The Explosion of Globalism and the Advent of the Third Nomos of the Earth

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ABSTRACT
We on the planet are experiencing a change of era, no longer an era of changes. In the era of changes (1500–2000) or the era of the Westernization of the world, changes were linear and within the frame of the colonial matrix of power. The concepts of newness, evolution, development, transition, and postmodernity are concepts singling out the changes in a linear, universal time. The change of era cannot be understood as a transition in the linear time of Western modernity but as an explosion and the reconstitutions of planetary cultural times. That explosion marks the advent of the third nomos of the Earth and the dispute for control of the colonial matrix of power by states not grounded in Western political theory and beyond the scope of international relations after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Russia’s 2022 special operation in Ukraine, responding to NATO’s provocations, with the collaboration of Ukrainian government, to “contain” Russia, is a signpost of the change of era and the advent of the multipolar world order that is tantamount with the advent of the third nomos of the Earth. The second nomos, the Carl Schmitt narrative, was tantamount with the Westernization of the world and the colonial matrix of power.

KEYWORDS
change of era, colonial matrix of power, globalism, multipolarity, third nomos of the Earth

Sharjah is historic and present, social, natural, and political. It is a place that encourages thinking and negotiating with others. My natural response to its dynamism is to produce a Biennial which asks questions through art, and creates a dialogue that liberates us from Eurocentrism, Globalism, and other relevant -isms. (Yuko Hasegawa, at Sharjah Art Foundation, 2011)

The idea of totality in general is today questioned and denied in Europe, not only by the perennial empiricists, but also by an entire intellectual
community that calls itself postmodernist. In fact, in Europe, the idea of totality is a product of colonial/modernity [. . . ]. Moreover, such ideas have been associated with undesirable political practices, behind a dream of the total rationalization of society. It is not necessary, however, to reject the whole idea of totality in order to divest oneself of the ideas and images with which it was elaborated within European colonial/modernity. What is to be done is something very different: to liberate the production of knowledge, reflection, and communication from the pitfalls of European rationality/modernity. (Quijano, [1992] 2007)

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Although the main topic of this book is globalization in the past thirty years and the outlook towards the future, I will address it since 1500. I will use the expression global order as a synonym. Global order and globalization are nominative expressions referring to something that seems to be happening someplace and human agencies (actors, institutions, languages) that intervene into something already made. The expressions globalization and global order prevent us from asking questions about who made and regulates it, who interprets and explains it, who changes or preserves it, why and what for. These are questions I will address to understand globalism, the global designs behind the world order.1 Hence, each time I say “globalization,” I mean the global interstate order, piercing through the surface looking into the puppeteers hidden behind the drama that moves the puppet. The editor’s statement that motivates the publication of this book enumerates some elements of the global disorder and present illness. I assume that several essays will address them in detail. I will focus on the big picture of which the present is the chapter in which the contributors to this book are living and enduring. I close with speculations of what could be expected for the present and the futures (in plural), which depends on what is done and not done now.

My narrative of globalization starts in 1500. My perspective has been molded, however, by my experience of the Third World while attending the university in Argentina between 1961 and 1968. I began to understand “globalization” when I became aware of the meaning of the railroad installed by the British in Argentina at the end of the nineteenth century. One of the railroad lines crossed and divided the town where I was born and grew up in two. The early experience that molded my sensorium was later on rationalized, many years later, with the guidance of Peruvian sociologist, thinker, and activist Aníbal Quijano, whom I met personally around 1995, after reading his ground-breaking short essay “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” which was published in 1992 and translated in 2007 (Quijano, [1992] 2007). In 2000 Quijano published another ground-breaking essay looking at globalization from the perspective of colonial modernity that he had introduced in 1992. In this essay, titled “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Social Classification,” written in 2000, he stated:
What is termed globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established. (Quijano, [2000] 2008: 186)

Although the coloniality of power and the colonial matrix of power are the bases of my argument, I will consider Carl Schmitt’s concerns with the situation in Europe after World War II and his understanding of nomos of the Earth, and particularly the second nomos of the Earth. I will look at it in parallel with Quijano’s coloniality of power and the colonial matrix of power. Schmitt calls nomos any territorial organization that presupposes some agency appropriating, dividing, organizing, and managing the Earth. In that regard, Schmitt states there always has been a nomos of the Earth since our human ancestors began to control and manage territories and to build complex organizations today called civilizations. The distinction of the second nomos is that for the first time in the history of the human species a civilization created the conditions to control and manage the entire planet. Schmitt locates the historical formation and foundation of the second nomos in the sixteenth century. The decisive event was, in his terminology, the European discovery of America. It motivated the European invention of international law, which Schmitt calls Jus Publicum Europaeum, and the global linear thinking that propelled the designs to appropriate, divide, and distribute the Earth. The division of the Earth into Indias Occidentales and Indias Orientales, in 1594 and 1529 respectively, “possessed” by the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies with the benediction of the Papacy, was the foundational instance of the second nomos (Schmitt, 1962).

The turning point of the sixteenth century in the Atlantic was the “colonial revolution” and the invasion that constituted the European idea of modernity, simultaneously destituting the people, languages, memories, and institutions. It involved the First Nations of the continent, noninvited Europeans, and soon the transportation of captive Africans turned into slaves. Those were foundational events, in deeds and words, of globalization. After experiencing the legacies of the European invasions of the Americas and of the Third World conditions of South America and the Caribbean, Quijano perceived that what for Schmitt was appropriation, division, and distribution was, above all, the foundational events of the European narrative of modernity that legitimized and activated coloniality. Consequently, when Quijano states that globalization has a five-hundred-year history sustained by salvationist discourses, the rhetoric of modernity, and the implementation of the logic of coloniality, he is offering a decolonial narrative of the appropriation, dispossession, division, and distribution of the Earth and its land, as well as a decolonial narrative of the exploitation of labor and the radical
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transformation of the subjectivity of all parties involved: First Nations, Europeans, and Africans. It follows that globalization has its initial moments in deeds and words in the discovery/invention of the continents that Europeans called America. That is why Quijano asserted that, with the European invention of America, the Eurocentric control and management of capital and meaning (all the narratives, verbal and visual, legitimizing the invasion) was tantamount to the constitution of the Eurocentric global power: the coloniality of power. In that constitution, the mental construction of the idea of “race,” which activated the logic of classification and ranking of people and regions, was “the most important dimension of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism” (Quijano, [2000] 2008: 186).

The colonial revolution that created the second nomos of the Earth and the coloniality of power / colonial matrix of power initiated a long process of Westernization of the planet, of which globalization is one euphemism. Indias Occidentales and Indias Orientales were two Western nominations that divided the planet in two halves. They mutated into the “Western Hemisphere” and “Eastern Hemisphere,” and later on became Orientalism. As a result, globalization is a current chapter of the history of the will and the instruments (e.g., international law) to Westernize the Earth. Consequently, the simultaneous constitution of Western Civilization and the destitution of the barbarians, the primitive, and the underdeveloped destituted coexisting civilizations that were expected to upgrade themselves—with the help of the intruders—in their praxis of living, sensing, thinking.

The specific Eurocentric rationality that Quijano described as Eurocentrism held two basic assumptions: the logic of either/or (constitution/destitution) and the unilinear concept of universal time. Both are the legacies of Western Christianity that mutated into secular versions in the eighteenth century. The logic of either/or (binary oppositions) naturalizes the sensorium and the rationality of the zero-sum game that dominates the global order today. The notion of unilinear time also has its origin in Christianity. It goes from the creation of the world to its end (eschaton)—all that God created will be destroyed (2 Peter 3:10). G.W.F. Hegel narrated the secular version in his lesson on the philosophy of history and spatialized time. In that version, the journey of the Spirit from its origin in ancient China to the present in Europe announces the future of history without end in sight. The future, for Hegel, was the United States and, up to that point, he was right. The spatialization of time was and continues to be fundamental know-how for the denial of coevalness in words, which substantiates the deeds (Fabian, 1983). Consequently, the territorial constitution of Western Civilization (located in the space of Western Christians) was tantamount to the march of universal time that constituted Europe’s present and relegated coexisting civilizations to the past.

A summary of the colonial matrix of power from 1500 to 1989 would help to clarify the history preceding the periodization in this volume: 1989–2008, 2008–22, and 2022–40. Conceptually, the colonial matrix of power is grounded
on the universal temporalization of space sustained by the logic of either/or. This logic secured the second nomos of the Earth from 1500 to 1918 and its unipolar control and management, first by Western Christianity, and then by secular liberalism since the eighteenth century. The summary goes like this:

From 1500 to 1750, the Eurocentric frame was dominated by Christian theology and Renaissance Humanism. The universities and theological seminaries shaped and distributed knowledge managing people’s subjectivity (Vilches, 2010). Mercantile capitalism extended throughout the globe from the Americas to South Asia (Britain) and Southeast Asia (the Netherlands). It altered sensorium and intellect in conflict with that of the Church and helped create the conditions for the industrial revolution and for the displacement of the monarchic states by the ethno-bourgeois nation-states. The Enlightenment flourished at this junction. Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nation* (1776) and mapped the economy, Immanuel Kant’s *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) remapped the Renaissance structure of knowledges, and the French Revolution (1789) provided the bases for the upcoming liberal nation-state. The Enlightenment was the continuation of the colonial revolution, without which it could not have been. International law was extended from the appropriation of land to the control of the seas (e.g., Grotius). The management of the colonial matrix of power changed hands and actors, but the colonial will to power and its salvationist rhetoric (not progress and civilization instead of spiritual salvation) continued to justify the implementation of the logic of coloniality. Globalization became full-blown.

From 1750 to 1945 England and France dominated the scene, displacing Spain and Portugal from their previous dominant positions in the management of money and meaning (Rolph-Trouillot, 2002). The Industrial Revolution secured the imperial/colonial prominence of England. The steamboat increased the numbers of people and commodities transported across continents, and the railroad opened the veins of each continent to be explored, appropriated, divided, and distributed at will, although not always without resistance and resentment—domination and exploitation always created conflicts. In this period the nation-state form of governance consolidated in Europe and the secularization of the Renaissance model of the university secured the Westernization of the planet. By the mid-nineteenth century, three major political, theological, and humanistic systems of ideas (e.g., ideologies) that originated in the sixteenth century mutated into their secular political versions: (1) the conservative position defended the Spanish right to wage war against the barbarians, (2) the progressive position defended the “Indians” promoting instead peaceful conversion, and (3) the theological-legal position recognized the right of the “Indians” to
their land but declared them incapable of its administration. The first mutated into secular conservatism, the second into secular socialism, and the third into secular liberalism (Cortés, 1851). The Russian Revolution (1917–23) materialized socialism; the Alt-Right in the United States and Europe is not a new phenomenon: their ancestors go back to the sixteenth century. These three trajectories guided European global expansion until World War II. And European liberalism mutated into U.S. neoliberalism, whose seeds were planted in the late 1940s and ’50s (Metcalf, 2017).

From 1945 to 1989 a series of events altered and metamorphosed the structure of the colonial matrix as it was established in its previous iterations (1500–1945). One of them was the United States becoming the major player in the continuity of Westernization and of safeguarding the global order (Hudson, 2003). The rhetoric of modernity mutated from demanding progress and the civilizing of the barbarians, to promoting their development and modernization. This change in the rhetoric of Western modernity has enormous implications. While the former maintained a balance between the economy (progress) and the larger sphere of culture (civilizing and educating the backward), development and modernization made the economy the focus of Western saviors: to develop and modernize the underdeveloped. It was also the consolidation of coloniality without settler colonies, which had already been experienced in the Opium War. China did not endure settler coloniality, like India, but did not escape coloniality altogether. The current Western conflicts with China have much to do with this. Westerners may have forgotten, but the Chinese never will. The prominent role of the United States after World War II intensified the conflict with the Soviet Union that morphed into the Cold War.

The other event was decolonization. This was not just a drift of the colonial matrix of power but calling it into question. Decolonization confronted both liberal capitalism and state communism. The Bandung Conference of 1955 remains the signpost of the global questioning of globalization. From the trunk of the Bandung Conference, three major independent branches emerged. One was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), complemented in the Caribbean with the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in 1966. There is a significant difference between the Bandung Conference and its heirs. “Race” was a basic mover. “This is the first inter-continental conference of colored people,” Sukarno stated in his inaugural speech. Race was displaced by ideology in the NAM, and “decolonization” was mitigated in its statement of purpose. Cuba was not exempt from racial (and sexual) blindness. The emphasis then changed to class. The NAM confrontation was not with colonization but with capitalism and communism, even though Bandung and the NAM set up a Third World standing that aimed to delink from the First and the Second Worlds. While one outgrowth from Bandung was the
NAM, the second was dewesternization. Singapore gained independence four years after the Bandung Conference and was led by Lee Kwan Yew from 1959 to 1990. In retrospect, Singapore was the seed of dewesternization. What Lee Kwan Yew rejected was not capitalism, but liberal ideology and Western attitudes. When Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of the People’s Republic of China and pioneered “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and a “socialist market,” he was in conversation with Lee Kwan Yew (2012: 1–36). From 1959 to 1990, Singapore became a prominent financial Third World center, while at the same time it kept distance from the West and encouraged the reconstitutions of Eastern principles and praxis of living (Skaria, 1994). Deng Xiaoping followed a similar path, appropriating capitalism to secure the reconstitution of the Chinese ancestral praxis of living and thinking. In a nutshell, while Bandung confronted capitalism in the name of decolonization and the NAM promoted Third World nationalism, dewesternization embraced capitalism but rejected liberal and neoliberal managerial ideologies. Since then, dewesternization has continued to grow and assert itself as a present path towards the future (I will come back to this in the next section). The third outgrowth of Bandung was decoloniality, as Quijano reoriented at the end of the Cold War. The goal of decoloniality was to delink from the epistemological principles, the structure and content of knowledges and knowing that held the colonial matrix of power together with the nation-state, managing all political, economic, and cultural areas of experience.


The Russian invasion of Ukraine is either a turning point of the emerging multipolar global order or a difficult moment in the preservation of unipolarity. Beyond the human suffering, anguish, and disruption of the everyday life of the population who experience invasion and disruption (Iraq, Syria), the confrontation between unipolar globalism and global multipolarity is a confrontation for either the preservation of the privileges generated by the second nomos of the Earth or an opening toward the third nomos of the Earth (Turse, 2022). However, the march towards the third nomos is limited neither to appropriation, division, and distribution of the land nor to the political, economic, technological, and military confrontation of rewesternization and dewesternization. The forces of decolonization at large are also global. What global multipolarity would look like if the dewesternization were to advance is difficult to imagine by either the actors running international political and economic institutions or scholars and journalists interpreting what is done. Equally difficult to imagine is how unipolarity will look if rewesternization takes one step forward, having to confront the coexistence of dewesternization and decoloniality at large. But this could be advanced: the current global problems cannot be solved with the same mentality that created them. Hence, unipolar
globalism will be dissolved and submit to global multipolarity. If the reader thinks this cannot happen and is idealistic, I would ask: why should we think that getting out of the current either/or zero-sum game is impossible, and that endless war is the future forever?

Let’s step back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the neoliberal global dreams of the end of history and the homogenization of the planet encountered increasing defiance. In Schmitt’s account, the second nomos was destroyed by World War I. Today, in retrospect, one has the feeling that what ended was the unipolar world order established by the second nomos. But its legacy endured and was revamped by neoliberal ideals at the end of World War II, reactivated in the ’80s, and implemented globally in the ’90s. The European Union was inaugurated in 1993 and the World Trade Organization was founded in January of 1995, four years after the regional North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was put into effect on January 1, 1994. The same day, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) raised arms and words, mobilizing a vast population of Indigenous people in southern Mexico and Guatemala. In 1997, Subcomandante Marcos circulated an op-ed titled “The Fourth World War Has Begun” (Marcos, 1997). The signs of an emerging third nomos of the Earth were showing up.

The year 2001 is a date to remember. In September the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers collapsed. We may never know who planned and executed the operation, why and with what purpose. What we do know are the consequences: the redefinition of terrorism, the justification of the just war as long as necessary, and the legitimacy of invading countries supposedly involved or supporting the terrorists. The unipolarity secured by the second nomos was redesigned. However, in 2001 China joined the WTO and, in retrospect, the seeds of dewesternization planted a few decades before in Singapore and China began to grow. In the subsequent years, the failure to build Iraq after invading and dismantling the country in 2003, compounded with the financial turmoil of 2008 which shook the global financial system, were two events fogging the neoliberal design to revamp the second nomos to homogenize the Earth under the banners of political and economic unipolarity and epistemic universality.

This sketchy account of events points towards Western (U.S., NATO, EU) loss of managerial control of the colonial matrix of power. Political/economic unipolarity and epistemic universality (Eurocentrism), two legacies of the second nomos, became harder to maintain. Decolonization during the Cold War and dewesternization brought unexpected features into the global order. The decolonial claims made at the Bandung Conference and maintained by the leaders of decolonization in Africa made it possible to think that there was a life beyond liberalism and communism: the long-lasting memories, praxis of living and thinking of the people fighting to liberate themselves from either version of Western cosmology. Deng Xiaoping announced China’s politics in the two formulae “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” and “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The announcements
were taken with ironic smiles by Western commentators. They smiled because Western cosmology trains the sensorium and the intellect of its subjects to feel, think of Western binary oppositions as universal totalities. Therefore, capitalism and socialism cannot complement each other: they are irreducible to each other. But if your sensorium and your intellect are trained to feel, think, and see complementary dualities (e.g., there is no day without night, no left without right, no West without East; no North without South) and that yin and yang are two moieties of tianxia (all under heaven), then capitalism and socialism with Chinese characteristic make sense because they are appropriated and subsumed under another cosmology. Capitalism and socialism are denaturalized, so to speak, and the zero-sum game loses its meaning. The Chinese position on Ukraine today refuses to buy into the Western zero-sum game (Tsu, 2010). This is another sign of the emerging third nomos of the Earth.

Another feature brought to light by decolonization and dewesternization, which points towards the third nomos, is the productive tension between the existing praxis of living (languages, memories, sensing, thinking) with the invading Western coloniality of power. Decoloniality and dewesternization emerged at the moment that people who experienced the disruption decided not to surrender but to reemerge. The question is not one of returning to a pristine past, but rather of bringing the past to the present, reconstituting the praxis of living temporally destituted by the promises of modernity. Dewesternization appropriates capitalism but rejects Western cosmology as well as political liberalism, neoliberalism, and Western Christianity while using Marxism at will. These are all disruptions activated by the second nomos and the Western unipolar management of the colonial matrix of power. And this is the major difference between (a) decolonization during the Cold War and (b) dewesternization and decoloniality after the Cold War. Dewesternization was not then an option. Decolonization during the Cold War questioned capitalism and communism but failed to confront the colonial matrix of power that engendered and sustained both. Since the end of the Cold War, decoloniality has called into question the coloniality of power while dewesternization disputes its control and management. Another sign of the emerging third nomos of the Earth: unipolar globalism and universal rationalism, conquered during the second nomos, have exploded.

A third path I would like to underscore, beyond the sphere of global interstate political, economic, technological, and military conflicts just outlined, is decoloniality at large. By decoloniality at large I mean the sphere that Immanuel Wallerstein described as “antisystemic movements” (Wallerstein, 2014). The differences between decoloniality at large and antisystemic movements is embedded in the difference between world-systems (Wallerstein) analysis and the colonial matrix of power (Quijano). Wallerstein continued the work of prominent French historian Fernand Braudel (1973) while Quijano started from the prominent Argentine economist Raul Prebisch who, in the 1950s, introduced the ground-breaking
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distinction of center-periphery. This dynamic was invisible for Braudel and Wallerstein, who looked at the world from the North Atlantic. Prebisch, in Quijano’s interpretation, underscored “the historical model for the control of labor, resources, and products that shaped the central part of the new global model of power, starting with America as a player in the new world-economy,” without which the modern world-system “cannot be properly or completely understood” (Quijano, 2000: 180). Race is missing in Wallerstein’s antisystemic movements.

For Quijano, unlike for Wallerstein and Braudel, “race” rather than “class” is the concept that legitimized the historical foundation of capitalism based on massive expropriation of land and the massive exploitation of labor. Hence, by decoloniality at large I mean the myriad manifestations of the political society in the public sphere that not only resist but also reexist. That is, they delink from the regulation of the colonial matrix of power. However, since the colonial matrix of power has no outside, delinking is not exiting but a commitment to carry out civil and epistemic disobedience. Briefly, a wide spectrum of society has been mobilized by the current dispute for control of the colonial matrix of power in the domains of knowledge and the standards of white heteronormativity. All of these are signs the colonial matrix of power is getting out of control; the second nomos is being destroyed (to use Schmitt vocabulary), and the third nomos of the Earth is emerging.

Decoloniality and dewesternization share epistemic disobedience. Western theories of international relations, formulated on the secular idea and the nation-state form of governance (Kissinger, 2014), are called into question by de-Western and decolonial scholarship. I will close by discussing one instance of de-Western epistemic disobedience, and leave decoloniality aside for another opportunity. Dewesternized, like rewesternized scholarship (Kissinger, 2014; Brzezinski, 2016; Fukuyama, 2011) on international relations, is connected to the state, while the impact of decolonial scholarship is mainly in the social sciences and the public sphere. State politics and decoloniality are strange bedfellows.

Chinese philosopher and political theorist Zhao Tingyang has argued for dewesternization of international relations in his articles, interviews, and landmark book All under Heaven: The Tianxia System for a Possible World Order (2016). His argument is not proposing to replace one rational universality by another or one unipolarity for another. That would mean surrendering to the zero-sum game. Multipolarity in the world order requires pluriversal theories as much as unipolarity in the world order requires universal theories. Instead of assuming that the international order shall be regulated by political theories based on the Western nation-state and on Western political cosmology, Zhao dug into the past of ancient China (as much as Western theorists dug into the past of Greece and Rome), assisted by archeological and ethnohistorical research, drinking from the fountains of Chinese cosmology—tianxia, all under heaven. Why, Zhao asks, should Western theories of political sciences be the sole criteria for interstate relations? His question
has wider consequences. At stake is the entire domain of modern/colonial Western knowledge and its cosmological underpinnings.\textsuperscript{14}

There is a caveat before taking the next step into Zhao’s argument. In early February of 2022, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed a document titled the “Joint Statement of International Relations” and, as a result, entered a new era of international relations not defined by the West (Qingqing & Yuwei, 2022).\textsuperscript{15} If you search for this statement, you will find articles about it in the Western media bearing titles with the clause “against the West.” Decolonially read, the statement is not “against the West” but rather “pro the East.”\textsuperscript{16} Zhao’s argument disobeys and delinks from Western theories and state-led praxis in words and deeds. It is not anti, but pro: towards pluriversal theories of international relations. Unavoidably, Zhao’s de-Western theorizing acts out border thinking and border gnoseology, avoiding the trap of territorial thinking and Western epistemology. Similarly, the “Joint Statement” presupposes border thinking since it could not exist by itself as if Western and North Atlantic regulations of international relations did not exist.

For Zhao, the current unipolar global order is a nonworld, a disorder. The main challenge of getting off the \textit{unworld} and engaging in \textit{worlding} it is to extricate ourselves from the belief that the current \textit{unworld} that satisfies the interests and decisions of the G7 is the only available option. Zhao’s points display the direction of his thought:

\begin{quote}
My reimagining of the concept of \textit{tianxia} (\textit{All Under Heaven}) suggests a system of \textit{world order for and by all the world’s people}. This political ideal is not some unrealizable utopia but rather an accessible \textit{xontopia}. The concept of \textit{tianxia} was a political starting point for China. In contrast to the Greek \textit{polis} as the political starting point of Europe, \textit{tianxia} as a concept indicates that \textit{Chinese political thinking} had begun with an all-encompassing “world” rather than an exclusionary and discrete conception of sovereign “states.” [ . . . ]

Being so much more than a solution to the challenge of Huntington’s thesis regarding the inevitable clashes of civilizations, \textit{tianxia} is also an effective response to the failure of international politics with its regnant paradigm of zero-sum competitive logics obtaining among states and its woefully ineffective game rules that use only hostile strategies which are incapable of solving the world political problems.” (Zhao Tingyang, 249–50, italics added)
\end{quote}

“A world order by and for all people” doesn’t mean that China should be the supreme regulator of such a world order, for that would be another version of unipolarity. Zhao is not proposing a “new” unipolar world order controlled by China instead of the West. This would be a misreading of his argument and, by implication, of the Chinese government’s international politics. What Zhao proposes is a theoretical-political frame to make sense of de-Western pluriversal political philosophy and de-Western multipolarity for global interstate relations proposed by the joint statement. By definition, multipolarity cannot be unipolarly managed! The sensorium and intellect guided by \textit{yin-yang} could not be subsumed
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and reduced to the sensorium and intellect still following the “friend-enemy” logic (i.e., “you are with me or against me”). Consequently, the question of the future in the present (2022–40) is this: in the twenty-first century, when across the planet scholars, politicians, and journalists are experiencing the closing of unipolarity and the desperate effort to maintain its privileges, why should the global world order rely solely on unipolarity in deeds and universality in words?

Zhao calls the current unworld the privatization of interpretations and judgments. His arguments help intellectuals understand the current efforts of the United States, NATO, and the EU to maintain the unipolar perspective (Zhao Tingyang, 2016: 205, 208) and to contain the political, economic, and military disobedience. Zhao offers some advice on this matter: “Since Christianity conquered Greek civilization, a logic of struggle against heresy has taken shape in the West; with this, the West has come to see the world as being mired in conflictual opposition and warfare” (2016: 206). The world itself, Zhao adds, “has ceased to have potential for subjective agency and has now become a mere object. Because of this, all the myriad things of the world and all its diverse peoples have lost their unique histories. Any history and culture existing prior to becoming part of this totalizing ‘Christian’ civilization is viewed as forsaken and having hitherto existed only in a meaningless, existential absurdity” (2016: 208).

Globalism is another word and a secular version of the Western totalizing conception of the cosmos and human history and its implementation to pull everyone under the one big umbrella.

The Advent of the Third Nomos of the Earth

At stake is the global order rather than globalization. I have argued that globalization is not a network of events and processes happening as globalization, but that events and processes are not globalization until they are named, described, analyzed, and explained as such. For that reason, I focused on globalism, the global designs that the nominative globalization hides and that allows us to understand how globalization is made. Once a nominative has been accepted, it becomes an anchor for a set of conversations that connect statemen, scholars, journalists, artists, curators, and society at large. The same could be said for all nominatives and descriptors that anchor sustained domains of conversations such as the cosmos of theoretical physics, the divinity of religions, and the art of museums. Conversations coordinate domains of interactions, harmonic and conflicting, to the point that we forget to ask when and where the conversation started, who put it in motion, why and what for. The global order is being shaped up by the advent of the third nomos of the Earth in the coexistence of dewesternization, rewesternization, and decoloniality.

My first epigraph underscores cultural dewesternization (beyond the sphere and coexisting with states’ political decision-making), featuring prominent Japanese curator Yuko Hasegawa, whose work has been questioning the assumed epistemic Eurocentrism and globalism. The second epigraph comes from a prominent
Peruvian sociologist who addresses Eurocentrism and the totality of knowledge. Both statements make a similar claim: to liberate ourselves (Hasegawa) and divest ourselves (Quijano) from Eurocentrism, globalism, and similar -isms. They are similar but irreducible to each other. These gestures move both dewesternization in state politics and in the politics of academic scholarship (Zhao), as well as in curatorial praxis in museums and biennials. Similarly, decoloniality activates the public sphere and the political society mobilizing its/our potential to delink from futures grounded on zero-sum games in any area of experience. The advent of the third nomos of the Earth implies the competition for the appropriation, division, and distribution of the Earth in Schmitt’s conceptualization, as well as the increasing political claims of Indigenous organization to get back the stolen land. Parallel to the domains where politico-economic conflicts are driven by dewesternization and rewesternization, there is the domain of the political society in the public sphere where cultural dewesternization and decoloniality at large are moved by similar concerns: exiting the failures of modernization, as Yuko Hasegawa titled one of her recent exhibits (Hasegawa, 2016). These are some of the signs pointing towards the emerging third nomos of the Earth.

NOTES

1. Globalism was a felicitous call made by Manfred B. Steger (Steger, 2005). I paired it with global designs (Mignolo, 2003).
3. This book was written just before the collapse of the Soviet Union (Latouche, 1989).
5. In the eighteenth century the secularization of linear time went from the primitive to civilized man (Mignolo, 2011).
6. Immanuel Wallerstein identified three system of ideas holding the modern world-system: conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.
7. A few years before, Juan Bosch, former president of the Dominican Republic, elected democratically and deposed by a coup with the support of the United States, published a small book, Pentagonism: A Substitute for Imperialism (Bosch, 1969).
10. Indigenous cosmologies in the Americas are similar to Chinese’s cosmology in that they all refuse binary opposition fixity. Complementarity duality and example: Kapenawa & Albert (2013).
11. From Henry David Thoreau to Mohandas Gandhi, from the Zapatistas to the Jinology of Rojava Women, from the Peasant Way to Rhodes Must Fall and Black Lives Matter, and more, epistemic disobedience is moved by racial and sexual discrimination. The aims are not just to resist, but to reexist.
12. The bibliography is vast at his point. For an overview, see Krishna (2012).
13. See also Yan (2013) and Zhang (2012). The latter includes a conversation of the author with Francis Fukuyama.
14. On pluriversality, decoloniality, and dewesternization, see Mignolo (2018a, 2018b).
17. Japanese curator Yuko Hasegawa curated the Sharjah Biennial 11 in 2013. She titled it “Towards a New Cultural Cartography.” In her curatorial statement she pointed out that the biennial intended to depart from Westernism, Eurocentrism, and equivalent “isms.” More recently, 2016, she curated an exhibition in Germany titled “The New Sensorium: Exiting the Failures of Modernization.”

REFERENCES


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