

The *Longue Durée* and the Short Circuit

Gender, Language, and Territory in the Making of Indigenous Taiwan

Linguistic variation was the order of the day in nineteenth-century East Asia, as for most of the world. Before the advent of universal education and vernacular dictionaries, humanity's thousands of mother tongues were geographically circumscribed.¹ As we saw in chapter 1, communication by relay through chains of interpreters severely limited the scope and subtlety of linguistic transactions between Taiwan's natives and newcomers.² However, as long as states did not require routinized and rapid communication between capitals, and capitals between peripheries, the slow and halting process of cross-border translation did not become an overriding concern of central administrators.

Higher state capacities, longer imperial reaches, and administrative integration became imperative for dynastic states with the arrival of international society in East Asia on the helms of steam-powered gunships. This was the lesson future Meiji Restorationists learned from Perry's gunboats in 1854 and the Qing from the 1874 Taiwan Expedition that brought 3,658 Japanese occupiers to Langqiao. Now, a ship's crew running afoul of coastal wreckers on distant shores could be construed as injurious to national dignity or, perhaps worse, the steady flow of population-sustaining commerce. Left unresolved, such occurrences often spiraled into international incidents that brought indemnities and unwanted treaties in their wake.³

Accordingly, the Qing launched numerous attempts to extend its administrative reach deeper into Taiwan's interior after the shock of '74, with varying degrees of success. Nonetheless, when the Japanese regime replaced the Qing in the summer of 1895, the riddle of central command and control across Taiwan's complex linguistic landscape still awaited a solution.

When Japanese troops and officials arrived in northern Taiwan during May 1895, only a small minority of Taiwanese could speak the dialect of Chinese, Beijing

“official speech,” that Japanese interpreters could understand. The language barrier was made more insurmountable by the Meiji-period drift away from Chinese-language training in favor of Western languages. For example, of the forty students enrolled at the Army Staff College in 1885, “twenty-five studied French, fifteen German, and none Chinese.” As for study abroad, the numbers reveal the same lack of institutional interest in China. Of the seven hundred ninety-two graduates of the Army Staff College in 1883–1914, eighty-one studied in Germany, thirty-three in France, twenty-nine in Russia, twenty-four in Britain, and thirteen in China.⁴

A few unconventional military men and commercial innovators kept their sights on China despite the “civilization and enlightenment” period’s fascination with the West. Most famously, the “continental adventurers” (*tairiku rōnin*) advocated a China-first orientation for Japan’s foreign relations. Foremost among them was Arai Kiyoshi, who transferred to the China section of the General Staff from the Kumamoto infantry in 1885. Aside from presumed cultural ties and a collective sense of grievance at Western gunboat diplomacy, *rōnin* of Arai’s disposition believed that Japanese could not hope to compete successfully with Western merchants in Europe and the Americas. Therefore, Arai and like-minded *rōnin* saw Sino-Japanese trade as a potential engine for Japanese national wealth and large military budgets in the era of “survival of the fittest.”

Arai was sent to Shanghai in 1886 to gather military intelligence. He conducted operations under cover of pharmaceutical giant Kishida Ginkō, founder of the Ginza-headquartered pharmaceutical company Rakuzendō. Kishida opened Rakuzendō branches in Shanghai, Fuzhou, and Hankou in the 1880s. Kishida was also Japan’s first journalistic war correspondent, whose eyewitness coverage of the Taiwan Expedition of 1874 made him a national figure. On the mainland, Kishida provided lodging, food, and cover for Japanese students of Chinese language and for government spies. Under Kishida’s and Arai’s tutelage, Rakuzendō “employees,” Japanese men wearing queues and dressed in tunics, fanned out across the continent to learn the languages, geography, commercial habits, and folkways of China.

After his return from China in 1889, Arai vigorously promoted plans for a large, government-assisted Japan-China Trading Company to coordinate strategy and resources for Japanese commercial expansion onto the continent. Arai also proposed an attached training institute for Chinese language, geography, and business practices. From cabinet members to public audiences of potential students, employers, and entrepreneurs, thousands of Japanese heard Arai’s message. Promised public funding for the trading company and research institute, however, evaporated with the fall of the Kuroda cabinet and the seating of the fiscally conservative Constitution Diet in 1890.

Nonetheless, the *Nisshin bōeki kenkyūjo* (Sino-Japanese Commercial Research Institute) opened with a class of 150 students, selected by exam from a pool of 300 applicants that same year. Arai’s *Nisshin bōeki kenkyūjo* established a rigorous four-year curriculum that taxed many students beyond endurance. The school

was always on the brink of bankruptcy. Had it been a completely private concern, it surely would have collapsed. Arai's dense network of military connections in Tokyo made the difference. Vice-Chief of Staff Kawakami Sōroku, in charge of intelligence gathering in China, garnered emergency funding from the Diet and kept the research institute afloat. Though the institute cannot be called a government school, the Japanese Army lent it facilities for recruitment. In June 1893, its first graduating class of 89 finished just in time for the start of the Sino-Japanese War. Over 70 of these 89 graduates served as army interpreters or spies during the 1894–95 conflict.⁵

Arai's research institute could not, however, meet the demands of a protracted continental war. Apparently, the first call for interpreter applications met its yield target in September 1894. The theater of war quickly expanded, however, and by October the army began inducting less-qualified translators out of desperation. For example, forty students at the Kumamoto Kyūshū Gakuin were given accelerated training and pressed into service to make up for the shortage.⁶ Mori Ushinosuke, who studied Chinese at a Nagasaki commercial school before the war's outbreak, recalled:

At the time, anyone who could communicate in Chinese was recruited by the Army and sent to the Liaodong battle area; soon a shortage of manpower developed, and they began to use men who had barely a whiff of Chinese language training. If I think about it now, it is a kind of joke, because even those of us who could not understand Chinese were added to the ranks of these men. Since I did not continue with this work, I have long forgotten the words of Chinese that I did learn. But though I have no knowledge of Chinese at the present time, my associates and I, the ones unskilled in Chinese, were soon studying and being drilled, and we became very good Chinese translators.⁷

Those who answered the call to serve in the theater of war were classified as army auxiliaries and paid at the bottom of the officer's scale, between twenty-five and fifty yen per month. When the mainland phase of the war concluded in April 1895, many wartime interpreters went on to work for Japanese firms in mainland China, clustering around Shanghai and Hankou. Others went to Taiwan.⁸

Of the roughly 150,000 Japanese men activated for the Sino-Japanese War from June 1894 through the dissolution of imperial headquarters on March 31, 1896, over a third served in Taiwan at one time or another.⁹ Eleven translators accompanied Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa's expedition to Danshui on August 9, 1895. Their mission was to establish a Japanese capital in Taipei. The interpreters came directly from Lüshun, Liaodong Peninsula, still wearing winter jackets. Highlighting the scarcity of interpreters, Fukushima refused an urgent request to spare a few to the Imperial Guard. Indeed, in the report he filed, interpreters accompanied every landing party and participated in missions great and small, dangerous and routine. For their contributions to the mission, completed on August 25, 1895, interpreters

were awarded thirty-yen bonuses for meritorious service, on top of monthly salaries that ranged from thirty to sixty-five yen.¹⁰

Nonetheless, the bonuses did not provoke a flood of reenlistments. The *Daily Yomiuri* announced on September 12, 1895, that the military police (*kenpeitai*) in Taiwan “needed sixty translators.” Of the three regiments sent from Hiroshima to Taiwan on September 2–3, one left with two translators; the rest embarked mute, waiting for help to catch up later, if it could be found. Men with abilities in spoken and written Chinese, who could “transmit orders, warnings, and information to the natives” were scarce indeed, pushing salaries to between thirty and seventy yen.¹¹

The veterans and graduates of the commercial schools who could be persuaded to cross the strait did not speak Minnan dialects (in Japanese, called *Taiwango* or *Forumosago*, or Taiwanese) or indigenous languages. By the same token, most Taiwanese did not speak the Beijing dialect known to Japanese interpreters as Southern Administrative Chinese (to distinguish it from Manchu, or Northern Administrative Chinese). Therefore, additional talent had to be recruited in Taiwan itself. In the early years, the military hired Taiwanese fluent in Mandarin as “auxiliary translators” (*fukutsūyaku*) to work with the Japanese translators. Brush talking was heavily utilized, leading to frustration and miscommunication.¹² A *Yomiuri* correspondent provided a brief sketch of the early history of communication problems in Taiwan in this August 19, 1895, dispatch from Houlong, Miaoli:

At first, when our military took Jilong and then occupied Taipei [May–August 1895], natives [*dojin*] who could speak Mandarin [*kango*] were rare. This caused difficulties for our official translators [*tsūyakukan*], needless to say. It got to the point where certain lieutenants asserted they would not use official translators. Although the number of natives who spoke Mandarin was insufficient as far as the official translators were concerned, happily everyday communication could be conducted without too many tie-ups. Moreover, as the days passed, many of the official translators learned to understand Taiwanese [*dogo*].

As this division began its advance south, from Taipei to Xinzhu, and then from Xinzhu to Houlong, the language changed radically along with the topography. . . . The natives in the Houlong area do not speak Mandarin, so many discussions were conducted by brush talking [*hitsudan*], which was bothersome. To be sure, Houlong’s numerous so-called *jukuban* speak their own local version of Chinese, so some can speak a little Chinese. Nonetheless, unless some way can be found to translate this [local dialect] into Mandarin, the [Japanese] official translator cannot understand. This means that if another translator is brought in, three layers of interpretation have accumulated . . .

Again, brush talking is no simple matter, there are many idiosyncratic characters and colloquial phrases [in use among the locals]; often standard Chinese writing is not understood.¹³

The small corps of Japanese and Taiwanese military police with smatterings of language training could not meet the demand for translators that came with the

transition from regimes of punishment to regimes of discipline. By November 1896, the Civil Affairs Bureau and provincial administrations employed seventy-nine translators, all of them Japanese.¹⁴ Since the colony was in acute fiscal crisis in its early years, augmenting this expensive corps was impossible. An economical compromise was proposed on July 25, 1897. Taiwan prefectural officials proposed ten-yen monthly pay supplements as incentives to keep policemen proficient in Taiwanese from escaping to the private sector and to encourage further efforts at language acquisition, but the proposal was rejected.

The administration of Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shinpei (1898–1906) is often credited with bringing discipline to Taiwan. As part of a flurry of new measures, in April 1898, Imperial Order 68 was issued. It stipulated that *hannin* rank (fourth class) civil officials, police officers, and jail guards were eligible for stipends of up to seven yen per month as auxiliary translators. Qualified applicants would be paid bonuses to act as translators in addition to performing their prescribed duties.¹⁵ Evaluations of the first round of applications for auxiliary-translator pay supplements (*kensho*) in May 1898 indicate that about 18 percent of Japanese policemen had at least some familiarity with “Taiwanese,” while 6 percent of patrolmen and 9 percent of officers could “communicate effectively” or were considered “fluent.”¹⁶ Some 82 percent of Japanese policemen had no familiarity with a Taiwanese language in mid-1898. Even in the mother country, this state of affairs appeared alarming. In June 1899, the Taiwan Society, a group of powerful lobbyists that included ex-governors-general and some of Japan’s top politicians,¹⁷ lauded the *kensho* policy, explaining that the language barrier had fomented much “Taiwanese resentment and Japanese anger.”¹⁸ In October 1899, the government-general responded again. Taiwanese language institutes were attached to subprefectures (*benmusho*) and police stations to increase the number of qualified auxiliary translators. In September 1900, the Land Survey, Railway, and Camphor Monopoly Bureaus added language institutes to their local stations, as well.¹⁹

The Taiwan Government-General instituted the camphor monopoly in 1899 as one of several programs to address the fiscal crisis. After a rocky start, it established itself as a cash cow, thus impelling the state to abandon its role as peace-maker between indigenes and camphor workers. The government-general allowed existing private armies to guard camphor fields from the start. But with the camphor monopoly in place, it deployed its own policemen to protect the workers. It also devised legal machinery to dispossess indigenes of forest lands. These related projects touched off a rash of violent reprisals, which elevated the communication gap with rebelling Atayal, Sediq, and Truku speakers in Taiwan’s north to a matter of national security.

The government-general thereafter launched programs in Austronesian-language education for Japanese policemen and Japanese-language training for Taiwanese. It also sanctioned and bankrolled intercultural marriages to overcome linguistic divides that were formerly bridged by unreliable, free-booting

interpreters. In the short term, these policies appeared successful. By 1915, the government-general had achieved a military victory by disarming most “northern tribes,” as we saw in chapter 1. But while the state more or less established a monopoly on the legitimate use of force along the savage border by 1923, it did not horizontally integrate the fractured political and linguistic terrain of the so-called Aborigine Territory, nor could it instantiate a disciplined society beyond the edge of the *baojia* units (regularly administered territory). The costs associated with training its own officials in myriad indigenous languages or building a school system that could shift the burden of translanguaging to the indigenes proved too high for the always cash-strapped government-general.

Therefore, the government-general abandoned its mission to enforce the standard of sovereignty outlined in Ōkubo Toshimichi’s 1874 admonitions regarding the Qing’s uneven and dissipated sovereignty on its borderlands. What had been an expedient policy of benign neglect in the late 1890s hardened into a conscious policy of legally pluralistic, ethnically bifurcated administration in Taiwan.

During the 1920s, budgetary constraints and the appearance of calm reduced further the state’s allocations for manpower and infrastructure in the highlands.²⁰ Yet the Taiwan Government-General stepped up its resource-extracting activities. Postmortems of the Wushe Rebellion blamed the overbearing demands of the state, in the disciplinary vacuum left by government on the cheap, for the conflagration. As we shall see, the stunted communications network encouraged by recourse to political marriages and reliance on *tōmoku* (headmen) created numerous blind spots for the state. As the 1874 invasion shocked the Qing, the 1930 Wushe uprising prompted the government-general to launch sweeping administrative reforms.

The first order of business was to reform the police service and rid aborigine administration of underachievers and shady characters.²¹ The *tōmoku* who remained “incorrigible at heart” were the next targets. A concerted effort to reform aborigine customs utilized discipline-making techniques, with an emphasis on “imperial subjectification” (inculcating “Japanese spirit”). However, although these policies were superficially assimilationist, they did not portend the horizontal integration of the colony but rather reinforced the boundaries of an ethnic enclave.

To intensify imperial subjectification (*kōminka*), the government-general demoted “chiefs” (*shūchō*, *tōmoku*, *shuryō*, *domoku*) or “village elites” (*seiryokusha*)²² and promoted a generation of young “pioneers” (*senkusha*) and youth associations (*seinendan*)²³ to replace them as intermediaries. In the bargain, the daughters of the chiefs and village elites ceased to function as prominent political actors. Women such as Tata Rara, Iwan Robao, Yayutz Beriya, Yawai Taimu, Chiwas Ludaio, and others, and the Japanese men who married into their families, were no longer needed to maintain imperial rule in the uplands. This shift appears to have smoothed the linguistic interface in the indigenous territories, preparing the ground for its horizontal integration into the rest of the colony.

At the same time, decades of legal discrimination, economic protectionism, and third-rate education had locked the majority of indigenes, no matter how proficient in Japanese, into the status of perennial subalterns. By 1930, aborigine administration had become its own interest group, with publications, associations, and an esprit de corps. Moreover, the ethnic tourism industry, academic anthropology, and Japanese literary production discursively constituted the indigenous territory as “the real Taiwan.”

To be sure, indigene enrollments in night schools, police-station annexes (small installations dedicated to education), and elementary schools increased in the 1930s, as did the number of years of schooling for a minority of students. On the other hand, the variety of subjects taught, the quality of instructors, and opportunities for higher education remained limited by comparison with the lofty rhetoric of imperial subjectification. By the 1930s, although it went under the banner of assimilation and was dedicated to the diffusion of Japanese language and elements of home-country comportment, indigenous education came to mean “education to remain indigenous.”²⁴ At the time of war’s end in 1945, the second-order geobody of Taiwan’s indigenous territory had achieved unprecedented levels of linguistic and infrastructural integration, via Japanese language-training programs, state-organized pan-indigenous institutions, and the Taiwan Government-General’s road building program. In some respects, the indigenous territory bore many features of a community that could be imagined as a nation on the eve of Japan’s departure with the empire’s defeat. On the other hand, the indigenous territory’s denizens lacked rights in property, were cut off from the economic life of the rest of Taiwan, and were relegated to the role of toiling, honest, and loyal children of the emperor. In a word, the 1930s imperialization policies finished the job of turning erstwhile Qing border peoples into modern ethnic minorities.

THE GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR IN CROSS-BORDER COMMUNICATIONS

Before the Qing government could even sign the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858, foreign adventurers in Taiwan were testing the waters for trade and missionizing possibilities. In 1857, future British consul Robert Swinhoe wrote: “I had the pleasure of seeing a few [Indigenous] women, who were married to Chinese at . . . [Langqiao] . . . a Chinaman named Banchiang, of large landed property, traded with the Kalees [Rukai] of the hills . . . He was constantly at variance with the Chinese authorities who had outlawed him, but could not touch him, as he was so well defended by his numerous Chinese dependants, and the large body of Aborigines at his beck. This man was wedded to a Kalee.”²⁵

As we learned in chapter 1, there was no shortage of “outlaws” like Banchiang in late nineteenth-century Langqiao. Swinhoe’s vignette, however, is notable for exposing an element of Qing borderland society obscured by the outsized impact

of the Mudan village incident on historiography. The preponderance of documented transactions between natives and newcomers in 1860s–1870s Langqiao ran through the Siaoliao-Sabaree-Tuilasok corridor, or the Checheng-Poliac-Kuskus route along the Sichong River corridor. Male mediators such as Siaoliao native Miya and Poliac subofficial Yang Youwang (see chapter 1) are prominent in these records, because of their pivotal roles in the dramatic events of the epoch. Douglas Fix's research into Langqiao social history suggests, however, that female mediators also operated in this milieu: "Another group, unnamed older women—nearly all labeled 'aborigine' wives of headmen—seem to appear just as frequently as the [Miyas] in my sources. Their existence and recorded activities indicated that cross-community mediators were 'born' at the intersection of kinship connections, munitions markets, and castaway exchanges. Furthermore, the regularity of their mediation suggests that a gendered analysis of the historical constitution and reproduction of frontier communities is long overdue."²⁶

Xu Shirong's quantitative study of late Qing Hengchun social structure also notes the high incidence of intermarriage between Hakka residents of Langqiao and indigenous peoples. According to Xu, these intermarriages were woven into relations of mutual economic interdependence.²⁷ It may well be that male intermediaries such as Miya or Yang, who would qualify as "local gentry" under some definitions, typically dealt with conspicuously marked and well-armed official retinues of outsiders, while female interpreters such as those mentioned by Swinhoe, Fix, and Xu interfaced with smaller parties of traders, explorers, and missionaries.

For example, while traveling in a small party, William Pickering—whom we met earlier as LeGendre's interpreter—encountered a chief whom he referred to as a "Tong-su" (*tongshi*), the "headman of the tribe, responsible to the Chinese government." Pickering spoke to him through an "old woman, named Pu-li-sang, [who] was no novice to the ways of civilization, as she had, years ago, been married to a Chinese, and also had lived for some time with the [Tsou] Bangas . . ." ²⁸ On the eve of the Japanese invasion in 1874, American naturalist Joseph Steere also noted the role of indigenous women as mediators, writing that the "Kale-whan [Rukai], in times of scarcity, frequently sell their daughters to the Chinese and Pepo-whans [plains indigenes], who take them as supplementary wives and make them useful as interpreters in thus bartering with the savages. While we were among the Kale-whan the chief offered to sell us three girls of the tribe at twenty dollars each."²⁹

In world history, this was not an unusual arrangement; there are numerous examples from other times and places. In many cases, intercultural marriages were symbiotic, because outsiders provided access to far-flung trade networks or military alliances that could shore up a family's ascendancy in a fragmented milieu of stateless polities. In Taiwan, examples of such unions can be found in records going all the way back to the early seventeenth century. In fact, the term *tongshi*, employed by Pickering above, evokes a long history of semiofficial, bicultural

intermediaries who functioned on the fringes of Qing territory beginning in the Dutch era (1622–61).³⁰

Over the centuries of Qing rule (1683–1895) over Taiwan, *tongshi* were the primary conduits of trade and diplomacy during the era of tributary interstate relations in East Asia. The English word “interpreter” is a good approximation, but *tongshi* were more than linguistic adepts. They organized commerce, mediation, and taxation in the most sparsely populated areas of Taiwan. As would be the case during the period of Japanese colonial rule, *tongshi* often appeared as suspicious, disruptive, and not altogether trustworthy characters in Qing records.

Many of these intermediaries provided continuity between the successive Qing and Japanese imperial regimes in Taiwan. It is evident that ample room for cross-border maneuvering existed in Taiwan even after two centuries of Qing rule. On the eve of the handover to Japan in 1895, for example, Qing critics judged Shen Baozhen’s and Liu Mingchuan’s *kaishan fufan* policies to “open the mountains and pacify the indigenes” a failure. After twenty years and “several hundred million taels spent on road construction, military deployment, suppression and pacification of aborigines,” Han settlement had not increased appreciably outside southernmost Taiwan, while outlays remained exorbitant.³¹ Nonetheless, several individual campaigns and measures bore fruit, which supplied a small coterie of seasoned intermediaries who in turn formed the basis for the successor Japanese state’s attempt to integrate the indigenous territories into its empire. In the south (to be discussed in more detail below), a walled city, Hengchun, was built in 1875 as a base for pacification campaigns into the mountains. There, veteran Paiwan and Puyuma participants in the treaty-port diplomacy of the 1860s and 1870s signed on as Qing subofficials; many would later work for the Japanese. In the north, administrative beachheads were established near Wulai, Yilan, and Dakekan, which also became early base areas for Japanese rule in the indigenous territory.

The latter three northern examples were gateways into Atayal-dominated mountain interiors. There, various types of Atayal-Chinese interpreters mediated mountain-plain or state-society relations. Males, whether as subofficials or commercial operators, were called *tongshi* (interpreter). This title could be attached to a chief who collected information and mobilized labor for the Qing or to an interpreter for hire who had acquired language proficiency and political connections through intermarriage. In 1885, Governor Liu Mingchuan dispatched his son Chaohu to Quchi (near Wulai) at the head of three thousand soldiers. The eight villages of the area were named for the paramount chieftain Marai, who submitted to Liu that year. Marai was then deputized to collect information, coordinate gift distribution, and report to Liu for six Qing liang (Japanese *ryō*) per month.

Marai passed away around 1888 without a successor. A Wulai chief named Watan Yūra, the man we met in chapter 1 as Ueno Sen’ichi’s drinking partner and source of Atayal clothing and jewelry, filled the vacuum as the paramount headman of the Quchi tribes³² (see figure 18). The interpreters known to us as Aki and



FIGURE 18. Watan Yūra, ca. 1900. Goto Shimpei, “Formosa Under Japanese Administration,” *The Independent* 54, no. 2,796 (July 3, 1902): 1,582.

Kōan have been photographed with Watan Yūra (see figure 19). Aki and Kōan were Chinese by birth but became “Atayalized” over the decades. They moved into the mountains sometime in the 1870s.

Kōan was married to an Atayal woman and worked with the Japanese regiments stationed in Xindian in February 1896. Taiwan was still under military rule; the Xindian garrison was fighting Han rebels in Yilan. As the troops set out to survey a direct overland route from Taipei to Yilan, Kōan presented himself as an interpreter with local connections to the Quchi tribes. He arranged for Japanese forces to meet with the paramount chief of the eight villages, Watan Yūra, near Quchi on February 10. This led to a long series of parleys. The Japanese provided rice, liquor, gifts of various kinds, and assurances of protection from Chinese settlers in return for Quchi acquiescence in Japanese roadbuilding. These negotiations were carried out through an official Japanese translator, Kōan, and an Atayal man named Shiron, who had lived in Taipei and learned Chinese in the 1880s at Governor Liu Mingchuan’s Academy for Aborigine Boys.

If Kōan’s wife participated in these negotiations, her name was not mentioned. Female interpreters were referred to not as *tongshi* but as *banpu* (indigenous



FIGURE 19. Watan Yūra, Kōan, Aki, and Pazze Watan in 1903. Mori Ushinosuke, *Taiwan banzoku zufu*, vol. 1 (Taipei: Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai, 1915), plate 23.

females), though they often performed the same tasks as *tongshi*. The Atayal woman Awai and the Sediq woman Iwan Robao, for example, took the marriage route to becoming interpreters, as had Kōan. The most celebrated Atayal female interpreter, Yayutz Beriya, married a Japanese pharmacist named Nakano. Beyond taking the marriage route, Yayutz subjected herself to years of rigorous formal training in the Japanese school system to achieve prominence as a language teacher for Japanese policemen and as a famous interpreter.³³

In addition to the *tongshi* and *banpu* who learned languages through immersion, another type of Qing-period interpreter is exemplified by Pu Chin, a Dakekan-area native who learned to speak and write Chinese in a Qing school for indigenous children. In response to the booming export economy in camphor (see chapter 1), Governor Liu Mingchuan established the *Fukenu* (Bureau of Pacification) in 1886 to regulate relations between indigenes and Taiwan's Han population.³⁴ Its charter specified that "barbarian women (*banba*) should . . . greet and feast the barbarians (*banjin*) who come down from the mountains." The Japanese gloss to this passage added, "these are taken mainly from *banpu* (indigenous women) married to Chinese men (*Shinajin*)."³⁵

To mitigate the influence of the *banpu*, whose loyalties were necessarily divided, Governor Liu built a school to create a loyal corps of male interpreters. His academy

opened in 1890 and accepted twenty students; it added ten more in 1891—all sons of chiefs or men of influence, aged sixteen or seventeen *sui*.³⁶ Graduate Pu Chin was twenty-three years old and working in industry when he was hired by the Dakekan garrison to interpret for the Japanese in August or September 1895.³⁷ As recounted in chapter 1, the talks orchestrated by Pu Chin were initiated by the Dakekan garrison commander, one Captain Watanabe. On August 29, Watanabe sent a *seiban tongshi* (“savage interpreter”) to arrange for Jiaobanshan-area Atayal peoples to come down the mountain to speak with the Japanese. The next day, two women and five men showed up on neutral ground—down from the mountains, but beyond the rice fields abutting Dakekan walled city. Watanabe’s retinue brought over forty people, including soldiers, porters, and military police. It is likely that the younger of two Atayal women was an interpreter as well. She was about eighteen, wore manufactured Chinese clothing, and “could pass for Japanese but for her braided hair.” She appeared to be Atayal village’s delegate in dealings with Chinese.³⁸

A week later, current Taipei governor Tanaka Tsunatoku and future Taipei governor Hashiguchi Bunzō, each with a couple of staffers, left Taipei by train to meet the Dakekan garrison. This time, the Japanese arrived with an official translator (*tsūyaku-kan*), who translated Japanese into English and vice versa, and an unnamed Portuguese “temp” (*koin*) who translated between Taiwanese (*Taiwan dogo*) and English. In addition, they utilized two Atayal-Chinese interpreters, Pu Chin and Washiiga, to translate between Taiwanese and the Dakekan dialect of Atayal. At this parley, the relays were as cumbersome as those of Captain Cassel and Isa near Sabaree back in 1874 (see chapter 1).

The female Atayal interpreter named Washiiga was about nineteen years old. She had divorced a Chinese man at age sixteen, wore some “old Chinese clothing,” and understood the “Formosan-language somewhat.” Pu Chin, probably with Washiiga’s assistance, provided Hashiguchi and Tanaka with the names, domiciles, family relations, titles, and ages of the Atayal contingent in his all-important register.³⁹ Tanaka’s report, Hashiguchi’s report, and the Tokyo *Asahi* newspaper account, all based on eyewitness testimony, provide different names for the Atayal people, suggesting the uncertainty of the linguistic environment. Tanaka and Hashiguchi did not even agree on the number of Atayal people present at the lineup at their initial meeting, so opaque was the language situation.

While Governor Tanaka assiduously recorded the script of the speeches he made to the assembled Dakekan men (see chapter 1), he noted in his manuscript report that only the “gist” was communicated. His spoken words, after all, were converted from Japanese to English, English to Taiwanese, and then Taiwanese to Dakekan Atayal, so anything other than a few cardinal points would have been impossible to communicate.

To convince those who had traveled to Dakekan from Jiaobanshan to continue on to Taipei, the troops offered to surrender the four blankets they had lent to

the Atayal contingent, one blanket per person. Hashiguchi reported that the soldiers tried to explain to the Atayal people that the blankets were not the soldiers' private property but belonged to the platoon. The Atayal, for their part, believed that they already owned the blankets, even before the offer was made. Hashiguchi concluded that the Atayal people could not distinguish the concepts of *lend* and *give*, partly due to the small number of words in their language.

Rather, according to Hashiguchi, they conflated the concepts of *give* and *lend* into an Atayal concept somewhere in between that meant "to turn over, relinquish."⁴⁰ While Hashiguchi admitted that he was speculating, he had hit upon an important sticking point. The concepts of private property, ownership of goods, or keywords like *lend* and *borrow*, as we shall see in chapter 3, went beyond language difficulties and suggested fundamental differences in political economic cosmologies.⁴¹

After duly filing his reports and recommendations based on this encounter (see introduction and chapter 4 for details), Hashiguchi ordered subprefect Kawano Shuichirō to Yilan's Atayal territory. In September, "quite fortunately and by chance," they located four *tsūji* (interpreters) of former Qing employ and their *banpu* (indigenous women) wives. Kawano described the women as "pure indigenes with facial tattoos." The male interpreters themselves were described as *kabanjin* (transformed barbarians), a term applied to indigenes who had assimilated politically or culturally to Han folkways, though to a lesser extent than the *jukuban* (cooked barbarians). Kawano deputized the women as *tsūben* (go-betweens/interpreters) and ordered them to bring the chief of Xiyanlaowa village (Xitou) to the plains for a parley. The women then went inland and convinced a chief to meet Japanese officials on neutral ground.⁴² Awai, one of the *tsūben* hired by Kawano, was thirty years old and had been married to the *jukuban* Chen Xilai for eight years. Although she wore some Chinese clothes, she retained distinctive tattoos and spoke the local Atayal dialect.⁴³ Kawano also recorded the text of his lengthy speech. This long-winded admonition was presumably communicated through the government interpreter and the *tsūben* to the gathered Atayal men and women.

As was the case with the Hashiguchi/Tanaka mission and feasts during the 1874 invasion, Kawano's scribes were careful to transcribe and translate into Japanese a song relayed to the gathered listeners in Atayalic.⁴⁴ It is impossible to know if Japanese officials were putting words into the mouths of the gathered singers. In any event, Kawano, like Hashiguchi, was denied access to the abodes of these emissaries; he returned to Taipei satisfied that he had soothed the feelings of the Atayal people and allayed their suspicions of the new regime.

THE TROUBLE WITH TONGSHI

While male *tongshi* such as Pu Chin and female *tsūben* such as Awai, located in and around the Qing Pacification Offices, were readily available to lead Japanese

Army contingents to particular villages to read proclamations and distribute gifts, it would take many hundreds of interpreters to satisfy the needs of Japanese camphor industrialists, people in the tea business, and officials who were laying the groundwork for an island-wide infrastructure. As indicated by an early report in the magazine *Taiyō*, which described the frustratingly complex process of mediation in Taiwan's interior, locating and securing a sufficiently large and adept corps of translators would be a daunting task:

An interpreter is a Chinese who is good at indigenous languages and is conversant with conditions among indigenes. Each hamlet or group of hamlets has an interpreter (a hamlet is similar to our *buraku* [village]). The "local man" (*shatei*) works under the interpreter, procuring whatever is needed for each side to facilitate communication, diplomacy, and so on. Each hamlet without fail has a local man. These local men and interpreters are not always to be found in the hamlets, though. They have their own households with affairs to attend to, and they hire themselves out to people.

Moreover, these interpreters can apply for government service. Officials screen them, and . . . they become responsible for relaying directives and taking care of all manner of things related to the indigenes . . . One imagines that their income is not small.

. . . The interpreters and local men assume an arrogant and insulting manner toward the indigenes, who in turn treat the interpreters very humbly.⁴⁵

Saitō Kenji, a camphor merchant and engineer, reinforced the unflattering portrait of interpreters in *Taiyō* from a commercial perspective, for an audience of Japanese who were in Taiwan or likely to travel there. He wrote that most interpreters were *jukuban*, whom he described as "evolved savages" (*shinka no seiban*). According to Saitō, Chinese interpreters were rare. As liminal figures of uncertain affiliation, wrote Saitō, interpreters swindled and cheated Japanese merchants at every turn, holding them hostage with threats of head-hunting reprisals should they be dismissed by their employers. Saitō noted that interpreters could be hired for a fixed monthly salary but that it would be better to spend a couple of months learning "the indigenous language" oneself, instead.⁴⁶

According to a Japanese infantryman named Iriye Takeshi, who recorded his observations just after the cession in 1895, the availability of Atayal interpreters in the north was directly related to increases in trade volume in the treaty-port era. Iriye described the codependence of commerce and intermarriage:

In [*jukuban*] territory, indigenes give their daughters away and force them to marry. This is a recent occurrence; it did not happen in former times. . . . All of these types of marriages are related directly to [cross-border] trade . . . A meeting of the minds is reached between man and woman, and the marriage is arranged. Before any immorality is committed, the chief's permission is sought and the marriage carried through. When a *jukuban* takes a *seiban* concubine, the new bride is given Chinese clothing and so on. . . . For the return trip home, they are given a water buffalo, two jars of liquor, and black and red cloth.⁴⁷

Anthropologist, interpreter, and police informant Mori Ushinosuke recorded that bride price—in the form of red skirts (up to one hundred in some cases), cattle, pigs, guns, daggers, farming implements, and even farmland—was customary at Atayal weddings.⁴⁸ Therefore, the above marriages chronicled by Iriye, while financially motivated, were not casual unions. In fact, they were publicly sanctioned. Indigenous parties to such unions took care to assure that marriage alliances did not result in *too much* familiarity between lowlanders and highlanders—permission to visit natal villages was often limited to outmarried daughters and not granted to their husbands. Since chiefs enriched themselves and accrued political power by interposing themselves between villages farther inland and delegates of foreign powers, thereby monopolizing outflows of mountain products and inflows of imported prestige goods, such strictures make sense. They suggest that outmarrying was part of a complex political strategy to maintain power in a milieu that required the distribution of gifts to maintain leadership status.⁴⁹

To contextualize these practices, it should be noted that the selling, purchase, and exchange of daughters to further the goals of a village, family, or economic unit was common in rural northern Taiwan among the Han, as were arranged marriages in Japan for the same purpose. Han Taiwanese families in the Taipei Basin out-adopted birth daughters in exchange for adopted female daughters, to raise the latter as future daughters-in-law. This practice prevented expensive wedding costs and forestalled problems related to bringing outsiders into the family compound.⁵⁰ In Japan, *mukoyōshi* (son-in-law) adoption was a way to preserve lineage property in a system of inheritance based on primogeniture for families without male offspring. That is to say, the apparent ease with which Atayal chiefs outmarried daughters to secure future commercial intermediaries would not have appeared callous or outlandish to Han or Japanese people at the time.

From these and many other reports, a general pattern emerges. A minimum of two interpreters (usually three) brokered Japanese-indigenous communication in the early years of colonial rule. Japanese men known as “official translators” (*tsūyakukan* or *tsūyakusei*) interpreted for government officials to the Chinese or “evolved barbarian” interpreters (*tongshi*). They interpreted between the “official Chinese” spoken in Beijing and Taiwanese Chinese (Minnan dialect), while the intermediaries known simply as “local men” (*shatei*) or “aborigine women” (*banpu*) interpreted from Taiwanese Chinese to an indigenous language. Despite their low official status, the local men and *banpu* were indispensable for sojourns in the indigenous territories. When Pacification Office chief Saitō Otosaku’s Japanese official translator, Shōjiro Kunitai, was incapacitated with malaria during an early circuit of Alishan’s environs, Saitō’s mission continued to function. Saitō would not proceed, however, without his local man.⁵¹ An official from the interpreter’s bureau in Miaoli underscored the point: four different languages were spoken behind the mountains abutting Miaoli city. It was simply impossible to conduct business there without local men.⁵²

THE NEW CLASS OF JAPANESE INTERPRETERS

As recounted in the previous chapter, Hiyama Tetsusaburō's first mission to Puli took on the same trappings as other "first embassies" to plains-mountain interfaces. In one way, however, the Hiyama mission was unique. From their base in the newly established Puli Pacification Office, Hiyama himself, his associate Kondō Katsusaburō, and at least two other Japanese men made alliances with Tgdaya tribes by becoming sons-in-law. According to Irie Takeshi, Puli prefect Hiyama Tetsusaburō's wedding, held around January 1, 1896, was a major event. Hiyama doled out the expected blankets and jars of liquor at his wedding to Chiwas, the daughter of the Paalan headman Pixo Sappo.⁵³ By April 5, 1896, Hiyama's marriage was publicized in the Japanese press as a human interest story.⁵⁴ Hiyama was a colorful politician from Tokyo who was lampooned in the Tokyo press for absconding to Taiwan to make an easy salary by exploiting his connections to Mizuno Jun.⁵⁵ His tenure in Puli did not last; he was expelled from office on May 25, 1897, for collusion in a burglary that ended in a murder.⁵⁶

Hiyama's most notorious associate, Kondō Katsusaburō, would spend the rest of his life in Taiwan, achieving fluency in Taiwanese Chinese and at least one dialect of a northern indigenous language, probably Sediq. He was considered by some to be an expert on indigenous affairs on a par with Mori Ushinosuke himself.⁵⁷ Contemporary references to Kondō label him as a *tongshi* (interpreter), *shokutaku* (commissioner), or *buppin kōkanjin* (aborigine trader).⁵⁸ Kondō was also a decorated translator/explorer, who is credited for brokering complicated deals with Bunun, Atayal, Sediq, and Truku headmen and emissaries (see below). His long analysis of the causes of the Wushe Rebellion were picked up in various official, journalistic, and popular postmortems, thus spreading his name, for a time, widely (see figure 20).

Kondō Katsusaburō was born on December 10, 1873, the eldest son of Kondō Mankichi and Chiyo (née Kawahara) of Myōzai County, Urashō Town, Tokushima Prefecture. His family was in the indigo business. Kondō himself was a restless youth and purportedly blew 130 yen of his family's money in Ōsaka's warehouse and entertainment district instead of procuring indigo. The penniless Kondō made his way to Kobe, built up capital as a jobber and peddler, and finally opened a profitable store. His earnings were sufficient to repay his family. Kondō next joined the Ōkura Group to work in the commissariat during the Sino-Japanese War. Kondō sailed from Shimonoseki to Inchon and returned to Japan with the Nagoya army for the triumphal return. Kondō could not raise enough money for passage to America to learn the milling business, so he ended up in Hong Kong via Shanghai. His interest in Taiwan, piqued by stories of headhunters in the newly acquired land, sent him there on the next ship.⁵⁹

A fragmentary memoir asserts that Kondō actually swam into Jilong Harbor shirtless, after having been thrown overboard from an American ship for scuffling



FIGURE 20. *Back row center*, Kondō “the Barbarian” Katsusaburō, ca. 1910. Courtesy of the Rupnow Collection.

with crew members.⁶⁰ Kondō’s first known destination in Taiwan, Puli, was a crossroads of savage-border commerce and a melting pot. Conditions there rapidly deteriorated after the Japanese declared themselves masters of the island. Puli’s walled fortifications, coupled with its location on a plateau high up in the mountains, made it an ideal rebel (“bandit”) base.⁶¹ Puli was captured by opposition forces on July 11, 1896, as the last in a series of towns and cities under the control of one Kien-I. It was retaken by the Japanese on July 22.⁶² The Puli Pacification Office (*bukonsho*) officially opened on July 23, 1896, the day after Kien-I’s defeat, with Hiyama Tetsusaburō as its first chief.⁶³

Under Hiyama’s patronage, Kondō was granted a permit to “trade in indigenous products” in Puli on May 19, 1896.⁶⁴ As a first step to becoming a celebrated “aborigine hand” (*bantsū*), Kondō wed Iwan Robao, the daughter of a Paalan village headman named Chitsukku,⁶⁵ sometime in 1896.⁶⁶ By all accounts, Kondō was a talented linguist; he quickly became a much sought-after interpreter. In January 1897 Kondō and Iwan joined the ill-fated Fukahori Yasuichirō expedition. Before the expedition entered the high mountains beyond Puli, however, Kondō fell ill with malaria. Iwan accompanied the mission as an auxiliary interpreter, working with Kondō’s replacement, a plains indigene named Pan Laolong, also a merchant specializing in the “aborigine trade.”⁶⁷ Pan and Iwan survived because they abandoned the mission before it came to grief, rightfully fearing danger as the troop traveled beyond areas previously secured through parleys with local

chiefs. The frigid weather warned off other potential interpreters on the mission. Fukahori was able to hire about ten Sadō (near Truku village) men to lead him, but their assistance was useless in Xalut, where a different language was spoken. Because Fukahori's team was engaged in the visible project of mapmaking and had famously scolded and beat curious Tgdaya men for inquiring about these activities, the Xalut people feared that Fukahori was an advance team for a punitive expedition.

The wanderings of this troop were not unlike those of the Ryūkyū castaways in Langqiao in 1871. Without a common spoken language, miscommunication was the rule. The local peoples, rightly fearing large numbers of mobile outsiders, finally reacted with violence and slaughtered all fourteen of Fukahori's men. An indigenous-district policeman who reconstructed these events in 1936 opined that Fukahori's mission would have succeeded had the locally embedded and multilingual Kondō Katsusaburō not fallen ill.⁶⁸

Ostensibly to locate Fukahori's killers, on August 20, 1897, Kondō left his wife, Iwan, and headed north to the Truku-Toda village complexes toward Neng'gao Mountain. He brought two of his trading-post employees, Nagakura Yoshitsugu and Itō Shūkichi, in addition to securing the services of Itō's wife, a Toda native named Tappas Kuras.⁶⁹ After a grueling, rain-soaked march, Kondō secured the patronage of a trade-minded Toda headman named Bassau Bōran. The headman was a former customer at Kondō's Puli establishment. As Bassau's houseguest and adopted son, Kondō literally "went native" in the course of his twenty-month stay, earning the sobriquet Seiban Kondō (Kondō the Barbarian).⁷⁰

In the meantime, the Second Combined Squadron and a search party from the Puli Pacification Office conducted independent investigations in March 1897. The latter was ineffectual, for the same reasons that LeGendre's and Bell's investigations of Koalut in 1867 failed: they had no means for incentivizing cooperation. The more heavily armed and staffed squadron, however, determined that Fukahori's party had died in battle on a forlorn riverbed deep in the mountains. They recovered a few tattered articles of clothing and a pair of eyeglasses.⁷¹ In March 1900, two years after Fukahori's disappearance, Kondō himself accompanied Puli sub-prefect Ōkuma Hirotake to recover five of the actual skulls and more artifacts in Sado, the place Kondō had ingratiated himself with Bassau.⁷²

While Kondō and Itō bartered their way around Toda-Truku territory with the assistance of their new extended families, other noteworthy unions between Japanese men and indigenous women began to sprout up, including that of Jiku Shō Min and his Atayal wife, Bariya Nōkan. In 1895 or 1896, Japanese army interpreter Jiku (aka Watan Karaho) married into a Wulai family near Quchi. He claimed to be the heir apparent to his father-in-law's chieftaincy.⁷³ Inō Kanori's diary entry for May 23, 1897, referred to Jiku as the point man for directing Japanese officials on journeys from Xindian to Quchi (Ueno Sen'ichi's route in 1891).⁷⁴ Jiku signed several of his reports with the moniker Savage Righteous Army. His associations



FIGURE 21. Quchi-area residents posing with flag, ca. 1897. East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College, Easton, PA.

with camphor merchant and hydroelectric power entrepreneur Dogura Ryūjirō suggest that he used his relations as a labor force and perhaps as a private army.⁷⁵ As Inō Kanori's and Mori Ushinosuke's guide to Wulai, Jiku was also a key player in the birth of Japan's ethnology of Taiwan.⁷⁶ As Inō was making his famous tour, Jiku dispatched a Rimogan resident named Taimu to survey the location of dozens of inland villages. Jiku submitted a color map, several dozen sketches of cultural artifacts, and a taxonomy of Atayal language groups in an official report.

Jiku included a description of a Raga (south of Wulai) couple with his attached photograph—perhaps the first photo in Taiwan to accompany an ethnological survey. He described the sitters as a male named Yūmin and a female named Akashi. Jiku referred to them as pioneers of “aborigine civilization” because they requested flags and Japanese clothing (see figure 21).⁷⁷

Kondō Katsusaburō also translated for ethnologists Inō Kanori and Torii Ryūzō,⁷⁸ while Kondō’s wife, Iwan Robao, was subject to Torii’s interviews and anthropometric surveys.⁷⁹ Therefore, the bicultural marriages described above were indispensable for gathering practical as well as more abstract forms of intelligence regarding indigenous peoples in the early years of colonial rule.

Despite their benefits, in 1899 Sanjiaoyong (near Jiabanshan) district officer Satomi Yoshimasa complained to Taipei governor Murakami Yoshio that Japanese-Atayal unions were causing friction with local men. Satomi suggested that Japanese civilians be forced to apply for permits before marrying indigenous women. Murakami then proposed a system of punishments for Japanese men who abandoned their local wives. In addition, Murakami recommended state support for divorcées, whose local marriage prospects had been ruined by public association with foreigners. Murakami’s questionnaire, circulated to magistrates and police posted in aborigine territory, illuminates official concerns:

1. To what extent are there contracts or gifts of cash or merchandise on the occasion of a wedding (*kashu no sai*)?
2. [Provide] the name and occupation of the person who married a *banpu* (*banpu o metorishi mono*).
3. Is it possible for one who has been a secondary wife/concubine of a Japanese to remarry an aborigine (*naichijin no shō/mekake to naritaru mono wa futatabi banjin ni kasuru*)?
4. In the case of abandonment, how is the *banpu* managing? How do the aborigines feel about the situation?
5. Was the union with a Japanese (*naichijin ni kasuru*) entered into as a lifelong commitment, or was it rushed into avariciously for the short term?⁸⁰

Despite these problems, there appeared to be no other way to establish paths of communication with Austronesian language speakers. Even if official interpreters could learn indigenous languages, they were not stationed in places where they might have been useful. According to the personnel rosters for the first year of the Pacification Office’s operation (1896), there were eight translators posted among its eleven stations.⁸¹ The following year, the translator positions were all gone, although four of the 1896 translators remained as administrative assistants (*shujiho*), now performing “routine duties and tasks to be determined by the station chief, including interpreting.”⁸² In the late summer of 1897, one Pacification Office head reported in the *Daily Yomiuri* that even when translators were employed, communication was still difficult because they did not understand the local dialects very well.⁸³ The Pacification Office was dissolved the next year, and aborigine

administration was moved to Section 3 of the new District Administrative Offices (*Benmusho*). As a rule, the *Benmusho* stations lacked translators altogether.

But without Japanese staffers trained in indigenous languages, wrote one pacification officer in 1898, Japan was doomed to rely upon the shady local men who cheated indigenes by plying them with booze. The local men also frustrated Japanese policy by trafficking contraband rifles.⁸⁴ One obvious measure to dispense with Japan's reliance on interpreters, without relying on the fractious intercultural marriages, was formal language training for pacification officers and policemen. In March 1897, as a first step, the head of the Industrial Section in Taipei ordered Pacification Office heads to compile word lists and phrase books based on trading-post conversations, official meet and greets, and negotiations of camphor contracts with indigenes. The memorandum's author wrote that indigenous languages had no historical affinities to Chinese or Japanese and that mastering them was difficult. The circular proposed systematic word collection and phonetic analysis with the cooperation of the Pacification Office. Materials started trickling in by October 1897.⁸⁵

However, as anthropologist Mio Yūko's careful analysis of the manuscript copies of the responses reveals, the stacks of word lists and conversational phrases were made by linguistic amateurs, written down in katakana (a Japanese syllabary), and they ended up collecting dust in government offices. The ambitious project did not produce training manuals or textbooks, leaving the Japanese to learn indigenous languages through immersion.⁸⁶

To incentivize immersion learning, the so-called *kensho* (stipend) system was implemented. In this program, police officers and assistant policemen were given monthly pay supplements if they could pass language exams in Hok-lo, Hakka, or an Austronesian language.⁸⁷ The pay incentives for Han Taiwanese assistant patrolmen to learn Japanese succeeded. The Taiwan Government-General thus cultivated a cohort of Japanese-speaking Han Taiwanese to handle interpreting chores in the plains and ports. However, the stipend system was premised on the assumption that a comprehensive and fair exam could be administered in the target language. It is clear from the foregoing, however, that Japanese officials were not in possession of instructional materials or a language pedagogy that could produce examinations, examiners, and a curriculum for Austronesian languages.

Therefore, an exception was made. The indigenous-language tests would consist of abbreviated interviews with Japanese district officials, who determined if a candidate understood an indigenous language sufficiently to "communicate and understand complex matters" and "relay orders without doing damage." Examinees would be sorted into three categories of proficiency.⁸⁸ A set of 1907 regulations stated that exams for indigenous languages be limited to oral interviews. That same year, *bango* (indigenous language) was officially defined as nine separate tongues: Atayal, Saisiyat, Bunun, Tsou, Tsarisen, Amis, Puyuma, Paiwan, and Yami.⁸⁹

The practical application of government ethnologist Inō Kanori's taxonomy (see figure 2) had important long-term consequences. There are many more Austronesian languages in Taiwan than the nine listed above. As Inō's colleague and rival ethnologist Mori Ushinosuke observed at the time, Inō's taxonomy lumped dissimilar languages together, while it split similar languages into separate categories. Mori himself advocated a sixfold classification that fused Saisiyat with Atayal and grouped Puyuma, Tsarisen (Rukai), and Paiwan together, based on his own research as the Meiji era's most dogged survey ethnologist of Taiwan. Despite Mori's reservations, however, these nine groups became census categories, museum labels, and place-names on ethnic maps. As inscribed ethnonyms, they were carried forward with considerable institutional momentum into the late twentieth century (with the exception of Tsarisen, which essentially became Rukai). Until indigenous activists themselves met with some success in revising the taxonomy in the twenty-first century, these nine language groups constituted the building blocks of indigenous Taiwan's second-order geobody.⁹⁰

On July 27, 1909, police headquarters circulated another memorandum urging colonial police stationed in the northern districts to learn Taiwanese and indigenous languages. The Yilan district station employed three instructors in the office and another at a garrison. At other locations, however, no qualified instructors could be found, so the men were reduced to studying word lists on their own. One district head noted that lack of contact with Atayal people for actual practice hindered progress. The Xinzhu station chief claimed that most of his men could say a few words in an indigenous language but could not conduct everyday conversations. The best he could do was provide nonsystematic practice for the policemen under his command with indigenous mercenaries or the indigenous wives of Japanese policemen.⁹¹

It is not surprising that conversation partners for uniformed Japanese and Taiwanese officials were scarce in 1909. We saw in chapter 1 how Kondō Katsusaburō and Iwan Robao (or possibly other informants to the Japanese government) orchestrated a trap for Hōgō- and Paalan-village Tgdaya (Wushe) men, who lost most of their weapons and warriors on a single day, on October 5, 1903. After their defeat, emissaries from Wushe notified a local police office that the severity of the trade embargo had inflicted suffering, and they offered to supply troops and porters to help build a guardline. The Taiwan Government-General kept Hōgō waiting. They finally sent negotiators in late 1905. Kondō Katsusaburō then acted as the go-between to orchestrate Wushe's surrender in 1906. In order to resume trade, the Paalan and Hōgō headmen allowed the government-general to build a guardline path to the summit of Shoucheng Dashan, just below its 2,420-meter peak. This commanding height overlooked dozens of settlements of strategic interest in and around Wushe.⁹² To avoid being shot on sight, the Wushe-area men were told to bring Japanese flags to the Kasumigaseki station and check in before hunting in the area.⁹³ From this new section of guardline, which cut the Tgdaya villages off

from the trade hub of Puli, the government-general was able to encircle the Atayal, Truku, and Sediq tribes north of Wushe in subsequent campaigns.⁹⁴ For brokering the surrender ceremony at the Kasumigaseki station, Kondō was awarded seventy yen for meritorious service. This was an extraordinary bonus. At this time, the top cash award for ranking inspectors was only sixty yen.⁹⁵

Perhaps hoping to reproduce the 1906 breakthrough attributed to Kondō Katsusaburō, who was married to Iwan Robao of Paalan, Police Bureau head Ōtsu Rinpei urged the government to actively encourage, instead of merely tolerate, mixed marriages between low-ranking Japanese officers and indigenous women from chiefly lineages.

THE POLITICAL MARRIAGES UNDER SAKUMA SAMATA'S ADMINISTRATION

Following the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), Governor-General Sakuma Samata's administration (1906–15) accelerated the policy of military conquest over the Atayal villages that had refused to surrender their rifles and sovereignty during the previous decade of colonial rule. Although Wushe had formally submitted in 1906, many of the tribes farther upland and inland still remained defiant. Sakuma pledged to break the resistance of the northern tribes once and for all by extending the heavily armed guardline to the heart of Atayal country to encompass Xalut (which subsumed Masitoban), Truku, and Toda (see map 1).⁹⁶

Sakuma's right-hand man on indigenous policy, Police Bureau chief Ōtsu Rinpei, inspected the forward posts of the guardline in spring 1907. His report proposed to remedy the alarming interpreter situation with a "political-marriage" policy:

I have sensed an extreme paucity of indigenous-language translators at every installation on my tour. This being the case, it is not difficult to imagine that many, many more translators will be necessary as we bring the indigenes within the fold of government. I need not mention that success in managing the indigenes hinges upon the ability of our translators . . . The quickest route to cultivating translators would be to give occasional financial assistance to the appropriate men and have them officially marry *banpu*.

[We] recognize that such marriages can cause trouble because indigenes . . . will say that such marriages are unfair and benefit only the villages or lineages of the *ban-pu's* new husband. By the same token, if the Japanese husband is rotated to another post and abandons his wife, it will offend indigenous sentiment. Nonetheless, our present lack of translators is troubling. Because marriage to an indigenous woman will raise living expenses, occasional moneys should be provided for the low-ranking men who cannot afford it.⁹⁷

In August 1908 Ōtsu commissioned Kondō to secure Wushe allies in order to add another spur to the system of guardlines already in place. Kondō himself initially demurred but then reconsidered when Ōtsu offered him a land grant of thirty hectares near the Kasumigaseki police station outside Puli. In October Kondō



FIGURE 22. *Left, in Japanese clothing*, Kondō Gisaburō, with defeated Truku peoples, January 1915. The photographer, Mori Ushinosuke, attested to Kondō's linguistic prowess in Truku and credited him with helping to defeat the Truku pictured here. Note the oilcan in the foreground: a bamboo indigenous drinking vessel is resting on top. Mori Ushinosuke, ed., *Taiwan banzoku zufu*, vol. 1 (Taipei: Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai, 1915), plate 31.

found allies in the settlements of Hōgō (headman Aui Nukan) and Mehebu (headman Ludao Bai), two Tgdaya groups who considered Truku and Toda enemies.⁹⁸ According to Kondō, Ludao Bai and Aui Nukan demanded that he and his younger brother Gisaburō (see figure 22) take wives in Wushe to seal the bargain. Accordingly, Kondō paid the price of one pig to Paalan's chief to ratify his "divorce" from Iwan Robao to pave the way for his second marriage.⁹⁹

In January 1909 the brothers Kondō were married to Obin Nukan and Chiwas Ludao. In late February, soon after the formalization of the alliance by marriage, Kondō Katsusaburō led some 654 Wushe warriors in the general attack on Toda and Truku, which was successfully concluded by March 1909.¹⁰⁰ The official report states that Wushe drew the Taiwan Government-General into a local feud by blaming Toda for recent attacks on the Japanese guardline. The report's authors were skeptical of the charges against Toda but went along because they thought it expedient to use Wushe's manpower to gain a strategic foothold in difficult terrain. In

addition to Kondō's 654 Wushe (Tgdaya) allies, who apparently acted as laborers, the government fielded 580 fighting men for the climactic attack on Toda.¹⁰¹ These maneuvers secured more commanding heights for Japanese cannon and mortars as well as strategic passes for communication, which allowed the government-general to effectively hem in the Sediq territory from all sides.¹⁰²

As an eldest son and a future *koshu* (household head), Kondō Katsusaburō expected to secure his Japanese family's future by obtaining a large, government-registered farm near Puli for the care of his aged father, per Ōtsu Rinpei's promise in August 1908. Indeed, Kondō's father, who had immigrated to Taiwan by this time, passed away in March 1909, leaving Kondō legally responsible for the care of his mother, younger brothers and sisters, and a number of nieces. Kondō spent the years 1909 through 1916 pressing claims for the promised acreage while continuing to accept government commissions as a guide and interpreter.

As the years wore on, his patron Ōtsu Rinpei returned to Japan; other officials familiar with Kondō's case left Nantou Prefecture. Finally, Wushe district police inspector Kondō Shōsaburō (no relation) deeded the land to his own relative, preempting Katsusaburō's claim. This perceived slight angered Katsusaburō's younger brother Gisaburō to the boiling point, according to Katsusaburō's testimony. In 1916 Gisaburō tendered his resignation in Taipei but was instead transferred out of Wushe to a new post in Hualian District at Pushige.¹⁰³

Sixteen-year-old Kondō Gisaburō had come to Taiwan in 1901. Gisaburō worked his way up through the ranks to become a sergeant in the indigenous-territory police by the time of his infamous transfer, thanks to his facility with the Sediq dialects spoken near Wushe. Igarashi Ishimatsu, a Japanese official of long experience in Wushe, recalled Gisaburō as a companionate husband to Chiwas Ludao and a figure of local respect. Igarashi claimed that Chiwas's devotion to Gisaburō allowed the Japanese to squelch an uprising by Xalut and Salamao in 1913. Overhearing the plan from her brother Mona Ludao, Chiwas alerted Gisaburō, who in turn sounded the alarm and averted disaster for the Japanese.¹⁰⁴ Such timely intelligence is all that Ōtsu Rinpei could have hoped for when he called for political marriages back in 1907. However, this success story would be short-lived.

After Gisaburō's 1916 transfer to Pushige, he never returned, leaving Chiwas bereft. She eventually remarried a local man but was never compensated with death benefits, nor was she given a sinecure, as was done with other abandoned wives.¹⁰⁵ Kondō Katsusaburō recalled that Chiwas had not been entered into Gisaburō's *koseki* (household registry), making it impossible for the elder Kondō to file a claim on Chiwas's behalf.¹⁰⁶

THE TAISHŌ-PERIOD POLITICAL MARRIAGES

From 1909 to 1914, Sakuma Samata's "five-year plan to control the aborigines" (*gokanen keikaku riban jigyo*) brought most of Atayal country under direct

colonial rule. When the temporary organ established to administer Sakuma's five-year plan (the Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs) was disbanded in July 1915, the Taiwan Government-General declared victory in the north.¹⁰⁷ Thereafter, the indigenous territory was governed by Japanese police officers who "possessed the power of life and death" over their colonial subjects. The indigenous-district police were charged with peacekeeping, educational, and medical functions. They became the eyes, ears, hands, and feet of the Taiwan Government-General in the lands under "special administration." Unlike their predecessors, who lived near trading posts or in border towns, Japan's new "aborigine hands" would reside among the tribes and villages that they governed. As salaried officials (in contrast to *tongshi*), they would take direct orders from their superiors and transmit these orders to the "submitted tribes."

Two particularly well-known Japanese-indigene marriages, both initiated to advance the guardline in Atayal country, survived into an era that saw increased surveillance and conscripted labor. One of these marriages ended in 1925 with the sacking of Shimoyama Jihei after a drunken altercation with his superior officer, the other in 1930 with the killing of Sazuka Aisuke in the Wushe uprising.

Shizuoka native Shimoyama Jihei arrived in Taiwan in 1907 as a young army veteran, two years before Sazuka's arrival in 1909. During Sakuma's five-year campaign, the Malepa dispatch station was overrun and its staff wiped out. To reestablish control, the Nantou District head of indigenous affairs sent Shimoyama to run things, after ordering him to marry Pixo Doleh, the daughter of Malepa's headman. According to Pixo's niece, Malepa assented to the marriage out of economic desperation to obtain needed patronage and rifles.¹⁰⁸ According to their son Hajime, Pixo became proficient at Japanese conversation. Shimoyama, on the other hand, could not speak Atayal. Pixo bore him two sons and two daughters. Shimoyama's other betrothed, Shizuoka native Katsumata Nakako, arrived in Puli after he and Pixo had started their Malepa family. Nakako also began to bear Shimoyama's children. For a time, Shimoyama shuttled between Puli and Malepa. No longer able to afford two households, he finally moved his Japanese family to Malepa. Pixo Doleh, the daughter and sister of local headmen in a fiercely monogamous society, was humiliated.¹⁰⁹

Shimoyama's open display of contempt for Atayal sensibilities came to the attention of Neng'gao district commander (*gunshu*) Akinaga Nagakichi in 1925. One oral history claims that Akinaga was tipped off by a disgruntled Atayal youth. In any event, Akinaga broached the delicate issue of bigamy in front of assembled Malepa men. Shimoyama retorted that Pixo's relatives had consented to this arrangement. Besides, an angered Shimoyama replied, he had been assured that he could break off the political marriage to Pixo after three years' time, even if there were children. For his part, Akinaga took umbrage at being contradicted publicly by a subaltern. Tempers flared. Shimoyama challenged Akinaga by grabbing his lapels. Akinaga then threw Shimoyama down on a table. Shimoyama

was dismissed for insubordination the next day, a fact that demonstrated clearly that the government-general believed it could handle affairs in Malepa without him. Although his abrupt departure left Pixo bitter, Shimoyama secured a job for her at a Wushe infirmary at a salary of forty yen per month before he left. Nonetheless, Shimoyama's son Hajime recalled that his mother was never entered into Shimoyama's family register (*koseki*) as a legally recognized wife. Nonetheless, due to Pixo's high status in local society and official concerns about the ramifications of mistreating a headman's daughter, Shimoyama was not able to treat her as a disposable concubine.¹¹⁰

Nagano Prefecture native Sazuka Aisuke (1886–1930), unable to abide impoverished country life in Japan's "snow country," fled to Taiwan via Tokyo one January morning in 1909 with money stolen from his father.¹¹¹ Five years later, as combined police, army, and navy forces bombarded resistant villages near Hualian Harbor in the last spasms of Sakuma's "campaign to end all campaigns," Sazuka married Yawai Taimu, the daughter of an Atayal headman in Masitoban, just north of Wushe.

Sazuka's wife, Yawai, was remembered as one who spoke proper Japanese and worked harder than other Atayal women to assimilate to Japanese customs.¹¹² As one postmortem account of the Wushe Rebellion put it, Yawai married outside her local society only to be mistrusted by her fellow Atayal. She was also looked down upon by Japanese colonists for being a "savage."¹¹³ In a word, Sazuka and Yawai were representative outcasts of empire. One left the bleak prospects of Nagano behind to seek fortune in a colonial periphery, while the other was cast out by her father to shore up his position as a local headman.

For his willingness to persevere in aborigine country, Sazuka was finally made chief of the Wushe branch station on March 31, 1930.¹¹⁴ Wushe was an administrative center and showpiece for Japanese policies vis-à-vis the northern Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, a real step up from isolated Masitoban. There were eleven settlements under his new watch, and Wushe boasted a post office, schools, hot-springs inns, trading posts, and dormitories for students and government workers. Although it was a promotion, the reassignment to Wushe turned out to be Sazuka's death sentence. Because of their roots in Masitoban, Yawai and Sazuka were viewed suspiciously in Wushe. Residents in Wushe's villages were Sediq Tgdaya, who spoke a different language than Masitoban Atayals. Shimoyama Hajime recalled that Sediq visitors to Atayalic Malepa spoke Japanese with their hosts, since Sediq and Atayal were mutually unintelligible.¹¹⁵ In the Xalut settlements of Malepa and Masitoban, Sazuka relied upon his wife's Masitoban networks for local knowledge and, to some extent, for his legitimacy as a leader for some two decades. His linguistic facility and political experience in these former posts, however, provided Sazuka with little useful intelligence in the new setting. On the contrary, Sazuka's affiliation with a non-Sediq Atayal—his wife, Yawai Taimu—and her father inclined Tgdaya residents within his jurisdiction to accuse Sazuka of favoritism toward Xalut peoples. They expected Sazuka and Yawai to exact vengeance

against Tgdaya peoples in relation to recent intra-indigenous (though state-aided) violence.¹¹⁶ And although Ōtsu Rinpei thought low-ranking rural policemen such as Sazuka could maintain bicultural households on their modestly supplemented salaries, Sazuka was an infamous embezzler, who was known to withhold pay and salt it away for his personal use. After his death in the rebellion, it was discovered that he had amassed ¥2,000 in a savings account and ¥20,000 in cash.¹¹⁷

Shimoyama Jihei's ignominious firing and Sazuka Aisuke's violent demise can be considered the final blows to a system of rule predicated on a gender division of labor for cross-cultural communication that dated back to early Qing times. In this system, locally embedded women, as the daughters of headmen or local indigenous notables, were either adopted or married into outsider families to act as buffers between politically separated but economically linked social formations. The men in this equation—be they Han merchants, settlers, or officials, or Japanese policemen or trading-post operators—capitalized on their wives' bilingualism and local kin networks to make a go of it on the so-called savage border. In hindsight, it is clear that this ad hoc arrangement was perhaps adequate for maintaining a certain volume of cross-border trade or for gathering military intelligence for short-term expeditions. But intercultural marriages fell far short of providing a mechanism to consolidate a stable system of outsider rule among the Sediq, Atayal, and Truku peoples of northern Taiwan.

According to statistics compiled by Kitamura Kae, twenty-nine Japanese policemen stationed in the special administrative district were proficient in an Atayalic language circa 1930, to rule over hundreds of settlements—many of them still hostile. According to Shimoyama Hajime, the son of Pixo and Jihei, the language barrier forced Japanese policemen to use blows instead of admonishments. Hajime extrapolated from his father's beatings to hypothesize that generalized physical abuse was a long-term cause of the Wushe uprising. In an interview years after the fact, Hajime even wondered if better language skills among the Japanese police could have averted the slaughter that took place on October 27, 1930.¹¹⁸

TEACHING JAPANESE TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

As Atayalic language competence among Japanese policemen declined in the 1920s, the Japanese language skill of indigenes was on the rise. The formal instruction of indigenous peoples in Japanese language was consonant with the generalized imperial impulse to diffuse national culture outward. It also aimed to cultivate a corps of interpreters whose loyalty was directed toward the state rather than their Taiwanese in-laws or private trading houses. While this project did not bear fruit in time to prevent the Wushe uprising, it represented the centerpiece of Japan's assimilation policies toward indigenes.

In 1896, soon after establishing itself in Taipei, the Taiwan Government-General established fourteen Japanese-language training institutes (*kokugo denshūjo*)

throughout the island. Older students took crash courses in language and basic arithmetic to clerk and translate for the government. Younger students, as objects of the regime's "attraction policy," studied "written Chinese, geography, history, singing and gymnastics."¹¹⁹ The Hengchun walled city institute in southern Taiwan served a mixed population of "acculturated indigenes" (*jukuban*) and Han students. Nearby, an annex school (*bunkyōba*) was built in Tuilasok; it was the first government school for indigenes.

The Paiwan settlement of Tuilasok was the home of Toketok, the man with whom LeGendre had struck agreements in 1867 and 1869. Toketok died in 1873, thus leaving his nephew Tsului to represent Tuilasok in meetings with Saigō Tsugumichi and other foreigners. By Tsului's side sat Jagarushi Guri Bunkiet—the son of a Tuilasok woman and a Guangdong immigrant surnamed Lin. Bunkiet was born in Checheng or Poliac in 1854 and was purchased by the sonless Toketok, who groomed the bilingual Bunkiet to be a headman.¹²⁰ Bunkiet came to the notice of Qing officials when Hengchun walled city was built in 1875 as a base for Shen Baozhen's "open the mountains, pacify the indigenes" campaigns.

For his success as a labor recruiter, the Qing awarded Bunkiet the surname Pan. He thereafter worked, presumably as an interpreter, in the 1890s campaigns to pacify the Hengchun tribes, earning a Qing meritorious rank of the fifth order (*wu-pin*).¹²¹

In November 1895, Bunkiet, bearing a flag his family had received from Saigō twenty-one years earlier, attended Hengchun dispatch-station chief Sagara Nagatsuna's first official audience.¹²² That same month, a Japanese garrison stationed in Sabaree mistakenly killed several men and burned down even more dwellings. According to one version of the story, the garrison heard shots fired from the direction of a Koalut village. In another version, they mistook an armed contingent of Paiwan men for hostiles. In any event, skittish Japanese troops responded by tying eight villagers to trees. While Koaluts were fleeing, the Japanese proceeded to torch twelve houses. They also shot and killed six residents in the confusion. News of the depredations had spread to neighboring settlements when Bunkiet stepped in. With Bunkiet's intercession, the Japanese government assuaged local anger by disbursing twenty yen each to the families of the dead and five yen each to the victims of the massacre. For this service, Bunkiet was appointed commissioner attached to the Hengchun dispatch station.¹²³

As the government-general's new point man for the lower Hengchun, Bunkiet, in concert with other local leaders, brokered the formal submission of forty-four tribes in Taidong that same February.¹²⁴ Bunkiet and another bicultural mediator, a Puyuma woman known to us as Tata Rara, most famously assisted the government-general on May 18, 1896. Instead of merely brokering an agreement, Tata mobilized Paiwan and Puyuma troops to militarily defeat a remnant Qing officer named Liu Deshao (Liu Tek-chok) and his followers.

The Qing formally surrendered Taiwan on April 17, 1895, but (because of numerous rebellions) it took until April 1, 1896, for Japan to officially declare an end to




FIGURE 23. The Puyuma “Joan of Arc” Tata Rara with Japanese interpreter Nakamura Yūsuke, 1896. Adolf Fischer, *Streifzüge durch Formosa* (Berlin: B. Behr Verlag, 1900), 323.

the state of war and institute a civil government. Liu Deshao remained in southern Taiwan, operating as a local potentate beyond the reach of the government-general past the cessation of military rule on the island.¹²⁵ In accord with Shen Baozhen’s “open the mountains, pacify the indigenes” program, the Qing had begun to station officials and soldiers in Taidong (near Beinan) in 1875. Around two thousand men were posted throughout the Hengchun Peninsula. They were not especially brutal, wrote the Japanese commentator Hara Segai, but they did make inspections, conscript labor, and take millet and rice without paying. The Qing government accordingly became loathsome to the people, inciting head-hunting attacks on plainsmen and provoking armed standoffs. According to Hara’s report, when the Japanese took Taiwan in 1895, the Qing abandoned these forces without alerting them of the cession. The remnants resorted to looting and stealing to feed themselves, and the area descended into chaos.

During his first diplomatic mission to Taidong in February 1896, Sagara Nagatsuna consulted with Zhang Yichun, a prominent merchant and husband of the multilingual interpreter Tata Rara. Zhang’s wife, Tata, then lobbied Sagara’s translator, Nakamura Yūsuke, to intervene against Liu’s remnant troops (see figure 23).¹²⁶

Tata Rara was the daughter of Chen Ansheng, a chief who dealt with LeGendre during his perambulations in the 1870s. One source even referred to her as “Chen Tata.”¹²⁷ Tata Rara spoke Southern Min Chinese, as well as the Puyuma, Paiwanese,



FIGURE 24. Tata Rara with her Puyuma militia, 1896. Adolf Fischer, *Streifzüge durch Formosa* (Berlin: B. Behr Verlag, 1900), 324.

and Amis languages. Like Bunkiet, she earned a salary of six yuan per month as a Qing subofficial,¹²⁸ presumably for services rendered during the *kaishan fufan* campaigns.

In May 1896, Tata and Bunkiet organized a militia of three hundred indigenes to expel the Qing remnants. Tata Rara herself personally led the men through a hail of musket fire to secure the surrender of a thousand Qing troops. She appears to have been a formidable commander. One German publication referred to her as the “Puyuma Joan of Arc,” while a Japanese report referred to her as a “heroine” (see figure 24).

Bunkiet and Tata, as liaisons and military leaders, earned cash rewards and plaudits for the defeat of Liu Deshao. Bunkiet received a commendation called Order of the Sacred Treasure, Sixth Rank, on December 15, 1897 (see figure 25).¹²⁹ Tata Rara belatedly received her reward of forty yen on February 9, 1900.¹³⁰

After the suppression of Liu Deshao, Bunkiet and Sagara Nagatsuna applied to have the colony’s first Japanese-language institute built for indigenous students. On September 2, 1896, a plan to build this modest school was approved. Bunkiet then mobilized his followers to supply land, building materials, and labor in time for a September 10 opening ceremony. One encomium to Bunkiet reports that he registered his own nephew to lead by example and that over thirty youths in Tuilasok followed suit.¹³¹ A less celebratory account by a Japanese teacher reported



FIGURE 25. Tuilasok interpreter, headman, and Qing/Japanese official Pan Bunkiet, ca. 1900. The medal on his suit is a sixth-grade Order of the Sacred Treasure, conferred in 1897 by the Japanese government. Jun'eki Taiwan Genjūmin kenkyūkai, ed., *Inō Kanori shozō Taiwan Genjūmin shashinshū* (Taipei: Jun'eki Taiwan Genjūmin hakubutsukan, 1999), 177. Photograph courtesy of the publisher: The Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei.

that the first group of twenty-seven students did not know why they had matriculated, except that the headman Bunkiet had sent them.

Three neighboring Hengchun Paiwan settlements, Koro, Tekiri, and Kauwan, responded to Sagara's announcement of the "urgent matter" of Japanese-language education with much less enthusiasm. They temporized by convening councils to deliberate the matter. Tekiri and Kauwan did not apply for schools, and by 1900, only two institutes had been built in all of Hengchun. Koro village finally applied on the condition that the school be combined with a gun and ammunition depot. As Kitamura points out, the language institutes were not gifts from the government but were built with locally provided materials and labor. "Buy-in" could not be assumed. Several Paiwan schools were shut down temporarily or closed because of armed attacks from neighboring settlements.¹³² Reminiscent of the Meiji state's early efforts to spread compulsory schooling throughout Japan, central ambitions outstripped budgets, parents could not always spare the foregone labor of the children in the fields, and resentment by locals who paid for these unfunded mandates led to hundreds of cases of vandalism.¹³³

Despite these hiccups, the lower Hengchun villages were far ahead of indigenous settlements in the north in terms of formal education.¹³⁴ We recall here that Ōkubo Toshimichi's parting shots to Qing officials in Beijing at the conclusion of his negotiations in 1874 included criticism of the lack of schools in the Paiwan settlements in Langqiao. While the Qing did not exactly dot the landscape with schoolhouses, it did make a beginning. After Japanese forces left in 1874, Hengchun city drew population by decree but also through attraction, as the Qing filled in an administrative grid with *baojia* (mutual responsibility) units and *zhuang* (administrative villages). Educational institutions to transform indigenous peoples into Sinophone Qing subjects were also piloted. This flurry of activity directed at horizontal integration tipped the balance of power in favor of the Han, vis-à-vis the formerly dominant Paiwan, during the twenty-year interval between the Taiwan Expedition and the assumption of Japanese rule.¹³⁵

When Inō Kanori arrived in Hengchun at the behest of the TGG education bureau, the Tuilasok annex school was already in operation. In late October 1898, Inō stopped in the walled city, visited the local Pacification Office, and finally reached Tuilasok. During his tour, Bunkiet invited Inō into a ceramic-roofed home, well appointed with Chinese furniture. Bunkiet put on an elaborate feast for his Japanese guests and showed Inō a treasured copy of the admonition that Saigō Tsugumichi had issued in 1874, warning the Paiwan to be obedient to the Qing.¹³⁶

In his synthetic report on conditions throughout Taiwan's interior, Inō wrote that the lower Hengchun towns such as Tuilasok were the most "advanced" of all indigenous peoples, due to frequent intermarriage with Chinese in their proximity. Inō singled out Tuilasok and Sabaree especially as places where tiled-roof homes and the use of Chinese language were common—these villages were, in fact, hardly distinguishable from Han settlements, according to Inō. The "lower

Hengchun tribes,” south of the line stretching from Mudan to Fenggang (see map 5), were therefore geographically advantaged compared to the more isolated and less “advanced” upper Hengchun villages, according to Inō’s evolutionary taxonomy.¹³⁷ After the Qing began to fund reclamation and Han migration, the southernmost Paiwan tribes, such as Sabaree, Tuilasok, and Koalut, were forced to adopt the Qing hairstyle, the queue. In the northern part of the peninsula, however, around Mudan and Kuskus, Paiwan men retained their Paiwan hairstyles.¹³⁸

In 1902 the Japanese Hengchun district officer applied to abolish the status of Mudan, Kuskus, Sabaree, and Tuilasok as “savage villages” (Japanese *sha*, Chinese *she*) and promote them to “townships” (Japanese *shō*, Chinese *zhuang*). The application, like Inō’s survey ethnography, noted in-migration of Han and Paiwanese acculturation and intermarriage with Han as factors in favor of township status. Another reason the lower Hengchun tribes qualified for “normal administration” was their cultural competence regarding private property and the conduct of commerce. Most notably, unlike indigenous peoples more generally, the lower Hengchun Sinicized indigenes understood how to calculate the worth of trade-goods in abstract monetary units—rather than in terms of customary equivalences in bartered goods (see chapter 3). In a similar vein, the application noted that lower Hengchun Paiwanese adjudicated disputes through mediation. They did not follow formal court proceedings, but at least disputes were not solved by feuds, vendettas, or divination.

As a surplus-producing, stockbreeding, and agricultural area, lower Hengchun, it was argued, should contribute to the cost of government by paying taxes—which meant extending all rights and obligations of colonial subjects (*hontōjin*) to Koalut, Sabaree, Tuilasok, and selected other villages. Thus, on April 28, 1904, the former abodes of Isa, Toketok, and the wreckers of the *Rover* were, administratively speaking, no longer “savage” in the eyes of the Japanese government.¹³⁹ Bunkiet himself is said to have led a group of Paiwan residents out of the mixed-residence Tuilasok to resettle in Mudan Bay in 1901.¹⁴⁰

The evidence offered above suggests that Japan’s “savage border,” reckoned as a cultural boundary that separated economic moderns from indigenous peoples, reflected the extent of the Qing government’s reach by 1895: wherever Paiwanese had been forced to wear the queue, normal administration followed. In fact, the lower Hengchun settlements of Mudan and Kuskus (the villages whose men reportedly did not wear the Qing queue), located just north of Sabaree, Tuilasok, and Koalut, remained classified as *sha* (savage settlements) well into the 1930s. As map 4 and figure 51 indicate, Japan’s ethnic classification excluded Tuilasok, Koalut, and Sabaree from the Paiwan zone by 1912, while most of lower Hengchun remained firmly within it. The colorful maps attached to 1930s statistical compendia followed suit. On the Paiwan side, as late as 1934, Mudan and Kuskus were still sending children to the “aborigine schools,”¹⁴¹ despite the region’s status as a relatively wealthy and economically developed location. Thanks to its suitable

riverbanks, Mudan became an early site for the cultivation of paddy rice in 1909. Within a couple of decades, Mudan was a model rice-production center,¹⁴² though it still remained within the indigenous zone.

This seemingly arbitrary line—which divided fellow Paiwanese in a surplus-producing and fertile area of Taiwan into normally and specially administered peoples—had one important consequence. Like the qualifications for indigenous-district policemen (see chapter 1), which were lower than those for policemen stationed in Han districts, the indigenous school curriculum was adapted to special conditions—it was watered down. From the beginning, indigenous students were not expected to perform as well as their Han counterparts in Hengchun city or the other common schools and language institutes. Even under auspicious conditions—with an eager and powerful collaborator in Bunkiet and a surplus-producing Paiwan population versed in the Southern Min dialect of Chinese—Sagara Nagatsuna and the higher-ups in Taipei designed the Tuilasok annex school to keep Hengchun residents of Paiwan ancestry “down on the farm.” Although it has been celebrated as the first indigenous education facility in the history of Japanese colonial rule, the Tuilasok annex was, in fact, a precursor to the third-tier educational system that would define Japanese rule in the highlands.¹⁴³

By March 1898 the Taiwan Government-General had built sixteen Japanese-language training institutes and an additional thirty-six annex schools; four of the latter were for indigenous children (all in Taidong or Hengchun, in the south). That same year, the institutes were discontinued and replaced by a more ambitious common-school (*kōgakkō*) system. Its six-year curriculum “consisted of ethics, Japanese language, classical Chinese (composition, reading, calligraphy), arithmetic, music and gymnastics.”¹⁴⁴ However, in two locations, Hengchun and Taidong, the vocationally oriented institutes were left in place until 1905. As one official report put it, the “reason is not far to seek. The existence of so many aborigines in these districts accounts for this exception.”¹⁴⁵ In 1904, thirteen language institutes and annexes served indigenous children, with an enrollment of 803 (759 males and 44 females).¹⁴⁶

Even after the remnant language institutes for indigenous children were discontinued in 1905, indigenous schools remained separate and inferior, but under the new name aborigine common schools (*banjin kōgakkō*).¹⁴⁷ The government-general’s own English-language propaganda was forthright: “According to the new [1905] arrangement, the school course covers only four years instead of six . . . while the number of subjects was made less than those of the [common schools]. The aborigine pupils have in the regular course only three subjects: Morals, Japanese, and Arithmetic. They have no need of Chinese classics, Science, and Commerce. Only Agriculture, Manual Training, and Singing (one or all three) may be added to the regular course of study according to the intellectual development of the tribe.”¹⁴⁸

Because the residents of Tuilasok, Sabaree, and Koalut bore the burden of taxation after their incorporation into the regularly administered territory, their

children were theoretically eligible to attend six-year common schools with a full curriculum.¹⁴⁹ Aborigine common schools were built among Amis and Paiwan peoples who lived under normal administration and remained concentrated in the “advanced” south and the eastern rift valley into the 1930s. By 1935, there were exceptions: five aborigine common schools had been built in the specially administered territories. Of these five, only one was located in the north among the Atayal, Sediq, and Truku populations.¹⁵⁰

Eika Tai has noted that the common schools for Han children were aimed at creating “citizens” (*kokumin*), whereas that term was absent in planning documents and curriculum for the indigenous common schools. This nomenclature reflected the government-general’s pre-1930s approach to indigenous education: it would create not fellow nationals but rather docile and useful subjects.¹⁵¹

THE EXPANSION OF INDIGENOUS EDUCATION TO THE NORTH

Due to the violence surrounding the camphor wars, which surely fed into Japanese officialdom’s low estimation of Atayal cultural capacity, the first “northern tribes” school was established in Quchi in 1908. The Quchi school was called an aborigine youth school (*bandō kyōikujo*), a new institution that complemented the aborigine common schools. The youth schools were creatures of the guardline movements discussed in chapter 1. In contrast to schools for Han, making “citizens” was not part of their writ.¹⁵²

At the Quchi school and others like it, indigenous children were taught comportment (bowing, sitting respectfully, interacting with superiors), lifestyle “improvement” (wearing geta [clog-sandals], using chopsticks, wearing pants), ethics (loyalty), farming (intensive, fixed plot), and handicraft production (see figure 26). The youth schools were staffed by policemen and district-office staffers. The guidelines were drawn up in 1908, in the midst of the war against northern indigenes. They were built in part to win over the indigenous peoples and also to train interpreters.¹⁵³ The pioneering Quchi school was moved upriver to Wulai in 1911. The bulk of instruction was in field cultivation, tree felling, and other “regular employments. Japanese-language training was the second most important pursuit.”¹⁵⁴

In 1915, the same year that Japan’s major military offensives against indigenous peoples were terminated with the retirement of Sakuma Samata, the Taiwan Government-General issued first-year and second-year readers for indigenous children titled *Banjin dokuhon* (A reader for indigenes).¹⁵⁵ A user’s manual for *Banjin dokuhon* (published in 1916) forecasted an ethnically bifurcated administration and the birth of indigeneity in modern Taiwan. Taiwan’s educational administrators in effect hardened the line that LeGendre drew between indigenes and Han for political purposes in 1872 (see chapter 1), that census-bureau desk



FIGURE 26. The Wulai School for Indigenous Children, which opened ca. 1910. The standing adults wear the trademark embroidered upper garments with decorative buttons, as immortalized by Mori Ushinosuke's Quchi portraits. The male children sport Japanese-style haircuts and imported clothing, while the girls wear Atayal leggings with Chinese-style upper garments. THE SCHOOL OF URAI SAVAGE TRIBE, lwo410, East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, accessed July 26, 2017, <http://digital.lafayette.edu/collections/eastasia/lewis-postcards/lwo410>.

jockeys inscribed between “Mongolians” and “Malays” in 1905, and that guardline architects scorched into the earth in the 1910s. The manual explained:

In April 1914 . . . aborigine common school regulations were promulgated, beginning a new chapter in indigenous education. [Initially . . .], the aborigine common schools used the Ministry of Education elementary-school reader designed for *naichijin* (Japanese), or the Taiwan Government-General common-school reader for *hontōjin* (Han Taiwanese). . . . However, it goes without saying that these two readers were inappropriate for aborigines, who are of a different race, who differ in language, whose environment and climate is not the same, and whose lifestyles and cultures are varied. Therefore, the government-general ordered the formation of an editorial board for a new set of *Aborigine Readers*. . . .¹⁵⁶

While this manifesto suggests that indigenes had varied cultures and lifestyles, it was premised on the notion that they were all subunits of a Malay race that was also inscribed in the 1905 census categories. Education bureaucrats thus based the different levels of education, for Han and indigenous Taiwanese, on perduring attributes such as environment, race, and culture. The phrasing of the guidelines

amplifies Matsuoka Tadasu's view that 1915 was the turning point when Japanese colonists began to accept the specially administered territory as a permanent, rather than expedient, division.

In 1902, by contrast, the district officer of Hengchun applied to move Tuilasok, Sabaree, and Koalut under normal administration ostensibly because these communities had been Sinicized. However, *Sinicized* referred to those who spoke Minnan Chinese (a Fujianese tongue) and wore a Central Asian hairstyle (the Qing queue). Therefore, the term *Han* in this case did not have an ethnic referent but served as a proxy for the ability to produce surplus wealth and participate in a commodified economy. We can read this circa 1904 usage of *Han* as equivalent to *liangmin* (good subject), an old Qing term that separated most imperial subjects from pariahs, bannermen, nobles, and outlanders.

But under the 1916 educational guidelines for indigenes, reflecting wider currents in the post-World War I Wilsonian dispensation, indigenous status was being moved out of the plastic category of "uncivilized" and into the static category of "possessing unique attributes" as a racial/cultural marker, while the term *Han* moved in the same direction as it also became particularized as an ethnonym. As Sakano Tōru has argued, the first decades of Japanese colonial rule saw a conflation of "civilization" with "Sinicization" in the discourse on "aborigine improvement." However, by the 1930s, "imperialization/Japanification" had become firmly entrenched as the telos of progress in official discourse.¹⁵⁷

The pointed suppression of Chinese-character (Japanese *kanji*, Chinese *hanzi*) use in the 1915 readers furthered the ethnic bifurcation of Taiwan into Han and indigenous moieties. While common schools for Han students¹⁵⁸ and late Qing indigene schools in Taiwan focused on Chinese reading and writing,¹⁵⁹ Japanese authorities in post-Sakuma Taiwan regarded Chinese characters as optional for indigenes, almost a luxury. The first two years of indigenous instruction, according to reformed rules, were conducted in katakana (a syllabary). Teachers stressed oral communication and diction; hiragana (another syllabary) was added in the third year, with some very elementary Chinese characters. In the fourth year, indigenes learned a few dozen *kanji* related to their customs, surroundings, and vocations but not nearly enough to read a Japanese newspaper or a Chinese poem.¹⁶⁰

Of course, Japanese itself, like Chinese, was hardly a monolith, and what constituted Japanese in 1915 required spelling out. Because many indigenous-district policemen hailed from northeastern Japan and Kyūshū, the 1916 teacher's guide, echoing those for "national-language" teachers in the home islands, mandated the use of Tokyo-standard pronunciations. It inveighed against the rural Japanese policemen's "ragged Japanese" and "vulgar colloquialisms" and "mispronunciations," and it urged proper diction.¹⁶¹ Shimoyama Jihei's son recalled that the Kyūshūans and Okinawans who staffed the aborigine police passed their rough Japanese on to their students; female Atayal women commonly used locutions like *ore* and *o mae* (very casual forms of male speech).¹⁶²

Again promoting ethnic bifurcation, Japanese educators also pushed the notion that, as members of the Malay race, the indigenes were ethnic affines of the Japanese. Teachers could use the fourth-year reader's account of the emperor Jimmu's eastward conquests, it was suggested, to incline Taiwan's "Malays" (indigenes) to dis-identify with the Han race and imagine themselves as long-lost cousins of the Yamato (Japanese) ethnos.¹⁶³

So while the emphasis of indigenous education was practical and focused on everyday conversation, it also held within it the seeds of more complex forms of indoctrination. The fourth-grade reader taught students that a typical *ban-sha* (aborigine settlement) contained about 30 families and 150 residents. Indigenous residents generally farmed their plots but occasionally hunted in the mountains. Within each *ban-sha*, two buildings were most prominent: the schoolhouse and the police station. According to the reader, before the police station arrived, farming was difficult because indigenous peoples were in a perpetual state of war. Now they could farm peacefully. And, if they studied hard enough in school, they might be sent to the capital to study Japanese. One sample lesson reproduced postcards from a fictitious older brother in Taipei. The postcards reproduced pictures of the governor-general's residence and a large, ornate school building, as well. In addition to the large buildings of the capital, the reader also illustrated the countless thousands of Japanese troops that paraded in Tokyo and stood ready to put down rebellious imperial subjects.¹⁶⁴ In short, the reader reproduced in miniature the cardinal lessons of the indigenous sightseeing tours to Taipei and Tokyo, wherein headmen were made to understand imperial might and wealth and, hopefully, were dissuaded from further rebellious activity.

On the one hand, after 1928, some institutes adopted more challenging curricula. Thereafter, making *kokumin* (citizens) was a stated goal of indigenous schooling. Chinese characters were now part of the curriculum, as well.¹⁶⁵ However, proposals to send professional teachers to the indigenous territory, either to sharpen and reinforce the education outlined above or to improve the lives of indigenes, were continually thwarted. Indigenous schools were staffed by policemen for the duration of colonial rule. Throughout the 1920s, enrollments in aborigine youth schools actually increased. Nonetheless, allocations for instructional materials and physical plant were routinely diverted to fund shortfalls elsewhere in the colonial budget. In the end, writes Kitamura Kae, most Japanese-language schools for indigenous peoples, with the exception of the demonstration school at Jiaobanshan (see figure 27), became thinly disguised work camps.

Crops were raised by students to pay for their upkeep and the costs of infrastructure. Language lessons were dispensed in rickety buildings with chronic shortages of desks, chairs, and school supplies.¹⁶⁶ While common schools for Han students faced financial constraints because they were paid for with local taxes levied on colonized Taiwanese, the indigenous schools faced even tougher constraints because they were funded by a central government that was perpetually cash-starved.



FIGURE 27. Jiaobanshan model school for indigenous children, ca. 1930. [The Kappanzan School and Classroom], ip1532. East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, accessed July 26, 2017, <http://digital.lafayette.edu/collections/eastasia/imperial-postcards/ip1532>.

With the arrival of Taiwan's first civilian governor-general, Den Kenjiro, in 1921, a few highly qualified and ambitious Han and indigenous students were permitted to enter elementary schools with Japanese children. In 1921, eight indigenous students throughout Taiwan met the tough standards. The denigrating word "savage" was dropped from the name of the aborigine common schools in 1922, but the course of study remained restricted to four years of practical education. The exceptions who proved the rule were children of Japanese policemen and indigenous women who entered the elementary school in Wushe alongside Japanese schoolchildren. Most indigene school attendees—themselves a slight percentage of the total population—went to the Wushe aborigine common school. This was the only common school for indigenous children for all of northern and central Taiwan; all other Truku, Sediq, and Atayal children, if they attended at all, were taught at Japanese police stations.

Two Wushe common-school graduates, Hōgō natives Hanaoka Ichirō (Dakis Nobing) and Hanaoka Jirō (Dakis Nawi), entered the Puli elementary school as teenagers in 1921. Puli was a walled city and gateway to the mountain settlements in central Taiwan. The two subsequently took jobs as a school instructor and a police assistant, respectively, near Wushe, and became famous for the suicide note they left on the morning of the October 27, 1930, Wushe Rebellion.¹⁶⁷ While they were not directly implicated in the attacks, they blamed "excessive forced labor"

for the rebellion and reported that they had “been detained against [their] will by the barbarians.” The passionately scrawled note criticized both sides, reflecting the painfully torn identity of men who had ascended the meritocratic ladder but also identified with the people they had left behind.

The Hanaokas (not related) had married local Hōgō women at a Japanese-style wedding ceremony near a government office in the 1920s. Their wives, Kawano Hanako (Obing Nawi) and Takayama Hatsuko (Obing Tado) were the daughter and niece of a leading Sediq political figure, the Hōgō paramount chieftain (*sōtōmoku*) Tadao Nōkan. Hanako and Hatsuko were frequently photographed in Japanese clothing and attended the Puli elementary school, like their husbands. According to Deng Xiangyang, these marriages were arranged by the government to provide examples of successful assimilation by indigenous peoples.¹⁶⁸

The rumors of the two Hanaokas' complicity in the October 27, 1930, slaughter of Japanese civilians and police in the model indigenous administrative hub of Wushe suggested that too much education for indigenous peoples would only produce malcontents. Matsuda Yoshirō has written that after the 1930 uprising, indigenous peoples were no longer permitted to enroll in advanced educational institutes.¹⁶⁹ Kitamura Kae's statistics show that in the 1920s, fewer than ten students from the indigenous territory per year were selected to attend the elementary schools; by 1930 there were only twenty-eight total indigenous graduates of elementary, middle, normal, nursing, medical, and women's schools combined.¹⁷⁰ But the more important trend was the content, context, and purpose of indigenous education in the post-Wushe years, which shaded into the full-blown mobilization period after 1936. If the Taishō period can be characterized by the vocational bent of indigenous education, the Shōwa years featured an emphasis on spiritual transformation and imperial subjectification.

Inspector Yokoo Hirosuke took a leading role in framing post-Wushe policies for the indigenous areas. Yokoo obliquely referred to the “Hanaoka” syndrome with a reference to French colonial education in Africa. Yokoo believed that the French were moving too quickly on their assimilation policies. Therefore, the African educated elite returned to home villages resenting their own countries. Some suffered the anomie that bedeviled proletarian intellectuals in other colonies. Yokoo was not against education per se. He insisted that its quality and extent be improved and that Japanese-language training be more thorough. Yokoo stated his belief that indigenes should internalize and themselves propagate loyalty to the emperor and a sense of imperial mission. Somewhat paradoxically, Yokoo emphasized respect for the indigenous character (although he called for the reform, if not eradication, of many indigenous practices). While he was an advocate for imperial subjectification, Yokoo also believed that indigenous education should not exceed the cultural capacities of its targets.¹⁷¹

TGG policies indeed reflected the twin priorities of imperialization and respect for indigenous particularity in the 1930s. The period saw decreasing expenditures

per indigenous student for education¹⁷² but also saw renewed efforts to propagate Japanese language through other forms of schooling, including ubiquitous night schools attached to police boxes. One official estimate in 1937 put the overall “can understand basic Japanese for everyday tasks” rate for indigenes at 34 percent for males and 24 percent for females. Among Atayal peoples (Atayal, Truku, Sediq), these numbers were 40 percent and 32 percent, respectively. By 1942, roughly 50 percent of all indigenous peoples were proficient in conversational Japanese, with 58 percent of Atayal men reaching that level of proficiency.¹⁷³

As indigenous proficiency in Japanese increased during the 1920s through the 1940s, the Taiwan Government-General hollowed out the incentive structure for Japanese policemen to learn indigenous languages. Before 1922 all policemen who passed a language test received stipends, but after 1931 that number decreased to 90 percent for a minority of “fluent” policemen and to only 20–30 percent of the majority “proficient” Austronesian language speakers. Diminishing incentives were reflected in low proficiency rates: in the 1930s, only 2.5 percent of indigenous district policemen were *fluent* in a local language, while 26 percent were merely *proficient*. That meant that about one in twelve dispatch stations had an officer fluent in a local language. But since the percentage of lower-ranking Japanese patrolmen in the indigenous area also decreased, while the number of indigenous policemen increased to about 50 percent of the police force,¹⁷⁴ the number of bilingual indigenous policemen actually increased; they just weren’t Japanese.

During the period that I have characterized as falling under “native authority,” circa 1910 to 1930, cross-cultural communication was anchored by female indigenous relatives of influential headmen who married Japanese policemen. The problems encountered by Kondō Gisaburō, Sazuka Aisuke, and Shimoyama Jihei revealed that system’s limitations and contradictions. The reliance on chiefs not only circumscribed the influence and knowledge of policemen attached to them, but as we saw in chapter 1, the older generation of headmen themselves were unreliable vectors of public power. Therefore, after Wushe, they were replaced by new leadership: the indigenous youth corps (*Takasagozoku seinendan*).¹⁷⁵

These new youth leaders were called “pioneers” (*senkusha*). They replaced the *tōmoku* and *seiryokusha* (headmen and men of influence) as the intermediaries between Japanese officialdom and the Taiwan Indigenous Peoples. With the advent of a new indigenous leadership recruited from aborigine youth schools, a less locally embedded intermediary cohort emerged. This new leadership was groomed to lead a society of farmers, stockbreeders, and fishermen who were destined, if Japanese colonial rulers had any say in the matter, to live their lives out in the indigenous territory. There was no question of integrating the highland economy with the rest of Taiwan. After the Wushe Rebellion, it was determined at the highest levels of government in Taiwan that Taiwan Indigenous Peoples could only thrive under the paternalistic care of a functionally specialized aborigine administration.¹⁷⁶

As Japanese became the language of governance within the indigenous territory, Japanese policemen were rotated more freely over the surface of the territory. But their new ethos and sense of professional identity tied them to the second-order geobody of indigenous Taiwan. The new role of indigenous women in the post-Wushe era is perhaps best symbolized by the famous Atayal heroine Sayon. In September 1938, Sayon and ten other Atayal women were helping a local Japanese policeman named Takita cross a river to get to his military post and join the war in China. Weighed down with three of his suitcases, Sayon herself fell in and drowned, becoming a martyr and the subject of song, film, a memorial bell, and more.¹⁷⁷ The seventeen-year-old Sayon was neither an interpreter cohabiting with Takita nor a leader in war on the order of Iwan Robao or Tata Rara.

Instead, she was carrying luggage to help a mobile, uniformed, male agent of Japanese empire exit her village peacefully. While many treatments of Sayon emphasize the hoopla generated by her supposed spirit of sacrifice, she was essentially a porter. In fact, as the indigenous territories became sites of ethnic tourism in the 1930s, the luggage-carrying indigenous woman became a common sight.¹⁷⁸

To be sure, the “normal administration” that indigenes were being excluded from meant heavy taxes, floggings by policemen without a trial (until 1921), and discrimination in public schools, administrative jobs, and the police force. Moreover, public education in the normally administered territories was far from universal or equal to the quality of education for children of Japanese colonists. Only 2.19 percent of school-age Taiwanese children attended schools in 1900. The rate reached 4.66 percent in 1905 and 5.67 percent in 1910.¹⁷⁹ By 1930, however, the rate was 30 percent, and by 1940, 60 percent.¹⁸⁰

Even after Gotō's administration put an end to large-scale armed Han resistance in 1902, rebellions continued through 1915. In 1907 rebels led by Cai Qingrin killed twenty-four TGG policemen and frontier sentries in the “Beipu incident.” The next day, insurgents killed all Japanese residents of Beipu town, for a total of fifty-seven fatalities in two days. The government-general killed about ninety rebels in its suppression sweeps. Over one hundred suspected rebels were arrested; nine were sentenced to death, and ninety-seven were either confined or put on *corvée* labor. Other planned rebellions were discovered before they came to fruition in 1912 and 1914. The hundreds of conspirators apprehended, however, suggests that Han-dominated lowland Taiwan could not be classified as a disciplinary society before World War I, insofar as brute force was required to maintain order.¹⁸¹

The Ta-pa-ni or Xilai'an incident of 1915 marked the last spasm of Han armed resistance.¹⁸² Former colonial policeman Yu Qingfang (1879–1915) and associates led this millenarian uprising. According to Paul Katz, author of a definitive social history,¹⁸³ “the number of Taiwanese and Japanese killed during the fighting

[was] estimated to have exceeded 1,000 people. A further 1,957 Taiwanese were arrested . . . of whom 1,482 were put on trial and 915 sentenced to death. A total of 135 Taiwanese were executed before the Taishō Emperor issued a decree of clemency, while scores more died in prison.”¹⁸⁴

Han armed resistance never again reached the scale and intensity of the Beipu and Ta-pa-ni revolts. According to Caroline Hui-yu Ts'ai, by “1920, when the colonial administration of Taiwan delegated part of its power to local governments . . . structural integration by and large had been completed.” In other words, over a two-decade period of experimentation, the Taiwan Government-General had effectively co-opted the *baojia* system for taxation and vital statistics while mobilizing it to make even Taiwan's rural population visible and amenable to policing and labor mobilization. Despite the coextension of territorially defined Japanese policing units (*gun*) with local self-responsibility units (*baojia*) throughout Taiwan, Ts'ai concludes that structural “integration . . . did not necessarily result in social integration. It took the two decades of the interwar period . . . for the colonial administration to appropriate Taiwanese society for its use.”¹⁸⁵

Nonetheless, in comparison to the indigenous territories, lowland Taiwan can be said to have become a disciplinary society in many respects. After the Ta-pa-ni rebellion was put down, normal administration began to diverge more sharply from special administration. By 1915, the year the reader for indigenes was published, a middle school had been established for Han Taiwanese. A few vocational schools were added after 1919 and a university (with only rare seats for Taiwanese) in 1928. Despite its restrictive and discriminatory nature, the Japanese education system for Han Taiwanese was robust enough to foment “major changes in the structure of Taiwanese elites. In the 1910s, the landlords and gentry . . . had begun to give way to the rising groups of professionals trained in colonial institutions.”¹⁸⁶ Over the next two decades, the court system, especially for commercial law, became more equitable; corporal punishment was abolished; and a great number of rights guaranteed by the Meiji constitution for citizens on the main four islands were extended to Taiwanese under regular administration.¹⁸⁷

Although social mobility through education for Taiwanese was restricted to medicine and education, it was structurally homologous to Japan's home-island system. Most students would obtain basic, functional literacy and morals education, and a small percentage of the population would be trained to lead the rest of society. Under colonial rule, these leaders were supposed to be models for collaboration and assimilation, but many led movements that challenged TGG prerogatives. The formation of a Taiwanese political class capable of mobilizing a petition movement for home rule and equal treatment in Japan had developed by 1914. This large-scale civil-society activism attests to the power of precolonial educational traditions and the strength of island-wide networks among Han Taiwanese. But the nonviolent political resistance movements of the 1920s and 1930s, as

Ming-cheng M. Lo has demonstrated, evolved in the colonial school system. In contrast, residents in the specially administered districts did not mount petition movements, establish opposition newspapers, or lobby the government in Tokyo. Instead, they attacked, burned, and looted exposed police boxes or Japanese settlements on occasion, most infamously on October 27, 1930.