

Marginalization and Middle-Class Blues

Race, Islam, the Workplace, and the Public Sphere

It dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil.

—W. E. B. DUBOIS, *THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK*

“Here I am, a black man who has done all the things I was supposed to do,” he said, and proceeded to tick off precisely what he done: gone to Harvard, labored for years to make his mark in an elite law firm, married a highly motivated woman who herself had an advanced degree and a lucrative career. He and his wife were in the process of raising three exemplary children. He had surmounted every hurdle life had thrown in this way. Yet he was far from fulfilled. “Blacks who have made it up the ladder have had to put up with a lot more crap” than have those who had given up along the way. But these successful people, he mused, were the very ones likely to be especially sensitive to the “crap” they encountered.

—ELLIS COSE, *THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS*

The middle-class North African second generation are cultural brokers (Warikoo 2011) in two senses—between white and maghrébin cultural worlds and between the cultural worlds of their immigrant parents and other working-class North African-origin individuals, and the middle-class world they occupy at work and school. They are cultural brokers in terms of race and ethnicity and in terms of their socioeconomic status. Their educational and professional successes in adulthood only exacerbate their feelings of occupying multiple worlds. Their middle-class status only heightens the difficulty and frustration of not being fully accepted as French by others. Their upward mobility and middle-class status launches them into a world different than their immigrant parents’, but having arrived there, what happens next?

In this chapter, I explore how individuals navigate these dualisms by demonstrating how middle-class, North African–origin individuals access different codes in different spaces. I also discuss their experiences of being marked as different across the different domains of Islam, the workplace, place of residence, and the public sphere. Those are all domains where their denial of cultural citizenship is evident. The North African second generation is marginalized owing to its North African names, identification with Islam, and residential locations—all of which are proxies for race and ethnic origin (Silberman 2011). I further illustrate the pervasiveness of the racism they experience, which has implications for the relationship between marginalized individuals or minorities and the state. Despite Republican ideology emphasizing how all citizens are the same in their relation to the state, middle-class North African–origin individuals are still not treated as full and equal citizens.

Second-generation immigrants in other societies occupy a liminal status between the country where they were born and raised and their parents' home country—never feeling as if they belong in one or the other, or in both (Eid 2008; Imoagene 2012; Kasinitz et al. 2004; PRC 2013; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes et al. 2011; and Zhou and Lee 2007). For second-generation immigrants who manage to be upwardly mobile, there is another dimension to navigate as cultural broker—their dual minority and middle-class status (Warikoo 2011). It exacerbates their feeling of being between two worlds, as they are not only between French and North African, but also between working-class and middle-class. As with middle-class populations more generally (Frazier 1957; Lacy 2007; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Vallejo 2012), middle-class children of North African immigrants move through different symbolic and real spaces, their interactions not limited to other maghrébin- or immigrant-origin individuals. This is a product of their upward mobility; their working-class roots did provide them with the same cultural and social capital as their white counterparts. They are second-generation immigrants, yet first-generation middle-class individuals. They can study at Sciences Po, for example, but they may not fit in or feel as comfortable as their white classmates. They may hold a leadership position at work, but they may not feel they are regarded as competent or knowledgeable as their white counterparts in comparable positions. This is a problem, not only for France, which espouses a particular model of identity politics, but also for all minorities in plural and diverse societies.

UPWARD MOBILITY, BECOMING MIDDLE-CLASS, AND THE GLASS CEILING

Consider Farid, a thirty-two-year-old with dual Algerian and French citizenship, whom I met at a café near the new Bibliothèque François Mitterrand building.

I had connected with him through an immigrant-related organization. He lives in the southwestern banlieue of Melun with his wife and two young children and works for the Ministère de la ville, de la jeunesse et des sports (Ministry of the City, Youth, and Sports, since renamed). At a very young age, his parents told him, “You are not French. We live in France, but you are Algerian.” They imparted to him their love and appreciation of Algeria, which took priority over any attachment to France, and their connection to Algerian culture—which he and his wife intend to pass on to his young children. His parents shared with him the family history and educated him in Muslim and Algerian cultural traditions, including music, common expressions, and speaking Arabic. “I do not feel an emptiness in this regard,” Farid explains, “meaning, culturally, I believe that I have an Algerian heritage. I am connected to a family. I am connected to a region in Algeria.”

This might be interpreted as a failure of children of North African immigrants to assimilate into French society and adopt its norms and values, and as a preference for retaining an attachment to former French colonies in the Maghreb. However, Farid’s story is more complex.

Looking back, Farid feels that he adopted an Algerian identity rather than a French one because he grew up in Rouen, in the northwestern part of France, near Normandy, in a predominately Muslim and maghrébin neighborhood, which was labeled a *zone d’éducation prioritaire* (educational priority zone, or ZEP) by the French government. He rarely interacted with whites growing up. Many of his neighbors also took Arabic courses on the weekend, and many of his classmates and friends fasted during Ramadan. His father was a factory worker and his mother, twenty-five years younger than his father, was a housewife. His father came to France when he was twenty-three years old to work, and then returned to Algeria to meet his wife, who would later join him in France.

Because neither of his parents was educated or literate, they always stressed the importance of him doing well in school. Farid credits his parents for his educational and occupational success; none of his childhood friends managed to graduate from college and hold a professional job, as he did. He remembers that his mother signed him up for a library card when he was young, though she herself could not read. Farid later studied at the University of Rouen, where he met his wife, a child of Algerian immigrants, and then earned a graduate degree from the University of Bordeaux. “It was just something I understood at an early age,” he said, when explaining the importance of education. “I just really wanted to make my parents proud.” His four older siblings have the same education level. Friends from his old neighborhood (also of North African origin) are less educated. Those who are consistently employed mostly have menial or working-class jobs, and some have had trouble with the law. “I think about that a lot, why I was the only one of them to finish high school studies, go to college,” he explained. “I think it’s

attributable to the motivation of my parents.” His parents served as role models, in that they struggled when they first immigrated to France because they were uneducated and did not speak French but “were able to adapt, to move forward,” he explained proudly.

The nature of social segregation in French society made it difficult for Farid to identify as a French person. The French state, through its policies and practices, has created and fostered his isolation and separation from mainstream society, a sense shared by other children of maghrébin immigrants. This difference was thrust upon him, not one he coveted.

If Farid does not necessarily see himself as part of the French mainstream, he nonetheless has moved up the ladder and is successful. He enjoys his job, but it presents its challenges, particularly in terms of advancing in the department hierarchy. But, he says, “it is always important for me to remember that I have it a lot better than my parents.” This is an example of the dualism Farid and others experience. They recognize their continuing difficulties as mediated by their maghrébin origins, but they also consider them relative to those experienced by their immigrant parents and economically disadvantaged.¹

Farid is a minority within a minority group. As such, he experiences ambivalence about his social position. Farid recognizes the advantages of his educational accomplishments and professional status, yet he is not far removed from his immigrant parents and his childhood friends from his neighborhood.

Middle-class North African-origin individuals are distinct from their white counterparts in France, as they do not experience the full advantages of middle-class status. Like second-generation Mexican Americans and other middle-class racial and ethnic minority populations, second-generation maghrébin immigrants can achieve upward mobility through education, yet face a “glass-ceiling mobility” (Rojas-García 2013) or an insurmountable barrier to being viewed as truly French. They are “qualified, yet excluded” (Rojas-García 2013). Though educated in the society where they were raised, they are not permitted to truly fit in.

I was struck by this when I began conducting fieldwork in Paris. Following the 2005 uprisings in France’s banlieues,² many news reports focused on the impoverished and unemployed segment of the second-generation population and how their lower socioeconomic status had kept them outside the French mainstream.³ These individuals were seen to have turned their backs on France, rejecting its norms and practices. It was they who were the problem, not France. They cultivated an oppositional identity and did not see themselves as French. Marginalization in France was based on class or socioeconomic status, not race and ethnicity. The issue was that this population did not work hard enough to make it in French society (Beaman 2015b). For members of the second generation who were educated and employed, marginalization was not an issue.

Yet maghrébin-origin individuals themselves know differently. The upwardly mobile are not viewed differently than their economically disadvantaged or disenfranchised counterparts. Individuals like Farid still do not feel as though they fit in or are included. Their success is not a panacea for the racism and discrimination they face. And their marginalization exists across multiple domains, including the workplace, residential location, and religious life.

Ndiaye's (2008) minority paradox, the theory of the simultaneous visibility and invisibility of France's black population, also applies in this middle-class minority population; their visibility is heightened by their presence in predominately white spaces (including elite universities and professional and executive-level offices), but they are invisible because their presence is ignored in mainstream society. The discrimination and marginalization they experience is more evidence of how race and ethnicity are constitutive of French identity.

North African-origin individuals have an ambiguous status vis-à-vis being middle-class in part because of their proximity to their working-class counterparts—often individuals in their own families or neighborhoods. For example, Hamama, a thirty-five-year-old of Algerian origin who works as a hospital director and studied at Sciences Po, has been more successful than her three younger brothers, who live in Lille in northern France, where she also grew up. One brother has been unemployed for about three years and another one works a bus driver. Hamama therefore realizes that her own material circumstances could have been widely different. "People see me differently once they learn that I am educated, that I went to Sciences Po," she explains. She started an activist organization denouncing discrimination and working to help banlieue residents and maghrébin-origin individuals who are trying to get ahead but lack the opportunities to do so. Individuals who have made it feel they cannot forget those who have not.

Many respondents are heavily involved in maghrébin-related professional organizations, which seek to provide opportunities for their working-class counterparts (as well as networking opportunities for fellow professionals). As the African American middle-class maintains connections to other African Americans to maintain their racial and ethnic identity even while seeking full incorporation into the American mainstream (Lacy 2004, Pattillo-McCoy 1999), so too do North African-origin individuals use professional and social networks to maintain and foster ties with other middle-class maghrébin-origin individuals. However, maghrébin-origin individuals must make these ties amid institutional contexts that do not recognize their ethnic identity as legitimate. There is no legally established maghrébin-French or North African-French identity. They are supposed to just be or act French, yet they are not treated as such. These networks allow them to cope with their position at the bottom of the ethnoracial hierarchy, despite their middle-class achievements.

Part of being middle-class and maghrébin is moving in multiple spaces, interacting with maghrébin individuals and whites. Assimilation is not an appropriate framework for understanding the experiences of this population. That they were born and have spent their entire lives in France allows them structural assimilation, yet they are not culturally assimilated (Lacy 2007), for they are not regarded as part of French culture. This is not a group that desires separation from non-immigrant origin individuals or whites; rather, its members become adept at strategically moving through in two different cultural worlds. Respondents often attend schools where other students do not resemble them, or they work in spaces where they are one of few immigrant-origin individuals.

My focus on the stigmatization and marginalization on middle-class maghrébin-origin individuals because of their race and ethnic origin challenges Loïc Wacquant's conclusions about the nature of assimilation and ethnic identity in France. He argues that this demographic has adopted "the mainstream cultural and behavioral patterns of the French" and has failed to form a distinct maghrébin community or assert any "ethnic specificity" (Wacquant 2007, 194), and thus has successfully assimilated. According to Wacquant, the second-generation immigrant population demonstrates how race and ethnic origin are insignificant for French daily life and how France is more successful at integrating its immigrants and their descendants than is the United States. He says that even if African Americans and North African-origin individuals in France have similar lived experiences, the explanations for each are markedly different. He favors socioeconomic explanations for marginality in France, versus a race-based explanation for marginality in the United States. However, in addition to neglecting an intersectional analysis focusing on race and socioeconomic status, Wacquant neglects how, though children of maghrébin immigrants may be socialized or assimilated along traditional lines (for example, by education or language), they nonetheless feel excluded from full participation in mainstream French society. Their racial and ethnic status do not allow them to identify as French, or have that identity accepted by others. He places the onus of this nonassimilation and noninclusion on the North African second generation rather than on French society at large: it is its members who are responsible for claiming their place within it. This discourse, of course, holds true for racial and ethnic minorities elsewhere: African American and Latinos, for example, are held responsible for discrimination or mistreatment they experience.⁴ By contrast, Wacquant and others believe that if maghrébin-origin individuals assert their French identity, they will be accepted as such. However, his theory does not acknowledge that even individuals who do everything right are still stigmatized and excluded. Socioeconomic factors are not the sole explanation for societal exclusion. Race and ethnicity play significant roles, regardless of class and socioeconomic status. More attention, therefore, must be paid to the everyday manifestations of France's racial project.

DIFFERENCE ACROSS DOMAINS:
OCCUPYING MULTIPLE WORLDS

I. Islam

The continual marginalization of this middle-class population is also due to the intersection of race and religion—here, Islam—in French society. Children of Muslim immigrants in Europe “grow up in a world in which Islam is a chronic object of discussion and debate, a world that is thick with self-conscious and explicit discussions about Islam” (Brubaker 2013, 4). The denial of cultural citizenship extends to this religious context. Maghrébin-origin individuals are associated with Islam, and they owe their marginalization in part to that.⁵

Much research on Muslims in France is based on the assumption that their religious identity, practices and beliefs are homogenous (Brubaker 2013; Lamont 2002).⁶ I am not interested in Islam in terms of its tenets (see Bowen 2009 for more on this), but rather in the degree of their religious-based marginalization and their individual religiosity, or degree of religious commitment (Voas and Fleischmann 2012), and how this shapes their status in and marginalization from mainstream society.⁷ This parallels Cadge and Ecklund’s (2007) “lived religion perspective,” which examines religion’s importance outside religious organizations, in social institutions such as families, workplaces, and schools.

Second-generation Muslim immigrants construct and negotiate a religious identity, but they do this in the context of a religion that is stigmatized in society at large. Second generation–immigrant religious participation has been found to depend more on the salience of religious identity than ethnic national identity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). France complicates this, as religion stands in for race and ethnicity as a marker of difference because race and ethnicity are not officially acknowledged. When North-African origin individuals are considered too culturally different from the French mainstream, their Muslim identity is often referenced because of the nation’s Islamophobia (Bleich 2006, 2009; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). This is even though respondents say their religious participation and religiosity do not hinder them from feeling French or asserting a French identity (Beaman 2016; Maxwell and Bleich 2014). Rather, they frame their religious practices in a way that corresponds to the tenets of French Republicanism—they frame their religiosity a personal and private matter.⁸

Islamophobia, then, is not just about Islam; it is also about ethnoracial exclusion. Religion stands in for racial and ethnic difference in a society that refuses to grapple head-on with these differences. Islamophobia is a form of racism—it sees certain individuals as too culturally different to ever be fully accepted as part of the mainstream. The connection between Islamophobia and racial and ethnic marginalization was perhaps most recently seen in the wake of the massacre in the offices of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, in January 2015 and the resulting

international rally cry of “*Je suis Charlie*.” Samir explained to me in a conversation a few months after the attacks:

It was so weird. . . . After the attacks, I got a text message from a friend from high school, a white guy, asking me what I thought about the attacks, if I condemned them. It doesn't make any sense. Of course, I condemn the attacks. . . . I mean, it's not as if we ever ask Catholics and Christians to condemn the attacks that other Christians commit. . . . This is a republic. I'm part of a republic. I'm an individual in relation to the republic. When I pay my rent each month, I'm just paying for myself, not for anyone else or any group.

The experience of Samir, who migrated to France from Algeria when he was two years old, reflects the collective punishment (Hajjat 2015; Hajjat and Mohammed 2013) that many North African–origin individuals experienced in the wake of the attacks. Such remarks—to him and to his cohort—serve as a constant reminder to children of maghrébin immigrants (and other French Muslims) of their marginal status in French society, and reflects that their Muslim identity is secondary to the Muslim label constructed for them by others.

About 80 percent of my respondents identify as either practicing or cultural Muslims. For many of them, Islam serves as a symbolic marker of maghrébin culture, just as Christian symbols and rituals are part of African Americans' cultural toolkit, which they invoke in certain contexts to make sense of their marginalization (Pattillo-McCoy 1998). *Musulmans pratiquants* (practicing Muslims) among my respondents engage in practices such as *salat* (ritual prayer); observing Ramadan; abstaining from alcohol and cigarettes; following halal food regulations; attending mosque; observing Muslim holidays; and wearing the hijab. About 68 percent of respondents self-identified this way. Zara, a twenty-eight-year-old of Moroccan origin who works as a social worker, is a devout Muslim who considers being maghrébin and French as constitutive elements of her identity. For her, being a Muslim means “respecting Islamic principles, the five pillars—faith, fasting, praying, making donations, and making the pilgrimage. I do all these, except the pilgrimage, which I haven't done yet. *Insha'Allah* [God willing], I will have an opportunity to make it.” Although her parents raised her as Muslim, Zara did not really take the religion that seriously until she was about fifteen years old. It was not until she was twenty years old that she started to say the daily prayers.

Some of my respondents say they are *Musulmans croyants*—believers who do not practice the religion but who nonetheless profess cultural ties to it. They participate in only a few rituals, such as observing Eid al-Fitr, the holiday that celebrates the end of the fasting period and of Ramadan. About 13 percent of respondents self-identified this way. For those individuals, their Muslim status is more of a cultural claim than a religious one (also see Bowen 2004a; Venel 2004). They essentially see themselves as less Muslim than other French Muslims. Nadia, a

twenty-four-year-old of Algerian origin and graduate student studying human resources and communications, explains this distinction: “I tend to say I am a cultural Muslim, which means that in terms of culture I am Muslim, because I was raised that way, though my father was not. . . . Algerian culture is anchored in the Muslim religion, so . . . the education I received had a religious foundation.”

Nadia does not remember being particularly interested in Algerian or maghrébin culture until she was a teenager. She increasingly felt a need for an attachment to her culture, sought out connections with other maghrébin youth online, and began to learn more. She owes her identity as a cultural Muslim in part relates to this social network of like-minded Muslim friends. Those Muslim friends characterize themselves similarly in terms of their religious identity and religiosity. Like most respondents, Diana believes religion should remain a private matter, per French Republican ideology.

That respondents’ Muslim identity and practices contributed to their marginalization underscores how religion is another space where this population is marked as different. It is important to note how this marginalization is often based on others’ perception of their religious identity and practices, not the actual practices themselves.

Harmellia, a twenty-one-year-old college student of Moroccan origin, was raised in a public-housing complex in Nanterre, a banlieue west of Paris, with other maghrébin-origin individuals. Her phenotypical features do not immediately convey North African origin—she has pale skin and long blonde hair. She remembers her early marginalization because she was Muslim: “When I was young, I did not eat pork. . . . But when I tried to explain that to my schoolteacher, she did not believe me. They forced me to eat it.” Her teacher’s ignorance and stereotypical views of maghrébin-origin individuals’ appearance resulted in a refusal to believe her.

Mourad also characterizes himself as a practicing Muslim who observes Ramadan but does not eat pork and does not say the ritual prayers. He says, “If a Muslim wanted to become French, he had to renounce his religion. He had to say, ‘Voilà, I want to be French, so I’m abandoning Islam.’ That’s how it was before. And I think in the minds of many French people today, you can still find this mindset, this idea that it’s difficult to be French and Muslim at the same time. Either we are French and not Muslim, or we are Muslim and therefore cannot be French.”

Mourad positions his religious identity as one barrier that keeps him from being fully accepted as French by others. He vividly remembers how his Muslim identity was used against him when he tried to rent an apartment. He had called a landlord to schedule an appointment to see it. When he arrived, the landlord asked him if he was Muslim. Mourad did not completely understand why he asked this question and responded that he was, indeed, Muslim. He later felt uncomfortable and did not pursue the rental.⁹ This experience was one of many in which

he was treated differently because of his ethnoreligious identity. Of note is how Mourad was set apart for merely identifying as Muslim, not for his practices. Here we have yet another example of how difficult it is for the middle-class maghrébin second generation to escape the difference assigned to it.

Nasar, a thirty-two-year-old Parisian of Algerian origin, often has similar experiences of feeling different based on his religious identity. He feels most challenged in this regard at his workplace, an organization related to French soccer:

At my job, there about ten Arabs, five of whom drink alcohol, do not observe Ramadan, who love to go out, go to clubs, hang out, smoke . . . and there are five others who do not go out. Me, I do not drink, I do not smoke, I do not really go to clubs and all that. But it's to me that they say, "You are extremist," yet they love the others. . . . But with an Arab like me, it's different. . . . If tomorrow you give in and follow what the French do, what they are, that's great. Then they'll say, "Nasar is a great guy, he drinks, he can drink two barrels of beer."

Nasar's coworkers see him as different because he practices the tenets of his Muslim faith. Unlike some of his coworkers, he refuses to perform a Muslim identity that the French more easily accept, one that Nasar considers inauthentic. He is unwilling to sacrifice his religious identity.

Hicham, a twenty-nine-year-old of Moroccan origin, feels that although he agrees with the Republican tenets of keeping religious practices in the private sphere, he is repeatedly reminded of his Muslim status and North African origin:

I know they always mock me in terms of halal, what you can eat. Saturday, I went to a conference . . . and there was a buffet with different sliced meats that I could not eat. I didn't say anything. It didn't bother me at all. I ate salad. And people said to me, "You don't eat the sliced meat?" And I said, "No, it's not halal." And one guy said, "But this isn't a Muslim celebration." I didn't understand . . . why they would say that to me, especially when I never asked them anything. I didn't say anything, I didn't ask why there weren't other options. . . . I consider it my choice to eat halal, something others should respect. There were people there who were vegetarian, who eat neither meat nor fish, but I'm not going to ask them why they don't. . . . I respect their decision. I'm not going to tell them, "Well, this isn't a vegetarian meal." It's things like this that we encounter more and more.

Hicham was particularly bothered by others' reactions to his avoidance of nonhalal meat because he feels that he does not force his religious practices on anyone else. His Muslim faith represents a racial and ethnic otherness to his colleagues that they would not apply to a vegetarian. He is continually reminded how he is a practicing Muslim and therefore not considered French. This despite his nonmaghrébin-like appearance—he has fairer skin than many of his counterparts, which has sometimes protected him from discrimination.

While religion is a site of difference for this population, respondents nevertheless claim a French identity by how they frame their religion. By relegating their

religious practices to the private sphere, they assert their place in France and consider themselves as French as anyone else.

II. Workplace

The exclusion of Muslim respondents extends into the workplace. For example, Farid remarked how, when there are meals or events at his office, it never comes to mind to his coworkers that Muslims generally do not eat pork. Though he has mentioned to them that he is Muslim, it is rarely taken into account. Though they have achieved professional success and have middle-class jobs, respondents feel that, compared to their white colleagues, they are regularly treated poorly.

The workplace is yet another context in which the middle-class North African second generation is denied cultural citizenship on the basis of its racial and ethnic origin. All my respondents are stably employed in professional or similar types of jobs: they are lawyers, journalists, teachers, bankers, social workers, and entrepreneurs. But to better understand the social locations and positions of immigrant-origin individuals, it is crucial to address not only underemployed and unemployed individuals, but also those who are stably employed. About 15 percent of second-generation maghrébin immigrant men and 23 percent of second-generation maghrébin immigrant women hold salaried or professional jobs (Lombardo and Pujol 2011). Although this is a minority of the North African second generation, it is not a negligible segment, especially when considering the successes and failures of France's assimilationist framework. Existing theories on assimilation among descendants of immigrants (Alba and Nee 2003; Zhou 1997), which emphasize upward mobility across generations as a key barometer of societal inclusion, are not applicable to middle-class children of maghrébin immigrants. While economic disadvantage plagues most of the North African second generation—and the North African-origin population more generally—even individuals who do not face such difficulties are reminded that their maghrébin origins are an inextricable barrier to full societal inclusion. Again, this is reminiscent of the marginalization black middle-class professionals face in the United States (Cose 1994). As long as the framework for understanding integration into mainstream society relies upon upward occupational mobility across generations, it is incomplete. The upward mobility of the North African second generation occurs in tandem with subtle and not so subtle mistreatment and discrimination when they enter predominately white institutions.

Being othered in the sphere of employment manifests in two ways—when seeking employment and, if hired, subsequent treatment in the workplace. The road to the current professional and employment status of the North African second generation was a long one. This corresponds with existing research, which shows how proxies for race and ethnicity, including name, skin color, or residential location, led to discrimination in hiring practices (Silberman 2011). For example, Hicham,

who lives with his family in the western banlieue of Poissy, feels that his Tunisian origin has directly shaped his experiences on the job market: “As soon as we make an effort, we find a wall in front of us. . . . As for me, I had a lot of trouble finding my first job after I finished school. It took one and a half years to find my first job, but my classmates who were named François, Édouard, Frédéric. It took them six months or four months to find a job, but for me it took one and a half years.” Hicham’s name thus betrays his maghrébin origins.

Lila, a twenty-five-year-old high school teacher in the banlieue of Drancy, remembers having trouble finding a job as well: “I remember realizing when I was very young and looking for a job for the summer . . . that all my friends with blond hair and blue eyes named Émile were able to find jobs and I was not. . . . It’s more the leverage we don’t have, the power we don’t have, or sometimes last names or appearances that don’t please employers.”

The markers of differences, including physical appearance and names, serve as proxies for being nonwhite and an ethnic minority to employers. Because the hiring process for teachers is different than for other occupations (requiring a certification exam, for example), Lil’s job search was less colored by discrimination. Yet she says, “I have felt obligated . . . to show that I was more capable than others.” Other respondents say they felt they had to work twice as hard to prove themselves as worthy as their coworkers, which mirrors their experiences as university students. This dynamic is echoed by racial and ethnic minorities in predominately white workplaces in the United States (Cose 1994; Deitch et al. 2003; Feagin 1991; Harvey Wingfield 2011, 2013; Neckerman et al. 1999; Skrenty 2014; Van Laer and Janssens 2011).

Though Hicham eventually obtained a professional-level job at a bank, the process was more challenging and complicated for him because of his ethnic origins. He was laid off during the economic crisis. Since he did not actually like his job, he saw the layoff as an opportunity to do something that would really fulfill him. He has since started an organization assisting the physically disabled (such as his younger brother) and began perfecting his English-language skills. Yet Hicham is quick to note that only maghrébin workers were laid off with him; white coworkers who began work after him were not. Hicham saw that he was more disposable in the eyes of his company than his white colleagues. He remembers a colleague suggesting he change his name to one more traditionally French, like Pierre or Jacques, to fit in.

Ahmed, a twenty-nine-year-old practicing Muslim who has dual citizenship, has also faced difficulties at his work as a technical director for his company owing to his Algerian origins. He feels somewhat protected from more overt discrimination because of his educational background (he has a *bac* plus 5, or the equivalent of undergraduate and advanced degrees). Ahmed feels that the “two different educations” (the maghrébin one at home and the French one at school) of his youth provided a rich experience, though he did not always



FIGURE 1. Nanterre, a western banlieue of Paris. Photo by author.

see it this way. However, as a maghrébin-origin employee, he feels he must work harder than his white colleagues and “cannot make any mistakes.” Other maghrébin employees at his company feel the same way and say they are treated differently than their white coworkers. “A Maghrébin making a presentation will have no credibility if he makes a mistake,” Ahmed says. He adds that he is made to feel different in more subtle ways at work. For example, he says, “In my conversations with coworkers, sometimes people say ‘you people,’ and it’s like, who is ‘you?’” The language of his colleagues thus “others” different people or groups. Sitting in a café outside his office, he described the glass ceiling maghrébin-origin employees confront, which impedes upward occupational mobility. Though Ahmed has substantial responsibilities as part of his job, including managing other employees, he believes that, however hard he works, he cannot advance significantly in his company’s hierarchy. “No one wants to see an Arab at the top,” he said. Middle-class status and occupational accomplishments are not sufficient barriers to marginalization based on race. Their successes do not challenge the existing ethnoracial hierarchy. Though they have made it on a socioeconomic level, middle-class children of maghrébin-origin immigrants are not accepted by others.

III. Place and Residential Location

Place, or one’s residential and spatial environment, is another domain where we can examine the relationship among race and ethnicity, marginalization, and

citizenship and explore the denial of cultural citizenship to racial and ethnic minorities. Put simply, “place is space filled up by people, practices, objects, and representations” (Gieryn 2000, 465). The meanings individuals attach to place are implicated in how they see themselves (Cuba and Hummon 1993; Gieryn 2000). Place also marks and sustains difference and hierarchy (Gieryn 2000). Regardless of whether children of North African immigrants live in banlieues or in Paris proper, place is one lens through which we can understand this population’s perceptions of and responses to marginalization; it offers a spatial dimension to the denial of cultural citizenship. Like the patterns of Muslim religiosity among respondents, respondents’ attachments to where they live do not negate their assertion of a French identity or feeling French. For many of these respondents, especially those who live in banlieues in the Seine-Saint-Denis département, where the proportion of immigrant-origin individuals is dramatically higher than in Paris proper, there is both a physical and social separation.

We can see how this manifests in France by considering the banlieues and the associated stigma of living in them (Balibar 2007; Oberti 2007; Préteceille 2008; Silverstein 2008; Simon 1998). I specifically situate the banlieue as a site of racial and ethnic otherness and marginalization, regardless of these communities’ heterogeneity and where children of North African immigrants live. In a context where race and ethnicity are not acknowledged, place or residential location becomes more salient as a marker for one’s racial and ethnic status (Silverstein 2008; Tissot 2008). If the assumption is that banlieue residents are of North African and sub-Saharan African origin, then by identifying someone as living in a banlieue, the implication is that he or she is of North African or sub-Saharan African origin.¹⁰ So someone’s ethnic origin can be referenced or identified without explicitly doing so, and place euphemistically stands in for race and ethnic origin (Calvès 2004).¹¹ Residential location is a proxy for ethnic origin, and this creates obstacles to employment for banlieue residents. Audits comparing identical CVs of individuals living in banlieues with those from other areas confirm this: employers preferred workers who do not live in banlieues typically associated with racial and ethnic minorities (ENAR 2014). Though France is not characterized by the same degree of racial and ethnic residential segregation found in the United States (Wacquant 2007), and residential integration within France increases from one generation to the next (Shon 2010),¹² there remains persistent concentration of minorities in banlieue communities (Shon 2010) that results in their stigmatization (Dikeç 2007; Silverstein 2008; Tissot 2007).

North African-origin individuals are often associated with the banlieues even if they do not live there (Amara 2006; Bouamama 2009; Hargreaves 2007; Silverstein 2008; Stovall 2003). This association of people of color with the banlieues is further evidence of France’s racial project, though ethnic-related segregation is antithetical to Republican ideology: the banlieues are stigmatized and considered

undesirable places to live. France's colorblind ideology veils the marginalization of individuals because of their ethnic origin.

Banlieues, regardless of the variation in socioeconomic status and ethnic background one finds there, are framed as synonymous with disadvantage and "otherness" (Hargreaves 1996); they evoke "the image of housing projects, with young people hanging around wearing baseball caps and sweat suits, smoking joints, perhaps standing beside a burning car. Banlieues have become the symbol of a bleak urban environment, deviant youth, and segregated minorities" (Tissot 2008, 1). The term *banlieue* has also become a catchall for *quartiers sensibles* (at-risk or vulnerable neighborhoods); *quartiers difficiles* (problem or underprivileged neighborhoods); *zones d'éducation prioritaire* (educational priority zones, or ZEPs); *zones urbaines sensibles* (sensitive urban zones, or ZUSs); *zones à urbaniser en priorité* (priority urban zones, or ZUPs); and *quartiers populaires* (working-class neighborhoods) (Dikeç 2007; Hargreaves 1996; Tissot 2008). They are flattened to characterizations of mass unemployment; the predominance of *cités* (high-rise public housing complexes) the absence of two-parent family structure; a deskilled workforce; a high percentage of residents on public assistance; low levels of educational attainment; and physical compactness (Avenel 2007; Balibar 2007; Dikeç 2007; Kokoreff 2003; Lapeyronnie 2008; LePoutre 1997; Maurin 2004; Rey 1996; Silverstein 2008; Stébé 2007; Tissot 2007; Wacquant 2007).

Within the French academy, scholars tend to emphasize the socioeconomic segregation of banlieues (Oberti 2007; Simon 1998; Wacquant 2007) over their ethnoracial segregation (Lapeyronnie 2008; Tissot 2008). Furthermore, marginalization is considered place-specific, so that banlieue residents are marginalized and Parisians are not, further separating them from mainstream society. Wacquant (2007) questions the marginalization of the middle-class segment of the North African second generation. He argues that banlieue residents can pass in larger society if they do not exhibit markers of living in a banlieue (including one's demeanor or speech patterns) (Wacquant 2007). But his argument ignores the connotation between the banlieues and racial and ethnic minorities who cannot overcome the association and be fully accepted as French.

Immigrants from the Maghreb originally settled in the banlieues of major cities (Tribalat 2004b). Immigrant-origin individuals who reside in the banlieues represent multiple ethnic origins, including Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan, as well as sub-Saharan African (Shon 2010; Simon 1997). Most of my respondents, about 65 percent, live in the banlieues, primarily in the inner-ring départements of Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, and Hauts-de-Seine (the rest live in Paris proper). Many respondents who are residents of the banlieues nonetheless work, attend school, or regularly socialize in Paris and travel back and forth by metro, bus, and tram.

This cross-boundary movement appears to be a privilege of the middle-class segment of the North African second generation, for working-class individuals I encountered spend more time in their neighborhoods or banlieue communities and are less likely to spend time in Paris. While doing my fieldwork at the Nanterre Association, I realized that though Nanterre is only ninety minutes by commuter train or a twenty-minute drive from Paris by car, it is more isolated from Paris than that spatial distance suggests. One time, when I was typing on my laptop in the main room of the Nanterre Association in between sessions teaching English, a maghrébin mother from the neighborhood approached and greeted me. We spoke briefly. The wallpaper on my computer screen was a photo I had recently taken of the Jardin des Tuileries, near the Musée du Louvre. She asked whether the photo was of Chicago (since I lived there before I moved to Paris) or somewhere else in the United States. I was struck that she did not immediately recognize a popular Parisian landmark next to a world-famous museum. On another occasion, several children were taking a field trip to a photography exhibit at the Galerie nationale du Jeu de Paume, near the Place de la Concorde, one Wednesday afternoon in spring 2009. Since school is only a half day on Wednesdays, the Nanterre Association often organizes excursions for those afternoons. An older Algerian man who lives nearby and does occasional janitorial work for the organization explained to me that he was excited about going on the field trip because he had not been to Paris in about nine years, despite living in Nanterre. Another time, when I went on a field trip to the Arc de Triomphe with some of the students, many of them were unfamiliar with it, though it is a major Parisian landmark and not far from Nanterre. Experiences such as this reinforced the separation of Paris and this banlieue community and demonstrated that for its residents, the distance between them is mediated by socioeconomic status.

The residential communities, past and present, of my respondents, how they came to live there, and how location has determined their place in French society warrants examination. For racial and ethnic minorities, interactions with whites outside their ethnic enclave are often characterized by heightened discrimination and prejudice (Eid 2008). This is true for Abdelkrim. He grew up in a HLM complex in a predominately immigrant neighborhood in central France. It was only later, when he attended a school where there were fewer immigrant origin individuals, outside of his neighborhood, that he felt out of place. In this new environment, his difference from others became more tangible to him, causing him to reconceptualize his identity. He now lives in the Malakoff banlieue, just south of Paris, which he describes as better than most banlieues. He prefers living there because the residents seem more authentic than Parisians and he feels more comfortable and welcome. As with his childhood HLM complex, Malakoff is a place where he does not stand out as much.

Though he works and spends a lot of time in Paris, Hicham is closely attached to the banlieue where he lives. He has spent most of his life living in a *cit * in Poissy, a western banlieue about fifteen miles from the center of Paris. His family settled in Poissy because the French car company Peugeot employed his father at a factory there. He describes his neighborhood as special because it is part of an urban renewal program. Hicham fought against the demolition of his public housing complex, which he feels was motivated by racist perceptions of immigrant-origin residents:

We had a mayor who wanted to destroy the neighborhood, because . . . you have a lot of people of foreign, maghr bin, African origin, and he wanted to eradicate the population. . . . That's what he said: "I no longer want any of you in this neighborhood or in this town." This is a racist person. . . . We had a meeting where he came to present plans for renewal, and at the end he said, "If I had known, I would have brought a translator with me to explain this to you." . . . But we understand French very well. And then he said, "I'm going to ask you to leave the room because we are going to have to ask the cleaning staff to disinfect." He believes that we are germs. He kept saying such violent things.

Author: And what did the residents say?

Hicham: They revolted. We revolted and we formed a collective. That was in 2005. We fought against him for four years. . . . The apartments, their exterior, everything has deteriorated. Come see. . . . Everything is degraded—the living conditions, there are rats. We had everything. . . . We had the odors from the sewer . . . the smell of piled-up trash, rising almost to the second floor. . . . Oh, yeah, the trashcans—they wouldn't come to empty them. . . . We had no hot water during winter, no heat.

Author: But isn't this illegal?

Hicham: Yes, it's illegal, and we complained . . . but the government was slow to do anything. . . . They had posted a sign stating that [the *cit *] was going to be demolished. We hired a lawyer and fought to delay demolition until the mayoral election. . . . Now there's a new mayor. He's launched a new plan. The residents are involved in it. We're staying in the neighborhood.¹³

Hicham emphasizes the social cohesion of his neighborhood, despite its problems. "It's like a family here. . . . There's a solidarity. Everyone knows each other. Sure, the living conditions are a bit difficult, but now they're improving. It's getting better." He sees living in his Poissy *cit * as part of who he is, and he hopes to be a role model for others in his community. He attributes the difficulties he has faced in finding a job to being maghr bin. He understands why the frustration of minority youth, led, for example, to the 2005 uprisings. Contrary to what Wacquant (2007) would argue, Hicham could not "pass" in larger French society. His name connotes not only that he lives in one of Paris's beleaguered banlieues, but also his maghr bin ethnic origin, considered inferior to white "native French" identity.

Nadir, a thirty-six-year-old of Algerian origin who works as a journalist for a major television news outlet, is similarly passionate about his *banlieue* and eager to refute its negative depictions in the media. Nadir lives in a Seine-Saint-Denis *cit * near the Stade de France soccer facility, one of the sites of the November 2015 terrorist attacks. Seine-Saint-Denis is directly north of Paris, and generally considered one of Paris's most troubled banlieues (Ichou and Oberti 2014; Kepel et al. 2011; Kiwan 2009; Truong 2015). He has lived there his entire life, save for eight years when he lived in Australia. Nadir describes this community as a typical French *cit *, with lots of immigrant families of modest or poor backgrounds. One day, when I was taking the tram with him from a caf  to his apartment so he could give me a copy of his memoir, he pointed out the window at all the nonwhite individuals on the street and asked me, rhetorically, how these people could ever see themselves as part of France.

Nadir is well aware of the perceptions others have of banlieue residents and feels it is important to challenge this stigma and set a good example for others in his community. Sitting in his office at the television station, one evening, he explained: "I feel more and more the fact that I live in Seine-Saint-Denis, because it is the poorest d partement in France, the d partement of the excluded, the d partement no one cares about, that we are really just left there." This, of course, influences how he sees himself, not just in France but also in the world:

That's why I feel solidarity . . . with the blacks who suffer in our country, solidarity with those in Gaza. I feel a solidarity with all who suffer . . . because I lived the same suffering myself when I was a kid. We didn't have money to buy things. We were constantly stopped by the police for no reason, and because we didn't have a lot of opportunities we had the same [kinds of] jobs. And as you can clearly see, there are only whites [in my office]. All the people are white. I am the only one [who's not]. To be honest, it is difficult for me to be proud of my country because today, me, I am doing well, but if there is one person [from the neighborhood] who is doing well, there are still forty others who are not.

Nadir's consciousness as a minority (Meer 2010) is situated both vis- -vis place and race and ethnic origin and connects him to other minority populations. He distinguishes himself from other residents who have no real attachment to their *cit * and move away as soon as they can, once they have the financial resources to do so. "If everyone who succeeded left the neighborhood," he explains, "only those who could not leave would live there, and that is what creates problems. Then you have a *real* ghetto." Nadir and Hicham are individuals who, though middle-class, continue to live in banlieue communities to which they are attached. This attachment helps them cope with their experiences in predominately white spaces.

Within Paris city limits, the link between place and residence and the marginalization of respondents is also apparent. Mohamed, a thirty-year-old insurance

agent of Algerian origin, moved to Paris in 1998 for work and lives in a *quartier populaire* (working-class neighborhood) in the thirteenth arrondissement, near the Porte d'Italie. He explains how his neighborhood is full of people who look like him. "There are many blacks and Arabs, and I like that . . . because I feel like I'm in a familiar element," he explains. Mohamed prefers to live among fellow minorities, rather than in a more bourgeois or middle-class neighborhood with more white residents. As one of the few nonwhites at the insurance office where he works, it is a comfort to make his home among people to whom he can relate. Mohamed's residential environment helps counter the marginalization experiences at his predominately white workplace. He operates within a French code while at work but operates within a maghrébin code at home and in his neighborhood.

Reda, a thirty-two-year-old human resources consultant of Algerian origin, has lived in both Paris and the banlieues. He grew up in a *quartier populaire* in Meaux, a banlieue in the Seine-et-Marne département near Disneyland Paris and lives in the ninth arrondissement, which he describes as nice and bourgeois. He does not recall feeling different in any way growing up, since he was surrounded by other racial and ethnic minorities. It was only when he moved to Paris that he felt excluded, partly because of his childhood in the banlieues, or ghettos, as he refers to them. He sees himself as "socially marked" because of his connection to the *banlieues*. Reda sees himself as occupying two different worlds—French and Maghrébin—because of he grew up in a predominately Maghrébin environment and currently lives in a predominately white environment.

Nasar has a strong connection to where he lives or has lived. He grew up in Marseille, second to Paris in the number of immigrant-origin residents, and connects his early years in a predominately immigrant environment with his understanding of being an ethnic minority today. He is quick to identify himself as *marseillais*, someone from Marseille; in fact, his coworkers identify him as such. Nasar has fewer issues with his identity than his counterparts, he says, because of his early environment. He did not feel like an outsider growing up in Marseille. Only after moving to Paris for work in 1998 did he first feel like one. The experience of maghrébin friends who grew up in other cities like Paris, Lille, Strasbourg, or in smaller towns did not mirror his own. In Marseille, he says, one was more likely to draw attention for being white than as a racial and ethnic minority:¹⁴

I remember the newspaper *Le Monde* did a study related to the children of immigrants, and when people were asked, "What are you?" 98 percent of them said *marseillais*. Whether they were children of immigrants or not, they said *marseillais*. I should say that in Marseille there are many emigrants. It is the first French port [from the Mediterranean Sea]. It was the point of entry from the colonies. People here claim to be *marseillais* first of all, so it's for this reason that I see these differences

[between Marseilles and other cities]. I don't care if people see me as French or not. As long as I am *marseillais*, I'm fine.

Nasar's insistence on the stark differences between his city of birth and the rest of France provides a coping method of sorts when he confronts challenges as a racial and ethnic minority living in Paris. Should others not recognize him as French, he can assert his *marseillais* identity.

Many respondents have also experienced overt discrimination when searching for housing. Mourad, whom I introduced in the previous section, attempted to rent an apartment and the landlord asked whether he was Muslim. When asked how long his parents had lived in France, Mourad answered thirty years, to which the landlord responded, "Only thirty?" Mourad was not shocked by this exchange. Rather, he says, this is common among his maghrébin peers: "It's simple, really. You're looking for a place, you see an ad, you call, and you don't say you're of Algerian or maghrébin origin. They say, 'Yes, OK, come by and check it out.' And then the day you come . . . [the unit is no longer available]. Or if on the phone you give your name—for example, 'My name is Mohammed' or something like that—then it's 'Oh, I'm sorry, the apartment was just rented by someone else.' It happens all the time."¹⁵

Safia, a thirty-two-year-old journalist with dual Tunisian and French citizenship, relates a similar story:

It took my husband and I six months to find housing, and still it was a friend of a friend who rented us his apartment, who was the landlord. But our application file was never taken seriously [by other landlords], though my husband works in finance and I also work. We make enough money. I remember they were asking for three times the rent, and with my salary alone we had enough money. So we had a lot, and they didn't want us. They kept telling us, "We just rented to another couple. It happened quickly." It was always this, or "We changed our mind, we have to do some repairs, so we're not going to rent it." It was always something. And once, an older woman told me very clearly when we checked out an apartment, "Yes, why not?" And when we called again to schedule another viewing of the apartment, she said, "No, you understand, there was a French couple who came, so we rented it to them. It's just easier." And me, I vividly remember feeling disgusted, and I said to her, "But Madame, we are French also." But they were white French. . . . And my husband, it was at that moment . . . he told me, "You see, we have to leave France. We'll never be recognized as normal people, because we both have jobs, but we could find an apartment only through a friend."

Married with two young children, Safia and her husband, a banker and of Algerian origin, rent an apartment in Cergy-Pontoise, a western banlieue. They want to buy a house but are already worried that it will be difficult—and not for financial reasons.

The couple demonstrate the paradox of the upward social mobility of children of North African immigrants. Despite their educational and professional successes,

they cannot live anywhere even if they can afford it, a difficulty that Safia attributes to being nonwhite or of maghrébin origin. Her experiences of living in France are like those of her immigrant parents, although their material circumstances differ. This affects how Safia locates herself in mainstream society. Her experiences of exclusion place her on its margins. Individuals like Safia are continually denied cultural citizenship across multiple domains, including place and residential location, though her educational attainment and occupational status would seemingly permit integration into mainstream society.

IV. Public Sphere

In addition to other sites of exclusion, the middle-class segment of the maghrébin second generation is denied cultural citizenship in the public sphere. Ahmed experiences this denial when walking through Paris or taking public transportation: “If I’m walking in a bourgeois Parisian neighborhood and an old French lady sees me, she’ll cross the street to walk on the other side. . . . I think it’s going to take several more generations for people to not see differences like this, for someone to see a black person or an Arab walk by on the street and not even notice it.”

This is reminiscent of what Lacy (2007) identifies as “public identities,” referring to the ways that black middle-class individuals negotiate racial discrimination in the marketplace, the workplace, and as they engage in other activities in public. The marginalization of racial and ethnic minorities in public space is not unique to France, as research on racial and ethnic minorities in the United States has shown (Anderson 2015; Jackson 2001). What is different about the French context is that racial and ethnic minorities were never segregated from whites by denial of access to public accommodations, as were black Americans and other minorities (Feagin 1991). Still, racial and ethnic minorities in France are devalued and discriminated against in public space in both subtle and explicit ways: their association with low-wage work means they face excessive surveillance when shopping. Race and ethnic origin mark Ahmed and others as outsiders in French society.

When Safia is out for a walk with her young children, she says that people often ask her, “What are your children’s origins?” or “Where do you come from?” These questions imply she and her children are not French and not legitimate members of the French Republic. Despite the state’s renunciation of racial and ethnic categories, she is a “perpetual foreigner” (Wu 2001).

IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPRESSING DIFFERENCE

At the end of one conversation I had with Hicham, he sighed and said:

They don’t want me. They tell me to integrate. Me, I don’t want to integrate. I am French. I don’t need to integrate. I was born in France, I respect the laws of the Republic. . . . But they still tell us, “No, you’re not French. You’ll never be French.”

They tell us that because our parents have foreign origins, we automatically do too. . . . We're sometimes obligated to hide our differences, as if we're ashamed of them. But I've arrived at an age when I tell myself, "It's my difference. I am not looking to put it out front, but I don't want people to tell me to hide it."

That is the dilemma of Hicham and many immigrant-origin individuals and racial and ethnic minorities in both France and other plural societies: whatever they do, whatever they accomplish, they are not accepted as full citizens. Salim, a thirty-five-year-old of Moroccan origin and self-described hip-hop journalist, concurs. In his living room in Ivry-sur-Seine, a banlieue south of Paris, he tells me, "In France we have to hide our differences." But how? Salim explains that before he even speaks, people often assume he was born outside of France. Salim often travels to the United States for his work, and he says he was struck that Americans openly wearing hijabs and other religious attire were not, as he saw it, stigmatized for it. He is happy to say that he is French, but in France he does not feel it's true. To him, the French Republican model is hypocritical. Salim grew up in Paris, and he and his family went to Morocco once a year to visit relatives. But he states clearly that "Morocco is not my country." When in Morocco, he was perceived as a foreigner. And in France, he is perceived as a foreigner.

At the end of my interview with Djamila in her office, in the eighth arrondissement, near the Gare Saint-Lazare, the forty-nine-year-old of Algerian origin sighed and said:

I think we see racism more and more these days in France. When I was younger . . . it all seemed normal. . . . I didn't experience it as much as other people. But I do remember hearing "Go back to your country." People thought that. But you know, my country, it's here, so how do you want me to return to [it]? But today [I hear it] even more. . . . I had thought that as I grew older, that would change, that it would subside, that it would fade. We would no longer mark differences or distinguish between people. And I see that we do differentiate. . . . We do it more and more. And I regret that, I find it sad.

Author: Differences like what?

Djamila: For example, there's discrimination. It's not necessary to pretend otherwise. . . . For someone named Rachid Ben Machin, it is difficult to find an internship. . . . It's not only a question of a foreign-sounding name, because there's also a territorial racism. If you live in [the Seine-Saint-Denis département], it's the same thing. . . . You can run into difficulties just because of where you live. We see that every day. . . . But I also believe it's because France has not addressed certain problems in its past. It hasn't always acknowledged its past.

Djamila says, "France belongs to everyone who lives here." She recognizes, however, that this is more theory than practice, as there are barriers to full societal inclusion for maghrébin-origin individuals, even those who are "successful." Djamila feels French. She affirms it as her identity before acknowledging her

Algerian origin. She considers herself as French as any other French person, even if she is made to feel separate and apart from the French nation.

Djamila grew up in the twentieth arrondissement and continues to live there with her partner. She has worked hard to get to her current executive-level position in a membership-based social development association. Yet her success has not shielded her from the same prejudices and mistreatment experienced by her less economically successful North African-origin counterparts. Djamila remains troubled by how immigrant-origin individuals are still considered different, treated as foreigners. The North African second generation grew up in a France that communicated to them—and still communicates to them—that not only are they different, but that they should be ashamed of their difference. They were not and are not considered French, yet many nevertheless assert their French identity.

In the several domains discussed above, my respondents, are repeatedly denied cultural citizenship. They feel their exclusion acutely. Though citizens on paper, they remain outsiders in the society into which they were born. And they acknowledge this status takes a toll over the course of their lives.