

## Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy

### *Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework*

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Cross-Strait relations under Xi Jinping's leadership remain stable and progressive in general, despite growing anti-Beijing sentiment in Taiwan, as highlighted by the Sunflower Movement, which protested the passing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement between Taiwan and the mainland, and the embarrassing failure of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, which had emphasized a platform of strengthening Taiwan-China economic ties in the 2014 election. Both sides have been prevented from making any substantial progress in cross-Strait relations since Xi came to power in 2012 (coinciding with Ma's second term)—Taiwan by growing anti-Beijing sentiment, especially among young people, and a drop in President Ma Ying-jeou's popularity,<sup>1</sup> and China by Xi Jinping's preoccupation with fighting corruption and restructuring the economy amid a substantial economic slowdown. But peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait has remained the trend since 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou came to power. The 1992 Consensus that there is only one China and that Taipei and Beijing agree to disagree on which government is its legitimate representative is still the foundation of cross-Strait relations. Moreover, the two sides have a better understanding and growing tolerance of each other's differing views of the implications, at home and abroad, of the assertion that there is only "one China." Meanwhile, economic, social, and political exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to increase.

With this background, this chapter seeks to address the following questions: What is China's strategy toward Taiwan under Xi Jinping's leadership? Have there been any changes to China's Taiwan policy since Xi Jinping came to power? Is there a departure from Hu Jintao's Taiwan policy? If there is a departure, to what extent will such a change affect cross-Strait relations?

This chapter will start with a brief review of developments in cross-Strait relations since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. It will then argue that despite substantial developments the status quo remains intact. However, this status quo in the long run is in favor of Beijing's policy goal to eventually reunify the two sides of the Taiwan Strait into the People's Republic of China (PRC). In this regard, while Xi Jinping's Taiwan policy continues to follow the fundamental approach adopted by Hu Jintao, namely to prioritize prevention of Taiwan's *de jure* independence over promotion of reunification, Xi has increasingly emphasized strengthening the strategic framework of the "one-China principle" in cross-Strait relations. The aim is to box Taiwan in toward the goal of eventual reunification, which has been incorporated into Xi's grand goals for China that are expressed in his "Chinese Dream." Although Taiwanese people seem to be less and less identifying with mainland China nationally and politically, Taiwan has been deeply drawn into China's economic orbit, while its international status, in terms of both legitimacy and influence, continues to decline. Thus Taiwan sees increasing difficulty in moving away from mainland China's influence both economically and politically. The dilemma faced by Taiwan is that it will either be drawn deeper into China's orbit or be marginalized in international affairs as well as regional economic integration. Taiwan does not have much choice but to accept the fact that it will have greater interdependence with the mainland. I conclude that although there may be a bounce or reaction against mainland China's Taiwan policy after the presidential election in 2016, this will only be a storm in the teacup, which will not alter the overall direction of the development.

#### FROM PREVENTION OF DE JURE INDEPENDENCE TO PROMOTION OF "POLITICAL AGREEMENTS"

The turning point of cross-Strait relations took place in 2004 with the May 17 Statement issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC. In this statement, for the first time Beijing made it clear that prevention of Taiwan's *de jure* independence was the top priority of Beijing's Taiwan policy.<sup>2</sup> With growing concern and suspicion from the international community over China's rise and a potential "China threat," Beijing had realized that a policy aimed at reunification was unrealistic under the current circumstances and would conflict with its efforts to build up the image of a peaceful rising power. On March 14, 2005, this policy was formalized by the Anti-Secession Law passed by the third conference of the Tenth National People's Congress. After that, joint efforts by Beijing and Washington kept Taiwan's then president Chen Shui-bian from going too far in his relentless pushing of the envelope for Taiwan's independence, which peaked when Chen won his second term in 2004. The *de facto* co-management between Washington and Beijing to check the movement for Taiwan's *de jure*

independence has helped advance Beijing's strategic vision for "one China" in cross-Strait relations despite some fundamental differences between the one-China policy that the United States espouses (which agrees to the existence of only one China but allows different interpretations as to which government is the legitimate representative of it) and the one-China principle that mainland China insists on (which stresses that the government of PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China and consequently entails eventual reunification).<sup>3</sup> The two sides seem to have reached a temporary but fundamental consensus on the Taiwan issue, namely that the movement toward Taiwan's independence does not serve the interests of either China or the United States, although the latter is by no means supportive of the former's policy of eventual reunification. Since then, both the Bush and Obama administrations have endorsed the policy of "peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait" adopted by the Hu Jintao leadership, although a "peaceful resolution"—not necessarily reunification—has been the US policy goal versus China's goal for eventual reunification. Together with this newly clarified US position, China's policy shift from proreunification to anti-independence enabled President Ma Ying-jeou to accept the 1992 Consensus as the foundation for cross-Strait relations immediately after he assumed the office.

As a result, during Ma's first term, the two sides achieved a long-overdue breakthrough in cross-Strait relations, the "three links," or commencement of direct flights, shipping, and postal service across the Taiwan Strait in 2008, which has in turn brought about an irrevocable economic integration between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait through direct transportation, trade, and communications. Furthermore, the establishment of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) has institutionalized economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait. It is expected that ECFA will further boost cross-Strait trade and economic exchanges, leading to the "one-China market" advocated by Ma Ying-jeou's first vice-president, Vincent Siew Wan-chang.<sup>4</sup> Thus, in terms of economic development, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have already been moving toward reunification.

Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, cross-Strait relations have remained stable, although there have not been many major achievements so far, largely because of Taipei's reluctance to approve any political agreement or any formal or informal measures to build trust between PRC and ROC militaries, despite the push from Beijing. Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Indonesia in Bali in October 2013, told Vincent Siew that "increasing mutual political trust across the Taiwan Straits and jointly building political foundations are crucial for ensuring the peaceful development of relations";<sup>5</sup> he also hinted broadly about the importance of a cross-Strait framework for mutual military confidence and trust.<sup>6</sup> But there has been little response from Ma Ying-jeou's administration to Xi's requests. Several

reasons account for the two sides' failure to reach any political deals. Ma Ying-jeou's rapidly decreasing popularity in Taiwan and his inept management of internal strife within the KMT have greatly constrained Taipei's ability to handle cross-Strait relations. Given the leadership transition in China and the US policy of pivoting toward Asia, it has become unrealistic for Beijing to push any further in cross-Strait relations.

However, as Xi Jinping told Lien Chan, the honorary chair of the KMT, Beijing has patience and confidence.<sup>7</sup> Given the overall situation, especially China's focus on developing, with the United States, a "new type of great-power relations" and on promoting the "One Belt, One Road" initiative that would build overland and maritime economic corridors linking China and Europe through central, West, and South Asia, Taiwan is no longer a priority for Beijing at the moment. Xi Jinping may not necessarily want to push any further in the cross-Strait relations and may wish merely to maintain the stability of the status quo. This is clearly suggested by Xi's speech at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2015, during which he emphasized that maintaining the 1992 Consensus as a foundation for cross-Strait relations was indispensable for peace and stability between the two sides of the Strait,<sup>8</sup> while reunification was a long-term goal that could be achieved only after substantial development took place across the Taiwan Strait.

#### XI JINPING TRIES TO BOX TAIWAN IN WITH THE ONE-CHINA FRAMEWORK

Xi Jinping has rich experience in handling cross-Strait affairs, for he has been the provincial party secretary in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, where the local governments have established substantial connections with Taiwan. These provinces not only are agents of the central government in Beijing but also have developed their own close social, economic, and political ties with their counterparts in Taiwan.<sup>9</sup> Thus, after Xi became a designated successor at the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007, he played an increasing role in cross-Strait relations. In December 2007 and January 2009, he met visiting former US president Jimmy Carter twice as China's vice-president. Besides emphasizing Hu Jintao's six proposals for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, Xi expressed China's willingness to cooperate with the United States against Taiwan's *de jure* independence, which as he said would not only serve mutual interests but also help to maintain regional peace and development.<sup>10</sup> Among all of his talks on Taiwan during this period, the most impressive one is the speech he gave at the opening ceremony of the 2010 Chinese Roots-Seeking Tour summer camp in Beijing on July 25, 2010. He claimed that for Chinese people inside and outside of China the solidarity and unity of the Chinese nation constituted their common root, and Chinese culture

their soul. On this basis, he claimed that it was the common dream for all Chinese to revitalize the great Chinese nation.<sup>11</sup>

After Xi came to power, he continued Hu Jintao's Taiwan policy and prioritized the prevention of *de jure* independence rather than promoting immediate reunification. In April 2013, Xi met Vincent Siew at the Twelfth Boao Forum. Xi called on compatriots from both sides of the Strait to work hard to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. He also called for closer economic cooperation between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.<sup>12</sup> There was no mention of any development of the political relationship in his remarks. Two months later, however, when he met Wu Po-hsiung, the honorary chair of the (KMT), he made four new proposals to further cross-Strait relations: "First, the two sides should take the overall interests of the Chinese nation into consideration when assessing the overall situation of cross-Strait ties"; "Second, the two sides should clearly recognize development trends throughout history in order to gain a better understanding of the future prospects for cross-Strait ties"; Third, "The mainland and Taiwan should enhance mutual trust, engage in favorable interactions, seek common ground and shelve differences, and be pragmatic and enterprising"; and finally, "The two sides should steadily promote the overall development of cross-Strait ties."<sup>13</sup> Compared to his previous talks on the Taiwan issue, this one more clearly articulated how to promote political trust between the two sides of the Strait based on peaceful economic development. Xi emphasized that the two sides "share the same destiny" and called for efforts to inspire them to "strengthen their pride in the Chinese nation as well as their shared goal of its rejuvenation." He also noted that "though the mainland and Taiwan are yet to be reunified, they belong to one China and are inseparable parts of the country." Xi added that "safeguarding national territorial integrity and sovereignty is at the core of this goal" Xi said, and emphasized that the two sides should uphold the one-China framework.<sup>14</sup>

Now Xi Jinping has put forward some specific political requirements for interactions with Taiwan, including reinforcing confidence building, promoting positive interactions, optimizing common interests, and being pragmatic. The essence, he emphasizes, is to consolidate and protect Beijing's strategic advancement of the "one-China" principle, which should be agreed on in cross-Strait relations. In October 2013, when meeting Vincent Siew in Bali ahead of the APEC gathering, Xi brought up the notion that "both sides of the Strait are of one family." As he emphasized, the two sides should treasure this historical opportunity, maintain the momentum of peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait, and strengthen political mutual trust, so as to lay a political foundation. He expressed for the first time that in the long term disputes across the Taiwan Strait could and should be gradually resolved—"We cannot hand those problems down from generation to generation." This remark reflects Xi's resolve to make substantial progress under his leadership in pushing cross-Strait relations toward reunification.

Xi urged heads of departments in charge of cross-Strait ties to meet and exchange views in order to build up cross-Strait political mutual trust.<sup>15</sup>

Xi's position on cross-Strait relations was further clarified in February 2014, when he met a Taiwanese delegation led by Lien Chan. He made it clear that reunification was an essential part of the Chinese Dream. Again he made four points in explaining China's Taiwan policy, but these four points included more political elements than the previous four. Reunification, he said, was the common wish of compatriots from both sides, and he affirmed that "no power can separate us."<sup>16</sup> His speech closely linked the Chinese Dream to Taiwan's future and again emphasized the importance of retaining a one-China framework. He expressed optimism over the eventual resolution of disputes across the Strait, even though he acknowledged that it might take a long time to achieve. Xi asked "the two sides across the Strait to consolidate the basis for adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing 'Taiwan independence' and to foster the common understanding of One China." He stated that "compatriots from both sides have chosen the path of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, a correct choice that safeguards cross-Strait peace, promotes common development, helps realize the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and brings benefits to people on both sides." Despite a general trend of peaceful development and increasing exchanges and communication, currently there are disturbances such as the Sunflower Movement, Xi noted. "We will try to do our best, as long as what we do can contribute to the well-being of our Taiwan compatriots, to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and to the overall interest of the Chinese nation."<sup>17</sup>

After carrying forward Hu Jintao's Taiwan policy, Xi shifted his emphasis more to establishing and consolidating a strategic framework under the "one China" principle. The aim is to box Taiwan in for eventual reunification. In September 2014, Xi Jinping told a visiting Taiwanese delegation that the basic guideline to solve the Taiwan issue is "peaceful reunification; One Country, Two Systems." He added, "No secessionist act will be tolerated. The path of 'Taiwan independence' is unfeasible."<sup>18</sup> The concept of "one country, two systems" has not been part of mainland China's official language toward Taiwan for quite a while. With Ma Ying-jeou's government being discredited by the Sunflower Movement, and with unrest in Hong Kong, Xi seemed to have come to a conclusion that certain principles needed to be reemphasized. This idea is reflected in Xi's remarks while he was joining a panel discussion with members of the National Committee of the CPPCC in March 2015. He proclaimed, "We should unswervingly pursue peaceful development, unswervingly adhere to the common political basis, unswervingly bring benefits to the people across the Strait and unswervingly join hands to realize the national revitalization." It is worth noting that on the same occasion he called on compatriots to be vigilant against the "Taiwan independence" forces.<sup>19</sup> It is a good indication that Xi Jinping is fully taking a no-nonsense approach to

cross-Strait relations in response to new factors in Taiwan that are unfavorable to mainland China.

Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have realized that the United States plays an essential role in cross-Strait relations. On the basis of the political heritage from his predecessors, Xi Jinping has developed a new strategy. Even before he became the top leader in China, he emphasized that the Taiwan issue should not interfere with Sino-U.S. bilateral relations.<sup>20</sup> Since he came into power, he has been trying to isolate the Taiwan issue from the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship while at the same time trying to build up what he calls a “new type of great-power relationship.” That is why in all of his discussions, communications, and joint statements with President Obama one can hardly find any mention of the Taiwan issue, at least not in published statements. This clearly indicates Xi’s position on Taiwan when he is dealing with the United States: since Taiwan is a core interest of China, China will not allow Taiwan to become a bargaining chip while it is making efforts to develop a new type of relationships between major powers. The aim is to isolate the Taiwan issue from the Sino-US bilateral relationship and cut out any US involvement in cross-Strait relations, or at least to make sure there is no direct US involvement. Thus it is not surprising that with regard to the US rebalancing policy in Asia, Taiwan has been absent from discussion.

Overall, Xi’s strategy can be summarized as follows. First, he has not made any dramatic departure from Hu Jintao’s Taiwan policy, which focused on the prevention of Taiwan’s *de jure* independence. Second, he is most concerned to consolidate the strategic fulfillment of the “one China” principle in order to box Taiwan in. Consequently, he has placed more emphasis on developing a political relationship between the mainland and Taiwan, based on a solid economic foundation in cross-Strait relations. Last but not the least, Xi is obviously a tough player on the Taiwan issue. His response toward any opposition in Taiwan against eventual reunification can be summarized as “If you move one step forwards, I will move two steps.” Xi Jinping’s revival of the slogan “One country, two systems,” which has not been mentioned since 2005, when the Anti-secession Law was passed, is only one example. His tough stance may continue because of domestic and external situations. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Xi wants to copy a Hong Kong model for cross-Strait relations. Rather, it reflects his determinations not to allow any setback in cross-Strait relations under his leadership. Xi Jinping believes that as long as he can keep institutionalizing the one-China framework in cross-Strait relations, Taiwan will eventually come back to the embrace of the mother country.

## CONCLUSION

Though in general Xi Jinping’s Taiwan policy has followed that of Hu Jintao in prioritizing the prevention of Taiwan’s *de jure* independence over the promotion

of reunification, Xi, apparently in response to the stability and enhanced development of relations across the Taiwan Strait after Ma Ying-jeou came to power, has tried to push forward some political agreements between Beijing and Taipei. However, this effort has hardly been fruitful, not only because of Ma Ying-jeou's decreasing popularity in Taiwan, but also because Xi's priority has been the anti-corruption campaign at home and the crises in East and South China Seas against the background of US rebalancing abroad.

As discussed in the previous sections, there are some emerging trends under Xi's leadership. First of all, as China has become increasingly capable of managing the situation on its Asian borders, Xi Jinping has tried to insulate the Taiwan issue from US-China relations in order to decrease US leverage on this issue in the bilateral relationship. Xi's policy has resulted in an obvious decrease in the influence of the United States on cross-Strait relations, to the point that the United States no longer plays a decisive role.<sup>21</sup>

Second, because of the rapid development of economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and both sides' acceptance of the 1992 Consensus as a foundation for cross-Strait relations, the topic of reunification is no longer an untouchable third rail in Taiwan politics. Despite seemingly growing indifference from Beijing, there are increasing discussions on the issue, not only among scholars but also in the media and in political discourse. Meanwhile, the issue of Taiwan independence has become increasingly difficult to discuss in Taiwanese political affairs. Even Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; more proindependence) leaders nowadays try to avoid giving an opinion on the issue, not because of any change in the DPP's guidelines or ideology, but because it will deprive them of political support at home and abroad that is necessary for them to prevail in Taiwan politics.

Third, as Xi Jinping's leadership is expected to further consolidate, it is inevitable that he will put more pressure on achieving "political progress" in cross-Strait relations. This is clearly indicated by his recent remarks on Taiwan. While emphasizing that the two sides will have to forgo political agreements in the foreseeable future, Xi unambiguously included the eventual reunification of Taiwan and mainland China in his "Chinese dream," which is centered on the revitalization of a great Chinese nation. This shows that Xi Jinping aims to make some achievements on the Taiwan issue a part of his political legacy.

Given the defeat of the KMT in the midterm election of 2014 and President Ma Ying-jeou's rapidly declining popularity, the DPP entered the 2016 presidential and legislative electoral campaign in an advantageous position and indeed won a convincing victory. This cannot but amount to a substantial challenge to Xi's leadership on the Taiwan issue. Given Xi's position and public statements, it will not be surprising if Beijing imposes more pressure on Taiwan. From Xi's perspective, it is unacceptable for cross-Strait relations to go back to the situation under President Chen Shui-bian in the first eight years of the twenty-first century. Given

the increasing economic interdependence of the mainland and Taiwan, and more importantly the deep interdependence of the United States and China, it is inevitable that the focus of Xi Jinping's Taiwan policy will shift toward political issues. The aim of reaching political agreements across the Taiwan Strait is to institutionalize not only the interdependence of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait but also the strategic framework of the one-China principle. Thus the victory of the DPP in the 2016 presidential campaign may only provoke a stronger reaction from mainland China on the Taiwan issue. After all, pushing for political agreements was already part of Xi's policy toward Taiwan. So there will be more challenges in cross-Strait relations in the coming years, not just because the proindependence DPP has come into power again after eight years since their defeat in the 2008 presidential election, but also because Xi has invested much of his political capital in this issue.

## NOTES

1. Ma Ying-jeou's approval rate plunged to 11 percent, according to a poll conducted by TVBS in December 2014, and he was listed as the least popular of twelve politicians. TVBS Public Opinion Poll, "Guónèi zhūyào zhèngzhì rénwù shèngwàng diàochá" [Survey on the main political figures in China], TVBS Poll Center, December 23, 2014, [www.tvbs.com.tw/static/FILE\\_DB/PCH/201412/20141226172450208.pdf](http://www.tvbs.com.tw/static/FILE_DB/PCH/201412/20141226172450208.pdf).

2. For the full context, see PRC Embassy in the United States, "Taiwan Affairs Office Issues Statement on Current Cross-Straits Relations (17/05/04)," May 17, 2004, [www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t11117.htm](http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t11117.htm). Also see Jing Huang with Xiaoting Li, *Inseparable Separation: The Making of China's Taiwan Policy* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010), 281–86.

3. Huang with Li, *Inseparable Separation*, 272–95.

4. Scott L. Kastner, "Drinking Poison to Quench a Thirst? The Security Consequences of China-Taiwan Economic Integration," in *The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia*, ed. T. J. Pempel (London: Routledge, 2013), 33.

5. "Xi Meets Taiwan Politician Ahead of APEC Gathering," Xinhuanet, October 6, 2013, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/06/c\\_132775470.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/06/c_132775470.htm).

6. "Xijīnpíng shuō 'liǎng'àn zhèngzhì fēnqí wèntí zhōngguī yào jiějué' shìfāng shà xīnhào," *News of the Communist Party of China*, October 9, 2013, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1009/c241220-23138541.html>.

7. "Mainland Respects Taiwan's Social System: Xi," Xinhuanet, February 18, 2014, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/18/c\\_133125207.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/18/c_133125207.htm).

8. "Jūjiāo liǎnghuì: Sān niánjiān xijīnpíng qīnlín de shǒu gè tuán zǔ," *News of the Communist Party of China*, March 5, 2015, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0305/c385474-26641415.html>. Whether Xi continues to insist on this prerequisite if Tsai Ing-wen, the winner of the 2016 Taiwan presidential election, maintains her denial of the 1992 Consensus remains to be seen but seems likely.

9. Back in 2006, when Xi Jinping was the party secretary in Zhejiang Province, he hosted Lien Chan, the honorary chair of the KMT in Hangzhou. Their talks focused on historical ties and social and economic exchanges between Zhejiang Province and Taiwan. See "Xijīnpíng zài hángzhōu huìjiàn bìng yànqīng liánzhàn yíxíng," Xinhua News Agency, April 22, 2006, [www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijīnpíngzhuanti/201401/t20140115\\_5531536.htm](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijīnpíngzhuanti/201401/t20140115_5531536.htm).

10. "Xijīnpíng huìjiàn měiguó qián zǒngtǒng kǎtè," Xinhuanet, December 6, 2007, [www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijīnpíngzhuanti/201401/t20140115\\_5531538.htm](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijīnpíngzhuanti/201401/t20140115_5531538.htm); "Xijīnpíng chūxí zhōng měi jiànjiāo 30 zhōunián

jiniàn wǎnyàn bing huijiàn kǎtè yìxíng” [Xi Jinping attended the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States and met with Carter and his party], Xinhuanet, January 12, 2009, [www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinpingzhuanti/201401/t20140115\\_5531539.htm](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinpingzhuanti/201401/t20140115_5531539.htm).

11. “2010 nián hǎiwài huáyì jí gǎng’ào tái dìqū qīngshàonián ‘zhōngguó xúngēn zhī lǚ’ xiàlǐngyíng kāi yíng, xijinping chūxi bing jiǎnghuà,” Xinhuanet, July 25, 2010, [www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinpingzhuanti/201401/t20140115\\_5531543.htm](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinpingzhuanti/201401/t20140115_5531543.htm).

12. “12th Boao Forum for Asia Concludes,” CCTV, April 8, 2013, <http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20130408/106818.shtml>.

13. “Xi Meets with KMT Honorary Chairman, Calling National Rejuvenation a ‘Common Goal,’” Xinhuanet, June 13, 2013, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/13/c\\_132453077.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/13/c_132453077.htm).

14. Ibid.

15. “Xi Meets Taiwan Politician.”

16. “Xi Proposes Equal Consultations on Cross-Strait Political Differences,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, February 18, 2014, [www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201402/t20140220\\_5705694.htm](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201402/t20140220_5705694.htm).

17. Ibid.

18. “Xinhua Insight: Xi Steadfast on Reunification,” Xinhuanet, September 29, 2014, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/26/c\\_133675240.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/26/c_133675240.htm).

19. “Xi Stresses Cross-Strait Peaceful Development, Urges Vigilance against Taiwan Independence,” Xinhuanet, March 4, 2015, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/04/c\\_134037908.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/04/c_134037908.htm).

20. In February 2012, during his Washington, D.C., visit, as China’s then vice-president, Xi Jinping raised the prospect of “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century,” emphasizing the importance of the bilateral relationship. See David M. Lampton, “A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for U.S.-China Ties,” *Asia Policy* 16, no. 1 (2013): 51–68.

21. I argue that with the power shifting among major countries, it is inevitable that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will play a more and more decisive role in cross-Strait relations. See more details in Huang Jing, “Héping jiāoliú, gòngtóng fāzhǎn: Jiniàn wáng gū huitán èrshí zhōunián” [Developing cross-Straits relations: Commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Wang-Koo dialogue], *Jiāoliú Zázhi* [Exchange magazine] (Straits Exchange Foundation), June 2013.