

Local Color

In 1935, an article entitled “Going to the Korea of White Robes” (Hakui no Chōsen o iku) appeared in the popular Japanese magazine *Tabi*. The article’s byline credited the account to Kobayashi Chiyoko, and while the article provided no biographical information, it is likely that the author in question was, in fact, the famous singer of the same name. She had recently recorded the first Japanese version of the Korean folk song “Arirang” for the label Nippon Victor. Its lyrics and melody evoked a Korea curated for the Japanese colonial imagination—a land of “simplicity, melancholy, and wit” that was also a “reflective mirror” of Japan’s modernity through which Japanese people could connect to the “primeval emotions and lifeways” of an imagined premodern Japan.¹

The Japan Tourist Bureau sent Kobayashi to the peninsula as its special correspondent. Like her version of “Arirang,” Kobayashi’s description of Korea represented the colony as both exotic and familiar. “You’ll be surprised to find that just by crossing one sea, there are scenery and customs that are so different,” she wrote.² The Korea of white robes was a leisurely place, a preindustrial paradise. The white-robed men were not just Koreans, they were emblematic of Korea itself—slow and unchanging, a land that was both close to and far away from what a subsequent correspondent referred to as “the rapidly changing inner territory” of the Japanese Empire.³

In the late 1920s the geography of civilization gave way to a geography of cultural pluralism. From Taiwan to the inner territory to Manchuria, imperial tourism shifted away from representing the place of the colonies in terms of their progress toward Japanification and industrialization and instead offered the experience of “local color” as its primary product. No longer was the value of the first-hand




FIGURE 8. “Hakui no Chōsen e yuku” (Going to the Korea of white robes). The cover to Kobayashi Chiyoko’s special report on travel to Korea linked culture and territory by placing a typical colonial image of a Korean man above a map of the Korean peninsula.
 SOURCE: *Tabi* 1935, no. 7. Courtesy of the Japan Travel Bureau Library of Tourism Culture.

experience of the colonies solely the observation of their incorporation into the circulatory pathways of civilization or their place in the national land. Rather, colonial boosters and imperial travelers increasingly portrayed the importance of imperial travel as the sensory experience of regional difference that it offered.

In emphasizing the value of regional difference to the national people, local color representations like Kobayashi's suggested a spatial and social imaginary of Japan that integrated colonized lands and peoples into a Japanese nation that was now understood to be a variegated space of diverse and commensurable cultural regions and a national body composed of multiple ethnic nations. This new spatio-social imaginary posited an elevated status for those citizens who could make use of regional difference, for it was those who circulated throughout the empire who could contribute their experience of Japan's diversity to the wealth, knowledge, and well-being of the nation. The emphasis on circulation changed the meaning of observation as well, which now was not only observing the sight at hand but also appreciating the differences between regions and peoples.⁴

Local color tourism invoked new modes of territorial incorporation and modified the old. Tourist materials no longer erased colonized subjects from the prescriptive lists of sights that defined each territory. Rather, local color introduced an ethnographic mode of territorial incorporation, advertising the observation of colonized subjects as a fundamental component of the experience of regional difference.⁵ The historical mode adopted "indigenous peoples" (*genjūminzoku*) as the subject of the regional histories of Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, while the nationalist mode emphasized the necessity of preserving diverse regional landscapes for the well-being of the national people. Most significant, however, were the modifications to the economic mode, which now treated commodities as natural resources endemic to particular regions rather than products made marketable through Japanese industrial know-how. Local color likewise represented physical labor as a product of the natural aptitudes of particular peoples rather than as an unfortunate holdover from a previous nonindustrialized era. In this, local color suggested a spatial and social imaginary of the Japanese nation that defined it as an economic body whose relations were constituted through a "mutual exchange of advantages" between ethnic groups and cultural regions.⁶

Local color's treatment of culture as something that one could consume reflected a broader shift to an everyday life defined by commodities and consumption, what has been called the rise of the *kokumin* as "consumer-subject" as well as citizen-subject in the late 1920s.⁷ Mass culture even—or, perhaps, especially—commodified sentiment through the production of consumers' desire for "the new," which, in the case of local color tourism, manifested as a desire for "the exotic old."⁸ What distinguished local color tourism from other examples of the "erotic grotesque nonsense" culture of the mass consumption era, and what makes it central to the analysis of the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism,

however, is that local color was about the consumption of place. Local color represented particular identities as endemic to particular territories in a manner that took both the territories and the identities outside of History.

The exhortation to imperial travelers to consume the nation's local colors necessarily involved them in the broader struggles of imperial and anti-imperial nationalism that shaped the 1920s and 1930s as the empire transitioned from an era of territorial acquisition to one of territorial maintenance. With the notable exceptions of anarchists such as Sin Ch'ae-ho in Korea and proletarian internationalists like Nakanishi Inosuke, who imagined politics to be an unstable conflict between classes and individuals imbricated in multiple subject positions, the conflict over the future of the imperial nation-state could not but invoke territorialized identities as the basis for political legitimacy.⁹ Native ethnographers used local color to foment ethnic nationalism in Japan, and Korean anti-imperial nationalists used it to lay claim to an independent Korean nation in Korea. Representatives from Japan's "second cities" used it to challenge the dominance of Tokyo in the determination of Japanese culture at the same time that Taiwanese Chinese activists used it to demand self-rule.¹⁰ The Japan Tourist Bureau used local color to emphasize the need for continued colonial rule in Taiwan, while the Japanese Kwantung Army used it to justify the formal separation of Manchuria from China and the establishment of the putatively independent state of Manchukuo. If the geography of civilization had emphasized the transformational power of History over custom, local color flipped this relationship on its head to argue that Culture and Ethnos were ontological properties of territory that must be protected from History.

The use of local color to fight so many different political battles suggests the further naturalization of the territorialized nation as the global archetype of political community. At the same time, it illuminates how such a concept could also be used to naturalize a multinational state that legitimated past colonialism in the name of future protection and prosperity. Indeed, it was precisely local color's utility to several movements—the imperial national, the anti-imperial nationalist, and the anticolonial liberal—that made local color tourism such an important political tool. In an era when anti-imperial and anticolonial activists took to newspapers, magazines, and even children's literature to challenge the legitimacy of Japanese imperialism and, in some cases, of nationalism and the territorial nation-state, local color suggested a way of seeing the nation not as a project of future homogenization but as a constructed cultural body. Culture, in this context, was understood as both the ontological local culture of the state's diverse regions as well as the voluntarist culture of the nation as a whole. Such a project naturalized the territoriality of the nation as a composite of its territorialized subcultures, which were represented as inseparable from the environment that had forged them. In its claim to protect and curate the empire's diverse regional cultures, local color provided a *raison d'être* for a liberal, imperial state that superseded the logic of

national self-determination.¹¹ Local color tourism naturalized this new imaginary by emphasizing the sensory experience of difference between places—now understood to be static and fixed—and encouraged travelers to reproduce this imaginary through the act of appreciating the complementary capacities and commodities that each region and ethnic nation had to offer.

This chapter shows how colonial boosters used the idea of local color to articulate a vision of Japan as a nation and empire of diverse yet complementary regions in Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan. It focuses on two of local color's common terms, *labor* and *landscape*. It was through these interlinked terms that colonial boosters transformed the threat that colonized subjects posed to the legitimacy of the Japanese Empire into an argument for the authenticity of a multiethnic nation of Japanese *kokumin* that nevertheless incorporated colonized lands and peoples on uneven terms. Though histories of the sublime—a sensory experience of beauty or grandeur that inspires awe—suggest that the production of a romantic landscape relied on the erasure of visible labor, central to local color's spatial politics was the territorialization of a hierarchical social imaginary through the figure of the indigenous laborer.¹² Colonial boosters used local color to define the empire's ethnic nations as essentially “from” a particular territory while at the same time representing the imperial nation as the complementary union of an imperial division of labor and natural resources. Such representations constituted the colonies as places within and yet somehow apart from the nation by positing an imperial social imaginary in which relations between ethnic nations were defined as a mutual exchange of advantages between the empire's regions and peoples. They also fostered new forms of dispossession in the name of “appreciating” the differences between the natural aptitudes and diverse histories of each region. The chapter traces the contours of local color in Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria to illuminate how the representation of land and labor used specific political conflicts over the future of each territory as a resource for reproducing place-images that fueled, rather than undercut, imperial travelers' sense of the “newness” of the colonies.

THE SECOND GENERATION PROBLEM

Behind colonial boosters' enthusiasm for local color was a hint of exasperation. The second generation of imperial tourists had grown up on the accounts of the first—accounts that described Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as places that felt, looked, and smelled different from Japan—and it was this experience of difference that they sought to acquire through travel. Yet the geography of civilization framed these experiences of difference as uniformly negative. While travelers were perfectly willing to recognize the modernization of colonial infrastructure, industry, and governance, they experienced colonial differences as negatives—aspects of colonial life that needed to be ameliorated before the colonies could truly

become part of the Japanese nation. It was this negative valuation of difference that Matsukawa Jirō pointed to in his 1925 guidebook, *Shi go nichi no tabi* (Four- and five-day trips). While Western-style buildings and street cars made the city center of Keijō “far more splendid than the city of Kyōto,” the city’s native differences lingered: “in the places where in between [the street cars and autobuses] white-robed Koreans (*Senjin*) lumber around, carrying tobacco pipes that might as well be three feet long, there is the unmistakable color (*karā*) of Korea,” he wrote. “If you take one step from the flourishing [central] district toward the poorer quarters, you are led to a squalid Korean town where the streets are narrow, and low houses made of dirt are jumbled together.”¹³ It was likewise this negative sense that sparked protest from one alumnus of Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School, who resided in Keijō. Major changes had taken place in the colony in the last ten years, including the construction of a new Government General Building, the widening of roads, and the introduction of asphalt. But, he complained, the country had not yet taken notice. “It is my strong desire,” he asserted, “to see this travelogue used throughout the country and to see it introduce the true conditions of Korea-Manchuria widely throughout the realm.”¹⁴ Itō Ken, a prolific literary critic, voiced a similar complaint in his 1935 *Taiwan annai* (Guide to Taiwan): “[The Japanese] (*Nihonjin*) lack clear and correct knowledge of this complete picture. If you immediately think of ‘savages,’ ‘venomous snakes,’ ‘bad illness,’ or ‘terrible heat’ when someone says ‘Taiwan,’ it must be said that you are very ignorant. If you are Japanese, then it really is an embarrassment not to truly know Taiwan.”¹⁵

Japanese settlers in the colonies found themselves fighting against a metropolitan imaginary that turned the terms of the geography of civilization against them. In the early 1920s, movements against Law 63 and Law 30—the laws that empowered the governors general of Korea and Taiwan to issue ordinances without the involvement of a parliament—gained strength as organizations of Japanese settlers joined with elite colonized subjects to advocate for the full incorporation of the colonies into the metropolitan political and legal systems. Yet in 1925, colonial residents found themselves further excluded from the imperial polity when a universal male suffrage bill was passed that formally denied residents of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria the right to vote in national parliamentary elections. Whereas, previously, suffrage had been based on tax qualifications, thus limiting the electorate to some five percent of the population, the 1925 act defined eligibility by age, sex, and place of residence. Only males twenty-five years and older whose official place of residence was in the inner territory could vote. The act thus enfranchised many colonized subjects residing in the metropole but excluded Japanese residents of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. The act also, however, mandated a full year of residency at the voter’s current place of residence, a rule that disproportionately disenfranchised the heavily Korean community of migrant laborers in the metropole.¹⁶ The exclusion frustrated many settler and colonized elites, who continued

to debate whether the best route toward achieving a political voice would be by demanding complete assimilation (the policy known as *naichi enchō*) or by seeking autonomy from the metropole in the form of local parliaments and self-rule, the strategy taken by the largely Taiwanese Chinese activists who participated in the movement for a Taiwan parliament.¹⁷

In both Korea and Taiwan, colonial elites chafed against the continuation of the Government General system, which had been justified, in part, by the argument that colonized peoples were not civilized enough to participate in liberal government.¹⁸ In Korea, the Government General was challenged by a nascent coalition of Japanese and Korean commercial elites, who opposed the government's proposal to maintain Korea as an agricultural appendage of Japan. Seeking a stronger voice in governing the colony, they rejected the notion that the political status of the entire territory should reflect the popular—and, they claimed, often inaccurate—notions of the developmental status of colonized subjects. In Taiwan, the lines of conflict were drawn differently. Taiwanese Chinese elites opposed the continuation of the Government General system, while Japanese settlers largely supported it as an important source of their special privileges on the island.¹⁹ Yet as Itō Ken's complaint shows, even as settlers argued that Taiwanese Chinese people should remain second-class citizens, they too argued that the geography of civilization ought to be replaced with a new spatio-social imaginary that treated the territory of Taiwan as fully part of the Japanese nation. In Manchuria, Japanese settlers in Dairen feared both the rise of Chinese nationalist claims to Manchuria and the Japanese government's apparent lack of commitment to Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria. A number of settlers campaigned vigorously for election to parliamentary office in order to protect these special interests and won five seats in the 1928 election. (The suffrage law prevented Japanese residents of Manchuria from voting, but these settlers were able to bypass that restriction on their voices by running for office—the residency requirement for holding office was determined by the location of one's household registry rather than actual place of residence.) As Emer O'Dwyer points out, the significance of the election was to be found not so much in the election of Japanese residents of Manchuria to the Diet, but in the political parties' adoption of the concerns of Japanese settlers in Manchuria and elsewhere as a core component of their own platforms.²⁰

If colonial elites found themselves frustrated that the uneven geography of empire was likely to continue for a second generation, metropolitan officials and colonial administrators likewise found themselves confronting the prospect of a second generation of colonized subjects who had little patience for the empire's empty promises. Though they were not threatened by the renewal of Laws 63 and 30 or disenfranchised by the Universal Suffrage Act, government officials were tasked with maintaining the viability of imperialism in an increasingly hostile domestic and international environment. Hamada Tsunenoshige, the former

chief of the Bureau of Colonial Affairs, noted this in his 1928 report on travel to Taiwan:

Among today's young students . . . there are those who have embraced treachery, using big exaggerations like so-called ethnic self-determination (*minzoku jiketsu*), Taiwan self-rule, or Taiwan independence. And there's also a group of inner territory people like members of the Diet who fan [their anger]. These guys think it's a good thing and run around making noise. The hot-blooded youth go along with the crowd. The problem gets bigger. Won't it be the case then that before too long phrases like 'establish a Taiwan parliament,' just like phrases like 'independence for Korea,' [will] penetrate the minds of elementary school children? That's what I worry about.

I'm convinced that probably nothing will happen with the current generation of islanders. But what about the second generation? It seems as if they're heading in the direction of absolutely opposing the Government General's policy of assimilation, and inviting the result of that opposition. This is the thing that I can't stop being afraid of.²¹

Within the borders of the Japanese imperial state, the moral renewal of imperialism revolved around the concept of "harmony" (*yūwa*). Officials hoped that the pursuit of harmony would mitigate anti-imperial activism among colonized subjects by encouraging Japanese citizens to appreciate more actively the virtues of colonized subjects. Harmony associations in Osaka and Yokohama, two cities with large populations of Korean workers, for example, encouraged students to write essays about their feelings toward Koreans and Chinese people and, in particular, to emphasize the contributions that each ethnic group made to the imperial whole. The associations saw composition as a particularly powerful vehicle for achieving the internalization of a multiethnic national identity because, like reports on imperial travel, the essays required students to write in the first person.²² Reforming the attitudes of the second generation of imperial subjects would also, officials hoped, help with the growing second-generation problem among colonized subjects by decreasing the instances of overt interethnic antagonism.²³

But the challenges could not all be fixed with adjustments to the public image of empire or to its prescribed method of interethnic relations. Colonized subjects also challenged the empire to live up to its own rhetoric. Writing a few years after Hamada, Taiwanese self-rule activist Cai Peihuo argued that assimilation's promise of eventual inclusion had brought the empire to an inevitable turning point. "Is this what the imperial command of 'all subjects are equal under the emperor's gaze' is supposed to mean?" he asked. He described in detail how the Government General of Taiwan's sugar monopoly artificially lowered the prices that Taiwanese Chinese farmers could get for their crops. "In this era of popular rights, in one corner of a Japanese Empire that absolutely protects the right to private property," he exclaimed, "there is this place called Taiwan, where we do not have the freedom

to sell the sugar cane that we ourselves have produced.”²⁴ For Cai, the passage of universal suffrage fundamentally transformed the character of Japanese imperialism. If before it had been possible to see imperialism as the work of a small group of vested interests making decisions on behalf of a largely disenfranchised population in the colonies *and* the inner territory, after 1925, imperialism was now truly a matter of a metropole ruling over colonies. Cai argued that universal suffrage represented a turning point in the history of Japanese imperialism.

Those of you who were in the position of being without prestige and being ruled are now suddenly in the position of controlling us. . . . While we celebrate your new life, we also eagerly hope that you will not forget the bitter and terrible taste that you experienced in the past as those who were controlled, who were underestimated and put down. . . . So as not to harm the rights that we have as human beings, we are asking of you that we be allowed to follow a different course. Why? If not, . . . Japan, whose imperialism has been dominated by a small number of vested interests, will really become in name and fact an imperialist country.²⁵

The second-generation problem called into question one of the fundamental premises of Japanese imperialism—that assimilation would transform colonized peoples into new Japanese subjects and colonized territory into Japanese national land. It seemed possible that the results were not as promised. Not only was ethnic nationalism on the rise, but metropolitan residents were also stuck in their erroneous views of the colonies. As Cai argued, the extension of universal suffrage created a moment of opportunity, but one that was fraught with moral stakes. No longer could empire’s contradictions be written off as a matter of time or as a project of elite vested interests—“rulers”—making decisions for the “ruled,” the unpropertied and disenfranchised. From his perspective, Japanese citizens of the metropole had to either affirm Japan as a culturally pluralistic nation or accept that they were embarking on a new era of outright imperialism.

Ultimately, those who sought in this moment of democratization an end to empire were sorely disappointed. The Diet voted to renew Laws 63 and 30, the two laws that granted the Governments General of Taiwan and Korea the power to govern through ordinances rather than representative democracy. In 1929, one year after Cai’s manifesto, the metropolitan government decided to bring the colonial governments under its formal control by placing the Governments General of Taiwan, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory, Karafuto, and Micronesia under a new ministry, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. The decision to go forward with the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was, in some sense, a victory for imperial democracy, in that it was largely motivated by the desire of the metropolitan political parties to take control of the Governments General, especially that of Korea, by formally incorporating them into a cabinet ministry and, therefore, into the system of political spoils.²⁶ Yet with the establishment of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and

the official introduction of the term “outer territory” (*gaichi*) for Korea, Taiwan, Micronesia, Karafuto, and the Kwangtung Leased Territory, the metropolitan government imposed a seemingly permanent geographic hierarchy on metropolitan and colonial territory that previous policy had insisted would be temporary.²⁷ Three years later, in 1932, the imperial government affirmed the establishment of the state of Manchukuo, and the state’s officials began constructing a history and ideology that would justify the permanent independence of Manchukuo from China and a relationship of complementary dependence with Japan.

SEEING WITH CULTURALLY PLURALISTIC EYES

It is in this context of myriad challenges to the spatial order of empire and questions about the future of the Japanese imperial nation that we must interpret the significance of imperial tourism’s turn to local color. The establishment of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in 1929, combined with the exclusion of colonial residents from the franchise in 1925, marked the sedimentation of a territorial-administrative structure that divided metropole from colony. Yet it did so without admitting to Cai’s proposition—that Japan really was “becoming . . . an imperialist country.” Instead, imperial discourse increasingly emphasized that colonized subjects were also *kokumin* and that Korea and Taiwan were “regions” (*chihō*) of Japan. A similar denial of imperialism shaped the official discourse of the new state of Manchukuo, in which the government prioritized its claim to sovereignty over members of the state’s “five races”—Manchurian, Mongolian, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean—with an official history that stated that Manchuria had been colonized by multiple ethnic groups and therefore no one group could claim an authentic link to the territory.²⁸ In this sense, the politics of local color went far beyond legitimating colonization to the construction of a new “metaethics of national life” that revolved around the triple categorization of difference as ethnic rather than temporal or socioeconomic, of ethnic identities as territorial ones, and of a new ideology of the state that located its legitimacy in its management of relations between ethnic groups and their regional “homelands.”²⁹

Beginning in 1927, the Japanese Ministry of Railways, the Governments General of Korea and Taiwan, and the South Manchuria Railway Company each revised their guidebooks to include numerous essays on local customs, languages, geography, and history. Previous guidebooks had not included this introductory information, considering it unnecessary. But the second generation placed it front and center. The 1927 *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* included, for example, “Exotic Taiwan and the Manners and Customs of Taiwanese: A Quick Guide to Taiwan.”³⁰ The Government General of Korea and the South Manchuria Railway quickly followed with their own local color guidebooks emphasizing the unique history, geography, and culture of the regions. The turn to regionalism extended even into

the inner territory, where the Ministry of Railways produced its own local color guidebook series for Japan, which divided the inner territory into seven distinct cultural regions.³¹

Colonial boosters portrayed the change as a response to metropolitan desires. “Today’s tourists don’t want to only see famous sights and historic remains,” wrote Mōri Motoyoshi, the director of the Keijō Tourism Association, in the magazine *Kokusai kankō* (International tourism). “They also want to have their fill of that land’s *local color* (*rōkaru karā*) and *local attractions* (*rōkaru atarakushon*).”³²

Rather than describe metropolitan desires, however, local color guidebooks and magazines took the lead in prescribing new ways of seeing the space of the nation. Consider the Keijō Tourism Association’s own description of the local color of Korea: “Since the Japan-Korea annexation of 1910, all of Keijō has been completely changed. Yet although the appearances of modern culture, such as the construction of tall buildings and modern houses, the supplementing of roads, and the [modernization of] clothing, are being furnished, Korea’s particular customs will add an exotic spice everywhere that will please the cameraman, starting with the ancient architecture of the Kinsei Palace at Keifukukyū, . . . the white-robed people walking on the street, the clothes-washing of the *omoni* (wives), and the *suljip* (sake shops) along the roadside.”³³

On the one hand, the Keijō Tourism Association used the Japanese readings of the names of local cities and sights to locate Korea within Japan, continuing the practice of Japanifying place names that had begun with the geography of civilization. On the other hand, the tourism association altered the framework for making meaning out of difference by treating it not as an element to be eventually eliminated but as a value to be appreciated. The tourism association represented Korea within Japan by spelling out the Korean words for “wife” and “sake shop” in *katakana*, the Japanese syllabary reserved for foreign words. Next to these words, in parentheses, the association included the Japanese characters. The tourism association also suggested that the appreciation of the value of local color was a universal characteristic of cosmopolitan—that is, modern—people. The “exotic spice” of Korea’s customs would “please the cameraman,” a figure who is described in terms of affect—his appreciation for cultural difference—but not ethnicity or nation. But since, as we saw in chapter 3, the ability to travel without ethnicity or nation was limited, the association’s cameraman signified those who enjoyed the privileges of imperial citizenship, those who experienced travel as the act of passing through borders that defined distinct places rather than those for whom their place traveled with them. Most significant, the tourism association did not suggest that the presence of a visible Korean culture was in any way antithetical to the legitimacy of Japanese rule. The tourism association defined the culture of Korea as a commodity. It was to be consumed and transformed into value for the traveler. It was not a political or historical statement.

Colonial boosters marketed the colonies as a welcome break from the rush of life in the metropole, drawing on a notion of the sublime that was not distinct from industrialization and labor but whose value to the nation was, in fact, constituted within the temporality of industrial life. The product, in this case, was less the site itself than the affective response that the experience of difference produced. In her special report, for example, Kobayashi Chiyoko marveled at how “white-robed Koreans” epitomized not working and that “she could not help but smile.” “Slowly, slowly the old white-robed Korean men put on their black hats and walk around, neither sweating nor making noise,” she wrote.³⁴ Hamada Tsunenosuke mobilized wonder and awe in his description of laborers in Dairen’s soybean oil factories. Responding to the idea that coolies wore little while they worked because they were uncivilized, Hamada argued that the nakedness was a sign of their specialized knowledge—it was not because it was too hot but because they knew that the oil would spit and get on their clothes. A neutral observer might suggest that having one’s skin burnt by oil several times a day would likely motivate a more well-remunerated workforce to purchase protective attire (or, better yet, demand that it be provided by the employer). But in Hamada’s retelling, the coolies were “strong” and “patient” workers. “Us inner territory people have a lot we must learn from them,” he concluded.³⁵

Colonial boosters and imperial travelers transposed their experiences into an imagination of the nation as a space of unique regions whose value emerged from their natural complementarity and the sensory experience of difference they offered. In 1929, the Japan Tourist Bureau advertised travel to Korea and Manchuria with the tagline “Can you see THIS in Japan?” “This” meant, “some thousands of coolies” laboring under the “white sun” at Bujun and the grand historical ruins of Hōten. But “this” also meant the “feeling of a life of freedom” that one got from looking down the Yalu River. These were all things that could “only be seen on the continent.” These sensations were unavailable in the inner territory: “One cannot get such a deep emotion from the scenery of an island country.”³⁶ Students on the Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School trip to Manchuria and Korea agreed. One student marveled at the scenery—all “I saw and heard through the railway carriage window was strange.”³⁷ Doi Ichirō, a student from Tokyo Prefectural Number One Commercial School, even went so far as to enumerate the differences between rail travel in the metropole and the continent in his reflections on their 1932 trip to Manchuria and Korea. Invoking the authority of the traveler as first-hand observer, he listed the differences “just as I saw them, just as I felt them, and just as they were”:

1. The trains carry more power and go faster because of the wide gauge;
2. The rail beds are rocks rather than sand;
3. The outside of the passenger cars is green rather than brown, as it is in the inner territory. Additionally, first class is yellow, second class is grass

- colored, and third is red-brown (just a little bit darker than the red of Japanese third-class cars);
4. There are fewer windows than in the inner territory, and they are smaller. The window glass is double weight because of the harsh continental winter;
 5. The third-class seats are fancier than inner territory seats—they are about the level of second-class seats in the inner territory;
 6. The Korea-Manchuria trains run lower to the ground;
 7. The trains ring their bells in the “American style,” that is, with the sound “garan garan!”
 8. They sell food on the train (because there are not as many options for buying lunch boxes at the station as there are in the inner territory);
 9. On the South Manchuria Railway Company lines there are pistol-carrying guards aboard the trains, and the uniform of the conductors is very high quality;
 10. In terms of general impressions, the stations and people of Korea are really calm, not like the inner territory. It is a grand feeling to board a South Manchuria Railway Company train rushing across the vast plains of the continent.³⁸

Matsuda Kiichi, a middle-school student who traveled by himself through Taiwan in 1937, could not contain his excitement at the thrill of difference. Looking through the window of a train car heading south, Matsuda exclaimed, “The mountains of Taiwan! The rivers! The houses! Even if there is a bit of the feeling of the southern country, nothing at all resembles the inner territory’s suburbs or the nostalgic landscape of my homeland.”³⁹

These expressions of awe and wonder at the strangeness of the landscape were a far cry from the Government General of Korea’s 1921 exclamation that the port of Pusan had “been so Japanified, it doesn’t even smell like Korea anymore.”⁴⁰ As these accounts suggest, by the late 1920s, to see with nationalist eyes meant something more than it had in the first years of imperial travel. In this era of economic and political turbulence, to observe colonized lands meant not only to territorialize a space for the nation but also to treat observation as a practice of appreciating the differences between places within the space of the nation. When the students of Hiroshima Higher Normal School toured Korea and Manchuria in 1915, both diarists commented that the colonial government’s policy of Japanification had gone so far as to even change the weather. Thunder was not often heard before the Japanese arrived, wrote the first diarist, “so even the atmosphere is being Japanified.” For him, this meant that human power—the power of an industrial society to reengineer social life through changes to the landscape—“had even taken control of nature.”⁴¹ When students from Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School traveled to Korea in 1930, however, their diarists read the landscape in an entirely different fashion. Watching the countryside pass by outside the train’s window, one

student said, “it was as if the ‘white-robed peasants’ emanated the atmosphere of Korea.”⁴² The atmosphere in this case was not the weather, but the sweatiness and “lazy movements” of the farmers in the fields. It was a welcome break, a valuable strangeness. In the words of another student, they enjoyed the “strange scenery” outside the window: women doing the washing, farmers in white robes, children playing strange hand games.⁴³

Some struggled with the mandate to see with culturally pluralistic eyes. Kamata Yoshio discovered as much when he toured Korea and Manchuria with his classmates from Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School in 1926. Reporting on the events of the day’s tour of Keijō, Kamata related a discussion that he had with his guide, a member of the Miyazaki Prefecture Residents’ Association (Miyazaki kenjinkai). “Koreans do a lot of goofing off and wandering around, huh?” Kamata asked, noting a number of Koreans relaxing in the Botanical Gardens at Ch’andōk Palace. “Well,” the guide responded, “it looks like that, right? But, even in the inner territory, think about Asakusa Park in Tokyo. People with nothing to do are just lying about. Now, when foreigners see that, they think that there isn’t a people in the world that plays around as much as Japanese people. In other words, it’s the same as what you’re thinking about Koreans.” Not having achieved the confirmation of his observation that he desired, Kamata tried a different tack. “Well,” he said to the guide, “Koreans *are* smelly.” Again, the guide offered a broader perspective. “Yeah, they are,” he acquiesced, “but that has to do with what they eat. Foreigners think that Japanese smell like daikon radish, and Japanese say that foreigners stink of foreignness (*ketōkusai*). If you go to China, Chinese people stink. No matter where you go, you smell what you call the stink of that country. So, really it’s not right to say that Koreans stink.”⁴⁴ Kamata described his conversation with the guide as a moment of almost enlightenment. “I heard this and thought, *Oh! Now I see*. It was a mistake to think of Koreans as a stinky people or a lazy people.” But then he reconsidered: “I thought that [it was a mistake]. But then again, I actually could not think [of Koreans] otherwise.”⁴⁵

For others, the mandate to see with culturally pluralistic eyes also served to demarcate the boundaries of acceptable behavior and national expectations. In this sense, appreciating cultural differences encouraged imperial travelers to reproduce the norms and expectations of the nation. For example, one Miyakonojō student incorporated a central tenet of Japanese colonial discourse on Manchuria when he described the thrill of riding on the Ajia Super Express, the South Manchuria Railway Company’s most famous and technologically advanced high-speed train, as the thrill of traveling through “an unpeopled region at super high speed.”⁴⁶ The land was not unpeopled. But Japanese colonial discourse often represented it as such, for this justified the larger discourse of Manchukuo as a blank canvas where the state could build a new “paradise” by combining technological modernity with a commitment, however chimeric, to multiethnic harmony.

In his discussion of “Chinese leisure” (Shinajin no kyōraku), Takahashi Gentarō likewise reproduced a point that imperial travelers had made constantly to legitimate de facto Japanese control over Manchuria under the geography of civilization: that the problem with China was that Chinese people did not understand the need to invest in the future. But now, under the geography of cultural pluralism, the argument was cloaked as appreciating the essential differences between Chinese people and other nations. He started with a comparison that drew on the common description of coolie leisure as “drinking, betting, and buying.” “In Japan we also say, ‘drink, bet, buy,’” Takahashi’s interlocutor, Mr. Kuchino, began. “But for Chinese people, it’s not a factor of three but five,” he continued. He explained that Chinese people also add mahjong and joking to the three standard amusements. Moreover, Chinese people revel in China’s extraordinary cuisine: “They say that the dogs in China are all skinny,” Mr. Kuchino reported. “Why?” asked Takahashi. “Because [Chinese people] eat the part that they are supposed to give to the dogs.”⁴⁷

In this manner, Takahashi’s fictional conversational partner appreciated “Chinese customs,” while presupposing the opprobrium or moral judgment of the Japanese reader/traveler. Appreciation became a vehicle for defining the limits of acceptability. Takahashi continued by explaining the differences between the two nations in a way that contrasted the presumed stability of the Japanese and Manchukuoan state’s protection of private property with what he portrayed as the lawlessness of Chinese life: “Based on what you describe, Mr. Kuchino, it seems that for Chinese people, the guarantees of life and property are not adequate, and so for that reason, they think that they had better enjoy themselves while they can.” “Yes, exactly,” Mr. Kuchino concurred.⁴⁸

THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF “FROMNESS”

The act of appreciating the differences between regional cultures necessarily involved the definition of what the authentic culture of each region was. Local color tourist materials placed great emphasis on indigeneity. The Government General of Taiwan’s 1927 *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* described the population of Taiwan as divided into three groups: inner territory people, Han people who migrated from China, and “the so-called savages, who are the native residents of Taiwan.”⁴⁹ The Government General of Korea’s 1929 *Chōsen ryokō annai ki* (Notes for Travel in Korea) emphasized that the history of Korea was a story of both “indigenous peoples in the Korean peninsula” and migrant peoples from Manchuria, Japan, and the Shandong region of China.⁵⁰ A later edition distinguished between an “indigenous Korean people” in the southern peninsula and an “indigenous people” in the north, who intermixed with various peoples of Manchuria and China.⁵¹ In contrast, the 1929 *Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai* (Guide to railway travel

in Manchuria) steadfastly refused to use the term “indigenous” to describe any of the region’s peoples. Instead, it noted that, “until the middle of the Qing period, Manchuria was managed by a race considered to be of the endemic Tungus family.”⁵²

A variety of terms were used to indicate indigeneity, each of which carried specific connotations. The Government General of Taiwan described the indigenous peoples of Taiwan as *dochaku no jūmin*, literally “the people who live on the land.” This term connoted “natives” rather than the self-conscious identification that the term “ethnic nation,” or *minzoku*, implied. In Korea, the use of *genjūmin* for “indigenous” co-opted the language of national self-determination by differentiating between an ethnic Korean people (*genjūmin taru kanzoku*) in the south and a migrant and mixed population in the north. The description went on to link the history and security of the southern Korean people with the Japanese state by explaining that it was the southern, “indigenous” ancestors of the Korean people whom the Japanese state had historically supported against the dominance of the Chinese dynasties and with whom the Japanese people shared common ancestors. In the case of Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway Company used the word “manage,” *keiei*, to cast the relationship between the Tungusic people and the land not as one of indigeneity but of supervision—precisely the same word that the railway used to describe its own relationship with Manchuria between 1906 and 1931.⁵³

In the aggregate, local color tourism engaged in what we might think of as a politics of “fromness”—marking certain bodies as essentially “from” certain places and using this to justify particular inequalities and restrictions. The politics of fromness “incarcerated” colonized subjects in place on the terms of the post–World War I era.⁵⁴ One aspect of this was guidebooks’ new emphasis on the idea that certain peoples were indigenous to certain places. Despite the variety of terms and connotations thereof that guidebooks used to define indigeneity, each took pains to address the issue, even if, as in the case of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the intention was to deny the possibility of its existence entirely.

The way that local color tourism defined the authentic culture of each region and the significance of that culture to the imperial whole spoke to specific political conflicts in each territory. In the case of Manchuria, colonial boosters argued that the region’s lack of an indigenous people defined its local color and delegitimated Chinese claims to sovereignty over the region. In its description of Manchuria’s history as one of an “endemic” (*koyū*) Tungusic people who “managed” (*keiei*) Manchuria, for example, the South Manchuria Railway sidestepped the thorny issue of authenticity by implying that the early Tungusic peoples held an inauthentic, non-sovereign relationship with the Manchurian region that was similar to the railway’s own non-sovereign relationship with Manchuria. After 1932, when, as guidebook author Ōtsu Toshiya pointed out, “the era of ‘the management of

Manchuria” came to an end, the 1935 *Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai* offered more specifics on the ancient history of Manchuria but continued to refrain from describing any group as indigenous to the region.⁵⁵ Manchuria’s history now began with the Sushen (J. Mishihase or Ashihase) and Yilou peoples, who “gathered in completely uncivilized villages without any regulation” and who, over time, “invaded” the cultural area to the south—that is, China—and were themselves settled by migrant groups from the northern part of China.⁵⁶ In this, the railway’s history preserved its emphasis on the inauthenticity of any one people’s relation to the territory claimed by the puppet state of Manchukuo.

Indeed, the guidebook described the unique local color of Manchuria as the result of this particular aspect of its history. It emphasized the history of Manchuria as one uniquely marked by conflicts of an ethnic character. For example, “The Yuan, who were a Mongolian race (*Mōko shuzoku*), were destroyed by the Han race (*kan jinshu*).” But later, the Aisin Gioro family emerged (from the Tungusic Jurchen people) and destroyed the Ming.⁵⁷ According to the guidebook, the landscape of Manchuria reflected this history. “Because Manchuria is a land in which races (*minzoku*) have risen and fallen since ancient times, there are not a few buildings that have been left behind by the various races. The stone castles atop Mount Daikoku (C. Dahei Mountain) and Tokuri Temple (C. Tei-li-ssu), the earthen castles in Kishū (C. Guizhou), and the stone-tiled castles in the flatlands of Kinshū (C. Jinzhou), Ryōyō (C. Liaoyang), and Hōten are examples of this.”⁵⁸ And, of course, seeing such sites in their proper historical context was an important aspect of seeing the “true” Manchuria: “Passengers can glimpse [these sites] from the train window or can visit the sites themselves at their leisure.”⁵⁹

Guidebooks and local color materials for Taiwan took a different approach. They recognized the island’s indigenous peoples as the source of the island’s authentic local color. In contrast, guidebooks described the island’s Taiwanese Chinese population as representatives of the Chinese ethnic nation (*Shina minozku*) who had “migrated” to Taiwan.

While guidebooks and travel magazines represented Taiwanese Chinese culture as an important component of the experience of Taiwan, it also took care to represent the true nature of the island’s land and landscape as indigenous.⁶⁰ For example, Matsuzawa Akira, who authored a guidebook for travel to Taiwan in 1929, described Taiwan’s difference from the metropole as primarily environmental rather than developmental.

The Island of Takasago—Hōrai Island. . . . The many flowering grasses that color the ever-green ground, or the dark red of the hibiscus flower in which we forget that winter comes, or the breeze that softly shakes the coconut palms, the rich fruits that coax out the sense of taste of the travelers who come in all seasons, the dusky forests, the stately figure of that sacred mountain Niitaka, the endless sugarcane fields, the herds of water buffalo, bamboo rafts, or the fascinating life of the savage tribes . . . for travelers, there is not one thing [about Taiwan] that is not exotic.⁶¹

Matsuzawa used indigenous people as the central image in the ethnographic representation of Taiwan. He did not erase Taiwanese Chinese people, or “islanders” (*hontōjin*), from the picture. Rather, he simply pointed out that they, too, were migrants, in contrast to the indigenous people. “There are approximately 4,000,000 people living in Taiwan,” he wrote, “but of this number, 3,700,000 are members of the Chinese ethnic nation (*kanminzoku*) who have migrated [to the island] and 200,000 are inner territory people. The rest are what we call ‘savages’ (*banjin*). Savages are the indigenous residents of Taiwan (*Taiwan no dochaku no jūmin*).”⁶² Matsuzawa was not alone in this position; other official tourist publications made the same arguments. Writing in favor of a gradual policy of assimilation into the political system of the metropole, Morishige Shūzō argued in *Tabi* that the true nature of Taiwan was defined by its “primitive savages” rather than its Taiwanese Chinese. Using a nationalist keyword from Japanese geography education, Morishige argued that Taiwan was the “native place” (*kyōdo*) of the indigenous people, while the “culture of southern China” had only been “transplanted” to the island.⁶³

Those writing from the perspective of the Movement for a Taiwan Parliament argued that it was precisely this transplantation that made Taiwan a unique place. As Cai Peihuo wrote in his manifesto, *Nihon honkokumin ni atau* (To the metropolitan citizens of Japan), “Just like you are not the same as us because of the effects of a thousand years of history and a special landscape, we also have special qualities that differ from you.”⁶⁴ In contrast, Morishige and later Japan Tourist Bureau publications argued that the government of Taiwan should be determined by the needs of its indigenous population. In Morishige’s words, the fact that “our Taiwan . . . jumped directly from the Stone Age to the Iron Age without hitting the Bronze Age” suggested the need for a “developmental” approach to political incorporation.⁶⁵ In this formulation, Taiwan was not ready for self-rule because its true nature was that of its indigenous population rather than its Chinese population. While Taiwanese Chinese assimilation activists such as Cai saw at least part of the solution to the “Taiwan problem” as one of differentiating the island’s Chinese population from the indigenous population (as they saw this lumping together of the two as one of the sources of Japanese discrimination against Taiwanese Chinese and against Taiwan in general), colonial boosters saw this differentiation as a solution to a different conceptualization of the Taiwan problem—that of Taiwanese Chinese challenges to the structure of empire.⁶⁶ To that end, Matsuzawa did not follow Cai in linking the exotic nature of Taiwan to the need for self-rule. Instead, he followed the practice of the Government General, which in the early 1920s heeded calls from local Taiwanese Chinese to engage in “effective propaganda” to correct metropolitan misunderstandings about Taiwan but left off their demands for equal treatment.⁶⁷ He simply touted the island’s exotic nature and modern infrastructure and erased its recent history.

Like the guidebooks' use of indigeneity to define the authentic character of each region, colonial boosters used indigeneity to define the place—quite literally—of colonized subjects within the territory of the state and the social imaginary of the nation. If, in its historical mode, local color tourism waded into the issue of national self-determination by differentiating regions on the basis of their indigenous occupants, in its economic mode, local color tourism integrated those regions into a labor hierarchy determined by ethnic aptitudes rather than exploitative structures. In the nationalist mode, it likewise drew on the spatial imaginary of local regions to constitute the figure of the colonized subject as one element of an exotic landscape to be appreciated and consumed by the national people.

In local color representations, the colonized subject did not appear as a political figure but rather as a laborer and a defining element of the landscape. Local color literature went to great lengths to insist on the locality of this labor. Colonized subjects were no longer referred to as deterritorialized “savages” or placeless “coolies.” Instead, colonial boosters argued that the figure of the laborer symbolized the unique landscape of the place itself. In Korea, for example, Government General publications emphasized the figure of the burden bearer, or *chige-kun*, as a must-see for travelers.⁶⁸ Arakawa Seijirō's 1918 report on Korea had included a description of *chige* that marked them as a sign of Korea's general disarray: the reason why *chige* were necessary in Korea was because “the roads are bad, thus horses and carts can't be used. Most of the hauling is done instead on human shoulders by these *chige*.”⁶⁹ By 1934, however, the Government General completely altered the significance of the *chige*—making them no longer a sign of lack of development. The 1934 *Chōsen ryokō annai ki* included a special inset on *chige* and insisted that they were an essential element of Korea's local color: “In places such as the crossroads of flourishing cities, the wharves of ports, and the entrances of stations, Koreans in ragged clothes carrying long wooden frames on their backs are wandering around. When they see people returning from shopping or passengers carrying luggage, they gather around from front and behind, right and left. In Korean, these are called *chige-kun*, and they are people whose trade is hauling. It can't be fixed labor, but rather what we might call work without art or place (*ikichi*).”⁷⁰ While the guidebook argued that burden-bearing was “place-less” work, it made an attempt to localize the specific figure of the *chige* as an element of Korean culture and history: “When we say *chige-kun*, we hear the *kun* as *kun* [n.b.: *kun* is a Japanese term of respect added to the end of a name and is also the first character in the word for ‘monarch’ and ‘sovereign’]. For this reason, we think, ‘Wow, [*chige-kun*] are important.’ But actually, *chige* is a name for a carrying device and *kun* is the word for ‘person’ in old Korean.”⁷¹

Each representation of colonial labor as local color emphasized the mutual constitution of labor and landscape. In the case of Taiwan, it was the sight of laboring indigenous people that produced the sense that Taiwan was both exotic and

integrated into the Japanese social body. The caption to the cover photo of a 1939 *Tabi* special issue on Taiwan described the labor of Taiwan's indigenous people as part of Taiwan's landscape. "Known to the world according to its name 'Formosa' (beautiful island), this island truly does not contradict that name but is a paradise of evergreens and a land of scenery." The caption concluded by linking indigenous people to the island's major industries as both a labor force and a consumable experience in their own right: "The cities are cleanly bright, and in the countryside, the figures of the Takasago-zoku working tirelessly, along with the rice, sugar, and fruit industries, gives you a deep understanding of Taiwan."⁷² In 1935, the Government General prohibited the use of *seiban*, "raw savages," in official documents in favor of "Takasago-zoku," or the "tribal peoples of Taiwan."⁷³ Takasago-zoku, the name by which the 1939 *Tabi* special issue referred to the Amis people that it featured, naturalized the figure of the indigenous person as part of Taiwan's natural landscape by collapsing the distinction between the Amis people featured (only one of the nine indigenous ethnic groups that the Government General recognized) into a single "tribe." Through this renaming, the Government General also placed Taiwan into the larger history of Japan. "Takasago" was an archaic Japanese name for the island, which came from the name of a Japanese settlement in southern Taiwan that was abandoned in 1628.⁷⁴ With its reference to the early Japanese settlements, "Takasago" territorialized indigenous peoples as the local color of all of Taiwan at the same time as it incorporated the island into the historical and linguistic space of Japan.

In case of Manchuria, colonial boosters took a slightly different approach to the practice of localizing labor as landscape. The South Manchuria Railway Company emphasized the "coolie" as one of the most significant elements of Manchukuo's local color, along with other aspects of social life in the region that they categorized as representative of "Chinese" culture, such as the "Little Thieves Market" in Hōten.⁷⁵ Indeed, despite a dominant Japanese political discourse that overwhelmingly rejected the idea that Manchuria was in any way an authentically Chinese territory, even imperial travelers saw the passage across the Yalu River from Korea to Manchuria as an act of crossing a cultural border between the "white robes" of Korea and the "black robes"—those worn by Chinese people—in Manchuria.⁷⁶

Colonial boosters went to great lengths to describe these low-wage laborers as essentially Chinese. In his *Shin Manshūkoku kenbutsu* (Sightseeing in new Manchukuo), Takahashi Gentarō used an imaginary dialogue to explain the place of Chinese labor within Manchukuo and within the East Asian labor hierarchy as a whole. Looking at laborers carrying towers of soybean cake, Takahashi's imaginary partner asked, "These laborers are what we call 'coolies,' I suppose?" Takahashi contradicted him: "Yes, but, instead of calling them 'coolies,' if possible, I would like to get into the habit of calling them 'Chinese laborers' (*kakō*), or what the

Chinese themselves call them, ‘laboring people.’”⁷⁷ A 1936 guide to Manchukuo in *Tabi* magazine even referred to the Dairen housing facility for Chinese laborers, which had been known in tourist itineraries and guidebooks as Coolie Camp (*kūri shūyōjo*), by its new name: Camp for Chinese Laborers (*kakō shūyōjo*).⁷⁸

Yet even though the “Chineseness” of these laborers was an important part of Manchukuo’s multiethnic local color, it also served to emphasize the state’s argument that Chinese people were essentially foreign to Manchukuo. Indeed, in May 1935, such a perspective became part of Manchukuoan labor law, when new restrictions on foreign labor required Chinese laborers to secure permission before entering Manchukuo, without which they were considered “illegal aliens.”⁷⁹ Yet even as colonial boosters encouraged an understanding of Chinese laborers as inherently from elsewhere, they also taught travelers to appreciate the natural aptitude of Chinese people for hard labor—and to understand that the low wages they received for this labor were a reflection of Chinese history rather than South Manchuria Railway Company policy. Takahashi argued, for example, that the new terminology of “Chinese laborer” was to call attention to the skill required to perform the work of a laborer in Manchuria, which sometimes involved carrying as many as forty-five layers of soybean cake. “Japanese laborers can’t even compare” to the skill and price of Chinese laborers, Takahashi argued.⁸⁰ A South Manchuria Railway Company publication elaborated on the origin of the wage differential: “During the past four hundred years, the powerless inhabitants of China Proper were continuously under the yoke of either vacillating regimes or selfish warlords. The privations and sufferings of their forefathers have inured these indomitable laborers to meager life and sustenance. The majority of coolies in Dairen are immigrants from Shantung and other parts of China Proper. Endowed with abilities to endure hardships, these energetic coolies are rapidly paving the foundation for stable and elevated life.”⁸¹

In his own account of travel in Manchuria, Nakanishi Inosuke raged at the idea that the origin of the laborers explained their condition. In fact, it was quite the opposite—the fact that they were free migrants from China was the source of their extreme exploitation, because as supposedly “free labor,” the South Manchuria Railway Company had an incentive to get as much work out of them for as little remuneration as possible. He concluded: “Those industrial laborers (coolies) are receiving the world’s maximum screwing from XX!”⁸² The censors blocked the name of the “screw,” but from the context it was clear that Nakanishi referred to the South Manchuria Railway Company.

Nakanishi was not wrong. What the railway portrayed as an inherent feature of coolie labor was better understood as a product of its own recruiting and employment system. The South Manchuria Railway and other Japanese enterprises primarily hired laborers through the *laoxiang batou*, “hometown boss” system. The *batou*, “head,” recruited laborers from his hometown and then traveled with them

and served as their foreman when they arrived in Manchuria. The enterprise paid wages directly to the *batou*, who passed them to his accountant, who passed them to the *batou*'s assistant, who distributed the wages to the workers themselves. As the South Manchuria Railway Company's own research suggested in 1944, this system created three different opportunities for wage skimming and left the workers destitute. The railway was perfectly happy to use this system, however, and even to celebrate the low wages it could pay Chinese labor.⁸³ The South Manchuria Railway departed from metropolitan practice, in fact, when it opted to continue working through the indirect *laoxiang batou* system rather than imposing "scientific" direct management. This choice contributed to the relative lack of white-collar, middle-management jobs—for either Japanese or Chinese residents—in Manchuria by outsourcing management to migrant Chinese laborers.⁸⁴ Explaining the difference between the metropolitan and Manchurian labor systems, however, the railway's tourist materials argued that it was simply following local custom. The coolies worked in a "feudal" (*tōkenteki*), indirect labor system that reflected the underdevelopment of China itself, and the railway was simply acquiescing to the social organization that they preferred.⁸⁵

In the case of Manchukuo, the "fromness" of Chinese labor buttressed a discourse of the natural complementarity of an exploitative division of imperial labor and the legitimacy of the imperial state. In the case of Taiwan and Korea, a similar rhetoric of complementarity justified the ongoing exploitation of local labor and new forms of dispossession. As did Kobayashi Chiyoko at the opening of this chapter, tourist literature for Korea used the notion of complementarity to represent Korea as a slow place that complemented the fast pace of the metropole—in other words, a framework of comparison set by the temporality of industrial society. In her special report on travel to the "Korea of white robes," Kobayashi Chiyoko described Korea as part of Japan's primordial past. Another account lamented the "half-Japanification" of the colonial capital at Keijō, preferring instead the exotic scenery of the nonindustrialized landscape. Describing her arrival to Korea in the page of *Tabi*, Aoi Ikko depicted a landscape coming into focus, with white-robed Koreans as its defining, localizing feature: "First I saw the mountains far across the blue sea, and as we got closer, I could see that the green trees were growing thick. Then, here and there, in high places and in low places, faint glimpses of the figure of white-robed Koreans came to me." For Aoi, the landscape represented an alternative to the clamorous modern: "Ah, this quietness and beauty—maybe this is a dream land? It is too far from the present."⁸⁶

Quite in contrast to earlier touristic representations, which had dispensed with Koreans entirely, local color representations argued that Koreans were a defining feature of Korea itself. And indeed, imperial travelers expressed such expectations. One student from Kyūshū Imperial University's 1933 trip to Korea and Manchukuo argued that if it were not for the white robes of Koreans, he would not have had the




FIGURE 10. “Pose of Powerful Coolies.” Postcard, c. 1935. The postcard shows the ambiguity that defined colonial boosters’ representation of the place of coolie labor in Manchukuo. On the one hand, the postcard described coolies as an element of the “the customs of Manchuria.” On the other hand, by 1935, tourist materials increasingly emphasized the “Chinese-ness” of Chinese laborers to delegitimize Chinese claims to Manchuria by emphasizing the foreignness of the region’s Chinese population. Digital image courtesy of the East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip0099.

sense of being in a different place at all: “The many Koreans wearing white robes is strange, but otherwise [Pusan] gives off entirely a feeling of the inner territory.” It was, in fact, somewhat of a disappointment to this student. Pusan “did not live up to [his] expectations.”⁸⁷

Local color tourism fostered the ongoing reproduction of an increasingly sedimented metropolitan social imaginary that equated Koreans with Korea and vice versa, and which had already marked Koreans for different treatment based on the dual facts of their foreignness to the inner territory and the supposedly undeveloped, “slow” nature of Korea itself. It was the idea that Korea had a lower standard of living that had initially authorized the creation of an artificially cheap market for Korean migrant labor in the metropole. But by the late 1920s, Korean labor had become synonymous with cheap, precarious labor—particularly construction day labor. Governmental officials in the inner territory began to comment on the necessity not of cheap day labor but of Korean labor. Koreans were, in the words of one Kyōto city official, “an absolute necessity.” This was especially true “in the areas of unskilled labor in public works construction.”⁸⁸ Deploying language eerily similar to that of the touristic representation of Korea’s local color, Sakai Toshio, an official in the Osaka city labor bureau, described Korean workers as perpetual migrants: “Like nomads roving about in search of greener pastures, Korean workers wander the heavens and the earth in search of labor, appearing in Manchuria or in the wilderness of Siberia. Or, crossing the straits to Japan, they come as a white-robed army, a veritable Asian multitude.”⁸⁹

The idea that lower-paying, less-secure employment was appropriate for Korean workers relied on the dual notions of Koreans as always essentially from Korea and of an undeveloped “Korean Korea” that existed apart from the industrialized Korea of Japanese colonial rule. Traveler Akimori Tsunetarō articulated and challenged these notions when he critiqued the Government General’s policy of paying Korean and Japanese workers different wages. Though the Government General argued that the prevailing wage for labor in Korea was 60 percent what it was in the metropole because it only took 60 percent of what it took in the metropole to live, Japanese (*naichijin*) working in Korea were generally given a 60 percent boost. In his 1935 self-published travel report, Akimori pointed out that regardless of one’s ethnicity, the cost of riding the trains was the same. The disparate wage policy was akin, in his mind, to gradually refusing to allow Koreans to ride the trains, which, for Akimori, was “not good government.”⁹⁰ Indeed, as Nakanishi Inosuke complained in his 1936 essay “Angry Korea,” the image of “the Korea of white robes” encouraged travelers to view social relations as a matter of relations between places rather than between peoples—and that masked the increasing incorporation of Korean laborers into the most precarious positions in the imperial economy.

THE NATIONAL LAND

Perhaps the best example of the imbrication of local color tourism with the production of a new ethics of postimperial empire is the establishment of national parks in Taiwan in 1937. The 1930s saw a boom in national parks around the world and, though it has largely gone unremarked, nearly half of these parks were established on colonized or semi-colonized land.⁹¹ The designation of three national parks in Taiwan—Daiton, Tsugitaka Taroko, and Niitaka Arisan—took place soon after the designation of twelve national parks in the metropole between 1934 and 1936. Though colonial officials celebrated Taiwan's national parks as the first in the outer territories, they were not the only parks to be established on colonized land.⁹² Two national parks—Akan and Daisetsuzan—were also established in Hokkaidō in 1934, Japan's first colonial acquisition.

National parks displayed and preserved scenery that represented the nation through the diversity of its regions—yet it was a diversity defined on imperial terms. The founders of the first part of the national parks movement, which focused on establishing parks in the inner territory, framed much of the appeal of the parks as their ability to encapsulate a particularly Japanese view of nature—in contrast to a Western one—a view that imperial subjects could be taught to appreciate. The areas selected to become national parks not only were rich in resources for “the study of topography, botany, and zoology” but also “held a deep significance as a training ground for the improvement of the nation's knowledge and cultivation of the nation's spirit,” because they were rich with historical sites that would attest to the glorious history of the national land.⁹³ The twelve parks established in the inner territory included scenic landscapes like Mount Fuji; sites of national history, such as the Tokugawa shrine at Nikkō; historical sites relating to the Southern Court, which ruled during an imperial schism in the fourteenth century (and to which the current imperial house linked its line); and sites of imperial mythology, such as Mount Kirishima, the site of the descent of Amaterasu's grandson, Ninigi-no-mikoto, from heaven to the islands of Japan (known as the *tenson kōrin*).

In Taiwan, the Taiwan National Parks Association chose the mountainous regions of Daiton, Tsugitaka Taroko, and Niitaka Arisan to be national parks—areas with scenery that reflected the particularity of Taiwan within the framework set by the metropole. For some, the choice of mountain scenery to represent the uniqueness of Taiwan was strange. In debates over which areas to select, the Government General overruled the suggestion that at least one park represent the tropical plains of the island, which was not only a major component of tourist advertising and the place where the majority of the island's residents lived but also, the author argued, a kind of scenery that was unique relative to the metropole (though in this the author of the proposal ignored Okinawa, perhaps because he imagined it to be outside of the metropole as well). Countering that proposal, the Government

General of Taiwan's Interior Department argued that any area selected for a national park in Taiwan must include mountains, because mountains had been part of the selection criteria—the theme of “big nature” (*dai fūkei*)—for metropolitan national parks (all twelve national parks contained famous mountains). Taiwan's national parks were intended, the Interior Department argued, to remind visitors and local Japanese residents of Japan.⁹⁴


The landscape and natural monuments that Taiwan's national parks represented were thus set by the frame of the metropolitan national parks. Though all three parks were on the island of Taiwan, national parks literature described their uniqueness in the context of Japan. Niitaka Arisan contained the “tallest mountain in Japan, Mt. Ari,” while Tsugitaka Taroko was the biggest park in Japan and included the spectacular mountains of the Tsugitaka (C. Xueshan) mountain range. In contrast, Daiton National Park was the smallest national park in Japan, but that made it quite similar to Mount Unzen National Park in Kyūshū, and, given its proximity to the island's capital, Taihoku, it was in the most advantageous location.⁹⁵

Taiwan's national parks further underscored the idea that the authentic identity of Taiwan was indigenous rather than Taiwanese Chinese and, like the representation of Korea and Manchuria, demonstrated the simultaneous incorporation of Taiwan into the nation and its differentiation through the figure of the laboring “native.” The framers of Taiwan's national parks incorporated the labor of indigenous peoples into the foundation of the national parks while, at the same time, representing the park as quintessentially primitive, right down to the “savages” themselves, who could be seen in the park and were part of the unique characteristics of the scenery.⁹⁶ In an attempt to raise awareness of Mount Niitaka (C. Yushan) and Mount Ari (C. Alishan) in light of their candidacy for national park status, *Tabi* ran a lengthy article that included maps and itineraries for mountain climbers and emphasized the unique features that Taiwan's mountains had to offer. Following two paragraphs on the distinct flora and fauna of the Mount Ari area, the article pointed out that travelers could also see the Tsuo people, the local population, from the window of the Mount Ari Electric Railway. The scenery, in other words, was not limited to peaks, plants, and animals: “The savages who live in the high mountains, in particular the savage girls of Mount Ari, are extremely beautiful in appearance.”⁹⁷ The national parks enabled the incorporation of indigenous people into the tourist economy as labor and as scenery.

Indeed, a central component of the movement for national parks in Taiwan was to represent Taiwan and Taiwan's indigenous peoples as “in place” in the Japanese nation but, at the same time, to deny indigenous peoples a claim to any particular territory within the nation. Two of the parks—Niitaka Arisan and Tsugitaka Taroko—were firmly within the so-called Savage Territory, and this fact played a central role in their constitution as part of the national land. In order to facilitate

tourism, the Taiwan National Parks Law stipulated that the restrictions on entry to the Savage Territory were to be removed as soon as possible. For those in the Bureau of Savage Management (*Ribankyoku*), this dictate presented worrisome challenges to their dual mandate to undertake the “guided enlightenment” of indigenous peoples while protecting the safety of what would surely be an increased number of visitors to the special administrative zone.⁹⁸ But the Taiwan National Parks Association insisted that it was precisely the primitive nature of these sites that made them such a valuable resource for the national people. Like Taiwan’s local color more generally, the Government General of Taiwan represented Taiwan’s national parks as pure nature.⁹⁹ The Government General declared emphatically that the national park sites had no history—or, more precisely, that they stood outside of history. It was that fact that had preserved their scenery, the Government General argued, leaving for future generations a kind of nature to which Japanese in the metropole and Korea would otherwise have no access, because of the long history of civilizational and commercial development in these areas. Because the Atayal residents of the area “engaged in only primitive cultivation,” the mountains were “virgin soil.”¹⁰⁰ As Yokō Kōsuke, an employee of the Bureau of Savage Management, wrote, “Precisely because the parks are within the Savage Territory, they are natural areas that have been protected by the savages, who we now call the Takasago tribes. They are sacred lands that the gods (*kami*) have left especially for today’s cultured people.”¹⁰¹

The location of the parks offered a special opportunity. Enumerating the special features shared by all of Taiwan’s national parks, the vice chairman of the Taiwan National Parks Association pointed out that in addition to the relatively little damage from industrial development that the areas exhibited and the fact that they showed four distinct seasons (another trope of the Japanese national landscape), they were all on state-owned land (*kōyūchi*) and would be very easy to regulate.¹⁰² The distinction of being state-owned land was significant, because it meant that the Government General would not have to negotiate with the present occupants of the land; it could simply assert its rights to use the land as it saw fit. The primary residents of the special administrative zone were, in addition to Japanese colonial police, indigenous peoples. In 1902, the Government General of Taiwan had declared that indigenous peoples possessed no rights to property within the special administrative zone. Arguing that the indigenous residents of the territory recognized no “unified institution” that could guarantee property, the colonial state determined that they could therefore make no claims to ownership. This rule, in fact, contradicted the Government General’s own ethnographic surveys, which demonstrated that indigenous communities had a variety of concepts and practices of ownership. Yet it served as a convenient tool for the Government General as it sought to access camphor and timber in the special administrative zone.¹⁰³



(園公立國コロタ高次)てし指目を頂山高次

FIGURE 11. “Tsugitaka sanchō o mezashite” (Heading for the summit of Mt. Tsugitaka). Okada Kōyō’s image of Tsugitaka Taroko National Park shows the centrality of indigenous labor to the representation of Taiwan’s national parks as well as to their actual operation. Image courtesy of Okada Kōyō Photo Art Museum. Digital image courtesy of East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip1035.

The Government General's Committee on Taiwan National Parks addressed the question of land rights directly, asking, "Won't savages think that their land has been taken?" The response from the director of the Government General of Taiwan's Interior Department was clear: "The Takasago tribes will be relocated."¹⁰⁴ The Government General of Taiwan was not the only participant in the national parks process to suggest such a practice. In his own report to the Government General on the potential of the Mount Ari area as a national park, Tamura Tsuyoshi, one of the founders of the national parks movement in the inner territory, argued that the Government General ought to move indigenous villages out of the park boundaries and incorporate their residents into the promised tourist economy. "Construct a small village," Tamura advised the Government General's Forestry Management Office, "say, of two or three savage houses, above a waterfall near Suganohira, where savages can farm fruits and vegetables, make souvenirs, or, if necessary, serve as guides for Mount Ari and Mount Niitaka."¹⁰⁵

The suggestion that indigenous villages be relocated was not new. A few years earlier, the Government General had begun a policy of both forced and voluntary removal of indigenous villages from mountain highlands to the lowlands.¹⁰⁶ Tamura himself had encouraged the deployment of a similar "move and work" policy at Hokkaidō's Akan National Park, where Ainu residents were made to move or participate in the tourist economy—either as scenery themselves or as guides or small-time entrepreneurs.¹⁰⁷ Okada Kōyō, who would become famous in the postwar era for his photographs of Mt. Fuji, captured this constitution of indigenous peoples as both landscape and labor in an image that appeared as part of a 1939 collection of photographs celebrating the opening of Taiwan's national parks.

FROM COLONIAL FRONTIER TO NATIONAL EXOTIC

Between the mid-1920s and the late 1930s, colonial boosters set about attempting to create a spatial and social imaginary of the Japanese nation that decentered the inner territory and its people. In its place, they proposed a cultural and ethnic hierarchy of "harmony" that marked colonized peoples as "in place" in particular regions of the nation but on terms that maintained colonial hierarchies in the name of natural complementarity. The twin ideas of harmony and local color encouraged a second generation of imperial travelers to see themselves as the pinnacle of an imperial division of labor through the productivity of their leisure practices, which constituted the work of observation as a matter of appreciating the empire's complementary diversity of human and material resources.¹⁰⁸ The normative landscape that local color proposed undercut anti-imperial and anticolonial demands for self-rule and self-determination, while positing a place (albeit a subordinate one) for ethnic nations and their historical territories within the Japanese imperial

nation. Under the geography of civilization, Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan constituted the colonial frontier. Under the geography of cultural pluralism, they came to be coded as the national exotic.

Writing on the politics of multiculturalism in Australia, Elizabeth A. Povinelli argues that multiculturalism represents a “new metaethics of national life.” If the study of ethics focuses on what is or is not moral in a given society, metaethics examines morality itself. For Povinelli, multiculturalism became the determinant of morality in postwar Australia—to put it simply, laws and practices that promoted the state and social recognition of multiple cultures, particularly of indigenous culture, were moral; those that denied the place of minority and indigenous culture in Australia were immoral. But, as Povinelli points out, recognition is itself a political act, the drawing of lines that bounded not only a “national common sense” but also the realm of possibility for recognizable “cultural” expression.¹⁰⁹

There are many significant differences between Povinelli’s analysis of the politics of multiculturalism in Australia and this book’s analysis of the spatial politics of the Japanese Empire, not least of which are the differences that emerge from an ethics of multiculturalism rooted in what Povinelli defines as the apologetic historical consciousness of postcolonial settler modernity and those rooted in the triumphalist historical consciousness of what here is colonial settler modernity. But in many ways, the comparison is illuminating, because it draws our attention to the ways in which the cultural pluralism of imperial tourism’s local color discourse was not merely designed to legitimate the possession of colonized land by perpetuating acts of dispossession. It also produced a national subject who understood these practices to be moral under the post-World War I era’s new symbolic regime of authenticity.¹¹⁰

Tourism’s affective productions contributed to the reproduction of an ethics of harmony in ways that incorporated the recognition of indigenous land and labor but denied political emancipation in favor of protecting an imperial cultural pluralism. If colonial boosters located the work of imperial citizenship in the appreciation of place-based difference, they also anchored the morality of cultural pluralism in the duty and power of the state to manage relations between ethnic groups and cultural regions to create a productive complementarity. The challenge of anti-imperial nationalism and anticolonial liberalism made it no longer possible to argue that the temporal and spatial form of imperialism was a project of making the space of the nation symmetrical with the territory of the state. Instead, local color deployed a notion of indigenous land and labor that territorialized a permanent hierarchy of ethnic peoples. This hierarchy emerged, so the argument went, not from the whims of the imperial state but rather from the state’s recognition of ethnicity as natural product of environment. While not discounting history entirely, local color downplayed its transformative potential and instead proposed a notion of culture that was indexed by place and largely outside of history.

The rise of romanticized representations of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria was as much about producing an ethical or “good” subject of a culturally pluralistic nation as it was about legitimating the continued colonization of any one territory. As we saw in chapter 1, the production of good subjects through the formation of ties to the national land motivated imperial travel and tourism from its inception, immediately following the Russo-Japanese War. What we see here is that the spatial politics of the 1920s and 1930s adapted this practice of observation to incorporate the demands of the post–World War I era’s new symbolic regime of authenticity, which argued that nationalism and imperialism were two opposing forces and located morality firmly on the side of nationalism. In practice, the distinction between empire and nation remained fuzzy. No place was this more true than in the case of Manchuria and Manchukuo, which travelers treated as part of the complementary hierarchy of the Japanese Empire, even if it was still not part of the territory of the Japanese state.

The rise of local color tourism illuminates how tourism facilitated the transition from imperial state to multicultural nation by making the appreciation of local difference part of the work of national subjects, that is, part of the culture of imperial nationalism. The 1930s saw the rise of local color tourism in colonized lands around the globe—from Hawai’i to California to Algeria.¹¹¹ In Japanese colonial boosters’ representation of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchukuo, local tourism industries represented colonized lands as the ancient past of the colonizing nation and as the home of indigenous cultures to be both consumed and protected. Through local color, cultural pluralism became the basis for what we might think of as “post-imperial imperialism,” in which the metaethics of cultural pluralism domesticated challenges to the legitimacy of the imperial state by incorporating the recognition (but not emancipation) of multiple ethnic nations into the historical consciousness and practices of “good” national subjects.