September 1895 mission: after the initial toasts, Tanaka announced to the gathered men and women that the relationship between Japan and the Dakekan peoples would conform to the principles of nondiscrimination:

Here we must communicate to you a matter of utmost importance. You should listen silently and with full attention. This island of Taiwan, the parts inhabited by you [Indigenes] and by the Chinese (shinajin), has wholly become a possession of Great Japan, under the rule of our Great Emperor. Henceforth, the garrison troops and officials posted here will administer both Taipei and Dakekan, and govern everyone uniformly (mina ichiritsu ni waga nihonkan kore o kanri suru). The previous Chinese administrators have fled and left, so from this day forward, you are all, just like us, the children of the Emperor, you are our brothers. Having listened well to our office’s order, you will exert yourself to be loyal subjects of the Emperor and the Great Empire of Japan.

Tanaka’s speech was communicated through Atayal interpreters and received in the context of joined-mouth drinking rituals and presentations of gifts. At the same time, it was filled with “dry” sobriquets written in lofty and abstract phrases
that disavowed special treatment or a budding personal relationship. Japanese officials would propagate these mixed messages throughout the interior in subsequent “first-contact” events.

Despite the layers of linguistic confusion, Hashiguchi’s and Tanaka’s adherence to Ueno’s notes on hospitality and their willingness to participate in wet diplomacy achieved their short-term goal. Twelve of the original twenty-two Atayal were persuaded to visit the Dakekan garrison. Seven of these, including the Jiaobanshan headman Watan Nui (who had dealt with Watanabe on August 29), returned to Jiaobanshan soon thereafter (see figure 11). They were issued a beef cow and a written note signed by Hashiguchi and Tanaka as a receipt to commemorate Japan’s expression of sincerity and its announcement that Taiwan was now “imperial territory.” It is not clear from the documentation whether Watan Nui, like Toketok and his brother in 1867, requested this written record or if the Japanese team felt it served a purpose.

Figure 11. Drawing of Watan Nawi’s wife, Lemoi Maton, present at the meeting during Watanabe’s expedition to Dakekan. In the head-hunting bag, note the alcohol bottle and can, which were gifts brought back from the meeting with representatives of the colonial government near or in Dakekan (Daxi). Tokyo jinruigakkai zasshi 11, no. 115 (1895): back cover.
The remaining five Atayal emissaries were lured to Taipei with the promise of additional wool blankets. Accompanied by their Atayal interpreter, Pu Chin, they went to the capital for meetings with Governor-General Kabayama, presentations of gifts, and photo sessions. The Dakekan contingent of six (including Pu Chin) was welcomed by a brass band and feted at an elaborate banquet with Kabayama himself. They also visited a military police station, where they taunted a Han Taiwanese prisoner with threats to cut off his head and bring it home as a souvenir. These events generated sufficient excitement to be chronicled in several magazines and newspapers.\textsuperscript{130} The Shanghai illustrated Dianshizhai Pictorial even published an engraving of the Japanese band serenading the tattooed Atayal men, women, and children as they dined in an ornate Chinese banquet hall.\textsuperscript{131}

On September 12, the five emissaries were sent back to Dakekan on a boat, where they continued to drink, sing, and nap.\textsuperscript{132} Thus the government-general established its initial method of rule in the uplands, whereby Japanese rural officials “governed” their indigenous subjects by personally distributing gifts to headmen and retainers at events that involved alcohol consumption and intimate physical contact, far removed from the habitations of the indigenes themselves.

As did Ueno Sen’ichi in 1891, Hashiguchi returned to Tokyo and publicized his observations and opinions regarding Taiwan’s non-Han population. On October 13, 1895, he lectured at the Oriental Club (Tōhō Kyōkai). There, Hashiguchi reiterated Ueno’s assertion that indigenes and Han were mortal enemies, thanks to the Chinese practice of breaking their promises. Hashiguchi characterized the “brigands” (dohi) fighting the Japanese government as Hakka from Guangdong Province. The seiban (raw barbarians), by contrast, were well disposed to the Japanese.\textsuperscript{133} Hashiguchi showed up at the Tokyo Geographical Society on October 22, 1895, to repeat his performance.\textsuperscript{134} Colorful speeches like Hashiguchi’s, larded with asides, anecdotes, and speculation, remained popular in prewar Japan. At the same time, there was also an outpouring of attentive journalism and academic writing, including notes and observations about the indigenous alcoholic beverages mentioned in passing by LeGendre, Mizuno, Ueno, and Hashiguchi.

**INDIGENOUS ALCOHOL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AS CULTURE**

As a low-ranking official in the Bureau of Education, ethnologist Inō Kanori conducted Japan’s first extensive ethnological survey of the island’s non-Han population. Inō’s influential descriptions confirm Hashiguchi Bunzō’s report on the etiquette observed in the north and indicate that there were several types of liquor found beyond the pale of the former Qing administration. Here is Inō’s description of Atayal spirit production:

To make liquor, millet or rice is steamed in a wooden basket steamer. It is mixed in a pot with water and yeast purchased from the Chinese. This is covered with leaves
and brews for three or four days. Then the unfermented yeast is filtered out and the liquor is ready.

We should say a word about the related matter of the actual drinking. There is the special custom of two people touching the sides of their mouths together and drinking out of the same vessel. This should be called a drinking ritual (inrei) which expresses good will or courtesy.\textsuperscript{135}

Based on more extensive fieldwork, fellow government ethnologist Mori Ushinosuke emphasized that Atayal people were not habitual drinkers; they manufactured and consumed spirits only on special occasions. Mori’s account echoes Inō’s but employs native terminology:

Rice or millet is placed in a steamer basket (called a koro) and then put on top of a kettle and steamed. It is transferred to a winnowing basket and cooled, and then the appropriate amount of powdered yeast is added and mixed in. It is put in a pot and a little water is mixed in, and the whole thing is covered with leaves. Then heat is applied to certain areas of the pot and it brews for three or four days. Now more water is added and the liquor is filtered in a device made from wisteria, and it is ready to drink.

In some villages, after brewing, the refined portion of the liquor is consumed first and then the rest is expressed. To distribute the liquid portion, a bamboo cup called a zō is dipped into the middle of the kettle.\textsuperscript{136}

Inō’s earlier account also provided recipes and commentary on manufacturing processes and consumption practices among Bunun, Tsou, and Paiwan peoples. Inō noted that Atayal and Bunun both engaged in joined-mouth drinking, while southern groups used double-chambered drinking vessels for the same purpose.

Inō Kanori’s diary documents his own direct participation, revealing that even anthropologists were expected to get wet if they would ply their trade in northern Taiwan. On May 26, 1897, in Wulai (just south of Taipei), Inō was welcomed by a young bantei (brave) named Watosinai, whom Inō had previously met. Upon seeing his acquaintance, Watosinai struck Inō in the chest and then opened up some liquor. Subsequently, Inō and his men joined in a banquet with the village headman, Wataniurrak (Watan Yūra), and Watosinai, during which the younger man broke out into exuberant singing before the group turned in for the evening.\textsuperscript{137} It is probable that this was the same Watan Yū who drank with Ueno in 1891.

Through firsthand observation and his study of Qing records, Inō also learned that in addition to welcoming strangers, indigenous Taiwanese engaged in communal drinking at fixed times on the ritual-agricultural calendar. On September 2, 1897, in Tōsha (near Sun Moon Lake), Inō’s party was feasted on native liquor as part of a thirty-day harvest celebration. Inō and his party drank the festival liquor with young and old, finally joining in a ring, dancing and singing as participants in a scene reminiscent of Saigō Tsugumichi’s 1874 adventure. Similar festivities were held when Inō’s party arrived in Beinan on November 9, 1897.\textsuperscript{138}
Okada Shinkō, prefect of Jiayi in 1905, recorded investigations of Tsou customs near Alishan. Okada emphasized that, though liquor was the staple beverage (excepting water) among the Tsou, it was not produced regularly and stored for everyday use but was only for special occasions. This observation would be repeated in many later reports on various groups of indigenes in Taiwan. In sum, it is evident from contemporary firsthand observations that alcohol consumption, before 1905, was variable and often restricted to particular seasons, occasions, or festivals. For Japanese administrators in the early years, social drinking was an effective method of bringing indigenes down from the hills to government stations and trading posts in order to gather information.

**ESTABLISHING CONNECTIONS THROUGH WET DIPLOMACY**

Just as the five emissaries from Jiaobanshan were leaving Taipei in September 1895, Hashiguchi Bunzō ordered Captain Kawano Shuichirō to lead Japan’s first official embassy to the Yilan Plain on September 14, 1895. Kawano reported that under the Qing, the border trade with the Nan’ao and Xitou Atayal was conducted privately by interpreters. In 1889, however, after a military campaign to establish a Qing presence in upland Yilan (at a cost of a thousand Chinese lives), a Pacification Office (fukenju) was built at the mountain pass Dingpobuwu to supervise trade with the Xitou tribes. Another fukenju outpost was built at Alishi to manage trade with the Nan’ao tribes. Thus, like Watanabe and Hashiguchi before him, Kawano headed for a well-established junction settlement to initiate diplomacy with Atayal peoples.

Kawano’s expedition left Yilan on November 16, 1895, for Dingpobuwu and wound through narrow passes beset by bamboo thickets. The troop’s ears were assaulted by howling dogs and shrieking waterfowl. The Japanese ferried across a large ravine and forded the same stream over twenty times. To avoid scaring the Atayal away, “fourteen or fifteen” men were ordered to take a rest under cover of a thicket. The government translator and two others were sent ahead. Kawano’s men hiked along a valley from which they saw smoke rising from the many active camphor stoves. At a clearing, the Japanese presented themselves to ten emissaries from two Xitou villages, Xiyanlaowa and Mosu. Among them were eight men, including the Xiyanlaowa headman Yawa Ui, and two women—Kawano recorded all of their names and ages. Kawano’s speech made no mention of nondiscrimination but emphasized Japan’s military superiority, while it demanded compliance. Here is the text Kawano entered in his report:

The Great Empire of Japan has recently defeated the Qing in battle. Now Taiwan and the Pescadores islands belong to us. Henceforth, you shall follow the directives issued by the Great Japanese Empire. Since the local villagers (jinmin) shall henceforth absolutely cease their violent acts, you shall in turn cease committing violent acts
against the residents of this district. Because they were enemies of Japan, we killed ten thousand Qing subjects in this region; we sent the other ten thousand back to China. You should not disobey the commands of the Japanese empire and bring disaster upon yourselves. [We shall pacify your hearts, everywhere cultivating virtue and encouraging industry. Eventually, we shall open a path of intercourse between yourselves and Japan.]

Echoing the June 8, 1874, meeting between Paiwan emissaries and Commander Saigō in Hengchun, Kawano and his men distributed a Japanese flag, gifts, drink, and food to the assembled Xitou men and women. The meeting featured trappings of a negotiation, with its attendant toasting, gifting, and oathing, but the visitors were backed with overwhelming military force just beyond the scene of the meeting. In this regard, parleys on Taiwan’s “savage border” in the opening decade of Japanese colonial rule were not so different from treaty-port negotiations between Qing, Tokugawa, and Joseon officials and gunboat diplomats.

In some cases, as with LeGendre’s early meetings with Toketok or Akamatsu’s first meeting with Isa, the threat was imperfectly understood or ignored. Such was the case with Kawano’s mission. Despite the bluster, the Xitou men firmly refused Kawano’s entreaties to visit the walled city of Yilan for further parleys, just as Watan Nui of Jiaobanshan refused a similar request from Hashiguchi to visit Taipei. They also rebuffed Japanese requests to travel farther inland. The Xitou emissaries did offer to distribute the remaining gifts to other tribes and act as intermediaries between the Japanese and the inland villages. The mission succeeded in establishing rudimentary communication, but the new subjects of empire successfully parried Japanese attempts to visit their habitations.

The Watanabe, Hashiguchi, and Kawano missions all took place near the Taipei Basin or Yilan Plain, at active nodes of indigenous-Chinese-Qing communication, trade, and warfare. The junction city of Puli, farther south, shared these attributes but was farther inland and more remote from the coastal ports and cities. While the highest mountains in the Langqiao visited by Saigō in 1874 were about 200 meters above sea level, the Puli basin sat at about 500 meters, and Japan’s first Sediq contact settlement of Paalan was at an altitude of about 1200 meters. At these higher altitudes, the Hiyama mission broke new ground among villages not found on treaty-port maps of Taiwan.

Puli prefect Hiyama Tetsusaburō made his first overtures to the Tgdaya (Sediq) tribes of Paalan in December 1895. Following precedent, Hiyama dispatched a “northern tribe” wife of a jukuban (cooked barbarian) to carry gifts and a message to the most powerful Tgdaya chief, the headman of Paalan. After her second trip and much delay, four Sediq scouts came to test the waters in Puli. They were promptly treated to drinking, dancing, and photographs with a Captain Ishihara of the Puli garrison. On December 31, the Paalan headman brought five “subordinate” village headmen and a contingent of three hundred retainers, plus women
and children, down to Puli. The Japanese put them up on the grounds of the old Qing Pacification Office post, sending them provisions of sake, rice, and salt. The next day Hiyama Tetsusaburō, a government interpreter (tsūyakukan), and “two or three low-ranking officials” delivered an inaugural Japanese speech:

We are overjoyed that you have come here from afar. From the beginning, we Japanese, as your brothers, have desired to meet and parley with you. Fortunately, the whole of the island has been restored as the emperor’s territory. Now we have come to establish our administration on this part of the island. We are genuinely pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you.

We have heard that you have always killed and injured Chinese people. This is a very evil practice. If you are really our brothers, as we have already mentioned, you absolutely must stop murdering. You may come visit our offices at any time. We, in turn, would like to go to your abodes. Today, since you have visited our offices, we have prepared a meager offering of drinks and side dishes. So let us drink with gladness to your arrival!

After hearing this initial Japanese declaration, the Tgdaya contingent replied with a counterspeech: “Murder and carnage do not come naturally to us. In the past, the Chinese have gathered strength in numbers and committed murder when catching one or two of us alone. Therefore, when we find a small group of Chinese, we murder them. But now that the Japanese are our brothers, we will certainly not act this way anymore.”

With this exchange of solemn promises and admonishments, a stone-burying ceremony ensued. The anonymous correspondent who chronicled this exchange explained, “even should this stone and things thus buried disintegrate, our promises to each other shall not be altered.”

INSTITUTIONALIZING WET DIPLOMACY

In January 1896, district officials and Taipei authorities issued decrees and created organs of government for the purpose of routinizing and regulating contacts with indigenes. As a former Qing center of administration and hub of the border trade, Dakekan was the logical starting point. The old walled city of Dakekan housed the government-general’s first dispatch station (shutchōjo), the forerunner of the Pacification Offices. Its chief, Miyanohara Tōhachi, applied to the government general for a modest 143 yen to fund “Barbarian Feasts” (seiban kyōhi) as a first step to addressing the area’s endemic violence. Miyanohara acknowledged that a recent rash of murders and beheadings by Atayal people could be attributed to Japanese disarmament policies that left Chinese dwelling near the “savage border” defenseless. Nonetheless, Miyanohara trotted out a list of good reasons for Atayal to murder Han sight unseen: Qing policy was one-sided and relied exclusively on force; Han merchants cheated indigenes in trading; Han cultivators encroached
on Atayal lands; and finally, Han were just as guilty of murdering uplanders as the mountaineers were of raiding the townspeople.

Miyanohara insisted that the Atayal were stubborn, obstinate, and unreasonable. However, they were very well disposed toward the Japanese and could be counted on to keep an agreement. Thus, to prevent further violence, Miyanohara invited over ten village headmen and admonished them to stop killing Han. To govern through suasion, Miyanohara argued, regular feasts for village leaders were the ticket. The government organ that would forever be associated with feasting and drinking, the Pacification Office, was chartered to begin work on April 1, 1896, soon after Miyanohara made his recommendations.

The early years of Japanese “Aborigine administration” (riban)—the “Pacification Office period”—were later criticized for their leniency, along the same lines for which Ōkubo criticized lax Qing rule in Langqiao in 1874. As a policy that left border areas opaque and hindered Taiwan’s economic integration, the gift policy became a lightning rod for invective. These criticisms perhaps overstated the government-general’s largesse, however. The initial proposed budget of ¥1,293 for gifts, or about ¥215 per prefecture, was less than half the monthly cost of subsidizing a local Chinese militia to stand guard against the very same Atayal men and women targeted to receive these gifts. In short, the feasts and gift distributions held at the dispatch stations wrapped the savage-border militia’s iron fist in a velvet glove. Just as LeGendre and Saigō professed the warm relations between non-Chinese foreigners and indigenes as a product of each side’s sincerity, the actual meetings were held with overwhelming firepower in reserve on the side of the visitors.

As a veteran of the 1874 expedition, Satsuma man Kabayama Sukenori took a special interest in indigenous affairs. Yet his programs had to meet strict budget constraints, due to the cost of the war against Han insurgents and the fact that Taiwan was a drain on Tokyo’s finances. Therefore, the twenty policemen originally requested by the governor-general for each of eleven proposed Pacification Offices, at a total cost of ¥111,181, were cut out of the budget. Instead, each station received one interpreter (tsūyaku of hannin rank), two assistants to the chief (shujiho of hannin rank), and two “operatives” (gishu of hannin rank); only eight out of the eleven stations would have a chief (shuiji of sōnin rank), for a total of sixty-three officials, including chiefs. In May 1896, Bureau of Industrial Development Chief Oshikawa Noriyoshi, under whose purview the Pacification Office fell, requested forty-two additional “staffers and special commissioners (koin and jimu shokutaku)” for the rural outposts.

In our first concrete example of how Japan governed the indigenes “on the cheap,” these 105 pacification officers were charged with intelligence gathering, diplomatic relations, commerce, and public works among a population commonly believed to cover 60 percent of Taiwan’s territory and comprising at least eight major language groups (and many dialects). Although the indigenous population
was estimated at around only 100,000 souls, they inhabited forbidding terrain and guarded their autonomy with widely available firearms.

Dispatch station chief Miyanohara Tōhachi was appointed first Dakekan Pacification Office head on May 25, 1896. The station itself commenced activities on June 30. Within the month, local headmen accepted Miyanohara’s invitations to Dakekan city for parleys. He was not sure exactly where these villages were located, however. Things got off to a rocky start when his Han tsüji (interpreter) refused to go inland for fear of a bandit leader known as Jian Ai. This so-called bandit was ensconced in the mountains beyond Dakekan in Shinajii, with his Atayal wife and a number of followers. Shinajii was home to many of the emissaries who had met with Hashiguchi the previous September. Miyanohara heard that Jian Ai was turning the Atayal against the Japanese, so he wanted to apprehend him.

Miyanohara hired two local interpreters in Dakekan as well as two banpu (female Atayal) to accompany them to the interior. Their immediate target was the paramount headman Daima Weixian of Yiheng. The four interpreters reached him, and then Daima sent six scouts to Dakekan. They were duly feasted, toasted, and lodged on the evening of July 21, 1896. The Japanese sent them back to Yiheng with fancy cigars to entice Daima to broker a parley.

On July 28, a contingent of chiefs, men, women, and children representing six villages arrived at Dakekan. Miyanohara recorded, “When the indigenes arrived, the two banpu explained to us what sort of feast to prepare. They like nothing more than pork, salted fish, and native liquor.” As it turned out, Jian Ai answered the call, while Daima did not. Miyanohara offered Jian Ai amnesty for his past crimes against Japan in return for a pledge to become an interpreter and informant on conditions near Shinajii, conditions to which Jian Ai apparently assented. Chief Daima’s emissaries attributed his absence to an injured leg.

Saitō Otosaku, the chief of the Linyipu Pacification Office (see figure 12), counted fifty-two villages under his charge. He reported that in August 1897, twenty of his twenty-seven men were in sick bay. The turnover rate was high. In its second year, the total number of salaried officials in the Pacification Office increased to sixty-five (from fifty-seven the year before), but forty-one of these officials were new. In some posts, like Puli, the turnover rate was 100 percent for titled officials. And here was a potentially fatal flaw: from the indigenous side, particularistic bonds were being forged via wet-diplomatic protocols, while from the Japanese side, duty on the savage border was a sort of exile to be endured and then left behind as quickly as possible.

The Pacification Office installations themselves were built over a period of two months, from June 2 to August 3, 1896. Oshikawa Noriyoshi, Hashiguchi Bunzō’s successor in the Industrial Promotion Section, issued a thirteen-point circular defining the Pacification Office’s mission. Oshikawa underscored the importance of explaining to chiefs and men of influence that the Japanese were impartial rulers. He wrote that the simple, savage indigenes could quickly be won over by
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gift giving, and he instructed officers to meet with headmen on appointed days, distribute presents, and explain Japan’s imperial mission. Loyal villages would be rewarded with further gifts, while disobedient ones would be punished by withholding presents. This last caveat presupposed that indigenous hunger for imported goods was strong enough to leverage cooperation in such operations as mapping, labor dragoons, and even turning over local peoples to Japanese police officers. For many areas of Taiwan, however, such conditions would not obtain until the 1920s or even later.

The Origins of Special Administration

During the early years of Japanese rule, members of parliament and other public intellectuals advocated for the extension of the Japanese constitution to Taiwan. The debate was similar to ones raging in the United States about the Philippine Islands. At issue was the capacity of colonized populations to “play by the rules,” or bear the rights and responsibilities of citizens. While the “extend the constitution”
faction lost the early rounds of the debate, over the course of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, a great deal of legal integration between the mother country and the colony actually occurred. However, the geographic reach of this integration stopped at the areas beyond the old Qing savage border, in the areas placed under “special administration.”

Early debates about the legal bifurcation of Taiwan, into normally and specially administered zones, occurred in the spring of 1897. Then, the Pacification Office heads met under the aegis of Oshikawa to chart a course for the future based on their first eight or nine months of field experience. One of the burning issues regarded punishments for head taking, robbery, and other violent crimes—the myriad “illegalities” that fester in ungoverned areas beyond the reach of “public power,” to use Foucault’s phraseology. Hiyama Tetsusaburō, the first Japanese prefect posted to Puli, argued that Japanese law could not be applied to the Sediq peoples under his charge. Echoing the Zongli Yamen members who contested Ōkubo two decades prior, Hiyama argued that, if penalized severely for murder, as called for in Japanese law, Sediq people would rebel en masse. Besides, Hiyama added, if Japan enacted a strict, consistent law code for the Sediq and Atayal peoples, it could only be applied to those who had shown themselves at the Pacification Offices. In the end, he recommended an ad hoc form of punishment, appropriate to the means at the disposal of the overstretched colonial state: “for those who take heads, cut off their gifts completely, stop distributing liquor, and stop giving them their needed salt.”

On the last day of the aforementioned conference, the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Taiwan Government General issued regulations to the prefects, subprefects, and gendarmes (kenpeitai) in regions with significant non-Han populations. The regulations are prefaced by a recognition that hunting was crucial to indigenous livelihoods, explaining that a complete ban on guns was inadvisable. Nonetheless, the following restrictions were put into effect to check what was perceived as rampant disorder:

1. Merchants must have a certificate/warrant (shōmei) from the Pacification Office head to supply indigenes with gunpowder—no exceptions (kyokashō) or special permits (tokkyo shō) are allowed.
2. Those who are not merchants must have a permit/permission (kyoka) from the Pacification Office to supply indigenes with gunpowder; for hunting rifles, the police and gendarmes may supply up to 3 hyakume (about 375 grams) of gunpowder or 500 percussion caps/fuses; to supply over this limit requires permission of the prefect.
3. The distribution of gunpowder to indigenes falls within the purview of the Pacification Office and therefore should be witnessed by officials.
4. The Pacification Office must issue a monthly report to the police and gendarmes stating the amount and kinds of gunpowder distributed to indigenes.

Some Pacification Office heads judged the 1897 regulations on trade as too lenient. In the fall of 1897, Nagano Yoshitora, who replaced Hiyama Tetsusaburō as Puli
Pacification Office chief in July, argued that Atayal tribes were more bloodthirsty than the Bunun tribes who resided south of Puli. Nagano agreed that the new regulations on gunpowder and shot should be observed in the south, but that a complete ban should be put into effect for Atayal. In keeping with the early Japanese view that the indigenes were, at heart, good subjects, Nagano suggested that the northern “savages” be reformed by taking them on sightseeing tours of Taipei. After sufficient transformation, the trade in gunpowder and shot, so vital to peoples who relied on hunting for protein, could be resumed. In fact, Nagano’s recommendation was taken to heart, and a delegation of indigenous representatives toured Japan that year; they were received by throngs of curious onlookers. In the short term, the tours did not have the intended effect of reducing violence related to camphor forests, however.

In response to a report that the Wuzhishan Pacification Office had punished a camphor worker’s murder by levying a “traditional fine” of shell-money currency, Division of Interior head Sugimura Shun took exception. “Traditional” punishments, even if supplemented by embargoes of trade or the cessation of gifts, he argued, would embolden indigenes and cause them to despise the weak government. Outraged, Sugimura suggested that Pacification Office chiefs use gifts as weapons, and that trade embargoes, as means of collective punishment, could force the hands of indigenous leaders. Before resuming trade, the Pacification Office should

1. Order that the indigenous perpetrator be delivered.
2. After receiving the delivered perpetrator, deal with them by applying the law.
3. During the time that the perpetrator has not been delivered, the whole village should be held responsible: the distribution of gifts will be suspended; it goes without saying that the sale of arms and ammunition will be strictly banned.
4. During the period referred to in item 3, other villages will be ordered to cut off commerce/communication with the [offending] village.

In July 1897, Kawakami Chikakata, Pacification Office head in southern Taiwan’s Fanshuliao Prefecture, also railed against the patchy sovereignty that characterized Japan’s government along the savage border. Kawakami noted that many camphor harvesters were forced to present gifts to indigenous headmen for access to the forests; some demanded rattan, others tea leaves. These audacious headmen even collected tribute outside the so-called Aborigine Territory. The indigenes were acting under the mistaken impression that they “owned the land” and could force outsiders to pay tribute, which in turn required the services of the hated “go-betweens,” who were completely untrustworthy, according to Kawakami. In the end, commerce and “Aborigine education” were impeded because of blurred distinctions between public and private. Kawakami suggested that all lands abutting the Aborigine Territory be put under the jurisdiction of the Pacification Office.
THE FUKAHORI MISSION AND THE END OF WET DIPLOMACY

While the Pacification Office was still operative, in February 1897, an expedition led by one Captain Fukahori Yasuichirō disappeared in the Neng’gao mountain peaks just northeast of Puli while searching for a potential railway route to Hualian Harbor. Captain Fukahori left Puli in late January 1897, and by March, all fourteen of his men were given up for dead. In April the local garrison chief initiated a prolonged, frustrating series of negotiations with area headmen to find the remains and the Fukahori expedition’s murderers. Reminiscent of LeGendre’s search for the remains of shipwreck victims in 1860s Langqiao, the usual methods of gift presentations backed by threats were used, but the area headmen stonewalled the investigation.160 To pour salt in the wounds, a camphor worker was slain by Tgdaya locals at the same time. In retaliation for Fukahori’s disappearance, the stymied investigation, and the fresh killing, the government imposed an embargo on salt, ammunition, and guns for eight whole years.161

As we have seen, the Pacification Office officials operated through concentric rings of intermediaries at this time. The whole structure was bound together by the distribution of material goods and the forging of personal bonds through drinking rituals. The first intermediaries were the “Aborigine interpreters,” male and female, who were sent to mountain redoubts to bring headmen to the Pacification Office stations with promises of gifts, food, and drink. The next ring of intermediaries were the “conciliated/submitted” indigenes who carried invitations to other villages, bringing more headmen, interpreters, warriors, and children to the Pacification Office’s banquets, gift distributions, and trading fairs. Although this system performed well enough for an understaffed, poorly informed, outnumbered set of rural outposts, it could not protect camphor harvesters from indigenes who felt cheated of customary tolls or were defending what they considered ancestral territory. Moreover, indigenes desperate for salt, guns, ammunition, or machine-made cloth traded through other indigenous groups to subvert the embargo.162 Rightly sensing that the understaffed, lightly armed, and linguistically disadvantaged Pacification Office could not extend sovereignty by wet diplomacy alone, the government-general decided to abolish it altogether and place indigenous affairs within the purview of the Third Section of the lowest rung of the territorial administrative hierarchy, the District Administrative Office (Benmusho, hereafter DAO).

After the DAO replaced the Pacification Office in the summer of 1898, Japanese rural administrators repeatedly called for tougher measures against the indigenes who fought back against aggressive timber harvesting. Time and again, administrators called for trade blockades to be used as incentives for good behavior. In other words, now that the Japanese, like the Qing before them, were taking sides in an economic war for rights to harvest timber along the savage border, mentions of Japan’s “special relationship” to indigenes disappeared.
In February 1900, Governor-General Kodama Gentarō lambasted the policies of his predecessors Kabayama, Mizuno, and Hashiguchi. With insurrection ebbing in the plains areas, Kodama declared, “we must shift our military forces to the savage territory. Those who live there are stubborn, and live like wild beasts; if we continue to feast them with liquor and food, staying with a policy of attraction, it will take many months and years for them to reach even a limited degree of evolutionary development.” And here was the crux of the matter: wet diplomacy would not make indigenes into loyal, governable, imperial subjects in a timely manner. For Kodama, the clock was indeed ticking, as Japan was a relatively poor country playing in the high-stakes international game of competitive colonialism. In late 1900, Japan was undergoing a massive armament expansion to prepare for war against Russia and could not afford to manage a colony in the red.

The years 1896 through 1900 paved the way for the aggressive measures that followed. During this interval, gift distribution centers became trading posts, with fixed exchange rates. Having established the posts as primary nodes of exchange, the government-general then began to impose selective embargoes against mischief-makers. By this method, devised from expedience but also based on field reports about wet diplomacy from the 1870s and 1880s, Japanese officials in northern Taiwan’s mountain districts had cultivated an effective network of collaborators, trading partners, informants, and mercenaries to go along with a rudimentary knowledge of local political conditions.

The effectiveness of wet diplomacy as a stepping-stone to the eradication of indigenous sovereignty is best illustrated by a notorious 1903 incident on the Sediq/Bunun border just south of Wushe. The grislier details and some of the specifics come down to us through memoirs many decades after the events, so there are factual discrepancies in these accounts. The cataclysm had its origins in the salt embargo placed on the Tgdaya tribes after the disappearance of the Fukahori mission in early 1898. On December 16, 1902, the Puli subprefect dispatched a “savage woman [banpu] named Iwan” to sound out Tgdaya tribes about an upcoming Japanese punitive expedition to the north. Iwan learned that they sought a truce with Japan in order to resume trade in salt. Besides, they were engaged in a cycle of revenge feuding with neighboring Toda and needed arms and ammunition. Iwan was a common name in the Tgdaya region, so it is hard to say if Iwan Robao (see chapter 2) is the person mentioned in the above report. Nonetheless, Deng Xiangyang, Aui Heppa, and Pixo Walis have all attributed the planning of the “Bukai incident” that followed Iwan’s reconnaissance to Kondō Katsusaburō and his Paalan wife, Iwan Robao. This interpretation is consistent with other documented facts, but I have yet to find direct documentary evidence of Kondō’s involvement.

On October 5, 1903, the continued economic blockade drove Tgdaya men into a bloody trap. Short of salt and firearms, men from Paalan consented to a meeting with Gantaban men of the Bunun group south of Puli, at Shimaigahara (Bukai).
The meeting’s pretext was Gantaban’s promise to funnel embargoed goods to Paalan behind the government’s back. On the appointed day, the Gantaban trading delegation served the Paalan men large quantities of alcohol to initiate talks. Thereafter, concealed men rushed in, killing 95 of the 100 Paalan men and taking their heads. The Japanese press reported 104 dead along with a yield of 57 rifles, 130 spears, and 127 daggers. The Bunun warriors brought 27 of the heads to the Puli subprefect, who appears to have expected this outcome (see figure 13). The TGG file gives similar casualty figures while noting that Wushe’s once reluctant posture toward the Japanese was much improved.

**THE CAMPHOR INDUSTRY AND THE GUARDLINE**

The causes of armed conflict along the indigenous-Han border were multiple. Japanese officials reported a surge in revenge killings and ritually sanctioned head taking in the wake of Japanese arms confiscation sweeps that were part of the anti-bandit campaigns of 1896 through 1902. But most of the killings represented efforts by indigenes to defend hunting grounds, fallow fields, or forests previously subject...
to fees levied by headmen on camphor harvesters. These camphor-related killings dated from the treaty-port period (1860–1895), reached a fever pitch by 1900, and climaxed in a major battle between the Japanese state and Ri Aguai in late 1902.

The camphor tree (*Cinnamomum camphora*, or *Camphora officinarum*, or *kusunoki* in Japanese) “is a rather small-leafed evergreen, attaining . . . [a] height of from sixty to one hundred feet, with wide-spreading branches and a trunk two to four feet in diameter.” By century’s turn, the western plains had been denuded. Camphor was still abundant, however, in the “debatable land between the Savage territory” and the foothills. The aggressive collection of the product in the latter half of the nineteenth century incited warfare between highlander and lowlander, creating a frontier that resembled a permeable membrane; commerce flowed through, but armies and lowlanders were kept at bay. During the last decade of Qing rule, government losses from these battles were horrendous, totaling hundreds of casualties per encounter.

Camphor, traditionally used as an insect repellent and medicine, had been harvested in Taiwan since the seventeenth century, but developments in technology and politics increased the product’s value sharply in the late nineteenth century. In 1858, Englishman Alexander Parkes invented a way to use camphor in the manufacture of celluloid, which meant that “combs, tobacco pouches . . . and indeed everything which had before been made of ivory, coral or tortoise-shell now came to be made of celluloid.” Camphor also became a crucial ingredient in the production of smokeless gunpowder during the latter half of the century. In the same year that Parkes put camphor on the industrial map, the Treaty of Tianjin forced Taiwan’s two major ports to open to international trade as part of the settlement of the so-called Arrow War. With demand for camphor up, increased numbers of foreign traders called on Taiwan’s ports, and an influential comprador class emerged. By 1878, the export economy of camphor, tea, and sugar “absorbed about twenty percent of [Taiwan’s] population.” The Lin family of Wufeng, who later supplied the Japanese colonial government with its first hired troops to guard the camphor districts, were part of this class.

The Lin guardline stretched from Taizhong city to Puli. Iriye Takeshi, an infantryman who surveyed the area in 1896 for the army and wrote extensively for the trade press about Taiwan’s indigenes, reported that these private guards (*aiyong*) could be bought off and had conspired to allow the murder of Japanese telegraph-wire stringers in February 1896. By 1898 camphor manufacturers were hiring their own guards in addition to the ones employed by the Lins and subsidized by the Japanese government. One company paid out ¥1,200 per month for its own security. That same year, the Taiwan Government-General began recruiting guards for its rural installations in the foothills. With the emergence of camphor as a pillar of state revenue collection, the government-general abdicated its role as referee between indigene and Han and jumped onto the playing field as a partisan
of the lumber business. The total number of government and privately employed camphor guards totaled over 1,100 in 1898.

The majority were Taiwanese resident in the border areas, working under Japanese police officers. With these forces, sporadic Japanese-led military offensives were launched against villages accused of attacking government installations, experimental camphor plots, or Taiwanese plainsmen. These episodic “punitive expeditions” (tōbatsu) had mixed results—at times whole villages were burned, at other times companies of Japanese officers with their squads were routed and killed. Many battles were inconclusive.179

Recorded instances of armed conflict totaled 79 in 1897; they more than trebled to 271 in 1898. In each of the years between 1898 and 1901 (inclusive), over 500 deaths and 100 injuries were dealt out to government forces by indigenes near the guardlines. The great majority of the casualties were Han and jukuban Taiwanese (see table 1).

A look at the financial stakes for the central government in Japan explains why the Taiwan Government-General was willing to absorb so many losses. In 1896, expenses related to war and civil government in Taiwan cost the Japanese Treasury 11 percent of its annual budget. From 1895 to 1902, subsidies to Taiwan were about 7 percent of the Japanese national budget. By 1898 there were calls in Japan for the sale of the new colony back to China or to a European power.180 In this atmosphere of crisis, Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and his civil minister Gotō Shinpei took charge of the colony in February 1898.181 Gotō's short-term solution to the colony's financial problems was a government monopoly on opium, camphor, and salt. By instituting a government monopoly on camphor in June 1899, the government-general not only received the profits from a lucrative export product but also forced up the world price, since the only major competitor was Japanese camphor. As table 2 illustrates, with the exception of 1903, which showed uncharacteristically low yields for the monopoly, camphor consistently supplied 13 to 30 percent of the Taiwan-generated revenue for the colonial state during the critical 1900 through 1907 period of Japan's rule.

To finance projects in governmentality that would ultimately make the Han-dominated lowlands into a disciplinary society (see introduction), Gotō secured a Japanese government bond issue of ¥35 million in 1898. The proceeds were earmarked for railroads, land surveys, harbors, and other improvements. Between 1899 and 1905, the Taiwan Government-General received ¥31.2 million in installments from this bond issue, which gradually overtook and then replaced Tokyo's annual subsidies. (For this period, Taiwan's annual revenues, subsidies included, were a little over ¥10 million.) The home government released this money expecting the government-general to repay it out of the colonial budget.182

To increase the output of camphor and reduce injuries to the labor force, all privately employed guards were brought under the command and employ of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total casualties</th>
<th>Casualties per case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jpn</td>
<td>Twn</td>
<td>Jpn</td>
<td>Twn</td>
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<td>Twn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
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<td>1898</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>4,341</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>5,917</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data from Formosa Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, Report on the Control of the Aborigines in Formosa (Taihoku: Government of Formosa, 1911), adapted from table iv, 45; Mochiji Rokusaburō, Taiwan shokumin seisaku (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1912), 395; Taiwan jijō (Taihoku: Taiwan Government-General, 1923). 95; Riban gaikyō (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku [Taiwan Government-General Bureau of Police Affairs], 1935), 70–71.
### Table 2. Sources of revenue for the colonial administration, 1897–1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tax revenue (¥ millions)</th>
<th>Net revenue from monopolies (¥ millions)</th>
<th>Revenue generated in Taiwan (¥ millions)</th>
<th>Camphor profit (¥ millions)</th>
<th>Camphor as % of monopoly revenue</th>
<th>Camphor as % of local revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>11.19</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>15.54</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For this calculation, I am only considering revenue generated in Taiwan (the total of tax revenue plus net revenue from monopolies); I am excluding subsidies from the Japanese treasury and bond sales.

*For this calculation, camphor profit is shown as a percentage of revenue generated in Taiwan.

Japanese government in 1902. Then, on January 27, 1903, all affairs pertaining to
the indigenous territories were moved from various provincial and subprovincial
offices to the jurisdiction of the central police headquarters in Taipei. In March
1903, Kodama and Gotō convened a conference of all high-ranking officials on
the island to discuss a plan for ending “the Aborigine Problem.” The committee
was chaired by Mochiji Rokusaburō, a councillor in the Ministry of Civil Affairs.183

During his ten years in Taiwan, Mochiji worked in provincial administration,
engineering, communications, and education.184 In December 1902, he was sent
on an inspection tour of the aborigine border. The resulting “Mochiji line” was
approved and codified as a working document at the “Provisional Section for the
Investigation of Affairs in the Aborigine Territory,” convened in March 1903.185

As a proponent of the governmental modality discussed in the introduction,
Mochiji urged calculated restraint after an initial “big bang” of brutal landscaping
to create the playing field for modern economic growth. Instead of eradicating
the indigenes, which would have been an expensive, drawn out, and ultimately
pointless enterprise (from the standpoint of efficiency), Mochiji argued that
Japanese offensives be limited to areas that would bring in enough revenue to jus-
tify the expenditures of life and treasure.186 With these priorities in mind, Mochiji
proposed a three-pronged approach to savage border policy: (1) to unify com-
mand under one head; (2) to divide the indigenous territory into the north and
south—treated the northerners (Atayal, Saisiyat, Truku, and Sediq) as hostiles
and the southerners (Bunun and presumably Paiwan) as allies; and (3) to revive
the Chinese guardline system to surround the hostiles in the northern district.187
Mochiji’s academic credentials made him a true exemplar of “Meiji youth,” a gen-
eration for whom social Darwinism formed the backbone of a modern, scientific
worldview.188

According to Mochiji, in cases where inferior races came into contact with
superior ones, “history” taught that the inferior race was either eradicated in the
struggle for survival or assimilated to the superior race.189 His analysis suggested
that indigenous defense of local forests was an affront to imperial prestige: “Until
we solve this problem with the indigenes, we will not have sufficient cause to boast
to the outside world of our nation’s will and ability to expand and be enterprising.
The Aborigine territory occupies 56% of the island’s surface, and is a storehouse of
mineral, forest, and agricultural wealth. Unfortunately, the savage and cruel indi-
genese have thrown up a barrier to this storehouse of natural resources.”190

Echoes of treaty-port rhetoric are audible in Mochiji’s position paper. In the
1860s and 1870s, it was Paiwan treachery that endangered free trade and use of
the sea-lanes, thus thwarting “progress.” Now it was the “aborigine problem” on
Taiwan’s forested inland sea that frustrated imperial Japan’s drive to become a first-
rank nation-state.

From 1903 until 1909, the Taiwan Government-General extended guardlines
around the perimeter of northern indigenous territories. The extension process
involved building trails, stringing wire, and erecting guardhouses in cooperation with hired, allied, or coerced Taiwanese. The case study of the Quchi alliance in chapter 4 indicates that the networks, knowledge base, and control over trade established during the Pacification Office and DAO periods made it possible to close this perimeter before marching it inward. Large-scale coordinated military offensives were the exception during the 1903–09 extension period; more common were skirmishes that came from attacks on advance posts, camphor workers, and police installations. To build the first strongholds, Japanese forces put mortars and other forms of mountain artillery at commanding heights to provide cover for timbering, wire-hanging, and construction crews. All of these men were exposed to sniper fire, boulder cascades, and sabotage from above. The Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs recorded a total of 1,154 such confrontations for the 1903–09 period, for a total of 1,693 killed and 902 wounded on the government side. The great majority of the casualties were Taiwanese (see table 1). One estimate of the number of indigenous casualties put the figure at 30 percent of the number of Japanese casualties.\(^{91}\)

The next phase brought overwhelming force to bear on mobile, motivated, and fugitive populations in the deeper mountain recesses of central northern Taiwan. The price tag for this endeavor and its timing support this book’s contention that the attempted integration of former Qing peripheries into the Japanese polity was a continuation of the treaty-port project to accommodate higher volumes and velocities of global commerce by expanding the radius of public power. While Governor-General Sakuma lobbied to fund a military “surge” in Taiwan’s northern and central mountain forests, the government-general also battled to secure funds to expand and deepen Jilong Harbor.

In sync with guardline construction to pipe flows of camphor from interior to port, Jilong Harbor had been subject to dredging and incremental improvements since 1898 to push bulk commodities, including camphor, onto the world market. Initially, the government in Tokyo dribbled out only small fractions of TGG funding requests, often reducing or suspending allocations. In 1906, the twenty-second Diet finally released a large sum—over ¥6 million—for a seven-year harbor improvement plan. But increased demand for Taiwanese rice and camphor exceeded the harbor’s capacity to service sufficiently large cargo ships to clear the docks. Therefore, the Diet earmarked another ¥5 million in 1912, to be disbursed over a fourteen-year period.

By 1917, a total of ¥11,720,000 had been allocated, out of ¥15,700,000 million requested over an eighteen-year period, to build Jilong Harbor.\(^{92}\) For the duration of colonial rule, Jilong dominated Taiwan’s foreign trade in ship traffic and tonnage. Unlike the budget for Sakuma’s punitive expeditions, however, the Jilong Harbor budgets were paid completely out of the Tokyo treasury.\(^{93}\) Nonetheless, their roughly equal cost suggests the urgency and magnitude of the “Aborigine problem” for advocates of an aggressive policy circa 1909.
Sakuma’s famous five-year plan (1910–14) was actually his second five-year plan. The first five-year offensive was launched in 1907. Sakuma sought mass surrenders and, apparently, glorious victories crowned with parades and triumphal arches. These failing, Sakuma’s staff submitted a budget to the twenty-fifth Diet with ¥15,399,000 slotted for the construction, staffing, and movement of the guardlines, to be disbursed and spent over a five-year period. This enormous sum was the lion’s share of the estimated ¥18 million that Japan poured into the camphor wars from 1904 through 1916. Even the abandoned first five-year plan was ambitious, financially. In 1907 and 1908, a total of ¥3.58 million was allocated for the extension and movement of the guardlines.

The expense of this seemingly inconclusive war had its critics. At the February 1909 session of the twenty-fifth Diet, the firebrand representative Sasaki Yasugorō grilled Prime Minister Katsura, Communications Minister Gotō Shinpei, and Home Minister Harada Tōsuke for requesting large outlays of blood and treasure to subdue a “dying race.” Sasaki was known as the “King of Mongolia” and as a “continental adventurer” (tairiku rōnin) for his exploits in Central Asia during the Russo-Japanese War. While Mochiji invoked world history to espouse social Darwinism, Sasaki held up Zheng Chenggong and other imperial powers as models of competence in aborigine administration, compared to the Taiwan Government-General, which Sasaki considered inept.

Sasaki accused the cabinet members of refusing to answer questions, criticized them for their inattentiveness to the science of colonial statecraft, and even charged that measures to annihilate the indigenes were unconstitutional. At the heart of Sasaki’s long harangue, which was interrupted by applause, was the charge that the cost of indigenous suppression had no end in sight and would increase ad infinitum until it broke the national budget. He doubted that suppression of the indigenes was an urgent national matter.

Despite Sasaki’s sharp questioning and the thirty signatures his inquiry garnered, the budget passed. Fujii Shizue attributes the approval to Sakuma’s connections with Yamagata Aritomo. A hero of the Meiji Restoration, Yamagata was also the father of Japan’s modern army, a prime minister, and a mentor to sitting prime minister Katsura Taro. In addition, Fujii argues, the Meiji Emperor himself took a personal interest in the undertaking and lent his prestige to Sakuma’s proposal.

Out of an estimated 1909 aborigine population of 122,000, there were 28,242 Atayals, the principal targets of the guardline movements. These guardlines were manned and advanced by forces that varied between 6,000 and 7,000 inspectors, engineers, laborers, guards, and police officers (mostly Taiwanese guards). A description of the guardline’s physical aspect explains how these thousands were deployed:

The guard-line has two components. The first is a road opened up in the mountain areas. . . . The other is the guard station. This is a kind of a dugout, a sentry box with
gun holes which is protected from bullets and shells by impenetrable sandbags, earth, stone, etc. Where necessary, electric wire fences have been hung and land mines have been buried. An electric current was passed through the wires, and many uplanders and their domesticated animals have died from electric shock. At this time, field and mountain artillery, as well as mortars were set up. As for the land mines, they were installed by the police inspectors and their assistants; the construction was left to police officers, who were all Japanese, and the assistant patrolmen, who were of Chinese descent, were not allowed to install them for the maintenance of secrecy. It appears that the electric wire fences began to be hung beginning in 1905. The electric switch was controlled by a Guardline Headquarters police inspector; since there were only one of these stations per guardline, even the guards were electrocuted from time to time.201

By 1912 the lines contained 756 guard stations, 427 branch stations, and 196 superintendent stations, extending to a total length of 226 miles.202 The organization of these facilities was quite methodical, at least in its schematic form:

The width of the guardline’s path was 1.8 meters, and the foliage for 100 meters on either side of the path was cut down so for the sake of visibility. The Chinese guards protected the guard stations, and were equipped with rifles, which allowed them to be mobile. Two to four guards manned each guard post. A branch superintendent station was placed every four to five guard stations; officers and assistant policemen, as well as guards were stationed here. For every four to five branch stations a superintendent station built; besides the police and guards, inspectors and assistant inspectors were stationed here, as well as the intermittent medical personnel or reserve unit . . . amazingly, one of these posts was erected every 220 meters, which testifies to the strength of the resistance to Japanese rule.203

The guardline’s organizational chart mirrored an ideal of centralized administration: priorities were set, and knowledge was concentrated, at the bureaucratic apex, while sacrifice was demanded from those at the bottom. At the pinnacle stood the police headquarters in Taipei, executing policy that was drafted with an eye to the “greater good” of imperial Japan, as defined by the imperatives to balance annual colonial budgets. At the nerve center of the guardline itself were the control stations. Here, Japanese inspectors were attended by physicians and heavily guarded. The inspectors were entrusted with the electrical switches, as well. Below them were Japanese nationals at branch stations and substations who were apprised of mine placement, and then at the bottom rung were the exposed Chinese and juku-ban units. They absorbed the preponderance of casualties and, for fear of security breaches, were kept in the dark about operational secrets (the placement of mines or the ignition of the electrical fences), to their own physical peril.

Schematic maps from the extension and movement phases of these pacification campaigns represent the scorched-earth installations as circles and triangles arrayed on a “line.” However, written accounts described a “hundred-meter-wide
clear-cut” path, while photographs attest to three-dimensional, undulating ecological boot-prints. In a word, the term “guardline” (aiyūsen) soft-pedaled the physical magnitude of the scorched-earth installations. The photographs below document Japanese, Taiwanese, and indigenous guards, tree fellers, and porters who walked this tightrope during the period 1903–15 (see figures 14–17).

As guards, porters, and soldiers, Taiwanese recruits were exposed to enemy fire. In 1911, for example, 151 Taiwanese, compared to only 4 Japanese, were killed advancing the guardline.\textsuperscript{204} Overall, over 2,000 government forces perished (including Japanese), with another 2,200 wounded, in the camphor wars of 1904 to 1915.\textsuperscript{205} Taking a longer view, the death toll attributed to the war against indigenous people—including the spike in resistance from 1897 to 1901 and the dead from the Wushe uprising—amounted to 7,080 Taiwanese and Japanese, with another 4,116 wounded (1895–1935).\textsuperscript{206} Caroline Hui-yu Ts’ai reports that some “55,600 [Taiwanese] men” were commandeered to serve in the subjugation campaigns as corvée labor.\textsuperscript{207} At its peak, expeditionary forces proper numbered 12,000 men (including regular army and navy units).

Acknowledging the danger these exposed patrolmen, sentries, porters, and infantrymen faced, day and night, the Taiwan Government-General promulgated criteria to award special cash bonuses for meritorious service on the guardline in July 1905. The rationale stated that this type of duty was no different from fighting a war.\textsuperscript{208} In April 1907, another TGG internal order announced that medals would be awarded to the bravest scouts and soldiers on the guardline; the governor-general himself would bestow top honors; battalion leaders would dole out lesser awards. The medals and prizes gave these punitive expeditions and related activities the trappings of a glorious undertaking.\textsuperscript{209}

There were three tiers within which the pay levels for the one-time bonuses were set. Awards for inspectors and assistant inspectors ranged from the most meritorious award of ¥60 (grade A), down to the grade D award of ¥30. Policemen started at ¥35 and could earn as little as ¥12. Lastly, assistant policemen earned from ¥20 to ¥8 (descending from A- to D-class awards). In other words, the most meritorious assistant policemen would earn ¥10 less than the least meritorious inspector and ¥15 less than the most meritorious policeman.

A list of sixty-four awards submitted to Governor-General Sakuma by Nantou Prefect Koyanagi Shigemichi in May 1906 included commendations for twenty-eight assistant patrolmen, all with Taiwanese names. The remaining inspectors and policemen had Japanese names, meaning that Japanese guardline combatants outearned their Chinese compatriots handily, while casualties and the risk of death were much higher for Taiwanese participants.\textsuperscript{210}

At the height of the five-year campaign, Ōtsu Rinspe, who directed operations as Sakuma’s police chief, wrote the preface for a collection of bidan (glorious tales) about the brave men of the guardline. Some of the men lionized in this volume were killed in action; others were severely wounded. Ōtsu introduced these fifty-four sketches
Figure 15. Cutting trees to build the scorched-earth barricades, ca. 1910. “[T]here are many old trees with huge trunks, and it can require many days for a single tree. . . .” Narita Takeshi, *Taiwan seiban shuzoku shashinchō* (Taipei: Narita shashin seihanjo, 1912), 161.

Figure 16. The large Taiwanese labor force, mostly sedan porters, at rest during construction of the *aiyüsen*, ca. 1910. At its peak strength, the Japanese guardline forces employed over fifty thousand Taiwanese laborers. *Tôbatsu junsatsu kinen shashinchō* (unpublished photograph album). Courtesy of the Chiyoda City Hibiya Library and Museum, Tokyo.
by magnifying the importance of the war. He wrote that Taiwan presented three challenges to Japan: bandits, pestilence, and savages. The former two were eradicated with policing and medicine in the early years of Japanese rule, while the last obstacle was still being overcome. These tales describe the actions of men running into nests of headhunters to secure strongholds, fighting gamely against ambushes, or collecting intelligence in the face of grave danger. In total, the collection lauds the actions of twenty-six Taiwanese guards and twenty-eight Japanese policemen. In contrast to the cash bonus system’s racially determined hierarchy of danger and compensation, the glorious tales were presented in chronological order with no preference for rank, age, or nationality. The roughly equal representation and equalitarian format of Ōtsu’s pamphlet stood in stark contrast to the patently discriminatory nature of day-to-day operations, be it measured in terms of risk or reward.

There were four major offensives in Sakuma’s campaign, beginning with the attack on the Gaogan Atayal near Jiaobanshan in 1910. The picture that emerges is not so much that of a master plan coming to fruition as that of a centralized state with vastly superior technology and resources exhausting itself in a border region whose political economies, topographies, and traditions of armed resistance confirmed the wisdom of Mochiji’s formula—some areas of Taiwan would not be worth the investment of blood and treasure to administer. In fact, the original
¥15.4 million budgeted for the campaign was insufficient. Supplementary requests drove the costs up to ¥16.24 million. Although official summary reports buried this figure, a contemporary economic analysis of the government-general’s developmental policies discovered that over half of this burden—about ¥8.3 million—was paid out of the national treasury in Tokyo as supplemental funding.²¹²

Although the five-year budget was drawn up with great precision, planners could not predict the course of the war. Early movements were repulsed, soldiers ran away, and the plan fell behind schedule. The 1914 Japan Year Book, which assiduously updated annual entries regarding the war’s progress, reported ominously: “The [first] three campaigns cost about [¥9 million], but only about one-tenth of the program was effected.” In other words, well over half the budget had been spent, and four of the five budget years had passed, but only 10 percent of the plan had been completed.²¹³ Time and money ran out that summer. The vaunted plan abruptly ended with Sakuma’s declaration of victory over the Truku peoples in August 1914.²¹⁴ Although southern and eastern Taiwan remained untouched, and the proposed network of roads and fences to secure the perimeter of the indigenous territory remained a dream, Sakuma and his officers erected triumphal arches in various parts of Taiwan and paraded to celebrate.²¹⁵ The Emperor Taishō granted Sakuma an audience on September 19, 1914. The seventy-one-year-old general reported to the throne, “the indigenous suppression undertaking has been concluded.”²¹⁶

Japan declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914, a week before the Truku campaign ended. The six-week siege of the German port at Qingdao cost 1,400 Japanese casualties (400 deaths), while the Japanese Navy steamed southward to occupy German holdings in the South Pacific.²²⁷ The opening of the so-called Great War marked the end of imperial Japan’s attempts to incorporate indigenous Taiwan into the empire. Sakuma’s successor, Governor-General Andō Sadami, closed down organs and installations associated with the five-year plan between July and September 1915.²¹⁸ In 1917, the guard posts themselves were dismantled. Their personnel rotated into police administration as mobile units in more scattered but densely staffed police boxes.²²⁹

Tōgō Minoru and Satō Shirō, who finished their tome on Taiwanese colonial development in February 1916, wrote hopefully that the resources expended during the five-year campaign would be recovered as more indigenous territory in Taiwan was added to the tax base through incorporation into “normal administration.”²³⁰ The official digest of Taiwan’s administration for 1915, however, was less optimistic. It issued a skeptical and prophetic warning: “The work of subjugation has thus been completed . . . , but this may not mean that the savages have been reduced to submission. Some of them may still remain incorrigible at heart.”²²¹

The subsequent 1916 edition was more pointed. The “work of subjugation,” it reported, “has thus been completed over all the aborigines’ region, at least for the present. Strictly speaking, out of the total tribes of 672 with 129,715 inhabitants, 551
tribes representing 116,744 have vowed allegiance and the balance of the 121 tribes with 13,000 are still to be dealt with.”

As testament to the TGG’s lack of appetite for resuming Sakuma’s aggressive policies after World War I, subsequent Japan Year Books repeated the 1916 summary verbatim, as boilerplate, for ten years running through 1927.

FROM MIDDLE GROUND TO NATIVE AUTHORITY

The historical contours of wet diplomacy in Taiwan’s uplands recall the fate of North America’s “middle ground.” Historian Richard White’s study of eighteenth-century frontier diplomacy argues that as long as Algonquians and Ojibwas had the leverage to force British and French agents onto the “middle ground” between state and nonstate spaces, gifts, feasts, and oaths were required to secure indigenes’ provisional allegiance. By the early 1800s, writes White, the United States had neutralized the French and British threats to its sovereignty. Without rival powers to divide its energies, Washington trained its guns on Indians and enforced directives in Algonquian and Ojibwa territory with ultimatums and firearms instead of with banquets and gifts.

Echoing this pattern, wet diplomacy in Taiwan prospered when indigenes occupied the middle position between contending powers: the Japanese state and Han guerilla fighters. The government-general’s fear of a two-front war recommended a policy of negotiation, feasting, and gifting. Fiscal and political pressure to produce income from the camphor monopoly made wet diplomacy less tenable, however. After Gotō Shinpei’s mass annihilation of Han rebels in 1902, Taiwan’s middle ground became harder to maintain. Even so, while the Taiwan Government-General from 1903 onward trained its forces on indigenous peoples, tōmoku and seiryokusha (headmen and men of influence) remained important intermediaries, resembling the functional group “native authority” as described by Mahmood Mamdani.

The members of the native authority, who were recruited and coerced by the Taiwan Government-General in the 1910s and 1920s during the peak of the guard-line movements, had achieved local leadership status through prowess in mediation or battle, as leaders of ritual groups, or as members of chiefly lineages. The government-general supported the authority of these men with field trips to Tokyo and Taipei, stipends, badges, medals, and cash awards for meritorious service. This generation of mediators, despite these emoluments, were not utterly dependent upon the state for authority nor were they disciplined imperial subjects. Some remained incorrigible at heart.

By 1933, there were 186 Atayal, 92 Bunun, and 128 Paiwan officially recognized tōmoku. Of 431 headmen for all of Taiwan, only 22 could understand Japanese; a mere 20 had attended a Japanese educational facility (see chapter 2). Therefore, while members of the native authority might have been amenable to bribes,
threats, or expedient alliances, they could not be counted on to prosecute Japan’s interests for love of country, the emperor, or a belief that the new order would bring progress—the hallmarks of discipline (or interiority). In short, Japan’s version of native authority in Taiwan was a poor instrument for establishing public power in the interior, and it can be viewed as a stopgap measure for a government that could no longer expand its territory through the use of massed force.

Mona Ludao, who would lead the Wushe Rebellion in 1930, himself played the role of tōmoku. He traveled to Nantou City and Japan as a government-sponsored “tourist” in 1911, along with dozens of other tōmoku and seiryokusha. At the height of the guardline movements, four troops of headmen were brought to Japan to overawe them with views of Japan’s economic, demographic, and military power. According to TGG police records, Mona himself was a revered warrior and a physically imposing man, recognized by other Tgdaya as a worthy successor to his father, Ludao Bai, a local chief (domoku).

Ludao Bai’s adoption of Japanese son-in-law Kondō Gisaburō, in fact, had one foot in the world of wet diplomacy and another in the scorched-earth policy. To consecrate the marriage of Kondō and Ludao Bai’s daughter Chiwas and activate the new Japan-Tgdaya alliance, the Taiwan Government-General contributed six oxen for slaughter and twenty oil cans of sake, most of it distributed at a wedding feast at Kasumigaseki (near Wushe) in 1909. Ludao Bai’s son Mona Ludao mediated between Sediq men and their new Japanese in-laws during the drunken and tense proceedings. The debauch carried on for about a week. Afterward, about 650 of Ludao Bai’s followers, thanks to this wedding feast and promises (unfulfilled) of enemy heads, supported guardline extensions at the expense of Truku and Toda settlements just north of Wushe (see chapter 2).

A decade later, the government-general called upon Mona Ludao. Much has been written about the Salamao incident of 1920. Official sources consider Mona a conspirator against Japan during this affair, whose bad aims were thwarted by leaks. Oral histories and documentary evidence, on the other hand, suggest that Mona helped lead, or at least mobilize, about 560 Tgdaya troops to punish Salamao rebels. The incident began with an influenza epidemic attributed to the presence of outsiders. The most infamous in a series of Salamao raids and ambushes was an attack on a police station that took nineteen Japanese lives. As a condition of their earlier surrenders, and to avoid suspicion of conspiracy, warriors from Malepa, Xalut, and several Tgdaya villages signed on to fight with Japan. Fujisaki Seinosuke judged Japan’s crushing victory a turning point, noting that the wrath of imperial forces frightened indigenes throughout northern Taiwan into submission.

Reminiscent of the Stone Gate Battle of 1874 and the Gantaban slaughter of 1903 (see figure 13), Salamao heads were displayed publicly to heighten the demonstration effect. Twenty-seven heads were photographed in front of the Wushe police station as trophies of the punitive expedition. Five heads were brought back to Malepa, where they were feted at a large head-taking festival—a long-banned
practice that the police allowed on this one occasion, since the killings were government sanctioned.227

Mona Ludao’s involvement in the 1920 maneuvers is sporadically documented; the contested nature of the records reflects his structural position as a member of native authority, which inclined him toward double-dealing. His clan expected material benefits for his family and followers by taking Japanese in-laws such as Gisaburō or contributing fighting men and laborers to Japanese expeditions. At the same time, chiefly cooperation was forced, on pain of the resumption of bombardment from mountain guns or of trade embargoes, leaving men like Mona with little choice. On the other hand, alliances with Japan, as the above campaigns showed, provided young Atayal, Sediq, Bunun, and Truku men opportunities to take heads and exhibit bravery in battle—rare occasions, since head taking had technically been outlawed.

But to favor Mona’s men, thereby propping up his stature as a tōmoku, the Taiwan Government-General perforce eroded the prestige of Mona’s Truku and Toda counterparts or the Salamao chiefs, just as the government-general had taken sides against Paalan (Tgdaya) in 1903, when they sanctioned the Gantaban head-taking binge. In other words, the favoritism entailed by wet diplomacy was anathema to the rationalization of state machinery, while it was the very antithesis of isshi dōjin (impartiality).

Mona himself, according to one memoir, was known to burst into anger at the mention of his role in Salamao. Official records describe him as a reluctant imperial soldier—the government-general marked him as a malcontent. Kondō himself complained that his Wushe in-laws had donated twenty thousand man-hours of labor to building the guardline in early 1909, while their fields lay unattended.228 Kondō argued that long-term resentment at the government’s ingratitude, which could have been allayed with a few kegs of sake and an official thank-you or a few more guns and bullets for Mona and his allies, ultimately led many locals to sympathize with and participate in the Wushe Rebellion of 1930.229

Therefore, Sugiura’s rebuff of Mona’s offer of mediation after the Yoshimura beating incident on October 8, 1930, should be seen as the last straw, one that added humiliation to long-standing torment. Of course, the relationship was also unsatisfactory from the TGG side. Accordingly, Japanese officials took steps to break their reliance on Mona’s generation of headmen in the 1930s and to replace them with more dependent and reliable intermediaries, whose loyalty would not be purchased with canisters of alcohol, head-hunting licenses, or the promise of preferential treatment at government gun depots.