

Introduction

This book is about the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism, that is, how the Japanese Empire possessed colonized lands by domesticating, disavowing, and disappearing other claims to that same land. It illuminates how territorializing a Japanese national identity on colonized land shaped the modern Japanese nation and brings into focus how ideas of place sustained the legitimacy of colonialism in a period when the world's major empires, including the Japanese, largely disavowed territorial conquest. This book explores the spatial politics of empire through a study of imperial tourism, which was one of the few institutions of the era to operate on a truly empire-wide scale and one that was uniquely concerned with producing firsthand experiences of colonized land.

Japan was a great imperial power during the first half of the twentieth century. This much is well known. But it is perhaps less well known that between 1868, when the new Meiji government formally colonized the island of Hokkaidō, and 1952, when the Japanese government formally renounced sovereignty over Taiwan, Korea, the Kuriles, the southern portion of the island of Karafuto (Russian [hereafter, R.] Sakhalin), and the League of Nations Mandate Territory in Micronesia (Japanese [J.] Nan'yō), the Japanese government possessed no single mechanism for differentiating, legally or politically, between colonized and Japanese territory. Even after the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, generally used to mark the beginning of Japan's formal empire, there was never a coherent practice of referring to colonized lands as "colonies" (*shokuminchi*). Instead, they were the "new territories"; they were "regions"; they were "territories governed by governors general." Anything but colonies. In fact, the spatial order of the empire was so liminal that when the administration of Korea and Taiwan was placed under the aegis of a new

Ministry of Colonial Affairs in 1929, Japanese residents of Korea complained so vociferously that Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi was forced to assure them that the ministry would “not treat Korea as a colony.”¹

In hindsight, it is obvious that Korea and Taiwan were colonies. The Japanese state acquired these lands by conquest and treaty but opted not to extend the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship to their residents. Moreover, the governors general and the imperial government treated these territories as “agricultural appendages” of Japan, setting policies that encouraged the production of basic commodities such as rice and sugar for the metropolitan market while discouraging local industrialization.² Internal border controls and overt discrimination in education limited the physical and social mobility of colonized subjects in ways not applied to most Japanese residents of the empire. Similar policies, varying only in their details, were applied to the remainder of Japan’s colonized lands—local governments distributed political and economic rights unevenly in Hokkaidō, Okinawa, the Kuriles, Karafuto, and the League of Nations Mandate Territory in Micronesia. At the same time, colonial governments fostered a cultural hierarchy that marked the Japanese language and official culture as the basis for public life.

To put it bluntly, there was an element of instability about the place of these lands within Japan, about the relationship between colonized land, the territory of the state, and the space of the nation. This book examines this instability from the late nineteenth century until the post–World War II period. Through a study of imperial tourism to Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan, I delineate how the question of where the colonies were shaped the conceptualization of the Japanese imperial nation and how, in turn, this spatio-social imaginary affected the way colonial difference was conceptualized and enacted. In so doing, I explore the significance of spatial politics to the maintenance of colonial hierarchies in a world in which the nation-state form has been globalized but political emancipation has not.

Japan was an empire, thus it is fair to ask why the history of its spatial politics is relevant to the larger colonial and postcolonial history of nationalism and nation-states. Indeed, despite the flexibility with which Japanese officials defined the territories of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria in relation to Japan, they were not so shy about describing Japan as “Great Japan,” “the Japanese Empire,” or the “Great Japanese Empire.” Yet the distinction between nation-state and empire was not at all clear. As Ann Stoler has argued, “distinctly rendered boundaries represent . . . only one end of the spectrum” of empire. Imperial formations operate precisely at the “troubled, ill-defined” boundaries of citizenship, territory, and legal rights.³ The “externalization of empire,” the idea that nation-state and empire comprise two entirely different spaces and histories, is best considered a political narrative that arose after World War II than an accurate representation of the relationship between empires and nation-states.⁴

The early twentieth century was a time of global transition. Between the late nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth, the emergence of the modern system of international relations, with its commitment to the territorial nation-state as the basis for human social and political organization, and the shift from mercantile to monopoly capitalism produced contradictory spatial formations within which imperialist and anti-imperial nationalists struggled to claim a place in the world. Like other new empires, such as the United States and Germany, the Japanese Empire faced these tensions by creating a regional empire that could be used as a resource base for capitalist expansion. In this context, imperialism mediated between the territorializing impulses of the modern state and the de-territorializing impulses of capitalism.⁵ Rather than drawing firm boundaries between empire and nation, Japan and other new empires were what we might consider “imperial nation-states.”⁶ The result was a hybrid form of empire in which the state territorialized a sphere of influence that exceeded the boundaries of the nation but could nevertheless be made available for capitalist exploitation. On the one hand, the idea that the territory of the state was the patrimony of the nation legitimated the state’s sovereignty over colonized land. On the other, the need to maintain colonized lands as territories to be exploited in the name of national strength authorized the creation of uneven forms of citizenship and the treatment of the colonies as spaces of exception to national norms.⁷

Over the course of the early twentieth century, the economic, administrative, and discursive structure of empire and nation in the Japanese imperium shifted in such a way that it is difficult, even now, to draw a firm line between the institutions and discourses of the Japanese nation and those of the empire. As scholars working on the history of modern Japan and the Japanese Empire have no doubt encountered, imperial discourse described the space of empire in terms of its places—Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan; Japan; the inner and outer territories. Yet these places did not generally correspond to distinct territorial or institutional jurisdictions; place names appeared as indices to a geographical structure of empire that was itself a chimera.⁸ Such is the case, for example, with the term *naichi*, “inner territory.” Scholarship on the Japanese Empire routinely uses *naichi* to signify the imperial metropole in contrast to the colonies, or “outer territories.” Yet this description implies a concrete-ness of reference that did not exist in practice. The term *gaichi*, “outer territories,” only came into official use in 1929, some thirty-five years after the colonization of Taiwan. The term *naichi* was used in a number of ways that were neither geographically nor conceptually overlapping. *Naichi* first appeared as the territorial opposite of the foreign settlements in Japanese treaty ports in the 1850s—ports that the unequal treaties with Western powers had opened to foreign trade. “Inner territory” simply meant “places that foreigners cannot live.” Yet in the 1910s the Government General of Korea used “Japanification” (*naichika*, literally, “becoming like the inner territory”) to refer to the industrialization of Korean

urban areas, while in the 1930s, travelers used “like the *naichi*” (*naichi no yō*) to describe Japanese-language speech that approximated that of a Japanese native, in contrast to the “textbook speech” of colonized subjects. Throughout the history of the Japanese Empire, “inner territory” was a territory, a relative location on a universal trajectory of development, and an essentialized sensibility.

Recent research shows that imperial legal, educational, and political institutions did not create wholly distinct metropolitan and colonial territories. Prestigious metropolitan secondary schools enrolled elite colonized subjects, who had formative political experiences in Tokyo dormitories. The “colonial” legal system was actually at least two in Korea (one for ethnic Japanese and one for colonized subjects) but perhaps three in Taiwan (with separate treatments for Taiwanese Chinese, Japanese, and indigenous inhabitants). Penal systems in the colonies deployed spatial referents to justify treating “people of the inner territory” (*naichi-jin*) less harshly than “people of this island” (*hontōjin*)—a reference to Taiwanese Chinese—“savages” (*banjin*), and Koreans (*Senjin*). In the case of Taiwan, we must also consider what Hiroko Matsuda has termed the “everyday politics of distinction,” which shaped the self-representation of and encounters between migrant laborers from Okinawa, Japanese settlers from the main islands, and Taiwanese Chinese. Unskilled Okinawan migrants to Taiwan, for example, were categorized as Japanese, but Taiwanese Chinese often referred to them as “Japanese aborigines,” and Japanese settlers informally excluded them from the elite institutions of settler society, such as the most prestigious schools.⁹

To build on the words of Barbara Brooks, the Japanese Empire was “profoundly conflicted” not only about the status of non-Japanese subjects but also about the status of colonized and metropolitan land.¹⁰ In fact, the spatial politics of the Japanese Empire parallel much more closely the complicated and contradictory history of defining “Japanese” ethnicity and citizenship than they do the history of the expansion and contraction of the Japanese state’s territory. It is often argued that, although some rights and responsibilities were divided based on one’s place of residence, the household registration system (*koseki seido*) created a “clear dividing line between ‘Japanese proper’ and ‘colonial subjects.’”¹¹ For example, white-collar workers whose households were registered within the main islands, Okinawa, or Hokkaidō received a “colonial bonus” when they worked in Taiwan.¹² The location of one’s household registry also determined one’s eligibility for military service (until 1938, when, in the first years of total war, colonized subjects were allowed to enlist).¹³ And yet, ethnicity and gender also profoundly influenced the location of one’s household registry. A 1921 law formally recognized the intermarriage of Japanese and Korean subjects, for example, but mandated that the location of the household registry be determined by the ethnicity of the male half of the household. A Japanese woman who married a Korean man was entered into the man’s Korean household registration, thus legally transforming her into a Korean

woman. Korean women who married Japanese men, however, were entered into the Japanese registration. They became Japanese women. A different set of rules applied to children of mixed unions. A child born to a married Korean man and Japanese woman would be entered into the Korean household registry. But if the parents were unwed, the mother could enter the child in her Japanese registry as an illegitimate child, thus conferring upon her offspring the privileges of Japanese classification.¹⁴

The blurry lines between the space of the nation and the space of empire were not accidental. Rather, the instability of spatial and social boundaries was an essential component of the operation of early twentieth-century imperialism in the Japanese imperium and elsewhere. The present study examines this aspect of the Japanese Empire's spatial formation, the fixing and refixing of colonized lands within the space of the Japanese nation and the concomitant fixing of the Japanese nation on colonized land. For despite this instability, people did talk about places—indeed, an entire industry, tourism, emerged to produce the experience of place, which, as this book argues, became the spatial foundation for the practices of exclusion and dispossession that sustained imperialism after World War I.

TOURISM AND THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF EMPIRE

One way to understand the history of tourism is to see it as an attempt to stabilize and standardize understandings of place—to produce, in other words, a hegemonic socio-spatial order anchored in specific understandings of place.¹⁵ As an industry, tourism emerged in concert with the expansion of railways and the industrialization of labor.¹⁶ Yet it also emerged during a time of intense geopolitical turmoil, which saw the shocking destruction of the First World War, the reorganization of empires, and the establishment of an organization (the League of Nations) that would, in theory, allow self-determining nations to protect the peace by agreeing upon practices of global imperialism and capitalism that could be imposed upon other, non-self-determining nations.¹⁷ In other words, tourism—an industry devoted to selling experiences of places—was born at precisely the moment when the determination of boundaries, location, and essence was imbued with concrete and intensely debated political stakes. In this sense, tourism and the places it sold were an argument about the global social and geopolitical order.

There is a rich and diverse literature on the subject of tourism and empire. Much of it focuses on how the tropes of touristic literature facilitated and justified formal and informal conquests of colonized lands and on how colonial settlers deployed tourism to articulate their own place within their imperial nations, however geographically distant from the imperial center they were.¹⁸ I am indebted to this literature, particularly to the works of Christine Skwiot, Vernadette Vicuña-Gonzalez, and Jason Ruiz, whose studies of U.S. tourism to Hawai'i, Cuba,

the Philippines, and Mexico have laid bare the ways in which particular representations of these destinations and their peoples were—and are—embedded in much broader and long-running attempts by settlers and national governments to sustain claims to colonized lands.¹⁹ Likewise, the works of Ellen Furlough and Inderpal Grewal expose how imperial tourism served as a vehicle for consolidating ideals of national citizenship while at the same time reinforcing the boundaries between metropolitan and colonial territories and between metropolitan and colonized subjects.²⁰ Together, these works show that the territorialization of the nation did not occur in the empty space of *terra nullius*—territory that colonial states claimed was not under the sovereignty of any state and was therefore available for colonization—but rather through a mutually constitutive process of displacement and appropriation, of possession by dispossession.²¹

This book contributes the first comprehensive study of tourism in the Japanese Empire to the growing field of tourism and empire studies. Earlier studies have illuminated how imperial tourism functioned as “self-administered citizenship training” and as a “memory industry” that encouraged the production of nationalist sentiment toward and the romanticization of colonized lands.²² Yet the field as a whole has focused on studies of single colonies, and often only in the 1930s. As a result, the striking similarities between touristic representations of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan—and the stark contrasts between earlier and later practices of placing—have been overlooked. To explore the significance of these similarities, this book deploys a unique, transcolonial archive of tourist materials from 1906, when the first tours left for Manchuria and Korea, to the late 1930s, when the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the rise of the total war ideology led to a narrowing of tourist discourses and an increased emphasis on the imperial house. The conclusion carries the analysis forward into the early postwar period, when former imperial officials, the Ministry of Education, and the U.S. Occupation worked to reterritorialize the Japanese nation in Asia after the end of formal empire.

A central argument of this book is that the challenge of anti-imperial nationalism and anticolonial liberalism led to a significant change in how imperial travelers and colonial boosters made sense of the place of colonized lands within Japan. In the early years of imperial tourism, representations of the place of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan within Japan were structured by a “geography of civilization.”²³ Under this geography, imperial travelers and colonial boosters placed the colonies within Japan using three modes: a historical mode, which used the notion of “transition” to naturalize the transfer of power from indigenous states to Japanese colonial governments and the incorporation of colonized lands into the space of Japanese history; an economic mode, which described the colonies and their commodities as part of a network of production, circulation, and exchange made possible through Japanese intervention; and a nationalist mode, which encouraged travelers to forge affective connections to colonized lands and a

sense of themselves as national subjects by using sites in the colonies to reenact a Japanese national past. As travelers used these modes to lay claim to the colonies as Japanese national land, they also used them to explain why colonized subjects could be dispossessed of their lands. Under the geography of civilization, imperial travelers emphasized colonized subjects' lack of historical, nationalist, or economic consciousness to legitimate Japanese colonial rule. The result was a core-periphery geography in which colonized lands were imagined to be quickly becoming—or in the case of the nationalist mode, already part of—the national land. Imperial travelers and colonial boosters treated colonized inhabitants as out of place in their own lands.

But the denial of coevalness that the geography of civilization represented could not be sustained in the face of widespread protests, from colonized subjects and Japanese settlers alike, against the uneven territorial-administrative structure of Japanese imperial rule. Starting in the late 1910s, the geography of civilization began to give way to a geography of cultural pluralism, under which imperial travelers *re-placed* the colonies using an ethnographic mode, which represented the space of the imperial nation as one composed of diverse cultural regions and ethnic peoples. If, under the geography of civilization, the colonization of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan was justified by marking colonized subjects as out of place in the national land, under the geography of cultural pluralism, the notion of “from-ness”—of subjects who were essentially and unchangingly *in place* in one specific region and only that region—became a key way that imperial travelers and colonial administrations conceptualized and enacted colonial difference. The geography of cultural pluralism fostered new forms of dispossession, internal bordering, and differentiation between colonized and metropolitan subjects in the name of appreciating the essential differences between the empire's cultural regions and its distinct ethnic populations.

What emerges from the transcolonial approach to the study of imperial tourism is the idea that tourism was not just useful for justifying individual instances of colonialism. Rather, tourism was central to the maintenance of empire itself. Imperial tourism was one manifestation of what I call the “spatial politics of empire,” the use of concepts of place to naturalize uneven structures of rule.²⁴ For historians of tourism, spatial politics offers an answer to the question of why tourism emerged as the solution to the particular crises of so many imperial formations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It draws together the insights of myriad national case studies of tourism to expose the critical role that imperial tourism played in the colonial and postcolonial history of the modern world. It shows how tourism made spatial relationships meaningful in ways that suited the overall goal of sustaining colonialism and how these spatializations changed over time and in response to broader shifts in concepts of sovereignty and economic structures.²⁵

For historians of modern Japan, the concept of spatial politics illuminates how the dramatic changes that the territory of the Japanese state underwent between the late nineteenth century and the end of the U.S. Occupation were not merely a matter of expanding and contracting borders but rather a cause for serious engagement with the problem that imperial territory posed to conceptualizations of the nation.²⁶ Previous studies have argued that the parameters of the modern Japanese spatial imaginary were set by the early twentieth century.²⁷ Yet, as the history of the empire's spatial politics makes evident, the problem of maintaining an imperial territory in a world increasingly dominated by the ideals of the nation-state imposed new demands on the spatial and social imaginary of Japan. From the first years of Japanese imperialism, tourism emerged as one of the primary vehicles for spatial politics as Japanese colonial boosters sought to fix and refix colonized lands in ways amenable to the image of Japan as a territorial nation-state rather than an expansive empire.²⁸

PLACE BETWEEN EMPIRE AND NATION

Spatial politics engages a phenomenon central to the history of imperial tourism: the intense focus on producing and circulating firsthand experiences of colonized lands in relation to, but not subsumed within, the politics of race, culture, and language. As Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose argued decades ago, the construction of national identities and of differences within the nation took place on terms that were sometimes racial and sometimes spatial.²⁹ Yet while numerous works have shown that capitalism and nationalism require the constant production and reproduction of notions of racial, gender, and class difference in order to create the conditions in which exploitation and identity-formation take place, the study of the problem of spatial difference and spatial politics within the nation-state remains a niche issue—the domain of activist scholars of settler colonialism rather than a problem central to the history of the modern world.³⁰ This book argues that the management of ideas of place was central to the maintenance of empire precisely because, unlike the other two axes of colonial difference, race and culture, its politics directly addressed the problem of colonized land to the territorial nation. Place did not operate in a vacuum. It drew on, buttressed, and challenged prevailing notions of racial and cultural difference. At the same time, to ignore place and the problem of land that it reveals contributes to the erasure of the ongoing nature of colonialism in the postcolonial world.

Place is central to how societies understand themselves and how individuals understand their position within a society. As geographer Tim Cresswell writes, “Looking at the world as a set of places in some way separate from each other is both an act of defining what exists (ontology) and a particular way of seeing and knowing the world (epistemology and metaphysics). . . . In other words, place is

not simply something to be observed, researched, and written about but is itself part of the way we see, research, and write.”³¹ Human geographers, who have been at the forefront of attempts to grasp the humanistic significance of place, treat place both as a social construction and as a phenomenon that makes possible “the very possibility of the social.”³² It is more than a set of ideographically distinct regions. Rather, place has multiple elements. It can be a locale, a site where events occur. It can also be a location or status, a place in relative space. And, of course, it can be an essence or sense, as in the atmosphere of a place or the sense that one gets of being in a unique place.³³

When shared, understandings of place produce a common language for describing the world and our relations within it.³⁴ But as geographers from the feminist tradition emphasize, it is, in fact, impossible to conceive of or even analyze place outside of the “power-geometry” of how different groups relate to movement and to each other. In other words, an ontological definition of place always occurs within, not prior to, an epistemology of space and a materiality of social relations. “What gives place its specificity,” Doreen Massey argues, “is not some long internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together at a particular locus.”³⁵

Place is thus both a noun and a verb. David Harvey once described *place* as a way of “carving out permanences” in space and time, and it is in this sense that I use it here.³⁶ Place is both an action and a tool—we use it to identify and individuate objects, people, and events as if it were a static or objective category. At the same time, each time we do so, we create or sustain a particular spatial order of our world. Locating, naming, and bounding places are political acts that represent and reproduce social relationships and political orders. Place is also subject to “perpetual perishing.” We enact place each time we use it to describe the world “out there.” As we do so, we extend its conceptual life a little bit longer. On the other hand, the enactment of a new place can challenge the dominance of an old order. Place is thus an act of world-making that cannot be reduced to geography or territory—place is an articulation of social relations that is always made from a particular perspective.

Of primary importance to this book’s argument is the rise of the territorial nation-state as the “global archetype” of sovereignty and political freedom over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.³⁷ One of the distinguishing features of nationalism is that the nation imagines itself to have emerged from, and to be anchored in, a particular territory.³⁸ It claims a place. In the words of Edward W. Soja, in the modern era of nation-states, social definitions of territory have been replaced by territorialized definitions of society.³⁹ For this reason, if none other, the nation-state form placed a new emphasis on territory as the “mediator” between state and people, especially in situations of contested sovereignty.⁴⁰ Starting in the late nineteenth century and cresting with the establishment of

the League of Nations and later the United Nations, the imperial powers—both the Great and the Late—embraced exclusive territorial jurisdictions as the principal boundaries of sovereignty and the nation-state as the principal guarantor of political freedom. Congruent with theories of state sovereignty established in the late nineteenth century, the nation-state form was based on an understanding that the ideal form of sovereignty was the possession of exclusive jurisdiction over a discrete territory.⁴¹ Yet this process took place without empires abandoning the entirety of their colonized lands or granting political emancipation to all colonized subjects. Indeed, from Hawai'i to Puerto Rico to Australia to Hokkaidō, postimperial states sustained colonialism in new forms. Patrick Wolfe famously underscored this ongoing nature of colonialism when he defined *conquest* not as an event in the history of colonial nation-states but rather as its structure.⁴²

It is in this context that spatial politics took their modern form. Attachments to territory were powerful not because they were primordial, but because international relations and official nationalisms increasingly “attribute[d] . . . power and meaning to them.”⁴³ Through geography education, museums, cartography, and collective memory, nationalists sought to produce affective attachments to the state's territory by defining it as the place of the nation. The names for these places were localized, although the concept was not—for example, *Heimat* in Germany, *kyōdo* in Japan, and the *swadeshi* movement in India. Indeed, it is no accident that Ernest Renan's famous 1882 speech *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (What is a nation?) took as its object the problem of Alsace and Lorraine, a region with a distinctly Germanic population that had been recently conquered by Germany but nonetheless remained, in Renan's argument, a legitimate part of French state territory and French national identity. Although for Renan the nation was a form of consciousness, a voluntarist state of mind rather than an organic ethnic identity, part of that voluntarism involved rising out of one's local place to lay claim to the entirety of the territory of the state. Even organicist visions, as Anthony D. Smith argues, relied on an element of voluntarism in that “primordial attachments rest on perception, cognition, and belief.”⁴⁴ The representation of the territory of the state as the space of the nation, what Thongchai Winikachul has called the “geobody of the nation,” thus became a central element in the production of the nation itself as it “provide[d] the ground upon which to stake the claim for nation.”⁴⁵

Yet it is perhaps more profitable to think of the idea of the nation as a territorialized community—a nation-state that governs a particular place—as an ideal rather than a reality. The formulation takes for granted what has been a constant struggle for much of modern world history.⁴⁶ Nation and state are two distinct and “asymmetrical” spatial identities.⁴⁷ The modern state is a product of the modern concept of sovereignty. Its spatial identity is one of territorial administration, of defining jurisdictions, governing the human and material resources contained within the territory, and controlling borders with other sovereign states. In con-

trast, the spatial identity of the nation is discursive; it is an unstable collection of cultural, historical, and environmental relations that tie a particular community to a particular space but do not *limit* it to that space. While some nations are able to link themselves to particular states, this has not always been the case. Between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the asymmetry manifested in a number of ways, including separatist movements and other sub-state nationalisms, contested borderlands and areas of blurred nationalities, and diasporic communities with a transnational scope but a specific territorial homeland.⁴⁸ It was also seen in situations of settler colonialism, when the territory of the state expanded far beyond the spatial identity of the nation or, as in the case of Japanese-controlled Manchuria, the space of the nation expanded beyond the territory of the state.

A map published in a 1919 Japanese geography primer illustrates the problem. The islands of Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, Kyūshū, and Okinawa are the darkest; the legend informs us that they defined the extent of Great Japan (*dai Nihon*) in 1888, twenty years after the Meiji Restoration. Karafuto and Taiwan are slightly lighter, indicating that in 1898, Japan included these territories as well. The Kwantung Leased Territory, the railway line between Dairen (Chinese [C.]: Dalian) and Chōshun (C. Changchun), and Korea are even lighter, marking these territories as part of Japan by 1907 (a slight fib, since Korea was only a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and was not formally annexed until 1910, while Manchuria was never part of the sovereign territory of Japan). The shading ends with Micronesia, which the legend tells us has been part of Japan since 1914. In contrast to the legend, the accompanying text notes that Micronesia “was under the management of the League of Nations” and that Japan merely leased the Kwantung Leased Territory from China.⁴⁹

The map showed Japan as a historical and territorial entity. Produced by Yamazaki Naomasa, one of the most prominent geographers of the era, it displayed visually what other geographers, such as Odauchi Michitoshi, represented textually through descriptions of Japan’s “national land” as divided into “new” and “old” territory (*shin* and *kyū kokudo*). These depictions committed the sleight-of-hand of equating the spatial identity of the state with that of the nation. To put it more precisely, Yamazaki and Odauchi did not differentiate between the two at all. Yet as we have seen, there were real differences in the administration of colonial and metropolitan territory, and in many respects, these administrative and institutional differences grew more pronounced over time. The space of the nation never fully encompassed the territory of the state. It was in the tension between the two that concepts of imperial nationhood took form.

Indeed, only a couple years before Yamazaki published his map and a couple years after Odauchi published his primer, another definition of the relationship between the territory of the state and the place of the nation appeared, one that helps us to square the circle of spatial politics between empire and nation. In 1915,




FIGURE 1. Map of “Great Japan.”

SOURCE: Yamazaki Naomasa, *Futsū kyōiku Nihon chiri kyōkasho* (Tokyo: Tokyo kaiseikan, 1919). Courtesy of the National Diet Library.

Nitobe Inazō, Japan's most famous scholar of colonial policy, gave a lecture in which he defined *colony* as a "new territory of the state" (*shin ryōdo*). To justify this definition, Nitobe surveyed the meaning of the word *colony* from the Roman Empire to the British Empire, tracing its meaning in relation to cognate terms such as *territory*, *plantation*, *province*, and *dependency*. In its widest meaning, Nitobe concluded, *colony* could refer to an ethnic enclave, as in the case of referring to the treaty port town of Yokohama as a "colony of Westerners." In its narrowest definition, it might refer to just the area in a colonized territory where settlers from the colonizing country reside. Admitting that, "it probably was not precise in the scientific sense," Nitobe offered a middle ground. "All definitions have two components: genus and species," he argued. In this case, "'colony' is of the genus 'territory'; species, 'new.'"⁵⁰

The working definition encapsulated what Nitobe defined as the most important components of a colony: people, land, and "the political relationship with the motherland."⁵¹ But it also illuminated the unstable position of colonies between the territory of the state and the space of the nation. Newness, for example, was subjective. Nitobe defined *new* from the perspective of the colonizing nation. "Through language, customs, institutions, thought, etc., as long as the national people (*kokumin*) think of it as somehow different, the territory is new."⁵² Likewise, he chose the word meaning "territory of the state" (*ryōdo*) carefully. Simply referring to a colony as a new territory (*shinchi*) would not do, because a colony is always constituted within a political relationship to the colonizing country—in his words, the "mother country."⁵³ The term *shin ryōdo*, "new territory of the state," defined colonies as phenomena that were both temporary and permanent at the same time. Indeed, part of Nitobe's purpose in defining *colony* was to offer the field of "colonial policy" and "colonial policy studies" in the service of managing these tensions: "'colonial policies' are the policies that attempt to make permanent the benefits that the mother country accrues vis-à-vis a phenomenon that tends toward the temporary."⁵⁴

Thus, as I use it here, *place* is not in opposition to *territory*. Rather, *place* and *territory* worked in conversation with one another to produce hegemonic spatial imaginaries that fed and were fed by material and political structures of power—the spatial imaginaries that kept the colonies "new" in the eyes of the nation. Imperial discourse used places as signifiers—as the seemingly concrete site of historical events; as territorial homelands for cultures, languages, and ethnicities; as territories in particular spatial and temporal relations to other territories. Placing the colonies and the nation was, in this sense, not distinct from the drawing of borders and the implementation of policy. It was an inherent part of maintaining the uneven forms of citizenship and spaces of exception that defined the colony within the imperial nation-state. Much like Edward Said's imaginative geographies, spatial politics were a way of using representations of place to justify territorial-administrative divisions and the uneven treatment of different popula-

tions. They were a way of sustaining particular spatial imaginaries by amplifying and disseminating them to the nation at large through institutions such as education, the print media, and, as the case is here, tourism. As I show, these spatial politics were linked to specific institutions of possession and dispossession—from the use of local color to deny political emancipation to Taiwanese Chinese in colonial Taiwan to the use of theories of native rootedness to legitimate the exploitation of Korean and Chinese labor and to the use of place- and race-based language expectations to limit the social and physical mobility of colonized subjects within imperial society. The geographies of civilization and of cultural pluralism that structured the spatial politics of the Japanese Empire were imaginative, but they were also purposeful.⁵⁵

OVERVIEW

During the era of Japanese imperialism, tourists visited all corners of the empire, including wartime conquests in China.⁵⁶ Of these destinations, I focus on Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan. This is for three reasons. One, these territories were explicitly outside of the jurisdiction of the 1889 Constitution but within (sometimes ambiguously so) the territory of the Japanese Empire. For this reason, they posed a more troublesome conundrum to travelers attempting to make sense of their relationship to Japan than did Okinawa or Hokkaidō, which had been annexed outright in 1879 and 1868, respectively, and incorporated into the juridical territory of the nation-state as subordinate administrative units. Two, these territories were the site of multiple, well-publicized challenges to imperial rule. Therefore, the place of these lands and their peoples within the territory of the state and the space of the nation were a subject of considerable discussion. There are a plethora of sources, primary and secondary relating to the place of these territories that we can use to explore the relationship between spatial politics and imperial tourism in the Japanese Empire. Three, among all the destinations for imperial travel, Manchuria and Korea—generally referred to as a single destination, *Man-Sen*—were by far the biggest draw. By the 1920s and 1930s, an increasing number of Japanese travelers reached out to Taiwan as well. These territories were the first destinations for imperial tourists and later came to possess the largest and most organized imperial tourist industries. Indeed, as we see in chapter 1, it was the desire to send influential metropolitan Japanese to the new territories of Manchuria and Korea that sparked the formation of an imperial tourism industry in the first place. Later, the domestic arm of the Japan Tourist Bureau, the Japanese government's official tourist organization, largely came into being in order to facilitate travel by metropolitan Japanese to Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan.

Manchuria is, in this regard, somewhat of a special case. In contrast to the Japan-Taiwan and Japan-Korea relationships, the relationship of Japan to Manchuria is generally described as one of informal imperialism.⁵⁷ As a spoil of victory

after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained possession of the Russian railway concession in Manchuria. This concession was unique among railway concessions in China in that it granted the owner the right of “exclusive and absolute administration” over a 438-mile stretch of railway between Dairen and Chōshun, including a mile of territory on either side of the tracks; this became known as the “Railway Zone.” In 1906, these formerly Russian tracks became the trunk line of the South Manchuria Railway Company, a joint-stock company in which the Japanese government held a 51 percent stake.⁵⁸ In 1932, the Japanese army stationed in Manchuria attacked Chinese garrisons in Manchuria’s major towns, and claimed a far wider territory for a new, putatively independent state, which they called “Manchukuo.” From 1932 until 1945, Manchukuo was a puppet state of Japan. In contrast to Korea and Taiwan, which were part of the territory of the Japanese state, Manchuria/Manchukuo was a significant Japanese colony but never formally under Japanese sovereignty.

Yet, despite the many ways in which the political history of the Japan-Manchuria relationship differs from that of the Japan-Taiwan and Japan-Korea relationships, this book finds many similarities in how imperial travelers made sense of these lands as places that were both inside and outside of the social and political boundaries of imperial Japan. While Manchuria presented special challenges to colonial boosters, the practices of placing that they deployed were rarely unique. To the contrary, they were similar in ways that are worth paying attention to. The similarities illuminate how the changes in the geopolitical order that motivated the Japanese government to establish Manchukuo as a puppet state rather than a formal colony also forced colonial boosters and imperial travelers to re-conceptualize the relationship between Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

We begin our story of imperial tourism and the spatial politics of empire in the city of Port Arthur at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, which was located, depending on which nationalist spatial imaginary you employed, either in the Three Eastern Provinces of China or in Manchuria, a place that had always been rather distinct, Japanese imperialists insisted, from China itself. There, a group of Japanese settlers established a society to preserve the battlefield ruins from the Russo-Japanese War. Unlike memorials to the war dead that were established at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and elsewhere in the inner territory, the Society for the Preservation of Manchuria’s Battlefield Ruins sought not only to “comfort the spirits of the war dead” but also to “foster unwavering loyalty to the national land.”⁵⁹ Manchuria was not part of the sovereign territory of the Japanese Empire. It would seem that only a very capacious definition of *national land* would include it.

But it was in the pursuit of affective connections to a national land that exceeded the boundaries of the imperial state that imperial tourism was born, thus it is with this chimeric concept that we begin our investigation of spatial politics between empire and nation. Part 1 explores spatial politics under the geography of civilization. Chapter 1 shows how imperial travel began to reify the abstract

concept of a national land by fostering emotional ties between imperial travelers and a small number of sites in Korea and Manchuria. The idea of a national land (*kokudo*) was, like the concept of a national people (*kokumin*), extralegal and inconsistently defined. At the same time, it was, also like the concept of a national people, an extraordinarily powerful discursive object upon which people acted and which acted upon them. In a reversal of the extant practice of “colonial tours of the metropole,” which sought to induce submission to and desire for the metropole among colonized subjects by bringing elite members of these societies to see Tokyo and other urban areas, imperial travel arose to make meaning of the national land by creating a body of subjects who had firsthand experience of it and whose social position authorized them to disseminate their experiences as authentic knowledge.

If affective ties to a national land were the first way in which colonial boosters sought to place the Japanese nation on colonized land, they did little to address what imperial travelers found to be the obvious differences between life in the urban metropole and the colonies. Chapter 2 traces how the Governments General of Taiwan and Korea, as well as the South Manchuria Railway Company, quickly adopted imperial tourism and its central tools, tourist guidebooks and standardized itineraries, to teach imperial travelers to see Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as places within the space of the Japanese nation. Rather than simply denying the coevalness of colonized territory, tourist guidebooks used three modes—the historical, economic, and nationalist modes—to place colonized lands within the bounds of a past, present, and future that was both “civilized” and “Japanese,” and at the same time, to mark colonized subjects as “out of place” in these same lands. In this, colonial boosters enrolled imperial travelers in the project of constructing a spatial imaginary of the nation that might one day overcome the core-periphery geography of civilization to encompass the entirety of the territory of the state.

Part 2 explores how the crisis of empire that Japan faced after World War I produced a shift from a geography of civilization to a geography of cultural pluralism. In the post-World War I era, the binaries of colony and metropole, colonizer and colonized, Japanese and non-Japanese, were re-constituted as relations between ethnic nations and cultural regions. In a time of growing anti-imperial activism, encounters between travelers and colonized subjects, and between traveling colonized subjects and the state, became sites through which travelers reified a spatial imaginary of Japan as a nation of diverse cultural regions and yet marked the Japanese ethnic nation as the nation’s political and cultural core.

Chapter 3 argues that the spatial politics of empire were centrally concerned with movement—as an ideal (free circulation) and as a practice (tourism). In the years after World War I, imperial tourism expanded from an elite practice to what one official called the “democratization and socialization” of travel—what we might think of as mass imperial tourism. At the same time, this era saw the establishment of new boundaries within the state that limited the movement of

colonized subjects, especially that of laborers and those engaged in leftist activism. Coming on the heels of unprecedented labor activism and social unrest and concomitant with a political push to universalize male suffrage, the effort to expand imperial tourism in the early 1920s was inseparable from the effort to create a concept of imperial citizenship that could encompass the entirety of the territory of the state while still retaining a hierarchy of colonial difference. Through an analysis of tourism's border-crossing narratives, the chapter shows how the 1920s saw the rise of a new way of spatializing the relationship between metropolitan and colonized subjects. "Citizens" were those travelers with free mobility who were at home anywhere in the empire. "Subjects," on the other hand, were those who the state treated as essentially "from" certain regions and who were out of place when they attempted to travel elsewhere.

The spatial politics of "from-ness" structured new ways of defining colonial difference. These politics were based on an understanding of the colonies as distinct and unchanging cultural regions, with particular natural characteristics that shaped the cultural and ethnic characteristics of the populations that inhabited them. Chapter 4 investigates the rise of a touristic discourse based on this notion of a cultural region: that of "local color." Appearing in response to several high-profile uprisings in Korea, China, and Taiwan against Japanese colonialism, local color discourse co-opted the rhetoric of cultural and linguistic difference upon which anti-imperial groups based their claims for self-rule and independence. Instead, colonial boosters used local color to offer a vision of the nation and empire as a complementary space of diverse cultural regions, defined by history, cultures of labor, and landscape. At the same time, these mechanisms served as the foundation for new practices of dispossession and exclusion, including a spatialized division of labor and the further dispossession of Taiwan's indigenous peoples in the name of preserving the "national land."

Chapter 5 returns to the affective space of the Japanese nation by examining how the geography of cultural pluralism encouraged travelers to experience the empire as a decentered, yet still hierarchical, multiethnic polity. The chapter traces how language became a vehicle for spatial politics as local color discourse shaped travelers' expectations of colonized places and their inhabitants. Rather than reinforce a sense of shared nationality, imperial travelers used Japanese-language encounters with colonized subjects to articulate the impossibility of colonized subjects ever overcoming their place of origin to become authentic members of the nation.

Today, Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan are no longer part of the territory of the Japanese state. Yet spatial politics did not disappear with the end of formal empire in 1945. The conclusion explores the transformation of the imperial spatial imaginary into an object of memory in the immediate postwar period. In the postwar era, the imperial tourism industry struggled to make sense of its former self. The U.S. Occupation required the production of a spatial imaginary of Japan in which

the space of the nation was symmetrical with the territory of the state. Japanese people struggled to re-articulate memories that had been forged under a previous geography, while the next generation of travelers created a new geography of spatial and social relations that addressed Japan's imperial past and uncertain future in Cold War East Asia. In this context, the geography of cultural pluralism continued to structure the representation of Hokkaidō and Okinawa—places that were kept “new,” in other words, in the relationship between the nation, colonized land, and the motherland that Nitobe Inazō first defined as *colonialism*.

A NOTE ON PLACE NAMES

Writing the history of imperial tourism and its spatial politics requires careful attention to the rendering of place names in roman script. Place names have a “semantic depth”; they index networks of relations and shared histories.⁶⁰ In the Japanese Empire, place names were an essential part of the larger project of producing and reproducing a social imaginary of the nation that incorporated colonized land into the space of the Japanese nation. Japanese-language tourist guidebooks labeled each place or station with its name in Chinese characters (*kanji*) and its reading in the Japanese syllabary (*hiragana*). Travelers encountered the cities of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan in the language of Japanese imperialism, that is, in Japanese: Pusan, Keijō, Heijō, Antō, Hōten, Chōshun, Dairen, Ryojun, Taihoku, Kagi, and Arisan. The colonial governments Japanified place names—the characters for the name of the Korean capital were read in the Japanese fashion, Keijō, rather than the Korean one, Kyōngsōng; similarly, official tourist literature described the reading of the characters for the capital of Taiwan as the Japanese “Taihoku” rather than the Chinese “Taipei”—to demonstrate that these places were now part of the space of the Japanese nation. In Manchuria, Japanified place names were often represented in parallel with Russian and Chinese names as part of a broader move to treat political transitions and imperial expansion as a natural part of the history of nations, as well as, in the specific context of Manchuria, to emphasize the local Japanese government's commitment to the principles of the Open Door policy. The South Manchuria Railway Company's guidebooks, for example, represented “Dairen” through its Chinese characters, bordered by a Japanese pronunciation, a Chinese pronunciation, and a Russian pronunciation. A similar practice of foregrounding the historical geography of place names appeared in the Government General of Taiwan's guidebooks, which invariably recited the history of names for the island of Taiwan. In Taiwan, the chronology of place names served as a convenient tool for illustrating why Japanese colonialism was the most humanitarian of all previous colonialisms—the Spanish and the Dutch, who had called the island “Ilha Formosa,” had been concerned primarily with extracting from the island only what was useful for them; in contrast, the Japanese, who called the island “Taiwan,” aimed to better the entire island. As we see in the conclusion,


deconstructing the shared history of place names was an essential component of constructing a post-imperial social imaginary of Japan that treated the empire as a problem of the past and constituted the present, authentic Japanese social body as an “island nation.”

The use of place names as mnemonic sites for imperial narratives of Japanese national history was an important component of the nationalist mode of territorial incorporation, the subject, along with the historical and economic modes, of chapter 2. But the phenomenon is perhaps equally well illustrated by marginalized and colonized groups’ use of place names to challenge imperial spatial imaginaries with their own, anti-imperial nationalist renderings of place and spatial order. Just prior to Japan’s colonization of Korea, for example, Korea’s King Kojong named Korea “The Great Han Empire” (*Tae Han Cheguk*) to signal the independence of Korea. The previous name for Korea, Chosŏn, had been chosen by the Ming emperor in 1394. “Han,” in contrast, was “a term traceable to ancient kingdoms on the southern half of the peninsula, an area, most significantly, that had never been invaded by China.”⁶¹ When, in one of its first acts, the Japanese colonial government renamed the Great Han Empire “Chōsen,” it likewise conjured up a new political relationship, though in this case between Japan and Korea. The Government General stripped Korea of its nationalist name and bestowed upon it the Japanese reading of the name of its last tributary dynasty. In the current era, some Ainu activists seek to territorialize an Ainu identity by referring to the northern island of Japan’s archipelago as Ainu Mosir, or “land of the humans,” rather than the colonial state’s name of Hokkaidō. The territorialization of sovereignty and identity that this conceptualization of Ainu Mosir enacts owes more to a nationalist concept of community than an indigenous one.⁶² All the same it evidences the ongoing nature of imperial spatial politics in the post-colonial era.


This book uses the Japanese readings of place names within the Japanese Empire. I found this decision difficult. In the end, however, I decided that the use of the present-day names would have been an anachronistic ascription of a permanent identity to places that were (and are) in flux. It would also have inadvertently effaced a colonizing practice that was an important part of Japanese efforts to naturalize Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria as places within Japan. Instead, I wish to highlight the significance of renaming to the spatial politics of imperialism, which was part of the broader effort to culturally assimilate colonial populations, such as teaching the Japanese language in schools and converting Korean surnames to Japanese-style names. Whenever possible, I include the current Chinese (pinyin) or Korean (McCune-Reischauer) reading of the name the first time that I mention a place or site. Readers may also consult the appendix for an index of all Japanese place names that appear in the book with their current names in both the roman alphabet and their local script (i.e., Korean *hangul* or Chinese characters).



MAP 1. Map of Northeast Asia. The formal and informal territory of the Japanese Empire encompassed the islands of Japan (including Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyū Islands), Taiwan, Korea, parts of Manchuria, and the southern portion of Sakhalin. Map design: Lohnes+Wright.



MAP 2. "Abbreviated Transportation Map of Korea-Manchuria-China," 1931. The map shows how the Government General of Korea and the South Manchuria Railway Company suggested that Japanese travelers read the names of station stops along the Korea-Manchuria-China tourist route. Names of stations have been rendered in Japanese for stations in Korea, in Chinese and Japanese for stations along the South Manchuria Railway Line, and in Chinese for other stations within Manchuria and China. The map is redrawn and simplified from Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., *Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Shōwa 6-nen ban* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1931). Japanese pronunciations of place names are from Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, *Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai* (Dairen: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, 1929) and Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen ryokō annai ki* (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, 1934). Map design: Lohnes+Wright.



MAP 3. "Abbreviated Transportation Map of Taiwan," 1931. The map shows how the Government General of Taiwan suggested that travelers read the names of station stops in Taiwan. Names of stations have been rendered in Japanese pronunciation. Map is redrawn and simplified from Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., *Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Shōwa 6-nen ban* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1931). Japanese pronunciations of place names are from Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1927) and Sawada Hisao, *Nihon chimei daijiten*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Nihon shobō, 1937). Map design: Lohnes+Wright.